construction, as well, and this had to be shared as much as possible with the international community, and that is what we went to the imf and eaglebank, so these are the preparations that we made, but the first public advancement of setting aside money was in november, and we set aside when does billion, but by that time, i had already made available to the defense secretary $500 million for the purchase of necessary equipment in case we were to be at war. i think that it came in truncheon's of $200,000. we also set aside money for training that was to be available for the ministry of defense, and then every application made by the administrative defenses subsequently, i made it absolutely clear that every application that was made for equipment, and every application that was made for equipment and resources necessary for the campaign in iraq had to be met by the treasury, and we created a system which was quick and

fast moving so that we could make sure the ministry of defense had been acquitted they needed as quickly as possible. it. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute]

. ambassador bremer spoke at an event in colorado springs. this is just under an hour. [applause] >> thank you very much for that kind introduction. i was reminded when schering made that comment that they were all socialists, avnet -- when sherry made that comment that there were all socialists, i want to ask the socialists to leave now.

i think it is a wonderful program. because we have so much snow, the government was close down for a number of days one of the congressman has a sign that says the republic is never safe for then when congress is adjourned, but the schools were also closed, and there was this story that a mother went to her son and said, you have to get out of bed and go to school, and he said, i do not want to go to school today. she said, give me too good reasons why you cannot go to school. he said, first, the students hate me. second, the teachers paid may. those are not good answers. get up and go to school.

he said, give me one reason i should go to school. she said, you are the principal. we face three main foreign policy challenges. the first is china, which is in the process of emerging as a great power. it has acquired a enormous strength and is a big power. chinese people have benefited greatly from economic growth over the last few years, but it is true that china has longer for natural resources and is gradually becoming less dependent on the american markets. secondly, the chinese administration is still a totalitarian government, and

chinese foreign policy is becoming increasingly more assertive, which suggests we will continue to have tensions between us and the chinese and rising tensions in the pacific region. history is full of examples of the problems of dealing with an emerging new power. the second problem is russia, which presents, a rather bizarre combination of a researcher and -- reassertion combined with demographic weakness. people do not realize how isolated russia really is. russia is facing a demographic collapse. some estimates are that the overall population of russia will fall from 140 million to

less than 100 million by the end of the century, and there is a real contrast between the state and aim of the russian government to establish influences combined with this weakness. we have seen russian defense spending quadruple in the last six years, and we have seen russians intimidate neighbors like georgia. georgia. russia presents a bizarre combination of early 19th century russian nationalism combine with the weakness and resentment that characterize of post world war rooneii weimar germany. these problems can be dealt with by tough-minded american diplomacy.

the bad news is we're not likely to find support among our european allies on either issues theory of let me turn to the third and major threat your -- of the other issues. let me turn to the third and major threat of islamic extremism, and that this combined with the fear of islamic extremists getting their hands on weapons of mass disruption. i want to leave you with three thoughts. first, this is a global threat not just against america but against the west. second, the threat has an important dimension, iran, and thirdly, that the united states needs a comprehensive way to deal with the threat. i am not sure we have the strategy yet.

most of you think about 9-11. i have to say, in the 15 months before 9-11, we face a new threat of extremism, and they must conduct mass casualty attacks on american homeland on the pearl harbor scale. we said that in june 2000. why did we say that? we looked at the evidence, and the evidence suggested real change had taken place in the late 1980's and early 1995. i was involved in the war on terrorism in the 1970's and 1980's. terrorism was much different from what we face today. they basically use terrorism as a tactic to get attention to their cause. they would kill enough people to get across their but not so many people the public would be turned off from their cause.

they wanted to draw attention to their cause, whether it was getting american bases out of germany, and so forth. those terrorists practice self restraint. they did not want to kill so many people they would turn off the public very good they did not want to go to jail. they did not want to die. suicide attacks were almost unknown in the 1980's. the old strategies we put together of treating terrorists as criminals made sense. it no longer makes sense. the national commission on terrorism said there were three new trend that took place in the 1990 [pause] reagan -- in the 1994 offering of first, terrorism was becoming more deadly. -- in the 1990's.

first, terrorism was becoming more deadly. suicide attacks were becoming more common, and the bipartisan national commission pointed out that all of the known terrorists were conducting programs to acquire or had acquire weapons of mass destruction. in the case of iraq, if not only acquire weapons of mass destruction, but it had used it against his own people. the program continued just recently when israelis on the nuclear and now they're thin syria, and the iranian program continues today. i will have a lot more to say about iran and a minute. these new terrorists must have a different motive from all terrorists, because they are completely different.

what do we know about the motives? we know a lot, because terrorists sought a lot about their motives. lisa -- they started talking about it in the late 1980's's. these islamic extremists affect an extreme version of his long they define as being at war with the west. for two decades in the statements they have issued thurman they have been very clear. they have a goal, which is the conversion of the entire war to their own -- the entire world to their war division of is long. -- their warped vision of is from -- of islam. the founder of the muslim brotherhood wrote decades ago, almost 80 years ago, "a maslow

has no nationality but his belief -- and moslem has no nationality but his belief." they call for a grand jihad to eliminate and destroy western civilization from within so it is eliminated and allah's nation is made victorious over all other nations. one said the order -- the goal is to commit all mankind to islam. these are motivated by a burning hatred of everything western. we're not talking about magazines and films of western culture.

they those, too, but they hate the kinds of things in this nation was founded on. separation of church and state. universal suffrage. women's education. these things they hated more. the thing they hate most is democracy. bin laden calls it a project because it chris dodd and not man in charge of how society is run -- it puts god and not man in charge of how society is run. one denounced the election and said, democracy is a new religion that must be destroyed by war. think about that. democracy is a new religion that must be destroyed by war this sunni extremism i am describing is half the problem. there's also a sheehan dimension -- shia dimension, and

this is particularly -- particularly dangerous because of the sponsorship from tehran. for 30 years, iran has been identified as the major state sponsor of terrorism in the world. it was iran that created hezbollah common-law -- hezbollah, the terrorist group in lebanon, and by -- before 9- 11, hezbollah had iran today sponsors shia extremists as far away as yemen, but iran's support for terrorism is ecumenical because iran is also the major supporter of hamas, and iran is in fact at

war with america, because they are killing our soldiers in iraq and afghanistan. these are the facts. like sunni extremists some, this geranium -- iranian shia extremism regiois similar. a senior iranian cleric, one of president ahmadinejad's clerical mentors has said, "of accepting is lomb is not compatible with democracy -- and accepting islam is not compatible with democracy." they felt nothing but contempt for the idea of a free election in their country. radical extremist is lomlam

resembles totalitarianism decrees like nazism and communism. -- like nazism and communism. the revolutionaries motives have consequences for our security, because the new terrorists want to kill us by the thousands or by the hundreds of thousands. some of you will remember there was a first world trade center attack, which took place in february of 1993. remember, they drove a truck into the basement and blew up a bomb. we were able to capture those six terrorists, who then told us their objective had been to

kill 250,000 americans that day. that was their objective. the new dimension which makes these terrorist so terrifying is the possibility that by getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction they could have the capability of killing us by the hundreds of thousands. this is the crucial nexus, a nexus between terrorism- supporting states, weapons of mass destruction, and islamic extremism, which is the major threat to american national security in the early 21st century. the clock is ticking. another bipartisan commission reported in december that dreamless will use some weapons -- extremists will use weapons of mass destruction in an attack

in the next few years. once you get this in your mind, people often say, what is the root cause of all this hatred? why can we all just get along? the root cause is not poverty. osama bin lighten -- osama bin laden could buy and sell all of us. the guys who did the attacks on the world trade center were well-educated. the christmas bomber was a college-educated man from an upper class, highly respected nigerian family. the root cause, i believe is nothing less fun the existence and success of western civilization.

-- nothing less than the existence and success of western civilization. they hate us because of who we are. we stand behind to enter 50 years of independence, but another 700 -- 250 years of independence but another 700 years of western thought. this is not a clash of civilizations. this is a clash of civilizations. bernard lewis, a professor at princeton, and one of the best observers of the middle east, believe this comes from a sense of failure on islamic societies to reconcile their vision of islam with the modern world. i think he is onto something and that this analysis has important implications for our strategy,

and in particular, for the role of presenting representative governments. let me finish by making clear two important things. the vast majority of muslims are not terrorists. the vast majorities of terrorists are muslims, and there is in effect a civil war going on to define appropriately what is is lompoc's role in the modern world -- what is islam's role in the modern world, and we have a big stake winning that war. the iranian government for years has lied to the united nations, the international atomic energy commission about its program to get nuclear

weapons. today, they're simply can be no doubt this program, despite repeated iranian denials, is directed at acquiring nuclear weapons, and i will talk about two american officials. admiral blair told congress, iran has the scientific, technical, industrial capability to produce another hydrogen- enriched uranium for a weapon, and i was at a public meeting with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, admiral mollen, in january, when he said iran has the strategic intent to have nuclear weapons. iran has paid no price for lying about its nuclear, for disregarding success of u.n. security council resolutions,

and for mocking express concerns in the international community. for almost 20 years, europeans have pursued what they call a constructive dialogue on the subjects. it has been neither constructive nor a dialogue. in the past year, president obama has given several deadlines, by which time they should comply with their un security council demands, only to move the line in the san he has drawn successively as the iranians have not meant -- not met those deadlines. even after iran announced that it had enriched uranium 20%, which is a significant step to getting weapons-grade uranium, even after that announcement, american policy seems to be

focused on the wish that iran will somehow see the light and seize its nuclear program -- cease its nuclear program. it is difficult to exaggerate the consequences of a nuclear iran. let me name six that come to mind off hand. first, a nuclear iran would represent a major shift in the geopolitical balance in the most unstable region. second, as a consequence, it would seem more nuclear proliferation, as iran's historic non-persian neighbors would seek to redress the balance by requiring nuclear weapons themselves every year thirdly, it would promote proliferation in other parts of the world. countries like north korea and japan are watching closely what happens in iran. fourth, it would lead to boulder

iranian interference in the neighboring countries of iraq and afghanistan, threatening american interests in both those countries. fifth, peace between israel and the arabs would be less likely. sixth and most importantly, it would increase in a measurable way the possibility of nuclear proliferation towards super terrorism. that is to see the possibility of nuclear weapons and materials would find their ways into the hands of extremists. let's face it. diplomacy is failing. no sanctions on iran -- even the robust package the administration talks about, even if we get that robust package through the security council, which i doubt, even that kind of regime is unlikely to persuade

the iranians from continuing their nuclear program. president ahmadinejad is on the record as saying iran's nuclear program is a train without brakes, and he has an apocalyptic view of the end of the world and iran's role in it, calling repeatedly for the destruction of israel and often welcoming the idea of a world without america. our options with dealing with iran are rapidly disappearing. only peaceful means left to us now, assuming sanctions do not work, the only peaceful way to stop the nuclear program is regime change, and failing that, only option left in stopping the program will be military action, and despite the obvious downside of that option, it must remain on the table, and it must be seen to remain on the table. when he was a senator, senator

obama said it was unacceptable for iran to have nuclear weapons, as did senator clinton. that was the position of the bush administration. if it is unacceptable, we have to be prepared to do something about it. to defend against this general islamic threat, we need a grand strategy, and that grand strategy has three components. one, conceptual clarity about the threat. two, good intelligence to deal with the threat, and three, the mobilization of the entire scope of powers, political, economic, military and, to deal with the threat. how are we doing? i think there are reasons to be concerned about the of ministration's approach. first, lack of clarity. now to his credit, after he took

office, president obama continued a number of essential elements of the fight his predecessor had put in place, continued most aspects of the patriot at, wiretaps, and e- mailed intercepts. the indefinite detention of the extremist killers. and he continued president clinton's policy of rendering terrorist extremists to third countries. those things he has done, but the president admitted in his state of the union address last month that "we are at war." the problem is the policies do not seem to follow logically from the statement that we are at war. they suggest and many of his administration believes this is less of a war than a law- enforcement problem. let me give you an example. lookit the response to fort hood and the christmas bomber.

in the case of fort hood, two high officials and their immediate reactions solve the problem. the case was clear. major hassan was a self- proclaimed extremists. he went on television and said, the most important thing known is to see that justice -- the most important thing now is to see that justice is done. isn't it to stop it from happening again? it is not to seek the justice is done. that will happen. that is not the most important thing. in a different reaction, he expressed the impact it would have on the diversity of our service. how about on the safety of our service men and women?

isn't that what should be the concern of the secretary of the army the month after action report the release last week, 86 pages long looking into fort hood, talked and talked and never mentioned the word islam how could you do a serious examination without examining what has happened? . we know the story. he was questioned for 50 minutes, and we are left with the spectacle of the president's senior counter-terrorism adviser

plea bargain with the man who tried to kill 3300 -- 300 americans. and then we have them saying they want to kill the 9-11 mastermind in a civilian court, a decision trumpeted as "an important victory for the rule of law." he is an enemy combatants. he is not just a criminal. he is an enemy combatant. this will be the first time in history and enemy combatants captured abroad will be tried in a federal court. their rule of law operates in the military commissions established by congress, signed into law in 2006, and finally, there is no reason why a terrorist could not be taken into custody, interrogated appropriately and eventually turned over to civilian trial.

it leaves us with some questions. if we were lucky enough to capture osama bin laden, would he be mirandized? sound funny, but it is a serious question. would he be mirandize? would he be tried in the u.s. court. would we, the american people, be subjected to the spectacle of plea bargaining with a man who led the death of 3000 people on our shores? those of the logical consequences of the administration's approach and lack of conceptual clarity. they are still thinking that this is the problem of law enforcement. so it appears that there is a problem with the conceptual approach. there is no area in the world where intelligence is more difficult and important to get than in counter-terrorism. the terrorists work in cellular

structures that are very difficult to penetrate. it takes a very high-risk taking intelligence service to get into these cells and figure out what they're doing. the objective is to find out what they're doing before they do it. and to stop it. that is quite different from saying that your job is to capture the guy after he has done it and prosecute him. there is a big difference. a risk-taking the intelligence service requires two things. it requires political leaders that risk will be taken and mistakes will be made secondly, a group of intelligence gatherers who understand that when mistakes are made, political leaders will back them up and not just throw them overboard. [applause]

it is also the case of that, because of the high stakes involved in fighting islamic extremists and, a president may very well have to decide and should decide to preempt it? before they happen. again, it is a very different approach if you are in law- enforcement. in law enforcement, if you wait until a crime is for the trip, you move in and you prosecute. you have to be prepared to preempt. in many cases, the president will have to make that decision on the basis of incomplete and ambiguous intelligence. it does no good than to point fingers at the intelligence community. there are signs that i think the current administration is repeating the mistakes that we have made in this area in the past. back in the 1970's, the church

and height committees conducted a vigorous witch hunt in the cia which hampered the cia's operations for years. the national commission on terrorism reported that, in 1994, the cia imposed highly restrictive restraints, rules, on agents in the field, in terms of how they could basically penetrate terror cells. those highly restrictive rules were in effect still on 9/11, by the way. are we seeing the repeated the same problem? i am afraid that we may be. about a year ago, this administration release highly classified cia documents against the advice of seven current and previous cia directors. last year, the attorney general announced that he would

reinvestigate cia officials who have already been investigated and cleared by career justice people. he was going to investigate their use of enhanced terrorist techniques -- enhanced interrogation techniques. there is reason to be concerned about this area. finally, where is the grand strategy? where is the mobilization ball all of the political and economic and military and covert weapons we have? first of all, we need to kill or capture the hard-core extremist wherever they are. to the president's credit, he has made even more aggressive use of creditors in the afghanistan fitter than bush did.

-- use of predators in the afghanistan theater than bush did. it also has to do with their ideas. in particular it is their idea that islam is not compatible with modernization. some people in this administration argued that to speak of a war on terrorism is wrong because it is basically a war on tactics. terrorism is something that they're simply thinking about and is symptomatic of the underlying thing i talk about. at the heart of a grand strategy there must be promoting a representative government. the objective is to help moderate muslims when that civil war that talked about earlier. we should be supporting them where possible, investing where necessary and possible the local

governments in africa and asia. but the promotion of representative government in the muslim world no longer appears to be a high priority of this and this -- this administration budgets have been cut. the discussion of democracy is no longer a public discussion that american officials have. there is a way to do it. in the case of iran, we should be supporting the democratic movement that was crushed after june 12. there is the iran democratic transition act that should be supported and not the -- and not opposed as the administration is doing. in the case of iran, we should support the women in those societies who are, in many ways, way ahead of their male

counterparts in their desire for freedom and democracy. let me finish with my sort of summary on all this. we face a serious and broad threat from islamic extremists. iran is a major element of that threat and its possible acquisition of nuclear weapons threatens to destabilize the entire region. thirdly, while the administration has taken some steps to do with the extremist threat, there are reasons to be concerned about it truly -- about whether it truly understands the workings to bring intelligence agencies to bear on this threat. what we need is a broad and global strategy to defeat this islamic extremism by the way, as was the case in the cold war, it will be a long struggle. it will be a generational

struggle. we need to try to build bipartisan support. no one party or two parties can carry this on for as long as the need to be carried on. we need republicans and democrats to agree that this is a threat. i thought, after 9/11, that we would have a chance to do that. for a great time, we did. i am a historian coul. america's never failed to stand up to the challenges we face. we will do it again. but it will be tough. thank you very much. [applause] >> yes, sir. >> could you speak to the risk you see in suny nuclear power in pakistan and the threat of the

shia in [unintelligible] >> pakistan is a nuclear power. i do not think there is much likelihood that they will use their nuclear weapons against iran. objectively, the iranians are surrounded by nuclear states -- russia being somewhat removed now because they are no longer in central asia. but it is clear that it is not in america's interest for iran to have nuclear-weapons. that is the bottom line. as the president used to say, it is unacceptable for iran to have nuclear-weapons. >> i would like to know at what point do you think israel will step in and act to defend

itself against iranian nuclear weapons? >> first, obviously, that is a question that only an israeli government official could answer. but from an israeli point of view, it is understandable that they would be very concerned about a nuclear run -- a nuclear iran, especially when it has an extremist islamic government. i am not saying that if iran were democratic and had a nuclear weapon that israel would not be concerned. we would be concerned, too. but we would be much less concerned. we are less concerned that france has nuclear weapons for a reason. it is not all equal. it is a different thing when there is an extremist government. i would not want to predict

what israel might or might not do. but i can certainly see it they're concerned and i think those concerns will grow. >> some apologists for ron think that -- some apologist for iran think that' [unintelligible] do you think that appearing crazy enough to use nuclear weapons is an intentional tactic for the iranians? >> the psychologist in my family is my daughter. i will leave of the second one of those because i do not know. i think it is a very dangerous form of capitulation to assume that we can deal with iran through what is called extended deterrence. there have been some hints in the administration, especially by secretary clinton lasted all,

that this may be the direction that the administration would be headed. i think it is a very dangerous assumption that the leadership, which claims its right to rule through divine right, regularly refers to the belief of the return of the 13th osculating imam and talks regularly of the destruction of israel. it is a bit dangerous to assume that a government like that would not be prepared to use nuclear weapons. i think you have to make the assumption, if you were an israeli and american, that it is far too dangerous. we cannot accept it if it happens. >> thank you for your message today. you referred to a civil war going on within islam over the

central problem of hate, violence, and escalation to dominance that you identified. i would like to think it is so, but i do not see them much evidence in the muslim world, in europe, or in this country that there is a moderate or a conciliation side fighting against the hateful side. >> it is a good point. i sink c old american term, you have got, -- i sink in the old american term you have got what we used to call the silent majority, and i think that is more or less right. there are governments, and i know many islamic leaders i have met, who genuinely paid fees extremists, and if you look at the polling -- genuinely hate these extremists, and if you look at the polling, there has

been a rather dramatic drop in expressed support for islamic extremism among the public. are they willing to stand up and say it publicly? many of them are afraid. one thing they are afraid of is they will not get support from us, so one thing that part of the strategy must be to encourage those people to be brave and to go out and say, you extremists are that the states here. you are the people who are not -- dthe apostates here. you are the people who are not carrying out true islam. i believe the vast majority of muslims are not terrorists. >> how did iran come into contact with the means to create

nuclear weapons, and how of the display into the mix, since you thing he did all the proliferation in the first place? play into it? >> it goes back to the days of the shock, when both the united states and france were involved in what was a peaceful nuclear power program in iran. i think there is a lot that we still do not know about it ucowith this. there is a north korean connection that comes up from time to time. the central point is not to do the bureaucratic archaeology. the central point is to stop it. >> thank you for your service, mr. ambassador. will you talk about pakistan and its ability to deal with its

internal security problems? >> that is a very important question. i am not an expert on pakistan, although i have been there very often and i lived in afghanistan for two years. i think that the pakistan government, in the last year, has begun to show movement in the right direction, particularly their operations with very important captors of operatives. it shows that their intelligence and the pakistani military air beginning to move. they have a problem. the indians still have many people in kashmir. it would be helpful if the indians would work to reduce the tension which would allow the pakistan military to focus more

in the west. some of that is happening. as long as the pakistani government, military, and intelligence services are confident that the united states is there to stay and to win, we will continue to see improvements. while the president agreed on the surge in afghanistan, he unfortunately connected it and immediately with a withdrawal. power relationships are finally measured by people and they will see who is going to be up and will be down and mostly who will be there. one of the challenges for the administration in the next 18 months, on the political side as we move toward on the military side, is to persuade the people that we really mean it. that we are really there to see this through. >> your comments seemed to be supportive of the patriot act.

there are many people who are concerned about the threat of our own civil liberties with that act. >> it is always a hard triggetre off. i take a backseat to nobody with respect to our liberties and our rights. but there is a trade-off. we cannot be 100% free in our civil rights and the 100% safe. there's always going to be a trade-off. so i would not begin to comment on particular aspects of the trade gap. however, on the whole, it is a good act and i think it is commendable, for the most part, that the administration has continued to carry it out.

>> i appreciate your presence and your message, ambassador. how do we persuade china, which has a lot of oil interest and energy interests in iran, and russia, which has this beltline that can be pretty rattled by islamist interest? how do we go about persuading these two countries to side with us? >> i think it would be an ideal of come to get them to side with this because it would make more likely the possibility of a robust regime of sanctions getting through the security council. but i think it is a mistake to make that the first step. i know you will hear from my friend john bolton tonight. he had to put up with the u.n. for all of those years. he always admired what went on

in the united nations. it reminded him of underwater ballet. all of those intricate maneuvers with nowhere -- but with no air -- all those intricate maneuvers with no air -- [laughter] there have been dealing with the problems of islam before it 250 years or 300 years. their former colonies in central asia [unintelligible] the chinese are a more difficult problem. our economic leverage is declining, i think. but the main point is that we should not let the russians or the chinese hold hostage something central to american national security. if we can get them to go along,

that is great. if not, but if they want to go through the security council quietly and covertly -- if they want to go through the security council quietly and overly, that is fine. time is running out. >> my concern is radical islam that is already within our borders and putting down sharia routes. why is not the congress and the justice department investigating organizations that are fronts for the muslim brotherhood. it seems that there are things within our borders that could be done that are not being done by our representatives. >> i think that is i and it is

appropriate concern. -- i think that is an appropriate concern. there is a balance to be drawn between our freedoms that we all hold very dear and security. one of our tenants is freedom of religion. there is no reason to punish someone because he or she is muslim. we have to find some predicate criminal activity or indication of criminal activity. that can be difficult. i think we are making progress. we have had a number of important arrests. it is not fair to say that nothing is being it is probably fair to say that not enough is being done. but finding that balance, particularly when it concerns

activity within the united states, it is far more difficult to find it. i think this is going to be the last one. >> it has been said that insanity is doing the same thing time after time and expecting different results. how much longer are we going to wait with the united nations and the sanctions that we continue to put on iran and similar countries with absolutely no results? >> you should ask john. [laughter] i think his answer would probably be that we have already done it too long. the un is not a world government. it has its uses. as long as whoever is in power in washington understands the limits of those powers, and it is quite limited, they can be

dramatic tools. you can go back to the league of nations for the most immediate and conceded. but the un ihas not been a great success in a lot of crucial areas. here i think is where philosophically this administration differs from the previous administration. in the end, is on to be american leadership that will protect the american people. you can use diplomacy and influence. but to do that effectively for our security, you have to sit -- up to start with a clear concept of what the threat is. that is where we still have a lot of work to do. thank you very much. [applause]

>> up next, the administrat or of the u.s. agency for international development. after that, a forum on insurgency in iraq. after that, the president of washington university. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] president obama heads to the philadelphia area tomorrow. he is expected to talk about health insurance reform. our live coverage starts at 11:00 a.m. eastern. >> over 1000 middle school and high-school students enter the c-span documentary competition with a short video on one of our country's greatest strengths or a challenge we are facing.

>> in which four presidents lived past 90 years old, they were john adams, herbert hoover, ronald reagan, and gerald ford. find these and other presidential facts in seized and cost nearly updating book, who is buried in grant's tomb -- and other presidential fax in a c- span's new book, "who is buried in grant's tomb?" the story of their final moments and insight into their lives. now available at your favorite bookseller, or get a 25% discount at a publisher's web site. a look now at u.s. aid efforts in haiti. this is about 25 minutes.

pap -- c-span 2. host: we have the administrator for the u.s. agency for international development, usaid. he is here to talk to us about foreign aid and different aspects of the foreign aid budget. doctor, if we could start with current issues, do you know how much has the u.s. government spent so far in haiti and chile? guest: between the two more than $600 million with the vast majority of that being focused on the relief effort in haiti. when this incredible earthquake happened, it was the worst natural disaster to hit haiti in centuries and destroyed critical infrastructure in and around port-au-prince. the main city. the president immediately asked for a swift and aggressive and coordinated response, so we put

together a broad range of assets and capabilities and started to provide water, shelter, food and sent more than 500 search and rescue experts to we will continue to stand with haiti going forward. >> what about chile? >> they have also been hit by a tremendous earthquake, and 8.8 magnitude earthquake that has affected 2 million people. this is the most directly hit has been concepcion. estimate more than 800 people have lost their lives in chile. the president has asked us for specific resources and specific help in areas like water, medical, field hospital support, communications equipment to help their own relief systems operate more effectively.

chile has had an effective response, so they have provided a great deal of their own response to this tragedy. >> where does this come from? is it what you did for? >> it is budgeted for kerrigan wages have -- it is coveted for. we just made the 2011 budget. the goal is to meet the needs of humanitarian crises around the world, primarily by funding office of foreign disaster assistance. it is critically important we continue to provide resources and capabilities so we can act quickly and aggressively and often, and the united states offers the first humanitarian assistance on the ground in haiti. assistance. in haiti it was the u.s. capability that kept the airport open and made it accessible to people around the world so that

we could bring in and coordinate assistance not just from the united states but more than 40 countries. host: let's put the numbers on the screen. we have dr. shah for 20 minutes. he is the administrator for the u.s. agency tpfor international development. you can see the numbers on the screen. first-time callers only. in your view is there a secondary purpose to foreign aid besides humanitarian aid? guest: absolutely. the president said we cannot be secure and setting can't be secure unless they have access to meet basic needs. secretary clinton and secretary gates have both spoken about our ability to provide resources and cooperation to other countries to help solve critical problems, whether extreme poverty, poor

health, vulnerability to climate, these are the challenges of our future in an interconnected world and if we can help countries resolve those problems and put themselves on a path of sustainability and growth we will have more trading partners, we will be more safe and secure and kids that have access to education and young adults that have access to employment are far less likely to be vulnerable to threats of extremist ideology or other things that could take them in a different direction. this is a critical part of foreign policy and sraoelt to national -- vital to national security interests an aside from the humanitarian efforts this is critical to our national security. host: does u.s. get political good will out of aid, or is it -- guest: we do. i will tell you when i was in haiti i visited a town outside

of port-au-prince. that town had a u.s. a.i. tkfd. built school near where you enter the opportunity and it was built to earthquake standards and it was one of the few buildings left standing. they were using it for jackson and distribution of relief supplies. there is a little plaque that it was the generosity of the american people that enabled that to happen. that is recognized around the world. i have visited those types of sites, whether schools, hospitals, health clinics or any other facilities, all over the world. in india, parts of africa, latin america. so, this is how we express our abili ability. this is really the expression of what is best about our country. it is a hopefulness that all people no matter where they are born should have the opportunity to lead a healthy and productive life and that we care about the well-being of people who may be born into extreme poverty and misery in some other part of the world.

this is really an expression of american values. we recognize we have to be accountable for how we spend and be focused on results. but people do recognize the value of this generosity from the american people. host: the chairman of the joint chiefs just said that the military is doing too much when it comes to foreign aid. do you agree? guest: well, i agree with the admiral's speech. i thought it was a very important speech and echoed many sentiments expressed by secretary gates an secretary clinton where he basically said as part of our foreign policy we have to have a multi-facetted foreign policy that includes a strong and capable and very effective military presence. but also it includes a strong diplomatic capability with active and effective diplomacy. and alongside that a strong development capacity. so, if countries are

experiencing an actual increase in the number of people who go hungry or starve or kids who are m malnourished or extreme poverty going up in places where it has been going down the past several decades, those trends work against our national interests. so, if we can do things that are effective and efficient to help kids go to school and have access to healthcare, make mature mothers with give birth without the risk of death themselves, then we should do something about that to create a just and more peaceful world for our own safety and security. host: how gdo you go from beinga medical doctor to being director of usaid? guest: before i went to medical school i worked in a tuberculosis program in india and saw the value of u.s. assistance and targeted and effective medical care in a way

that could save lives an improve living standards for people who live in circumstances that frankly i had a hard time understanding being born and raised in michigan. when you see that type of extreme poverty and suffering it is almost unbelievable. and it touches you very deeply. so, i had the opportunity to serve in this capacity and it is tremendous. i was at the bill and melinda gates foundation before that and i had a chance to participate in that and i hope to bring some of that focused on results and accountability. and we will make mistakes but we hope to learn and be more efficient and effective in the execution of or work. host: first call for dr. shah is from stone mountain, georgia. cayen cayenne. on the democrat line. caller: good morning. and good morning, dr. shah.

thanks for addressing such a complex matter. that said, i would like to shift back to haiti because you made the comment about the u.s. being the first presence on the ground shortly after the earthquake. however, isn't it true that cuba had already and a has pretty much always had a presence in haiti? and i wonder why is it that for the most part the corporate run media -- and i had also include c-span to a large degree -- ignores the efforts that are made by the island nation who are not occupying haiti with a military presence but actually are engaged in humanitarian work? and if you can address that. and -- host: caller, why do you care so much about cuba? caller: because i do think there is an unfair policy that has been in place for years now that

has unfairly targeted cuba for its politics. host: all right. dr. shah? guest: thanks for that question. i do think in a humanitarian crisis and emergency our goal both on behalf of the united states and our president but the buyer international community is to work with everybody as effectively and rapidly as we can. so, our initial effort was to open the airport, get the seaport working, make sure assistance could flow in. the united states, of course, has had a presence in haiti for many years making significant investments in building schools and providing health services to low income children and doing a range of other things. so, we did have a presence and we had many of our own staff and organizations and partners who had been working on the ground before the earthquake, lived through the earthquake and continue to provide results and

humanitarian solutions after that. one point of note is that we actually do work with cuba in haiti through the medical care system and in support of cuban doctors in particular. we were really in a position where we wanted to provide as many medical services as we could to the people who were affected. more than 200,000 people almost immediately needed some immediate medical attention, more than four million were affected overall by the earthquake. so away worked with everybody. and i think that it is great the cuban doctors were there and able to provide services in some of the hospitals. we september our own medical assistance teams that saw more than 30,000 patients and performed hundreds of surgeries. it continues to be an international effort and in a time of crisis like that it is wonderful to see people and professionals and assistants come together against that common service mission. host: our us aid people still in

haiti? >> absolutely. we have a full team there. we have expanded it significantly to include people who can work directly with the military and go up for guidance in support of the ability to the military to provide support to the humanitarian mission. and we will continue to thereby for some time. we have had a longstanding special relationship and commitment to haiti and we will absolutely see that through going forward. host: easton, maryland. phillip, republican line. caller: good morning, dr. shah and thank to you c-span. you helped my drive time go quicker. my question is this. i will take the answer off the air. during the vietnam war us aid was using or was employing military officers to work in an advisory capacity in helping the populace. i was wondering if that is still used in any areas where we have had recent conflicts, whether it be in bosnia or, say, in

afghanistan and/or iraq? guest: i would say in all of those places we work very closely with the military. we have a strong connection with the military through a variety of different personnel relationships and offices of civilian and military affairs. and it really is important to be very coordinated as we do this work. afghanistan is a great example where this is our largest u.s. aid mission in the world. we have had some successes going from 900,000 kids in afghanistan had access to school and now we have more than 6.2 million children six or seven years into that effort that are going to school and 40% of them are girls. so, there are some big improvements and there is a real opportunity to create improvement in meeting human needs and laying the basis for a stable and sustainable society. in places where there is a military operation we of course work very closely and in tight

concert with our colleagues from the department of defense. host: a tweet, early after earthquake i heard relief planes brazil and france were turned away while our dignitaries and press landed. is that true? guest: well, the airport was very challenging. right after the earthquake the control tower had collapsed and the airport was actually not functional. so, the united states military went in and within 24 hours had the airport up and running. that is an airport that had about 20 flights a day before the earthquake. with effective military operation of the airport they had it up to 160 flights a day at peak. so we had more than eight times the stashed capacity. -- standard capacity. even at that increased capacity we had to make some decisions with the haitian government and with the united nations about prioritizing flights. the priorities were always heal health, food, water, medical supplies and relief personnel. we didn't have any situations

where certainly on behalf of the united states where u.s. dignitaries took flight slots that could have been used for foreign assistance. we were very specific about t that. the haitian government set a number of other priorities so we did have dignitaries from other parts of the world coming in at their request to help coordinate and lead the relief effort and do other things. but this was a real success story of getting that airport up so quickly to high capacity. now it is down far below that because the seaport is working at a capacity that is 400-plus containers a day which is more than twice the capacity prior to the earthquake. but when it kind of earthquake happens and we lost access to the seaport and airport, it just became a challenge at the beginning and it was a great thing we were able to get so much more through-put into the country to provide relief. host: on our independent line robert from rosemont,

pennsylvania. caller: doctor, thank you for your service. it outstanding. given yesterday's one million homeless and the rain and hurricane system how do i get involved in building homes, orphanages. we have built hurricane proof homes in two to four weeks. guest: that is wonderful. i would appreciate learning more about that and you could connect with us through our website at w wfrw www .usaid.gov. you can collect to the clinton bush haiti fund which is the primary vehicle for getting private and donor khreuplts. it is clintonbush haiti fund.org. that would be a way to do that. it true right now we are in an absolute race against the clock. there are efforts to get emergency shelter materials to

1.3 million in part principals in -- in port-au-prince in advance of the rainy season in april. we are working with partners and encouraging as many creativity and innovation in the process. i just got a briefing yesterday about how our teams on the ground and i applaud their incrennel work, are -- incredible work are clearing rubble, working with haitians and often in haitian job programs, making sites safe, surveying which settlements are in and which people are in very flood vulnerable plains and areas and moving them to safe are places in advance of the rain. so it is a big effort and requires a tremendous amount of logistics and i applaud the interest of the caller and look forward to learn more. host: could you speak about the coordination between federal and private funds in because we talk about usaid funds. how much in private funds and

what kind of control is there over the private funds in guest: first in has been a tremendous private response and shows the common humanity and commitment of the american people. we believe more than half of all american families have given in some way to haiti and if you think about that, that is a tremendous achievement and something that all americans should take great pride in. the clinton/bush haiti fund is the primary vehicle for acknowledging that if money comes in we can account for its effectiveness and allowing it against the top priorities coming out of the relief effort. host: is that a fund controlled by usaid? guest: no, it is a private fund. presidents clinton and bush were asked to come together as they had around the tsunami effort and do that in order to facilitate getting private resources into haiti and doing it in a coordinated way.

so, that is deeply and tightly coordinated with the process on the ground. for example, i think they just took delivery in haiti of some 70 trucks that are being used to move rubble and move people and do all of that. but, knowing where to get those types of contributions and knowing which organizations need them, getting them to them quickly and picking the things that are most important is a significant coordination challenge and that is why we encourage people to use that fund. host: last call for dr. shah administrator of usaid from akron, ohio. caller: i'm independent. host: go ahead. caller: thank you for taking my call. dr. shah, it is wonderful to talk to you. you sound like a very knowledgeable, caring person. one of the things i don't understand is why not, if it is ever talked about that we have a vital interest in haiti. we took out an elected official

and flew him to another country and hand picked who we wanted to lead their country, who now is off site. host: could you expand that a little bit? the political aftereffects or political importance of usaid? guest: you. such a strong vita interest as juanita indicated to ma sure that societies have the ability to protect their vulnerable populations grow and have an opportunity to connect to a more interconnected global economy. doing that in a way that is effective and sustainable so that we can all benefit from the fruits of a global economy that is peaceful and just. and that is a critical part of our security. in so many countries that is more acute than other places and haiti is one of those places we just have a longstanding commitment and relationship to

the people of haiti and its leaders. and we have been working very closely with president preval in coordinating our effort and working in support of what the needs of the haitian people are. so, that is the spirit that continues to guide our work in haiti. but in countries all around the world we want to be respectful of governments and work in deep partnerships so we are tphnot exercising our work at patronage but real partners and we want to listen ultimately to the most vulnerable people that we serve so we can meet their needs and help them pull themselves out of poverty and lead better lives. and when we are successful, i have had the chance to visit schools or hospitals or entire societies that have graduated from usaid commitments and programs and gone on in many cases to be donors of the activities and you. the gratefulness and connection

of that work when we find scholars that performing a curl kinds in africa or medical doctors in asia. they value the fact they had the opportunities because of usaid programs and commitments of the american people and i believe this country will benefit from that good will. host: what is your response to people who say we are spending $8.5 billion on global health, $7.7 billion for afghanistan, pakistans iraq, $4.2 billion for humanitarian assistance and our budget is 40% of our current budget is deficit spending? guest: well, a few things. i come back to admiral mullens' article and speech. these are investments we are making in our own security and well-being. these are also investments we are making because they are the right thing to do and when we have the opportunity to save lives as at $11 it $14 we can

do in vaccination or have the opportunity to treat h.i.v. patients and keep societies from losing the core productive workforce and falling into disarray and conflict we are saving money in the long run and creating a more stable and just world to participate in. and that is as president obama has said the responsibility of a superpower that has the capability to do this. we need to hold partners accountable and i think the united states agency for international development and american people should make sure every dollar we spend is worth it and be focused on that. but when we know we are generating ons for security, stability and well-being. this requires the effective use of fenster redds of the national security including development. and this requires relentless focus on results and accountability, focus the embrace with enthusiasm.

thank you and i look forward to your questions, your guidance and ongoing consultations. blblblblblblblblblblblblblblblbl conversations and brainstorming related to five core working group topic areas related to how

the united states projects its power and its marra power in diplomatic and development capacity is around a world. as we transition we are in the process of transitioning to a series of more operationally oriented task forces that will be addressing specific topics like how we improve our ability to do policy planning, how we develop systems for accountability in budgeting, how we help our country missions and our country chief of missions develop long-term investment strategy is for development and diplomacy and have the flexibility to partner more effectively with the private sector with sources of innovation and with country governments themselves. the results of those more specific operational efforts should be available in the april -- may timeframe and we at this time hope to have a deep an ongoing conversation at both about the contents of the qddr as well as learning from the

committees and the congress around the range of views on some of these core issues and that is an ongoing process but one that has shifted the from a larger strategic conversation to a more focused said of operational discussions. a presidential study directive a similarly making the same transition after having completed a series of phases of work that brought together 16 -- 18 different agencies throughout the federal government to discuss ideas and concepts in a more open space related to the future of development, that is transitioning into also m.r. operational focus to come up with specific constructs that will define development strategy that this administration is going forward. if they come together in a number of different ways not least of which our deputies committees we participated in but also the key individuals part of the process is often the same individuals. >> and the psd, when you think

that process -- you mentioned april. a notion of idea for the qddr, what about the pst? >> i don't think this qddr will be completed in april but we will have enough specifics to begin a serious consultation on the set of ideas in that timeframe. on this before i would expect the same thing although i shouldn't speak on behalf of the national security council and they can identify more specific time line and we come back with a specific answer. >> i would appreciate that. in a foreign the funding, can you borrow from the programs across the globe until the supplemental funding arrives? everyone understands in the overall needs in haiti, but the fact is these top-rated hardships and delays on the ground in other countries such as sudan and condo. what is being done to ensure that other humanitarian

emergencies on to being neglected in order to address the tragedy in haiti? >> well, i appreciate that question and i believe the u.s. government has committed more than $600 million to the effort in haiti and as you point out a large percentage of that has come from the idea -- the account that provides the flexible and rapid funding. we will seek a supplemental to reconstitute the account as fully as possible in this context. we've been in close contact with are implementing partners and other complex crises around the world and have asked them not to delay or slow down program implementation working and the assumption those additional resources will arrive prior to the june timeframe. which was when we would have to sire to make in the trade-offs we hope not to make so i am aware that a number of partners felt they might have to do that and we try to be in touch with

everyone who has reached out to indicate they should not slow down programs and other areas and we expect the supplemental to reconstituted in a manner -- >> assumption of my question is wrong, there hasn't been depravation and other programs as a result of the transfer of. >> that is correct, sir,. i believe -- i know partners have reached out asking if they should and when we did we try to this correct -- barack at. >> my time is expired, the ranking member is the. >> thank you. i am concerned that with the arrests and the presidents of u.s. citizens alan groce that's a id programs in cuba may have come to a standstill and, if we get a commitment from you and dr. shah that usaid is going to continue to carry out u.s.

democracy programs in cuba. i would appreciate that. on haiti following up on the chairman's questions how should the costs of the recovery response and long-term development in haiti be shared among donor countries and what portion of the overall aid efforts for haiti over the covering years should the u.s. expected to provide have a 10%, 20%, 30%, whichever figures you think? lastly on the west bank and gaza, the administration has requested another $400 million in economic support funds for west bank and gaza, but as we have seen there's been a lot and a stealing of those funds that's not been managed well. what kind of getting to we have a place to ensure that the funding does not benefit to violent extremists, corrupt officials, and instead richest its intended targets? what kind of metrics are we

using to ensure that we can actually accomplish what we seek to do with the finding? thank you, sir. >> thank you. i appreciate those questions. on cuba in particular i think we can strongly affirm our commitment to execute our priorities, we've taken a number of steps working with the states the power and to try to address the needs of mr. groce. i've been in direct contact with the partner for whom he was contacted to work with and we work directly with the rangers to ensure that they and then challenging travel situation that they come up with alternative solutions to execute and implement these programs and we're giving them the flexibility so we are fully committed to seeing to the program there. on haiti i appreciate your points in your earlier comments there as well. we have been at approximately half of the overall early relief efforts. a large part is the department of defense, the costs related to

to the assets including the marines, the comfort hospital, the effort to rebuild the port and airport -- those were mission critical early activities required for other assistance to come in. as we transition three construction of expect that percentage to go down significantly and we're working with the range of major bilateral partners but also the world bank as part of the post disaster assessment to make sure a strong plan is going ford unveiled at the donor's conference in march this month, and that u.s. assistance is targeted and a far more modest percentage of the overall aspiration -- needs. it will be a small percentage better of leadership will be critical and our technical support and deeper engagement in this process will be continued and unwavering. on a world bank@@@@@ @ @ @ , r

account in the palestinian banking system and then flows mauna turn on a case by case basis. so there's a very strong system in place for tracking cash flows in that environment as well and our budget request going forward and is two really focus on to a specific work that will achieve real outcomes and infrastructure and in health and humanitarian support and draws up. i'm happy to describe it that some of the things we have done have been successful building

60 kilometers of road in the west bank, funding seven schools that are operational and effective in promoting the health system in that region that is reaching many more people in need. so we will continue to track those outcomes closely but we have special systems for tracking how we work with partners and how we track the flow pash. >> thank you so much of the imposition of the wispy to make sure that it's a transparent accountable system of aid that is not corrupted the by the corrupt officials in the west bank and gaza. thank you dr. shah, thank you mr. chairman. >> i yield to five minutes to the gentleman from new jersey, chairman of the african subcommittee, mr. payne and. >> thank you dr. shah and let me commend you for the outstanding job you've done in haiti. also i wish we didn't have a dead but we have to remember we have a balanced budget when president clinton left however,

a war in the rack which was unnecessary and a big tax cuts put this in a position we're in today unfortunately. let me just say about the global fund, i see that you have cut 50 million from the global fund and i wonder if you look at that because as you know the u.n. formula is a one-third u.s., 150 million will be cut over all when the other nations participate. secondly on the neglected tropical diseases, although you are dealing with them, some of them most neglected such as fatal distiller, sleeping cessna -- sleeping sickness, charges, and disease, and some of these other disfiguring all service are not covered and i wonder if they could be included in that. just quickly on three governance

groups, somalia with a transitional federal government. i wonder will there be a significant increase in development aid because we have to support those governments or we're going to be in my opinion is very serious problems. if they fall all of these africa as you know somaliland will go. secondly are we concentrating enough on south sudan? in 2011 they decide to secede, how will we support the new government with the additional funds? and finally liberia and needs to have a some consideration of where we have a strong institutions. we see elections work like south africa and other places where we don't they fail us so if you've been book and liberia, the historical relationship between the u.s. and library it is important and finally i'd like

to know how you are making out with africa, and the coordination with that. i will just also you can answer the questions. thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. we have on the global fund in particular and that's in the context of the larger global health initiative, we're committed to the financial increases against global health. and even more than that using the resources in the way that will be effective against those lagging indicators like maternal mortality in newborn and obstetric care. we are working with the global fund for vaccines and immunizations and other programs to accelerate the partnerships between them and get more value out of the overall investment. the overall administration would press as a billion dollars because it includes the treasury components and will be very committed to helping the global fund succeed. on neglected tropical diseases that will take your comments as

a heisman and look specifically into those cases. that's a unique area where i do believe we can and have been in discussions to sell republic private partnerships and me to the overall needs that they have been delayed by the world health organization and others and as a very much a priority of the global health initiative. on somalia we will in terms of increases in development assistance most of our assistance is humanitarian, going to the normal, we continue to be in close conversation with the world food program to explore what can be done and when in other parts of somalia and we look to use our development assistance in a strategic manner. i will follow-up more specifically on what we can do to be more expansive in that context. with southern sudan we had $95 million for the referendum and for support for the referendum and we're doing a series of activities with respect to capacity building and serving the people of southern

sudan. i will go to our mission is in that region there and unlike other partners even multi lateral partners that are trying to serve the region from farther away, we feel we are well-positioned should the needs arise as you have identified so we are in contingency planning around that. also identify what kind of budget flexibility and indians but we think we would have an important role in leading that and think we have important role in bringing other multilateral institutions to that mission should that be the outcome of the early 2011 referendum. i will take your comments on liberia as guidance and on that effort -- africom we are in discussion with them and you hope to have a solid coordinated effort in africa. have visited them this summer and hope to continue that conversation. >> the time has expired, the gentleman from texas is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman.

dr. shah, thank you for being here. i am over here. the far right to you. first of all, i want to commend the workers in the field and usaid. i have travelled like everybody in this committee all over. there are the greatest ambassadors for the united states and freedom and that we have, those people in the field. i know that usaid is developing all kinds of things most recently the former's -- the former said texas a&m have had some soybean that yields nine times what they used to yield four afghanistan and so that's the farmers in afghanistan don't have to raise poppies, they can raise soybeans that were invented at texas a&m. that's all good thing. i'm concerned about those being good stewards of money.

last week we had before us this special inspector general for iraq reconstruction and he said in a reconstruction of iraq there was and there is a $4 billion and accounted for a. and i asked him which of all the agencies that are in direct from the united states has i guess the worst record of accountability and he said the state department. of course, the example he used was the $2.5 billion that went to dime corporation for training police officers and there's no records about a prayer that $2.5 billion went. and so i'm concerned about the unaccountability of money we sent and i also ask about could some of that money have turned up in the hands of our enemies like al qaeda? he mentioned that there were 14,000 bloc weapons that

disappeared from our possessions to summer else. that troubles me when we have our men and women in uniform overseas trying to protect us and downs that we ship over there and up in their hands because our federal agencies aren't good stewards of the money. so you want an increase in the budget, we have 50 million americans unemployed, it seems like to mean when some country is in trouble, of course, they call 1-800-usaid to come over and help them out. that's what we kind of do in this country, the government and the people of this country are the most giving of any nation in history. but i would like for you to specifically address this problem of accountability and how do we know that this money is going to be accounted for, that these are going to steal

it, crooked contractors aren't going to steal it and the bad guys aren't going to end up with some of the aid that we send to ford countries. similar to some of the questions the ranking member addressed and other parts of the world. so how about that dr. shah? >> thank you, sir,. i want to thank you for your comments about our staff and also with knowledge that our foreign service nationals in that context to make us awfully proud. i also want to address your comments about texas a&m. for proposing in this budget increase in our agricultural research and development as relates to meeting the needs and some of these prior countries and food security. with respect. >> reconstruction, the contract you referred to, i wouldn't point out for usaid we have a shifting strategy where we are moving toward supporting the elections that are upcoming and providing a real support to the

government and the health system. and other community basic means and the needs of population. if we are more aggressively pursuing matching fund requirements to make sure that our resources are being matched by the government of iraq and we have a strong financial accountability and procurements systems in place that are tracked closely in that context. in general -- >> excuse me dr. shah, are these accountability -- procedures new? were the same ones? >> many of them are new over the course of the last. some are based on learning, there are four basic strategies we used to track ensure accountability. i agree they could be more transparent and that's my party to make them more transparent. we have rigorous systems for making sure we work with those partners especially in pakistan where we can track the resources and have confidence in effectiveness of spending in the second is capacity building

particularly its procurements systems both reform and tracking here a third is on monitoring and a fourth is on auditing which we do in a multiple of manner system in those places. >> thank you dr. shah. >> the time has expired, the gentleman from new york is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman. good morning dr. shah. it's great having you here and i think q4 your efforts especially in helping haiti with the aftermath that devastating earthquake. you talked about how complex it is in dealing with haiti. i would like first to ask the question, can you describe for us the international aspect of the effort to help haiti's? specifically the causation of funds, who is leading the effort, word we go from here and what role can the haitian government play and had we support that government until it has the capacity to take on more

on most of the responsibility? i know there is a number of the international community is calling for a he the marshall plan and i myself have put in a resolution calling for a he t. marshall plans live like to know what your thoughts are on whether or not we need to do that clearing call and whether he needs a marshall plan? and then i just want to ask also in the short time that we have about african latinos, you know that the obama administration has finalized a signing of the u.s. columbia joint action plan on racial and ethnic equality and we had one on brazil which i passed your report on that so we can continue to follow that. i know we're still making progress, but over the years i've requested appropriations from the usaid that we specifically help rationalize

communities inland america and more often than not a those are disproportionately africa latinos and indigenous populations so i'd like to know can you tell me about your plans to address the plight of african latinos and indigenous populations and have you prior to rice of plans from the budget perspective it? finally in a real briefly, a@@@@ establish sector by sector.

we play a key role in each of the clusters and directly with the government and we also in some cases like rubble removal for the establishment as safe place in advancing where the budget is coming in or in food distribution and water distribution at times when frankly we felt the clusters needed more support we stepped in and offer more capacity and director of leadership from our military civilian partnership in haiti. so that is how it is chlorinated on the international aspect. the haitian government has had a plan was recently unveiled a last spring and also revised and updated for last fall which was based on a decentralization of the population outside of port-au-prince and creating a vibrant economic opportunities and centers of economic activity outside a port-au-prince. we expect them to unveil the plan in a more updated in specific form at the upcoming darth conference and believe that constitutes the groundwork

for a very strong reconstruction everett that will hopefully build a packing more vibrant and more effective economy, government system and ability to meet human needs in port-au-prince and perhaps more portly the majority of the population outside of port-au-prince. in terms of your comments about african latinos in the western hemisphere it's absolutely true company recognized by our agency that those marginalized communities are disproportionately suffering on health and human indicators as welfare and well-being and throughout the hemisphere and that's a clear and statistically history for a point. i will come back to more specifically on how our budget addresses that by and our efforts to dress whose attorney, global health and meeting space -- meeting human needs which are disproportionately targeting those marshall as populations, how that plays out in terms of budget numbers i will come back to more specifically.

finally entrée capacity building in coordination, i do believe that we need a more effective coronation in that context. we've been in a conversation as part of the directive and in efforts like aref and security initiative to explore how we can improve the integration of our trade policy, trade capacity investment and our investment in agriculture and high-value ever closer to get more bang for our buck. >> the time has expired and the gentleman from new jersey and mr. smith is recognized. >> thank you for your testimony. about 12 years ago dr. shah your initiative and effort on the issue of autism and a time when very few people paid attention to it and it led to the creation of centers of excellence -- i wrote the provision for the centers of disease control and we quickly found that we may have an epidemic of about one add of every 100 of our children have autism or part of the best

burgers spectrum. i have since been focusing on the national elements of autism and to my not shocking but certainly to and many others this way, have realized that we have a global epidemic of autism. i'm working with a number of ngos in kenya, indonesia, poland and ireland trying to combat autism and all of these organizations have a is a deficiency in funding. lots of thoughts, a lot of good expertise, but lack of funding. i've introduce legislation h.r. 1878 about a year ago that would have a small grant program and also a teachers program and am asking if he would take a good long hard look at these ngos. am sure you have the authority, absent the legislation to assist these ngos and i will give you one on autism in nigeria. i know some involved with ngo

there, they suggest there may be as many as a million nigerians who have autism. i would ask you to take a good hard look at this and provide some assistance there. secondly on your three priority areas to talk about instability from rapid population growth and i would respectfully request you take a second look at the issue of the population. and places all all over europe, russia, the u.n. estimates by the year 205025% of our population than that which currently exists in russia, sam way with the eastern european countries, we're seeing a depopulation trend and the reason why the aggregate continues to grow is we're living longer. not about birth, it's about the other side of the spectrum. south korea there are so far below replacement japan has the same problem that they're looking at a serious this proportionality when it comes to workers and those who are on the other end of the spectrum receiving benefits so i think

your underlying assumption has been surpassed in many ways by a depopulation trend that is very injurious to individual countries and in china where the sex selection abortions has led to gender sided with 100 million missing girls, in whole unique set of problems has developed near as many as 40 million men will not able to find wives by 2020 because they are gone and dead as a result of sex selection abortion. ..

i would be happy to look at the ngo's you are proposing and we can do that in a systematic manner. i do believe the principles of the global health initiative which is to broaden the scope of how we think about supporting health systems in setting priorities based on medical need and based on what are the biggest lagging indicators against development goals will help guide our work in the health sector overall going forward and i appreciate your comments on that issue. on instability from population growth, i do believe the 2050 population projections are significant. they do show over 9 billion as a

global population and they i think consistent with your comments they show those increases will happen in certain parts of the world in certain parts of the world will stay flat and in some cases decrease, so i appreciate that and we will take a nuanced look at that very specifically. some of your comments related to gender and girls in that context which is an immediate priority for our team and for the secretary and abstract eric fistula i believe for global health of skilled attendance at birth than focusing on the needs of women and girls will create a strong strategic priority in that space. thank you. 's be the time of the gentleman has expired. the gentleman from georgia, \mr.{~}{-|}\mister scott is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you \mr.{~}{-|}\mister chairman. dr. shah let me first of all commend you and the obama administration for the very quick response to the situation in haiti. i would like to ask you a few questions about that if i may.

first of all, as of today, how much money has usaid spent in the disaster relief in haiti? >> i believe the overall federal commitment has been just over $600 million, maybe just over 600 and 30 million. of that amount, i think usaid has been approximately 350 million with the majority of the alternative part of that being department of defense spending. >> and which leads to my next question, where has that money been spent by category? >> i would have to provide you more specific rate down but the more areas have been a disaster relief account which immediately supported priorities for urban search-and-rescue. we sent our to train international search-and-rescue teams but also for five other teams that were stood up by fema so that we had at any one time more than 500 american

search-and-rescue professionals with heavy equipment and specialized training at work for an extended period of time. we made significant investments in the health space spending resources to take disaster assistance team from the department of health and human services and put them in place, supporting the treatment of more than 30,000 haitians in that context and then food and water were immediate priorities that accounted for a large bulk of that spending. we successfully supported the discretion of food to more than 3 million people who are at risk and had some have some immediate and aggressive procurements to make sure people had as much access to water in the camps as possible. we think we successfully met the needs around water and that was a big concern in the early moments of those up in the big areas of disaster assistance spending and in addition to that the department of defense with its personnel and its other resources and the comfort hospital ship also cost items we are tracking. >> going forward dr. shah, where

do you feel the priority should be now? where is where's the greatest need now for the people of haiti? >> the immediate needs are into areas. one is in the collective effort to remove rubble from and other waste from critical sites, whether they are elevated sites where people could live or whether they are drainage systems that will be critical when it rains, and link to that of shelter and sanitation. we are aggressively pursuing those three priorities with the common goal of reaching every haitian was shelter materials first by march 8 and then an expanded set of materials by april 8. that is a top priority in the second priority is public health. we have vaccinated more than 150,000, trying to reach 150,000 and have reached 80,000 so far in advance of the rainy season. >> there have been some reports coming to us from haiti that in our efforts to really move

forward and help them particularly in our food export area and particularly in the area of rice which is a major farming product of the farmers in haiti, and there has been some concern that maybe our efforts to do that have undermined the basic farmers in haiti because we have oversupplied the market and thereby putting disincentives in for the haitian people themselves and farming to produce their own food. can you give us an assessment of that situation and what are we doing to make sure we correct that? >> it is an incredibly important.. what we did is initially upon sending food we also sent some experts who could track market prices of different food commodities including rice, vegetable oils beans and track the flow of charcoal and cooking supplies and markets to make sure markers to make sure we are pursuing and assistance strategy that did not impede local market systems and resilience. we have been tracking that

closely. we do think we have had an aggressive response. the data on the rise and beans and vegetable oil is that we have not had a significant price effect and complementary to this effort we have accelerated our major program to support the agriculture sector including trying to get fertilizer support and cedes another agricultural support out to farmers in this farming season and we will continue to track the price of rice closely to make sure we are not distorting incentives for local production and you are right to point that out as a critical issue. >> we do have effective monitoring and evaluation and measurement systems in place to measure what we are doing? >> as best we can in an emergency environment. we were getting wildly different price estimates from different markets which would not take place in the normal setting so we are doing our best. >> thank you and i commend you for your excellent work. see the time of the gentleman is expired and the gentleman is

recognized. >> secretary clinton studied that we hope to put ourselves out of the ad business because due to our success countries will no longer need this kind of help. can you give us some examples of how a need in initiatives have been successful and permanently breaking the cycle of the pendants by impoverished countries, and also maybe in your answer, microfinance is something i have a lot of interest in. >> certainly, thank you. i think that is the long-term goal for anyone in the assistance business, which is to put ourselves out of assistance because countries effectively graduate. the most commonly cited examples are not always the most generalizable ones like western europe after the world war and after the marshall plan for south korea and some other east asian and east asian economies that were usaid beneficiaries and now are becoming donor

countries. so, that is an important example and we are trying to learn lessons from there to apply elsewhere. the guidance and dispense commission report offers a lot of interesting parallels of how we can pursue work differently in other parts of the world to achieve those outcomes. in terms of more specifically, areas like global health@@@@@ @d ℠$ this is an important area and the ranking member made reference to the credit authority.

we recently completed a transaction that provided credit authority support to microfinance institutions through the grinning bank and its global network. that will leverage more than $160 million and provide institutional support to institutions around the world to put resources in the pockets of women and vulnerable populations around the world that have a surprisingly high repayment rate and in the financial system that even though it is banking to the poorest it is an incredibly safe bet to make in terms of repayment rates and risk the communities take. in the development of other services for the poor. most notably insurance products and savings products that have recent data and research have shown are critically important to reducing the vulnerability of all kinds of shocks and wrists to the experience on the daylight so we appreciate your comment. >> very good. one of the other things i have

experienced in traveling to various countries and this is certainly not true of all areas, but it does seem like there is a duplication of services. you get into turf battles where usaid is doing a certain function and you see duplicative activities by perhaps another branch of the state department. do you see that is a problem? is that something you have experienced and if so how do we solve that problem and how do we get people to sidetrack it right now all of us being so aware of the finances, the limited finances that we have god. again i would appreciate your comments on how we tackle that problem. >> i appreciate that. there clearly are in certain parts of the world significant duplication of services and what is a clear priority for us is

trying to get to a place where we are predatory sink outcome and using resources as effectively as possible. i think you do that they really three things. the first is you set clear to set clear and specific development goals and develop hierarchies, and we are expanding our efforts to do that both in our hiring of expertise that usaid ended developing better policy planning and evaluation systems. the second is, we aspire to serve as a whole of government platform two-point resources against those goals and an efficient and not non-duplicative manner. the learnings from haiti accelerate the need to do that. the health sector in haiti is a good example where we have unique capabilities at the department of health and human services that were brought into the field and we have been able to transition those capabilities to local ngo partners to expand their ability to provide more services to patients. we need more examples of that kind of partnership for effectiveness and outcome. the third is really to focus on

scale as we implement our programs, so we have restructured our policy planning to do that on a program by program basis. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> the time of the gentleman has expired and the gentlelady from california is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you mr. chairman and dr. shah, welcome. i have really admired your stewardship of usaid. i've been in several i have been in several informational hearings with you, and you give us inspiration that this program is working well. i want to relate now to the lantos hyde act and if you remember it mandated a five-year strategy to treat 4.5 million cases of tuberculosis under the ots and 90,000 multi-drug-resistant tb kate-- tb cases. the global health initiative on the other hand proposes to treat

only 2.6 million tb patients and only 57,000 mtr tb cases. moreover tv will soon need new drugs to combat the rise in highly resistant tb. so, what specific initiatives are planned to strengthen country responses to reemerge in infectious diseases such as tb and how will tb treatment be incorporated into a health system, strengthening approach. >> thank you. i very much appreciate that. i got my first experience in tuberculosis working on a program and burr south india and number of years ago and recognize how critical and important this issue is and the importance of the legislative targets. i would say the distinction between the targets in terms of the 4.5, 2.6, 90 and 57,000 with

respect to npr is primarily i believe the distinction between what we think we can achieve in our bilateral programs with current technology and implementation protocols and what we would hope to achieve by getting more efficiencies out of the global health initiative, and we can get those efficiencies in two ways. one is as we repackage our complete programs to be more systems oriented i fully expect especially given the relationship between tb and hiv that will actually have more resources that are currently not counting going towards the joint treatment of tb and hiv and getting those numbers up. the second is i think we will partner better with the global fund and do more shared strengthening investments that would strengthen their capacity and hours to reach tb patients. i believe those numbers, the 2.6 and 57,000 our floors upon which we can build his begets more efficient and as we partner more effectively. the second one i would make is we will increase their research

and development investments. i am particularly enthusiastic about new diagnostic technologies that i think will detect tb earlier allowing more cases to be treated in the general platform as opposed to mtr requirements of that would lower dramatically the cost of each treatment episode. i also believe with new drugs and treatment protocols over time the length of time needed to treat an mtr patient will come down significantly potentially to as low as nine months and if that happens that would significantly expand our capacities to offer treatment more broadly so we will track these things very closely and try to learn from some of the more innovative efforts taking place around the world with tb. >> are you seeing tb and haiti? >> we have had all kinds of reports. we had a 51 surveillance site system that the centers for disease control has set up with our support tracking diseases. we have not had a big outbreak or any specific reporting in that area but they are out there

looking forward and i did see some earlier episodes they thought were tb but then i didn't get the follow-up that indicated it had been confirmed. >> thank you for that. the administration has stressed country ownership of the aids projects, aids projects, and that your meaning of this concept is really unclear to us. words such as country based and country led are also in the mix and in addition, aid is coming from me for i.d. of sectors. ghi, pat farr, and the global fund and so forth. can you tell us what country ownership and its many dairy nations means to you in the administration and how will this be reflected in your policies, and can you expand on how health initiatives will be coordinated within countries already receiving other forms of aid in

and keeping in mind the country ownership concept? >> thank you. the global health initiative will include all the investments to achieve that goal. quickly the four components of ownership to us our country plan, specific guidance from countries that informs her own strategic investment and restructuring our contracts and programs to abide by those guidances and sharing data information and personnel against a common strategy and learning platform. i am enthusiastic about my ability to work with tom frieden at the cdc and erica goos be in order to do that more effectively going forward. >> we are out of time. thank you so much. >> the time of the gentlelady has expired and we recognize the gentleman from california, mr. sherman for five minutes. >> i believe in foreign aid development because it is the right thing to do but we are told to go to our districts and sell it as a necessary component in the war on terrorism,

something we do for national security not just out of generosity. frankly, if the american people were convinced that it was only all true a stick, i think we would have an even more difficult time selling foreign aid. now, the proponents of foreign aid put forward the idea that any alleviation of poverty in the world reduces terrorism. this fits a western orality view of the world. we all desperately want to live in a reasonable world. so something like terrorism must be that just and reasonable response of desperate people who are desperately poor. unfortunately we live in an unreasonable world. poverty does not correlate with international terrorism. both be christmas day bomber and bin laden come from some of the

richest and most powerful families in the world and a majority of those who struck us on 9/11 come from a country that has received far more infusions of cash then usaid has ever dreamed of putting into one country or all countries. namely saudi arabia. they were middle and upper-middle-class kids from a country that gets an awful lot of american cash. somalia is kind of a separate case, but looking at the world as a whole, the poorest 10% of the world's people cause less than 10% of the international terrorism. so, simple poverty alleviation itself cannot be justified as a good investment in the global war on terrorism. another problem we have is the bureaucracy of usaid. it took strong political push to get them to put the flag on the

back. they did not want to say, this aid is from the american people. they just wanted to give out the aid. so many of your staff are people that wanted to work at oxfam but wanted a retirement plan. what can you do to make sure that when we select the countries and the projects, when we design each part of that project, and when we publicize the efforts and decide how much resources to put into publicity rather than putting the money and telling the people that you are doing good that we are in fact honest with the american people that this is an effort to win the global war on terrorism and to protect them. because, as good a goal as alleviation of world poverty is, and as much as i would supported i don't support telling the american people we are doing it to stop terrorism and then

failing to select, design and publicized so that we really are. if even your elected drucker see, what are you doing? >> thankb. thank yous or for tht comment. i do believe that our budget presentation prioritizes the intersection of the development investments in specific places in parts of specific civilian and military strategies that are designed to defeat al qaeda and support a stronger and more effective local security environment for our country. it is why we present our budget in the context in afghanistan and pakistan, where that is being carried out as a frontline state. i would also note that we have looked carefully at the data following the intimations and ami and i doubt you were involved in it, with the relief effort. the branding effort around usaid 's giving in that context more than doubled our favorability rating among the

intonation people and in that same six-week period after this nominee reduced by half the favorability of the indonesian people. >> i have limited time. i would like your answer and i hope you will extend it for the record. i just want to urge you to do everything it can to make sure every aspect of design and selection reflects what we are telling the american people and i want to put forward one idea. in the impoverished world people have to pay for kids textbooks. if we were to print all the elementary school and middle school textbooks a we could make sure the content, while not entirely politically correct perhaps from an american perspective is good and secondly would be helping education and third we would we-- we would be reducing corruption because it is hard to steal textbooks and turn them into cash. >> thank you. >> the time of the gentleman has expired. the gentleman from california, mr. costa is recognized.

>> thank you very much mr. chairman for this important hearing and thank you dr. shah for the good work you are doing. i want to cover your efforts and a host of countries that were focused and i would like some quick responses. obviously it was noted earlier about our efforts with regard to gaza and the west bank. how would you assess the results of the infusion does far of aid that has been provided and the palestinians ability to absorb the large amount of american aid , quickly. >> we track that very carefully. >> we made note of that earlier. how would you assess it? >> i think there has been more success in some areas than others. there hasthere is that there han success in infrastructure and development of road networks and building schools and there have been successes and health. in particular building a stronger health system and i think there are real challenges especially in gaza where there

for a brady of the reasons have been issues with both transport mobility of goods and individuals as well as some interference, and so there is much to do to improve the effectiveness of those efforts and we are working for a tuple medic channels to help improve that. >> i would like to provide a letter written, both of those challenged areas. in afghanistan and pakistan obviously those are harsh environments. many of us have visited those countries in the past. it is mind standing that usaid personnel were only there for a year in length, however as we know after the year ends most people are getting their feet on the ground at some level of understanding of local knowledge do you think that is too short of a time period as they are just becoming experts in their field or are you considering extending the time? >> we would like to encourage staff to stay for an extended period of time. we are doing a number of things

to facilitate a more effective personnel situation in afghanistan in particular related. >> that could be an administrative change could that? >> we have to balance that with our recruiting and process of making sure we have enough numbers. >> wouldwhat if an individual ds in pakistan or afghanistan they would like to stay beyond the year? >> they absolutely can if they would like to. >> as-- i have had experience with some folks from my area and have taken the time and contributed to build a hospital in afghanistan outside of kabul. i have seen where some of the money has been spent by us where we have had a lot of problems with corruption. it just seems to me that we don't have that right it right yet in terms of how whether we are building a road or building or school or housing or in this case a hospital. for $2 million they are able to build a state-of-the-art hospital, 100 and 20-- 120 beds

with no corruption involved. whether you guys doing to figure out how you can avoid or learn from past mistakes? >> first i will say i am aware of that hospital and appreciate the advanced but that represents in the work for members of your district. i do think our work in afghanistan is tracked quite closely. health is a good sector example. we were very selective in working with the ministry of health. it took a number of years to build the procurement system and other tracking systems to give us the confidence we can enter into the agreement we entered into with them last year. we have now started to flow resources through that ministry, but we track every procurement action quite carefully. we monitor every strategic decision and in addition to that we have a series of audits that take place both from our ig and the special inspector general to major that those resources are

being spent effectively. as a result of our health sector investments we believe we have more than tripled access to the health access for afghanistan, for the population of afghanistan and we think that is a tremendous achievement. we are optimistic. >> quickly before my time expires, mr. chairman i would like to see more work as it relates to determining how well we are applying the smart power and to ensure that the money is going into the right places. which brings me to iraq. what would you say as we ramp down and usaid ramps up in iraq are the lessons learned from the experience the department of defense? >> wells the or i think there are a broad range of lessons learned. some related contracting in the risks of very large and poorly supervised. >> you are going to sue apply those lessons? finally what you think your biggest do you think your biggest challenges are this year?

>> our efforts in afghanistan and pakistan in haiti as well as our health and food efforts, when you put that together will severely strain our workforce so building a strong workforce and our ability to do that will be critical to success. >> thank you very much. >> thank you mr. costa. the gentleman's time has expired and now the gentleman from minnesota, mr. alice is recognized for five minutes. >> let me add my voice to everyone for the speedy response in haiti. i represent minneapolis, minnesota and we have a large somali community there. they are all, not all but mostly all concerned about what is going on in somalia. and i realize that the u.s. reduced its funding to somalia last year after ofac expressed fear that the extended supply line and insurgent heavy areas were operating that it could be

diverted to al qaeda linked groups, but on the other side of the coin, the people in the u.n. have expressed concern about that because it results in a net reduction to food to people who needed desperately. what are the things that you think could be done to straighten the situation out, and do you care to offer some views on this? >> certainly, thank you. first i will start by saying we will follow and respect the law and the guidance around protecting and stewarding effectively u.s. resources. we have been in a very in-depth conversation with the world food program and they are our primary food distribution partners as you point out that they have been clear with us that this is not, that our policies are not impeding in any way their capacity to distribute food at

this time. they are not distributing food margaret sibley in southern somalia for their own safety, security and logistics capacity to do so in a difficult operating environment. so that is not the current constraint. we will work with them if that becomes the constraint and they have the ability to distribute food that we have offered to them. if they agree to do that then we will work with them to make sure we have a policy in place that supports those efforts. >> i'm going to submit this article for the record with unanimous consent or go. >> without objection. >> i will send it to you and perhaps we can flush out a stronger answer because i would like to get to the bottom of this because it seems there was some sort of a technical requirement that we are being restricted and i am sure you are aware of the complaint. it sounds like you are saying it maybe is not a valid complaint. >> i am sorry, what i was suggesting is we will work through that and we are now in a

different circumstance. the circumstance they are in right now and we are in direct communication is that that is not an operating issue any more. >> that is great. next, thank you for their work that you do to support the people in gaza. do you think that usaid could be more effective at its work if usaid personnel were able to enter gaza? have you reviewed a process by which usaid personnel might actually be able to enter not just work through surrogates? >> as a general principle, we do believe that our presence allows for improved effectiveness. we are reviewing a broad range of things we can do to improve the operations in gaza that include working with partner agencies, u.n. agencies more aggressively and working with diplomatic channels to reduce some of the issues.

>> forgive me sir, i am sorry doctor. usaid is working through circuits now. i want to know do you thing it would be an advantage to having usaid personnel in gaza since we are our ready and other tough areas like afghanistan and iraq and others'? >> i think the core constraint for us right now is actually mobility, getting items in and a series of specific issues with respect to interference from hamas and others in that environment. in that context it is not clear that sending our people and is the immediate resolution to that. i think the immediate resolution solving those problems as a precondition for that so we are working with others to do that. i am happy to review that more specifically though and come back to you with a more specific answer. >> yeah and usaid does operate in gaza, and do you feel that an

rot is doing all it can to keep materials and supplies away from hamas? >> we believe it is an incredibly important partner and needs to be successful with their partners so we work in coordination with them. i think we all can do a better job

.

[captioning made possible by comcast entertainment group] >> something that is ignored as

a command issue, and i think academics is especially blind about this. he didn't actually just get the theory right, he shoved it down the throat of the commanders. the theory was a colonial counterinsurgency theory. there were a lot of people in iraq that knew this well before petraeus got there. what he did was make every command was finally fighting the same war. this had been a major problem in iraq for several years. i remember in 2003, 2004, 2005, you would move around and there was like a different war. specifically how close could you get to a convoy before they shot at you? you had signs that would inform you, but the signs were already in english, not real helpful to the iraqi farmer trying to get

his things to market on time. what i saw petraeus do is get several echelons down. they would say, oh, yeah, petraeus spent several hours with me driving around in my humvee. he also had a political comisar to make sure they were not only talking a good game, but were executing a good game. there were some that talked a good game but seemed reflectionively -- reflexivel to operate in an old are fashion. by the time petraeus took over, they had a seasonned force behind them. they had tried it the hard way and were willing to listen and had enough knowledge of the streets to understand when

something made more sense. i think this made a huge difference to understand what was being said to them in a way that never made sense to sanchez or to casey. i remember at the time one of petraeus' advisors saying to me, i said who do you listen to when you are out? he said i listen to the company commander. i said, what are you feeling out here? he said, when those guys started saying to me in may and june of 2007 that things are changing, he said that's when i really started thinking, hey, this thing may be improving the security out here. the second thing that happened

and is still happening is something that andrew and i have talked about a lot over at cans where we write our instructions for the obama administration. [laughing] this is a question of host government. i think it is a huge part of our thinking. the french and british were essentially fighting colonial countercampaigns to retain a presence in these areas. we are trying to establish governments that can stand on their own and let us go home. i think there is a fundamental difference there. it leaves with the question, again, how does this end? it may be the victory in both iraq and afghanistan is when the host government feels strong enough to kick us out. try explaining that to the american people.

i ran this as an op-ed. i called for keeping 30,000 to 50,000 troops in iraq for several years to come. that is because of the possibility that a source like that could deter a slide back to a civil war and also because that force would buy you time, and time, i think, is important in growing a new iraq. in retrospect what we should have done is not thinking with national elections but begin with local neighborhood elections and maybe a year later, towns and cities, a year later provinces and grow a new generation of political leaders. instead what we tried to do is quickly hold elections and basically throw a class of imbittered, distrust frl exiles and sectarian leaders into leadership positions.

i think this is something we need to think of a lot is how we deal with the host governments in the future. i don't like the idea of keeping a lot of troops in iraq. i think it is the least bad option, though, and i also think as gil collins said, just because you invade a country stupidly doesn't mean you should leave it stupidly. i ran into henry kissinger at yale and we were talking about the end of the vietnam war. i said which do you think is more dull as a strategic problem, vietnam or -- is more difficult as a strategic problem, vietnam or iraq? he said no question at all, iraq. >> well, first off, it is a real honor to be here on this podium with two journalists that have written quite perceptively or not the iraq -- on the iraq war. i feel out of place.

i spent four months in iraq mainly trying to lose the war. but pat trick -- patrick has given me a chance to think about the changes that took place that took place within the u.s. government and specifically the u.s. military that were caused by iraq and where that leaves us going forward. as i looked at my wardrobe this morning, i thought, do i really need to wear a tie? i thought, who are you kidding? tom ricks hasn't warn a tie since 1973, but i think there's a lesson here -- just because it hasn't happened before doesn't mean it isn't going to happen. i said i served in iraq. again, i was really trying to lose the war. all that indiscriminate targeting we were doing in the

fall of 2003 and 2004, yes, you can blame me. ironically, though, one of the things that i haven't really seen come out in any of the narratives about the iraq war thus far, and really in a coherent manner was that, you know, the beginning of the iraq war, those of us who were in the special operations units and task forces, i think, misdiagnosed the iraq war. we thought -- we confused an insurgency for a counterterrorism problem. we approached the problem set like we would the red army faction in germany and kicked down a lot of doors and broke down a lot of windows. remember the deck of cards? trying to get those guys on a certain list. now when a counterterrorism or special operations task force are linked in with a wider counterinsurgency campaign, it can have a deadly effect on the

ability to operate. i think that's something we saw in 2007 and 2008. what i would like to see drawn out is the degree to which -- i'm talking about guys like jef bannister and mike kershaw, what units had they been in prior to that? some had been in conventional units prior to that as well. so the relationships that i think had been forged in special operations units before mattered in 2007 and 2008. iraq did have a pretty big impact on my life, though, because i gave up going to law school. i invaded my second country

without knowing anything about the people or the language. so i ended up in the past six years in the arabic speaking middle east. let me comment on a few of the things just said. i think it is important, and it is something that, again, hasn't been in the narrative so much, probably for classification issues. the other thing is that linda and tom have written two really good narratives of the surge, but they were initial narratives. now i think we're going to start seeing other -- i think they both say that. there are other stories to be told. there are stories to be told from the platoon perspective, stories to be told from the iraqi people's perspective. amos has a new book on the

effect the surge of u.s. military operations had on iraqi refugees in the iraqi refugee crisis. it is a fantastic book. i would recommend it. there is a new memoir about matt gallagher about fighting his platoon leader in 2007-2008. again, it is fantastic. i'm going to agree with tom on something big a little later. but i want to degree. i think i have told tom this, i think he is too wed do the narrative that the surge failed. i don't think that the goal of a counterinsurgence iy campaign waged by a third party on behalf of a host government is to create time and space for a political breakthrough but to create time and space for a political process. i think we have done that in iraq. i think it is happening now. also you said petraeus left

saying we just want to get out with the shirts on our back, but we initiative jated the s.o.f.a. agreement. i think they deserve credit about that. i am not sure i would be so quick to say the surge failed. a, it may be too early to make that judgment. b, i think an important political process is taking place and has been taking place that we can take some credit for, that the u.s. military and diplomats can take some credit for. but the goal of my remarks is to learn what we have learned in iraq, what we haven't learned, how we learned, and where this leads us going forward. over the past 25 years there has been a lot of social science literature looking at what derrives information within military organizations. and this literature has certainly picked up pace in the 1990's and i think can reply --

apply to what's taken place with the u.s. military and iraq and afghanistan. you have rationale explanations and cultural explanations. to give two rationalist models. in one model you can have people working within an organization to create new pipe lines and innovations. this is the posing theesis -- theesis. you also have a field unit that can create new pipe lines and leads to innovations. kind of top down, bottom up explanations. i think we have seen a lot of that in iraq. two other things. military leaders can change culture on purpose. external shocks can make innovation more probable. i think certainly in iraq we

have seen strong military leaders like general petraeus really create cultural changes within the u.s. military. certainly vietnam was not enough of an external shock to create significant and enduring change in the u.s. military and how it does its business. as far as iraq, if work takes place at four different levels, i think tactically iraq has changed the way the u.s. military does its business. operationly as well. strategically, politically, and

culturally, i'm not so sure. as tom menged, one of the real holes is that it doesn't negate the fact that we're not great britain, we're not france. we're not fighting our counterinsurgency campaign on our home turf. from the french perspective, that's what algeria was. maybe not from the algerian perspective. the same thing with northern ireland, maybe not from the irish catholic perspective, but from britain's perspective, it was home turf. the irish protestant leadership are similar to the problems we have as we deal with a host nation government. there are a lot of lessons to be learned overall, but there is a kind of -- fm-3-34 represents some naivete.

there is this idea that our interests line up with the interests of the host government. because there is that assumption, we haven't thought what happens when those interests don't align? this is something that a written he is a was written -- essay was written about. i think as we look at any third-party intervention. you know, how exactly you use leverage over the host nation government is a problem that i don't think we've fought really hard about and we are suffering for in afghanistan certainly and iraq to a lesser degree. culturally, as i spent time in afghanistan over the past summer, i think because of lessons that i learned in iraq and were beaten into my head as i got to know the arabic

-speaking middle east, i think culture really matters. i'm hesitant to make estimates about. without speak any of the two languages, and one of the things i really focused on was our operational culture. our culture. as you study other cultures, you become more atuned to your own norms, your own social rules, your own biases. an irish scholar wrote an essay on american strategy a few years ago. two of the things he noticed in american strategic culture were what he called petrological asce -- i think in afghanistan

you can see that aversion to cast wals waltz applied -- aversion to casualties applied. it is a problem in a counterinsurgency campaign when you have to assume a lot of risks to get to know the population. you have to be walking your beat. some convoys, you know, moving throughout afghanistan do this well, some troops do this well, some commanders do this well. they undse understand -- understand, some days you may need to be on the street. other commanders don't understand this very well. in iraq what you had, and tom alluded to this, is he talked about the need to push petraeus' vision down the throats of the military. this is something i was talking to a brigade command erg during -- commander during the throat.

he said he shoves the ideas of petraeus down the throats of the one stars. so if i could tee this up, again, for afghanistan and with respect to lessons learned, i think there have been some significant lessons that have been learned in iraq, and that both linda and tom have written well on tactical and operational lessons. the strategic and political lessons, i don't think we have learned nearly as much as we needed to. i don't think we have done a lot of hard thought about how you apply leverage when conducting a counterinsurge yinencey campaign with the military. as far as the -- i think it remains to be skeen seen whether

or not the cultural changes that you see in the junior officers are enduring or fleeting. afghanistan in a lot of ways will be a test case for whether or not that's the case. >> thank you very much. we now have about 35 minutes for questions. all three of you highlighted the importance of iraq, the building of iraq, making a transition. specifically about the iraqi security forces to this question of what lesson do you draw from especially the u.s. attempt to try to build the new iraqi security forces. i know these are forces that some iraqi forces have talked about. what lesson is important from

your perspective, and maybe we can begin in any direction. tom, you are nodding your head. >> like a lot of things in iraq, i think it is too early to tell. one thing that struck me is every single advisor i ever talked to said that at some point in the middle of the night his iraqi counterpart sade said as soon as you guys leave we go back to saddam ways. this is another thing that we don't recognize. this is will be interesting as 2010 continues and we see post-occupation of iraq and where their allegiance lies. i think the answer will be many different secretaries on any given day. when americans get out of the way and let iraqis be iraqis,

we'll find out what that means. >> thank you, patrick. i didn't address the security force in my remarks. my few in broadest terms is that they are less problemmatic than the threat of political manipulation by the civilians and the potential perjurying of their ranks. not to say there aren't sectarian actors, but i think by and large -- and i would like to credit general democracy, martin -- general dempsy, martin dempsy, because he really pushed through a major process of purging, especially in the national process. the re-bluing of that force. there was also a critical intel contribution made. they really relied on iraqi officers to provide insights into this influence, the

political chain of influence going up to the prime minister's office. and so i think that del, you know, it's a long-term effort. we spent a decade in sal vadore. we need to look at this as a long-term process of helping to mentor and train a long-term force. that's one of my top messages. the lesson of this war is we cannot anymore think of war as a short exercise. we must tend to what comes after and the building of viable security forces, nonpartisan professional security forces for the long hall is really a generational project. i understand the political reasons why president obama says we're getting out, the war is over. well, for the americans it may -- well, for the americans. it may resume for the iraqis. there are political things that still have to happen. it can happen wlile a draw-down

is occurring. >> i want to take this thing in a different direction, and think about building the -- building security forces from the perspective of one of the things that tom and i were talking about, about how you use leverage over host nation governments. i think over the past eight years we have actually made real gains in thinking about how we build security forces. i think you have seen that u.s. troops have taken it more seriously. i think we have gotten better at it. i think it is something that quite frankly we are moving in the right direction as far as how you rool -- roll troops off the line and how you build security forces from the ground up, how you partner with them long term. i think we have made some good strides here. where we have a lot of room to grow, and this is something that -- steve takes credit for this -- is thinking about strategically how we build security forces.

when he we think of building leverage over security forces w. the speed with which we give forces, the weaponry we give security forces, that is often a concrete leverage we have over host nation governments. so i think the room to grow as far as the americans thinking about building security forces in both iraq and afghanistan has to do with that strategic componeyebt and the way we use the degree to which we support and train security forces as leverage over the host nation government. >> and andrew, just to tease it out so people have a clearer idea what's on your mind, you are talking for instance about a government that before political reconciliation has occurred is forced, essentially, because of u.s. leverage, to adopt a more professional military? >> no, i was actually thinking, what happens after we leave? maybe we leave iraq but we have logistical contracts with the iraqi army that lasts five or 10 years after we leave.

so even when we no longer have troops on the ground we still are able to exert concrete leverage over what that host nation government does and fails to do. we have done this with lebanon to a limited degree. i think we are thinking hard about -- in afghanistan we're up against, you know, between a rock and a hard place. i think on the one hand we would like to use the training and quipping of the afghan security forces, but on the flip side of that, we have a need to get troops rolling off assembly line and sit down into r.c. south and what's soon to be r.c. west. >> i would like to chime n this is nothing new. we have always -- latin america history, we have always conditioned military aid. the question is, is congress going to pose the conditions or can the administration do it, which is often more palateable. the whole idea is where the real

lessons learned haven't yet occurred. i notice this conference is primarily focused on the military but i think we have a real gap in the national security civilian cadre and they could have their own conference and learn a lot on this front. >> steve and bill, it looks like a follow-up conference. >> yes, in the far corner. >> thank you very much for an insightful panel. this question is directed to miss robinson and mr. ricks. everyone needed to understand iraq for the sake of iraq. can you talk about the present and future influence of ahmad chalabi, if there is any? >> the plan has nine lives. i think it has been in i lot of the papers, so i -- in a lot of the papers, so i won't repeat

the details of that. again, diplomatic intervention was required before those 500 people were perjuried -- purged from the electoral rolls. it is important that you get full reputation across the iraqi spectrum so you can have multisectarian political building that is neeted for the end game. it is a parliamentary system, and this is absolutely critical. so i am very concerned, a, that it happened, and b, that we were not more on top of it and did more to walk the cat back. and i think that we really do -- this is one thing. behind-the-scenes, petraeus and crocker worked intensively with malaki. the general is an able general, but he doesn't have that political intuition and

maeuverability. he's not as ad event in that world of maneuvering. i think we have suffered at a critical time. ultimately, it is the iraqis who have to come around to brokering these deals, and maybe they will get to a painful period that may involve some return to war. i was a little concerned to the new u.n. envoy where he is saying let's let the iraqis sort it out. there are some deep clevages and traditionally war-ending scenarios have involved some kind of mediation and envoy. so i think some group of friends -- you know, i think the diplomatic measures need to be taken to help through what is a true iraqi process r i think we can get there, but we need to rely on people. i find it ironic that in one of

the greatest statesmen of iraq is a kurd. here's a man that is willing to reach outside very heavy sectarian pressures within his parties, both kurdish parties, frankly, and be willing to relinquish some of the kurdish demands to get some deals brokered. while i do think the central feature of iraq is the arab power-sharing arrangement, the kurdish is a close second. you very much need to stop kurdish expansionism and put together a reasonable formula of what a kurdish regional government's powers are going to be. far-sighted kurdish leaders understand that you cannot go it alone or you are going to invite certain war with turkey with no u.s. ally with you. >> i think we tend to under

estimate these people repeatedly. the american attitude toward sodder is basically he is al sharpton with heavy weapons. in fact, he actually has proven to be a real survivor, in the same way that chalabi is. chalabi we treat like a mississippi river boat gambler. i think if he ever becomes prime minister, he will become a pro-iranian prime minister. to see the look on their faces that day. >> come on down to the microphone. >> my name is fufus phillips. i have a question about how we train forces. i wonder if we have done any fundamental training about what we tell them in addition to how

to fire right. in other words, what is -- what are we doing to involve the local folks in giving a rationale to the average trainee of what is his duty to the iraqi people or the afghani people? in other words, are we trying to get across or trying to get the local folks to get across the notion that he owes his allegiance to an idea and not just to whoever happens to be his commander in terms of how he deals with his own people? and i think this is absolutely critical. i go back, of course, to vietnam and the fact that we were a able to turn the vietnamese army around in very early days in terms of how they dealt with the people.

i go back to the philippines and how important that became in terms of setting a model for what the soldier was, which was he was the true servant of the people. it seems to me that that's probably a neglected area, but i don't know enough about it. and i think we ought to maybe think about it. >> andrew, do you want to -- have you thought of that? >> yeah, i'm not the pro on developing security forces. there are some people in this room who know a lot more than me, but i'm not going to embarrass them or call them out. but i think that just real briefly, the one thing i wrote down, the one thing that's taken place in the way we develop security forces, we sort of had an institutional perspective on it. in other words, you take the men, you train them based on marksmanship and fizz dal fitness, i think we are making a change. this hasn't taken place in iraq,

because we are winding down our presence in iraq, you may have read about it. but this has taken place in afghanistan where we are taking this move from kind of training to partnerering. that has a couple different effects. first off, it has a pragmatic effect where you are training someone in the institution of the schoolhouse, and then you can partner them with -- say for example you take an afghan kandak and you partner with a u.s. company and you can do certain things there. first off, if you have a batallion of u.s. marines garrisoning a district, that's kind of a waste of marines. if you have an afghan kandak, now you are doing a lot of things. first off you have afghans on the ground, you don't have as many u.s. troops on the ground, and you are able to start partnering in such a way that the type of training the type of mentoring that's taking place is

not the big brother-little brother type thing that i think we never really got beyond in iraq. it's really, you know, living together, sleeping together, working together, training together, planning together, and then operating together in such a way that we would hope that the way we do business both operationally and culturally begins to have a way -- to have an influence on the way the troops operate. as far as instilling patriotic values and devotion to a greater cause, that i cannot speak intelligently about. again, i think we've gotten better at the way we think about training security forces. i don't know how exactly you do that, creating the idea of a nation or the idea of a -- the

idea of military training. >> i agree with everything andrew said. i wanted to add quickly. i think we went far in iraq when the idcdc was formed. they were forced to take on their brigade initially, and they just saw them as force-protection threats and they sequestered them on their base, and they really wanted nothing to do with them. those were the chaotic dirty areas, and they couldn't get with iraqi culture. the soldiers were totally unprepared. over time it worked but one result was isop, the iraqi special operations forces. over time it also included navy seals and some others as well. that was really the model that they know, right? you are with them from dawn until dust. you live with them, eat with

them, and so forth. that has created the nonpartisan and very mixed. i think dave mcchrystal is right in trying that approach. i still wonder if conventional forces are ready. they have provided an advisory core to get do not ventional forces that are steeped in that cultural know-how because you spr to keep going back to the same place, ideally to the same unit, and i know that's what the special forces dorks but when we are talking about these exercises of big coin, we want to do small coin, we have to have something that's better, that's more knowledgible. i think professionalism occurs by osmosis. i think the professional u.s. soldier, that will rub off. but going the other way, having the u.s. soldier understanding what he's dealing with, we need

more intensive training. to train the trainers. >> thank you for being here. andrew, you alluded to this earlier. you indicated when third parties fight on behalf of a host nation, recently president karzai usurped power from his electoral commission, and i'm wondering what the panel's thoughts are. when a counterinsurgent is already engaged in an insurgency, and it heavily invested as we are, what happens if we don't have a legitimate partner in the host nation government? >> yeah, i mean, look, the odds are you are not going to be fighting the counterinsurgency campaign if the government is legitimate in the first place, right? so this shouldn't shock us that a government facing an idge

insurgency is also facing a crisis of legitimate massey. that, in part, is what is so frustrating about this, that we haven't come up with a sophisticated political route to acome any what -- to come any what has become a sophisticated military campaign. one of many problems we have in afghanistan stems from the fact that, you know, if you read tom's book, linda's book, you read about the relationship between general petraeus and ambassador crocker that we had in iraq, it was really something pretty special that you had the military stakeholder, the diplomatic stakeholder that were basically joined at the hip. there have been a lot of rumors about relations between mcchrystal and ambassador

ichenberry. the two, i think, get along very well. but there are obstacles in the way in afghanistan that prevent us from being able to use kind of the same -- the same pair of chief diplomat and military official. a lot of it has to do with the fact it is a coalition. ichenberry can meet with karzai and he can meet with him at 2:00 and the british ambassador comes in at 4:00 and they are all stakeholders and they have just as much of a stake in afghanistan. in addition, you have a u.n. higher representative. you have a nato civilian representative. so general mcchrystal doesn't have that civilian counterpart. i think the, you know, as far as when you cry no joy, i think we have already done that. i think general mcchrystal

understands all too well that our -- the current troop levels in afghanistan cannot be sustained. political, you know, host nation government. you know, i think you do have to make clear, as we have made that our presence in afghanistan goes up or down largely depending on what they do or fail to do. >> can we move to the next

question? >> i would like to say quickly that i think the answer there is going to be to find local political leaders. you primarily have to work from the bottom up in afghanistan. as long as you have karzai taking some measures to at least hopefully improve the trajectory, i think they need to get a few of the really corrupt people out. i think the key there is going to be getting local legitimate leaders and hopefully elected ones, but if not use the elected ones. >> let me apologize to the afghan leaders that follow. >> i'm ron. i teach military history and vietnam war at texas tech university. i also teach a graduate seminar on the history of insurgency. when fm-324 was published in 2007 or 2008 i kind of used it

as a background textbook for the various wars that we study. some of my veterans of iraq and afghanistan who served in the early years reading that book were saying, i wish we would have had this in the early days. now america had wars in the philippines. certainly our experiences in vietnam. why was there no anticipation that an insurgency would develop to the point where we would need a manual by 2003? because it seems so obvious that these wars would have developed into something like what we have seen? >> this is actually something i have addressed in my next book i am working on. why would we have something like the most tactical military in

the world when the leadership is so blind to the nature of the war in which they have engaged? and general jack keen has written in an insightful way about this. i think basically at the end of the vietnam war, the u.s. military said, we're not going to do that again, and the american people agreed. this is written about the army in vietnam. they went through and they took out all the insurgency stuff. there is an argument that the u.s. military was so strained and weakened at that point that it needed to get back on filling the gap because that's all it was capable of doing at that point. it was a sort of straightening your lives and doing what you could do. that said, someone in the u.s. military might have woken up and said, you know, we are so dominant conventionly that the only way we can be phased it f is at the small ends of the spectrum, either in units of

warfare or in weapons of mass destruction, that we have occupied the middle groupped so effectively. instead you had an army that after the gulf war was extraordinarily complacent. we heard, "i think we have it just about right." i have learned that is one of the warnings of military leadership. whenever someone tells you that, look for your wallet. >> we can take three or four or five questions, and then we will turn to the panel for final thoughts, and they may or may not touch on your questions. so you are going to have to take notes on the panel. >> i'm sure you are aware of the marine corps small war manual. it needed updating, but it was there. back to the mighty milita and the sons of iraq. one of my concerns is that a

large sfailinglauth letting the mighty army go to ground and then arming the sons of iraq and what that might pose for us when we draw down below 50,000 or 30,000 or lead completely. >> the gentleman next to you? >> i have a question about the petraeus braintrust. ms. robinson mentioned the interdisciplinary nature. i wonder who in the group was responsible for providing historical expertise about iraq, and especially the pre-2003 history. most of the historians of iraq would stress that the sunni-shiite divide, the deeper historical roots were very

salient. i am interested to know about that. >> i guess the gentleman here and then here. >> can you hear me? >> i have two questions. one for thomas and one for andrew. the first is, after your assessment this morning of general petraeus, i would like to ask thomas first if you think his activity is spread too thib and -- thin and should he have stayed or should he go back and finish one job before he starts a second one. the second question is withdrew, and this deals with the young men and women coming home. i want to know -- i'm a retired teacher. we see a lot of the veterans in north carolina -- by the way, i'm bob macke. we see a lot of these young men and women and we talk to them. and we ask them what they thifment this is what we talked about yesterday. this is a national debate on

what we're doing. this is where i think it starts with these young men and women coming back to their churches, civic groups, high schools coming back and we do something novel, we actually listen to these men and women and see what they think. my question is guys and ma'am, is a priority given to the soled soldiers coming home that they are, i guess i would say, enthusiastic about their service? are they willing to share it with americans? >> sir, could you pass the microphone right in front of you? thank you. >> mark gilbert, pacific university. we have been talking a little here about how the lessons of vietnam were for gotten in the 1980's and 1990's. my concern is that part of that change was because wre were turned to face a soviet threat or russian threat. when this war is over, we're going to face larger conventional threats. right now we're assuming all the wars are going to be like this,

and i would have to agree. but i can see with a long-term expenditure of money the davet disastrous -- the disastrous effects on our military person -- personnel, the american people turning away from this when we have reason to do so. i wonder what we are doing to institution lies -- institutionallize this to save us from these lessons being lost again. >> i apologize for thees those hands i did not get to. i would like to in the next six minutes give each panelest two minutes to respond to dirnl comments, and i want to go in reverse order. andrew if i can go to you, the floor is yours. >> just with respect to veterans, i think in the near term you are seeing a lot of veterans come back from iraq and afghanistan. i'm looking at a couple in the audience right now, who have come back and are getting

involved in policy, looking at defense policy, the way we are building the force. it is very positive. i guess what i'm worried about is in the long term, which is so few of us, it is hard to imagine the wars in iraq and afghanistan occupying prominent places in the political decision-making relevant many of the united states 20 years from now, because again, there are just too few of us. there aren't many. there hasn't been a shared experience. this has been an experience that has been, you know, largely undertaken by -- what? i think 1.5% of the american public and their families, and that's it. as far as where we go from here, i think you will probably -- you probably will see a desire not to get involved in these counterinsurgency campaigns ever

again, and i for one, having fought in them, am highly in favor of that. but having said this, you may see two things, you may see the united states and our military mour oriented toward off-shore balancing and protecting the global commons. c.n.s. has a new report on that, you know, protecting sea lanes, getting back to more conventional threats. maybe not the rise of china, but just ensuring that a lot of the things we take for granted right now such as space, the high seas, remain secure. but the caveat to that is something that h.r. master always brings up, which is that the enemy always gets a vote in how he's going to fight. if we get good at low-intensity conflict and -- we better prepare for cyber-war. if we get good at cyber-war and forget conventional con flict,

we may -- so i think the lessons are not to get good at one but to have flex yibblet -- flexability. >> on the issue of sons of iraq, i think that is a good question. this is something andy basically has written about. the questions may lead to long-term problems. this oddly takes us back to host government issues, which is the sons of iraq would tell you if you ask them, and i did, what do you think of the bad government? they say, as soon as you guys are out of the way, we're going after them. we're just keeping the powder dry until we can get them. i think there are long-term problems created there. a second question is we should

also be asking what the enemy has learned. i think what the enemy has seen globally in iraq and afghanistan is that the united states can be taken on. and this is one reason to pay attention to the hezbollah vs. israel fight of the summer of 2006. what we're seeing is that regular forces now have sufficient precision and fire power that they can do quite a lot of damage to what used to be overwhelming conventional forces. when hezbollah light infantry can stop an israeli-backed military with tank helicopters, there is a different kind of war going on out there. what we may see is high-intensity insurgencies, which is a phrase that just occurred to me but i want to copy right right now. [laughing] in "another host government

solution" i didn't know this. "the pakistani government newly independent dealing with the north frontier province invited and paid the t come back in. not because everybody loved him but because he was an honest broker and he understands the situation. he was steeped in the politics, the tribes, and the culture. it was a useful way. that may be our way out. when you subordinate yourself to the host government and actually perform some of the same fumpingses for them as a transitional thing. finally, on the question of learning, i'm beginning to think this may be just a human failing , that every generation has to learn these same damn lessons over again, and that's a human tragedy. >> lindy. >> i have a little different perspective on the sons of iraq. they were already armed. what it was was a play to bring the men in on the other side.

the bumper sticker of this war is "you can't kill your way to victory. " so it was a maneuvering to get a different solution going. the deal was they were supposed to be finance corporate rated into iraqi security forces, and i don't think odierno cut a good enough deal. it should have been more like 40%. people in those areas wanted to know them and trust them and it helped rebalance the police force, which is still problemmatic. we need to be there holding their feet to the fire making sure this end game works. historians, molly feed, toby dodge, c.b. moore at some distance. so there were a number of people brought in. but also, people were sponges. they were reaching out and sucking up from other areas as they were doing that three-month, in-depth study. and you have already mentioned, andrew, the hybrid warfair.

i think the future is not going to be going back to some former combat operations, the hybrid model is where the future is, because it is very hard to counter the tactics that we've seen. we have adopted this silly acronym, i.e.d. vietnam tactics. they are very hard to counter. those are going to be used by a -- a lot of this is not only working its way through the q.d.r. but it is going to be in a rewrite of joint pub 3-0. i would like to pay attention to the brigadier in iraq in a critical era. we can't think petraeus did it all. he was the commander at the top. john was the multinational division baghdad a.d.c. for maneuver and he was the man who

made this happen, going around to every urinity day after day working hand and glove with the iraqis and the baghdad operational command and being the example and the mentor. he is now in charge of the 101st airborn division and he's headed to afghanistan, and i'm sure he's going to apply many of the practices that he learned and did so well there in a very different environment. finally, i would like to just emphasize again what i've been saying, and what i think is going to apply for the next panel. i'm eager to hear them. we must have a small coin model in mind. i call that big coin and small coin, but for those into the details, support for count erin surgencey is what we have been doing, and otherwise known as foreign internal desent. we should not be out there fighting these wars as the ones in charge, we should be fighting the host nation government forces. >> this one short panel, one

insight i already had, one lesson i had coming to the table, when you are dealing with a difficult issue, make sure you surround yourself with top quality experts. i have done that today. [applause] force norris i have never heard >> i have never heard a more on-point description or analysis. [applause] >> we'll take a 15-minute break and start on afghanistan. >> coming up next, it is "q & a" with patricia mcguire.

then at 7:00, your calls and comments on "washington journal." >> almost 40 years ago as lead engineer at motorolla martin cooper held the firsthand-held phone. tonight a look at the cell phone on "the communicateors. "john adams, her berlt hoover, ronald reagan, and gerald ford lived passed 90 years old. find out these facts and others in "who's buried in grant's tomb?" >> it is a mini-history biography of each of these presidents, and let's face it, you can tell a lot about people at the end of their lives. >> a research to the prid