none. but that capability, having a posture consistent with the threat to deter but not to overwhelm, working those and tailoring those for the regions around the world, these are critical activities that we must be able to do. we will continue to have a capability on the tactical side whether that is applied with a bomber or a next generation aircraft. having that capability out there to ensure that we can move forward and face forward in a tactical sense for those cases where it is appropriate to do that. . . ,,,,,,

,,,,

the primary and secondary, the nuclear part of this thing. that will not be touched. in a refurbishment, you're just working are round, the components that the fighter aged out and become obsolete over time, are those that by replacing them would substantially improve the stockpile or that weapon's safety, security, or effectiveness. in the case of reuse, those are nuclear designs currently or previously in the stockpile but from different warhead types. so we might take one from one warhead type, match it with another in order to be able to preserve that weapon. no new capability, no new mission, but that will allow us to take known, tested designs,

keep them in the stockpile without having to retest or establish a test program and allow us to keep the stockpile fresh. and then the third one, which is the one that probably it's the most discussion, is replace. we're utilizing designs not in the stockpile but based on previously tested designs. we are allowing the space to make changes to the primary components that would be consistent with improving safety and security, ok? you might do any number of things associated with those components, but as long as it is aligned that way, we would do that. it still requires a presidential approval and the congress would also get a look at this. that would look at the transition. as you go to engineering phase, they would in fact have a review of that -- those kinds of weapons that are put into the category of replace.

we have talked about the over $5 billion over the next several years that we would put into the complex from the department of defense to the department of energy to address both the aging infrastructure, updated support to our science and technology -- technology capabilities of the recruitment and retention of the physicists and scientists that are associated with this capability, and then a promise to renew and refresh our continued leadership focus on the nuclear mission within the department, those who lead this inner voice -- this enterprise. last slide. this goes back and restates everything that we've talked about up until now. one point that i would bring out is that the reality of the world that we live in today and the world we anticipate living in -- we have to expand the spectrum that we watch and guard against in this area. so everything from nuclear weapons being used to influence, through terrorism, all the way

up to icbms that would be coming over the poles toward the united states. our defensive capabilities, our deterrent capabilities must be able to address that entire span. a substantial amount of the work in this nuclear posture review goes to the one end of this discussion that heretofore probably has not been emphasized as much as it should be, the area of terrorism-influenced non-state actors, and making sure that we have the capabilities to address those types of threats as we go forward and that we develop those capabilities and we keep them robust and credible. and with that i will ask my colleagues to join me. it will take all the questions. -- they will take all the questions. thank you. >> i want to explicitly introduce undersecretary of state ellen tauscher and undersecretary of energy tom discussed and no -- a dusting them -- d'agostino.

>> could you walk us through what china is not being transparent about when it comes to its program? >> i will start with the command-and-control side of the equation. if we have sensors, modern sensors, the cape we are -- the type we are capable of employing today, we can know sooner that weapons are being postured for launch, that weapons actually have been launched, where they are going precisely. and what we're trying to do is increase the understanding both of the knowns -- and the one that is most difficult is a better understanding of intent. was this one weapon? it was a the flesh of a large number of weapons? or other forces postured at the same time?

are there other objectives -- but having both the sensors and the command and control to ensure that president in our case has the maximum amount of knowledge necessary to make a decision and that it is not artificially rushed because of a lack of information that could have been obtained. >> i will say a word about china. we want to avoid situations in which we have a misunderstanding about the programs that are under way in their intent, the modernization programs -- and china is modernizing its nuclear arsenal at this time, or misunderstanding with respect to the type of doctrine, what would be done in the event of a crisis. we would like to have conversations both about where the capabilities are going over time and what the chinese are thinking about the purpose of these capabilities as well. >> mary beth sheridan from the "washington post." the nuclear posture review talks about reducing the role in the

numbers of weapons. but i did not sell what about the numbers of weapons, a defense the start figures, which a lot of people consider fairly modest. where do you see the reduction in numbers? >> i think that was actually addressed in the last chart. i'll invite ellen to come in if you would like. we are looking to do -- after ratification and entry into force of the new start treaty, then engage with russia in a follow-on discussion that would address the full range of nuclear weapons, strategic and nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed. after this treaty, we will still of the vast majority of the nuclear weapons in the world and we think it is a free to take that step next. >> general cartwright, question for you. what is the uniformed military's view about no new nuclear warhead, no replacement nuclear warhead for some marc are you concerned at the door has been

shut too much on that? and could you review this concept of ocean targeting for us? what exactly is involved in that? >> on the no new and the caveat is associated with replacement -- no, i do not feel constrained in the least. i think we have more than enough capacity and capability for any threat that we see today or might emerge in the foreseeable future. the capabilities that have been brought onboard with our missile defenses and other general purpose forces have been pretty substantial. the capabilities that we have in our existing nuclear fleet are more than adequate for the threats that we know of and that we believe we could face. both for myself, as the previous commander at stratcom, and also for general shelton, we feel very comfortable with these numbers and with these descriptions of reuse, the place, refurbishment, so to speak. we're very comfortable there. the second part?

ocean targeting. it is to say that for a weapon that has a target associated with it that is on alert, there is a specific target. that target is the ocean. it is the center of the ocean. and we have specific areas that we keep available for that type of work. and that is done to ensure, god forbid, that if there were an inadvertent launch, that the guidance systems would take you to a known place and that known place would not be inhabited. we do everything possible to ensure that that never occurs. but when we did the work associated with taking the bombers off alert, we also -- this was another relativity that we undertook to ensure both that the weapons themselves were not artificially targeted on something without a scenario and without a set of circumstances to be associated with why they were targeted there, and that no mistakes or errors in all one system could put them into a place where we would not want

them to be. that is correct. >> a question for secretary tauscher? >> madam secretary, given your just-completed experience with the russians in geneva, which you may still be recovering from. >> i am fully recovered. >> what is your sense of their inclination to engage in broader, deeper nuclear negotiations in the near term, or even in the distant future? >> i think most of us -- both of us have to get our teams back, get them some rest. there was a heavy investment on both sides from the interagency team. we had approximately 50 people in geneva for many months, and the russians led by their ambassador antonov, had the same kind of hitter agency team away from home, away from family. and these of the key experts in our case certainly that have the

most experience, either in the previous start but now have the pedigree of the new start agreement. so we have a ratification process. that is very important 3 we need to have both teams in the united states and russia work on that. but i will say that this administration took advantage of the reset in two ways. first was -- first was to move forward on the negotiants for the new start agreement but also to improve the relationship. and the last time that you and i talked, as a small child, i was an investment banker. in the test is never the negotiation you're doing. it is so whether someone is willing to do in the negotiation with you after they have survived the existing negotiation. and i'm very impressed by the russian willingness to, in the post-ratification time, talk about new reductions and new things. we of very large agenda. there are many areas where we are engaging. i'm hopeful that once we began the ratification process, we can begin on a new effort.

>> so they did in some sense indicate to you during the process that that would be willing to go further? >> we understand our responsibilities, not only as npt depositories but also holders of the most nuclear weapons in the world. we know that this is a path and a journey. we are not near the end. we still hold more than 90% of the weapons. i think it is cleared everyone that there will be future engagement but through the ratification process. >> i'm sorry, let me get one question at the back. dollar t expect any pushback from congress on the npr and also on the ratification of the new start agreement, based on what the npr is laying out here? >> we expect to have an extensive dialogue with the congress on the npr and i'm sure with the senate as well. on the new start treaty, that dialogue really began months ago, when we initiated this review. and we've had extensive consultations with congress as

well as the new start negotiations have been under way. i don't know if you want to add to that. >> jim is right. from the very beginning, our lead negotiator, rose got a mahler -- cote the molar -- rose gottemoeller, assistant secretary of state, has been going to the hill, briefing members on both sides of the aisle and their staff. we actually had senator kyl and senator feinstein come to geneva late last year as observers. then the duma brought some people to observe, so there was a sense of bilateral legislative interest in what is going on. and this is important, a new effort, because we have not ratified anything like this in a while. but i think that certainly we're very anxious to engage the senate and get their advice and consent for ratification. >> in a 2008 speech, secretary

gates said that there is absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrence and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either -- without either testing or resorting to testing our stockpile are pursuing a modernization program. so the report says there will be no new testing. what's changed here? why is it ok not to test now? and can we maintain an effective deterrent now without testing? >> i always agree with my boss, but the context here is one that for the foreseeable future there are numerous people in the government that every year certify that the stockpile is in fact saved. and we continue to certify that. but we also continue to caveat that with -- we do not know what five years from now might bring. and this is in the context of there is always the potential, and no one has ever removed from the commander or anyone else in that chain the ability to stand up and say, "i am uncomfortable,

i believe that we're going to test for have to build something new." that is not been removed here. but what has been done is to say that in the realities of what we know today, we so -- we see no requirement for any additional testing and we feel very comfortable staying in an environment and a protocol of not doing nuclear testing as it is described, or as it is defined. and we see no need for additional nuclear weapons of a new type, either in capability or in capacity. so this is a reflection of where we are now, looking forward, versus a reflection of -- i always have a responsibility as a commander to come in and stand up and say if i feel like there's any reason in that protocol that i must say that for some reason a particular weapon is not going to make it and just refurbishing it or doing reuse or replacement is going to be insufficient. and all the commanders will always have that ability to lure so there is no scientific need to test what you have now to

make sure it is effective? >> that is correct. >> i just want to add that secretary gates said explicitly that he sees the investment program that we put floored to congress as a credible modernization plan to deal with these issues. yes. >> i do not completely understand the replacement category -- a design that is not in the stockpile, i think it was said. is that a new nuclear weapon? and also, one of the arguments for the reliable replacement warhead was that we need to keep our nuclear experts -- we need to give opportunity to design a new weapon. is this the kind of activity that keeps our scientists fresh, for lack of a better way? >> replacement category, i think, what's your question. general cartwright described the definition that we have, which is a design that use nuclear opponent -- that uses nuclear components, designs that have not been in the stockpile but that we have tested before.

the united states over many years has conducted many hundreds of nuclear test. most of those or a good number of those designs are not in the stockpile and never have been. but we learn something from those. and the idea is, what did we learn? how do we take that learning from those tests that we have done in the past and apply it to the standards that the congress has put forward in the stockpile management program -- this idea of advancing the safety and security of the stockpile, the idea of no underground testing, the idea of being able to facilitate the reduction in the total number of weapons that we might have, reducing the total number of types? so what we want to do is provide the flexibility particularly in the very early stages, in the conceptual and design stages, to try to woodman's as much as possible what congress has asked us to do -- safety, security, reliability of the stockpile, out of the future, so we do not

have to test -- and then create a position or point in time where we have to say, if we have to go to that replacement category whereby -- because we think it is the only way or one of the best ways, to achieve the aims that we have -- safety, security, reliability, and no underground testing -- then we have the flexibility to do that. but we want to make sure and the president will have an opportunity to specifically take a look at that, to ensure that it meets all of those objectives and it does not get us closer to one of those touchpoints that we've said we're not going to do, which is no new warheads for new may look -- new military capabilities. so that flexibility in my view provides exactly what our scientists need. they need to be able to do that. and that is the path for on that. >> all like to talk a bit about what appears to be this new emphasis on conventional response. the on the conversion of the

boomers to carrying conventional warheads -- beyond the conversion of the boomers to carrying conventional warheads, what else is being planned to make u.s. conventional response more robust? and given the fact that the not states has got such lead in terms of its conventional response and ability to hit and target points around the globe, why would a country that is thinking about nuclear weapons not continue to develop those nuclear weapons, given the fact that it does not have the ability to develop the kind of conventional strike that the united states has? >> we're currently looking at the potential future mix of long-range strike systems, both coming out of the quadrennial defense review and the npr, and in that study, which is now well under way, looking at the mix of penetrating bombers, stand off bombers, cruise missiles, conventional prompt global

strike capabilities, as well as the supporting electronic warfare and other capabilities that would be necessary. we decided, after all hard look at the issues associated with the next-generation bomber, that we wanted to pull back and have a look at the broader portfolio or the family of systems. that work is now under way, and we expect that to inform the fiscal year 2012 budget submission in all of these programs. and we do have research and development under way and money set aside for these sets of capabilities that we will then propose the specific allocation in fiscal year 2012. from a policy perspective, if you think about the perspective of a potential proliferator, what we're trying to do in this npr is give incentives for them to move away from nuclear capability. and the caveat that we talked about earlier with respect to biological weapons is to get the same time ensure that they do not have incentive to go that direction. i do not see any prospect that

any of the countries that we have talked about will have the ability to compete with united states with respect to conventional military power. as general cartwright said, the capabilities that we have today and that we have committed to sustaining for the future are second to none and there's just no question of the commitment to sustain that. >> and a fall on. for that reason, given that there is no prospect that they can compete on conventional weapons, why would they not have an inducement to continue developing nuclear weapons? >> the inducement that we're trying to give is obviously in the other direction. if you're a country considering proliferation, and as the secretary of defense said, you put yourself in a different category respect to our nuclear capabilities. and in addition to that, as we continue to develop both our conventional capabilities, including but not limit to to strike, our military defense

capabilities, and our defense -- and our ability to combat wmd, our counterproliferation capabilities, that the states will see less and less of an advantage going down that path. the largest water to more and then we will bring it to a close. >> a two-parter for the npr and terrorism. with the elevation of terrorism for the first time to a core theme of the npr, what new programs are needed and required? if it is not russia and china as the major risk, but terrorism and the proliferation, how do you still defend 1550 warheads? that seems like a very high number. >> let me start with the warheads. that number with the product of negotiations with another sovereign power, with the russian federation. and npr did the extensive analysis of the requirement with respect to the united states with respect to both warheads and delivery vehicles.

so that number is one that is associated with product of a negotiation and as the npr says, while parity is not -- well, approximate parity with respect to overall numbers is certainly not as important as it appeared in the cold war, we still believe that approximate parity is appropriate with respect to, in particular, deployed strategic seas -- deployed strategic systems as we think about the balance on both sides to make sure there are not misperceptions, misunderstandings on either side, any sense of advantage or disadvantage. that is the sense that as we go down in new start and as we take next desk, and extends beyond for the following ratification entry into force, that we ought to do it by working together. you want to speak to any of the specific programs in doe and then we can add some other? >> absolutely. the npr makes it clear that this is not just about warheads but taking the totality of work that we have in the administration in

the executive branch to move florida nonpolar reparation programs. as you heard earlier, $2.7 billion is the largest non- proliferation program in the world that this country has put forward. we've got significant increases in our work on bringing nuclear materials, securing materials at the sites themselves where they're located, installing radiation detector equipment at land border crossings and at seaports, to make sure that we're there. and the gillan asked a question about exercising our scientific capability. that is not just take care of the nuclear weapons stockpile or the deterrent itself. it is absolutely essential. that is the capability that does non-proliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear intelligence analysis, forensics, emergency management, and on downstream. so it is that broad spectrum of nuclear security activities that are supported by the foundational work of the stockpile itself. that is why we have the

capability. that's why you see such a tremendous investment to bring up overall in the department of energy or in the national nuclear security administration of very significant 13.4% growth from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011. it is a significant growth but it is a clear demonstration that the administration will in the stands this problem. it is about exercising the people. >> let me go in the back here. >> will you say more about what follow-on studies you have to do and how that will impact the future force structure? >> of course. the trip -- the president has directed that we study the potential next dance in arms control following ratification and entry into force of the new start treaty and that will include a number of steps, including an assessment of future deterrence requirements, a consideration of the overall balance between deployed and nondeployed forces.

we've talked before about the strategic systems, those that are deployed, those that are nondeployed, and then thinking about the hedge force that we have as well as where we could bring additional weapons in. it will depend, in part, also on our success in getting congressional approval for infrastructure investments so that we can shift from -- as we think about how to hedge for possible technical problems for warheads to shift from one that keeps a warhead offline that could be brought back in if there is a problem to thinking that we have confidence in the ability -- in an infrastructure that is able to work on a warhead to make sure that it is sustainable over time. all those factors have to be addressed as we go forward. and we've begun the work associated with that. we have a number of related studies underway as well, including future of conventional long-range strike. the air force is looking at their proposal for a future alcm, air launch cruise missile,

and we really need to bring these together. and this is analysis that is under way, but really is going to take a period of time to complete. >> let's do one more. perhaps there is someone that has not had a chance. [laughter] >> go ahead. >> i have a question for general cartwright. can you walk us through a little bit on the practical steps that need to be taken at strategic command operationalize these new policy changes? hell is our operational plan for nuclear war fighting being changed such that general chilton can meet his requirements with fewer warheads on hand deployed? >> there will be -- once we have this distributed and everyone gets a chance to read it, once we have start signed and we have all the annexes and all the pieces so that we have an understanding of what the guidance is in some level of detail, then we will going to

review from a policy perspective on guidance that would be appropriate under these new regimes, so to speak. that will then manifest itself in direction of attributes that stratcom would be as to ensure our part of the deterrence strategy and consistent with deterrence strategy when you start talking about proportionality and about targets and things like that. that will then lead us into in an evolution associated with what we're going to do with these weapons and these delivery platforms and how they will be used. i expect that will take us somewhere in the neighborhood of one or two years. and as i said before, seven years to come into compliance with the numbers side of this equation. i expect that each year we will revisit and it will be a set of milestones that is a journey towards either the number of vehicles or the number of weapons and having that be consistent both with the policy and with the attributes associated with