brief and focus onu president obama is meeting with the central european leaders in prague on thursday evening. i would say this to begin with. paradoxically, his planned meeting with 11 leaders from the new democracy and allies is intended to demonstrate that relations with central and eastern europe have not been reset or have not been downgraded, which is the way it is perceived in some parts of the region. in other words, despite attempts to upgrade relations with russia primarily through the s.t.a.r.t. treaty, the u.s. will not, according to the obama administration, let me make by points here -- weaken its commitment to nato, with from military from europe, agree to any revision of the continent's into blocks or spears and influence, four, close the door

to further nato enlargements, and five, make any grand bargains with moscow over the heads of former soviet satellites in central eastern europe. .

>> what commitments are made to mutual defense and the nato role of the coming decade. is it a global nato? is it back to basics or how can they be combined? there are different views on how this should be structured the concourse of the new missile defense system. i remember president obama canceled the bush version but has talked about his own version to which several countries have already quickly signed on to. the question there is exactly how this will be an integrated nato system, how russia will be included and if there will be included. it is worth remembering in this

context that one of the reasons warsaw and prague initially signed on to the bush version was not so much defense against iran if but to try to establish a black role -- a black robe -- a bilateral link to the u.s.. to summarize or to conclude, the european states bordering russia are concerned about russia's ambitions in countries like ukraine, moldova and georgia and the possibility of another war in georgia is not to be discounted. exert even on their own security, particularly with the most vulnerable baltic states, as proof of their article 5

defense guarantees, they have pushed the alliance phosphatase for the three baltic states from the fact for chief of -- baltic states. nato did not respond. even to position some nato infrastructure on their territories, this is why the deployment of a battery of patriot missiles with a small american contingent in northern poland is considered extremely important because it ties nato closer to the defense of these countries. they also want greater clarity as to how all nato countries interpret article 5 which is subject to some debate.

and proof that the alliance is an effective deterrent policy. if you have any questions, i am happy to answer. we will open it up to questions. >> i was wondering if you could elaborate. you talked about the political capital the president has and the capital he has with european leaders because of the treaty and how that will play out with other issues this year. >> that is a great question. it is hard to quantify. i think that 56 says the administration has experience in the last month, international

leaders in europe and elsewhere have to regard the administration as one which is, there was a tendency given the difficulty of the first year to sort of say they are weak and discount them and we may not be dealing with this guy in 2012 and beyond. 5 think that the ovulation looks different now than just one month ago. howled that is going to play out -- how that is going to play out and behind the scenes, the administration has been getting closer to a meeting of the mine's not only with the russians but to some extent with the chinese.

china decided to come to the nuclear summit. if the could offset tight a correlation between the victory in health care and that but the fact that he is coming here bolsters that image that this is a president that is looking more successful. how successful they are going to be with the sanctions on iran, i did not think anybody in the obama administration is under the illusion that would avert sanctions are leveled on the iranians are going to solve the problems. we're going to have to wait and see. >> could you follow up just a bit? what are we likely to see? will there be developments in

the coming week on sanctions in iran and how would that become evident? >> in a lot of ways, we are in the same place we have always been on sanctions with iran. over the past few years, we have tried to target sanctions so that they did not effect the iranian people as a whole all the while knowing that the kinds of things which would relate get their attention are the kinds of things that hurt -- restrictions on refined petroleum products into iran. they heard the iranian people and iran's trading partners. it is easy for the u.s. to talk about sanctions. we cannot have a big trading relationship with them. it is a lot harder with russia and china, particularly china. the effort right now, since iran

has really refused to comply with u.n. security council resolutions, and even the olive branch offerings in the fall to get back to the negotiating table, we are engaged in an effort to get another round of resolutions. the issue is will china at best support or a not so bad outcome would be if they abstained and how much will russia support a new round of sanctions? there are a lot of things that could be done outside the u.n. security council and a lot of those measures that deal with transactions at banks have been helpful but if they show no sign of either returning to the negotiation table or halting

their enrichment program. i think we are in a slightly better position. the chinese have shown a bit more flexibility. until now, they have taken a principled stand against sanctions but we will have to see. this security summit next week offers an opportunity to talk on the margins which is what happens at major summits. the hope is there as well as this meeting in prague that we can bring first to russia and then china along. >> i do not think we are going to see sanctions on the energy sector. i am skeptical that we seek sanctions on arms exports to iran from both the russian and chinese. it looks like there is a decent likelihood of more restrictions

on the banking sector in trying to restrict the access of some of the political leadership has to capital. one of the positive things that i took note of was the report that the russians and chinese made a statement to the iranians about their failures to be more forthcoming with their nuclear weapons program. that was a bit lost because it was the same week it was announced that the start treaty was agreed to and a debriefing of the national security council pointed to that is quite a positive sign. they were not able to say whether it was a russian initiative to the chinese but nobody was quite sure about that.

that raises the interesting aspect between the russian- chinese relationship and to what extent they are together and to what extent are we picking them off somewhat. it is clear on iran that the russians are closer to us then the chinese are. >> if i could just answer briefly in terms of russian policy toward iran, it is very ambiguous. on the one hand, they did not want them to develop nuclear capability. on the other hand, they do not want the americans to sanction. that means less russian influence in the region. it suits them to have a little bit of a problem with iran. not one that gets out of hand and is set into a strike against nuclear facilities or for them to develop a nuclear device that could be -- that could be deployable.

we see the same situation in afghanistan. they want to help us but they do not want us to win, either. it is tying down american resources and restricting american influence and using themselves as a potential mediator. that is part of the strategy. >> thank you. >> we are looking at the release of the ncr tomorrow. i want to ask how that fits in with this. india and pakistan will both be participating in the summer at. a and -- participating in the summit. i wonder how the recent comments

and afghanistan will factor into the meetings and prague and the discussions in terms of what to expect. >> i will start on the npr. the long awaited nuclear posture review. what this has done in the past is set out the role of nuclear weapons in u.s. national security strategy. it is no coincidence that the bush administration's nuclear posture review basically said that we have 2000 warheads and that is what you saw in the treaty. the nuclear posture review this time around will talk about whether the primary uses of

nuclear weapons, what are the levels we can live with, i do not think there is going to be a whole lot that is going to be very surprising but it should support what the obama administration is doing with the start treaty and follow-on negotiations there. on india and pakistan, pakistan is probably even though the nuclear security summit is not designed and hopes to avoid pointing fingers at any single country but obviously, the issue of nuclear security is a big one in pakistan. both the security of nuclear material and the security of nuclear weapons. i do not thinks that we will see too much progress between india and pakistan at this summit but i think it is a good thing that both are it least attending. -- at least attending. >> one comment about the

administration's going to 0 agenda which is what the secretary of defense said not anything that will happen soon. one of the fundamental problems about that agenda is that it and list the support of other countries with it beginning with the russians and then the chinese and so on down the line. nobody else in the world that is officially recognized is particularly enthusiastic about it because the u.s. enjoys -- here is the rub for the russians. they are concerned that the combination of their eroding of conventional weapons and the deteriorating numbers on the

offensive forces and the u.s. conventional weapons development which are weapons close to nuclear capability and the development of nuclear defenses, all of that from the russian standpoint, they see this as potentially making the world safe for american military intervention when ever we want. that is a court tension and challenge -- that is a core tension and challenge for the agenda. we are spending 55% of the world expenditures on global arms and telling the rest of the world that we should be moving for aggressively toward no nuclear weapons. that is a tough nut to crack. it will become more telling as we get beyond the replacement treaty.

on the comments of president karzai, wow. some of our friends -- with friends like that, who needs enemies? this is the crux of the problem in afghanistan. if it is true that he is going to be at the nuclear summit in washington next week -- sorry? [inaudible] >> that was in reference to the separate meeting. which is still on asset today. that is what robert gibbs said today. one of the core problems we face in afghanistan is the competitive instincts of pakistan and india so i would have to think that both of the leaders here next week is a

point of discussion. with the upcoming planned offensive, the ambassador was recently here and his comment was this is one part military and five parts political. the one part military, the afghan leadership is likely to support the five parts political, big question mark. >> welcomed -- >> i would like to go back to the reset with russia subject and could you talk a little bit about the political aspect of it and whether you see any relationship developing between obama and the russian prime minister that could cause any

issues? >> i think there is no question that president obama finds it easier to interact with him then putin. it is a tricky point. on foreign policy and security issues, my view has been that there really isn't any space between them on foreign policy and security issues that they see that is significant. what is significant, and i have

observed this myself from simply being with the two of them separately, they really do have different outlooks on the development of russia. they talk about it very differently. the fact that the russian premier is a lot younger and he has experience in the private sector, he does what we have -- what we would call a more liberal outlook on things than does mr. putin. it is impossible to miss that. what happens in russia is impossible to predict. i would be very wary about making any bets against vladimir proveutin and i would be wary at being viewed overtly as supporting the russian prime

minister publicly at the expense of mr. putin. we could have more potential to endanger him than we have to actually help. we did not have a particularly good track record in trying to intervene in other country's domestic politics, particularly in russia where sovereignty is so sensitive, that has to be handled with the utmost care. >> i was wondering if you could talk about the role of congress particularly on the start treaty ratification and how much they could be an obstacle for what the white house can do. >> that is a great question. congress can obviously be a big obstacle when it comes to nuclear arms control and that is

because on the start treaty, the senate has to have comprehensive consensus on the treaty which this administration supports. but they can also be an obstacle of there. we have seen some things from the hill from particular senators expressing their views on certain issues related to this on missile defenses and several of those things but i think the obama administration has tried to head them off at the past. a lot of money for the nuclear weapons complex which many thought would be kind of a prerequisite for senate

approval and some of these nuclear arms control areas but we will see what happens with the debate on start. i do not think there are too many -- this new treaty, on the face of it, incremental, there is nothing in there on missile defense. it does not same ring from a rational, a technical perspective that there are too many leaps. politics is politics. there can be any number of different organs that can be asked for. i particularly was hoping that obama would be able to do a series of unilateral moves that would not depend so much on congressional approval and we

will see in the coming days, particularly in the next two weeks, i think we will see more views emerging from congress not just on start but on the nuclear posture review. >> do you anticipate when the president meets with the russian president that that will be a meeting to get the russians to sign off on sanctions? should we look at the chinese meeting as well as potentially face-to-face sign-off on sanctions with iran? we on that kind of timetable? should we consider that one of the central items of that agenda? secondly, what ever happens to the security council, the you think it would be likely and it possible to do it other component of sanctions? would europe be open to that

question of should we anticipate that after what everett the security council does or does not come up with? lastly, almost every tree of this nature has been a conversation of the numbers. we have not talked numbers at all. are they not impressive or is it about something else? that is a lot so i will stop there. >> on the iran question, i am operating under the assumption that the meeting in prague is very important to us to get sign-off and the following week there will be a meeting with the chinese. that may be overly ambitious but that looks to be the case of sequencing from my standpoint. the russians are closer to us on this.

the hope has always been that you get the russians which will help bring the chinese along. i have always been intrigued by the idea of let's see because the chinese traditionally have been quite happy to hide behind russian opposition to sanctions and russian vocal opposition on a lot of issues that the chinese are not particularly enthusiastic about it. on the iran sanctions, it will be interesting with the obama administration, they have been pretty explicit in talking about this as on the reset of getting the russians to come on board as the litmus test. if you ask them whether arantxa test is with the u.s.-china relationship, it is not. that reflects a much greater leverage that the chinese have

with the bilateral relationship with the u.s. than the russians in particular. that is an interesting and telling change of affairs from even just a few years ago with the russian support was viewed as you get that and you have the chinese. i think that is a paradigm. if it ever existed, i think it is broken. the chinese have shown themselves on a number of issues are for the past year to be willing to be more in front in opposition to the u.s. interests. the question on the nuclear treaty, the numbers. the you want to talk about the numbers? >> sure. i think that there is less of an obsession with the numbers

because of the reason that andy gave earlier which is the u.s. does not fear russia as the major strategic competitor. maybe andy can talk about the discussion and russia over numbers. the numbers are not so low compared to what they were previously and it depends on what you are comparing it to. are you comparing it to the original and how you are counting. is it the original agreement for the moscow treaty? the white house has said this is 30% lower but in the end, do you really care? when the warheads start to get, we are at 1550, when they start to get to the thousand level or below, then you are really the way to start to care about numbers becau t