>> that is a great question. >> i am afraid that my question is somewhat parallel. your statement was very informative and very perceptive. in listening to it, i felt that if you had given that statement before the u.s. armed service committee, that it would not have helped the eradication on the americans side. if you were asked on the hill to testify, not on the basis of what the obama administration would argue, but on terms of what you would argue in the interest of the united states to skeptical democrats and republicans, what would you say? >> i think that russia has to be much more constructive on the subject of joint ballistic missile attacks. up to now, russia has proposed

some agreements. e some agreements but there is a widespread impression that this group assessment of threats and whatever is done in joint ballistic missiles has, for russia, lever to put the brakes on an american program. i think it is time to come out with new proposals. maybe you think what vladimir putin proposed on on the joint data center on mitchell --

missile launchers but also move forward whe. vladimir putin and president medvedev proposed that we have to have joint missile defense with the united sates and the european union. how about the russian people living in asia. ? are they entitled to protection or not? many people are going away from that but still, if we are to have ballistic missile defense coverage in asia and america would like to cover their asian allies, there is the question of china. both russia and the united states, not jointly but in bilateral format in parallel should start serious consultations with china on ballistic missile defense so

that china does not become an obstacle to russian-american cooperation. we would have to persuade that ballistic missile defense is not against china. america has to be clear on some important issues. is china entitled for its own nuclear deterrent against united states, like russia? is china and titled to treatment -- entitled for treatment as a superpower? is china entitled to some information and consultations like the united states are doing with russia on ballistic missile defense in the far east? , providing information, talking about chinese concerns, trying to find solutions like it was between the united states and russia so that they are

involved. that is important. my first recommendation to russian government would be to start being very practical and technical on ballistic missile defense. it would be very difficult to come with a grand design of strategic ballistic missile defense because we still have a balance of forces which are targeted at each other. i think that is something that we have to start the list with strategic ballistic missile defense and take care of rogue states who are the most urgent threats. i think russia should be tougher on iran. i think iran has overplayed their cards. iran is treating russia like the tail was wagging the dog. that should not be permitted. i think russia should take a

more tough position, sanctions against iran, for two reasons. this is because iran has crossed to many barriers, too many red lines and secondly because this is a prelude to war in the persian gulf. if it is not the united states, -- if it is not because of the united states, israel would not tolerate iran getting closer to nuclear capability. this is the argument i would use in russia and the united states, that the new treaty should be the basis for a much greater calculation on the fence and on iran. it can be like that. the fact of signing and ratification of the new treaty will already affect iranian policy. they are touchy on the question of russian-american policy.

whenever we have contradictions, a rent toughens its position immediately. -- iran toughens its position immediately. >> terry taylor for the international council of life sciences pres s. given your view that this nuclear agreement, if it is ratified, is a big political deal rather than a military one, i was looking for your views on the political troubles arising from this in strengthened cooperation between the rrussia and the united states, how do

you think that the leading political establishment would respond to the view you expressed on iran? is there a real prospect of real collaboration between russia and the united states on this? >> a quick question -- it seems to me that you predominantly reference the perceptions of what we might call the key leaders in russia -- the elite in russia and to what extent is the popular opinion in russia concerned about the specifics of a nuclear arms agreement and also, to what extent is popular opinion concerned about the gap

between the actual and perceived power in the world between the united states and russia? . .

>> there is a notion that the nuclear route -- nuclear-weapons are not the only color remaining in russia. the balance of power is not in russia's favor and we have a lot of foreign policy problems. second, it makes up for progression inferiority in other aspects. it will take a lot of persuasion. hopefully a clear stance by the prime minister to make russian public opinion complacent about the new treaty. russian public opinion is enormously concerned about russian vulnerability, the economic liability, financial vulnerability, a vulnerability

to terrorism, vulnerability to nato, and in prospect, to china. it recently has come to the foreground of russian public debate, and there is much greater concern that is openly expressed about china and the way china treats russia, and the way things may change in 10 or 15 years with respect to china. for many people, this is an additional argument that we have to avoid making china an enemy because obviously the balance is so much in china's flavor -- chuck's favor -- china's favor. we have a huge border with china

where russian and the structure was virtually dismantled. with respect to iran, i think that russia will support sanctions with some exemptions. the ban on weapons transfer will not be supported. russia would certainly provide defensive weapons to iran. not so many, after all. iran is not our primary partner any longer. but this ban would not be supported in russia. some things that are not proposed that may come in the debate like doing something with [unintelligible] project, russia would not agree

to that. russia would agree with other sanctions, particularly the embargo on supplies to iran of oil products, gasoline, and others. that will meet no objection from russia. the main problem is to have germany firmly on board and to persuade india. with india, it will be very difficult. india makes iran its primary ally in the indian ocean and they're building a military port facility in iran, competing with china. china is placing its emphasis on pakistan and myanmar primarily.

so it would be 80 gm-economic data it would be a geode- economic game. in principle, there should be sanctions, but sanctions should not be at russian expends. the most effective sanctions would be an oil embargo. that's a subject for the united states to negotiate now with russia, but europe, japan, china and india. after a new wave of sanctions, it would be wise to revise our policy toward iran. i think the previous crop -- the previous policy, no encouragement, safeguards, it has not worked.

-- no in richmond, safeguards, it has not worked. unless there is a threat of an embargo or military action. i think we should change the emphasis to the primary emphasis on iaea safeguards, the acceptance of the 1997 [unintelligible] the second approach might be to shift the emphasis to agree to make iran agreed to withdraw and rich uranium elsewhere. not keeping the stock of enriched uranium, while having the permission to continue operating its existing cascades of centrifuges. some new ones is needed with

respect to enrichment, and said of stating once again for the sixth time, no in richmond, or else nothing. -- no enrichment, or else nothing. do not expand@@@@@@@@k a nuclear weapon, much longer

than if iran kept the stocks and stopped the centrifuges. >> going back to the earlier questions and things you said about nato and the number one threat perception in russia being made at. let me ask the question a 5- year-old asked. what is it that russian security things nato would do to russia? it's fine to say nato is a threat, but what is it that russia has what is the military action nato would take against russia that causes all of this concern? >> the russian military doctrine is something like [unintelligible]

music, it's not as bad as it sounds. the globalization of nato and movement of data to russian borders is the number one military danger, not threats. russians make a difference. threat is something that is already here that threatens war. danger is something that potentially might lead to bore. in the list of dangerous, this is number one, but it is not on the list of threats. there is a specialist of threats and nato is not mentioned there. second, moving nato military infrastructure, moving alliance to russian borders, this may be hair splitting, but it's different from saying nato movement to russian borders. russia is concerned about infrastructure. ballistic missile defense

structure in romania, air fields in lithuanians. russia cannot understand why it is going on. there is no terrorist threat or rogue states. that is about nato. in principle, there are political and psychological biases with respect to nato and nato expansion. it is seen from russia as the west taking advantage of gorbachev's soviet union and yeltsin's democratic russia. this is not to eliminate -- this is not to eliminate those countries from, misrules. yeltsin decided to liberate delayed -- in neighboring soviet republics from communist rule. neither of them expected nato to move to take this space.

russia considers post-soviet space as an area of legitimate interests. and it really is. the only problem is russia does not formulate its interest in a tangible and clear way. that has been my problem for many years. i tried to persuade them if they would formulate in a very precise way what are your economic and other interests in each particular neighboring country, the west might look at it in a much less hostile way rather than one russia says this is our area of national interest which is often seen as neo-imperial attempts to dominate. russia does not want nato to

take over post-soviet space under whatever pretext and deprive russia of its legitimate interests toward russia as nec minorities and economic investment and everything russia has with respect to that space. there is concern that some conflict in the caucuses, which still remains quite likely, may bring russia and the wet sand and to direct confrontation -- and the west into direct confrontation. if nato comes right to the russian border from the west and from the south, that is why russia says that. in the new military doctrine, it is formulated in a very cautious

way, just like the formulation on nuclear-weapons. it is worth mentioning here because in some short time, russia will come with its nuclear posture review. russians waited and waited for this to come with their own military doctrine. then they decided not to wait any longer but then as military doctrine was effective by the thrust of president obama for nuclear disarmament, by the information we have that the posture review was delayed because of obama wanted to have some less traditional formulation, and by negotiations and resetting relations -- since 1993 when first russian military doctrine was formulated, we have never had a doctrine that would be so cautious and conservative on nuclear-weapons as the present one.

it formulates only two situations under which russia may use of nuclear weapons. one is in retaliation afford nuclear or chemical or biological attacks on russia and its allies. second, to repel overwhelming conventional aggression which would put under doubt the very existence of the russian state. that such a tall order that i cannot think of anything more liberal than just and equitable pledge. this comes very close to equivocal no first use pledge. it is already weapons of mass destruction, no first use pledge. the very existence of russian

state, it's difficult to think what should happen to doubt the very existence of the russian state. maybe america defaults on all of its investments -- [laughter] >> that is an important point about the doctrine because it has not been discussed. either that language or demeaning and that is different than it seemed like it is going to be months ago. >> a lot of people and high officials were improvising on the subject come out with sufficient knowledge of the subject and there was a lot speculation, preventive strike, pre-emptive strikes and so on. nothing of that is in the new military doctrine. the previous ones that russia might use nuclear weapons in case of conventional aggression in critical situations. but that is a very amorphous term.

the present term is i would say very conservative. >> thank you for this good conversation. the u.s. is behind on its commitments for dismantling nuclear weapons. in fiscal year 2011, the obama administration has significantly increased funding for the laboratories, some argue some of the funding is not necessarily needed for reliability means. how do russian negotiators view these increases and the backlog of dismantlement and does it affect any future negotiations after the start treaty. >> we will go with you and some

of time have left. >> i base slightly different version of the question from a five-year old. given that nato was created as primarily a buffer against presumed soviet aggression, now that the soviet union no longer exists and presumably the threat of russian aggression is at least substantially reduced, why do we even have nato? >> it's great to ask a russian those questions. >> i will leave the second question to you. why do we have made no? >> why do you think we think we have nato? [laughter] >> with respect to laboratories in the budget for stewardship of those things, it has taken

russia and a very complex and way. nobody is very concerned about it. weapon storage business something that will have to wait for many years before nuclear disarmament comes. what it does, that would be a real hard core nuclear disarmament. we're dealing with launchers and delivery systems. it is peripheral. even as slowly as we go with reducing missiles, bombers and submarines. those russians who are responsible for watching americans would probably interpret at as a way to pacify republican opposition in this set, the beginning of horsetrading, and even more on future [unintelligible]

>> russians are good reading things, so that's a good interpretation. >> was nato, -- with nato, russians were not against nato in the early '90s. when the soviet union agreed for german reunification within the nato alliance, russians looked very well at the at and considered data to be -- looked very well at nato and considered a dead to be good and there was a top of russia eventually joining nato. yeltsin wins even made a very conspicuous statement saying russia will put the question of joining nato [unintelligible] and it produced such a reaction that corrected it in a few days, saying the typist made a mistake, that russia will not

participate. but then, the attitude toward nato started to change. the crucial turning point was the bombing of serbia and. after that, at russia's started to see nato as an aggressive alliance that used its force arbitrarily out of united nations security council framework, out of for a mark of international law, at will. what is more importantly that it did not change the official attitude toward nato, but the grass roots, russian attitude toward nato. i lived at least half of my professional life in the soviet union. i do not remember ever seeing such an outcry of anti-nato, and

that-western movements at the grassroot lovell of the russian public as in 1999. the more official propaganda was coming against nato. the more russian people like nato. but that changed dramatically after 1999. then, russia started to judge nato not by the nature of the state's which are native members, whether democratic or not quite democratic, but by the nato actual functions. by the actual operations. the operation in iraq, which was not a new operation, but the united states and a number of nato allies, intervened without