field on the other hand. let me give you the bottom-line assessment by looking at countering violent extremists o. those of us who work in this field know the lengths to which violent extremist groups will go to kill americans, and we are all working incredibly hard to prevent it. the agencies that make up the intelligence communities have done amazing intelligence work. they have all made tremendous improvements in their area, and there's of fanning cooperation among them -- there is outstanding cooperation among them. but there are still gaps in responsibility and sharing of information.

our organization of responsibilities are constrained still buy legacies. the unsuccessful bombing of a fly on christmas day exposed much of the work left to be done, and we are doing a great deal of it, but it was there before that event still eight years after 9-11. our overall tool for assessing the contributions of each agency to common mission, whether it be combating violent extremism or activities based on a country far tool for assessing contribution and assessing their activities are generally rudimentary. we therefore often do what we can rather than what we can -- should. i am talking about challenges such as foreign languages and cultural education -- science and technology, many of the standard procedures, and if this

is true for a priority mission like countering violent extremism, it is even more true for other intelligent priorities -- intelligence priorities. my mission is i will note i have achieved success when they can link the intelligence contributions of each discipline against each other and other technical means. when we can link these contributions and the appropriate contributions of each analytical organization common -- organization, when we can link them to the intelligence of a country, and when we can then assign responsibility appropriately for the challenges. division is for all information collected by foreign centers and domestic agencies to be available by all analysts who need it and are authorized to

handle it. analysis is to be provided quickly both to officials in washington, operational officials in the field, throughout the government as well as federal and foreign partners. to achieve this, we are building an improved system based on the program started under my predecessor. this system is designed not only to set objectives for the separate agencies to allocate resources and hold them to their objectives and measure performance, but also to make cross-agency trade-off. we never be able to compare the mythical value of a pound from one to another, but we can make decisions the supply of all whole rather than divvying of resources. we have really only scratched the surface on true information

sharing. it is true we have made much progress within this area, and my predecessor signed a policy before his departure that the established a model for the signing -- the sharing of information, but the implementation of this foreign policy is a significant challenge. there are countless security and technical barriers. for example, those inherent in making computer systems compatible with one another. it will take continued dedication to reach our goal, which is information constrained only by law and policy and not by technology. we are beginning to exchange this information within the intelligence community itself, but that is only the beginning. we need to excel rate of

exchange of information across the federal government -- to accelerate the exchange of information across the federal government and with foreign partners. there are many promising initiatives i see every day and which we see flashes of the possibility of this sort of sharing, but it will take many months of hard work before they become common. information sharing requires we address security reform at their roots level. we cannot succeed without fundamental security reform and removal of the barriers, many of the self-imposed by practice or policy. i am talking about issues related to clearance reciprocity, implementation of responsibility to provide, and a host of technical problems which are part of this. as part of this work, we are also working on sharing

information of level of data base access. we must have access to raw material across agency lines. there often is not time or resources turned databases into finished reports that can then be index, a share, and turned into analysis, so we are developing ways to handle unstructured data across agency lines in a secure matter, we must do that if we are to keep up with the threat. through it all we have to continue to insure the privacy and civil liberties protections of americans are maintained intact. that is an essential part of being part of the intelligence community. that is an important part, make the jury takes part within our constitution.

those are my three areas. most of us would agree that the intent of the act were largely correct. the intelligence community needs leadership to achieve dramatic change. progress has been made in key areas, but there is much more to do. it is not so much about authority. the institution mainly needs more support as it takes on these difficult task of integration and more time. more fiscal authority would be helpful to reinforce fiscal authority. i have to be able to follow up and enforce compliance, but these three key goals are these -- first, creating a critical mass across agency knowledge and experience in the leadership mass of the intelligence community. it is important to build within, creating officers to

leave this community. change is hard. it took decades to overcome the rivalry within the department of defense perry and i have been 18 years in the navy when they came along, and of -- apartment of defense. i had been 18 years in the navy when they came along, and i was not a fan of it, but i was wrong. the armed forces are much more effective today than they were doing it separately of fighting over who was in charge. joint doody has taken as part of the way -- joined in to see -- joint duty has taken it part of the way. we have to learn you can still

take pride in being from an agency were you also take pride in the accomplishments as a team, what you are able to do together. i am encouraged because the younger generation sees themselves more readily as players on a team with more professional and personal opportunities than any time in history. they are excited by different experiences, and that is the kind of ease those we need to encourage, and that is what we need -- the kind of ethos we need to encourage. the second is to have covert action indicted by a clearly articulated principals, and our third goal is to drive a truly integrated analysis turbocharge by information sharing across the intelligence community.

the intelligence community has specialized skills, but is one place of doing business. across community perspective does make it more likely that all who can will be invited to contribute in solving the challenge ahead of us, that it will be directed towards the missions, and the information will be widely shared the cost of moving this most dramatically is the concept of mission managers. some of them are centers. some are focused on countries like iran and north korea. some are functional. they all have different approaches for because of the challenges they face, but their

common approaches a full sharing of information. i see if its mission-based information that would make your real of game changer. information is they give the framers gave to the nation, and because we always have to remember intelligence reform is really a means to an end, and both of these mean keeping the country save and secure. if we can truly create a more perfect eden of the components of the intelligence community, we will eventually be able to remove the seems with those who

formulate policies, programs, those who conduct diplomacy and defense, so the motivation is not simply what is best for the intelligence community, but it is what is us for the people of the united states -- what is best for the people of the united states we have our challenges, and we can take great pride as we seek to balance protection of the security and welfare of americans with the protection of their privacy thank you very much for your attention. [applause] >> he has agreed to take a few questions.

>> one of the discussions we have earlier was the issue the dni does not have operational roles, but one concept was the they would act as coach to call the plays and making sure operations transcend different parts of the community or transnational borders would be carried out effectively. how much have they taken on that role and worked to call the plays, even though they are not carrying out the flavor is? >> -- carrying out the plays?

>> i see it as making sure the right plays are called and been the architect so it does its many functions terry and the intelligence community is so complex. if we are going to be quick, we have to have an empowered people down the line during their job based on a mission guidance, not on centralized direction, so i think my responsibility is such a structure that does the example would be the president's daily briefing, which goes across the top policy makers of the government, and i would say in that case, i do not always do it myself. i know the people doing it. we have talked about it.

that analogy goes through the community. i do not have an operations center. i do not go rushing in and put a headphone of -- put headphones on. i think, are they well- supported? are the resources in place devlin it is really one step back from that to get the job done. -- for the resources in place? it is really one step back from that to get the job done. >> since 1947, a lot have gone out of business, yet the intelligence community below the management lovell -- level, the organization of the community

remains virtually voice -- like it was in 1952 forget -- 1952. the you see any reason why that needs to be changed to improve the effectiveness of the community? >> my frame of reference for many of these is an aircraft carrier. you look at the world war ii aircraft carrier. there is no comparison as to what goes on inside an aircraft carrier right now. i would say the same is very much true of the intelligence community. what actually goes on is completely different from what went on with the predecessor organizations, so i think the key is to continue to evolve to

meet the challenges we have. there have been some structural things -- the combining of the intelligence components of the cia into an independent agency that was done when they agency was established. i look less at the wiring diagrams and looked at the results in think those are better now when i left our fifth duty in 2002 and came back in 2009, there is a more capable intelligence community that i saw. i think things are removed -- things are moving in the right direction. most are impatient about seeing how much better it could save.

-- how much better it could be. >> gary elliott. you spoke of the doctrine of using knowledgeable people on the periphery to deal with real time issues in a proactive, innovative, and risk-taking manner, and you talk about centralize management for you had to have high knowledge verses making decisions. you basically transitioned into a knowledge management organization. with the information sharing agencies we have, there is a lot of problem with the fact that they do not have the same model you have, and they do not understand the need to make the

decision, to make decisions quickly in real terms. this is the front we are on now. intelligence sharing is process management, and we are doing decision making on policy, but we have to bake decision but the speed of knowledge. how are we going to transform from this legacy -- we have to make decisions at the speed of knowledge. how are we going to transform from this legacy? >> we allow it to be achieved through new management. >> i am an intern. my question is what is your position on the role of the homeland security in years ahead?

>> i'll leave that to secretary of impala, -- napolitano, but i do have some views about what we do on the intelligence side and how the department uses that information, and i would say interacting with those refundable for checking people who come into the country common looking out for a threat in this country is a pretty typical relationship. week of as much intelligence to them, and they use it, and we try to do more of it, but there islam -- there are fundamental

things we have to develop. a great big one is information on americans, and because national intelligence includes intelligence from domestic agencies with those overseas, and because they can move back and forth so quickly, we have had to make real adjustments to break down those all barriers while maintaining the rights to privacy and insurance regulations and inspections are done right, so that is another piece of it. the other piece of it i think is developing is more of dynamism in terms of what is going on off with the department of homeland security. it was not our only tool, but the primary tool was the watch list until recently, and that

was a fairly static process . what we have developed in the wake of christmas day last year is a more dynamic way to use partial intelligence, something short of going on red alert for the entire country, but for them to be able to take actions that will make the country safer based on intelligence we are able to generate, and we continue to generate more intelligence. eventually, we would like to have the names so someone can be arrested, but this dynamism is very important, and i think that will be the model for the future. those are the vague ones reaching becoming more dynamic, and we are going in the right direction but need more speed.

>> my question is who keeps score who doesn't evaluative process who makes the decisions of the implications of good or bad performance? it seems if we do not have a devaluation, all the rest of this is almost always of time. >> there are three or four ways you could do it. i would say the best score keeper is a demanding policy maker. if you tell us what the terrorists is stored to be as the surgeon -- at a certain location the next morning and go

and arrest the, you know quickly in operational intelligence how you are doing. a demanding policy makers also owes her to knowing how well you are doing, and experienced a policy maker who tells you what you need to know about the political issue you are dealing with -- that will drive you pretty hard, and that is fifth to know. the third one is comparing what is done in one section with something not very well in another section. we know everything. we have got some wired. that gives you a pretty this standard, and you look around the country at what you would like to have been the same category, and we are not there yet. operationally, it is pretty easy

out the policy level, and then trying to spread best practices. >> i just wanted to check with you and see if you agree with your predecessor in saying it is time for the u.s. to move to a different man of intelligence or to cabinet level of intelligence official that would have authority outside of the secretary of defense. >> i am pretty busy trying to work with what i have. >> i have two questions. the first is, with hindsight, do you believe you should have been more of front after the

attempted bombing on christmas day? >> you will have to say it more slowly. >> with hindsight, do you believe you should have been more upfront after the attempted bombing on christmas day? >> should we have done more of front? >> should you have been more upfront about the public face with the administration gammon >> i spend less time worrying about counting 9 minute than worrying about continent the accomplishments behind the scenes, so it does not matter too much who is out front. >> given what we know about the american cleric, why did it take more than two months to call it an act of terrorism? >> to do what? >> to call for a hood and acts of terrorism in someone -- fort

hood and acts of terrorism? >> labels are one thing. reality is another. from an intelligence point of view, no matter what we label in, doing something about it is what is most important to all of us common and the thing about fort hood that we had to fix -is bringing the information the intelligence community had to the defense department in order to take action that had it been done, we could have been able to prevent that awful tragedy, and all of that has been fixed, and it did not take two months.

>> we have time for one more question. >> you said, what are the ways we know how to keep score of how we are doing is having a demanding policy maker. who are you thinking of when you say a demanding policy maker? >> i would say it starts of the talk, and this president and the policy team -- it starts at the top, and this president and the policy team are incredibly demanding. i told my analysts they are in a golden age because this administration wants to know what the facts are on the ground, what the possible actions aren't, and in all these

big policy issues we have taken on, whether they be afghanistan and pakistan, north korean a, intelligence is playing an incredibly central role, and that role is being driven by being asked tough questions and coming up with the best answers weekend. also, once the policy is decided, the role of intelligence changes a little bit. as the policy is reconsidered, you provide information, but you are also in the mode of checking whether that policy is working or not based on the effect of the ground, and again, we are finding of this administration really wants to know how things are working out in a particular country o