. >> that concludes the program.

thank you very much. once their root clears, they are going to have the priest -- a brief press availability down this way. but that isn't. thank you very much. -- but that is it. like you very much. -- thank you very much. >> in a few moments, a briefing on nuclear weapons policy with defense secretary gates and separate -- and secretary of

state clinton. and a little more than an hour, a preview of next week's summit on a clear weapons. after that, a look anti- government extremist groups. and then the intelligence community. on all but washington journal," we will look get the administration's plans for nuclear weapons with kingston reif. pollsters discuss this year's elections and will talk about efforts to increase senses' participation in the hispanic community. "washington journal" is live on c-span every day at 7:00 a.m. eastern. first lady michelle obama is focusing on fighting childhood obesity.

it was the subject of a studentcam winner matthew shimura. live on c-span tomorrow morning at 11:00 a.m. eastern. defense secretary robert gates says that the united states must maintain a nuclear first right option because of worldwide threats. he outlined the policy in the nuclear policy review, mandated by congress. he was joined by secretary of state hillary clinton, the joint chiefs chairman mike mullen, an energy secretary steven chu. this hourlong event includes a review by a state department and pentagon officials. >> thank you for being with us today. today we wrote releasing the nuclear posture review, outlining a balanced and comprehensive approach to deal

with nuclear weapons in the america's national security. i am pleased to have secretary clinton and secretary chu joining us to make this announcement. this is indicative of the issues and the significant interagency cooperation that this review enjoyed. both secretary clinton and secretary chu as well as admiral mullen will make brief comments in a moment. and then we will take three or four questions limited to the npr and start. the npr provides a road map to implement president obama is the agenda for reducing nuclear risk to the united states, our allies and partners, and the international community. this review describes how the u.s. will reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons with a long-term goal of the nuclear- free world. driven by the changing nature of the security environment, the npr opuses on five key objectives. preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism. reducing the role of u.s.

nuclear weapons. maintaining strategic deterrence instability at a reduced nuclear force levels. strengthening regional to terrence and reassuring u.s. allies and partners. sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal. to these ends, the npr shows significant changes to the posture. some of the calculated ambiguity is removed. if a non-nuclear weapon state is in compliance with non proliferation treaty and obligations, the u.s. pledges not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. if any state eligible for this assurance or to use chemical or biological weapons against the u.s. or its allies or partners, it will face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response.

still, given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the rapid pace of biotechnology development, the u.s. reserves the right to make any adjustment to this policy that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of biological weapons. the review rightly praises the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation of the top of the policy agenda. given al qaeda's continued quest for nuclear weapons, the ron's ongoing nuclear efforts and north korea's proliferation, this is appropriate and is central. -- and the central. the np concluder it that stable deterrence can be maintained that nuclear vehicles can be reduced by 50%. this finding drove negotiations to the new start treaty with russia. the u.s. will pursue high level dialogue on strategic stability with both russia and china that

are aimed at fostering a more stable strategic relationships. we will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities. we will study options for ensuring the safety and security and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case by case basis. any decision to proceed to engineering and development will give a strong preference to refurbishment. replacement of any nuclear components, if absolutely necessary, would require specific presidential approval. correspondingly, the u.s. must make much-needed investments to rebuild our aging nuclear at the structure, both facilities and personnel. i have asked for nearly $5

billion to be transferred from the department of defense to the department of energy over the next several years to improve our nuclear infrastructure and support a credible modernization program. there are also areas of continuity. among them, the u.s. will continue to hold accountable and the state, terrorist group or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction. whether by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe-haven for such efforts. we will maintain the nuclear triad of icbm's, nuclear-the global aircraft and submarines. we will continue to develop non nuclear capabilities including nuclear -- missile defense. finally, the u.s. will continue abiding by its pledge not to conduct nuclear testing.

this review was from beginning to end an interagency effort. i want to express my appreciation to the contributions bridget for the contributions -- for the contributions of each department. i want to thank the men and women of the department of defense and department of energy. the important work underwrites the security of the u.s. as well of that -- as well as that of our partners and allies. >> thank you. let me begin by thanking you for your leadership in this effort and for the collaboration that persisted throughout. the nuclear posture review we are releasing represents a milestone in the transformation of our nuclear forces and the way in which we approach nuclear issues. we are we calibrating our priorities to prevent nuclear

proliferation and nuclear terrorism. we are reducing the role and number of weapons in our arsenal while maintaining a safe and secure deterrent to protect our nation. this provides a foundation where we can build a more secure future. this review is important not only for what it says but also the way in which it was conducted. i believe it is the first unclassified review in its totality. secretary gates is responsible for making this the most inclusive nuclear posture review in history. ,, >> i am very proud of the role that the state department played in making the policy and we will be working with our allies and

partners to explain it and implement it. it truly was a collaborative effort in keeping with the agenda and the goals set by president obama. the consultations that supported this process included more than 30 of our allies and partners. for generations, the u.s. nuclear deterrent has helped prevent proliferation by providing our non-nuclear allies with reassurance and security. the policies outlined in this review allow us to continue that stabilizing role. this review also makes it clear that we will cooperate with partners worldwide to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. under president obama's leadership, we work to advance that agenda beginning with the u.n. security council summit and the president's speech in prague. thursday, the president will be back in prague signing a historic start treaty with

russia and next week, president obama will host more than 40 heads of state to tackle the most dangerous threat we face today, the threat of nuclear terrorism. this posture review provides the strategic bases for all of these efforts and demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. we are enforcing our commitment by stating clearly for the first time that the u.s. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the npt and in compliance with their non preparation obligations. we believe this is a important step as we approach the npt review conference next month. let me thank secretary date, secretary chu admiral mullin. you'll be he -- you will be

hearing from experts that worked on this. ,, we believe that this represents the best interest of the united states and our partners around the world. >> let me begin by thanking secretary gates and secretary clinton and admiral mullen. as we said before, while the defense department led the effort, this was a balanced reviewed text reflected the expertise of these eight departments and the energy department as well as the the department of defense. the effort to reduce nuclear dangers will require an all of

government approach and it also reflects the president's commitment to address these issues and a way that improves the security of our people and our partners around the world. in prague we will sustain us effective nuclear arsenal as long as the weapons exist. this puts the nation on a path to provide the nations -- the it defines specific steps in the non poor relation -- non- proliferation regime. it is based on several key principles that will guide future u.s. decisions on management. first, the u.s. will not conduct nuclear testing and will seek nuclear testing and will seek gratification we want not develop nuclear weapons. our laboratory directors and a host of other technical reviews

have been very clear that our extension programs will maintain the security and effectiveness of the stockpile. to accomplish that goal the npr makes it clear that it will be on the case by case basis, congressional with congressional mandates. approaches will be considered for reuse of nuclear components of different warheads and the replacement of nuclear components. this makes clear that the united states will only use nuclear components based on previously used designs and will not provide new nuclear capabilities. finally, in any decision to proceed forward house -- warhead

life extension programs, the white house will be able to refurbish. this would only be undertaken all live critical management goals turned out to be otherwise met a specific authorization is obtained by the president. this is how we intend to implement the president's strong commitment to making effectiveness of it provides an outline of the resources that we will need to get the job done. the review calls for the modernization of nuclear weapon and the structure and sustainment of the science and technology base which is required to support the full range of nuclear security missions. this is reflected in the president's budget request which requires a 13.4% increase in funding for the nsa. this investment is critical for addressing our aging and the structure and enhancing our

efforts against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. it will also allow the u.s. to reduce many non-deployed warheads currently kept as a technical hedge. we know the human capital in the dod and doe for the nuclear mission and reposes on building on current government levels. if we are to succeed, we need to be able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear security professionals. our people are our greatest assets. the people that work so hard to complete this review, i look forward to for -- to working with congress to implement this. thank you. >> thank you for your leadership in this tremendous effort and leading in a way with

the process was very collaborative and really the strength of the interagency which produced a great product. the chiefs and i support the findings of this review because we believe it provides us and our field commanders the opportunity to better shape our nuclear weapons posture, policies, and structure to meet an ever changing security environment. we appreciated the opportunity to inform it and be informed by it as the process went forward. even though it produces a reduction, a reduction i endorsed, it reaffirms our commitment to defend the vital interests of the u.s. and to those of our partners and allies with a more balanced mix of nuclear and non-nuclear means that we have -- then we have at our disposal today.

we will retain the strategic triad that has served us so well, the review further strengthens the united states command and control and works to prevent nuclear terrorism and proliferation and suggests a new dialogue through which we improve transparency with russia and china. it includes the development of new warheads, it bolsters regional deterrence by improving counter weapons of mass destruction capability and revitalizing infrastructure. as secretary gates made clear, we must invest more generously and wisely to preserve the life span and the effectiveness of our existing arsenal. we must hold ourselves accountable to audit the jubilee -- to high standards of management and we must recruit and retain the scientific expertise to advance our

technological edge in nuclear weaponry. i am encouraged to see these so promptly addressed in the posture review but i am also mindful of the challenge. without such improvements, and aging force supported by and neglected infrastructure only invites any misbehavior and miscalculation. thank you. >> the review says that the it administration possible goal is the only purpose of a weapon is to deter an attack. what will it take to get to that state and why cannot go there now? would you comment on the russian minister's comments in moscow that russia would reserve the right to withdraw from the start treaty if it felt the u.s. missile defense became a strategic threat to the russian

to turn around and will the u.s. have a unilateral statement about the treaty? >> the review is very explicit and referring to the fundamental of nuclear weapons being for deterrence. i know that there has been a lot of speculation outside of the government about how to frame that and describe it, whether it would be the sole purpose, whether we would forgo first used and so on. there was agreement within the administration that we did not think we for far enough along the road toward getting control toward nuclear weapons around the world to limit ourselves so explicitly. there was general agreement that

the term fundamental purpose basically made clear that this is obviously a weapon of last resort and we are also explicit about that. we recognize that we need to make progress moving in the direction that the president has set but we also recognize the real world we continue to live in. >> i am not aware of the statement but it is no surprise that the russians remain concerned about our missile defense program. we have persistently sought to explain to them the purpose for missile defense, the role that we believe can and should play in preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism and we have consistently offered the russians the opportunity to cooperate with us. the start treaty is not about missile defense, as you know.

it is about cutting the size of our arsenals. we will continue our conversations with the russians. we have made it clear that we look forward to the ratification of start and another round of discussions with the russians about further reductions and we will also be working with them to try to find common ground around this. >> tactical nuclear weapons did not enter your discussion. what is the review say about nukes and europe? what will be required of the russians as part of this process? >> the review is very explicit that any decision with respect to nato's nuclear capabilities

will be handled within nato according to the consensus principle and that as long as there are nuclear weapons that threaten nato, nato will need to maintain nuclear capability. this is clearly one of the issues that will be addressed and the strategic concept that data is undertaking. -- that nato is undertaking. what the review does is draw attention to the number of tactical nuclear weapons and also to the number of non- deployed weapons that we are looking at and of these clearly should be a part of the arms control agenda as we move forward. >> there is a section and the review for those of you who have not had a chance to review it, including a picture of the

russian minister, it is in there somewhere, page 19, in the chapter called strengthening regional to terence and reassuring u.s. allies and partners, -- deterrence and reassuring u.s. allies and partners, action should only be taken after a thorough discussion with the alliance. those discussions have begun with connection to the new strategic concept being worked on that will hopefully be ready for consensus discussions at the nato conference in lisbon. >> your concerns about iran and did those play any role in formulating this review? the president said he is concerned that iran is still on

a track for nuclear capability. your current assessment of the time frame, what that means, what message you are sending to iran. >> i actually think the review has a very strong message before both iran and north korea. whether it is in declaratory policy or other elements of the review, we essentially carve out states like north korea and iran that not in compliance and all options are on the table when it comes to countries in that category, along with non- state actors who may acquire nuclear weapons. if there is a message for iran and north korea, it is if you are going to play by the rules and join the international community, we will undertake certain obligations to you. if you are not going to play by

the rules, if you are going to be a proliferate hr, all options are on the table. >> one of the goals of an enhanced regional architecture is to ensure that any attempts to protect u.s. forces or allies will be planted with a -- and enhanced ability. if iran talks -- if a brand attacks israel, would the u.s. attack? >> i would not go down the hypothetical road. >> the alert status, what does that remain on changed? did you tell us a bit more about how the presidential decision making process will be changed under the review? >> there are some changes that

we made in command and control that tighten things up and give the president more time for decision. what was the first part? >> military alert. >> frankly, we feel like the situation is a satisfactory one at the current one. we have no armed bombers sitting at the end of runways any longer. we have our icbm's are all targeted right now on the oceans it. if there were an accidental launch, or a problem, it would put a missile right into the middle of the ocean. we have taken a number of steps

to ensure that the president has additional time for decisions and the forces on alert are not subject to some sort of disaster. thank you very much. >> we have a number of we have a number of policy experts that are here to address your question send greater detail. jim miller is the principal secretary for policy during the defense department. and he will share that briefing live general cartwright, the vice chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. and then we will and by their colleagues to