without having to retest or establish a test program and allow us to keep the stock pile of fresh. the third one, which is the one that gets the most discussion, is replaced. we are utilizing designs not in the stockpile but based on previously tested designs. this one, we are allowing the space to make changes to the primary components that would be consistent with improving safety and security. you might do if the number of things associated with those components but as long as it is aligned that way, it still requires a presidential approval and the congress would get a look at this, too. . . ,,,, ,,

>> last slide. this goes back and restates everything that we have talked about up until now. one point that i would bring out is that the reality of the world that we live in today and the world we anticipate living in, we have to expand the spectrum that we guard against in this area. anything from nuclear weapons being used to influence, to terrorism, all the way up to

icbm that would be coming towards the united states. our defensive capabilities must be able to address that entire span. a substantial amount of work in this nuclear posture review has not been emphasized as much as it should be. and making sure that we have the capabilities to address those types of threats as a go forward and that we develop those capabilities and we keep them robust and credible, which is a key attribute. i will ask my colleagues to join me and they will take questions. >> thank you. i want to introduce an undersecretary tauscher and the undersecretary of energy. >> can you explain the changes that will be made to allow the president more time?

the report talks about a lack of transparency on china's programs. can you elaborate on what specifically china is not being transparent enough about? >> it is a study to look for those types of capabilities. if we have modern sensors, the type we're capable of deploying today, we can know sooner that weapons are postured for launch, that weapons have been launched, where they are going precisely, and we're trying to increase the understanding of the knowns, and a better understanding of intent. was this one weapon? were other forces postured at the same time? are there other objectives? having the sensors and the command and control to ensure

that the president has the maximum amount of knowledge necessary to make a decision, and that the decision is not artificially breast because of a lack of information that could have been obtained -- artificially rushed because of a lack of information that could have been obtained. >> in a situation where you have a misunderstanding about the programs -- and their programs -- the modernization programs, or misunderstandings with respect to the doctrine. we would like to have conversations about where their capabilities are going over time, and what are they thinking is the purpose of these capabilities. yes? >> marybeth sheridan. the nuclear posture review talks about reducing the role and the numbers of weapons. i did not see much about the

numbers of weapons, other than the start figures, which a lot of people consider modest. where do you see the reduction in numbers? >> i think it was addressed in the last chart. we're looking to -- after entry into the new start treaty, and then engage with russia on a dialogue that would address the full range of weapons. after this treaty, we will still have the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. we think it is appropriate to take that step next. >> general cartwright, what is the military's view after all of this about no new nuclear warhead? are you concerned that the door has been shut too much? can you review this concept?

>> on the no new and the caveat is associated with the replacement, no, i do not feel constrained in the least. i think we have enough capacity and capability for any threat we will see. the capabilities that have been brought on board have been substantial. . the capabilities we have are more than adequate for the threats that we know of and that we believe we can face. from myself as a previous commander, and also for the general, we feel confident that these numbers and descriptions of reuse, replace, and refurbishment -- we are very comfortable.

on ocean targeting, it is to say that for a weapon that has a target associated with it that is on alert, there is a specific target. that target is the center of the ocean. we have specific areas that we keep available for that type of work. that is done to ensure that if there were an inadvertent launch, the guidance systems would take you to unknown places. that place would not be inhabited. we make sure that never occurs. when we did the work associated with taking the bombers off of alert, this was another activity that we undertook to ensure that both the weapons themselves were not artificially targeted on something without a scenario and without a set of circumstances to be associated with why they were targeted. and that no mistakes in a

launch system could put them in place where we would not want them to be. >> given your experience with the russians, which you may still be recovering from, what is your sense of their inclination to engage in broader nuclear negotiations in the near term or the distant future? >> both of us have to get our teams back and get them some rest. there was a heavy investment on both sides. we had approximately 50 people in geneva for many months. the russians, led by their ambassador, had the same kind of interagency team. these are the experts, in our case, that have the most experience in the previous start, and now have the pedigree of the new start agreement.

we have a ratification process. that is very important. we need to have those teams in the united states and russia working on that. this administration took advantage of the reset to move forward on the negotiations for the new start agreement, but also to improve the relationship. as i said the last time we talked, as a small child, i was an investment banker. the test is never the negotiation. it is whether someone is willing to do a new negotiation with you after they survived the existing negotiation. i am very impressed by the russian willingness, in a post ratification time, talk about new reductions. we have a large agenda. there many different areas where we are engaging. we're hopeful that once we get through the ratification process, we can begin on a new effort. >> did they indicate to you

that they would be willing to go further? >> we understand our responsibilities as the holders of the most nuclear weapons in the world. we still hold more than 90% of the weapons. we know this is a path, a journey. thank you. >> let me get one question in the back. >> do you expect any push back from congress on npr and the ratification of the new start agreement? >> we expect to have an extensive dialogue with the congress on npr. that dialogue began months ago when we initiated this review. we have had extensive consultations with congress as the new start negotiations have been under way.

>> jim is right. from the very beginning, our lead negotiator was the assistant secretary of state. he has been briefing members on both sides of the aisle and their staff. we had senator kyl and senator feinstein come to geneva last year as observers. there was a sense of bilateral legislative interest in what was going on. this is an important effort. we have not ratified anything like this in a while. we are very anxious to engage the senate and get their advice and consent for ratification. >> in october 2008, secretary gates said, "there's no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either testing or

pursuing a modernization program." this report says there will be no new testing. what has changed? why is it ok not to test now? can we maintain it without testing? >> i always agree with the boss. the context here is that for the foreseeable future, there are numerous people in the government that certify every year the stockpile is safe and secure, and there's no requirement for additional testing. we continue to certify that. we do not know what five years from now will bring. there's always the potential. nobody has ever removed from the commander or anyone else in that chain and the ability to stand up and say, "i am uncomfortable, or i believe we will have to test." that has not been removed.

what has been removed -- in the reality of what we know today, we see no requirement for any additional testing. we feel very comfortable staying in an environment and a protocol of not doing nuclear testing, as it is defined, and that we see no need for additional nuclear weapons of a new type, either in capability or capacity. this is a reflection of where we are now, looking for work, versus a reflection. i always have the responsibility as a commander to come in and say -- if i must say that a particular weapon is not going to make it, or refurbishment or reuse will be insufficient. all the commanders have that ability. >> as we transition to the next question, secretary gates said

he sees the investment program as a credible modernization plan to deal with these issues. >> i do not completely understand the replacement category. "a design that is not in the stockpile" i think is what was said. one of the arguments for the reliable warhead -- does is keep our scientists fresh? >> general cartwright describe the definition that we have. that is, a design that uses nuclear component designs that have not been in the stockpile, but that we have tested before. the united states has conducted

many hundreds of nuclear tests. a good number of those were not in the stockpile and have never been in the stockpile. we learned something from those. what did we learn? how do we take the learning from this tests and apply it to the standards that the congress has put for word? the idea of no underground testing. the idea of being able to facilitate the reduction in the total number of weapons that we might have, and reducing the number of types. we want to provide the flexibility in the early stages to try to advance as much as possible of what congress asked us to do. and then create a position or a point in time.

if we have to go to the replacement category because we think it is one of the only waste to achieve safety, security, and reliability, then we have the flexibility to do that. the president will have an opportunity to look at that. that flexibility, in my view, is exactly what our scientists need. they need to be able to do that. that is the path forward. >> yes? >> i would like you to talk about this new emphasis on conventional response. beyond the conversion of the boomers to carrying

conventional warheads, what else is being planned to make the u.s. conventional response more robust? given the fact that the united states has such a lead in terms of its conventional response and ability to target points around the globe, why would a country that is thinking about nuclear weapons not continue to develop those nuclear weapons given the fact that it does not have the ability to develop the kind of conventional strike that the united states has? >> we are currently looking the long-range strike systems. we're coming out of the review and the npr. in that study that is now under way, we're looking at penetrating bombers, standoff bombers, cruise missiles, potential global strike capabilities, as well as supporting electronic warfare.

after having a hard look, we decided that we wanted to pull back and have a look at the broader portfolio and the family of systems. that is now under way. we expect that to inform the fy 2012 budget. we do have r & d under way and money set aside for these capabilities. from a policy perspective, when you think about the perspective of a potential proliferators, in this npr, we're trying to give them incentives. and to ensure that they do not have incentive to go the biological weapons direction. i do not see the possibility that any of the countries we

talked about would have the ability to compete united states with united states. our second to none, and we have no question about the commitment to do that. >> a follow-on, for that reason, given there is no spot -- no prospect to compete on conventional weapons, why would they not have an inducement continuing to develop nuclear weapons. >> the inducements we're trying to give is the other direction, that if you are a country considering cooperation, you put yourself in a different category with respect to our nuclear capabilities. as we continue to develop conventional capabilities, the missile defense capabilities and our abilities to -- the states

will see less and less of an advantage of going down that path. >> one question on npr and terrorism if i could. >what new programs are needed ad required? if it is not russia and china that is a major risk, how do you still defend the warheads? it seems like a very odd number. >> let me start with the warheads. that number was a product of negotiations with the russian federation. the npr did extensive analysis of the requirements with respect to the united states. with respect to both warheads and delivery vehicles.

that number is one that is associated with product negotiation, and while parity is certainly not as important as it appeared in the cold war, we still believe is appropriate with respect to deployed strategic systems to make sure that they're not misperceptions are misunderstandings on either side. that is the sense that as we go down a new start, following ratification, we ought to do it working to get there. do you want to speak to the specific programs? >> absolutely. the npr makes clear that this is not just about warhead, but it takes the totality of the administration in the executive branch to move forward.

our proliferation programs are the largest nonproliferation program in the world. we have significant increases on bringing materials, securing materials at the site where they're located, installing radiation detector equipment to make sure that they were there, and the gentleman asked a question about exercising scientific capabilities. the scientific capability does not take care of the nuclear weapons stockpile. it is essential for nuclear counter-terrorism, intelligence analysis, emergency management. they are indeed supported by the foundation work on the stockpile itself. that is why we have that capability, that is why we see

such a tremendous investment to bring up overall in the department of energy a very significant growth from fiscal year 2010 the fiscal year 2011. it is clear that the administration really understands this problem. >> let me go to the back here. >> how will that impact the future and structure? >> the president has directed that we study the potential next steps in arms control following the ratification of the new treaty. that will include a number of steps including the consideration of the overall balance between deployed and not deploy forces.

those that are deployed and non deployed, we could bring in additional weapons. it will depend in part on our excess -- success getting congressional approval for infrastructure investments as we figure out how to hedge for possible technical problems, one that keeps the war had offline to think that we have confidence in an infrastructure that is able to work on the warhead to make sure -- the air force is looking at their proposal for a future airline cruise missile, and we need to bring these together.

this is an analysis that is under way, but it is going to take a bit of time to complete. >> to go ahead. >> could you walk us through a look on the practical steps that need to be taken at strategic command to operational lies policy changes? [unintelligible] >> this will be distributed and everyone will get a chance to read it. that way we have an understanding on what the guidance is -- we will go into a policy perspective on guidance

so to speak. that will manifest itself in direction of attributes would be part of the -- when you start talking about targets and things like that. that will lead us into a revolution associated with what we're going to do with these weapons and these delivery platforms, and how they will be used. i suspect that will take us in the neighborhood of one or two years. know that it will take seven years to come into compliance with the numbers side of this equation. i expect that each year will revisit and it will be a set of milestones that iis a journey that is consistent with the policy and the attributes associated with realizing it.

>> i would like to thank them for the time of day and you for your aunt -- independence topic. think you very much. -- thank you very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> now look at the upcoming nuclear security summit. several dozen world leaders meet in washington next week to discuss strategies for keeping nuclear weapons at the hands of terrorists. our coverage of this preview hosted by the fissile materials working group begins with questions after the opening statement. this is 40 minutes. >> i don't know to whom i want to direct a question, but how well does the u.s. protect its own stock of nuclear weapons, and how likely would it be that

someone gets their hands on it? >> the u.s. nuclear weapons complex are among the best secured stocks of materials in the world. that is not to stay there aren't issues that need to be addressed, but the likelihood that a nuclear weapon is going to get stolen is not high on my list. everything is secured the way they are secured, i would probably move on the other topics. i was in belgium recently where peace activists climbed over a short chain link fence onto the grounds of the air base where nuclear weapons are stored, went out to the air strip where they were expected to be arrested, and they noticed that a double fence into a secure area was

open. nobody bothered to arrest them, fortunately, those were not the bunkers where they were stored. still, it revealed a very substantial difficulties with debt protection, assessment, in response at that particular base. in 2001, the belgians arrested at an operative for attempting to bomb that day. he testified in court that al qaeda received information about insiders. i thought it was somewhat shocking, so there is more to do, even in the united states. i think the biggest areat