doesn't it make a whole bunch of sense, and i think that joe barton said the same thing that, you guys talked to dr. gilbert when the shearing over, probably offer him more than and the three of you sit together and see if there is something -- what is the downside to testing this gentleman's theory? >> there is no downside. i don't want to down play what he has done. again, i'm not sure about his testing paradigm but we welcome anyone that can find any issues with our electronics. if there is a problem, we want to find it and we want to fix it so yeah, there is no problem. >> it is in your best interest. no one has more to lose than you and your employees and dealers to not fix this problem. you should have every incentive and i believe you do want to fix the problem. your company has a very good reputation. it has been put into question.

perception is reality. if the public thinks that your car isn't safe you need to go out of your way to prove that it is. >> yes, sir. . . >> yes, sir. >> and so i just -- i just think, you know, before you leave washington you ought to get this guy's phone number and he should be sitting down with your people and you ought to test his paradigm and see whether it has any merit. >> and what's important is when i was at exponent, i drove a vehicle as they did the test to short circuit the accelerator pedal. and so i had the sense and the feel of what happens when it gets in the limp mode, how they can measure what happened. and that's why i just have to really understand as does exponent what mr. gilbert did. because my understanding is we were splicing wires together. >> okay. yeah, and if i were you, i'd

want to know what he dshgs too. there's no good outcome from you not trying to get this problem fixed. fixed. it's not good f it's not good for all the people that work for your company here in this country. and all the people that drive your cars for you not to go the extra mile and test any theory that seems to have any merit to it. >> i agree 100%. and that's also why going forward any time we have a reported incident of ua, we're going to send a s.w.a.t. team out there, the goal is within 24 hours, so we can learn as much as we can. that is why it is also helpful if we could get full vin numbers. sometimes they get a complaint we don't ever receive. and the current thing, unless an investigation opened up, we can't get that information. it would really be helpful, for the entire industry, not just us. >> okay. mr. chairman, in the interest of time, i'm going to yield back. >> thank you, mr. doyle. miss christianson for questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to take this opportunity to welcome the

dealers and the workers in the audience and recognize that they were here when i made my opening statement. but i did say at the time that we want this toyota to really fix this quickly, not only for the customers but for the workers and the families that depend on them having a job. until all of you have been in your position? >> since july of 2006. as an evp, then president, then president coo. but basically the same responsibility. >> i read an article, i don't remember what paper, about a week and a half ago maybe. it was really talking about the history that toyota has in not responding to complaints. but it started out by saying that in the late '80s, toyota would actually go to a customer's home and say your car has a problem. we pick it up. they pick it up and take it and

fix it. by late '9 o's and beyond that, toyota started maybe fixing problems that they found in future cars and not even telling the other customers about the problems. and then we have the failures that have brought us here today. so that's a total culture shift over that period of time. can you tell us what happened? i mean what happened to the toyota of the '80s to bring us to the toyota of the 2010? >> one comment before that is there are dealers that still make house calls. my father who lives in colorado, his salesman lives about three or four miles away and every time he needs service, the sales person drops his demo off, picks up my dad's car and takes it in for service. so that does still happen. we're not totally out of the '80s yet. but i think what happened, i think we lost sight of the

customer. i don't think it was a goal for us to grow faster but we did. we had a lot of customers that loved our product. our loyalty rates were growing higher and higher. and our volume grew. the complexity of the product line grew from the number of models to the number of engines to the number of transmissions to everything else that goes with it. and i think we outgrew our engineering resource. and i think when that happens -- and we had strategies to deal with that. but the strategies didn't work. and i think as a result of that, we're suffering from that today. i think -- i think the most important thing is we lost sight of our customers. and i'll give you an example even in the floor mat issue. in the very beginning back in 2007, we recalled vehicles because of the all weather mat.

the mat was too thick and there was risk it would bind up underneath the accelerator pedal. it would happen if the mat wasn't properly put down. so from an engineering standpoint, if the mat is properly in place, it's no big problem. but we didn't understand a simple thing like how customers use a floor mat because in climates like this, people double stack mats. they put the rubber mat on top of the carpet mat. not just in our cars but others. we didn't understand something as simple as that. >> and just to get one other question in, you know, i'm really disturbed by what sounded like a real snap diagnosis. i'm a physician in the case of the mats. when we're presented with a problem, we can welcome diagnose it by listening to history but we always look at every other possible cause before we really make a diagnosis and we start to treat. and, you know, that doesn't

sound like it happened here. and in your business and my profession, lives depend on the decisions that we make. and it's really important to really examine all of the possible things, rule out for every other possibility. can ayou assure me -- i hear yo saying it's not that electronic thing. can you assure us today that not only with this but with every complaint that you're going to do a complete diagnosis? >> yes. i can tell you that the company's process is from top to bottom are being evaluated. and starting with the president of the company who is going to speak tomorrow to one of the committees. he is responsible for global quality committee. it's a brand new committee that is going to look just at quality and safety. and there are representatives from each of the large regions around the world that are on that. there is an independent advisory board that will report to that.

to look over his shoulder -- >> what independent advisory board. we talk about people paying and stuff. how do you get this independent -- >> you go out and hire safety and quality experts from outside of the company to oversee what's happening to make sure that we're doing the right thing. and that's -- the north american region of that and these committees are going to be announced by the end of march. they are going to be responsible for an independent, totally independent safety testing of the throttle control system. >> my time up is. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. miss sutton for questions, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i'd like some clarification on the points raised here today during your testimony. a few moments ago in response to a question you were talking

about that we welcome anyone who can find the problem and so that we can fix it. something to that effect. is that accurate? >> yes. >> when you say we, who do you mean we welcome? >> toyota. >> toyota international? >> yes. tms/usa is a distribute your for toyota in the united states. my group is not designed or efrpg neared products. >> i would like to talk about that a little bit. because you're the president of toyota motor sales in the u.s. as was pointed out by ranking member barton. does toyota motor sales make safety determinations? does your department make safety determinations? >> no. what we do is we get feedback from a number of different sources. we get feedback from customer that's call in or contact us online. we look through the internet. we look at nhtsa data. we look at a number of different sources. we get reports from our dealers.

we have product reports. all of that information from my side gets put together in reports and they go to japan to the quality site. to say that i'm not involved in quality, i am from an antenna standpoint. >> you also said that communication is pretty one way with respect to safety and reporting back to japan because you testified here today in relation to mr. marky's questions about the alarm that's were going off in other parts of the world and we just sort of had -- we have a plea of ignorance that we didn't know here. and it might have made a difference in some of the accidents that could have been avoided. so i'm a little bit perplexed by the idea, does washington staff, safety staff that deals with nhtsa report to you as the head of sales? >> no. >> okay. >> no. >> okay. who does that safety staff that reports to nhtsa report to within your company?

>> reports to tma washington, d.c., office. >> okay. so they are testifying tomorrow he is the chairman of toyota mote yar sales of usa but president of tma. that report is in through him, new york and washington, d.c. >> so he's responsible for safety decisions in the usa? >> no. >> it's still in japan. >> still in japan. >> okay. why would toyota send the head of sales to discuss safety issues here today? >> i was invited to attend. >> okay. so it was a decision made by the committee? is that what you're -- you were invited by who to attend? >> this committee. >> all right. let me ask you this. you said in your testimony in reept months we've not lived up to the high standards our customers and the public have come to expect from toyota. and we're all concerned about that. and there are two groups of

people who i think that we've all expressed concern for, most obviously the consumers out there who put their trust and faith in -- and their families in the toyota vehicles. >> yes. >> and, of course, the workers. the workers in this country who rely upon toyota to make a living and take care of their families. i guess that's why i ask you the question about the we. we've also heard a lot of confusing testimony about the electronic throttle control system. six years ago nhtsa compiled data showing that toyota camrys had over 400% more vehicle speed complaints than those with manual controls. so it's rather difficult to -- do you think that's an acceptable sort of number to suggest that there isn't something to it? i mean 400% more.

>> there's no question it's a big number. but i think, again, we have to understand what those complaints are surrounding. i don't know if all of those are sudden acceleration instances. >> right. well why don't we know all of that? 400%. we might not know might not kno. but when you say i don't know if all are, that's a big samt, too. we must know more than we -- than that statement reflects. >> well, i can't tell you again if you are speaking off of the ntsa database, unless those are investigated, i can't tell you just from the database exactly what's going on. and that's why it's important that we are able to get that information. quite frankly iwould love to be able to get confidentiality agreements with insurance companies as well. where they can supply us with that kind of information so we can see what's happening. >> the american people and the american market has been very, very good to toyota. a lot of money has been made by

the company. in decades past. when we read, i'd like to show the american community that nothing matters more to toyota than the safety and reliability of the vehicles. we're committed not only to fixing vehicles on the road and ensuring they are safe but to making our new vehicles better. your testimony continues. when we read that and then we hear the testimony about the safety decisions being made in japan, in a vacuum, isolating those who are selling these cars to our constituents and their families, and who are having the workers and the dealers sell these cars, you know, it begs the question about why people would be concerned of where the facts match up with the testimony. and i yield back. >> no, i understand. that's why the process is changing where there is going to

be a person from the united states that sits on the defect committee in japan to be able to make those decisions and if they don't agree with that decision, there's going to be a possibility for us to then appeal that decision. it's not just the united states but from around the globe will be on that. >> okay, but i have to tell you, it comes very late. >> yes, sir. yes, ma'am. >> we appreciate that things get ygrr"4 one has to ask, "would it happened but for some of the bus? coming to light?" i am glad for the change.

i hope it is enough. i yield back. >>mr lentz, are you asking us to believe that no one at toyota usa knew about recalls in canada? >> specifically on a 2003 celica i don't know about the details. i don't know the specifics. i don't know if that was a floor mat issue. -- it's just really hard to imagine that whether it was deliberately shared or not, that given the fact many americans can see canada from their house that we did not know about the -- >> again, i can't speak specifically to that exact incidence. i don't know the details behind what it was recalled for.

>> in 2008, a woman named guadalupe alberto was killed when her 2005 camry suddenly accelerated, jumped a curb and struck a tree. her car didn't even have floor mats at the time. so why wasn't this incident further investigated then? it says -- i mean, we know as recently as november, or you say in november of 2009, toyota, or at least up until then, was still claiming that floor mats were the only problem. >> again, i don't know the specifics of that particular accident. i can look into it for you. >> that would be fine. >> but the floor mat issue came around earlier than that. the issue in november was as we got into the issue of the sticky pedal. >> right. until then. but here was a 2008 accident.

she didn't have a floor mat. but, anyway, you know, we're all in the customer service business ourselves. >> right. >> we have constituent service personnel in our offices. we take it very, very seriously. i heard you say that you apologized to customers for the problems with toyotas. did you apologize to customers who were treated like they were crazy when they made these complaints? did you apologize to the smiths? >> i have not spoken to the smiths, but i'm going to. again it was embarrassing to hear what happened to them. i don't know the specifics of the situation. but it's just to hear that, especially on the lexus side of the business, that's a very unusual way for business to be done. >> it's a very unusual way. let me quote to you from a letter that was sent to a customer. 2005 toyota tacoma driver told

your company that his truck accelerated by itself, despite stepping on the brakes, slammed into four parked cars. here was the answer. the throttle was inspected and moved freely without any binding and was found to operate as designed. the brakes will always override the accelerator, which may not have been true at the time. besides, you're making that change. in order for this tox have happened as reported, two totally separate systems, the brakes and the throttle would have to fail at exactly the same time. this is virtually impossible. and there's -- that phrase, that sentence, this is virtually impossible, seems to have been repeated over and over to your customers. you're in charge of sales. is this any way to deal with customers, just to tell them absolutely impossible? >> no, it's not.

and i have talked to our group that i'm going to be involved in every event of unintended acceleration so that i know what happens. so you know, just overall customer complaints that come in, i get probably 20 or 25 complaints a week. each and every one of those complaints, i have to receive a buck slip back to know exactly what the issue was, what the solution was and whether the customer is saeftd or not. and i -- >> you also review -- i review letters that go out to my constituents. do you review -- does someone in authority review letters that are sent out so that the credibility of the customer is not only questioned but just negated? >> i personally do not. i will find out. is that a recent letter? >> well, i'm looking at three

answers that use the same phrase about virtually impossible. so i don't know the date. i'm sure our staff has those letters and dates on the letters. and my time is up, but i hope you'll also make sure. they become part of the calculation of how you respond. thank you. >> thank you. >> mr. brady for questions. >> i want to begin by commending you for sharing your personal story of loss with the committee here today. and that takes great courage. i would encourage you to share that story with the decisionmakers in japan who are making the key decisions on product defects, product recalls, product retrofits and failure analysis because i think they need to hear that story from you. >> thank you. >> i also want to commend you for commending the dealers in this country who have done an extraordinary job responding to

your recalls and performing retrofits and tying up their staff all over this country. some of them are my friends and my constituents. so i appreciate your recognition of the sacrifice they are making. i want to focus specifically on the comment that you made on page two of your statement which you repeated here today. where you said we are confident that no problems exist with the electronic throttle control system in our vehicles. we have done extensive testing of this system and have never found a malfunction that caused unintended acceleration. i am having a hard time squaring that with toyota's 2002 technical service bulletin which noted that if customers complained of surging accelerators, reprogramming their engine, which you mentioned earlier, was a way to fix that problem and that, sir, sounds like an electronic problem to me. >> i don't know that for certain because i can't tell you if it's a software issue, if it's a transmission issue. there are a number of different

reasons for surges. it could be a high idle up that takes place sometimes when air conditioning kicks on, as an example. >> but reprogramming the computer would not be a mechanical fix, would it? >> no. >> and the other reality of that notice is that these 2002 to 2006 camrys which were the subject of that technical service bulletin, you not addressing the problem of the brake override retrofit with those models, are you? >> camry, i would have to look and see what year it goes back to. but we are going back in the case of camry. >> all right. >> now one of the things you also mentioned in your statement was that in december you asked exponent, a world class engineering and scientific consulting firm, to conduct a comprehensive independent analysis of your electronic throttle control system with an unlimited budget. so let's talk just a little bit about that. your counsel who is with you today is with a very well-known firm that defends not just

toyota but other auto manufacturers in product liability and crash worthiness cases all over the country. you agree with that, correct? >> yes. >> i am in no way impugning them for their role, but i find it very odd that when you were presented with this challenge of getting to the root of this problem you went to your defense firm to go make the contact to arrange for this independent testing. >> again, our legal staff put together the request. i can tell you that that report in its entirety is going to be made public. >> and we look forward to it, sir. >> so if there are issues in it, it's going to come out. >> let's talk a little bit about the company that you retained, exponent, because they are a successor corporation to a company called failure analysis associates, which has done extensive work for not just toyota but all the big auto manufacturers and the motorcycle manufacturers on not only failure analysis.

>> i'm not sure about the expert witness but they've worked for other automotives in vehicle stability control and other things that have been developed that are great for the industry. >> one of the things i can tell you is that i have a copy of a deposition that their chief technical officer, roger mccarthy, troided in 1998. in that deposition he testified that failure analysis associate, then known as accenture, received between $30 million and $40 million a year for the work they did for the auto industry. were you aware of that? >> no. >> isn't it true that toyota has paid them over a million dollars in the past for the work that they've done? >> exponent? >> yes. >> i do not know. >> would you be willing to provide us with documentation of what toyota has paid to accenture? not just in relation with this study that's being done or in relationship with mr. gilbert's follow-up analysis, but over the period of time that these

recalls that are being considered or have been issued have been performed. can you do that? >>. >> i'm sorry. could you repeat the question. >> i would make a formal request that we get as much information as we can from toyota international, toyota north america, documenting the financial relationship between their company and accenture or its predecessor, failure analysis associate, not just in relationship with the study that was done as has been the subject -- >> that's fine. we'll do that. >> now one of the things that you talked about was the fact that you were present during some testing that was done at accenture. >> exponent. >> exponent, yes. >> is that something you were part of when there was filming that was done to document the testing? >> no. i just wanted to go see how they

test. i have never been in a vehicle that's gone into fail safe mode. so i wanted to understand what it feels like from the consumer's standpoint. what fail safe feels like as you are driving down the road. >> were you involved in any way in the analysis in terms of defining the scope of that project or how the results would be submitted? >> no. the only portion i was involved in was that when that research becomes available in its entirety it would be made public. it would be made available to congress and nhtsa. >> and did toyota make a direct relationship for the performance of those service with exponent or was that something handled by bowman and brook? >> i don't know. >> because when you indicate in your statement that you requested them to do a comprehensive independent an analysis with an unlimited budget, i'm just wondering whether there are documents that would define the scope of that request and the terms under

which exponent would be compensated for what they were performing. are you aware of that? >> i'm not aware of it. >> then i would also request that, mr. chairman, and i yield back. >> thank you. that concludes questions by members of the subcommittee. we'll now go to questions from members of the full committee. >> as far as i know, accenture has not been hired by you to do any engineering or testing, have they? >> exponent. >> exponent. accent surlike an accounting financial firm, right? >> yes. >> you got -- you are asked questions by my democrat colleague about accenture. i want to make sure for the record it's been cleared. with regard to the firm that you hired, exponent, as far as i'm aware, even the united states government turned to this firm to help us come to the solutions as to why we lost the shuttle "columbia." is that correct? >> yes. >> so this is not a fly by night

firm. this is someone who is one of the best in the united states that is -- when it comes to problem solving. >> yes. >> we want to define the best. and again there will be another review of the ects done by this independent study group. they may choose to go with them. they may choose someone else. >> with regard to some testimony that you -- i wrote this down because it was bothersome to me. you said that with regard to testing that was done last night with regard to the methodology used by dr. gilbert on the first panel, you said, quote, it's not a real world scenario. so can you explain that a little bit further? in other words, he did testify that he used manipulation. he told me he did not cut three wires. but when you say that there was a methodology that's not a real world scenario, help me understand. >> well, -- yeah, i think he

said tapped in, which is how he gets into the -- again, this happened just 12 hours ago. so i don't want to attack him without knowing exactly what his process was. but my understanding is he took the plug off the back of the accelerator pedal. there are six wires on the back of that. two that go to the sensor, two that go to the power and two that go to the ground. he tapped into the two that go to the sensor anb@@@@@@@ @ @ @ ) one of the power wires it to the other one.

does not seem as if that is something that necessarily happen in the real world. exponent has tested if you lose ground. what happens at the centers break them. -- sen source of breaking down. i would like to make clear is not the testing paradigm that causes this. >> when abc showed this, in order to have these results, your testimony would be that dr. gilbert had to induce called by manipulation to create and generate artificial bolt for the result you seeking? tudy through exponent because they did the same study. >> all right. earlier i made the comment about -- i think the american public, we have seen what happens when nbc "dateline" staged a crash between two trucks to claim general motors fuel tank design caused fire

crash -- crash test on television. and we were all pretty upset over it. so now what we have is a repeat scenario with regard to abc, also using a manipulation, not using a real world scenario. so that type of -- that type of thing can be left to the credibility of the viewer and the american public. now i'm going to shift. the reason i'm going to shift is let's go back to "columbia." when there is a crash in america, and we have a concern, we go to the product. so exponent looks at "columbia." tries to gather as much information as they possibly can. dataa and what's left. >> right. >> when there is an airline that crashes, ntsb will go in and try to re-create and rebuild that aircraft. when i look at what exponent is doing, and i look at the report and i look at the thousands of vehicles they are looking at, what bothers me is why -- why

wouldn't you, when an automobile that has been identified as this sudden unintended acceleration, why isn't that product pulled aside and ripped apart so you can understand what is exactly going on. those are the thousand ones that if i were in your seat, that i would be going after and applying the greatest minds of the world to understand. >> in many cases, one of the field technical specialists or one of the quality specialists, they do go out. and if there is a component failure, they would take that component off and send it to the quality side to see what's going on. but in the case of the electronic throttle, if they don't get a code reading out that shows a failure and they can't re-create it, it's very, very difficult to be able to do that. now they may take the throttle body off if it's cracked or if it's somehow defective. they'll take a pedal off if it's

defective. if an ecu is defective, they'll take that off. in many cases, that's what's so frustrating about unintended acceleration is it's very, very difficult to duplicate. unless they can duplicate it, they have no way of knowing exactly what's taken place. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. gonzalez for questions. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. mr. lentz in my limited view of things you hosthe consumer protected? how is the best interest prom e promoted? i've just concluded that, one, it's the manufacturer's own moral behavior, first fd foremost. then we go into the governmental regulatory oversight. and then we have our justice system. i'm a great believe in the civil justice system. the problem, that's always after the fact, way after the fact. so i'm looking at the manufacturer's moral behavior, and i'm looking at the

capabilities, proficiency and competency of the regulatory scheme that congress has in place. when any of this breaks down, congress will move forward. and you heard mr. waxman say, look. we may need legislation. and that's a process that we're engaging in at this time. it's going to get hot and heavy and you're going to see all the different interest. last week i was on the radio. when i simply said let us not rush to judgment. that goes whether it's toyota, whether it's gm, ford. i don't care who it is. an individual or a corporation. the interviewer then said, are you apologizing for toyota? so we've got that issue. now we have members of congress that may be a little aggressive in fulfilling their duties. you have letters going out that are saying it does sometimes appear, however, that the negative news is being encouraged by plaintiffs trial lawyers, union activists and those interested in cutting into toyota's marketshare. that's the environment. it's not healthy. it's not good. and all these reasons, which are

totally wrong and ridiculous are being attributed to those individuals simply trying to do their jobs as members of congress. so i'm hoping this process will be fair. but in the meantime, there is a rush to judgment. this is the danger. not just to toyota but everybody that will be similarly situated some time in their lives, whether as an individual, a company or a corporation. months from now we may discover that it wasn't electronic and all of the action taken was timely and diligent. but it really won't matter. we have an old saying. and i said this the other day. everyone will remember the accusation. no one will remember the exoneration. and for a business in the united states, people are making decisions today on what car they're going to buy. by the time we figure out what the truth may be, that decision has been made. and i'm going to tell you that i believe what's going on today

will affect that decision. that's why we all have to be so careful in how we do this and that we're fair to all parties, whether it's going to be the consumer, the smiths or even toyota. but to be fair to everyone. i want to know what you can tell toyota owners today regarding the safety of their vehicles. >> what i can tell them, and i'm not going to go through the detail of all of my family drive products. i would not have my loved ones driving products, recalled or not if i didn't feel they were safe. so that's number one. number two is we have processes in place, new processes in place, that are going to ensure a lot more transparency and responsibility to make sure we make faster decisions that are the right decisions. everybody has defects. everybody is going to have recalls. but how quickly we react to protect that consumer, how much

the consumer sees us standing behind their product, that's what's most important. i can tell you the other thing. we have a lot of dealers sitting behind me. the way we start to build trust in our brand is through our dealers because our dealers are the true contact with the customer. and they are doing a tremendous job in taking care of these situations. i mean, almost 800,000 customers already taking care of in about 20 days is an amazing number. and you'll hear from the dealers that the customers are understanding. sure, there are one or two customers in each dealership that are pretty upset at what's going on. but for the most part, our loyal customers know for the last 50 years that we've stood behind our product. we've done the right thing for them. >> let me ask you this because i think you touched on it. i have 35 seconds, but quickly. you drive toyotas. your family drives toyotas. everybody you care about drives toyotas. are you going to quit driving

toyotas? >> no sirks. >> and you heard the members of congress on this committee drive toyo toyotas. i'm not going to ask them whether they're going to quit driving their toyotas. my suspicion is they will not. so i think maybe that's the message that comes from this hearing today. we're going to be aggressive, vigilant, diligent. we're going to get to the bottom of this. the question is to what degree can we protect the american consumer and i believe that we're going to measure up to that duty and responsibility that we owe them. and again, thank you for your testimony. >> thank you. and i agree. it starts with us. >> thank you, mr. gonzalez mr. mcnierney. >> thank you mr. chairman. i appreciate you allowing me to address the hearing. thank you for attending today and take something tough questions. addressing the safety issues we're discussing today is vitally important, but i'd like to focus my questions on a related matter that i believe reflects on toyota's disregard for its loyal customers and its

loyal employees. i'm referring to the decision recently to shut down operations at numi plant in fremont, california, which will cost us about 35,000 jobs in the state of california, and i don't believe that toyota has done nearly enough to prevent this loss of jobs. i have an opening statement that i'd like to include in the record, mr. chairman. >> will be, without objection. >> mr. lentz, toyota is currently experiencing major public relation problems and the public concern about safety failures is going to hurt your bottom line. california is one of your biggest markets, and it's obvious that keeping numi open will help rebuild your image. wouldn't that be beneficial to toyota? >> our image is beneficial, but specifically, numi? i think we have to be clear that toyota is not shutting down numi. numi is shutting down numi.

it's a separate corporation that was 50% owned by toyota and owned by general motors. and when general motors moved into bankruptcy and the new partner became motors holding -- liquidation holding, it was general motors abandoning numi that set this in play. that's the truth of the matter. when they pulled out and they pulled out 30% of their volume, that plant was difficult to become commercially viable. it's a long way from our supply lines. we supply -- >> it's a long way from your customer lines. i understand the pontiac vibe was only about 20% of production at num ni 2008 with toyota vehicles making up the rest of that production. surely toyota could modify its operations to account for a 20% drop in production. it seems to me that you are putting numi out of business because of antipathy toward west

coast workers. not out of necessity. unfortunately, toyota hasn't demonstrated that made any meaningful effort to explore possibilities to keep numi open. i was asking you, do you expect californians to believe in the brief time between gm's announcement and your decision to close, were you able to definitively determine that it was impossible to maintain operations at numi? >> yes, it's not financially viable to do. it's a long way from our logistics lines. the volume, 20% is a pretty big number. i mean, california sells about 13% to 14% of the nation's sales. that's a plant that has capacity for almost 400,000 vehicles that's building around 300 at the most. i mean, you've got to remember that when this industry collapsed after lehman, we had a 40% collapse from the peak of the marketplace in 20, 2001 to

where we ended last year. there was tremendous overcapacity all across the united states. and it's not something you take lightly closing a plant. you look at the workers behind me. when that market collapsed and we had 100,000 unassigned vehicles sitting in our ports that we didn't have dealers to be able to accept because inventories were so high, we didn't lay these people off. we kept these people working because we know that they are a huge asset for us. so we don't take closing a plant or numi doesn't take closing a plant lightly. we believe in our workers. they've done a tremendous job in getting us through all of this. so numi is, unfortunately, we're going to stop ordering product at the end of march. and we will do what we can to try to help the workers through transition. and hopefully, i don't know if another assembly can go in there or they can redevelop the

property and create jobs through the redevelopment and whatever else goes in there. >> i'm really thinking of your benefit as well as ours. i mean, i'll leave you with this parting thought. you are having a public relations nightmare right now. and it may benefit you a slight amount to close a plant like that, but you're going to face the public backlash on the west coast. on the other hand if you work with us to keep that open, it's going to be a real plus for your public relations issues. i just ask you to keep that in mind as you move forward. >> just understand as well, we're going to do whatever we can to help through that transition. we're not legally obligated, but we are going to throw money into it to help through this. i just wish our partner of 25 years would step up and do the same. >> that's all. >> thank you. let me just ask you a few questions to clarify our record. there's been a lot of testimony here and a lot of questions. so just make sure i'm correct

here. the only independent analysis that you have had, when you spoke on today show you said you have independent analysis on your problems with the sudden acceleration has been exponent. >> yes. to my knowledge. >> and you were referring to that report of exponent, right? >> now ntsa has always done studies in the past, but i don't know how robust they are. >> you don't have any knowledge of any independent studies they did? >> no, not to my knowledge. >> and there's been no independent electronic throttle control system studies? >> not of toyota. there may be industrywide. i don't know. >> but for your -- >> yes, to my knowledge. >> after this situatio@@@@@@@ r

>> do they get the same result as dr. gilbert? did the a fail-safe system cannot receive the system to enact tax whether it is an override, the diagnostic codes did not kick him? >> i believe he has blown around the override system. >> and we don't know the source of but it is a book and to start research? >> yes. have information beyond site. mr. dingell asked and a couple of questions have been about this event data recorder. >> yes. >> the event data recorder tells you what happens five seconds before an accident and one second after. specific requests have been made on the auburn, new york, crash which was a 2010 camry. that erb has been seized.

do you know where it is? why isn't that information made available to ntsa or anyone else? >> if i can get information on that crash. >> how about the southlake texas one. 208 toyota avalon. happened on december 26th. same thing. it says conduct a site visit on 1/12 where they pulled the black box out if you will. where is the results on that? >> and they pulled the pedal off. i don't know. nhtsa was also down there with our engineers but i don't know specifically what the result was. >> or how about mr. jeff pinsky from minnesota. he's had a 2007 lexus es 350 and had problems with it and requested repeatedly to give him the information off the black box. he's always been denied. he's always been denied. o have this s.w.a.t. team and we're going to be more transparent and bring forth this information why not on these fatal crashes, especially these ones i mentioned, why not disclose what

happened on that black box? >> i think right now the issue is there's one tool in the entire united states, and i believe it's still in the prototype stages. so the final production tools we won't start seeing here until april. so -- >> but standards for a black box were developed in 2006 by nhtsa that everybody has to have starting 2012 and 2013, correct? >> yes. >> if we have standards in 2006 you are still trying to develop a prototype. >> that's my understanding. >> so the information off this black box then, if i wanted to get the information if there's no mechanism in the united states, it has to go to japan to get the information? >> correct. correct. it is a unique mechanism for our black box. >> and this defect committee, u.s. may have a representative on it but decisions are still going to be made in japan? >> well, there will be -- the process of making a defect decision is there's a general manager of the quality group that has a committee with a number of different engineers

and everyone else. that has always been in japan with japanese. that committee now is going to have people that will be seated on that from other parts of the regions around the world. >> sure. >> united states for certain, i don't know. i'm assuming europe will probably be there as well. so they will be part of -- they will be tied into all the information available into the decision process and we will have the ability to appeal that if we don't believe in it. >> you have input but decision will still be made in japan. >> the input will be made but we'll have the ability to appeal that decision we do not have today. >> on the black box, whether wr is that data stored? >> pardon? >> if i get a black box out of the southlake, texas, accident, where would that data be scored? would that have to go to japan to get downloaded? >> if we have the scan tool, once these tools are available -- >> right. but right now because you don't have the scan tools. >> i don't know if japan has

tools or not. if we're in prototype stage, i'm assuming it's a global prototype stage. i don't know that for certain. but i do know in april we're slated to receive about 100 of these. >> all right. that will be in april. okay. if you receive -- you said you receive personally 20 to 25 complaints a week. any on unintended accelerations. >> i've got to tell you in the last three years, i have seen them on surges. but i don't recall anyone that was on an unintended incident. >> could you provide us an example of some of those surges that you personally handled? >> sure. >> okay. >> sure. >> mr. burgess, did you have any questions? >> i think it's already been addressed but would like for you or toyota to provide the committee your analysis or exponent's analysis of when they do the gilbert testing, the retesting on the gilbert thing. i just echo about the black box.

southlake is right outside of my district. very tragic accident right after christmas where a car went through an intersection and ended up upside down in a pond and all the occupants died. some question as to whether or not there may have been a medical emergency involved in that. but i thing black box, in addition to the other physical evidence, the brake pads and that sort of thing will be very instructive for your group and, of course, instructive for us as well. so as this information on these look backs, if you go out and get the car from tennessee, and your engineers come up with a decision on this, i just think it would be very useful that this committee would have that information as early as possible after you get that. and, heaven help us if there's an uncommanded acceleration. but get that car. somebody has to look at that car and figure out what's going on. appreciate it. >> we're about to wrap up. i see mr. engel is here.

dow do y do you have a question of this witness? >> thank you mr. chairman. i think a lot of the questions have already been asked. but when i was asked by the media yesterday what question was i going to ask, i said that i would ask what did you know and when did you know it and what do you still know that we don't know? and i listened to the hearing. all i can say is that i hope you can appreciate that we are very skeptical because it certainly seems if you just look at the chain of events that there was an attempt to kind of sweep everything under the rug. and i'm still not sure that the question has been reasonably answered in terms of, you know, you talk about these six

vehicles that you tested. but why would not your first inclination be to test the vehicles that accelerated. when i heard mrs. smith earlier on, the first panel, and she talked about how it just went 100 miles an hour and she couldn't do anything to stop it, wouldn't it have just been logical to take that car and others like that and just rip it apart? i know mr. barton asked you earlier. but i'm not sure i'm satisfied with your answer. >> again, i don't know the specifics, but it sounded as if she said there was a technical person that was down there and did look at the car. so i can't tell you, if they didn't see anything, that's probably why they didn't tear it apart. if they would have seen a component failure, i'm sure that that component failure would have come off that car and we would have received it. and again it may have happened. i don't know the specifics on her accident.

but it wasn't only her car. there were others that gave similar stories and for how long was toyota saying it's mats, floor mats or rugs or sticky pedals when it just would seem clear by her story. i'm sure there are others like her that it wasn't that at all. >> well, it may not be. there are so many different causes. they are very broad, very rare. and in some cases, they are just very, very difficult to duplicate. so, i mean, that's the frustrating part about researching what happens on some of these instances. especially if there is something that's going on with the throttle. if there aren't error codes and it can't be duplicated, that was one of the issues with the sticky pedal in the beginning. by the time the consumer got it to the dealership, all the moisture had dried from the pedal and the pedal wouldn't stick. you've got a consumer saying, i

know this thing has been sticking. but by the time they get it to the store, that can't be replicated. that took awhile to understand. >> but in every case -- would that happen in every case? >> surely once there were many different instances it seemed to be a pattern that you didn't have to be a rocket scientist to say, hey, wait a minute. maybe something is wrong. there's, you know, not only the acceleration but we've heard about steering and brakes and other things. you know, it just seems that if you look at everything, it certainly seems to me that there was an attempt to keep it under the rug and keep it under the table and let's not tell anybody anything and maybe it will go away. and, of course, with all the testimony, nhtsa is to blame as well. i just don't think that toyota handled it properly. let me just -- go ahead. >> in the case of brakes if you were talking about prius brake, we jumped on that very quickly and have taken care of that. in the case of corolla steering,

it's being investigated right now. so, yes, we have complaints on it. nhtsa has complaints. we're digging into that right now to find out what is the issue and let's make sure the customers are happy with their products and safe with their products. >> so let me ask you as the last question, when i was asked yesterday, what would i ask you and i said what did you know and when you knew it. what do you know that we don't know yet. what do you know that we don't know yet? what's going to come out in the days and weeks? i know mr. toyoda is testifying in another committee tomorrow. what bombshells are going to come out that we don't yet know. >> god i hope there aren't any more. let's get back to the good old days of 2009, and i didn't think i'd ever say that. you know, right now, we have to fix the process so these things don't happen again. i don't know what's behind the curtain. no one knows in the auto industry as manufacturers what

defects you could have down the road. what challenges you have. so it's important that we have built-in quality and build-in safety so we don't have these issues. and that's why our processes are changing to make sure that we get back to where we once were. this was a company for 50 years in the u.s. that, whenever you said toyota or you said camera it was quality, dependability. and we've stubbed our toe. and we've got to get back to where that once was and we're going to do that. >> i would hope so. thank you mr. chairman for holding the hearing. >> mr. ging ry, question? >> very, very quickly. i could ask you a couple of yes/no questions. have you enjoyed pebeing here today? and do you want to take any more questions? i guess the answers would be yes and no. seriously idid want to can you. do you think this is a software or hardware problem? >> in the case of the etc? >> yes. >> again, based on our analysis

of what we've seen, based on going to accident sites and checking these cars out, i don't think it's either right now. but exponent has not tested the software yet. so that's yet to come. so if there is a software issue, if there is an issue about how independently these two processors are working because that's the key to make sure that this thing works. we'll know that. >> but it could be either, and you're going to get to the bottom of that? >> we have to get to the bottom of it. >> absolutely. and it may be that the bottom of it is they find nothing. and we have another independent group that goes in and researches again. >> mr. lentz, thank you. mr. chairman, thank you. i yield back. >> that concludes all questions of this panel. mr. lentz, thank you. we invite you to stay for the next panel, secretary lahood. we have five votes coming up. i'm go [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> this morning, another house hearing on a toyota's recent vehicle recall. we will hear from the president and ceo akio toyoda. live coverage on cspan 3 begins at 11:00 a.m. eastern. "washington journal" is next on c-span. the house will be in this morning and will take up a repeal of the antitrust exemption in the health industry. that is at 10:00 eastern. coming up this hour, we will continue our look at the toyota recalled. --