and most of the new ones will be offense, so they will not have come parable capabilities. the main argument in favor of the new treaty in russia is the american reductions. nothing prevents russia from reducing uses -- producing new systems, and i show will be under the ceiling anyway because of the withdrawal of old system and very small numbers of deployment of the new ones. but in 10 years, according to the russian side of the plan, russia will almost fully modernize its plan under start, at least by 70%. that is the official number. including, and i would draw your attention to that, the plan developers and in deployment of

a new heavy missile. and then if the united states insist on a new treaty, on going further with reductions, and russia at the provisions will be much bigger than now, because then it will affect newly deployed, very expensive systems, rather than a ceiling on the empty places, since russia is now withdrawing too easily to fill the new start treaty. in order to conduct nuclear disarmament and go with further arms reductions, it would be very important to persuade russian politically and strategic communities, and three

principal ideas. the first is that nuclear disarmament will not affect russian levels throughout the world. . with much fewer nuclear weapons, russian interests and the world will not be paid much less attention than at present. second, that the united states are serious about nuclear disarmament. the present treaty, as i mentioned, sent conflicting signals about that. signals about that. on the one hand, this is the first practical treaty of the last 20 years would probably will be ratified and implemented. on the other hand, artificial accounting rules make a treaty very strange from the point of

actual nuclear weapons elimination. there are many doubts and russia there are many doubts and russia about the respect to nuclear disarmament. very few people doubt president obama but many doubt the seriousness of american bureaucracy, military establishment, and the political elite. last, and probably the most important idea, is that the united states is pursuing nuclear disarmament and if they are serious about it, in order to improve international security, rather than in order to enhance the huge superiority in advanced weapons systems, space, ballistic missile

defense, conventional forces, and precision guided conventional long-range systems, russian military doctrine presents this new threat as the number one threat among the the traditional military threat to russia. russian military doctrine demands from the russian defense establishment to assure the fans against space, air -- air- space attack as conventional systems relying on space information. all these three ideas are to be taken very seriously here in the united states and in the west in general. i think it is high time for the united states military

establishment, the department of defense, to stop ignoring this growing concern of russia with long-range guided systems. since americans have opened of this new avenue of military technological development, i think it is up to them to initiate serious consultation with russian military and scientists and provide persuasive arguments that these new systems are not against russia and to suggest confidence-building measures and other initiatives that would remove this number one concern of russia. as of now, as far as i know, americans were just ignoring that and saying that russia is annoyed. they say they are not against russia. much more is needed than that. the same relates to ballistic

missile certainly, this treaty is not in ballistic missile defense but it provides for a lot of transparency uncertainty at least for the next 10 years with respect to strategic defense forces. i think it would be good if the united states provided the same level of transparency and certainty to russia about their strategic defense programs. before and now, the main concern of russia is not the existing systems or the system's water plant in the nearest future but the prospect -- or the system s that are planned in the nearest future. that will define, to a great

extent, whether the new treaty is the first practical step on a long road of nuclear disarmament or the last step of many decades to come. thank you. [applause] >> rather than use my position as moderator to ask questions, i want to go directlyxp to you all to ask questions and i may jump and if there is something that i cannot resist adding or challenging. i want to ask you to raise your hand and when i call you, identify yourself and your affiliation. then we can begin their in the back. ango ahead and stand up, please

. >> thank you for an interesting presentation. foreign minister lavrov said he was more open to the idea of missile defense with the united states after this treaty. can getsx your sons on that from the russian point of view? undersecretary tauscher moved on -- suggested moving on to the prospects of other missiles. what do you think about that? >> i think that cooperation on ballistic missile defense is the most important thing in the long term relationship.

we have to recognize that during ballistic missile defense implies military alliance. common enemies, common threats. at present, we are quite different from that state of relationship. it is not only technically complicated, it is politically complicated. as long as we're talking about some kind of global defense which will cover threats from wherever they may emerge. for russia, that would create great problems with china because china is against any type of bat defense. they would not participate in any of that. for russia, china is not only a great partner but a great concern.

russia would not like to enter into ballistic missile defense and make a mistake like iran. a large part of the russian political elite would be strongly against that. after successful reeducation of the treaty -- successful ratification of the treaty, it would be possible to start to approach this on a step-by-step basis. the first thing that would be very important and not very difficult to implement is to revive the joint data center. , which was agreed to 10 years ago and has still not become operational. having a link and early-warning

systems and collect on launches would be important in order to contribute to each others' knowledge about what is happening with ballistic missile tests and launch it. does important also to avoid miscalculation and avoid some concerns about the tests of the other side. it would be possible to use it as a data collection center but in line with vladimir putin proposal several years ago, to make it operate in real time. that is to send a warning of the ballistic missile launch wherever it happens to both sides and probably to allies on both sides. another step would be to make our cooperation on missile defense practical rather than

purely theoretical computer exercise. from a strategic logic point of view, this is possible because it does not create conflict of the interest with our strategic defense neither russia or the united states have weapons which may be intercepted by ballistic missile defense due to intermediate and shorter-range missile treaty which was signed in 1987 and we should preserve. we do not have weapons that would be targets ballistic missile defense. we do not have medium-range missiles or shorter-range missiles. it would be more logical and easier for us to agree on some joint programs or joint deployments to protect our

forces abroad and protect part of russian territory in europe and european territory against possible threats from the south without bringing in the picture the most complicated and controversial factor of china. if we are successful and that development, we may gain experience to start something more grantor -- more grant. nd with respect to missile defense. that will have to wait to move far enough when we move into strategic arms reduction and alerting our strategic forces so we do not find ourselves in a schizophrenic situation when we have joint strategic ballistic missile defense while still relying on the strategic balance of offensive weapons against

each other. with respect to attack to call nukes, i think there is great enthusiasm and the west about tactical nukes and future tactical nuclear weapons reduction and limitation. i am not so enthusiastic about that. this is not because of strategic reasons. there are strategic reasons for russia to have quite an extensive number of tactical weapons. it is the same reason which made nato maintain technicoltechnicar weapons years ago. it is the ratio of conventional imbalance which is about the same but is in favor of nato and against russia compared to what it was 20 or 30 years ago. in this situation, tactical nuclear weapons, russia will

look to be an equalizer in that situation. this differs from the technical and legal part. the united states trying to achieve new success in the treaty created a serious problem for potential future negotiations on technical minuks negotiations on technical minuks @@@ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ u)s@ @ >> if you proceed on the legal precedent, of the new treaty, then you would be in people's minds. you will be able to say a year

from now that all technical nukes did not exist. they are all in storage. if they are put on delivery systems, you cannot use that pre principle of doing away with weapons through dismantling or limiting delivery systems because you cannot dismantle and eliminate heavy colorable artillery and short-range surface-to-surface missiles with which used conventional weapons to attack aircraft or ships which made use tactical nuclear weapons for naval purposes. you cannot apply the same principle, otherwise you will have to do away with your conventional forces altogether. if you try to limit those

weapons which are in storage, you will have to get them out of storage. there is no difference between technical and strategic weapons, at that point. the strategic weapons kept in storage with tactical weapons in storage, this is not a question of tactical nukes. as a problem of nuclear explosive devices. there is no difference between said technical and strategic. this will have to be addressed sooner or later. this is not something we can address now, especially with the prospect of thousands of strategic nuclear weapons removed to storage in line with the new treaty. both from the legal point of view and from the technical point of view, tactical nuclear weapons would be a very serious problem. to give you one example, russia

has about 3000 tactical nuclear weapons. i do not know where this figure comes from. i could never find out. [laughter] the chairman of the general staff of russian non-forces tested repeatedly that all russian technical nuclear weapons are in storage. the vice premier has said the same, but all tactical russian nuclear weapons are in storage. i have doubts that all of them are in storage, maybe some of them are at airports and military bases but they are in the post pde pots.

you have to get in there and teltake nuclear warheads there e a cruise missiles or warheads for sea-based ballistic missiles and then bringing them to a manufacturing facility and eliminating them. that would be a great problem. my suggestion would be for the united states to remove its technical news from europe to its national territory and russia to keep its tactical nukes only on its territory which actually russia does now. and to have a formal agreement that those nuclear weapons would be kept in storage and not deployed with operational conventional forces. if you want to go further than that and insist that all of them

are in centralized storage, you would have to have verification procedures by which russians would be able to come to every american air force and naval base to make sure that in the depots of these bases, there are no cruise missiles or for any other weapon. in charleston, according to available data, about 100 nuclear warheads or cruise missiles. it would be prohibited and russia should have the right to come to every base and to say that as strategic. if it is tactical, you would have to get rid of it. that might be possible but it would be extremely difficult. >> let us take two questions.

>> thank you very much. i have a question on ratification. those of us who have been through other treaties no complicated and politicized ratification debates can they hear in the united states but also in moscow. can you explain more your thoughts on ratification of whether you think this will go smoothly or will be extremely difficult in moscow. >> introduce yourself. >> i am with the arms control association. your markets are insightful and provocative as usual. can you give us more insight into the thinking on the russian side about the curious bomber warhead counting rule and the new start agreement. ?

you think the russians would be concerned about the american ability to do bomber of flooding given the greater historical american reliance on the bomber leg of the triad. , the lack of the kind of inflation of all kinds of problems on russian heavy bomber aviation during the 1990's for research problems. -- for resource problems. can you tell us why the russians pushed for this provision? >> let me start with the second question. in my talks with russians who are in negotiating position, they were not very happy about such accounting rules. the fact is that neither russia nor the united states have presently nuclear weapons actually loaded to bombers.

all nuclear weapons are at depots at the airfield. they are not operational and deployed. under vladimir putin and george bush, russians did not want to agree to the principle of operational and deployed weapons as the criteria for accounting rules. now, the major russian concession was to agree to that principle. i think president medvedev played a big role in persuading russian military and those who might be opposed to that that that is in the best russian interest to accept that. it will permit russia to deploy more workers on missiles within a set. if the bombers are counted as

one or head, there is more space for deployment of warheads on submarine launch ballistic missiles. russia will eventually give -- bring their program to the end . they might introduce a new missile which will provide russia with local available warhead deployment. from this point of view, this liberal bomber accounting rule may be favorable to russia. >> in talking to people here, the more accurate number would have been zero which is less acceptable and starts to raise the question if it is zero then why do you have them?

they are not for strike weapons. they are not to stabilizing so it reflects a really does not necessarily an accounting reality, but it is more of a political reality that they are useless but you don't want to say that. >> it is not really deployed on bombers. >> pettitte should be 6 -- so then it should be sex. ix. >> first of all, to support and that ratification does not take too long. remember the start ii treaty

took seven years for russia to ratify. the position to the new treaty would not be weaker than the position to start ii, maybe it would be stronger. a lot depends on how the size of -- how the size of the president and prime minister are -- how decisive the president and prime minister are. there will be a big campaign against this treaty and it has already started, as i have mentioned. it is important that the new treaty becomes a ground for better relations between russia and the united states rather than an arena for mutual recriminations and suspicions and accusations. it quite easily may happen but it will be that.

in this case, the new treaty will not improve relations as far as public opinion is concerned. that would be very bad. that should be avoided. lastly, the new treaty should not be ratified as accelerating a weapons program. by way of a trade-off. the united states has a missile defense program that will be used by the republican party as a bargaining chip. in russia, it will be the heavy missile, the new system and some other programs and that also would be detrimental to our relationship. in russia, prime minister vladimir putin is to be engaged

by the united states to help the ratification of the treaty. up until now, he has kept silence on the negotiations and of the new treaty. he has never publicly supported it. it is important for the united states to directly contact him and asked him to do whatever he can to accelerate and to insure its ratification. you have to remember that it is not president medvedev who rules the majority but vladimir putin. he has enormous influence over all the russian military institutions, public opinions, and the party of the majority in both chambers of parliament. he has to be on board. that would be very conducive to ratification of the treaty. >> this gentleman here and wait

in the back. -- and away in the back. >> it seems to me that the discussion you have about russia and america moving towards ratification but some kind of future vision, one thing you talked about were some things that american could do that would be helpful but i thought there was a need, on the other hand, for russia itself to take some vision with that perhaps with the signing of a tree or some more calls for both either together or initiating a vision of where you want to go in productions and for the relationship itself. what could russia to do that would both help the ratification here to provide that vision