one with one hand and was quite surprised he could not even raise it. he then tried with both hands and still could not manage it. he reportedly said at least he had seen and held the real core of a nuclear bomb. despite the time which has elapsed since the visit, this photograph also has direct relevance for today as well as this next photograph of the accompanying saudi delegation. if and when iran becomes a especially in state, saudi arabia is likely to ask pakistan for some nuclear umbrella. the most frequently mentioned idea is that pakistani missiles tipped with nuclear warheads would be based in saudi arabia to deter iran from threatening the kingdom. such an arrangement would not break international agreements if the weapons remained under pakistani control.

there are no hard facts to prove the existence of this notion of a pakistani nuclear umbrella. at least none available publicly. indeed, there are a range of denials but there is certainly a close diplomatic relationship between saudi arabia and pakistan. perhaps unusually close. wunl only has to -- one only has to watch the high-level visits to see the respective leadership's value. i don't have a photograph of another visit later in 1999. by the then minister of information, the united arab emirates. he was apparently given the same tour. i don't know whether a particular u.e. anxiousle was pointed out. this was the prefabricated structures under which the missiles were being assembled and shielded this activity had

been imported from the member state. but he probably was told that much of the equipment imported was ordered by trading companies operating in another member state, dubai in order to vate export controls. the u.a.e. certainly knew this was happening. once after i walked into the offices of one such trading company in dubai while reporting for the financial times, the dubai authorities complained to the british government. this was in 1980. yes, 30 years ago. the u.a.e. would probably now prefer to forget the sheikh's nuclear tourism.

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two other states, it is the protection offered to other allies. it might be the energy security. nuclear science has much to offer, but it also carries considerable risk of nuclear weapons falling into rove hands, and even -- into the wrong hands. it might appear all good people would think the same way, but i suspect that is not the case.

the thicket -- particular danger is terrorists will acquire such materials. obama wants to offer reduced nuclear arsenals, and declining ambitions, and widespread availability of nuclear power alone. the middle east offers several challenges. i will list them as follows. nuclear weapons are seen as the ultimate guarantor of sovereign's year. this is the case in pakistan, israel, and iran. do not forget the united states was in this category during the cold war. according to news reports, a

terrorist now seen nuclear material has been the must have terror weapon. whatever is agreed of next week's summit, anxieties remain. last october, a terrorist attack pakistan's headquarters. is the nuclear headquarters meant to be secure? they did not get as far as office. the third challenges there remains an unfortunate not overlap in scientific knowledge and technical skills needed to develop a civilian nuclear program or a nuclear program,

and the fourth challenges nuclear technology has become an agreement in rivalry. think about the u.s.-led diplomacy in iran and the tolerance towards russian and chinese business links with iran. despite these challenges, there has been progress. pakistan is no longer exporting enrichment technology or any other technology. libya is desired, serve brown remains a big problem. -- disarmed, but iran remains a big problem.

another item of progress -- nor is item three j are they giving away -- nor are they giving away bomb technology. such a policy came from the very top. this 1988 photograph is of the grand old men of the chinese nuclear weapons program. i will tell you the names later rather than attempt to pronounced chinese myself, if anyone is interested. another item of progresses' the notion nuclear weapons are the ultimate status symbol has been

downgraded. the kernel of libya sagas. some who say in sound of the hard way. -- don sa -- saddam hussein found out the hard way. this other man came in the peace program. he worked in vienna for 14 years. in pakistan he directed a program working to produce plutonium nether. then -- to produce plutonium. they would never have learned so much of the dutch had been forced their own rules of non- nationals being permitted to

such materials prepared are we any better at this today? i am not sure. didn't we read that he was considered a key player in his nuclear -- in the nuclear weapons program? the wrong people getting access to information will continue to be a problem and a particular challenge for the middle east. where will the stuff come from? could pakistan be tempted to work in the uae. if the uae continues to forsake nuclear weapons, there could well be an infortune hospitalization of knowledge and skills, and if you think i of

unfairly focusing on the uae or pakistan, think of morocco or egypt. the challenge in terms of the discussion of the middle east is what bright young engineer or scientist is studying and traveling, picking up ideas, and what is forming the context of the person's thinking. is there a conference on magnetohyrodynamics? what is that? it is complicated, but it can relate to centrifuges that produce uranium. there was a conference here. it is not clear anyone should

have noticed, but it illustrates the extent of a challenge between allowing the normal academic discourse we pride ourselves on and what can be done with the knowledge acquired. thank you. [applause] a nous which have sent share the event -- i now switch hats and share the of vent. we open it up for question and answer, but i will use my temporary position of power to ask questions. ambassador, was there ever a time -- was it ever possible to have stopped iran? i know it would be a dream, but

if you could look dark night beside you're going to -- look back and decide you were going to be an extraordinary capable person, what would you have done to stop it, or were you only the vague is thelma and -- now only delaying its? and you said your focus was not likely to be on iran in a month's cannes. what are we missing? is there a way to switch focus to iran, or do we have to see a lot of meetings against the united states? in order to catch everyone on camera and in the network, i am going to us you to respond and these microphones.

>> it is always nice to reminisce about opportunities for gone. i think the last administration pursued a dual strategy, and one truck was to offer opportunities to produce of it, to have dialogue and other issues if they suspended their uranium enrichment. the other was international isolation. i think part of the problem was each track was too little, too late. the inducements for week. it is conceivable if loan strategy had operated -- if the strategy had operated at a higher level, if we were able to threaten sanctions a number of years ago, and if we have more serious inducements, maybe we

could have changed the approach by day iranian leadership, but maybe not. >> on the question of the non- proliferation treaty review process in may, i think there are a number of things that can be done. i do not think the bleeding in the u.s. will be as dry as it has been, and i think that will be the case for a variety of reasons. i think much of the world has a greater dislike than hatred for the bush administration than warranted, and many have greater fondness for the obama administration then would be warranted, but i think that

works in the u.s. advantage in this case, and there are number of things but would be happening and the nuclear security summit next week. please sir pri leads to the review conference, making it very clear that there would be able to mobilize others, also kicked out would get noticed. the question about iran -- also that would get noticed, but the question of iran, there are several things. iran has isolated itself more lately.

has obama of cost pressure brought the russians along and pressuring iran? -- obama's pressure brought the russians along in pressuring iran? no, i think iran will find less support this time than before, so the pivotal issue will be the middle east question, which can be allowed to devolve into the question of israel. iran loses tremendous support. egypt were very closely with iran.

i met with the iranian president, and he said, the egyptians did it for me. i did not have to do a thing. to the degree the u.s. can have a more forward approach, the takes away the issue, and you can get more focus their, and the french really want to focus on iran. it is not just the u.s.. there are others who want the focus, so we will see if they can mobilize and with that is effective, too. >> we are open to questions, and if you can identify yourself and make sure your common sense and with a question -- your comments end with a question. do we have a microphone? this gentleman here, if you could identify yourself.

i am afraid you love to turn around and speaking to the microphone and press -- have to turn around and speak to the microphone, and press the button. >> national defense university. my question is about the assumptions, one of them that if iran makes the bomb, other middle eastern countries will follow. all these examples show that countries make the bomb because they aren't concerned about their security. -- they are concerned about their security. does iran pose a threat to saudi arabia and turkey. another is that iran is making the bomb. can we be mistaken, the fact

that iran has taken longer than any country in the world to make the bomb if this is the case someone -- if this is the case? is there any doubt in your mind about why it is taking very long. thank you. >> could you give a diplomatic response, please. >> i am speaking, so it may not be diplomatic. i think you're right to question the assumption of a nuclear arms race. i used to talk about all the time. but as what would worry countries, that it would spark a nuclear arms case, and we all agree -- all agree the middle east is full of clothes in the world of what a nuclear arms -- the middle east is the last place in the world that would want a nuclear arms race. i have had discussions in which

senior officials of said if iran has nuclear weapons, we will need them to. it is for security, proceed, -- prestige, and influence. if iran has nuclear weapons, it is going to upset the strategic balance in a way these countries are going to have to react. have you prevent that? that is what we need to start thinking about. you need to work on the security, the prestige, and the influence, so you have to convince these countries, you're going to be secure, and we're going to help provide for the. that is why you love to strengthen the security relationship with -- going to have to strengthen the security relationship with these countries. having nuclear weapons should make you more like north korea. you have to convince them it

does not buy new procedure or influence. you cannot assume there will be a nuclear arms race. in the nuclear arms race will take a long time, but the thing we have to work to prevent a nuclear arms race. iran could have nuclear weapons. they have been working on it for a long time. i think what we have seen is they have not mastered the technology -- now mastered the technology about how to enrich. it has taken a long time to figure out how to do it, but they cannot enrich uranium at the level required if you wanted to have the large program, but they can enrich it well enough to want to produce a large -- a small amount for nuclear weapons, and we are confident that they worked on how you take

the material and fashioned it into a when. u.s. intelligence -- into a weapon. u.s. intelligence said they could have a weapon between 2010 and the end of the decade. maybe we are still talking that time frame, but they have the wherewithal to build nuclear weapons. the question is will they make the final decision regan maybe we can still influence the final decision. i am worried they are going to make a final decision. they are going to decide it is useful to have those weapons, so we have to learn how to live with it. >> two >> supplements, on why it is taking iran so long, i am not sure they have made up their mind. they are the only state that has sought nuclear weapons while being in the non-proliferation treaty, which slows things down

and complicate things enormously and raises the stakes if you get caught. israel, india, and pakistan acquire nuclear weapons but were never part of that treaty. north korea broke out. it join the nonproliferation treaty in 1992 but was already breaking now before it started, so it has much less constrained. iran is the only one that made that commitment and hud international and for vacation but it would not be making nuclear weapons and send -- and had international implications it would not be making nuclear weapon went against that. i would think farms raise pressures would be between saudi arabia -- the arms race pressures would be between saudi arabia and egypt. if persia has nuclear weapons,

and arab state will need it, and the question is between saudi arabia and egypt. which is the one that gets the status and prestige first? i think that attention would be very strong. >> i will come to bill schneider afterwards. >> there was a regional security conference in december. general petraeus attended, and general petraeus made cryptic remarks about security architecture, and the impression he seemed to be getting was that the united states and other countries were trying to develop a coordinated response to a uranium -- iranian program. is the united states or any other country trying to organize or could together a

coordinated set of responses for next steps for the day the iranians finally go public, who is in charge of this? >> i an not and the government, so i cannot talk about what is going on, but my sense is like yours. the u.s. government is starting to take some steps i described, whether it is working with the gulf coordination, in terms of enhancing defenses, strengthening our security cooperation, i think that is the right thing to do. some of the started in the last administration. remember secretary rice started to have meetings with countries plus saudi arabia and georgia,

and she started talking about iran and but also started talking about, how do we deal of regional security, and secretary clinton, you may remember she says something about the importance of defenses, and a lot of commentators interpreted that as we are giving up on iran having nuclear weapons, and she said that is not the case. the challenge for the administration is how you shift from the diplomacy of prevention to the diplomacy of containment without losing your allies, without suggesting you have given of on iran having nuclear weapons or suggesting it is the acceptable? a lot of things i talked about,

i hope the countries in the region notice it, and our public rhetoric was still concentrate on how do we convince iran to stop nuclear pursuits? >> thank you, bill schneider. the board did some work on the proliferation issue, and there's a compelling body of evidence hudson just perhaps the most important factor -- the suggest the most important factor reduce the u.s. credibility as a deterrent, and on wednesday the president will sign an amendment that will extend the process of

further reducing the number of u.s. weapons. there has not been too much discussion about the uproar between these proliferation discussions we have been concerned about and the reduction in u.s. nuclear capabilities, but the commission oto some very persuasive testimony about the concerns midi allies and friendly governments have about the reduction in u.s. nuclear capabilities, so i wonder if this is likely to have an effect on regional consequences of a iran becoming a nuclear power.