fundamental principle. this review started with and looked at how to implement the president's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. some of the steps we intend to take are listed, including the treaty negotiations, but also a comprehensive program on verification, including contributions from the department of energy, the department of state, and the dod. the secretary spoke about renewing the u.s. commitment t. next chart. this is where i want to take the bulk of my time, to talk about u.s. declaratory policy. you can think about two different categories of states. the first is non-nuclear weapons states that are compliance with their obligations. this comprises the vast majority of countries in the world.

what we look to do in the declaratory policy is to strengthen the u.s.-nato assurance that is associated with the nonproliferation treaty, and if tht is quoted. and to remind you, if any of the state's use chemical or biological weapons, the least a three clearly that they face devastating witmilitary response. as the secretary of defense noted, we explicitly reserved the right to adjust this assurance in the future if biological weapons grow significantly. this combination of policies is intended to give incentives to states to join an adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but to also take steps to reduce the threat of

biological weapons. for nuclear weapons states and states that are not compliant with obligations, there is a different rule sets. we still say that the u.s. would not use nuclear weapons [laughter] -- would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances. we specify that for the states, there's a narrow range of contingencies. as was discussed by the secretary of defense, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we see the fundamental role of u.s. nuclear weapons to defend ourselves. we will look to strengthen capabilities, including missile defense, counter-wmd capabilities, in order to reduce nuclear weapons.

with that, i would like to turn it over to general cartwright. >> slide. i'm going to give you a couple more slides, and then you ask questions of anybody else. on this page, start. we expect the president to sign with president medvedev the start treaty. when you look at the reductions that will occur, they represent 65% of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war.

an 80% reduction in the operationally deployed strategic launch vehicles. a pretty substantial reduction since the end of the cold war. 1550 is the floor for deployed nuclear warheads. 700 for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. that's a combination of launchers and vehicles. for example, a bomber counts as one. an icbm with one orwarhead is one. the 800 number for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is an additional 100 that are not deployed. for instance, a submarine that is refueling the not actively

count. that allows you to have spares. the russians are in a period of modernization. we will enter a period of modernization during these 10 years. we have a period of time that allows you to bring the old bombers out of the fleet and put the new ones in. we will retain the nuclear triad. that is the bombers, submarines, and icbm's. we will reduce the number of warheads and associated with icbm's to a single warheads each. there are no constraints in this treaty associated with our missile defenses we do make

substantial new investments and steady efforts associated with command control and decision times. if you have followed this activity over the years, one of the issues has been a concern about alert status is. the secretary walked through what we have done with the bombers. we've done about as much as we can do with the physical capabilities and his architectuarchitectures. we are studying -- what can we do to make sure we have the maximum amount of decision time for national leaders before they would enter into any decision to use nuclear weapons? that can happen in better sensors, better command- control, and also and the architecture of the weapons themselves. today, the secretary described one of the activities is called

open ocean targeting. what else can we do? that study began about three years ago. for the architecture and next- generation weapons, over the life of the 10 years, we will be looking at what we can do. the studies will start in fy 2011 to look at the actual vehicles and what can be done. we also talk about high level dialogue and establishing them with the russians and chinese. this is an effort to get more transparency, more confidence, understand the intent of each other, understand where modernization programs are going to reduce the potential for instability or misinterpretation. next slide. strengthening regional deterrence. we've done a lot of work here. a lot of it is in the early

stages. the missile defense capabilities at the theater level to allow us to have that as a low of our deterrents. in addition, the general purpose forces. that capability, improving it, maintaining it, having a posture that is consistent with a threat to deter but not to overwhelm. working those for the regions around world. these are critical activities. we will continue to have a capability on the technical side, whether that is applied with a bomber or a next- generation aircraft, the f-35, or the current aircraft. having the capability to make sure that we can move forward in a tactical sense for those cases where it is appropriate to do that. we are going to retire one of our weapons that has been in the

arsenal for a long time. this is the tomahawk. that will be retired. it has been on the sidelines for several years. we will be officially retiring that weapon. we will also spend time at the regional level, working with our allies to have discussions about the credibility and effectiveness at what has been called extended deterrent. the secretary talked about the nato responsibilities, but those also extend to our allies. next chart. sustaining a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. this has been an area of a lot of discussion. i'm sure we will have several questions. principally, no new testing , no new warheads, no new

missions or capabilities. there are three principal categories of weapons. those that we refurbish, those that we rios, and those that we replace -- those that we reuse, and those that we replace. in other words, you have not changed anything associated with what we would call the physics package. in refurbishment, you were only working around the components that have aged and become obsolete, or those that, by replacing them, would substantially secured the stockpile. in the case of reuse, we might

take one from one warhead type and match it with another in order to be able to preserve that weapon. no new capability or mission, but it would allow us to take known designs and keep them in the stockpile without having to establish a test program. the third one is the one that gets the most discussion. that is, we place. we are utilizing designs and not in the stockpile, but based on previously tested designs here it we are allowing the space to make changes to the primary components that would be consistent with improving safety and security. you might do any number of things associated with those components, but it still requires a presidential approval. congress would also get a look

at this in the transition to engineering phase. we talked about over $5 billion over the next several years that we would put into the complex to address the aging infrastructure, updated support to our science and technology capabilities, the recruitment and the retention of the scientists associated with this capability, and then a promise to renew and refresh our continued focus on the nuclear mission within the department. this goes back and restates everything that we have talked about until now. one point i would bring up is that the reality of the world that we live in today -- we have

to expand the spectrum that we watch and guard against. everything from nuclear weapons used to influence through terrorism all the way to icbm's that would be coming toward the united states. our defensive capabilities must be able to address. the entire. a substantial amount of the work in this nuclear posture review goes to the one end of the discussion that has probably not been emphasized as much as it should be. that is, and terrorism, and on state actors, and making sure we have the capabilities to address those threats -- that is, terrorism and non-state actors, and making sure we have the capabilities to address those threats. with that, i will turn it over to my colleagues. >> thank you.

i want to introduce an undersecretary tauscher and the undersecretary of energy. >> can you explain the changes that will be made to allow the president more time? the report talks about a lack of transparency on china's programs. can you elaborate on what specifically china is not being transparent enough about? >> it is a study to look for those types of capabilities. if we have modern sensors, the type we're capable of deploying today, we can know sooner that weapons are postured for launch, that weapons have been launched, where they are going precisely, and we're trying to increase the understanding of the knowns, and

a better understanding of intent. was this one weapon? were other forces postured at the same time? are there other objectives? having the sensors and the command and control to ensure that the president has the maximum amount of knowledge necessary to make a decision, and that the decision is not artificially breast because of a lack of information that could have been obtained -- artificially rushed because of a lack of information that could have been obtained. >> in a situation where you have a misunderstanding about the programs -- and their programs -- the modernization programs, or misunderstandings with respect to the doctrine. we would like to have conversations about where their capabilities are going over time, and what are they

thinking is the purpose of these capabilities. yes? >> marybeth sheridan. the nuclear posture review talks about reducing the role and the numbers of weapons. i did not see much about the numbers of weapons, other than the start figures, which a lot of people consider modest. where do you see the reduction in numbers? >> i think it was addressed in the last chart. we're looking to -- after entry into the new start treaty, and then engage with russia on a dialogue that would address the full range of weapons. after this treaty, we will still have the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. we think it is appropriate to take that step next.

>> general cartwright, what is the military's view after all of this about no new nuclear warhead? are you concerned that the door has been shut too much? can you review this concept? >> on the no new and the caveat is associated with the replacement, no, i do not feel constrained in the least. i think we have enough capacity and capability for any threat we will see. the capabilities that have been brought on board have been substantial. . the capabilities we have are more than adequate for the threats that we know of and that we believe we can face. from myself as a previous

commander, and also for the general, we feel confident that these numbers and descriptions of reuse, replace, and refurbishment -- we are very comfortable. on ocean targeting, it is to say that for a weapon that has a target associated with it that is on alert, there is a specific target. that target is the center of the ocean. we have specific areas that we keep available for that type of work. that is done to ensure that if there were an inadvertent launch, the guidance systems would take you to unknown places. that place would not be inhabited. we make sure that never occurs. when we did the work associated with taking the bombers off of alert, this was another activity that we undertook to ensure that both the weapons themselves were not artificially targeted on

something without a scenario and without a set of circumstances to be associated with why they were targeted. and that no mistakes in a launch system could put them in place where we would not want them to be. >> given your experience with the russians, which you may still be recovering from, what is your sense of their inclination to engage in broader nuclear negotiations in the near term or the distant future? >> both of us have to get our teams back and get them some rest. there was a heavy investment on both sides. we had approximately 50 people in geneva for many months. the russians, led by their

ambassador, had the same kind of interagency team. these are the experts, in our case, that have the most experience in the previous start, and now have the pedigree of the new start agreement. we have a ratification process. that is very important. we need to have those teams in the united states and russia working on that. this administration took advantage of the reset to move forward on the negotiations for the new start agreement, but also to improve the relationship. as i said the last time we talked, as a small child, i was an investment banker. the test is never the negotiation. it is whether someone is willing to do a new negotiation with you after they survived the existing negotiation. i am very impressed by the russian willingness, in a post ratification time, talk about

new reductions. we have a large agenda. there many different areas where we are engaging. we're hopeful that once we get through the ratification process, we can begin on a new effort. >> did they indicate to you that they would be willing to go further? >> we understand our responsibilities as the holders of the most nuclear weapons in the world. we still hold more than 90% of the weapons. we know this is a path, a journey. thank you. >> let me get one question in the back. >> do you expect any push back from congress on npr and the ratification of the new start agreement? >> we expect to have an extensive dialogue with the

congress on npr. that dialogue began months ago when we initiated this review. we have had extensive consultations with congress as the new start negotiations have been under way. >> jim is right. from the very beginning, our lead negotiator was the assistant secretary of state. he has been briefing members on both sides of the aisle and their staff. we had senator kyl and senator feinstein come to geneva last year as observers. there was a sense of bilateral legislative interest in what was going on. this is an important effort. we have not ratified anything like this in a while. we are very anxious to engage

the senate and get their advice and consent for ratification. >> in october 2008, secretary gates said, "there's no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either testing or pursuing a modernization program." this report says there will be no new testing. what has changed? why is it ok not to test now? can we maintain it without testing? >> i always agree with the boss. the context here is that for the foreseeable future, there are numerous people in the government that certify every year the stockpile is safe and secure, and there's no requirement for additional testing. we continue to survivcertify th. we do not know what five years

from now will bring. there's always the potential. nobody has ever removed from the commander or anyone else in that chain and the ability to stand up and say, "i am uncomfortable, or i believe we will have to test." that has not been removed. what has been removed -- in the reality of what we know today, we see no requirement for any additional testing. we feel very comfortable staying in an environment and a protocol of not doing nuclear testing, as it is defined, and that we see no need for additional nuclear weapons of a new type, either in capability or capacity. this is a reflection of where we are now, looking for work, versus a reflection. i always have the responsibility as a commander to come in and say -- if i must say that a

particular weapon is not going to make it, or refurbishment or reuse will be insufficient. all the commanders have that ability. >> as we transition to the next question, secretary gates said he sees the investment program as a credible modernization plan to deal with these issues. >> i do not completely understand the replacement category. "a design that is not in the stockpile" i think is what was said. one of the arguments for the reliable warhead reliablreliablp our scientists fresh? >> general cartwright describe

the definition that we have. that is, a design that uses nuclear component designs that have not been in the stockpile, but that we have tested before. the united states has conducted many hundredths os of nuclear t. a good number of those were not in the stockpile and have never been in the stockpile. we learned something from those. what did we learn? how do we take the learning from this tests and apply it to the standards that the congress has put for word? the idea of no underground testing. the idea of being able to facilitate the reduction in the total number of weapons that we might have, and reducing the number of types. we want to provide the

flexibility in the early stages to try to advance as much as possible of what congress asked us to do. and then create a position or a point in time. if we have to go to the replacement category because we think it is one of the only waste to achieve safety, security, and reliability, then we have the flexibility to do that. the president will have an opportunity to look at that. that flexibility, in my view, is exactly what our scientists need. they need to be able to do that. that is the path forward.

>> yes? >> i would like you to talk about this new emphasis on conventional response. beyond the conversion of the boomers to carrying conventional warheads, what else is being planned to make the u.s. conventional response more robust? given the fact that the united states has such a lead in terms of its conventional response and ability to target points around the globe, why would a country that is thinking about nuclear weapons not continue to develop those nuclear weapons given the fact that it does not have the ability to develop the kind of conventional strike that the united states has? >> we are currently looking the long-range strike systems. we're coming out of the review

and the npr. in that study that is now under way, we're looking at penetrating bombers, standoff bombers, cruise missiles, potential global strike capabilities, as well as supporting electronic warheafar. after having a hard look, we decided that we wanted to pull back and have a look at the broader portfolio and the family of systems. that is now under way. we expect that to inform the fy 2012 budget. we do have r & d under way and money set aside for these capabilities. from a policy perspective, when you think about the perspective of a potential proliferators, in this npr,