>> another question right here he contended the microphone. >> has there been many times when the senate chaplain has made a remarkable difference? published the nature of the chaplain's job is private. i know that when senator byrd's 16-year-old grandson was killed in an automobile accident in 1982, the senate chaplain was of impalpable personal comfort, according to senator byrd. -- incalculable personal comfort, according to senator byrd. he considers the entire senate as well as the staff as his flock. it is on a personal basis. they lead the senate in a prayer every day and then they are there to counsel and be available.

>> i know we have another question right here. try not to step in front of the camera. >> has the senate ever entertain the idea of trying to see people in some way other than left-hand side versus right hand side. it might be interesting if they were set next to a person whether they agreed with them are not. social security #, wait to bridging weight -- social security number, weight. >> during a ceremonial sessions, the instinctively said on the side as they would within the current chamber. and then they catch themselves, a bit embarrassed that some of

them will actually cross over and set with republicans. side, but there's a lot pressure against doing that. in the early days of the senate, there was no party seating. that developed in the 1840's as parties coalesced in the senate. i think that will be on the bottom of the list of recommendations. [laughter] one recommendation was that they have lunch together, the two parties have lunch every tuesday as our group. once a month, get them all together. who knows how that would work? i think the attendance might be low. >> we have time for one last question. ok, i am going to ask it. [unintelligible] let's get a microphone right here.

>> explain the procedure that senator bain is using right now that requires only one person to stop everything -- senator bunning is using right now that requires only one person to stop everything. >> the senate runs on unanimous consent because of the way the rules are constructed. to avoid any hard feelings, and this gets back to the question of the job of the majority leader and the minority leader to organize these unanimous consent agreements. weather is as simple as having a vote it 5:00 in the afternoon to something more complex, and they spend hours with a lot of staff involved on this. the leader goes then, mr. president, i ask unanimous consent to do this. and then at the back of the senate chamber, you hear the two

most hateful words a senator can utter -- i object. that is what is going on here. perfectly within the right of the senator to do that. to the great credit of the majority and minority leaders, they try to keep that to a minimum the lot of personal consultation, maybe back scratching here in there, but every once in awhile, particularly in contentious times, it happens. >> tell everyone about the custom that got started under then-senator jack kennedy, the guidelines for how the senators and the hall of fame were selected. >> lyndon johnson as majority leader in the middle of the cold war, senators were grumpy and they needed to feel better about being in the united states senate.

just off the senate chamber is the reception room, and although it is grandly decorated by the italian fresco artists, there were five medallion portraits spaces left vacant. lbj came up with the idea of selecting five outstanding former senators no longer living, who can serve as role models the current senators. they can be proud of being a senator or at least had ideals to aspire to in human form. then lbj suffered a heart attack in the summer of 1955, so he cannot share -- chaired the committee to make the selections. it fell to john f. kennedy, the junior senator in the middle of writing his book "profiles in courage." he became chairman of the committee but the other senators were much more senior than he. they brought in a group of 160

academics, including harry truman, to send in a less. and i think the list had about 68 major senators. they could always a light five. that finally did boil it down to henry clay, daniel webster, john c. telcalhoun -- no-brainers. but there were two slots for the toy center. the great progressive republican from nebraska, father of the tva another progress of legislation, that the first vote from the outside panel. but the nebraska senators decided that they were not going to let him brace holes, so they agreed that this would be unanimous.

so they said -- they selected a senator from wisconsin, another progress of senator, and then robert taft of ohio, who had been the republican leader for a very short period of time. and that was set. and then in 1999, trent lott looked around and saw some other interspaces. -- empty spaces. so we in the senate office -- senate historical office played that role. we ran a competition and they ran up -- ended up with one republican and one democrat. there were more space is available on the walls there, and so that is for future

generations to decide. but it was a good exercise by saying, what you mean by outstanding? no one would agree with best, but outstanding -- why did they deserve that credit? and there they are in the senate reception room, hopefully in spiring senators as they go about their daily work 3 >> richard, thank you for this great evening. we appreciate you being with us. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> next, a forum on u.s. relations with russia. and then a discussion on efforts to modernize the defense department. and after that, who looked at whistleblowers -- a look at

whistleblowers' relation with the media. a discussion on conservatism and what sparks the new capitalism and a look at what free-market systems must do to survive in today's global economy. that is here on c-span. >> i know what the challenges, but we need is policymakers in washington developing the road map so that we can get it done. >> something about energy policy that you would like to talk about on your blog? you can search it, watch it, put it, and share it. from yester day or 10 years ago, every singles -- every c-span program since 1987. cable's latest gift. >> now what discussion on relationship between the u.s.

and russia. there is a been a recently announced nuclear weapons treaty between the two countries. from the carnegie endowment for peace, this is about one hour and 25 minutes. >> central to the reset, is the strategic arms relationship and nuclear proliferation and other nuclear issues.

so i think it is particularly fitting this morning at carnegie to have one of the leading experts on their own staff and also on the staff in moscow talked to us this morning about what has happened over the last several years to the nuclear relationship and the situation of nuclear weapons with russia. it is my pleasure this morning to introduce the director and vice president for studies, who focuses our effort here at carnegie in washington on the nuclear agenda, and he will introduce alexei arbatov, a recognized expert and political leader and longtime student of the strategic relationship between russia and the united

states through without further ado, george and our thoughts. >> to build a little bit on what he said to set up the discussion the start treaty has been agreed and will be signed. there are other things and talk about and respond to your questions, because just as the united states next tuesday will release or preview its nuclear posture. the administration's review policy and force posture, russia and february announced its new military doctrine. i think the will be useful for him to describe that and discuss that with us.

and then also has today's papers recount, there is news in the ongoing movement to try to deal with iran's violations of security resolutions, and the u.s.-russian relationship is very important in that process, which alexei is very well situated to discuss and comment on that here today. and in the broader question of how wall all of these particular issues which have but nuclear dimension the into the overall reset of the u.s.-russia and relationships, which began very early with the russian counterparts. i do not know anybody better to talk about all these issues and put all of these issues into context than alexei arbatov. alexei is the chair of the non- proliferation program and

moscow, and also head of international security and moscow, the russian academy of sciences's most pretentious institute dealing with the issue. he has played a leading role in the russian duma, on ongoing advisor of the security council, a prolific author with a new book out in russian, which covers the rise in half of players govern, the international affairs. we are honored and delighted to have him here this morning. and then we will open up to a discussion. thank you. >> thank you, chairman george, i am delighted and honored to be here again. and i thank you for coming.

let me start with the new treaty, which is to be signed in a few days. i think it would be the most controversial nuclear arms treaty in the whole history of arms control. i am tempted to use by spite -- vice-president biden is formula which used with respect to health care -- [laughter] and apply it to the new treaty, but the question is [unintelligible] i think that we have to see the text to see all of the articles to make a comprehensive judgment, but from what we know at the present, some of the

judgments may already be advanced. the first thing you ask about a new arms control treaty is how much does it affect strategic forces? what is the real reduction? and the answer is, compared to what? he compared the new treaty -- if you compare the treaty with the one it is replacing, then it is very impressive. the reduction by launches is also impressive, by 50%. if you compare it with the salt treaty of 2002 which never became a treaty in the achievement is less impressive.

depending on the ceiling of the departing point, it is 10% which is less impressive. if you compare the ceiling of the neutrality, it was forced deployment. then the official position of the united states which i have already heard is that reduction is bu1/31/1/03. -- 1/3. the treaty has very certain accounting rules. 1/3 of these reductions will be taken care of through a new accounting. in the new treaty, it will be

counted as one launcher and one warhead. you almost have all the reductions at the expense of the new accounting rules. there are a number of other accounting rules which make the job of the military and him -- and industries implementing reduction month or easy that it would look if only judging by the formal treaty. if you compare reductions which are envisioned by the new treaty with reductions which were envisioned by start i, you will see that start run one in seven years introduced actual reduction of warheads by many thousands, 4000-5000 warheads or redress from strategic warheads in the new russia and the united many hundreds of

missiles, bombers, and many submarines. from this point, the new treaty is less impressive because for seven years, 10-year duration time, the reduction of warheads will be a few hundred at best and even that, with the new formal accounting rules. the main significance of the new treaty is not in its fiscal reduction. the main significance is the restoration of the formal, legally binding framework of strategic relationship between the two leading nuclear superpowers. after a long breath, -- break, it has to be keep in mind that we have not had a new arms control treaty for 20 years, since 1991 when sincei was signed, we have never had a tree that was signed, implemented,

implemented and entered into force. we had a chain of unsuccessful attempts. but we never had a formal and legally binding treaty and this is the main significance of the new treaty. basically, the treaty is the salt treaty of 2002 with slightly different ceilings, with a ceiling on delivery vehicles and agreed rock accounting rules and the application procedures. this is not part surprising. the expiration of starti puts a very tight schedule for negotiators of the new treaty. during less than one year of administrations, starting from scratch because in the preceding years, communities greatly to

soften the had to reorganize. during one year, they did a great job in coming to a legally binding treaty which will be hopefully ratified. i think it is worthwhile to pay tribute to the russian representatives who worked very well together especially the carnegie person. i think it is worthwhile to emphasize their great contribution. another significance of the new treaty is that it is a fulfillment of the commitment of the nuclear weapons states by article 6 of the non poor operation treaty. it is time because the review is coming in may. after the disastrous review in 2005, the new conference will

define whether we go through disintegration of proliferation regime or restart resetting and fortifying on the basis of the new treaty between the two countries. last but certainly not least, this is in line with the ambitious goal of the article of the four great statesman and commitments of president obama. this is a real practical step on the road to nuclear disarmament. however, this is not the end of the process. i would say it is just the beginning of the process. because both in the united states and in russia, the process of ratification of the treaty will face a lot of difficulties, a lot of problems. i would be happy to say that russian people enthusiastically

wait for the new treaty to be ratified as implemented but that would be a great exaggeration. those russian people who are interested in this subject largely have great doubts about the new treaty. because nuclear weapons are for russian people now, much more important. they are more important than during the cold war as a pillar of national security. already, even before the treaty is signed during the previous few months, in russia, a campaign started against the new treaty. in an erroneous way, this campaign started by mass of the tax -- by massive attacks on the tree which expired last year.

after 20 years of upstart start attacking start i is viewed as detrimental to russian security and was called a traitorous treaty. i cannot have any other explanation than to is a precursor attacked of the first salvo in the campaign which will be conducted against the new treaty when it is signed and presented for ratification. the reason it is is that 20 years after the cold war, russia feels much less secure in contrast to the united states, the european states, and china and many other countries. it is of russia's own fault.

their domestic politics and foreign policy can be bland but the united states and nato contributed a lot to that feeling of insecurity and russia. nuclear weapons now look as the only reliable assurance and pillar of national security. the military doctrine of dr. clearly spells that out without and reservations. nuclear weapons are one of the few legacies of the superpower status of the soviet union of which russia has a share. after the economic crisis, it greatly diminishes the role of gas and oil exports as an instrument of russian foreign policy influence and role in the world. nuclear weapons, relatively, have become that much more important.

certainly, nuclear weapons are looked upon by experts, by the professional community, has the greatest equalizer and an instrument to make up for russian inferiority in conventional forces, in particular with nato getting very close to the russian borders and acquiring multiple superiority over russian conventional forces as an instrument to make up for russian inferiority in missile technology and space technology. foremost, the long-range precision guidance systems relying on space intermission support with which russia feels the most vulnerable. in parallel with start i, you can sa ee russia as a new

complaint over the united states guidance systems as the greatest threat to russian national security. if you look at the military doctrine, the list of priorities for foreign military threats, you may find that nato expansion is number one, ballistic missile defense and precision guidance long-range systems are number four, non- proliferation threats are number 7 and national terrorism is number 11. you may argue about that. you may prove that this is the wrong list of portis but it is an officially accepted document which reflects the prevailing opinion of politically elite and the strategic community and the government and out of the government of russia. to to be taken as a political

reality. -- it is to be taken out as a political reality. the main argument that is to be used against the new treaty is easily predictable. first of all, it does not in any way limit ballistic missile defense of the united states and does not provide for any certainty about the future ballistic missile defense while placing quite stringent limitations on russian strategic defense for the next several years. secondly, the precision guided systems which will be expanded and will be one day -- one way of reduction than united states, the strategic forces, this will be conducted by converting

nuclear weapons. that would be seen as a major deficiency of the new treaty. the reconstitution capability in the past was the number one objection, now it has moved down the list but it is still important because of the new accounting rules, in particular the irrational deployment principle which counsel workers who are really only on missiles, not the number with which missiles were tested for it it provides the united states with great potential built up from potential missiles returning from storage to returning from storage to delivery russia will not have that potential because russia is withdrawing and massive numbers and producing new ones at a very