with their non-proliferation requirements. this will help reinvigorate the global non-proliferation bridge game -- regime. that may thank secretary gates, secretary chu and admiral mollullin. i just want to thank everybody who helped work on this because it took a lot of meetings and effort but we believe this represents the best interest for the u.s. and our partners and allies around the world. >> let me begin by thanking

secretary gates, secretary clinton and admiral mullin. this was say multi-agency review. it reflects the important expertise of the state department and the energy department and the department of defense. this report reflects the understanding that the effort to reduce nuclear dangers requires an -- an all-out government approach. as the president said, we will sustain a safe and secure effective arsenal as long as weapons exist. this review reflects the commitment and puts the nation on a path to grab the research required to make that possible. it defines specific steps, accelerates the securing of

nuclear materials worldwide. it is based on several key principles that will guide future u.s. decisions on stockpile management. the u.s. will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek ratification for the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. we will not developed a new nuclear weapons. our laboratory directors and a host of others been clear that our programs can maintain safety, security, and effectiveness without testing. to accomplish that goal, the npr makes it clear that the u.s. will study options to ensure that effectiveness of nuclear weapons on a case by case basis. consistent with with a congressional-mandated program. approaches will be considered. refurbishment of existing warheads and replacement of

nuclear components. this makes clear that nuclear components will be used on previously tested designs and will not support new nuclear missions or provide new capabilities. finally, to proceed to the engineering and development stage, the u.s. will give strong preference to refurbishment or produce. this makes clear that the replacement of nuclear components would only be undertaking only if critical goals could not be otherwise met and it specifically authorized -- and it must be specifically authorized by the president. this is how we intend to carry out the president's strong policy. it calls for the modernization

of nuclear weapon infrastructure and the sustainment of the science and technology base which brought -- which is required to support the full range of nuclear security missions. this is reflected in the budget request which includes a 13.4% increase in the funding for the nsa. this investment is critical to addressing our aging infrastructure and enhancing our efforts against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. it will also allow the u.s. to reduce many non-deployed warheads currently kept as a technical hitch. the npr notes the retaining the human capital in dod for the nuclear mission and proposes building on current levels. if we are going to succeed in our mission, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals. our people are our greatest asset. i applaud the team that worked

so hard over the last year to complete this review and i look forward to working with secretary gates and secretary clinton and congress to implement this in the coming years. i turn it over to admiral mullin. >> thank you. thank you for your leadership in this tremendous effort and leading in a way or the process was very collaborative and the strength of the interagency produced a great product. the chiefs and i fully support the findings of this nuclear posture review because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policy, and structure to meet an ever- changing security environment. we appreciate the opportunity to format and to be informed by it as a process.

while it reduces the role played by nuclear weapons, and -- a reduction i endorse, this review reaffirms our commitment to defend the vital interests of the u.s. and those of our partners and allies with a more balanced mix of nuclear and non- nuclear means. while it retains the strategic triad of bombers, submarines and misfiles that have served us so well, -- and missiles that have served us so well, it works to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation and suggests new dialogues to improve transparency with russia and china. off while it precludes nuclear testing in the development of new warheads, the review pollsters original to terence by fielding new missile defenses, and proving counter capabilities.

as secretary gates made clear, we must invest more wisely and more generously to preserve the life span and effectiveness of our existing arsenal. we must hold ourselves accountable to unimpeachable high standards of nuclear training, leadership, and management. we must recruit and retain the scientific expertise to advance our technological edge with nuclear weaponry. i am encouraged to see this requirement so prominently addressed in the review. i am also mindful of the challenge. without such improvements, and the misbehavior is invited. thank you. >> the review says that the administration has a goal to meet conditions in which the only preference is to deter a

nuclear attack as opposed to other types. what will it take to get to that stage and white can do not go there now? would you comment on the statement today in moscow that russia would reserve the right to withdraw from the start treaty if they felt the missile defense became a strategic threat to the russian deterrent and will the u.s. have a unilateral statement? >> the npr is very explicit and referring to the fundamental role of nuclear weapons being for deterrents. there has been a lot of speculation outside of the government and there was a lot of discussion inside of how to frame that and how to describe it whether it be the sole purpose, whether we would forgo first use and so on.

i think there was agreement within the administration that we did not think we were far enough along the road toward getting control of nuclear weapons around the world to limit ourselves so explicitly. there was general agreement that the term fundamental purpose basically made clear, and other language makes clear, this is obviously a weapon of last resort. we are also very explicit about that. we recognize we need to make progress in moving in that direction but we also recognize the real world we continue to live in. >> i am not aware of the statement but it is no surprise that the russians remain concerned about our missile defense program. we have persistently sought to

explain to them the purpose for missile defense, the role that we believe it can and should play in preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism and we have consistently offered the russians the opportunity to cooperate with us. the start treaty is not about missile defense as you know. it is about cutting the size of our arsenals and strategic offensive weapons. we will continue our conversations with the russians. we have made it clear that we look forward to the ratification of start and another round of discussions with the russians about further reductions in our arsenals and we will also be working with them to try to find common ground around missile defense which we are committed to pursuing.

>> tactical nuclear weapons have not yet been mentioned. what does the npr say about these and europe? what will be required of the russians as part of this process? >> the npr very explicit that any decision with respect to nato's nuclear capabilities will be handled within nato according to the consensus principle. as long as there are nuclear weapons that threaten nato, nato will need to maintain a nuclear capability. this is one of the issues that will be addressed in the strategic concept that nato is undertaking. i would say and invite secretary clinton to comment but basically, what is the npr does is draw attention to the number of tactical nuclear weapons and

also to the number of non- deployed weapons that we are looking at and of these clearly should be part of the arms control agenda as we move forward. >> he is absolutely right. there is a section for those who have not had a chance to review it, including a picture, and in the chapter called strengthening and reassuring u.s. allies and partners, we make it very clear that any changes in nato's nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review within. those conversations have begun in connection with the new strategic concept that is being

worked on and will hopefully be ready for consensus discussion at the nato conference in lisbon. >> your concerns about iran and what role the those play in formulating this review? the president said he was concerned that iran was still on track for nuclear stability. your current assessment of the time frame, what that means, what message you are sending to iran with all of this? >> i think the npr has a very strong message for both iran and north korea because whether it is in declaratory policy or other elements, we essentially carved out states like iran and north korea that are not in compliance with mpt and all

options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category. if there is a message for iran and north korea here, it is that if you are going to play by the rules and join the international community, we will undertake certain obligations to you. if you are not going to play by the rules, going to be eight proliferater, all options are on the table. >> page 33 talks about the goals of an architecture ensuring that any attempts [inaudible] translate to the middle east, does that mean if iraq attacks israel for the gulf states with a conventional or nuclear weapon, the u.s. would attack to blunt them? >> i am not going to go down a

hypothetical road on that with you. >> why does the alert status remained unchanged when other things are changed? did you tell us more about how the presidential decision making process will be changed? >> there are provisions and the experts can get into it with you but there are some changes that we have made in command and control that we think tighten things up and give the president more time for decision. >> on that military alert. >> frankly, we feel like the situation is a satisfactory one at the current time. we have no harm to bombers sitting at the end of runways any longer. as you read in the npr, our

icbm's are all targeted right now on the oceans so that if god forbid there was an accidental launch, it would put a missile right into the middle of the ocean rather than targeted on any country. we have taken a number of steps to ensure that the president has additional time for decision and the forces on alert are not subject to some sort of disaster. thank you very much. >> the following secretary gates, we get details on the nuclear weapons report from another -- from a number of other pentagon officials. this is 14 minutes.

>> there are experts to address your questions in greater detail. before matt is we start off with a brief presentation -- the format is the start off with a brief presentation. he will share that briefing with the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and we will invite their colleagues to address any questions that you might have from the other departments. >> we will go to these charts relatively quickly so you can get to the questions. this is the third comprehensive review of nuclear posture. this is the first one to have entirely on classified product. previous reviews, you have heard

about the collaboration between the departments. there was and -- extensive involvement of many different departments. this review did build upon the defense reviews when general car right talks about regional security architecture and our approach to regional deterrence, the closest link is to those. eight meetings took place during this review. -- 80 meetings took place during this review. starting with an assessment of the strategic environment. it has substantially changed from the cold war and prior years. this review focused extensively on the challenges of nuclear proliferation and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. we see terrorism groups continuing to seek weapons of

mass destruction including nuclear materials and weapons. as was referred to before with respect to iran and north korea, we see nuclear weapons being pursued in defiance of the international community. understood also is the desire to enhance regional security infrastructure. this is not just under the nuclear umbrella but also considering how to strengthen our missile defenses and conventional capabilities. the purpose is both to deter and to reassure allies. understanding that with the u.s. and russia continuing to have 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world, reenforcing strategic stability with russia was a central and with china, we need to begin discussions with strategiy.

this is the next step and the effort. this goes through the list of five different areas of the npr policy framework that we used. the first priority and topic is preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. this lays out additional steps that will be taken to bolster the regime and to bolster safeguards. the review conference is a critical next step in this process. we also looked to what sort of budgetary steps' were appropriate and necessary and we have just shown one of the examples and that is an increase in non-proliferation requirements. the president had committed to a

global lockdown within four years and this review confirms that and looks at how to implement that. we will see further progress on that at the declared security summit next week. part of the review looked at what kinds of investments are needed to have better capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear materials. we have increased investments in those areas, as well. we will also be setting up a joint task force for wmd elimination. renewing u.s. commitment to fulfilling these obligations, including disarmament with the fundamental principle and this review started and looked at how to implement the president possible of a world free of nuclear weapons.

some of the steps that we intend to take are listed there including treaty negotiations and contributions from department of energy, department of state and department -- and department of defense. this is one where i want to take the bulk of my time before i turn it over. this is to talk about u.s. declaratory policy. you can think about two different categories of states. the first is non-nuclear weapon states that are compliant with their non-proliferation negotiable -- requirements. this is the vast number of countries in the world. -- this is the vast majority of countries in the world. i will not repeat it but you can

have a look at it. i remind you that the state's that are compliant use chemical or biological weapons, we state very clearly that they face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response. as the secretary of defense noted, we explicitly reserved the right if our capability does not change with it. this also takes steps to reduce the threat associated with biological weapons. states that are not compliant with their obligations, there is a different rules that. we still say that the u.s. would

not use nuclear weapons -- would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances. we specify that for these states. as was discussed by the secretary of defense, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we see the fundamental role of u.s. nuclear weapons to deter attack on ourselves or forces allies are partners, we look to strengthen conventional capabilities including missile defense, counter wmd capability to deter attacks with the objective of making the sole purpose of u.s. nuclear weapons being to deter a nuclear attack on the u.s. or our allies. with that, i would like to turn it over to general kurt right. -- cartwrithgt.

ght. i will give you a couple more slides and try not to say anything over again. on this page, start. we expect the president in the next two days to sign with the russian president, the start treaty. if you look at the reductions, put together, they represent 65% reduction of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war. 75% reduction of deployed and non-deployed combination of the two. 8% reduction in the operational deployed launch vehicles. -- 80% reduction in the operational deployed launch vehicles.

1550 is the floor for deployed nuclear warheads. 700 for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. that is a combination of launchers and the vehicles. a submarine which has multiple tubes counts as multiple vehicles. a bomber counts as one. an icbm counts as one. we have seven years to get to these targets that are deployed appear. the 800 number for strategic delivery vehicles is an additional 100 that are non- deployed. a submarine that is and refueling or come back and have the missiles reviewed -- removed does not actively count and allows you to have spares and allows you to make transitions. the russians are in a period of modernization. we will enter a period during this 10 years.

if a new bomber comes on and one goes out, having both of them, you have a period of time when you can get the old bombers out and bring the new ones and without a period of vulnerability. it was in that contract that we added this additional number of 800. we will retain throughout the life of the treaty the nuclear triad -- the bombers, submarines and icbm's. we will reduce the number of warheads and associated with icbm's to a single warhead each over the lifetime of the treaty. there are no constraints in this treaty associated with our missile defenses or global strike capabilities. we to make substantial new investments and steady efforts associated with command and control in decision times. if you have followed this activity over the years, one of the issues has been a concerned

about -- a concern about hair trigger alert status and the secretary walked through what we have done with the bombers. we have done about as much as we can do with the physical capabilities and architectures of the existing weapons and platforms. as we go into modernization, which are studying what we can do to ensure that we have the maximum amount of decision time for national leaders before they would enter any decision to use a nuclear weapon. that can happen in better sensors, a better command and control nets and the architecture of the weapons themselves. how we would keep them safe and how we would architect of them so there would be safe today. one activity is open ocean targeting. what else can we do? that study begins for the -- began about three years ago. for the next generation, over the life of the 10 years, we

will be looking at what we can do. the studies will start in the fiscal year 2011. we also talk significantly about high level dialogue and establishing them with the russians and chinese. this is an effort to get more transparency, more confidence, understand the intent of each other, understand where modernization programs are going to reduce the potential for instability or misinterpretation. we will and denver in the case of both the russians and the -- we will endeavor and both the case of the russians and the chinese with this. a lot of the work is in the early stages. we talked about the face- adaptive approach. it is the missile defense capabilities that allow us to have that be an element of our deterrent. in addition to that, our