as both my relationship with the prime minister and with the information, i was fully in line with what was being done. >> on the intelligence, which you mentioned, robin cook, of course, had raised concerns about the way the intelligence was being interpreted. he had actually challenged this. were you aware of the time of his concerns that he discussed -- did he discuss them with you? . . .

at that time ahead full briefings from the intelligence services. i was given information deemed plausible at the time. >> bill was a statement that was from before we learned the intelligence was faulty. he challenged whether it was correct in the house of commons and he kept a distance himself with no accountability. >> i think we knew that there were objections because he felt the sanctions, the non-military

road, should be pursued. i think the question of the intelligence emerged more after the investigation took place into what happened that led the intelligence services to complete certain things. intelligence is a guide, but it cannot be the only thing by which you make decisions. >> from the five briefings that you had from the papers that you read and received, like other members of cabinet, were you convinced that the threat from what was being reported, the iraqi programs of weapons of mass destruction, was growing? >> there were more basic facts. the major issue was a breach of the international community's laws and the decisions was something that was unacceptable. as far as the intelligence was

concerned, we'd soak the information that was given by the intelligence services, but the more basic question was whether you could continue into a new world would circumstances where one country was determined to stand out against the international community no matter what happens. >> i think the chairman wants to call a coffee break. i would like to come back afterwards to go into other aspects of the question that affected the cabinet on the 17th of march. >> thank you. >> please do not leave the room unless you live the suit. it will take quite a long time to gatx in. we -- to get back in. it will take quite a lonthat yo. -- thank you.

>> the british iraq war inquiry will continue. they're taking a short break. it started at 5:00 and will continue till about 7:00 eastern. we will resume washington journal at that time. later today the testimony continues on c-span 3 at 8:30 eastern. during this break we also use some of what happened already this morning. >> prime minister, you have been a senior member of the cabinet since 1997, prime minister since 2007 in june. you are particularly well-placed offer us insight into a time covered by our terms of reference. it's been brought up in this inquiry from the outset that the coalition decision to take military action led directly or most often in directly to the loss of lives of many people,

servicemen and women, and in ours and in multinationals of forces, the iraqi forces and many civilians, men, women, and children in iraq. many have been affected by those losses and by other consequences and actions. given all that experience, i still like to ask right at the outset whether you believe the decision to take military action in march of 2003 was right. >> it was the right decision and it was for the right reasons. but i do want at the outset to pay my respects to all of the soldiers and members of our armed forces who of with courage and distinction in iraq, for the loss of life and the sacrifices that they have made, my thoughts are with their families. next week we will dedicate at the national arboretum and memorial to the 179 servicemen and women who died in iraq. my thoughts and prayers and

hearts are with all the families today. i also like to say there were many civilian injuries and deaths in iraq as well, british citizens, and my thoughts and prayers are with them. we know there was a big loss of life in iraq among civilians. any loss of life is something that makes us very sad. i would like to a knowledge of the contribution of all our british forces, particularly the sacrifice of a loss of lives. i think that this is the gravest decisions of all, to make a decision to go to war. i believe we made the right decision for the right reasons, because the international community had for years tried to get saddam hussein's to abide by international law and things that he had accepted. resolutions were passed by the united nations. at the end of the day it was impossible to persuade him that

she said -- that he should abide by international laws. my feeling was and still is that we cannot have an international community that works if we have either terrorists who are breaking the rules or in this case an aggressor states refusing to obey the laws of the international community. i think that we have lessons to learn, however. in three areas i would like to discuss with you and i hope that you will take on board the questions and the answers that come from these issues. the first is we have been fighting two wars. it is essential we have the proper structures of decision making. as time has gone on, tony blair and i have changed the structures of decision making in government. the second thing is we've won the battle within almost seven days but it has taken seven years to win the peace in iraq. and i think we are developing the concept of a just peace and

how we can actually manage conflict like this in a way that we get reconstruction and a stake in the future, in this case the iraqi people. the third thing -- and double like to discuss it with you and you can ask questions -- is that there will be interventions in the future. an international cooperation has to be far greater than it was. global problems require better global institutions. i want to draw attention to the importance in all this of the strongest possible relationship between europe and america, something i am determined to build up and continue to make stronger in the future. >> we are taking a break from the british iraq war inquiry. we have brought you live coverage from london, england this morning on c-span, testimony by prime minister gordon brown. a short break. when it gets back underway, we will have it for you live. in the meantime, yesterday, health and human services secretary kathleen sebelius met

with representatives of several large health insurance companies. they spoke about recent premium increases. we will bring those remarks of her with supporters after the meeting now. >> >i just wanted to report that i just completed a meeting with five ceo's of the lodge's health insurance companies in america. the meeting was really focused on what is happening with the kind of jaw dropping rate increases that people are seeing, particularly in the individual and small group market and what other reasons and what we can do about it going forward. it was a helpful conversation. ceo's were joined by representatives of the leadership of the national association of insurance commissioners who have oversight

responsibility now in the marketplace. we spoke about some of the rate trends and cost issues. at the end of the day i still think there's a concern that the medical trends do not match the rate increases. the medical trend costs, which are ahead of inflation costs, are still well below what is being filed in the individual and small group markets. i asked the companies and will follow up with an official letter that they file online their rate requests along with the actuarial data that supports those rates requests. what they are paying out, what they are collected for over a costs, what they're collecting for administrative costs. at a minimum, until we have comprehensive will perform and a new marketplace and rate review and oversight, people at least

understand what is going on. the president stopped by the meeting briefly to share his concern about what he hears, the fact that the current situation is unsustainable. that was acknowledged by the company presidents. as rates continue rising dramatically, more and more people are leaving the marketplace. and making the situation far worse for the ones left in the system, often the sickest, those with no place to go. this is a step in a conversation that i hope will be followed by some greatly increased transparency about what indeed is going on in these marketplaces, why it is that companies who have healthy profits -- i think the top companies filed for a $12.7 billion profit in 2009 and in

this marketplace they have filed dramatic rate increases which will further the decline of the private insurance in america. >> [inaudible] he had a letter that premiums increased by 40%. can you describe that moment was like and how the ceo's responded when they saw that? >> a constituent had written from ohio who was a cancer survivor but had been cancer free for 11 years. their premiums went up 25% this year. they're going to go up another 40% in 2010. if she is already paying $7,000, plus most of her medical expenses she is staying out of pocket. she had the highest deductible possible and yet she still sees extraordinary rate increases. what the president said is this clearly is unacceptable and

unsustainable. they admitted it was unsustainable. we spoke about why this market is divided into little bits and pieces. why the sick people are segregated, essentially. it is a problem the president addressed at the summit. frankly, it is a big disagreement between the republican strategy and the president's strategy moving forward. the republicans feel that it is acceptable to have a risk pool that only has six people in it. we put folks with pre-existing conditions in a high risk pool and that would be their strategy going forward. the president said we need a different marketplace. we need to pool risk again. we need the same bargaining power that business owners have and members of congress have perished in the meantime, we want to shine a bright light. i am hoping that the ceo's on to

the call for -- >> let's take you back live, as we promised, to london, england. the british iraq war inquiry. questioning under way with prime minister gordon brown. back now to london. this is c-span. >> if the role of the attorney general was to advise us on the matter of the legality. he gave as the advice. he was certain about the advice he gave. then we had to make our decision on the base is not simply of that advice but the moral, political, and other things for making the decision. >> were you and other cabinet minister is aware that the attorney general's position had been very different to early february of 2003? >> i was not aware in any detail of this. i was not involved in discussions with the attorney general. i was not involved in meetings with the attorney general at all. we have this straightforward

issue. we were sitting down as a cabinet to discuss the merits of taking action once the diplomatic avenues had been exhausted, unfortunately. we had to have a straightforward advice from the attorney general, was a lawful or not. his advice was unequivocal, in the cabinet meeting. but at that time you had not seen the formal written advice that he presented to the prime minister on the seventh of march? >> no, --i'm not a lawyer or international order. as i and understand it, the constitutional position is very clear, that for -- before a decision of such magnitude is made, the attorney general has to say whether he thinks it is lawful or not. that was the question to answer. if he had answered quickly in this statement to us then, there would've been questions, but he was very straightforward in his recommendation. to me, that was a necessary

part of the discussion about the decision of war, but you have to look get the political and the other case that had to be examined in the light of the failure of diplomacy of united nations. >> you and other cabinet members accepted the course with a fine secretary and the prime minister -- except for the foreign secretary and the prime minister. that you were opposed to the position he took in the cabinet. up to the 11th of february, you were not aware of this and you were unaware of the foreign office's advice, you do not agree with the position of the foreign secretary? >> i think there may have been some -- - -- some press coverage.

the question was whether this was lawful or not. the attorney general gave unequivocal advice to the cabinet. i have heard him give his evidence to the committee. he had a straightforward question to ask. not a simple question, but straightforward. was it lawful or not. he gave an unequivocal answer. >> the cabinet needed to know whether this was based on a robust position or slightly controversial one? >> historians will look back on this carefully and decide what happened and what was said between people at different times and what was the first and second and third draft. we are cabinetmaking the decision. did the attorney general have a position on this that was unequivocal. his position was unequivocal

besides the u.n. resolution that led us to believe that saddam hussein's failed to comply with international law. he cited one that had the importance of the final opportunity for saddam st.hussein. it laid the basis, but it was not the sufficient reason in itself for us making the decision if you had known his decision was equivocal 10 days before, would it have changed your view? but i don't think it would have. unless he was prepared to say that his unequivocal advice was that this was not lawful, then the other arguments that i thought were important played, which was the obligation to the international community, the failure to honor them, the

failure to discharge the spirit of the resolutions, particularly 1441. i knew there was a debate about whether that resolution should lead to a further decision or discussion. i knew that was an issue. it seemed the attorney general's advice was unequivocal. >> we get to the decision itself. you say the attorney general has advised th -- the cabinet has been advised of the diplomatic route being at an end. only the prime minister and the foreign secretary had been fully involved in the approach at this stage, and the foreign secretary. for example, they had been aware of the terms of the prime minister's correspondence with the president and the foreign secretary had seen earlier advice from the attorney general. but the cabinet has to share in the responsibility of the

decision. we cannot achieve all the things we wanted on the middle east peace process, in terms of u.n. support, in terms of international support, and so on. do you think that this cabinet in which only two members were fully 100% in the picture and you were more in the picture than those not as close as you to the prime minister, was able to take a genuinely collective decision or was it being asked is essentially to endorse and a process that had been taken by your predecessor at a time when the die was? already was >> i believe we were already making the right decision for the right cause. i believe i had sufficient information before me to make a judgment. of course i was not trying to do the job of the foreign secretary or trying to second-guess something that had happened at other meetings. i was looking at the issue on its merits. eide was looking at the merits

of our case. equally at the same time we have learned about how we do these things in the future. it was important to me that the matter went to parliament. the matter would to a debate in the house of commons. the vote in the house of commons was absolutely overwhelmingly in favor of taking action that was necessary. i believe in the future it will be important that a government puts the matter to the house of commons as a matter that the house of commons is brought even before any country goes to war. i think we have learned that we need parliamentary engagement in this. i want a change in the constitution where parliament will be brought up on the issues of peace and war. >> two of your colleagues that were around the table, the former development secretary and the events are a secretary gave

evidence to the inquiry. they've told us of concerns they had. mr. straw said it was the most typical decision he faced in his life and one of the most divided questions of his political lifetime. it was a difficult decision for him. was this a decision that you had any personal reservations about? >> nobody wants to go to war. nobody wants to see innocent people die. nobody wants to see your forces put at risk of their lives. nobody would want to make this decision accept in the most grave of circumstances where you were assured you were doing the right thing. i have said i think it was the right decision, made for the right reasons. i think the issues that arise in the construction and what happens afterwards are issues that i want to learn an important lesson from and we are learning important lessons for

the future. but the decision to take the action we did was the right decision and it was made for the right reasons. >> you spoke of the importance of the house of commons vote. and your own influence in securing support for what was a controversial decision in the house of commons on the 18th of march, was have been important. were you happy with the way the question was presented to the house of commons by your predecessor in his speech on that day? >> yes, but were in a position where the cabinet's had made its recommendation. i think in the future the house of commons will have the right to make the final decision. that is what i'm trying to achieve. it was clearly a vote that was made after the recommendation of the cabinet, which was sufficient in itself for us to make the decision to go to war. it would have been better that

parliament retains the right to make a final decision. >> you have stressed this morning the importance to you of maintaining international order and international institutions in the world that we now live in. but we were in a situation -- you as a cabinet were in a situation of having to go to the house of commons and ask them to support something for which we had not gotten, the support of the u.n. security council. would it not have been much better if we had been able to prolong the diplomacy until such time as we had received support of the security council, thereby strengthening international institutions? >> if there had been any chance that the security council would have been prepared to come to a decision based on its merits within a few weeks' time, i would have supported that. but the countries have made it clear that irrespective of the merits, they were determined not

to enforce the will of the international community. >> which countries? >> a number of countries made it clear that irrespective of what the results of the investigation work, that the resolution that said they were prepared -- that although the resolution had said they would consider this, they would be prepared to act. france and germany were making that clear as well as other countries. >> you are referring to france when you refer to the security council? >> president should iraq was willing to support the military action. -- not prepared to support military action. he could give no indication there would be a time that he could support military action. >> after he made that statement, did not the french government to immediately contact number 10, the foreign office and the british embassy in paris, to say that the british government was not interpreting his statements

accurately? gravette may have happen> tt i'm not aware. there was very little chance that the diplomatic route could lead to success. i think you have to understand that we are at the beginning of a new phase of a world community. we are opposed cold war phase where tensions between russia and america are not the paradigm within which people see what they should do as individual states around world. there's a danger in this time that certain countries, a rogue states, would be prepared to take action that hurt the international community and disobey the laws of the international community. this was a test of whether the international community could hold together.

unfortunately, we could not bring all countries all. if the international community had been decided that after 14 resolutions and after a huge attempt at diplomacy and after trying sanctions but not succeeded with sanctions, it was time to give up on this, then i think we would be sending a message to every potential dictator around the world that they were free to do with a wanted. it is an important message to learn that nothing was going to be perfect in a situation where we were in the midst of creating the institutions and practices of a new world. it was perhaps inevitable that some countries would not feel part of that process for the time being. but relationships between france, germany, britain, and america are stronger than ever. that shows the determination of all countries working together to create international community that requires international law and rules be observed. >> at this precise time you're

talking about, the u.n. inspectors were saying to give us more time. the french government was saying to the chilean president, we need more time before we come to this decision. they were not saying that we would never do it. why did we have to take the decision? >> you have to make a judgment. but it was not because of the americans saying we are going to take military action? >> it is a matter of judgment. >> the american military? >> i am talking about the decisions we made, not the ones other countries made. if the matter was whether after 14 resolutions failed, having united international community, after saddam refused to comply, the diplomatic channels had been

exhausted. as to whether you took the action in november you were prepared to take, we were prepared to take the action. i justified the decision on the basis of our judgment, that the diplomatic route had become exhausted. other people can take different judgments, but this was the judgment of the british cabinet at the time. >> mr. strawe told us that the fund policy objective of regime change would be improper and unlawful. mr. blair perhaps in contrast to that told in his speech in texas in 2002, talking not just of iraq but in more general terms, if necessary, the actions should be military and if necessary, unjustified, there should be an involvement of regime change. he said to this inquiry that saddam had threatened the region and the world and in the circumstances it was better to deal with the threat, to remove

him from office. does that imply that the british government ended up by allying with the american interpretation of international rules, and revival argument that the attorney general presented to the cabinet and the american objective of regime change, which had always been their position under the previous administration, under pressure of an american deadline? >> opposition was to support actions so that the will of the international community let saddam dispose of weapons be in force. in the back of my mind was a sense that if international community did back, >> i got back to the argument

about defying the will of the international community. >> labeouf the question of weapons of mass destruction? >> the intention of the action was to force iraq to abide by the interpretations of the international community about its obligations. is really geared to comply aaron's disclose and dismantle was seen as the reason for removing him from office. >> looking ahead, not back at what happened in the cabinet, but rather to a lesson to be learned for the future, that there was a risk exposure for the ministers, themselves and

for the crown service, military and civil, in the event that some jurisdiction or in some process it could be found that the decision was not lawful. is there a plane constitutional doctrine that's as it is or is not sufficient, then there's that elements within it. i'm thinking about future situation where the risk exposure of crown servants and crown ministers may be involved. >> i knew at that stage that they had issued clear guidance as to what the position was. i was satisfied that they were satisfied that they got the information necessary. as far as the future, our desire to be more transparent in the way we make decisions has to be

balanced by the needs of national security. but it is important that we do everything in our power, if we are putting these issues to parliament, not simply taking executive decisions without parliament, then we have to provide greater information. that was one of the lessons will be learned, that parliament was making a final decision, it would ask for greater information. i think this is one of the lessons we can learn i do say . i do say that everything mr blair did during that time, he did properly. i was fully informed on what i needed to make the decisions i made. >> thank you. >> now to the aftermath of the military action.

in january of this year you said in a press conference that the mistake in the war was not to do the reconstruction and plant it in a way that was necessary so that iraq could recover quickly after their leader fell. what rent wrong with the planning for the aftermath? >> this will be debated for many years. i hope your inquiry can make recommendations on how to deal with it in the future. if the i'll deal situthe ideal e that there could be an international group with immediate plans for recovery in the country. if, for example, in zimbabwe. and it's true in the balkans, where reconstruction must take place. one of the lessons to learn is there are going to be intervention is necessary in the future for humanitarian or other

reasons, that you will have failed states, you will have conflict within states that will break down. you will have states that need to change. we should have in place, as we have now in britain -- we put a thousand people ready to help in reconstruction immediately if there is a need for it. we should have a united nations or some international agency responsible for security and reconstruction. we need civilian support so we can do all the things necessary when a broken state has to be rebuilt. that is the first lesson i learned. i always thought ever since june that reconstruction would be a problem from 2002 onward. in my first meeting, i said that we have to plan properly for that. but we could not persuade the americans to take a priority it deserved. the course of action in iraq has been that we only gave to the

iraqization, iraq's security forces, iraq police, iraq economic and political development. that was the basis on which we construction could take place. that was what a just peace involved. we only came to that later and not shortly after the invasion. i regret this. i cannot take personal responsibility for everything that went wrong. i did a paper to the americans just before the war was declared that said these things had to be planned for. and that we needed international organizations to be involved. >> we have anticipated that the united nations would do exactly as you said. you have a lot of experience and organizations like the world bank. but we were not able to do that because we could not get the support of the united nations. you can have an international agency, but if you don't have the legitimacy that allows it to

operate, then you are stuck. that was the situation we found ourselves in. >> but the united nations came in after a resolution in may. it is true to say that the postwar planning -- because we now know that you cannot win the peace simply by military action. you need to engage the people of iraq or any other country. you need to give them the chance of political empowerment at some stage. if you need to have strong security forces. and you need economic development. people have debose stake in the future these things were not the central part of the initial reconstruction plan, but they

became that way. lessons we've learned in iraq are being applied in afghanistan in the policy we are pursuing now. i hope the committee will begin to draw some of the lessons we've learned in iraq and say that they are more relevant of other situations as well as iraq. >> i think there will be a lot more to explore. you say that from june of 2002 onwards, you were pressing for thought to be given to this question. but the british government's own planning for the aftermath really did not get into gear until february of 2003. why did we take so long doing this? >> i think the committee will have a paper that we did in september. >> we set up direct lending unit on the 11th of february of 2003 or so. >> this was originally, we wanted this to be an international effort, so we wanted to involve the united

nations, imf, world bank as quickly as possible. that was affected by of what was happening in diplomatic negotiations as to try to find a way forward. we had a meeting i believe on march 9 of ministers to discuss reconstruction. i was asked as a result of that -- >> that is very late. >> that was a result of the paper is being done. the meeting on march 9. i was asked at that meeting to a paper that we set to the americans after that meeting about some of the things we thought had to be done for reconstruction. >> why do you think the cabinet had not paid more attention to the aftermath planning at an earlier stage? >> i think because we were more confident than you may look at it now, that the diplomatic process would have more success. clearly we were preparing for military options. clearly we had also to prepare for reconstruction. work that was done in america

and and worked in britain was not done as much as it should have been done in parallel. >> there was a great deal of planning done for the aftermath by the state department, but that was not drawn upon when the department of defense became involved. >> there was a different decision being made about the past for reconstruction. obviously, are planning was based on more international involvement by other partners and secondly on the issues that i have raised, that we have learned more about in recent years, that you have to get to the iraqi people on your side. this is what general petraeus learned when -- from the work he did in 2006 and 2007, that you have to have economic projects that allow people to feel they have a stake in the future, and you have to get the

security and armed forces of iraq in such a way that they can be responsible for security, and that involves non-corrupt police. we have applied this in bo asara. we have learned a lesson there that are applicable to afghanistan and other countries. this new world has to have some international organization that is responsible not just for peacekeeping and not just humanitarian aid, but for stabilization and reconstruction. >> you can onlit would only offp where there is consensus, cooperation. >> the united nations was prepared to come =iin, in the end.

the united nations mission led to a tragedy in baghdad and there was with a drawl that mission. the world bank mission personnel, imf had to be withdrawn. we had treasury people there working in very difficult circumstances, bravely organizing the new currency of iraq, organizing the new financial budgeting system of iraq from an organizing part of the construction. we were directly involved in these things. >> we and the americans were not joining up effectively during the planning stages. a lot of warning signals came back from washington to london in the early months of 2003 expressing great concern about the american lack of planning for the aftermath and what brought us to the defense department. we heard this from earlier witnesses. shouldn't we, given a large commitment we were making to this operation, military

commitment, have been able to exercise more influence over the americans, to make sure the aftermath planning was done properly? >> late in the year i went across to the states. >> i'm talking about before the invasion. >> i made it clear to the u.s. i felt they had to take more seriously the issues of the construction. for the first period, regarding the military campaign succeeding. it did. so the issue of reconstruction became more immediate than three people expected to be. we have started planning for this in the treasury, but we had to start convincing colleagues in other governments. >> your planning, did that look at likely scenarios that might arise after conflict in iraq, including surging tourism, instability, having to deal with

very damaged infrastructure, the need for peacekeeping forces to keep a lid on the ethnic and religious tensions and so on? >> a lot of these matters were for the foreign office to look at more than we did. we were looking at economic issues that could arise, like jobs, utilities, the currency. we completely remodeled the iraqi currency. >> you were looking at these things. the problems which arose in the aftermath, could they have been mitigated if the coalition had been much better prepared to get into action on the issues you mentioned right at the beginning? and if it had the broader economic support that we did not to get until after the second resolution was passed in the middle of may by the united nations? >> yes. it was not --

their only two or three or four or five countries. by the month of may, the united nations came into play. the u.n. was part of the reconstruction program. we needed the imf and the world bank. what we have concluded in the treasury with that we would need all these organizations to be involved for the reconstruction to be successful. >> at what point did it become obvious to you before the conflict that is planning was defective? >> i don't think that we were fully aware of all the tensions within the united states? >> of how bad it was going to be? >> i feel that we should of course have been able to more quickly and do what we eventually did on the politics, economics, and security, building up the iraqi forces. the decisions we made in the first days were not in line with that spirit we have learned that

lesson. that lesson has to be learned for future conflicts. and as a condition of change in iraq, that military action happens, that it was only sufficient if we had reconstructed. a just peace must involve that there's a right of the citizens to participate in the political system established as quickly as possible. >> once you have achieved law and order. >> reconstruction goes hand in hand. >> it was also decided that we would take the responsibility for four provinces in the southeast of iraq in addition to others. were you involved in the decision that we should take on this responsibility? >> this was a big decision. basically, we were taking greater responsibility for one area. basara was 2 billion people --

2 million people. that became the center of our problems and we were eventually able to zeev success in putting that city into a position where it could govern itself. >> do you remember when the decision was made that we would take that on? >> the first decision was when the military decision was that instead of our troops going into the north, troops were going into the south. that was a decision taken on military advice. that was a change that was made to our plans. the second decision was how we would organize iraq after the military success. i cannot recall exactly when we given the responsibility for basara. i know for us that involve economic, social, and political measures, including economic development. >> this was discussed in march,

i cannot recall whether you work at the meetings. there were discussions about taking charge of that town and what would be required for the funding. >> there was a war cabinet. the marks the ninth meeting -- march 9 meeting. >> yes. once the invasion had happened, we were in a position as occupying power, we began to have to deal with some very serious problems of insurgency within iraq, a big security problem that got worse and worse. do you consider the problems that the british and americans did encounter as occupying powers were principally caused by external interference and a al qaeda, external influence by iran and al qaeda? >> there was external interference. >> was the principal cause?

>> two things happening at once. you have an attempt from iran and outside a to make their mark in iraq. you also have the sunni insurgency. you also have tensions between the suunnis and sheias. >> could we have anticipated these problems? >> we could not have anticipated all the problems subsequent to the invasion. one of the lessons we have learned, we will apply in the future, that you have to move quickly to giving the iraqi people a sense that they have greater control of the situation. it is true that we were dealing with the iraqi army that had existed under saddam and politicians and bureaucrats who

had worked under him. we have learned that unless you can quickly involve the people of a country in a sense that they are about to get more control over their country, then you become very quickly an army of occupation rather than an army of liberation. we never wanted to be an army of occupation. >> finally, before i hand over to the chair, the cabinet mechanisms, you have referred to the ad hoc ministerial meeting that began to happen from the 19th of march and met almost daily until the 10th of april. that was an ad hoc ministerial meeting, effectively a war cabinet, i believe you intended it. the believe that served a useful purpose and function well? >> , yes, or cabinet met on problems daily. i attended a large number of these meetings, but it was also

happening at a time of the budget and i attended other international meetings. if it was a useful function and it allowed the different departments and agencies to report on what they were doing. and so we had greater coordination as a result. >> the second committee was set up, which was the ad hoc a ministerial meeting on iraqi ministers. it began beating on the 10th of april and through the 10th of august -- it began to meet on the 10th of april. was that an effective ministerial group that we've not had before? >> i cannot give you specific information about the success of that particular venture, but it was a necessary means by which we dealt with some of the problems that arose. we have learned a fuller lesson about the need to inform governments to be organized for a situation where you are at war. in this case, a war with two countries.

with afghanistan and iraq. so you need structures of decision making. >> as jessup or, you did not go to the meetings of the ministerial committee on rehabilitation? >> the treasury has two ministers. if there were matters affecting that, it would probably before that she secretary to be at that meeting. i believe he was present. but he went on the eighth of may. previous meetings you had, patricia hewett, the attorney general. i wonder why the treasury was not attending on an official level there at the meeting? >> malick, we would want to attend. >> thank you. i w -- normally, we would want to attend. >> thank you.

>> just to begin with, you told us already this morning, mr. brown, that the cost of potential united kingdom involvement, you told us was $2.5 billion, not to be seen as a constraint whether to act or not. how far was the potential impact on the party finances and particularly concerning the that you could share or something the treasury needed to contain within itself? >> we were setting aside money for this endeavor, so we made an original estimate of the cost would be 2.5 billion by 2006 because are planning to go through them. having revised our estimate, then it was 4 billion through 2006. the eventual additional cost of the normal budget by 2006 was just over $4 billion.

that was an accurate assessment that was made. in november i reported to the house of commons that we had a special reserve. that was 1 billion pounds. that was for a year. i was reporting a year of special reserve. in april when i did the budget, i reported it was 3 billion to take us through the next period of time. we spent a billion a year of additional money on iraq for most of these years. in total, iraq has cost the treasury something in the order of 8 billion pounds. 2 billion pounds for urgent operation requirements. the total cost is 8 billion that we have found over these years to pay for the effort we have made in iraq. on top of and also rising defense budget. >> i would like to return to the special reserve. first, picking up the point you made earlier this morning that

you were not going to advise your colleagues that the financial consideration should determine either the scale of our military contribution or whether we should make it, if diplomacy failed. your secretary told us pretty much the same, that the treasury was not in the business of advising ministers to support one intervention over another. on the grounds of the cost. on the other hand, the scale of the u.k. commitment, with the minimal engagement, whether it's a counter military invention or a major land contribution, the difference was very great. was the concern about the broader economic consequences for the u.k., the potential one, something that you needed to get a grip on and understand and estimates in contributing to the eventual decision?

>> yes, we had a paper in july or june where we looked at the cost of the various options that were being put forward by the ministry of defence. i think in that paper it said i should speak with the prime minister about that. i made it clear to the prime minister that no option should be ruled out on the grounds that it was too costly, that we had to choose what the right military option was, the right option for our security. if we were to be in a position where if diplomacy failed, that he should know that the treasury would make an allowance for whatever option was chosen. then in september we did a paper or it could of been october, we did a paper on the overall effects of a potential war with iraq. we said the oil price was likely to go up 10%. we thought the world economy would suffer a greater degree of

volatility as a result. we looked at all the issues that would arise if a situation where iraq was not supplying oil to the world and at the same time there was instability in the region. we concluded that the cost of reconstruction would be something in order of 45 billion, so we worked on the construction as well, and took the view that had to be shared as much as possible with the international community. if that is why we want to the imf and world bank involved. these were the preparations we made. the first public announcement of setting aside money was in november posted previous reports from setting aside 1 billion. by that time i had already made available to the defense secretary of 500 million pounds for corporations, which included the purpose of necessary equipment in case we were to be at war. i think it came in groups of 200, 200, and 100.

we set aside for training. and then every application made by the ministers of defense subsequently, i made it clear that every application that was made for equipment and every application made for resources necessary for the conduct of the campaign in iraq had to be met by the treasury. we created a system that was fast moving so that we could make sure the ministry of defense had the equipment they need it as quickly as possible. >> i will like to return in a moment to the operational requirements and how it worked. just before that, did the assessment of the financial impact globally as well as nationally of potential military action, did that clarifies itself sufficiently before the march period when it became

likely military action would take place? >> yes, i think so. i think we do what was likely to happen. the oil prices did go up by 10%. it is reassuring to note that our cost of the engagement was accurate -- reassuring to know . i think we were proven to be right. as far as the effects on the world economy, or thought these could be managed. >> just before we turn to the special reserve. we have seen the papers to which you referred about the assessment of the potential economic impact. it's impressive in quality. what we can find is that there is not much all the discussion of them or how they were