but also, to mission success. if people can get outside the wire, military and non-military, then they can do the mission assigned, which is a coin mission. they can't get outside the wire, then they can't. so it's essential to mission success to defeat the i.e.d. and finally, it's essential to the morale of people in afghanistan, our coalition partners and people themselves and all three of those ways, the counter-i.e.d. fight is essential and the secretary said i know of no other way of doing this than to do it myself. would you just every day make sure we're doing everything we possibly can and that's what i do every day and i'll give you some examples. and this is just a matter of getting everybody here in washington in the defense department, in the intelligence community, in the services, in the various task forces, isr

task force, biometrics, and so forth, and in theater, the various commands, centcom, all focus on these next few weeks and doing everything we possibly can. my discount rate is huge for this particular part of what i do. and we've had -- and just by focusing in that way, we've been able to do some things that i think are very important as the summer goes on. first, to accelerate the delivery of critical counteri.e.d. enablers to the troops for this season. this is a total of several billion dollars over the next weeks and months. these are robots, hand-held metal detectors and ground-penetrating radars, they

are vehicles and there's something you'll begin to -- they're something you'll begin to see over afghanistan, which are elevated line of sight, in particular, air ship borne sensors. we are pushing all the i.s.r., that is all the predators, reapers, hunters, warriors and so forth, we possibly can, into afghanistan, but there's -- no matter what we do, it's never going to be enough so that every time a patrol goes out, it has that eye in the sky over it, looking around, checking out its local situation. there is an alternative though, that for the area of a fob, or for a city or for a particular length of road, is just as good, it's kind of what you see every morning when you turn on the television and look at the traffic report, and that is an elevated line of sight camera. and we are going to be this summer increasing manyfold the

number o of aero stat cameras. i was in kandahar a few week ago, there's one in kandahar over top the city. every patrol can have a camera looking around, a few blocks around it, is anybody sneaking up on them. every person of ill will in kandahar thinks that camera is looking at them. every person of goodwill thinks that camera is protecting them. so worry going to be introducing a lot more of them, because it provides for those people under their own control the same functionality that a fancy uad would have, but it's imette st. guillen that we can afford to get if there this summer. so i knew i couldn't double the the number of uav's in afghanistan this summer, but i'm going to -- geez, 20 fold, what are that means, the number of these emelevated line of sight

aerostats. we're focused also on training, so that our troops who go into afghanistan this summer as part of the surge are trained for the distinctive character of the i.e.d. fight in afghanistan, one that depends on homemade explosives, for example, one that has much more decentralized networks behind it than was the case in iraq. so we can apply some of the lessons of iraq, but not all the lessons of iraq to the case of afghanistan. and so, john, if you go down to the national training center at fort irwin today, you'll find soldiers that are going to -- rotating into afghanistan being trained specifically in afghan lanes. that are mock of a began villages -- afghan villagers with of a began villagers and the particular kinds of ammoni

ammoniaan nitrate, so they're going into find what they're going to find in the actual area where they're going to operate. and third, because we're not alone fortunately in afghanistan, we're part of a coalition, secretary gates thought it was important, he announced this in istanbul several weeks ago, to do whatever we could, not at the expense of our own effort, but in addition to our own effort, to assist our coalition partners. in their counter-i.e.d. capabilities and so we're providing them with mraps, we're providing them with some equipment. we're taking some of that training expertise we have to their training ranges, so with they deploy from europe, let us say, to afghanistan, they're getting some of the same kind of training distinctive to the afghan fight that our people are getting. these are all things we're doing in these weeks and these months to get us better prepared to

deal with the i.e.d. threat in afghanistan and it's remarkable what can happen when you get everybody together focused and say i don't want to hear about anything six months from now. tell me what you can do now, how many weeks and every day, pushing away to get these things done and that brings me to logistics. and the huge logistics challenge that the department faces right now in the way that those logistics challenges are being met. i'll start very briefly with the retrograde from iraq . the retrograde from iraq, a huge task all by itself. of course, we have afghanistan on top of that, which is even bigger. just to pause for a moment on the retrograde from iraq , it is not as large in terms of tonnage as was the retrograde from iraq after desert storm, however, it takes place in a -- on a

particular timetable, we need to get down to certain level by august. it takes place in hand environment where there is still threat. it goes on while we are continuing to operate. and -- i don't think this is inconsequential, the retrograde from iraq takes place after being there for many years, so this wasn't like checking out of a hotel that you had been in for a short time, as in iraq of a desert storm. this is like leaving a home you've lived in for a while. we were more settled in, more equipment. and -- so we had a lot to do. we started out with 350 fobs in iraq . about a year ago, and we're closing them, getting those numbers down. 147,000 contractors by the way.

now down to about 100,000, going down to about 75,000. you know the troop levels will be going down to 50,000. 3.4 million items of equipment about eight months ago. we're now down to 2.2 million and we've got to of move another 1.2 million. before august. this is a variety of equipment, there's traditional military equipment, which had go back home with the units. there is equipment that was never associated with units, but was bought for iraq and put in iraq, so-called theater-provided equipment. that's all the green equipment. there's also white equipment, which is non-military standard equipment, bought to support the fight over the years. some of it in the hands of contractors, some of it in the

hands of troops. refrigerators, air conditioners, desks, so-called white equipment. 41,000 vehicles, which is now at 29,000. we've moved 12,000 vehicles in the last few months and we're going of to have to move many more, so this is an enormous migration of equipment. one of the things that has paced us is deciding where something goes. we know it doesn't belong or isn't needed in iraq anymore, but where does it go? does it go home to become part of the army or the marine corps of the future, do they want it, does it fit in? if not, guard, reserve, i mean -- so guard, reserve, active-duty. if not, where does it go? does it go to kuwait for a future contingency? does it swing to afghanistan? do we leave it behind for the iraqi forces. do we give it to somebody else

who needs it. all those decisions need to be made before a piece of equipment is moved, so it's not just the physical moving of it, it's decisions about where it goes. let me now close with the most important logistics challenge of all, which is afghanistan. afghanistan i always say, take a globe, spin a globe and say where is the last place you would like to be fighting a war if you would your choice other than antarctica, you might well pick afghanistan. land locked, very austere logistics environment. and we can't get effective until we get in and we can't get in and get set until we have moved the people and equipment and the means to sustain them through the very slender arteries. a couple of ground lines of communications, the air bridge.

and -- so we are working every day to widen those arteries, and i'll give you again an example of the mrap a.t.v. the a.t.v., because it's a military piece of equipment, we prefer to move by air and that means flying from charleston, where the government furnished equipment, the radios and so forth are installed in the vehicles, as they are delivered from oshkosh, flown to kandahar or bagram. they're to be married up with a unit and put out in the field. we are in the interest of fielding them more quickly and being able to use the air bridge for other freeup capacity on the air bridge for other urgent needs this spring and summer, we're beginning to put mraps

on ships now. now that we've shipped a whole lot of them into afghanistan, while those are being absorbed and digested, we have a little time, we're putting matvs on sea lift, taking them into theater on sea lift, transferring them there to airlift, because the legs are shorter then, and you can pop them in more quickly. and eventually, to -- may be able to use ground communication, ground transportation the entire way for mraps, so you have to, in the case of logistics for afghanistan, look at every piece of the pipe, all the way through -- up the -- in the case of ground transportation, up the two ground lines of communication, to -- from

karachi, over the northern distribution network, a couple of branches of that, up through russia, the baltics first and russia and the stands, over the caucuses and then in through the stands. and then the intratheater transport, whether by intratheater airlift or the very challenging job of getting on the roads in afghanistan, and moving things around from one place to another. so every day is an effort to widen those arteries, every day is an effort to get equipment into afghanistan and the people who do this work are truly premarkble. and i might -- my office is filled with messages about bottled water or fuel or toiletries or whatever. tents, containers for troops to

live in, containers for the contractors to live in, so that they can support the troops. containers for the people who ship the containers to live in. everything is like that. and you can't just show up in a bob with a sleeping bag. l/@ú2j@hzúz cities, container cities going

up there to support what the -- the effort, which this summer is going to be very critical for that effort, and if we don't in just in these next weeks and months, get ourselves in there and get set, we can't have success. so i wanted to tell you about that, because i think it's one of the most important things i've of zone in the defense world, transpiring in very, very few weeks and months, and it's a tremendous tribute to the logisticcations and the defense department today that we're able to do that. i don't want one more thing to talk about but i don't want to talk too long which is logistics in the acquisition system. perhaps i can say something about it in questions and answers. that's the logistics subject, that if this were no wars going on, we'd probably be discussing, what about logistics for the joint strike fighter, how can we

stop spending so much on sustainment of weapons systems, also very important topic, but in the interest of time, i'll pass on that, but i appreciate it, john, if you're still here, the opportunity to talk about acquisition technology and logistics, as it applies to the current fight. it's very different. i don't think many of my predecessors had that same circumstance, hasn't been traditional for at & l to focus on ongoing conflict as against the programs of record and the logistic system of record, but today's circumstance demand it. secretary of defense is very insisten on them and it's a privilege to be part of such a remarkably performing logistics system. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you, dr. carter. many you of course have been at events here of before and you know our normal procedure. you raise your hand and if you have a question that you like to ask, we have staff with wireless microphones. i'll identify you and you wait for the mic, and then stand up and say who you are and where you're from, and then proceed with your questions. so do we have any folks out there who have a question they would like to raise? let me start over here with the back one and then we'll come here. >> doug brooks with ipoa, the association of stability contractors. my question is on the nato allies and coalition partners, how much your business is actually supporting them with contractors and logistics support? i know that you have hungarian there and others that don't have their own logistics trained, so i'm wondering how much of that is weighing on you?

>> they in general -- there are three tiers of logistics, there's the u.s. stuff for the u.s., there are nation by nation, the way they sustain themselves. now we'll let them come in our slip stream if it's convenient for them, they're generally paying separately. then there's a nato effort per se. everybody tries to share. i'll give you an example. in the south, all of our fuel, we buy through the nato system. because the nato has been there for a while, they have a good system set up. we pay for it at the fob gate. i don't know how you got here, i don't care how you got here, that's your problem, i'm buying by the ga gallon at the fob gate and the truck shows up from the independent contractors and we test the fuel and then accept the fuel. that system is run by isaf in

the south. in the north, we do it ourselv ourselves, it's a logistics agency task. down at bastion leather neck and the bits, work and in hand, try to -- brits, work and in hand, try to share our logistics and do, and we do it with all of our other coalition partners whenever we can. >> mr. secretary, mike mitchell with lockheed armin. counter-i.e.d. as well as logistics capability, in the sense that a number of firms are developing unmanned helicopter capability that could fulfill niche resupply missions, it would take truck convoys off the road, and in hand area whereas

you've cited, there's limited road infrastructure in the first place, to get to areas, so i'm interested in kind of where the department's thinking abandon if there's any way to try to accelerate that capability for all the reasons cited. >> great great question and absolutely right. to the extent you can keep people off the road, that's particularly cumbersome supply convoys, in out lying areas, you reduce the i.e.d. threat. we're doing a lot more air drop in season, a lot more air drop than we were just a few months ago, so to an outline cop, that instead of driving trucks up there with their food and their water and their supplies and so forth, you fly over. they're gps controlled parachutes right now that it fly it right in, you keep people off the roads. similarly, we are looking at

several different versions of unmanned rotary lift, to do the same thing. put a pallet underneath, pick it up, fleiss over, fleiss to a base, drops it off, comes over and comes back. wonderful way of resupplying people without having anybody take any risk at all. >> let's go to the front table here. you'll bear with me. you have to raise your and high. there's a lot of nice light shining from behind you, so i can see the light a lot better than i can see the people. >> thank you. sandra irwin with national defense. i wanted to ask you about your comments on meeting the needs of the operational forces who say that's a big priority right now. a lot of people say that one way to do that is to have more joint acquisition, that acquisition is not joint enough, and you need to have more efficiencies to make it faster. can you talk about maybe your thoughts on how that could be done and if anything is being

done? >> well, it is a -- a perennial seam in our acquisition system that goes back now to goldwater nichols 30 years or. as everybody in this audience knows, that in the main -- goldwater nichols decreed that we shall fight jointly, but you are right, that we still in the main, still acquire severally, and so joint acquisition has always been a challenge and it's a challenge in the wars. as well. in all the ways you might imagine. if there are inherently joint capabilities, that is, things that everybody needs, like some of the counter-i.e.d. enablers, all the services that are present there, that have installations there, that have personnel there, need some of the eod equipment, and it makes sense for us to buy them in one

lot. that's why we have organizations like the joint i.e.d. defeat organization, as jay suggests, it's joint, -- as the j suggests, it's joint and it buys equipment for all the services. we also have to have different services take the lead for equipment that go to other services, so when joint urgent operational needs statement comes in, what's the j in juon mean, it means an army unit needs some air force support and the air force needs to resource that support, and they do, and so to a really remarkable degree, all four services are involved in afghanistan. my daughter said she was going to an event and the secretary of the navy was going to be there, ray moebus and she knows i know ray and she said what should i ask the secretary of the navy and i said ask him how many navy people are in land blocked

afghanistan. and it's amazing. it's amazing what the navy is doing in afghanistan. we've had to do that. because we have to take whatever capability we can, and apply it to afghanistan. so you're right, the contingency acquisition is even more demanding case of getting the system to behave jointly than is the program of record joint acquisition. >> dr. carter, we have a lot more questions, but i'm also mindful of the fact that we are approaching the time that we were going to release you. would you like to take one more? >> yes. >> all right. we have a microphone on this side here. there. let's take the guy at the front table there. >> colin clark, mr. secretary, pratt whitney is talking about a pbl for the f-135. exactly online --

>> give me one day off. one day of off. ask a logistics question. >> it's a pbl, it's logistics. >> come on. just one day. >> kevin green from ibm. dr. carter, you mentioned a large infusion of additional isr sensors and platforms. could you describe the department's intention to invest in the kind of data management and analytics capabilities that will allow that increased amount of data to be formed into actionable streams of information? it's a huge issue. it's one those for want o of a nail things. it's no point putting an air nail there if you don't have the

ramp space, you have to get the cement for the ramp space and then you have to have the analysts, you have to have the bandwidth, the processing capability. you have to ask yourselves questions like the one you just asked. who actually needs this information. for one of those aerostats that i described, that data doesn't have to go all over afghanistan, it doesn't have to go back to washington. it's feed by the people down under the balloon. and so that's a much simpler case. you have a van, a few operators, a tether, the aerostat. when it comes to something like a liberty ship, which is a complex, multisensor kind of intelligence platform, there, in order to make use of that information, you know, you do need stateside, let's say in the

signet area, there's no point in introducing that aircraft, unless you have the point to go back to nsa and the various facilities back here so that that data can rapidly be used, although we are building more, pushing forward into afghanistan more analytical capabilities, so that everything doesn't have to go halfway around the world. i'll say one other thing about analytical capability that i think is very, very important. and that is, the demand for intelligence analysis at levels -- echelons below brigade, it's still the case that most of the analytical expertise is associated with a division and brigade level. and in this fight, which is so local, and so information-intensive, and with

soldiers who are used to having information, you're used to acting on information. the army now has these company command posts, and boy, it's not your company command post of 20 years ago. they're all at laptops, they're expecting that kind of information, they know how to be effective with that kind of information, and they need intelligence analysts who can tell them about this town, who can tell them about good guys as well as bad guys, because that's important, not only the threat, it's do you know your situation well enough to do the counterinsurgency mission and it's still the case that -- i know this is noted frequently, we're fighting against it every day, that it's important to get those people down, out to the outposts an down to the echelons where analysis can really be useful and not just writing reports at