fact becket you are investing in a new generation of afghans through scholarship. that is exactly what we need. that is a very important investment for the future stability of the region. we have to have more pakistanis and afghan universities and more afghans in pakistani universities in order for these two nations to get together. these are crucial investments, not only for the future of afghanistan, but for improving understanding between our regions. we could live in peace and prosperity, or all of us will pay a price for it. we spend 60% of our revenue on education. that is the highest amount ever spent on education. it is larger than what we spend on defense or anything else. . . .

that's an area that is very, very crucial unless we delve that, the international accounting firms are way too expensive for afghans to be able to pay. and those standards are new to

afghan. we have also established an accounting academy in afghanistan to build its capacity from the ground up. >> ladies and gentlemen, i want to ask you to join me in thanking the ambassador for sharing this report on the foundation establishment of a foundation for afghanistan and want to thank also all of you who have come, but also particularly the future members of the board of trustees and general fields. if i may just offer a very quick comment at the end. general fields made an important point about the amount of expenditure there. it's a very substantial sum. but there is a presumption, i

sense, in the country that we've never done anything on this scale before. this is somehow bleeding us dry. it's too much maybe. but there's been a lot of study of this recently. and what we now know, that if you take from 2001 to 2010, actually in no year, maybe the present year, in no year did it otherwise equal the amount that we were spending nonmilitary expenditure in korea for every year we were there, which is a long time. and i'm not speaking about taiwan, i'm not speaking about japan, i'm not speaking about germany. so i wonder if we're not -- if we're not deluding ourselves, having convinced ourselves that this is some wreckless and unprecedented expenditure that our culture has changed, and something that we considered a

normal expenditure if you want to do the job right is now considered, we want it done on the quick and on the cheap. and that won't work. now, the second point i would like to suggest in the end is that of course the money that this foundation for afghanen is going to command, no matter how energyic its trustees are, and i'll be energyic as one of them. but no matter how energyic they are, it's going to have limited resources. and you might reasonably ask, after hearing the ambassador, can an entity, which is only dealing in millions and hundreds of millions at the best, can such an entity have a real impact on the ground? given all that we've heard? and i want to say that we know it can. and let me give us an example. the green revolution in india in the 1950s and 60s.

the ford foundation had a building there, had a lot of people there. it was spending a lot of money there. however, in relationship to the sheer scale of india, it was a drop in the bubt what they were doing. and yet, in the long run the ford foundation, the rock feller foundation brought about the green revolution. you know, transforming life. why? because they were strategic and they did things very wisely. they didn't just spread the money around. and so it doesn't take vast amtse of money. it takes clever people who are looking deeper and broader. now, but let me add one further issue -- point. and that is that running through this entire conversation today and everything you hear in washington this week or in the national press this month is

one big word, corruption. nothing will work there. these people are somehow, they don't get it, they're crazy, a bunch of thieves. it starts at the top, goes right to the bottom. you're throwing money down a well. and we've heard citations of very recent statements that very high officials and journalists and others in this country to that effect. but let me at the risk of sounding like a defender of corruption, let me -- let's take a word and say about the -- imagine yourself a provencial governor. until the last year or so you had a few hundred dollars a month. now, forget about the police under that governor who has much, much, much less salary. but you happen to have a wife and three kids.

you've got to eat. and meanwhile, it turns out -- and this is the entire international community after 2001 beginning enbang, focused entirely ln organizations outside the government. did not focus at all on building good, effective local institutions of government, the governors, the police and so on. that was not the focus. now, this has changed in recent years, and notice today we hear about in haiti a new emphasis on building governmental institutions first, not working swrout side of or against the government. so it seems to me the conclusion that we have to draw is that we helped build this culture of corruption by our neglect of governmental institutions, and, therefore,

we should not be the ones leading the complaints and attacking afghans for doing it. we should get about the work of building what needs to be built there. in other words, we need a deeper view, we need a broader view. we also need a longer view. and that's where the final point, the ambassador's wonderful presentation today. he's talking about way beyond any exit strategy. i didn't hear of any exit strategy with regard to the foundation for afghanistan. and, to me, this is like breathing pure oxygen. this is exciting. this creates hope. hope creates positive reality. and this engages people all around the world. they don't want a foundation for afghanistan that has an exit strategy. and that, first says we're

leaving and then says what we're going to do before then. they want a foundation for afghanistan that will be supported worldwide that's going to be there ten years from now and a hundred years from now. and i for one join all of you in wishing this entire enterprise enormous success. >> thank you very much. let me make one quick final remark. i apologize for the time. i really should mention the tremendous respect for the work that general fields and others are doing in afghanistan. they're listening to the afghans. we have issues. we have to work together. that's a good example of the excellent work. very quickly on the issue of korea. there's a book that no one reads any more and i've been giving it to my friends. it's called state building in korea. the approach that leads exactly to if foundation here is that the way you did it in the korean country to iraq and afghanistan, the united states spends a lot of money on

building the leadership first. in korea, you first built the army corps of offerser and then the army. now we are spending so much money building the institution without spending money to bring qualified afghans to lead them. either they are not trained. or if they are trained there's not enough incentive to join the state institutions. they're much better off doing it on the civilian side. so there is a need to build the leaderships in order to make these expensive institutions functional. and that can only come from afghans. and on the salary, again, if you are an eedscal person, you are not going to be corrupt if you are not going to die. if you offer $70 to a police officer, who is going to show up? the guy will show up who has no qualifications, or the guy who has the bad intention from the beginning. he is going to be using that

uniform and a gun to make money. a cook makes $500. why ask someone to enlist to be a police officer in afghanistan for $70? a worker on the poppy fields makes $5 an hour. so we have to pay better to recruit better people. everywhere from the police to the government. otherwise, they have many other options. and to end, you have great persons in afghan, looking forward to work with you, the afghan people. they should be treated as such. they should be treated as partners. and you have the investment you made in korea is an important asset for the stability of the region. the afghan people have the same potential in the long run. if you look at the condition of some of these countries, particularly korea, the lack of economic resources is worse than what afghanistan was. but there was a determination

by the korean people and the international community. and you did it and we can make it. thank you. >> thank you. ambassador, general fields, thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> a look at the obama administration's counter terrorism. the treasury department, a look at women in the finance industry.

>> next on c-span, daniel benjamin, the state department's current terrorism coordinator talks about the obama administration's tactics and strategy. this is just under an hour.

>> good afternoon and welcome. i'm the vice president for programs. i'd like to welcome you to today's meeting, which is another in the ongoing series on terror quasme and homeland security issues. it's a series that the center cosponsors with georgetown university center for peace and security studies and within the wilson center today's miting is co-sponsored by the grags computers barack obama and by the middle east program directed by the co-chair of this series, professor bruce hoffman sends regrets. he is unable to be with us today. i would like to extend a

particular welcome to those who are viewing today's meeting on c-span, welcome those who ra attending here in person. as is usual, the urge format after this meeting is over in one hour we will adjourn to a reception in an adjacent room. today's topic could not be more topcal. counter terrorism in the obama administration, tactics and strategy. and our speaker could not be more authority tative. he is ambassador daniel benjamin, the state department's coordinator. it's a position he has held since may of last year. prior to his appointment as the state department's counter terrorism coordinator, dan benjamin was a -- served as a senior fellow and a research director both at brookings institution and the center for strategic and international studies. prior to that during the clinton administration, he was

a foreign policy speech writer for several years and then went on to become a director in the office of transnational threats on the national security council staff. prior to entering government service in the 1990s he had been the foreign correspondent for time magazine and the "wall street journal." after leaving government during his think tank years, he co-wrote two important books on terrorism. the age of sacred terror, and the other was the next attack, the failure of the war on terror and the strategy for getting it right. it's a great pleasure to welcome ambassador daniel benjamin. i look forward to his remarks. [applause] great pleasure to welcome ambassador daniel benjamin to the woodrow wilson center. i look forward to his remarks. [applause] good afternoon. it's a pleasure to be back.

i want to thank my old friends for inviting me to speak today about the obama administration's counter terrorism strategy and policies. i have had the good for tune to appear at wilson on several occasions while i was out of government. i had a book lauch here. i didn't get nearly as many people. i believe the last time i was here was when there was an excellent event on muslims in the united states, together with the chicago council. so i am very happy to be here and to share my thoughts on how the administration is reshaping the way we combat terrorism in both the short and the long terl and on the persistent challenges that we face. let me start by talking about the broad issues. and then i'll try to provide some perspective and some context for understanding the threat and the u.s. response in three critical areas, pakistan, yemen, and the mag rab. if i had spoken to this

audience a year ago just before taking office, my view based primarily on what i read in the newspaper and learned that events like this one would have been that the united states had developed very good skills, great skills at what i call tactical counter terrorism, taking individual terrorists off the street, disrupting operations and dismantling cells. on the strategic side, however, i was concerned that we were losing ground on the campaign against international terrorism and in particular that we were failing effectively to counter al qaeda's narrative. in my roughly ten months in office, i have to say my view of our tactical capabilities in the area of intelligence, military, and law enforcement have been more than amply confirmed. and i have to say my colleagues working in these years have developed abilities far beyond anything i could have imagined when i left government at the end of 1999, after serving on staff. but my view that we had not yet

raised our efforts to a truly strategic level was also confirmed, and that we had not yet really begun the hard work of devising policies that would have stemmed the tide of recruits and undermined the appeal of al qaeda in the world's view. i am pleased to say that under president obama's leadership i think we are addressing that short coming. we are now formulating policies that seek to shape and constrain the environment that terrorists operate in. in other words, when terrorist discover that mir surroundings are more hostile to them, their ability to evade detection will diminish and their numbers will shrink. central is taking steps to undermine the appeal for al qaeda's rationale for violence. obviously part of this strategy involves building a genuinely global approach to a global threat. the administration's been working hard to reinvigorate

alliances and partnerships, and this is especially true in the arena of counter terrorism. through consistent diplomatic engagement we are seeking to boost the political will and strengthen the resolve of senior leaders around the world. that will is essential for our long-term capacity building efforts with a wide range of partners. because we know that ultimately our success will hinge on strengthning the ability of others around the world to deal with threats in their countries and regions. we cannot be everywhere all the time and we will be vastly better off and safer if others are as concerned about the threat as we are. and for these reasons we have also reingaged in a host of different global and roinlal multilateral forward that are bidding capacity whether in the u.n., the g-8's counter terrorism group or other-- elsewhere. at the core of our actions is the recognition of the phenomenon of radicalization and the need to stop

vunrabbling people from becoming terrorists. in every country where violent extremism has taken root, we are asking ourselves two questions to guide our approach. first, are our actions going to result in the creation of more terrorists? and what can we do to shrink the pool of future recruits? for many years while i was outside of government i argued that the united states had to make counter and violent extremism a priorities. and now in my position, i have to say i'm challenged in more than a little humbled by the responsibility of developing and coordinating the efforts to undercut the al qaeda narrative, to isolate extremism and prevent the next generation from being recruited. as part of this effort, we are looking to address what deputy national security advisor has called the upstream factors of radicalization. we are working to confront the political, social, and economic conditions that you're enemies exploit to win over those whose

surnt enables the militants to carry forward their plans. we are greatly expanding our foreign assistance to nations and communities where extremism and made in roads and providing positive alternatives we are working to marginalize the extremists. in addition, the president, the secretary of state and the rest of the policy team understand well how headline political grievances are exploited by violent extremists that's why the administration is giving so much attention to resolving conflicts like the arab-israeli one which creates great against the united states that can be exploited by violent extremists. as we pursue our counter terror quasme work more broadly, it's also viting that committee keep to our core ideals. president obama has said from the outset there should be no trade-off between our security and values. in light of what we know about radicalization, it is clear

that navigate big our values is an absolutely essential part. thus, we have moved to rectify the excesses of the past by working to close the prison at guantanamo, forbidding torture and providing a more systemic dealing with detainees. now let's turn to the geographic areas i mentioned earlier. i believe we are moving in the right direction in the central theater of afghanistan and pack stab. i have been in the both countries including spending the week before last in pakistan meeting with law enforcement and diplomatic officials. we are seeing growing resol and we should never forget that by far the largest number of al qaeda captain turs in the world have occurred in pakistan with the direct assistance of the authorities. the u.s. government have seen a number of encouraging sinds over the past year that pakistan recognizes the severity of the threat but is acttively working to counter and constrain it.

pakistani military operations in the federally administered tribal areas and in the northwest frontier province have eliminated strong holds and crippled the abilities of extremist groups. mourover, we are seeing increasing across border cooperation with afghanistan and the force which is are instrumental to the key militant safe hanse. in the wake of the military operation in swat we have turned public opinion turn more decisively against the militants, and now as a result al qaeda and the allies have found it tougher to raise money, train recruits, and plan attacks outside of the region. more broadly, we are working with pakistan to establish the kind of relationship based on trust and mutual interests that will lead to the defeat of violent extremism in that country which has claimed an enormous number of lives in the 35st year. we understand -- past year. we understand the feelings that

helped create the current situation. we know these challenges will not be overcome overnight but we hope we're on the right track. just last week the yilingts and pakistan held a strategic dialogue in washington, the first at the ministerial level. the discussions generated mutual trust to jointly tackle the extremist groups who threaten pakistan's security and our own. in recent weeks we have seen tangible evidence of their commitment to clamping down on extremist networks operating within its borders, as you know, several top afghan taliban leaders have been apprehended and we are very much grateful to the pakistani authorities for their actions. apprehended and we are grateful to the pakistani authorities for their actions. we understand that the united states has to do more than help

pakistan defeat extremists military. we have to assist with the economic development in those neglected areas that have been really safe havens for extremists and we need to strengthen back stan's ability to govern effectively. the u.s. government has allocated many millions of dollars into the projects that address the social, economic, and political factors that push individuals into the arms of violent extremist groups. and as you know, pakistan is now one of the top fie recipients of u.s. assistance. we know that despite setbacks in pakistan, al qaeda has proven time and again to be an adaptable and resillybt adversaresy, the the organization's desire to attack the united states and our interests abroad eremain as strong as ever. and under the greatest pressure it has experienced since being evibted from afghanistan in 2001, 2002, the group continues to try to inspire attacks.

no one should presume that we are out of the woods. far from it. let me also bring up one important addendum here. al qaeda is not the only group with global ambition that is we have to worry about operating in south and central asia, nor is it our only focus. others have made it clear that it is willing to undertake casualty with an underset that would please al qaeda planners. it thwarted its conconspiracyy, that it could evolve into a threat and one that seeks to replace al qaeda or compete with it. very few things worry me as much as the strength and the ambition of let, which is a truly maligned presence in south asia. we are working with allies to reduce the threat from this group and i am pleased to say there is growing cooperation in the region to will naurt let,

especially between critical and not always easy partners as india and bangladesh. let's move to the southwest. in terms of public perception of the shifting geographical origins, in one has received more attention than yemen. the failed christmas day bombing was a stark reminder that governed or ungovered space serve as an ink baitor for terrorism. further more that demonstrated that at least one, and not just the core leadership in pabpk stan, has developed the capacity to carry out strikes against the united states homeland. we can no longer count on them to be focused on the near enemy, the governments of their own countries. having said that, we should also have some perspective. contrary to some recent and very zover blown media accounts, the country did not turn into a safe haven

othernight. yesmen was the first front sibs the december 1992 attempt to bomb troops in a hotel was probably the very first genuine attack by the organization. those troops were en route to somalia to support the mission there. almost eight years before the uss coal attack in 2000. al qaeda has always had a foothold in yemen and has been a major concern for the united states. what i can say definitively is that the obama administration has been focused since day one on yemen. we have worked very closely and much more effectively over the last several months and we're making genuine progress. we've engaged consistently and intensively with our counter parts to build political will for our counter terrorism objectives. many of the administration's senior civilian and military officials, including depdi of national advisor