that you might have from the other departments. so with that, jim, the floor is yours. >> could we pull up the charts, please? we will go through these charts relatively quickly. and now people want to get to the questions and hear the answers. i will go ahead and start as it is coming up. this is the third comprehensive review of nuclear posture conducted by administration, and as secretary clinton noted, this is the first one to have entirely unclassified product. you've heard about the collaboration that went on with the departments in addition to state and energy, extensive involvement of the intelligence community and of all other members of the national security council as well. this review did build on the quadrennial defense review and the ballistic missile defense review. when general cartwright talks about regional security architectures, and our approach to regional deterrence, you'll see the closest link is to both

of those buried in close consultation throughout with congress and allies, something over 80 meetings that took place from the beginning to end of the nuclear posture review. started with an assessment of the strategic security environment and noted it was substantially changed from the cold war. this review focused extensively on the challenges of nuclear proliferation and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. we do see terrorist groups continuing to try to seek weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and materials. we see states pursuing nuclear weapons in defiance of the international community. understood is the requirement to reinforce and enhance regional security architecture to strengthen deterrence and regional aggression. this includes not just the nuclear umbrella but also

considering how to strengthen the nuclear defense system and combating weapons of mass destruction capability. third, understanding that with the u.s. and russia continuing to have 90% of the nuclear weapons in the world, that reinforces strategic relationships with china at -- with russia are imperative. this is a key step in this effort. the general talk about that more. -- the general will talk about that more. this shows the policy framework we used. >the first topic is the

prevention of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation. this review plays out additional steps that it will take to lead international efforts to bolster that regime as we look forward to compliance, the conference is a critical next step. as we conducted the review, we looked at what budgetary steps' were appropriate. other agencies have increased their funding. the president has committed to a global lockdown to secure all of honorable nuclear material within four years. -- all vulnerable to nuclear material within four years. part of the review looked at what types of investments are needed to have better capabilities to interject

smuggled materials. we have increased investments and those areas, as well. we will also be sending up a joint task force for wdm elimination. disarming was a fundamental principle. this review started with and looked at how to implement the president possible of a world free of nuclear weapons in the long term. some of the steps that we intend to take are listed there, including negotiations and a comprehensive program on contributions. the secretary spoke about renewing the u.s. commitment to hold accountable as you see in the chart. this is one where i want to take

the bulk of my time before i turn it over to the general. that is u.s. territory policy. you can think about two different types of states. this comprises the vast majority of countries in the world. what we look to do in the territory policy is to strengthen the u.s. security assurance strengthened by the treaty. i will not repeated but you can quote it if you have a look at it and i remind you that these states, if any of the states that are compliant use chemical or biological weapons, we stated very clearly they face the prospect of a devastating military response. as the secretary noted, we

reserve the right to adjust this in the future if the biological weapons threat grows significantly and we cannot cope with it correspondingly. this policy is intended to give incentives and going and it here to the nonproliferation treaty and to reduce the steps and not increase the threat of biological weapons. states that are not compliant with their obligations, a different rules set. we still say that the u.s. would not use nuclear weapons project would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances. we specify that for the states where nuclear weapons could play a role in deterrence. as long as nuclear weapons

exist, we have the fundamental goal of u.s. nuclear weapons to deter attack on us or our allies and partners. we will look to strengthen traditional -- conventional capabilities in order to reduce the role of nuclear weapons with the objective of making the sole purpose of u.s. nuclear weapons being to deter nuclear attacks on the u.s. or our allies and partners. with that, i would like to turn it over to general cartwright. >> as i understand the rules, i am going to give you a couple more slots and try not to say things that were already said. and this page reflect start. we expect the president to sign

with the russian president, the start treaty. when you look at start in the numbers associated with the reductions that will occur, they represent 65% reduction and operationally deployed nuclear weapons since the end of the cold war put up 75% reduction in deployed and on deployed -- and non-deployed. pretty substantial reductions since the end of the cold war 1550 is the floor for deploy strategic nuclear warheads. 704 nuclear delivery vehicles. that is a combination of launchers and vehicles. a submarine that has multiple tubes counts as multiple vehicles. a bomber counts as one. an icbm with one warhead counts as one.

just to give you a sense of this. we have seven years to get to these targets that are deployed appear. the 800 number for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is an additional 100 that are not deployed. the submarine that is refueling or has come back and had missiles removed does not count actively and that allows you to have the spares. it allows you to switch the ones coming out and going in -- and bring the new ones and without a period of vulnerability. it was in that constructive we added this additional number of a hundred. we will retain throughout the life of the treaty the nuclear triad which is the bombers and submarines and icbm's.

we will reduce the number of warheads and associated with icbm's over the life of the treaty. there are no constraints in this treaty associated with miss self-defense or our global strike capabilities. we to make substantial new investments and study efforts associated with command and control and decision times. if you have all this activity over the years, one of the issues has been a concern about hair trigger alert statuses and the secretary walked the what we have done with the bombers. we have done about as much as we can do with the physical capabilities and architectures of the existing weapons and platforms. as we go into modernization, we are studying what we can do in that area to ensure that we have the maximum amount of decision

time for national leaders before they would enter any decision to use a nuclear weapon. that could happen in better sensors, better command in control mats and also in the architecture of the weapons themselves. the secretary described one of the activities with what is called ocean open -- open ocean targeting. that study begins for the command and control for about three years ago. we will be looking at what we can do. the studies will start in the fiscal year 2011. we also talked significantly about high-level dialogues and establishing them with the russians and chinese. this is in an effort to get more transparency and confidence and understand the intent of the other and understand where

modernization programs are going to reduce the potential for misinterpretations. we endeavor to have these dialogues. strengthening regional deterrence. we have done a lot of work here. a lot of work is in the early stages. it is the missile defense capabilities at the theater level that allow us to have that be an element of our deterrence. in addition, our forces are second to none. that capability and maintaining it and having a posture that is consistent with the threat to deter but not overwhelmed, working those and tailoring those for the regions around the world, these are critical activities that we must be able to do. we will and fact continue to have a capability on the tactical side.

whether that is applied with a bomb or a next generation aircraft but having that capability out there to ensure that we can move forward and face forward in a tactical sense where it is appropriate to do that. we are going to retire one of our weapons that has been in the arsenal for a long time. this is the tomahawk. it has been on the sidelines and not deployed for several years. we are going to officially retire that weapon. we will also spend time at the regional level working with our allies to have a discussion about the credibility and effectiveness of what has been called extended deterrent. the secretary talked about our nato responsibilities. those also extend into the pacific and into the middle east.

sustaining the safe, secure, and effective arsenal. this has been an area of a lot of discussion and i am sure we will have several questions here. no new testing, no new warheads. the secretary went to the criteria associated with that. no new missions or capabilities. life extension programs will focus on existing, tested designs. there are three principal categories of weapons, those categories of weapons, those that we refurbished, in the case of refurbishment, these are nuclear designs that were previously produced for the warhead type undergoing an extension. you have not changed anything associated with -- with "we would call the physics package, the primary and secondary, the nuclear part of this thing.

that will not be touched. in a refurbishment, you are working around, the components that by their allies -- aged out and become obsolete over time or those that by replacing them with substantially improve the stockpile. in the case of reuse, those nuclear designs are currently or previously were in the stockpile but from different warhead types. we might be able to take one from 14 tie -- one warhead type, match it with another in order to be of the preserve that weapon. no new capability, no new mission, but that will allow us to take known, tested designs, keep it in the stockpile without having battery test or establish a test program, and allow us to keep the stockpile fresh. and that third one which is the most discussion is replace. and we're utilizing designs not in the stockpile but based on previously tested designs. we are allowing the space to make changes to the primary

components that would be consistent with improving safety and security, ok? you might do any number of things associated with the components, but as long as it is aligned that way, we would do that. it still requires a presidential approval and the congress would get a look at this, too. . . ,, we talked about the over $5 billion over the next several years that we would put into the complex from the department of defense to the department of energy, to a best of both the aging infrastructure, updated support to our science and technology capabilities, the recruitment and retention of the physicists and scientists associated with the capability, and then a promise to renew and refresh our continued leadership focus on the nuclear mission

within the department, those who lead this enterprise. last slide. this goes back and restates everything that we have talked about up until now. i think the one point that i would bring out is that the reality of the world that we live in today and the world that we anticipate living and, we have to expand the spectrum that we watch and guard against in this area -- so that everything from nuclear weapons being used to influence, through terrorism, all the way up to icbms that would be coming over the poles towards the united states. coming towards the united states. our defensive capabilities must be able to address that entire span. a substantial amount of work in this nuclear posture review has not been emphasized as much as it should be. and making sure that we have the

capabilities to address those types of threats as a go forward and that we develop those capabilities and we keep them robust and credible, which is a key attribute. i will ask my colleagues to join me and they will take questions. >> thank you. i want to introduce an undersecretary tauscher and the undersecretary of energy. >> can you explain the changes that will be made to allow the president more time? the report talks about a lack of transparency on china's programs. can you elaborate on what specifically china is not being transparent enough about? >> it is a study to look for those types of capabilities. if we have modern sensors, the type we're capable of deploying

today, we can know sooner that weapons are postured for launch, that weapons have been launched, where they are going precisely, and we're trying to increase the understanding of the knowns, and a better understanding of intent. was this one weapon? were other forces postured at the same time? are there other objectives? having the sensors and the command and control to ensure that the president has the maximum amount of knowledge necessary to make a decision, and that the decision is not artificially breast because of a lack of information that could have been obtained -- artificially rushed because of a lack of information that could have been obtained. >> in a situation where you have a misunderstanding about

the programs -- and their programs -- the modernization programs, or misunderstandings with respect to the doctrine. we would like to have conversations about where their capabilities are going over time, and what are they thinking is the purpose of these capabilities. yes? >> marybeth sheridan. the nuclear posture review talks about reducing the role and the numbers of weapons. i did not see much about the numbers of weapons, other than the start figures, which a lot of people consider modest. where do you see the reduction in numbers? >> i think it was addressed in the last chart. we're looking to -- after entry into the new start treaty, and then engage with russia on a

dialogue that would address the full range of weapons. after this treaty, we will still have the vast majority of nuclear weapons in the world. we think it is appropriate to take that step next. >> general cartwright, what is the military's view after all of this about no new nuclear warhead? are you concerned that the door has been shut too much? can you review this concept? >> on the no new and the caveat is associated with the replacement, no, i do not feel constrained in the least. i think we have enough capacity and capability for any threat we will see.

the capabilities that have been brought on board have been substantial. . the capabilities we have are more than adequate for the threats that we know of and that we believe we can face. from myself as a previous commander, and also for the general, we feel confident that these numbers and descriptions of reuse, replace, and refurbishment -- we are very comfortable. on ocean targeting, it is to say that for a weapon that has a target associated with it that is on alert, there is a specific target. that target is the center of the ocean. we have specific areas that we keep available for that type of work. that is done to ensure that if there were an inadvertent launch, the guidance systems would take you to unknown places. that place would not be

inhabited. we make sure that never occurs. when we did the work associated with taking the bombers off of alert, this was another activity that we undertook to ensure that both the weapons themselves were not artificially targeted on something without a scenario and without a set of circumstances to be associated with why they were targeted. and that no mistakes in a launch system could put them in place where we would not want them to be. >> given your experience with the russians, which you may still be recovering from, what is your sense of their inclination to engage in broader nuclear negotiations in the near term or the distant

future? >> both of us have to get our teams back and get them some rest. there was a heavy investment on both sides. we had approximately 50 people in geneva for many months. the russians, led by their ambassador, had the same kind of interagency team. these are the experts, in our case, that have the most experience in the previous start, and now have the pedigree of the new start agreement. we have a ratification process. that is very important. we need to have those teams in the united states and russia working on that. this administration took advantage of the reset to move forward on the negotiations for the new start agreement, but also to improve the relationship. as i said the last time we talked, as a small child, i was an investment banker.

the test is never the negotiation. it is whether someone is willing to do a new negotiation with you after they survived the existing negotiation. i am very impressed by the russian willingness, in a post ratification time, talk about new reductions. we have a large agenda. there many different areas where we are engaging. we're hopeful that once we get through the ratification process, we can begin on a new effort. >> did they indicate to you that they would be willing to go further? >> we understand our responsibilities as the holders of the most nuclear weapons in the world. we still hold more than 90% of the weapons. we know this is a path, a journey. thank you. >> let me get one question in the back.

>> do you expect any push back from congress on npr and the ratification of the new start agreement? >> we expect to have an extensive dialogue with the congress on npr. that dialogue began months ago when we initiated this review. we have had extensive consultations with congress as the new start negotiations have been under way. >> jim is right. from the very beginning, our lead negotiator was the assistant secretary of state. he has been briefing members on both sides of the aisle and their staff. we had senator kyl and senator feinstein come to geneva last year as observers. there was a sense of bilateral

legislative interest in what was going on. this is an important effort. we have not ratified anything like this in a while. we are very anxious to engage the senate and get their advice and consent for ratification. >> in october 2008, secretary gates said, "there's no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either testing or pursuing a modernization program." this report says there will be no new testing. what has changed? why is it ok not to test now? can we maintain it without testing? >> i always agree with the boss. the context here is that for the foreseeable future, there

are numerous people in the government that certify every year the stockpile is safe and secure, and there's no requirement for additional testing. we continue to certify that. we do not know what five years from now will bring. there's always the potential. nobody has ever removed from the commander or anyone else in that chain and the ability to stand up and say, "i am uncomfortable, or i believe we will have to test." that has not been removed. what has been removed -- in the reality of what we know today, we see no requirement for any additional testing. we feel very comfortable staying in an environment and a protocol of not doing nuclear testing, as it is defined, and that we see no need for additional nuclear weapons of a new type, either in capability or capacity.

this is a reflection of where we are now, looking for work, versus a reflection. i always have the responsibility as a commander to come in and say -- if i must say that a particular weapon is not going to make it, or refurbishment or reuse will be insufficient. all the commanders have that ability. >> as we transition to the next question, secretary gates said he sees the investment program as a credible modernization plan to deal with these issues. plan to deal with these issues. >> i do not completely >> i don't completely understand the replacement category.