depends on not understanding. >> i think another key player will be the non-governmental community, and that is what we hope to do, to shine a light on, make more transparent, make more accountable the commitment that the countries will make prior to the security summit itself. and you can check out our website. it is fmwg.org. we will have this today, the other minister -- other materials for the public as well as a follow-up to the summit that will be analyzing what the official summit outcomes are, actually, and whether they are good, bad, or explaining them. we will have our own summit. i have a question in the back.

. . n summit live webcast as well. i have a question in the back. >> thanks, i'm carla from canadian broadcasting. and i just wanted to get your thoughts on today's announcement about the npr. what kind of significant change in american policy you see or is there one? >> well, the two things that people are talking about or that seem to make the biggest splash is not using nuclear weapons to respond to chemical and biological attack which if my memory is correct, i think it is. was actually a function of the clinton administration change in doctrine. i'm not sure prior to that using nuclear weapons to respond to chemical and biological attack. so i don't see -- i actually don't see that as a significant item. and then secondly, no new nuclear weapon development. which, you know, we are spending 6 or $7 billion a year already

on the maintenance of the arsenal under stockpile stewardship. and there's been no credible analysis that the monitoring and the systems which have been in the technologies which are being funded under stockpiles stewardship are not adequate to maintain the u.s. nuclear stockpile. nuclear weapons are not militarily useable weapons. i mean, once you unleash a nuclear weapon, you're likely to unleash more than one nuclear weapon and you're likely to end up with an incredibly devastating situation. so i think they are the ultimate deterrent but they are not the ultimate useable military item. and i think that's a reality that the npr takes into account. and i think the carping about, you know, somehow the united states is not going to respond to some kind of chemical or biological attack by nuking the perpetrator most likely, which would be a nonstate actor. so i'm not sure we would even be

able to identify who they are is not necessarily -- is not necessarily a credible -- a credible argument. if it's a state that is a rogue state, you know, like what we used to call them, then i think it's, you know, something to consider. but a nuclear response to anything other than a nuclear attack is extremely serious business and i don't think it should be devolved down to a political football which i think is happening today. >> i think the review is a first step toward reducing the role of nuclear weapons. reassuring nonnuclear weapon states that we won't threaten them with nuclear weapons. and we are committed at least over the long term to moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. but it's only a first step. and i personally wish that it had been a larger step. i would have liked to see a more fundamental shift in thinking

about nuclear weapons this far after the cold war. the notion that we're still, you know, we're fighting over 50 or 100 nuclear weapons one way or the other in the s.t.a.r.t. follow-on or what have you is a clear indication that we still fundamentally don't understand the nature of nuclear weapons in the new world that we're in. so i think if we're ever going to achieve president obama's vision or even start getting reasonably close to that vision, we need a much more fundamental transformation of our thinking about nuclear weapons and what it takes to maintain a deterrent and what it takes to get out of a situation where we need to maintain a deterrent. >> other questions? okay. well, i thank everyone for coming and we hope to continue this conversation with you in the future.

>> in a few moments, the director of national intelligence, dennis blair, on the states of the intelligence community. in about an hour, a briefing on nuclear weapons policy, and after that, we will be air the preview of next week's summit on nuclear weapons. the financial crisis commission continues its focus on some prime lending. the panel hopes to publish its report on the financial crisis but the end of the year. tomorrow morning, the commission hears from alan greenspan. other witnesses include former

citigroup risk managers expected to testify about their warnings to executives. live coverage is on c-span 2 at 9:00 a.m. eastern. >> our public affairs content is available on television, radio, and online, and you can also connect to a son switzer, facebook, and youtube, and sign of -- to us on twitter, facebook, and you too. >> and his lawyer says intelligence reforms have not kept up with now are enemy's ability to adapt. he spoke for about an hour.

>> if i could have your attention. i would first like to thank the participants. as the office of the director of national intelligence approaches its fifth anniversary, we are pleased to have the director with us today. the attempted christmas day attack reminded us the threat over -- threat of of canada and radical groups still remains extremely strong, -- threat of al qaeda and radical groups still remains extremely strong. we also have to worry about homegrown terrorists. as we consider these threats, it reminded many of us of the need to establish a national counter- terrorism center. the dni has been charged with

breaking down barriers to make the intelligence community more a joint enterprise, including improving management, information sharing, so we are best positioned to meet whatever the new threats have been to be. how would we ever find the right individual to do all those things and do them well? we have the right person here today. his background makes him highly qualified to meet everyone of our challenges. admiral blair served in the u.s. navy as commander in chief of the u.s. pacific command. that is the largest.

during his career, he served on a guided missile destroyers in the atlantic and pacific fleets and commanded the kittyhawk battle group. he served as director of joint chiefs and is the first associate director of central intelligence at the sea it -- cia. he also served at the national security council. 1968 graduate of the u.s. naval academy, he earned his master's degree in languages from oxford, and he was there as a rhodes scholar. please join me in welcoming adam -- enroll dennis blair. -- admiral dennis blair. [applause] >> thank you very much. when i received the invitation to this group and saw the list

of analysts who would proceed may, i felt like a character robert duvall plays in "loans and of," and it says, -- lonesome dove, it says if you're going to be honda, it might as well be by friends. -- to be hung in my, as well be by friends. it is a serious consideration where we go from here, and i would like to thank you not only the work that led to the terrorist reform unmanneact, bun more the continued drive to insure the ideas were started then are kept alive to update and puts them on, so thank you both for not only this even but all the work you have done, and i would like to formally

recognize your contribution. [applause] it is worth it to look over this history of intelligence reform, as we looked with a bipartisan report that preceded that, and although most of it is pretty dry policy, i do have some breaking news. there is going to be a new gni soon -- dni soon, jonathan mcnabb. i am sorry. that is the director of the cia. [laughter] i got that wrong.

navy is going somewhere else, but i am reading maybe he is going somewhere else, -- maybe he is going somewhere else. looking back over the intelligence community's history, going back to key milestones from 1947 right up through 2001, the first panel moderated by walter pincus, and we would like to thank you for what you published in the favor. -- the paper. that panel did a great job of looking at how our safety and security have been improved since the intelligence reform and terrorist protection act, and i will comment a little bit

on that subject as well, and i very much enjoyed the final panel, which i had a chance to attend. those who were involved are very thoughtful and successful practitioners of needing the intelligence community at the highest level, and what they have to say has serious weight and made sense to me. there are really two foundation questions i think we are addressing in our proceedings during this day, and the first is this. what progress have we made in achieving the attend -- the intent? has it improved the performance of the intelligence community. as you know, it is even possible to have your students complete their undergraduate education in five years, so we should be able to get this done, but i will not

go to the far extent of repeating -- when i am asked this question, i am tempted to give their answer famously giving -- famously given to kissinger about the results of the french revolution. it is a serious evaluation of where we stand in terms of making progress that was envisioned when that act was passed. let me offer some observations on the first question. the second foundational question is this. what should be involved five years from now, looking at the same amount of time in the future. how can this organization of 17 intelligence agencies embody the promise that the united states is safer from threat, a better

able to take a the end of opportunities, whether they are close carnation fifth, and if there were obstacles to achieving that vision, what are they, and how can we not been down -- knock them down i knew david touched on the history of the intelligence community already, but i think we have to remind ourselves of the extremely important context of what we are about in the 21st century. the conversation is meaningless if we do not relate set where we are in history. it is a somewhat uncomfortable activities you have to do.

it seems compatible with a transparent democracy. intelligence was perhaps a necessary evil during the cold war and an important component of power as we phase of an enemy attacking our very existence. times have changed, and how does the affects the intelligence community. i find when we have this conversation, there are fundamental questions asked, and these questions are difficult. they are complex. they are only going to be answered in the united states by the interaction of three branches of government overtime through a public discourse and national decisions, yet within that context while we are reaching national consensus,

while we are getting to the next stage of what we want this enterprise to be like, how we wanted to act, what we want it not to do, and we have a job to do. we have to get on with our business. now a live briefing this morning. we have got to move. i would like to talk about the progress we have made, the challenges before us, and the real steps we can take to make the intelligence community vedder and the country even safer than we are now. i think looking back, the overall objectives of the terrorist reform whereon target. i think that both inspired and allow significant improvements in the intelligence enterprises. i benefit from those of the

third director of intelligence, and they provide many of the tool for further progress. the objectives are still a work in progress. while the intelligence community often our in an integrated fashion, and while many are doing their best to work seamlessly together, our ability to innovate across traditional boundaries often falls well short of our ingenuity and nimbleness be used against us, get this complex and dynamic world is placing even greater premium on integration and facilities. i think 1225 shows yesterday cost improvements from 9-11 are not adequate to meet today cost problems much less tomorrow's problems, and if left to their own devices, and agencies will

focus of their own strengths rather than the contributions of others as they enter new challenges the. they will who operate in ways that benefit their own interests, but left to their own devices, they are not likely to take the most difficult steps or invasion the full potential of a fully integrated intelligent enterprise. there needs to be a continuing drive mechanism, and i think the function isn't what my stuff was designed to create, a group that wakes up every morning worried about nothing but improving intelligence and better team work. we are looking back to the beginning.

let's look five years forward. as we continue to richard -- to mature, three achievable goals would help us to become a much more affective intelligence community with better intelligence for everyone from the president down to the u.s. aid worker, provincial reconstruction team, or the diplomat in an embassy. these goals were first joint leaders working together across the full range of intelligence activities. two, covert actions fully integrated with other tools of national power, and 3, integrated collection and analysis, relentless sharing of intelligence to support policy makers and operation officials confirm and i will talk about each of these. let me start with intelligence

community leadership, because it really is the people who determine the effectiveness and capability of an organization. while those of the very top of the agency can make a difference, the tone and accomplishment of the entire enterprise will be set by those next several layers, particularly of the major intelligence agencies. if we are going to achieve an intelligence community that forms quickly into teams better than the sum of the parts, it will be up to these leaders to make it happen. here is my bottom line assessment of where we are. the current level of leaders is very skilled in their individual fields of expertise. they show some flexibility in adapting to the individual strengths to read new challenges

in innovative ways. often -- however, there often set by tradition. already, in my year on the job, i have seen examples of a tax on problems by throwing together interagency teams and teams led by officials -- seen a tax on problems by throwing together interagency teams and teams led by officials, coming up with a solution. i find when we review those after six months, seven months, we have found they have only gone a certain direction. those steps need to be taken that involve breaking institutional glass and doing things in a new way. now it is partly a question of authority, but it is also partly

a question of the training, a background of these leaders. interestingly, i find the intelligence officials were most committed who were really doing amazing things are most importantly -- most often the junior officers out in the field, especially in war zones, and i will talk about that later. i see imagination, innovation, selflessness, dedication, and amazing things being done, so my vision is we will have achieved success in this important area with a senior intelligence officials worked instinctively as a team to address important issues, when they are willing to bend their institutional intros to the greater. rather than thinking of themselves only as a particular agency, they will think of themselves as part of a larger

intelligence community. there are three practical recommendations. they need to be driven to the above agency leadership during a first, as mandated, every officer must serve in a joint job before they can be promoted. this program is under way, and in i can tell you once you have served as significant time outside of your home agency, the and the fear of another agency, then you go back to your duties as a changed person. you have a real understanding of what can be done. second, we need a more thorough planning within the agencies, conducted by the agency itself,

but overseen by the dni. they need to make sure if truly has the right qualifications. succession planning is also necessary for other goals they are pursuing for the leadership of the intelligence community as well as apparent agencies skills. third, we need to continue to prove -- to improve education. we started a new training courses this year, and we will look to continually improve them. the curriculum must be continually updated and refreshed. we are learning the best practices, and all the time, and we have to plow those back into the education, so those in the courses can take full advantage of them. in addition, many courses are

taught by the agencies themselves, and these must be broadened to cover the full range of factors that come into play when you're doing analysis fend connection or election in the contemporary world. these are things which have a great affect on the fees we do -- on the activities we do, and they are developing all the time, and we have to plow them into our education system. i believe we can do this. the next generation costs experience will make them better leaders. they will cool capabilities, and one of my of fortune job is to speed up this process so that they arrive sooner rather than later. let me turn to the second call i

think is achievable, and that is covert action. covert action is an essential component of national power that we as a nation need to strive to get right. this is a second achievable goal in five years. let me give you the bottom line of front assessment. when it comes to the activities in which the hand of the u.s. government must be hidden, we must in knowledge it has changed in fundamental ways. there are many more tools available to attack problems in areas of the world where previously only covert action could be applicable. secrecy over time is now much more difficult than the past. national consensus on national security issues has diminished

with the end of the overarching threat of the cold war. my vision for covert action is that it should be an important component of an overall integrated government approach involving the military, economic, actions all integrated to the same goal. the recommendations can only be discussed in classified such things, and this and ministration is ensuring -- classified settings, and this administration is insuring it is linked three of we still need to worry about measures of the effectiveness. enhanced coordination using these available instruments and

that coordination should take place within a strategic framework of the highest levels. the good news is the field is ahead of us in washington. intelligence operations across the board are conducted by integrated teams from all the intelligence agencies. these scenes comply tightly with the department of defense and other agencies. much of the cooperation i have observed is dependent upon personal relationships that need to reinforce five authorities -- reinforced by authorities as commerce shape. the third achievable piece of this vision for the next five years is more fully integrated with operation