interests. this requires military capabilities to protect forests, to ensure the security of supplies and conduct operations despite the threat or use of nuclear weapons. this requires missile defenses that can protect the lion's territory and deploy forces. second the u.s. and nato should strengthen security relations with key arab partners, particularly egypt, iraq, jordan, saudi arabia, and the gulf states. consultations on the security risks of iran's nuclear activities would be a first step. subsequent steps could include bilateral exercises, combined contingency planning, foreign military sales and missile and air defenses that can extend protection to regional partners and operate with their own defenses. third, the united states and nato should act to discourage further proliferation.

they can reduce their incentives to proliferate. also iran must be denied any benefit from its nuclear arms. the world may have no choice but to live with a nuclear armed iran but we should not accept it or legitimate it. other would be proliferators should look at iran, even with nuclear weapons and see that treaty violations bring penalties instead of prestige and sanctions instead of security and isolation instead of influence. finally nato needs to consider the implications for its own policy. nato ministers will be meeting in estonia later this month. this item was added at the request of ministers from belgium, germany, luxembourg,

netherlands and norway. these ministers have asked to discuss how nato can contribute to president obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. nato has already drastically reduced its nuclear posture. after the cold war, i was there, i remember it. eliminated entire categories of weapons and radically reduced the readiness of delivery forces. while there may be scope for some further reductions, for the consolidation, a serious discussion ask warranted before the alliance sets forth its target at nuclear zero. nato's nuclear forces may still have a contribution to make in two ways. first by keeping iran's leaders from trying to exploit new nuclear arms and locate those

who might try to seek nuclear weapons. beyond having stronger security relations, what can the u.s. do to prevent another generation of proliferation? first, we should continue to discourage to spread of technology that can be misused to build nuclear weapons. it is good and important that countries like the u.a.e. and saudi arabia have committed to forego uranium enrichment technologies. they recognize that foregoing these technologies, every line in the market for the nuclear fuel makes sense economically and helps reassure the world of their peaceful intent. it would be good and important if countries like turkey and egypt would make that same commitment. it is troubling that they have not. we should continue to back efforts to establish international fuel banks.

to discourage countries from burr suing these technologies -- from pursuing these technologies. second, we must reinforce our ability to protect and investigate nuclear activities. it is deeply troubling that syria and north korea were able to hide for so long their collaborative construction of a nuclear reactor. much more encouraging was the success of our intelligence community in finding iran's second enrichment facility. we need to build on this success but look beyond iran and north korea. this not only means looking for clandestine nuclear programs. it also means trying to understand leadership motives and decisions that could cause a country to decide that it wants nuclear weapons. investigators do not have the tools or resources of our intelligence community or those of other major states.

inspectors often have access and information that member states don't and may be able to connect the dots in way that member states can't. we should continue to aid the iaea and make as routine as possible sharing of information. the inspectors need not only more information but more authority. the administration is thus right in encouraging more countries to sign the iaea's additional protocowl. -- protocol. i would argue president obama has an important discussion to have with the leaders of egypt and brazil in particular on the margins of the nuclear summit. third, the united states should step up international efforts to interdict a list of traffic material. pakistan's -- remains under house arrest.

duhe? simon can clarify that. however, whether he is under house arrest our not, the case of serious covert reactor suggests that north korea has moved into the market for nuclear weapons technology. the proliferation security initiative endorsed at prague by president obama needs to be reenergized and targetted in particular on north korea's proliferation activities. we should renew high level diplomatic efforts to bring in countries like china, indonesia and malaysia that rely on the maritime routes used by north korea. conclude -- our efforts to to promote nuclear security in the middle east, too little, too late. i regret to report my view that it may be too late to avoid a nuclear-armed iran but it is certainly not too late for a

concerted effort to contain the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed iran and prevent another round that could make the danger of nuclear terrorism that much more frightening. thank you very much. [applause] >> greg, thank you very much. no, he's not out under house arrest at the moment. he has to ask in advance, 30 minutes in advance before he goes out. has he gone out? i'm told that people saw him in a book hop last week, along with his wife. i would now like to ask george perkovich now to come forward and speak. >> thanks, simon. i'm guessing that was mr. book's book shop where khan would have

been shopping. i don't want to be more boring than usual, which i would be because i agree with just about everything that ambassador schulte said. i'm tempted to liven it up by talking about the u.s.-india nuclear deal where we do disagree but i though that is not our topic today though i think actually the implications or some of the effects of that deal carry over into our dealings with iran and pakistan and its nuclear program and certainly with our effort, meaning the u.s. government effort, to try and get agreement around the world and a treaty to stop producing additional nuclear weapon material, which actually does come to our subject today in a way that if we're talking about nuclear security and the security of materials, the highly enriched

uranium and plutonium that could be made into nuclear weapons, one of the ways over time to limit that problem and to get a handle on it is to at least get the state to stop producing more and there has been an effort. there is an ongoing effort to negotiate such a treaty, which pakistan adamantly blocks with an argument that is sound if not ultimately persuasive that because of the u.s.-india nuclear deal india is now in a position to produce dozens more weapons per year than it would have been for. pakistan will be producing more nuclear weapons and you should stay tuned to that space because there will be an announcement that pakistan's cape to believe the produce plutonium is going to increase significantly as will its determination to block a treaty to stop that and they will be blaming the united states for this because of the

nuclear deal with india. that will be a live topic going forward. but in terms of today's agenda, i, too, like greg, wants to unpack a little bit the title. the title was artful. how you can security in the middle east, too little, too late. each of those terms, you know, i think, invites a little bit of discussion. and so if what is meant by nuclear security is the security of nuclear materials, the parts that could be made into explosive nuclear weapons, i think you know, ambassador schulte did a great job. i think the message was, you know, relatively positive that there is a lot of effort. the nuclear security summit next week in washington is going to mobilize high-level leadership. of all the big problems in the world, this is one of the more manageable. it's -- the number of site where

is the material exists is -- is known. or close to being known. the it is a very finite number. a small number and not too complicated to know what to do with those sites or those materials. it is not an emotionally or historically laden issue. it is not like dealing with this -- or you know, in the middle east or you know, korea and japan where you have all of these legacy issues that very much complicate things. this is a relatively manageable issue and i think that the summit and the attendance that is going to be at the summit is testament to that. you get more than 40 leaders -- leaders of more than 40 countries willing to come to an invitation to come and work on this issue and not really

holding it hostage to a lot of other issues shuggets that it is a relatively benign problem to try to deal with. if what we mean, though, by nuclear security, is the broader understanding of security, the environment in which one lives, the sense of states or other actors that they are in an environment that is either secure from threats of nuclear weapon or proliferation or insecurity to the point it makes you want to get nuclear weapons or you're worried that your neighbor is going to get them. if this is that sense of insecurity, security that we're talking about, the situation is not too good in just securing the materials. and there the question, again, in the title, would be nuclear security in the middle east. well, the question is what is the stats of nuclear security in the middle east depends on where you sit and who you are.

the view may be different in israel than it is in iraq than it is in syria than it is in jordan than it is in saudi arabia. i would argue that in none of these places actually is it good but the degree of anxiety and sense of insecurity depends on the place. and i think in a lot of ways that wednesday up talking about iran and i will talk a little bit about iran but i think it's indicative of the overall problem and the way we might think about it. to remember back to the 1980's and the first -- the iran-iraq war and this motivations for iran starting its clandestine effort to enrich urine yum -- uranium. came out avenue very insecurity time for iraq where it was being attacked by chemical weapons by

missiles on saddam hussein's iraq and basically the international community did nothing to respond. denied the chaverages that iraq was making these attacks for a number of years. we can go through the history there and the different ways of -- but the general argument is that if you don't attend to states with capabilities when their security interests are very, very challenged and you don't respect those security interests, don't expect them to stand still. they will -- they will react. in many ways what we're dealing with now is a reaction to that. is it too little, too late? another element in the title? well, i think it depends on again, whom we're referring to and what the problem is. is it too little too late to deal with iran? i would say that many of the states in the region answering that question if the title is

nuclear security in the middle east too little, too late, if are you talking about israel? too little, too late? you have done too little or too late. or not at all. the nonproliferation treaty review conference next may in six weeks or what have you, less than six weeks. four weeks. they are going to be perhaps 190 countries meeting for a month in new york talking about nuclear security, nonproliferation, nuclear weapons. that event operates under consensus rules which i would say are very unfortunate that we all understand they exist. and there will be every day, reference to -- with great vehement, israel's nuclear stats and what the u.s. is doing to deal with it because there was a resolution at the meeting in 1995 when the decision was made

in which the u.s. strongly, strongly pushed for the right reasons, to indefinitely extend the nonnuclear proliferation treaty. that was in 1995. the u.s. and other states won basically agreements to extend that treaty. but it was contingency. there will be an argument that -- for which there is evidence that in the ensuing 15 years very little has been done to fulfill that resolution, which was a part of this deal made in 1995. i'm not here to litigate or argue it one side or the other. i'm saying this is a very big, live issue that will be affecting nuclear security in the middle east. u.s. national interests and other states' national interests in the weeks ahead and in the time after that.

and just as it is very common at carnegie or washington institute or other places now to have meetings on iran where we focus on the security implications on iran, in the rest of the world there is a very different focus, although they are worried about iran too, there are other elements and parts of this policy that we're going to get exposed to this may that we don't normally get exposed to. i'll have to do deal with the broader middle east and israel's position there. to the extent that we're talking about iran, too little, too late, i would argue again, too little of what? one could argue that the u.s. has tried isolation of iran going back to when i -- when i started working on this which

was 1993. it is a personal failure of mine for 17 years having tried to work on the iranian nuclear problem but people forget this was when iran was just starting to say that it wanted to resume the nuclear power plan, which had been stopped during the iran-iraq war and so iran had gone to germany to ask them to revacuum work the complete the project and the clinton administration, not the george w. bush administration, took the position that no civil nuclear program in iran. not just no enrichment. no nuclear power plant. no nothing in iran. that was the u.s. position. and the u.s. used its influence with germany to get germany to stop cooperation with iran. on this and that was seen as a victory of the strategy of isolating iran and then russia

came in to fill the german position. they said we'll provide this cooperation and then it was found, actually that russia around 1996, 1997 that russia agreed to supply uranium enrichment technology secretly to iran and in then clinton administration exposed this to yell citizen that the russians would back out of that part of it. that's where we thought things lay until it was discovered that pakistan was supplying uranium assistance to iran. i was in russia when this was announced. boy were the russians surprised and not happy. they thought they were the only ones in this kind of relationship with iran and it was like, somebody finds out their mistress is having an and

they are outraged. how could they be with the pakistanis? the russians are still mad about that. the point is that the way they are trying to do that isolation, which i support, we have been trying for a long, long time and so i don't know if it was too little or if it is just a question of there are all these ways around these problems. i don't think isolation was too late. iranians and others will argue that endeucement was offered too late and too little. but this again, remember in 1997 and 1998, the clinton administration tried inducements. there is a positive time. there were efforts. one could always argue that they are culturally incense sieve and we don't understand each --

insensitive and we don't understand each other. that was true. too little maybe. too late,ing orbly not but unreciprocated, it didn't work. then you get, we can argue, well, you have been too little threatening and too late. the bush administration. so it comes along in 2002. axes of evil. pretty threatening. mobilizing forces. we're going to do iraq first. iran is next. that's pretty threatening. strategy of regime change. which by the way is very threatening but not what you're supposed to do if a, you're trying to get people to stop building nuclear programs or b, you believe in deterrents because the whole idea of deterrents is if you behave, you get to exist and we have a nice relationship but if no matter what you do, i'm getting rid of you.

we can talks about that but we've -- we try these things. the iranian situation is not very different -- in 1997 there is a much greater attachment to enrichment that got turned into a national identity issue. so that brings me to the kind of the end and where -- the only place where i differ with greg is -- was, you know, is it too late to stop iran from acquiring

the capability to make nuclear weapons. i would argue probably in terms of enrichment that they are having difficulty but they basically know how to do it. i would argue perhaps differently from greg that it is not too late to they can get you in a lot of trouble. because you use one or two, you

actually don't destroy anybody but you guarantee counteraction that can destroy you. you have questions about can you -- would you -- invite massive pons. so it is a very precarious position that they may choose or may not have made up their mind yet that they want to have. is it too late to deter, contain iran, i think the answer has to be absolutely not. because what is the alternative. i remember there being a debate, i think it was patrick clawson up in new york and this was a couple of years ago. the proposition was can we live with a nuclear iran. my response was what is the alternative? suicide? things happen. if they happen, you do everything you can to prevent them. if they happen, you figure out how to live with that.

not desirable. not, you know, what you would set out. i don't think it is something that i would articulate. if i were a policy maker now that it is that is what we're doing. it is something you do. greg laid out a busm of the steps that you would do many of which are being undertaken already. not smart policy. it seems to me, those things are smart to do even if you -- they are smart to be preparing to do today for other reasons. iran is already projecting power and influence as we see in iraq, as you can see in afghanistan and syria and lots of other places. one of the big arguments of who won the iraq war was iraq. they are pushing so you need to be doing these things. in any case whether they get nuclear weapons or not, i think the list that greg offered is

obviously a good place to start. let me close there. with perhaps, the boring you know, kind of endorsement of my colleagues. basic policy recommendations. [applause] >> thank you, george. at this point, when i speak, we're going to have a few slides. not many. so greg, if you could get your vision. thank you. good afternoon. they say picture can tell 1,000 words. so as pictures go, i particularly like this one. it is the 1999 visit by so you

hadi defense minister prince -- to the pakistani uranium enrichment camp outside islamabad. 11 years on, he is now the crown peninsula. technology china, iran, libya and north korea. the extent to which he did this, as a so-called rogue agent is disputed. he claims he did it. there are also allegations that

he offered nuclear technology to iraq, egypt and syria. we can only see his legs, was pakistan's chief of army staff, general musharraf. he overthrew sharif in a military coup. also there that day were the head of the pakistan air force and navy and the top bureaucrat. a retired general at the pakistani military defense. reportedly the prince, his son and the saudi delegation were shown around the enrichment plant, saw the missiles asemmabilitied on the same site. they were shown some nuclear weapons. you will recall that in the previous year, 1998, pakistan successfully test-fired the

missile, a copy of the north korea -- and tested two atomic bombs. apparently, the conversation that day went something like this. khan, jokingly to the prince, if you want, you can take a few weapons with you. the prince said if pakistan has them, it is like we have them. khan, as long as your oil is similarly ours, your excellency. the delegation was shown the cause and reflectors for an implosion type of atomic bomb. if you don't know what they are, i'll explain afterwards. the prince, the commander of arab forces during the 1990-1991 duffel gulf war was told that they were very heavy. he reportedly tried to pick