change this. during those 15 years, and a few years prior, the world completely changed. and i would say that we did not have the best -- the best intelligence tools against this world. the example is the very bad intelligence leading up to the decision to go into iraq. i believe that the reform, that was modeled after the goldwater -- the idea was a joint command structure across 16 intelligence agencies. this was designed reasonably well. the original bill was introduced by the democrats on the house intelligence committee. this had to change in order to get through congress. this was based on the recommendations of the joint commission on intelligence, which was bipartisan.

this is probably the last bipartisan effort that we made after 9/11. this was based on the recommendations of the 9/11 commission. this command structure was supposed to be flexible and a coordinator across all of these agencies. .

in the five years we have had three -- i am looking at one right in front of me. mitch mcconnell worked very hard to implement the law here. i would say we still have a work in progress. it is 50% loss and 50% some leadership, and let me -- 50% law and 50% leadership. i think we all understand the best sixtfix we did have is sustained leadership at the front -- at the top. i am saying sustained leadership of the talk is what is going to make an excellent work force, -- leadership at the top is what is going to make an excellent

work force. we now have the ability to leverage the strength of 16 agencies. our intelligence processes are much better. i see we have the ability to leverage our strengths, and we are now capable -- a great example is the revised screening procedures the department of homeland security came up with last week that our intelligence- based rather than name-face. they are now capable of taking a look of things based on the information we get from the tip of this year, which is intelligence, so let me close with wishing everyone well and saying to everyone in this audience that your sustained leadership of helped us get to this point. our country is safer. i think our future will depend

on not letting down that focus. thank you. [applause] >> general hayden? >> a couple quick comments on the title of the panel. are we safer? yes, we are. we share some of the credit for making us safer. i would argue the national counterterrorism center this a success story in terms of what it has done to change how we defend the united states. these are all happening below the water.

the changes you see over the course of your have been put in motion. -- over the course of a year have been put in motion. i do not think it was a direct product, but it is the creation of the nine -- the dni free of the director of the agency to spend every moment running doesn't cia -- freed up the director of the agency to spend every moment running the cia. i had point wanted to make to leon as he was coming for his confirmation process, and the first thing i said, i do not know you realize this yet. you will be the combat and commander in the global war on terrorism.

i cannot imagine doing the java -- doing that job if i had to do what mike mcconnell had to do every morning i had a four-hour jump because the dni existed. i do not know how that sustain itself. i would travel to stations around the world after i became director, and this was one thing. my wife and i would have town meetings. we would do some broadcasting of things we thought they should know, to questions, and within the first three questions, what about this midianite saying -- what about this dni thing?

and would be the first to spend my entire day been the director of the ca -- cia. this is hard. personalities matter. if something needs to be improved, do not shop -- do not jump to the legislative fix. this may depend more on personality than it does the law. let me suggest things we could have done better. the dni had a tough job. the smooth functioning of an intelligence community. he really depends on his deputy. i was the principal deputy for a year, but if you look at history of the dni, the position of

director has been vacant almost as long as it has been filled. that is not trivial. that is a big deal. legislation says vanessa -- says the dni will nominate the director of the cia. if you get that right, a lot of other things happen naturally. the law says the dni will nominate. the law was passed for about 62 months. now in that time, the time in which one has been nominated is in seven months.

that relationship has to be built in the most personal exchanges of loyalties one can imagine. it is not impossible when one or more personality is delivered by the system, but it is a lot easier when the dni gets to shave that choice. a cautionary tale so we do not misdiagnose the problem. i think it is not the most critical relationship. it is the relationship to those big collection agencies. there is a dual personality in each one of those agencies. they are also combat support agencies. my sense was one of the implied

purposes of the law is to make sure the national identity is protected so they do not become consumed by their combat support function. that is unavoidable, because we are a nation at war. perhaps not everyone in the nation is at war, but the intelligence community is at war. it is unavoidable that the defense personalities becomes gradually more dominant. that is a good thing. it is not perfectly sustainable

with the overall trajectory -- perfectly consistent with the overall trajectory, and we have to be aware of that. [applause] >> thank you. i am going to make a couple comments. i had the privilege of working with david, and i think he has pretty well framed it. this has come of twice now. i would agree it is an unqualified success. we need to be how kurt -- careful how we attribute that. the predecessor was the terrorist threat immigration center, and it really was in motion before intelligence reform. that is not to take away what

is credited to intelligence reform. walters article has a right. there has been a doubling of the budget of the intelligence committee in the last eight years. let's not underestimate the impact in terms of strengthening intelligence and analysis capability, but intelligence reform was really important, and we have had many conversations about the importance of information sharing. but was a tremendous driver. the nation understood there was an intelligence failure. the nation understood. the nation shows to forgive the government for the failure, but it had a right to not make the same mistake again, so information sharing is really important. it is what we have seen in terms

of the frustration in the aftermath of the christmas day attempt. that is the important part, ensuring this community does have the procedures in place that allows them to leverage a tremendously valuable capability to the nation in terms of keeping it safe, so i do think we are safer. i think intelligence reform is a part of the. we understand this is a business that would be a constant work in motion to adapt to threats we have not yet considered that will come at us. one other thing that struck me -- i have the privilege during

the course of my career -- all of those i have some response ability for the review of recommendations that went to the president and subsequent implementation. i can remember in the aftermath of katrina i did not think i would ever quote general russell. he asked me what the heat -- what my responsibility was. he said, when you have a coordinator, they start out to make a horse but end up with a camel. there is something to that. i quote him feet of the thing that is people's frustration with vanilla -- because i think that is people's frustrations with the dni. one of the great debates we had was budget authority.

it was not just hiring and firing, but whether or not they had authority was a tremendous internal battle, between the executive branch and congress, and it matters . it matters because the relationship with the president common and the proximity, the relationship with other cabinet members became a far greater importance, so they did not have the actual authority to impose it. how you spend your money is where your priorities are, so we have to be honest about whether or not we are frustrated about how the intelligence reform legislation has unfolded. it has been affected by whether they had budget authority. i tend to agree just because there might be a lack of authority, the first solution

should not be a budget fix. i think we can do more more of effectively, so i toothache -- i do think we need to understand what the role is and what power he or she will wield. the last point i would like to make -- david talked about many of the important functions, such as the president freeing up the time, but not losing the management communities, which with its threats coming to everyday, the enterprise manager got less attention, as you would expect and want it to be, so somebody needed to spend every day all day worrying about enterprise management. that said, if he sent a majority

of time recruiting, acquisitions, a procurement, that sort of thing and, you probably would not be able to name him, and you probably would not care. the struggle we read about publicly is the struggle over -- and what is the dmi when told when you're talking about bilateral foreign intelligence relationships. i will say it is incredibly dysfunctional and confusing to them about who do they deal with. they understand the ci director it -- cia director is the same, but if the role is to be manager, does he need to travel overseas bowman -- travel

overseas? doesn't that creates inherent confusion with our allies? i think as we see debates unfold, this is where congresswoman harman said it is 50% lott and 50% leadership, this is where leadership comes in. the president must be clear what he wants donthe dni to do and hw he wants it executed. there will be conflict. now i guess that leaves things for walter to write about. with that, i will stop. [applause] >> there is always something to write about. i get complaints that i hang

onto little facts. one thing has not been mentioned correctly, and it is a question i want to pose. now the secretary of defense is really the 800-pound gorilla in intelligence. that is just a fact. how successful with the -- would the dni program be to dave robert gates were not the secretary of defense. >> since walter looked at me, i will try that, and then i will be corrected. i think having bob gates as secretary of defense is a wonderful thing, but i also think because he was the dci and has a background in intelligence, it is a helpful thing. the essential compromise is we

exempted tactical intelligence from the coverage. we took out intelligence for the war fighter. that was something that was an imperative. we never got don rumsfeld [pause] approval, but to get him to stand back a bit, and duncan hunter, too. i am quite sure he voted against law. that was the compromise he made, and looking back on it, i am ok with that, because i do agree with -- i think it was mike who said there was a different set of needs for the tactical war fighter then there is for strategic intelligence, so i think having bob gates in that role means there is more running room to get the concept right, and i see improvement over the years in how it works.

fran is ride that left undefined there will be inevitable conflict, but it is not left undefined. i think we are improving the definition of roles. we had a few dustups to get there, but boys will be boys, and now we are doing better, so my answer to you is the country should be grateful we have bob gates in this role and the fact he is in this role and sees it -- sees himself as a bridge to making the function work better is helping us fill out what was an incomplete picture of their role. >> that is all true. secretary gates is still secretary of defense, and he is not running to the conference table.

i will give you an example. this is a success story of the intelligence community. that is actually the one part directly transferrable. it seems to work about the same way inside the intelligence community, except we're in many departments. who gets to be the waiver authority? secretary of defense. who gets to be the waiver authority for the central intelligence community. that is a disequilibrium in trying to create a community, so i agree it is as good as it is going to get, that there are in our global equities -- inarguable equities.

>> i do not think we should evoke the catholic church now. to put it -- >> to put it is in its starkest form. on page 2 there was a sentence that referred to the duncan hunter subplot, which says the new dni is not going to walk across the cabinet level officials. the regional draft the cia supported was that carrying out his executive authorities, the dni should be presumed not to be the prerogative of cabinet level officials.

everyone out of the cabinet was a cabinet official. that language became carrying out his executive authority under the law, the dni will not, rather than shall be presumed not to. that is moving heaven and earth. we may not have the same stark language, but until we find ourselves as a collective institution more in that direction, it is going to be more than a couple bricks' shy of a loaded to do what we expect him to do. >> the only thing i would add, i agree with what is being said. not to embarrass mike mcconnell, but i would tell you, as important as secretary gates and his experience to the success of the efforts, so, too, who is

the dni? it requires somebody knows how to build the relationship of trust. to be fair to secretary rumsfeld, he was responsible for fighting a war in two theaters, and he was a gracious bureaucratic fighter for our sons and daughters. we have got to be careful about where you sit and where you stand and what your responsibilities are, so yes, it is important that secretary gates is there. also, the leadership and capability of this particular dni. >> let me raise one other set of things so far. one is the purposes of creating a tdni was to give somebody

authority over intelligence not just abroad but at home, and nobody has ever mention the fbi. the fbi, which has spent hundreds of millions of dollars, cannot make their own computer system worked, and it was found they did not even have an e-mail system at 9-11. why isn't the f -- why is if the fbi is never mentioned when you talk about the dni? nobody talks about it there have been major changes in the fbi internally as there were in the cia and the justice department after 9-11, but how much a story and interest does the and i paid to the fbi -- does the

dni paid to the fbi, which is the organization that cannot be touched? >> i did not mention the fbi today, but the fbi is certainly an agency along with the department of homeland security that i think about on a regular basis of my focus of the intelligence subcommittee is on information sharing domestically and how are we doing, making sure that our law enforcement community, way beyond 40,000 fbi agencies, has the information to know what to look for and what to do. certainly it is true that more people are at risk here from a terror attack then in our embassies abroad or in our war

theaters abroad, so it is critical this concept affect our communities -- not just the washington and new york communities hit before, but all our communities. i actually think the fbi has round up its act considerably since 9-11 -- has ramped up its act considerably since 9-11. there was a big issue about the wall, which was a fiction, but nonetheless, there is no more wall, so that is a good thing. issing see intelligence function at the fbi has been ramp -- i think intelligence function of the fbi has been ramp up considerably, and the joint terrorism task force around the country are helping our local so

cold fusion centers connect the dots before bad stuff happens, and a perfect example -- it would be in my home town -- is about the torrance police department. torrence is a wonderful community in the best congressional district on earth, but they noticed there was a string of gas station robbers that must have been intended to fund something. they get a search warrant, went into the apartment of one guy, and discovered weapon caches and plans to attack a military recruiting center, synagogues, and lax, and these guys were indicted on terrorism-related charges, tried on article 3, federal criminal court, and are behind bars for a long time, so a terror cell was discovered in america by an astute police department that connected it, and the fbi took the ball across

the finish line, so i think the fbi is better. i think there is still an issue, whether we need a domestic -- i think my answer is still no, whether we need a domestic intelligence the office based on the british, but paired together with local fusion centers, it is doing the job better. let me mention one thing. but an unfilled piece of the intelligence reform act is don a priority of the board, -- is a priority of the board, which i know many of us think is essential. the bush administration nominated the confirmable positions, and i think they were confirmed common -- they were

confirmed, and those were unfilled, and a number of us have been raising this issue, and there has yet been no response. i think it is important, especially as we ramp up domestic intelligence collected and -- collection activities, which we must do. we have homegrown problems that as we ramp up, we should have an independent watchdog making sure we are losing our values. i think that is a gap. i think we still over classified material, and i think we have a leak problem, but with those gaps, i think the fbi is growing into a bigger and more appropriate role. >> you have a very good point. you can make the argument that the most major muscle movement inside the legislation was not sharing information with the

cia, which it needs to do better. the major muscle movement was a linkage of foreign and domestic intelligence. that is a big deal. david was right when he said that could never be done by a dci, because of the history of the nation and his role running foreign intelligence of the same time. it could only be done by the dni, so i would make the case this is the really big one, and i would also make the case that it requires sustained energy on the part of all concerned to make it work because it is a historical and cultural first for us, and i would refer you specifically to the new attorney general guidelines. now they were issued very late by attorney general mukasey. more technically, it was allowing investigations and the gathering of intelligence and

information without a criminal predicate. left on its own without energy from the top, and here it is probably not from the top. here it is from the top of the justice department. without sustained energy on the part of the attorney general, that is so inconsistent with fast practices, that will not get the trash and the legislation wanted it to have, so this is one the ag really has to take on, and it remains to be seen whether or not he will have the focus on it. >> i was at the justice department during the clinton administration, where i was counsel for the attorney general of policy. there is now an attorney general. that is really where this rubber meets this road. in terms of what is the appropriate fbi role, we have to

remember, they have their own history, very much a part of the hearings. there was an investigation. many of you are familiar with this, so the role of the fbi in terms of domestic debt during of intelligence looms large in their thinking, so they want clear guidance. the attorney general's guidelines go a long way to that, but we have to remember -- the fbi is a different member of the intelligence community because of its law enforcement role and because of reports to the attorney general. fbi agents will remind to take the oath to support and defend the constitution, not a particular policy or administration, and as we heard, it is true to say the intelligence community has an appropriate role in terms of a tool ovef a particular administration, and that is different. the fbi is conscious --

conscience not to get -- conscious not to give full to the side. -- get pulled to the side. it has been a gross over time about what is the appropriate role -- a growth over time about what is the appropriate role. i am glad congresswoman harman mentioned the board. it plays an important function. you could hardly have imagined a more bipartisan group when it was convened. i have no doubt it will have the same intention, but it is important to get up and running, especially as we see and hear more about domestic threat and as we could charge for our domestic agencies to be aggressive, they need that guidance they can get. >> let me do one final one, and that is the director of national intelligence is the president's chief adviser on intelligence.

is he or she also the chief spokesman for the intelligence community? i remember when the bill was being discussed on the hill, when of issues was congress was looking for someone to blame when there was something going wrong. they wanted one person to blame. if you all remember the december 25 bombing, it was john brennan who stood up from the white house and was the person to take the blame. who is the spokesman for the intelligence community gammon -- community? >> you first? >> why don't you? >> i think it should be the dni. he is well positioned to do that. he is one with the god's eye view.

number two, on a human basis, the rest of the community cannot be looking at liberty crossing as a place that always ask them for something. it also has to be the place where things happen that help the rest of the community. and there are couple of times mike mcconnell went into harm's way, and he could have easily send that note down to congress and let me handle it, and we were very grateful for that. on the immediate case you raised, several people have already commented on that. first is the relationship with the president is very important to perhaps robust some shortfalls in the actual legislation. the fact director blair was not nearly as visible as john was in the aftermath of the december 25 thing, is something 100,000 people in the intelligence

community took note of. that was not a good thing, and he needs to be nbc in as the primary legitimate spokesman of what goes well and what goes still inside the american intelligence community. >> i every with director hayden. -- i agree with director hayden. i always used to joke that if there had been an attack, i would be the easiest and quickest person to fire and hold accountable, but i do think, in terms of the intelligence community, i do things the d -- do think the dni has a view into -- if we learned anything from what we know now about the

december 25 attempted attack, there is not a single point of failure. when there is a failure, there are multiple points of failure, and who isn't the best position to assess those points and the relative importance of those points, and that is dthe dni. i agree. you want someone in the white house to play that role, and the appropriate role because of access to information is andththe dni. >> i certainly do not think we thought about who was a spokesperson. we thought about who was accountable, and on that score, i agree. the dni is accountable and commendable for successes. it is true there are tens of thousands of folks -- i was told that was -- pythons and that was

a classified number, but one -- i thought that was a classified number, but what do i know? that person needs to be a cheerleader for the men and women who work for the dni. those folks are amazing, and they are often harms way right now, and many times their families do not know what they do, and when some of them are killed in the line of fire, it will still disclose what they did. it will be a nameless star on that wall if they are assets of the cia, but i see the dni as a person we intend to be accountable. in terms of a spokesperson, i am not sure who that should be. in terms of the homeland, more americans are at risk. i see that role as being played

by the homeland department secretary. one of my early council's should convert herself into the coop of protecting the country. every time you saw him coming, you knew more about cigarettes and anything else, and i think that is a role that should be played by our homeland security secretary. accountability is different from being a spokesperson. >> questions from the floor. yes? >> i would like further clarification on the comment about fbi agents having allegiance to the constitution and suggesting intelligence

officers will take the same oath. i think it is what you said. it may not be what you meant. your point goes to the politicization of intelligence. the intelligence community is getting drawn into politics of administration and suggesting that have been on the foreign side but does not happen on the domestic side. i would like you to clarify your remarks about who swears allegiance to the constitution. >> i think a greater misunderstanding you could hardly have had. there is no question both for and intelligence officers and fbi agents of hold and -- both foreign intelligence officers and fbi agents hold an oath to

the united states. it is very different for a host of legal and policy reasons, and there have been great concerns our privacy and civil liberties advocates about the role the fbi can and should play in terms of collection of intelligence inside the united states, and there are more than 100 lawyers in the justice department and a vote 24-72 making sure the fbi execute their authorities correctly. it is interesting you say my comments were about the politicization of the intelligence community, because that is not what it is about. i do not think there is anybody i work with who would advocate the politicization of intelligence. that is different. that is a corruption of intelligence capability, which is inappropriate. what i was referencing is, there is no question the president can

and those -- republican or democrat -- the intelligence community to support their foreign policy objectives. that is not politicization. that is a stated use of the covert action authority, so there is a difference. that is aligned cannot and mustn't be blurred. there has been much debate about it, and i think general hayden can also speak to this. there is a legitimate use in terms of your foreign policy objective to understand the intentions of your enemies, to understand the intention of other states. all of that is perfectly appropriate, and it is not politicization. >> i would just add that this challenge of being in that space as a decision maker, being true to the facts, and preserving your autonomy while at the same

time being relevant and listened to by the policy maker -- that is the existential challenge for intelligence. >> i think it is an important question, and i am glad you asked it. when bob gates left, he gave an impassioned speech to the workforce at langley, and said, the truth shall set you free. i think the role of our intelligence agencies is to speak truth to power. intelligence is not policy. intelligence is a set of three diction's. it is not science either -- based on the best facts and other information about human behavior you can gather, but if is corrupted and slanted to be what one thinks of policy maker wants to hear or distorted or cherry pick, i think it will

inevitably lead to bad policy. good intelligence of not guaranteed good policy, but bad intelligence tends to focus on the slopes for bad policy. >> my name is terry. my question is about oversight of the dni. i am going to assume nobody is going to say we should not have congressional oversight reform, so my question is how are we going to have congressional oversight reform? >> mike is ducking. does everyone know who carried is? she was one of the most outspoken members of the 9-11 families, and i called them the wind beneath our wings as we try

intelligence reform. it is a huge credit to you that you never quit. it would have been easy. it was not as bad as health care, but it was of there in terms of a big project to accomplish. oversight -- no one has missed its. congressional oversight in my view is still challenging. i think it has improved since we have passed legislation, and i think there is cooperation between intelligence community leaders and the members of the house and senate intelligence committees. i no longer serve on the intelligence committee, but i think the effort is under way to do better oversight. the other thing i would like to say is we do not get as high a remark with respect to a homeland security oversight.

one of the recommendations to the 9-11 commission that has not been fulfilled is that we consolidate and reorganize the way congress functions. congress still has 88 committees and subcommittees the do oversight over homeland security, and that is an embarrassment, and we are not doing much to change the situation, and that makes it extremely hard, not just for the homeland secretary, but it makes it very hard for us to do effective oversight, so keep at it. if we are going to do it right, it is going to beat the kiss you and the families keep reminding us -- going to be because you and the families keep reminding us. >> we are secret as the knowledge services inside an open society, inside an open society that is demanding an

more accountability from every aspect of the society. we cannot brief 300 million countrymen what we are doing. we have to do it through congress, so this does have to work. people on this side, the executive branch, are almost as desperate as the article one branch in terms of making it work. all but said, -- all that said, nobody gets a bridge built by the home because they are on the intel committee, so this is truly a labor of love. we have not had an intelligence bill in five years, and the report is only element that remains on active upon. -- unacted upon.

>> what are the difficulties in understanding how well it is doing? -- one of the difficulties in understanding how well it is doing is the measuring. if you take one method you get one result. if you take the intelligence model you get a different result. you talked about goldwater- nichols, which separates the joint staff from the service staff, and general hayden, you mentioned the command aspect. would anybody care to take that analogy a step forward and say, is the chairman of joint staff model to emulate in some respect, and if so, what authority and leadership should we take to make it more real? >> there are difficulties

transferring coldwater nichols as a model. number one, you do not decide one cabinet department. number two, and this is missed by a lot, but it is important. the department of defense is divided between combat and command and military departments. these guys train and provide. these guys operate. the intelligence community is not organized that way. nsa, cia, etc. as i suggested earlier, the only thing that seems to transfer is title 4, which is the personnel model, and i think that transfers nicely, but the rest of it does not, so we cannot simply brought it and throw it here and expected to work. one thought has come to my mind. it is related, and that is the chairman of the joint staff and

so on. i have thought a lot about the relationship between the dni. i think that is the pass failed relationship. there are six big collection agencies. one is cia, but that is different by kind of organization, so that is critical. i am looking for a model but some just how that might be, and i am thinking -- that suggests how that might be, and i am thinking many elements might relate to the relationship. there is no question reaching no question mike mullins works -- there is no question mike mullins works on this, but he has some inherent authority can do because he is chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. it is very rough. it probably breaks down at some point, but i think that might be

transferred, but the goldwater- nichols model is not. >> we considered a number of models. one thing we did not want to do is to rebuild the department of homeland security. 22 agencies put together in that new form has proved to cause a number of digestion problems reaching not just their but certainly in congress common -- problems -- not just their but certainly in congress, and we have used models that have been suggested by the joint commission and the 9-11 commission and others, and it seems to be kind of right. mike of experience in the military gives him a certain advantage i do not have in understanding how goldwater- nichols worked there, but i continued to believe the joint command idea was a simpler way

to leverage the strength of a number of agencies. it is not just the cia and dni relationship. we were very mindful of our amazing technology we use in the intelligence business. mike understands this. the one-off we're able to produce hopefully will not be produced anywhere else in the country -- on the planet. everybody wins -- not just an agency has ownership over them. it was a big piece of what we had in mind, so i think our concept is fine. 50% law, 50% leadership, and i would hope going forward the

peace of what we had in mind would be implemented vby the dni, fan that is to not build a big bureaucracy that computers -- and that is to not build a big bureaucracy that contain -- that competes with the responsibilities, but to have something nimble. we thought the staff would be adequate. not to build a big new buildings, but to sit as orchestra conductor and wave them across a symphony many instruments play, hopefully making real music. >> i was reminded by your question and discussion of an argument that came up in the

policy debates. he made the appointment -- made the point of having the cia, which has its own operational authority, reporting to an individual did not have operational authority. how are we going to swear that thurman -- how are we going to square that? he is recording on somebody who had a large set of authority. that kind of makes logical sense. this is going to be a challenge, and i think part of what you're hearing is we continue to grapple with that, because that is only -- only direct report, and the cia does not have a parallel line to somebody else with operational authority.

>> you said earlier today a member of congress under informed, and i am struck a almost a year ago, speaker follows the -- speaker pelosi misled congress, and i want to ask, is that true? is is still ongoing in your experience, and what can be done to remedy that as we talk about intel reform? >> the briefing to congress are improving. i have made that point, and the materials are improving. one of the huge 5 ipad -- huge fights i had was to get more people believed. mike will remember a saturday

afternoon phone call when he was shopping for as cellphone in a shopping mall. that was the day the president now declassified portions of the terrorist surveillance program, and it was the first phase -- the first day we call on others to understand some things we have not understood. i did not understand the program did not strictly follow it. i called mike to urge that he, immediately to brief all the members of the intelligence community on the program, which i thought would be very helpful here your he was called back, so

he could not do it. i think the briefing of more people is better, but that still leaves do something -- that still leads to something pete would say, and that is that we play 20 questions. if you do not watch -- do not ask the right question, you do not get the right information. my version is the intelligence committees should be given full information where an independent -- should be given full information. we are an independent branch. we should keep what is classified classified. there should not be over classification, but certain secret should not be in our newspapers or even revealed to congress of side the environment, -- outside of the

environment, so i think we are doing better, and i think it is crucial that relationship work well, because what are we trying to achieve? .

,,,,>> ladies and gentlemen,

president of the united states, barack obama. and the president of the russian federation president medvedev, the treaty on measures for the production and limitation of strategic offensive arms. >> [speaking in russian and then

translated] the president of the united states of america barack obama. and the president of the russian federation, dmitri medvedev, are signing the treaty between the united states of america and the russian federation on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the protocol to it.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

[applause] [applause] >> good afternoon, everyone. i am honored to be back in the czech republic with president medvedev and r chour czech host

for this treaty. happy to be back in the beautiful city of prague. the czech republic is a close friend and ally of the united states. i have great admiration and affection for the czech people. their bond with the american people are deep and enduring. they have made great contributions to the united states over many decades, including in my hometown in chicago. i want to thank the president and all those involved in helping to host this extraordinary event. i want to thank my friend and partner dmitri medvedev. without his personal efforts and strong leadership, we would not be here today. we have met and spoken by phone many times throughout the negotiations of this treaty and

we have developed a very effective work relationship built on calendar, collaboration, and mutual respect. one year ago this week, i came here to prague and gave a speech outlining america's comprehensive commitment to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and seeking the ultimate goal of a world without them. i said then and i will repeat now, that this is a long-term goal, one that may not even be achieved in my lifetime. but i believed then and as i do now, that the pursuit of that goal will move us further beyond the cold war, strengthen the global nonproliferation regime, and make the united states and the world safer and more secure. one of the steps that i called for last year was the realization of this treaty. so it is very gratifying to be back in prague today.

i also came committed to reset relations between the united states and russia. i know that president medvedev shared that commitment. as he said in our first meeting in london, our relationship that started to drift, making it difficult to cooperate on issues of common interest. when the u.s. and russia are not able to work together if on big issues, it is not good for either of our nations, nor is it good for growth. together we have stopped that drift and? and the benefits of cooperation. today is an important milestone for nuclear security and nonproliferation and for u.s.- russia relations. if it fulfills our common objective to negotiate a new strategic arms reduction treaty. it includes a significant reduction in nuclear weapons that we will deploy. it cuts our delivery vehicle by roughly half. it includes a comprehensive verification regime which allows us to further build trust.

it enables both sides of the flexibility to protect our security as well as america's unwavering commitment to the security of our european allies. i look forward to working with the united states senate to achieve ratification for this important treaty later this year. finally, this day demonstrates the determination of the united states and russia and, the two nations holding over 90% of the world's nuclear weapons, to pursue responsible global leadership. together we are keeping our commitments under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, which must be the foundation for global nonproliferation. the new start treaty is an important first step forward, it is just one step on a longer journey. as i said last year, this treaty will set the stage for further cuts. going forward, we hope to pursue discussions with russia on reducing our strategic and

tactical weapons, including non- deployed weapons. if president medvedev and i have agreed to expand discussions on missile defense. this will include regular exchanges of information about our threat assessments as well as the completion of a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles. if these assessments are completed -- at their completed, i laforce to launch an a dialogue about missile defense cooperation. but nuclear weapons are not simply an issue for the u.s. and russia. they threaten the common security of all nations. a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist is a danger to people everywhere. from moscow to n.y., from the cities of europe to south asia. so next week 47 nations will come together in washington to discuss concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials on the world in four years. and the spread of nuclear weapons to more states is also

unacceptable to global security, raising the specter of arms races from the middle east to east asia. earlier this week the united states formally changed our policy to make it clear that policy to make it clear that those nuclear@@@@@@ @ @ @

continually failed to meet their obligations. we are working together, the united nations security council, to pass strong sections -- sanctions on iran. we will not tolerate actions that followed the npt and threaten the international community and our collective and stability. while these issues are a top priority, they are only one part of the u.s.-russia relationship. today i express again my deepest condolences for the terrible loss of russian lives in the recent terrorist attacks. we will remain steadfast partners in combating violent extremism. we also discussed the potential to expand our cooperation on behalf of economic growth, trade, and investment, as well as technological innovation. if i look for to discussing these issues further when

president medvedev visits the united states later this year. because there's much we can do on behalf of our security and prosperity if we continue to work together. when you survey the many challenges we face around ", it is easy to grow complacent or to abandon the notion that progress can be shared -- many challenges we face around the world. when nations allow themselves to be defined by their differences, the gulf between them widens. when we fail to pepursue peace, its days beyond our grasp. prague is a monument to human progress. old adversaries can forge new partnerships. i cannot be help but be struck the other day by the person who helped build the soviet union's first atom bomb at the age of

92. having lived to see the world war and the cold war. he said "we hope humanity will reach the moment when there is no need for nuclear weapons, when there is peace and calm in the world." it is easy to dismiss those voices. doing so risks repeating the horrors of the past and ignoring the history of human progress. the pursuit of peace and calm and cooperation among nations is the work of both leaders and peoples in the 21st century. we must be as persistent and passionate in our pursuit of progress as any who would stand in our way. once again, president medvedev, thank you for your extraordinary leadership. >> your welco are welcome. [applause]

">> dear colleagues, dear members of the media, i fully agree with the assessment that has just been made by my colleague, president obama, concerning the fact that here in this room a truly historic event has taken place and the treaty has been signed for a further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. this treaty has a 10-year duration. it will supersede the start treaty which has expired as well as another existing crushes-u.s. treaty on reduction of strategic defense capabilities. first of all, i'd like to thank my colleague, president of united states of america, for

successful cooperation in this very complex matter and for the reasonable compromises that have been achieved thanks to the work of our two teams. the aborted a bank to them, but let me do it once again in the presence of the media and the public. we thank them for their excellent work. i would also like to thank the leadership of the czech republic, mr. president, you, for this beautiful city and this beautiful springtime, thereby creating a good atmosphere for the future. and i believe that the this signature will open new cooperation among our countries and will create safer conditions for life here and throughout the world. the negotiating process has not been --, but we have been

working in a constructive way that has been a lot of work and very often are teams worked 24 hours a day. that enabled us to do something that just a couple of months ago looked like a mission impossible. within a short amount of time and be prepared a full-fledged treaty and signed it. as a result we have a document that maintains the balance of interest of russia and the united states of america. what matters most is that this is a win-win situation. no one stands to lose from this agreement. i believe that this is typical of our cooperation. both parties have taken into account this victory of ours, the entire world community has one. this treaty has strategic ability and at the same time enables us to rise to a higher

level of cooperation between russia and the united states. also, the contents of the treaty -- let me point out once again what we have achieved, because this is very important, 1550 developed weapons, which is one-third below the current level. 700 deployed icbm 's. and heavy bombers. this represents more than two fold reduction below the current levels. deployed and non deplore launchers for such missiles as well as deployed and non deployed heavy weapons, which presents a two-thirds reduction below the level that existed prior to this treaty. at the same time can use its own discretion to determine the makeup and structure of its

strategic defense potential. the treaty also includes provisions concerning -- change. we are quite experienced in these two matters. experts on these matters, they have the greatest experts in the world. the treaty also includes provisions concerning conversion and elimination, inspection provisions, as well as confidence-building measures. the verification mechanism has been significant and simplify compared with the original start treaty. it insures proper verification, irreversibility, and transparency to reduce strategic offensive arms. we believe and our american partners are aware of it, this is our open position, we believe that the treaty can be viable

and can operate only provided there is no qualitative orix quantitative increase in -- or quantitative increase in capabilities. this is the gist of the statement made by the russian confederation in the signature. in the post-senator period, we will achieve the ratification of the treaty, as mentioned by my colleague, mr. president of the united states. if it is also important to synchronize the ratification process. in terms of proceeding quickly to present this document to the senate for ratification. we will also work with our federal assembly to maintain the necessary dynamics of the ratification process. by and large, we are satisfied with the work done. the result we have obtained is good.

but today of course we have discussed not only the fact of signing the treaty. we have also discussed a whole range of important key issues of concern to all the countries. of course we cannot omit the iranian nuclear program. regrettably, iran is not responding to many constructive proposals that have been made. we cannot turn a blind eye to this. therefore, i do not rule out the possibility that the security council of united nations will have to review this issue again. our position is well-known. let me briefly outline it now. of course sanctions by themselves seldom obtained specific results. although it is difficult to do without them in certain situations. those sanctions should be smart and name not only at nonproliferation but also to

resolve other issues. rather [unintelligible] [president speaking in russian]

this should not only be between the presidency, but presidents do not cover all the issues that have to be tackled by executive structures. on the working level, contact should be maintained on all levels. [president speaking in russian]

[applause] [applause] >> the chicago tribune, christie parsons.

[no audio] >> thank you very much. thank you for taking my question, mr. president. how will the two sides get around differences on missile defense to work out a fall on a

third countries. we recognize, however, that russia is a significant interest in this issue. and what we have committed to doing is engaging in a significant discussion, not only bilaterally, but also having discussions with our european allies and others about a framework in which we can potentially cooperate on issues of missile defense. in a way that protects u.s. national security interests, preserves russian national security interests, and allows us to guard against a rogue missile from any source.

i am actually optimistic, that having completed this treaty, which signals are strong commitment to a reduction in overall nuclear weapons and that i believe is going to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation treaty regime, that sends a signal around road that the united states and russia are prepared to once again take leadership in moving in the direction of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear materials, that we will have build the kind of trust not only between president but also between governments and between peoples, that allows us to move forward in a constructive way. . . ,,,,,, ,,

>> i would like to say a few words on the issue.

interrelation between missile defense and start was one of the most difficult subject -- at present, the language that has been in the treaty signed -- proceeding from the bases of the newly signed treaty. it matters to us what will happen in missile defense. we will watch how these processes develop. the preamble, the language that extends, replicates a legal principle of change ability of

circumstances that were the basis of the trading. a flexible process, and we are interested in cooperation with our american partners. in terms of decisions in the area of missile defense -- this does lead to progress. does not mean there are no digressions in understanding what we should address these issues. to help establish a global missile defense system. given the ball more ability of our world, the terror challenges -- vulnerability of our world, the terror

challenges, and nuclear arms by terrorists in this world, and i'm an optimist as well as my american colleagues and i believe we will be put to reach compromise on this issue. >> [interpreter] i have two questions. president obama, the first time to agree on reduction of the offensive arms. but as you mentioned, russia and the united states are not the only countries who have nuclear weapons. how specifically can it be achieved similar to today's documentation on limitation of nuclear arms. how soon will we see others sign the document and will you move

with the russian federation? president of the russian federation, a dimension -- you mentioned not able to agree on anything else except reduction of mutual arms. will we see any counter -- anything that counter such a statement and what will be agreements be? >> first of all, as i mentioned in my opening remarks, the united states and russia account for 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. and given this legacy of the cold war, it is critical for us to show significant leadership. that, i think, is what we have begun to do with this follow on start treaty.

other countries will have to make a series of decisions about how they approach the issue of their nuclear weapons stockpiles. as i repeatedly said -- and i am sure dmitri feels the same way with respect to his country -- we are going to preserve our nuclear deterrent so long other countries have nuclear weapons. and we will make sure of the stockpile is safe and secure and defective. i do believe that as we look out into the 21st century, that more and more countries will come to recognize that the most important factors in providing security in and peace to their citizens will depend on their economic growth, will depend on the capacity of the international community to

resolve conflicts. it will depend on having a strong conventional military that will protect our nation's borders and that nuclear weapons increasingly in an interdependent world will make less and less cents a as the cornerstone of security policy. but that would take some time. i think each country will have to make its own determination. the key is for the united states and russia to show leadership on this friends because we are so far ahead of every nation with respect to possession of nuclear weapons. the primary concerns we identified in a recent nuclear posture review essentially a declaratory statement of u.s. policy with respect to nuclear weapons. our biggest concerns right now are actually the issue of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. more countries obtaining nuclear

weapons. those weapons being less controllable, less secure nuclear materials floating around the globe. and that is going to be a major topic of the discussion we have in washington on monday. the united states and russia have a history already come a decade-long history, of locking down loose nuclear materials. i believe that our ability to move forward already on sanctions with respect to north korea, intense discussions we are having with respect to iran, will increasingly send a signal to countries not abiding by their nuclear nonproliferation treaty obligations that they will be isolated. all those things will go toward sending a general message that we need to move in a new direction. i think leadership on that front is important. the last point i would make is,

i would anticipate or approach the question about other areas of cooperation. our respective foreign ministers -- secretary of state hillary clinton and foreign minister lavrov have been heading a bilateral commission that has been working intensively on a whole range of issues. president medvedev and myself identified a series of key areas on the economic front, a trade relations, essentials for joint cooperation on various industries, how we can work on innovation and sparking economic growth. we already worked it gathered -- together closely on the g-20. i think we can build on that bilaterally. there are issues of counterterrorism that are absolutely critical to both of us and i just want to repeat how horrified all america was at the recent attacks in moscow.

we recognize that that is a problem that can happen anywhere at any time and it is important for russia and the united states to work closely on those issues. and there is the people to people context, figuring out how we can make sure there is more interaction and exchange between our two countries on a whole range of issues within civil society. so i am optimistic we can come to new to make progress -- but we need to -- it speaks to not only security of the nation but security of the world. >> [speaking in russian of] >> [interpreter] yes, we have 9%

of the stockpiles which is from the cold war legacy. we will do what we can to be taken in mind the special issue of the united states and russia on the issue. we do care about what is going on with nuclear arms and other countries of the world and we can't imagine a situation between the russian federation and the united states, taking efforts to disarm and the world will move toward a different -- printable different direction. we are in charge of our peoples and the -- so all the issues related to the implementation of the treaty and nonproliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism stood be in a complex and integrated way. i would like the signing not to be regarded by other countries

as stepping aside from the issue. on the contrary, they should be involved to the fall and take an active participation in it. they should be aware of what is going on. so, we would welcome the initiative that has been proposed by the president of the united states to convene a relevant conference in washington and i will take part, which should be a good platform to discuss nonproliferation issues. as far as the linkages in nuclear arms that are concerned. in this world we have a lot that brings us together. and today we have had a very good talk that has started not with a discussion of the documents -- they were coordinated -- and not without discussing iran, north korea,

middle east, and not other press shrink -- pressing issues of foreign affairs but we started with economic issues. with economic issues. i said there is a gap in our @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ @ fi.

to say nothing about the projects we talked about, high- tech economy establishment and russian federation. we are open to cooperation and we would love to use american experience -- issues of energy, cooperation in transport, and i suggest that some time ago returning to issue of creating a big cargo plane as such a unique experience. only two -- u.s. and russia. issues of nuclear cooperation are important. there can be a lot of economic projects. it is not the business of presidents to deal with each of them but some key issues are to become told -- controlled by us. relations between business,

between those depend on business ties. people to people context are important. it is significant that we do our best so our citizens respect each other, understand each other better, so they are guided by best practices of american- russian culture and not perceived each other through the lens of information that sometimes is provided by mass media. so we should more attentively, more forcefully in -- have more -- and i count on this. >> thank you, president

medvedev and president obama. for president obama first. could you an elaborate on how the year-long negotiations over the new start treaty had advanced u.s. cooperation with russia on iran and give us a sense of when you will pursue or move forward in the united nations or next week with sanctions discussions and what those sanctions might look like? for president medvedev, could you address whether russia could accept sanctions against iran, specifically dealing with its energy industry and energy sector? thank you. >> discussions about sanctions on iran have been moving forward over the last several weeks. in fact, they have been moving forward over the last several months. we are going to start seeing some ramp up negotiations taking place in new york in the coming

weeks. and my expectation is that we are going to be able to secure strong, tough stank -- sanctions on iran this spring. now, i think there are two ways in which the start negotiations have advanced or at least influenced russia-u.s. discussions around iran. the first is obviously president medvedev and i have an able to build up a level of trust and our teams have been able to work together in such a way that we can be frank, we can be clear, and that helped to facilitate than our ability, for example, to work together jointly to present to iran reasonable options that would allow it to

to clearly distanced itself from nuclear-weapons and the pursue a path of peaceful nuclear energy. that wasn't just an approach that was taken by the united states and russia, but an approach taken by the p5 plus 1 and the international atomic energy agency. iata. -- iaea. what we have seen from the start is a host of country is -- countries, led by united states and russia, have centered around, we are willing to work through diplomatic channels to resolve this issue. unfortunately iran consistently rebuffed our approach.

i think russia has been a very strong partner in saying that it has no interest bringing down iranian society or the iranian government but it does have an interest, as we all do, making sure each country is following its international obligations. the second way in which i think the start treaty has and will start discussions around iran is it sent a strong signal that the united states and iran -- the united states and russia are following our obligations and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. and our interest in iran or north korea or any other country following the mptnpt, is not signalling out one country but sends a strong signal that

all of us have an obligation -- each country has an obligation to follow the rules of the road internationally to ensure a more secure future for our children and our grandchildren. so, i think the fact that we are signing this treaty, the fact that we are willing as the two leading nuclear powers to continuing the work of reducing our own arsenals indicates the fact we are willing to be bound by our obligations and we are not asking other countries to do anything different, but simply to follow the rules of the road that have been set forth and have helped to maintain at least a lack of the use of nuclear weapons over the last several decades, despite obviously the cold war.

and the concern i have particular, and the concern that i think is the most profound security threat to the united states, is that with the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, with the state's obtaining nuclear weapons and potentially using them to blackmail other countries or potentially not securing them effectively or passing them onto terrorist organizations, that we could find ourselves in a world in which not only state actors but also potentially non-state actors are in possession of nuclear weapons. and even if they don't use them, would then be in a position to terrorize of the world community. that is why this issue is so important and that is why we will be pushing very hard to make sure that both smart and strong sanctions end up being in

place soon to send a signal to iran and other countries that this is an issue that the international community takes seriously. >> [speaking in russian] >> [interpreter] let us ask ourselves the question. what do we need sanctions for? do we need them to enjoy the act of imposing reprisals or is the object of another one? i'm confident all those present here will say we need sanctions and ordered to prompt one or another individual or state to behave properly, behaved within the framework of international law while complying with the obligations. therefore when we are speaking about sanctions, i cannot

disagree with what has just been said. and this has been the position of the russian federation from the very outset. although they are not always successful, those sanctions should be smart sanctions capable of producing proper behavior on the part of the relevant sides. what sort of sanctions? today we had a very open-minded, frank, and straightforward manner discussing what can be done and what cannot be done. let me put it straight forward. i have outlined our limits for such sanctions, our understanding of these sanctions, and i said in making decisions like that, i, as president of the russian federation, will proceed from two premises. first, we need to behave

properly. secondly, but not least, is to maintain the national interest of our countries. so, smart sanctions should be able to motivate certain parties to behave properly. and i'm confident that our teams that will be engaged in consultations will continue discussing this issue. >> [interpreter] vladimir -- now everyone is concerned whether it will be ratified by the parliament. you mentioned everyone will be working to achieve such ratification. what difficulty do you see and how dss chances for success? the question is addressed to both presidents. >> [interpreter] well, and all

appearances, -- believes we might have more problems with the ratification. perhaps it is true. let me say what i think about this question. of course, such agreements of major importance, international under our constitution and our legislation are subject to ratification by our parliament. and of course for our part we intend to proceed promptly and to do all the necessary procedures to ensure that our parliament, our state duma starts discussing this treaty. i will proceed from the following -- i believe that we have to ensure the synchronization of the ratification process so that neither party feels in one way or another compromise.

-earlier one state would ratify but another party would say sorry, the situation is changed. this is something we have to avoid. that is why i say we have to proceed simultaneously in the conditions of an open-minded and faithful discussion with subsequent ratification by our parliaments. that is what we need. and we will not be found amiss in that regard. >> the united states senate has the obligation of reviewing any treaty and ultimately ratifying it. fortunately there is a strong history of bipartisanship when it comes to the evaluation of international treaties, particularly arms control treaties. and so i have already engaged in consultations with the chairman of the relevant committees in

the united states senate. we are going to broaden that consultation now that this treaty has been signed. my understanding that both in russia and the united states, it will be posted on the internet, appropriate to a 21st century treaty. so people not only within government but also the general public will be able to rebuild it and open and transparent fashion what it is we agreed to -- review in an open and transparent fashion. they will discover this is a well crafted treaty that meet the interest of both countries. that meets the interests of the world. and the united states and russia, reducing its nuclear arsenals and setting the stage for potentially further reductions in the future. so i'm actually quite confident that democrats and republicans in the united states senate, having reviewed this, will see

that the united states has preserved its core national security interests, that it is maintaining a safe and secure and effect of nuclear deterrence, but that we are beginning to once again move forward, leaving the cold war behind, to address the new challenges in new ways. and i think the start treaty represents an important for step in that direction. and i feel confident that we are going to be able to get it ratified. all right, thank you very much, everybody. >> [interpreter] thank you, see you next time. [applause] ,,,,

.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] we have the capability to counter that. bullistic missile. it primarily rests in our newly developed destroyer which has over $14 billion of research and development invested in it. it is stealthy. it can handle. it has the growth potential.

the cooling capability. all of the power necessary to support future weapon systems, lasers, guns, x and f-band ray dars. wisdom. we're billing three. with no anti-bullistic missile capability. instead, what we decided to do, and this is critically important with the new troll navy has been tasked with in our anti-bullistic missile capability, what we have done, we have invested in a restart program to build 30-year-old guided missile destroyers which have no growth potential and only the basic anti-bullistic missile capability. this is a serious situation. and by the way, there is no cost oversight or capability

oversight on this program. everything is a shell game. much of the cost of this new -- which is something on the order of $3 billion sand 14 months behind schedule now, is being covered under government-furnished equipment. the anti-bullistic missile, the bullistic missile agency is funding all the software for these upgrades. i'm not sure any of this will raise the level of comfort with our allies. this is a program sfrernl the standpoint of an even -- certainly from the standpoint of an anti-bullistic missile that needs to be changed. much has been made about -- let me just say we have a very reliable command and control system. it is secure. the procedures are precise. they have been tested and tested

and proven to be reliable. i have total confidence that it will be so in the future. let me conclude by saying there is no dr. strangelove out there in the fleet. with that, frank, i'll turn it back to you. >> thank you, admiral, very much. let me just add one point to the observation that the admiral made about the implications for a stark treaty missile defense. i think this needs to be said very directly. the russians have put us on notice as recently as this morning's press conference that they will regard any qualitative or quantitative change to america's missile defense capabilities as a basis for departing from this treaty. i'm not even sure he qualified it as strategic. i think he said missile defense,

medvedev, today. we have in short, now -- we are in short, now, under, i hope, no illusion, that at will, the russians could simply say they are no longer conforming to this treaty and as several of us have pointed out, with their missiles, with their hot production lines for both missiles and nuclear weapons, if they have the funding, and that is a big if, but if they have the funding or the will, they could conceivably build substantially more nuclear weapons than they are permitted to have under this treaty and we might find ourselves in the position where we have neither missile defense that we need nor the deterrent capabilities that are appropriate. so with that, let's open it up. thank you for major patience. hearing some long and very

thoughtful and important interventions from our panel. when you address us, would you please identify yourselves and the organization, which pays you, if any and also if you have somebody you would like to answer your question, direct it to them, please. i want to say that right before they signed the treaty statement, the treaty between russian federation and the united states on the reduction and limitation of offensive and strategic arms can only operate and be viable only if the united states refrain from developing its missile defense capabilityings quantitatively or

qualitatively. consequently it goes on a little bit more. it is on the kremlin's website so you're exactly right. they have issued an unqualified statement saying that. >> and then president of russia said it in the press conference as well. this wasn't a somewhat authorized statement put up by someone else. >> and it is not surprising. i wanted to ask you, ms. desutter, will it identify the 15150 warhead number and also, peter, i wanted to ask, will it be necessary to reduce the itbm silo numbers? there are a number of senators that have written they would not like that to happen and also to ms. desutter again.

>> it is a -- question. be brief. >> on "newsweek" it said the administration is still working on nuclear targeting directive. do you have any inklings on this and what they may be. thank you very much, everyone on the panel. >> the second question is pretty easy. i have no idea how this will influence the nuclear targeting. as to whether or not there will be direct verification of the 1550 warhead number, my understanding is there will be some understanding -- inspection as there was under the start treaty. the russians repeatedly violated those obligations. we'll have to see how -- rbusi. we love acronyms. how effective that is.

also you're not going to go to every single missile and do an rbosi and count how many warheads are deployed. it is certainly going to be a sampling approach. to what degree will that approach give you confidence. at this point, i have to mention, apparently, and i don't fully understand this, but apparently, there is an agreement count, every strategic nuclear bomber has one warhead. now, i also note that the n.p.r. refers to the u.s. keeping a triad including nuclear capable strategic bombers and we also know that prime minister putin has called for the development of new strategic bombers for russia. so how that will count, i just

don't know. >> peter? >> your question about icbm's is critical to the whole question of stability and the deunder the. on my grave they are going to put icbm because i've been building them since 1981. to get from the 830 or 840 we got now down to 700 you could eliminate randomly bullistic missiles in the three-minute man fields that are old. the silos with the most trouble and reduce your maintenance costs. i wouldn't do that. this is the one part of the start treaty i have a real problem with. the russians are going to go down to 500 platforms anyway.

that gets dicey because the submarines you could count, not count two of the submarines in overhaul. that is 48 missiles. that will be part of the start treaty. that can get you down to within 50 or where you to be. but my question is none of this is necessary if warheads are the things that go boom and deployed warheads are the things that provide stability and instability, the warhead levels are the key. i can keep all 50 minute men. they are all going to be demurfed. it will take three years to do all 350 missiles. there is no big breakout capability there. it is the one part of the treaty that i have real problems with that 700 number.

the warhead number i don't have a problem with it. it is that 700 number. that is the saving grace may be that we don't have to implement this until the end of the treaty technically and by that time, we will have a plan hopefully to replace minute men. probably with another service, life extension because this one only goes to 2020 or 2030 and without that, no president of the united states has to make a quick decision in a crisis. that's why they are so valuable. remember during the cold war we thought they were terrible and we were worried about russia using 1,000 missiles. if everything is murfed, we have a point. russia, because of money issues have highly merved-land-based missiles. as paula mentioned, there is a

describe an imbalance in that forestructure. >> i know peter has got to go. if anybody has a quick question for him, i would invite you to -- if not -- we'll just take whatever questions we can and thank you, peter, for joining us and for your contribution. i'm sorry. do you have a question for peter? ok. fred from the institute for defense analysis. several of you mentioned that the russians were going down whatever level they nerkted in the treaty anyway for -- negotiated in treaty anyway for economic reasons and in essence they wanted to bring our level down to their level. several of you also mentioned there is a tremendous imbalance intact cal nuclear weapons. we have a few hundred. they have several thousand. does anybody have a clue why the legislation took the one piece of leverage that we had off the

table in the treaty that didn't benefit us and they were going to anyway? >> let me go back to the bush administration. i remember when we raised this issue. i remember people such as j.d. crouch and others said to me we have to forget it. the russians simply would not budge. you can drop an vill on them and they won't -- an anvil on them and they won't budge. we determined that gorbachev didn't follow through. he may have told his guys to follow through but they didn't. who knows the extent to which they reduced their tactical nukes at the end of the cold war. i see your point as that was the one piece of leverage we had big time. we didn't use it. i think they wanted an agreement to get the ball rolling on this and the fiscal material cut off

and but -- it is clearly the case in my view, that anyone who tells you they are going to get the stuff that they couldn't get in this treaty or maybe didn't even try to get in this treaty, the stuff that, as peter said, the russians have insistantly refused to negotiate away. some of which, by the way, we have reason to believe is sitting off the coast of the united states right now pointing at this city among others perhaps. warheads of the size of higher oshe ma warhead that are -- hiroshima warhead were not counted. i don't think this is a sound basis for national security policymaking. peter, i know you have to go. thank you so much for joining us. >> thank you for having me. >> good to have you with us.

the question was to this young lady. yes, ma'am. >> the mic. i got to put the mic up. while there may be one sitting off our coast, we also happen to have one of our own -- so -- in shalla as they say. >> i would like to ask if you could comment on notion of strategic -- in new n.p.r. in china because chinese have never officially had policy of mutual balance so does it have some further implications? thank you very much. >> repeat that for me. >> the question, as i heard it

was what do you think is the sense of the strategic concept, i guess, of the chinese in the n.p.r., the nuclear posture review, what is it that we are imputing to them in terms of their theories and the deterrence and the like? >> i think it had to be recognized of -- in expanding capabilities and the modernizeation of their forces. this is while the numbers are not great now, i don't see any -- restraint being imposed on where they are going with their various programs. and to the point, you know, as frank mentioned, when i have a specific fleet, i had 200 ships,

seven carriers. 58 submarines, many of which were ssbn's and when you look at that today, where they maybe have where we may have in the entire navy a number that frank just gave me, 213 somewhere downstream what china is doing cannot be ignored. i mean, it skews the whole equation. it is the same way in the development of the conventional capabilities. they are anti-ship bullistic missiles which can be easily converted. the fact that it is design, all of these programs that they have are designed to go against u.s. forces. what is their objective? certainly they want total control and dominance out to the first island in chain and the

second island in chain which includes gaum, by the way. -- guam, by the way. they have a very aggressive military sales program. they provided iran with a number of capabilities, not the least of which is the super sonic cruise missile, which they acquired from russia, which is specifically targeted to go against our cruisers. >> could i just add to this -- it seems to anyway the chinese view of the world is not uppermost in the minds to have obama administration. -- of the obama administration. it is one of the great ironies of this whole exercise. you keep hearing the president reviling may be too strong a word but not too much. the old cold war mind-set of

those bush administration people and how they are getting beyond that at the very moment that the administration is ranked back into the old cold war mind-set. this treaty is a throwback to the bipolar world and the constructs of arms control. that -- at the time, seemed to at least, at least in this country to be the way to modulate russian behavior. china is an inconvenient fact and the idea that china is engaged in the kinds of military programs directly aimed at us point one and point two, that the taking an unbelievablely holistic approach to warfare. in fact, i would commend to you, a book entitled "unrestricted warfare" published in 1999 by

the people's liberation army. it described at great electronic, numerous ways you can destroy the united states. from financial attacks on our economy to terrorism, to biological warfare to of course nuclear and we shouldn't forget, though we of course, are, that the chinese have actually threatened nuclear attacks against this country, specifically an attack on los angeles, if we behaved in a way they didn't like. so when we think about the president's fixation, and i don't think that is overstating it. his fixation with the pursuit of a nuclear weapons-free world through the prism of reducing u.s. and soviet, u.s. and russia

now arms and leaves essentially out of the equation the chinese nuclear program, he is inviting the chinese to build up to whatever levels we can persuade the russians the circumstances demand they go down to. i believe that is not going to make for a more secure world. did you have something? >> just to build a little bit on what frank said. parity, which is talked about in the n.p.r. says we don't need to have exact parity with russia. i think that's right, on the other hand parity is a cold war concept and it was developed and discussed primarily in an era when wr the only significant nuclear stockpiles were russian and soviet and american.

we are now in a situation that is very, very different. the question that the n.p.r. addresses, do we need exact parity with russia is the wrong question. the question is does the united states need parity and i would assert superiority to all of the other countries who impose particularly a nuclear threat but other threats as well to the safety of the united states and our allies. that's the question. and that means that you can just look at wasia and china. you have to look and iran and syria and north korea and you have got to be ready for all of those and you have got to address it not only with offensive capabilities but defensive as well. so i think that the stability question is -- it is probably -- maybe it is too soon to say that it has been made more dangerous but i think it is not too soon to say that they are asking the wrong questions and therefore

one has to wonder if they are going to get the right answers. >> let me pose a question myself to admiral monroe because one of the things -- and you sort of touched on it earlier but i think it requires a little bit more development. one of the things that is absolutely explicit in the n.p.r., is that we can live for the foreseeable future, at least as long as this president is going to be alive, with the nuclear weapons we have. and they have laid out some sort of exotic explanation of the ways in which they are going to try to maintain that. replacement and refurbishment and reuse. but you were in the business of ensuring that nuclear weapons

worked. and i would just ask you from a professional expert point of view to assess the probability of success of being able to have the security of the american people, which the president, himself, at least as i hear it, now says will require us to maintain a credible, febletive, safe, reliable -- effective, safe, reliable nuclear deterrent for the future without any modernizeation and testing. what are the chances? >> zero. >> seriously. >> our nuclear weapons stockpile today is safe, secure, reliable, but not at all effective. it is meaningless in -- terms of today's threats. these are high-yield weapons. they were designed to either

initially to destroy cities and when we -- as the cold war -- we changed it to a counterforce of threats so they destroyed silos, magazines, missile areas. air bases. that kind of thing. submarines. today, the threat is not -- well, the dominant threat, which we have all been talking about it, is not the launch of thousands of missiles at the -- and warheads of the u.s. it is that rogue state, two in particular, iran and north korea, will develop a nuclear weapons production capability and eventually they will get the weaponizeation right and

eventually they will have some kind of effective weapon although it will be primitive compared to ours, but they will work and kill millions and they will then go into production with these. and in the case of north korea, if they have a anything like they do at the present, they will sell them to anyone wishing to buy them. i don't mean any state wishing to buy them. any individual wishing to buy them. if it is iran, they would most probably be willing to give them to hezbollah or hamas or al qaeda for use. now, so -- i talked about deterrents in my talk. people seem to think that our

having a 400 kiloton warhead that will set for surface burst, this will somehow deter the iranians from continuing their program. what could we threaten them with? that we'll launch that and detonate it in the middle of tehran killing millions of people and mostly women and children? does anybody believe we would do that? but if we had highly accurate, low-yield, reduced residual radiation, earth-penetrating weapons, when they have a nuclear facility underground in a mountain or something like that and we threaten them with destruction and the first strike, let's say, was conventional, and did not

totally destroy the facility and so they say hah, you missed. we would certainly want to say, i'll bet we don't miss next time. and that low yield, highly accurate earth-penetrating, reduced residual weapon would be a real threat. we would never have to use it. they would comply with our wishes. so what this treaty, for example, one place, it says -- i don't know it is neither the treaty or some of the -- defense department statements that went with it said we will not develop new weapons. we reject that. period.

oh, it is in the n.p.r. sorry. the so many documents coming. the word effective is such a key word. using systems that have already been produced. refurbishment, which means modifying things slightly or replacement which means replacing them completely. if we used all three strategies, we could probably keep our

current nuclear arsenal, our stockpile alive for five years, maybe 10, but for the long-term future, as frank was saying, there is just no hope. >> let me see if we can take a question, bob. the thing i wanted to get at is can you do all of that without nuclear testing? to ensure that what you have got actually works? even if the weapon is properly designed? >> two aspects. if we go into the reuse, refurbishment, replacement and by the way, the n.p.r. sets replacement aside. you probably have to get an act of god to use replacement, again, for a few years, we can probably count on them. imagine in comblournt, a fire

engine that you were going to depend on to save your home or save your neighbor's home that was never started, never turned the ignition switch, ignition key, never fired up the earn gin, never run the generator, and never did anything and that sat there for five, 10, 15, 20 years. those weapons have been sitting there now for more than 20 years, which was their designed lifetime and in some cases 30 and 40 and they are not inert. think of them as a physics experiment cooking away, changing the nature of the components in ways that nobody has any idea. the only way -- the only way these can be considered reliable is with underground nuclear

testing. the computer simulations aren't going to tell you a thing because we didn't know about that condition, the crack depoxy or the -- the change in thickness of a membrane. we didn't know about those conditions when we were in the testing world so we didn't have any chance to test them. with all of these new weapons, the ones that would give us modern day deterrents, that would deter the real thets today, those have to be tested because we didn't build -- we didn't build weapons for those purposes. we have never done those. there isn't a battery of test data sitting out there in the nevada test site. >> so we've got trouble at the very least. the point i really wanted to emphasize is we are being told that these kinds of

work-arounds, can keep this nuclear enterprise going, essentially indefinitely. and the one thing i just wanted to underscore from what bob has said here, is especially when you're saying to the people that you hope will do that for you, under these exceedingly difficult, technically problematic circumstances, you really don't value what they are doing. in fact, you think it's a kind of loathsome activity. do you really think you're going to have the best and the brightest doing what is arguably the most important work necessary? we're almost -- we're actually past time. i see two more questions here. let me ask you guys to identify yourselves and pose the questions and then we'll answer them and wrap up. yes, ma'am? >> pam benson from cnn.

how important is this strategic triad and what happens to it if there are even further cuts that the administration would like? >> i'll take a cut at that. why do we have a strategic triad? we developed it over many years because each of the legs of the triad, as they are called, the ground-based missile systems peter was talking about and the silos now, the sea-launch bullistic missiles, the submarines that ace used to command and the manned-bombers, each have unique attributes that are both strengths and weaknesses. and the reason that we believed and invested enormous amounts of money over many years to develop and deploy these different

capabilities was a quite sensible concern that you don't want someone with a breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare to essentially take down your deterrent. or by bringing the bear breakthroughs in radar technology to keep your bombers from getting to their targets. >> that is more likely. >> of course from the navy, dupoint is that once we do get -- -- the point is that once we do get, i'm worried at these levels in start. peter said hopefully it will be seven years before we actually do all of this. i don't think so. we have an administration that wants to drive us toward the end of nuclear weapons. even before they got here, the previous administration got to the point where the strategic arms treaty that paul was

involved with, the moscow treaty call for, early. i think that is going to be what's expected here too, if not on the russian side, our side. but the point i'm making here is for sure, if you go to another level of reductions, which it remains to be seen whether the russians would agree. whether you just have to do it yourself because your forces are obsolete, you will not have a triad and then you will be exposing your forces and your country, i think, to the sorts of risks we decided that we did tot want to entertain. >> increasing destabilization. you're not enhancing anything. it is that simple. >> you may be enhancing the prospects for war. yes, sir? eric with german television. i would like to look into the future with you a little bit. next week, the summits are

coming up. what kind of message do you think obama administration is going to send to the world and what kind of message would you rather they send? >> any concluding thoughts on this? >> the question is would the meeting next week to have 47 heads of states would agree if the administration has its way on locking down nuclear materials within the next four years, what do we expect? what would we like to see? any thoughts on that? paul? >> well, we know what message they are going to send. the message they are going to try to send is look, the united states is disarming. we have this agreement with the russians and so therefore, maybe others could join us in having

decent sanctions against iran, etc. what message do i wish they were sending? i think that even countries that have criticized the united states because of our nuclear weapons and our reliance on nuclear deterrents also do enjoy the u.s. nuclear umbrella. and so oftentimes there were public the sames about wanting the united states to disarm, but when pushed and shoved, the reality is other nations want to be able to rely on the u.s. nuclear umbrella. and i think that as our numbers go down, there is a very real risk that we will be providing increased incentives for other countries that may have wanted a very small number of nuclear weapons for their power deterrents, may now start to see it as we can become real, pure

competitors in a nuclear sense of the united states. as that happens, as missile defenses are constrained because of fears of a veto by the russians, our missile defense umbrella will be reduced beyond where it is now. and i think that that makes things riskier and the collective security approaches that the united states has advocated for so long, including a viable nonproliferation treaty. including missile defenses and the urging of other nations not to pursue their own nuclear weapons capability because they were covered by ours, i think all of that is at risk. but there will be a lot of celebrations and a lot of press releases and a lot of, you know, isn't it nice now that the world is going to be kind to one another? >> i want to conclude by just

saying, you have heard some scenarios here today that are truly provocative, controversial, and perhaps, to some people's ways of thinking, outlandish. whether we all agree with some of the scenarios or whether those are necessarily where we're going to wind up, for example, i don't know that there are many countries other than the chinese, who are quite serious about being pure competitors if not superior to the united states in nuclear and other means. but the point is this, really. we're talking about what used to be called thinking about the unthinkable. as a nation, we have, for at least a generation now, mostly

decided we don't need to do that. or we can entrust to a few of us the responsibility for doing it and the rest of us can simply ignore these sorts of issues. and more to the point, can ignore the fact that there are people elsewhere, whether it is in the kremlin or whether it is in beijing or whether it is in tehran or whether it is in -- i don't know, venezuela. that are thinking the unthinkable in ways that will be very detrimental to our wellbeing and that of others and so what we're encouraging here, i hope, is a conversation with the american people about these most important issues to -- to

engage them in a way that will end hopefully this sort of illusion that it's either of no interest or somebody else's business to think about what it takes to protect this country. in a world that is going to have more nuclear weapons in it, notwithstanding the president's vision. that is going to have more bullistic missiles with which to deliver those and probably cruise missiles and perhaps other platforms. and most of those weapons in the future will probably be in countries -- in the hands of countries that are hostile to us. unless, as paula's question or answer suggests we're going the find ourselves with a lot of countries that in the past we used to think of as allies who have decided they have to look to their own security and get their own defenses and may as a

result acquire nuclear weapons and be less friendly. this is really my closing thought to you. most of what we have talked about here today is important in its own right but it is particularly worrying in the larger context of the doctrine that i think is emerging as that of the obama administration. i characterize it as a three-part phenomenon. undermine our allies. embolden our enemies. and diminish our country. and in that environment, what you're going to have is a lot more enemies and a lot fewer allies and the per stheapings this is a country that can -- perception that this is a country that can be -- if not attacked with impunity, certainly disr regarded in

pursuit of aggressive ambitions. that is not the kind of world i think any of us want to live in. i encourage you to take this message and disseminate it and help us have the kind of debate we must have at long last where we are going with respect to our nuclear weapons policy and our national security policy generally. with that, thank you very much for coming. take care. [applause] >> one point, peter, at the end of his remarks made a comment about how he thought sanctions would work against iran. he knows my view. i think sanctions are a cop out and if you're going to get a handle on the iranian nuclear threat, we're going to have to do a military strike. >> thank you.

[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> on this morning's "washington journal," a look at the u.s. economy with paula dwyer or "businessweek" and we'll discuss the coal miners accident with gregory wagner and gary stangler, executive director of the jim casey youth initiative. "washington journal" is live beginning at 7:00 a.m. eastern time on c-span. >> this weekend on c-span 2's book tv. on afterwards, n.p.r. foreign

correspondent deborah amos on what's happening to the sunnis following the fall of saddam hussein. her book is field notes on democracy and ralph peters looks at u.s. foreign policy in his latest collection of articles "endless war." follow the schedule on booktv.org and follow us on twitter. >> more on the russia nukes agreement with the group global zero. we'll hear from richard burt. other speakers include former c.i.a. agent valerie blame. -- pmp lame. this is about an hour.

>> we're going to start right now. i'll make a formal statement, which is i really like the individual who is responsible for arranging the seating on this panel. it is really well-positioned. i won't say any more than that. i would like to introduce our large panel this morning. i'm going to begin on my extreme right where we have mr. rick patel. the co-founder and executive director of abaz.org and he is working closely with our global zero initiative to focus on international political

activities. next to ricken is mr. lawrence fender. well known figure at least but certainly not only in hollywood. he is a co-founder of global zero. co-founder of a band of heart productions. a well-known producer of many well-known movies but right now we're focusing on the film "countdown to zero" which we showed to an audience last night here in washington, d.c. in fact, i see that david corn, who is with us this morning, attended that screening. next to lawrence is mr. jeff skoal. he is the founder and chairman of participant media. they were deeply involved in the production of "countdown to zero" but he is of course, very

successful entrepreneur and supporter of important social activities and movements beyond global zero. we have one of our key leaders of global zero directly to my right, her majesty, queen noor who'll be speaking on our grassroots activities and our goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide. i'm richard burt prment former u.s. diplomat and chief negotiator for the start one agreement and am the chairman of global zero u.s.a., directly to my left is ms. valerie plame wilson. of course she worked as a career

c.i.a. operations officer and plays a very prominent role in the film account countdown to -- "countdown to zero." to her left is a retired general jack sheehan. he is a former commander in chief in the united states atlantic command and has provided military expertise to the global zero tow initiative and last, but certainly not least is the ref rend richard seisic. i will just make one or two brief remarks to open this up and then turn to the other panelists.

global zero as an initiative is roughly 18 months old. so we got involved in trying to think through the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide prior to the inauguration of barack obama. and at that time, i think we played an important catalytic role in beginning to think through the problems of eliminating all nuclear weapons and in a large international meeting in paris over a year ago, we called for a resumption of the u.s.-russian negotiations to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, recognizing that with over 90% to have world's nuclear weapons, it was incumbent on the united states and the russian federation to exercise leadership in this area. we also called in what we called our global zero action plan for

negotiations to reduce russian and american weapons down to 1,000 or so nuclear warheads. we also said that the next step in the process, we needed to create a multilateral negotiation that would bring other nuclear powers suched a india an china into the process. in outlining this goal, we made the argument, a very strong public argument that for the united states and other existing nuclear powers that nuclear weapons were losing their political and military utility. that the danger of nuclear weapons was no longer the classical cold war paradigm of a u.s.-russian nuclear conflict. that the danger of nuclear weapons in the 21st century is the spread of nuclear weapons. not the strong states. not the great powers, but to weaker states, more fragile

states. to rogue states. and most disturbly to substate actors like terrorist groups. the reason i'm outlining these views is that we think we have really served over the last 18 months as a thought leader in this process because as we look at the remarks and statement s that arecontained in the president's recent nuclear posture, where the obama administration placed the issue of nonproliferation and nuclear terrorism as a key goal of american nuclear strategy looking forward, we are very pleased that we have, in our view, been leaders in leading this country and other countries in re-evaluating the role and place of nuclear weapons. as we look at the new start treaty, which was of course just signed this morning by president medvedev and president obama in

prague, i have to say i was delighted to see that the president not only focused on the important steps that are contained in this treaty, but also focused, together with president medvedev on a need for a follow-up negotiation to further reduce those weapons and continuing to endorse the long-term goal of nuclear elimination. and i was also delighted to see that he and his advisers have embraced the idea that the role of nuclear weapons is changing and that the danger of a nuclear weapons today is not of a major nuclear conflict, but the spread of nuclear weapons, that the risk of nuclear terrorism and the need to lock down nuclear terms worldwide which of course will be the central theme of the nuclear security summit here in washington next week.

so i will conclude by saying we will continue to act as a thought leader in this area and in the policy realm we're going to work in the coming year on plans for bringing china, india, pakistan, the european nuclear powers, britain and france and israel into the arms control process. this is a very important -- but while we focus on thought leadership, we also need to focus on political leadership and that means really working hard to develop political support for the global zero concept. political support in the near term for the new start treaty to make sure it is ratified but beyond the new start treaty, political support for a longer term process of creating a world without nuclear weapons. so with that political and focus on political organization and grassroots organization, i want to turn now to her majesty,

queen noor. >> thank you, rick, for a wonderful summary of the key points that we're trying to emphasize. i look at the historic steps toward zero the last year from the perspective, several perspective it is of my u.s.-based cold war childhood in the terrifying shadow of the mad policy, mutual destruction and the past 35 years of my work and my life in the developing world and as a muslim and as a mother, the progress that we have seen over the past year, president obama and medvedev in particular have -- it is very encouraging, but we still have so far to go. as a muslim, i share the moral and spiritual concerns about the

genocidal role of nuclear weapons, first expressed by the scientist who created them and who witnessed their destructive impact. the koran declares killing an innocent person is at the amount to killing all of mankind. for me as a global citizen, that is come pounded by the growing threat of proliferation and nuclear terrorism today increasing the odds of what president kennedy called the risks of accidents, miscalculation and madness and the potential for continuing and expanding irrational arms races in regions like the middle east. especially now when increasingly populations, por loplations in these -- poor populations in

these regions are facing consequences of global warming and severe economic downturn. we are at a nuclear tipping point beyond which there may be no turning back and we are witnessing the greatest opportunity in decades to mobilize what international polling has shown is majority support in nuclear and non-nuclear states for zero. if governments don't act now, our governments don't act now to begin to eliminate all nuclear weapons, we will likely witness in our lifetime, the destructive use of nuclear technology by a country or by terrorist groups. and for governments to act, global zero needs to become recognized for what it is, an urgent global imperative. it needs to be recognized by the stitchts of all of our governments -- constituents of all of our governments as that.

for governments to get involved. in post cold war generations, i think are largely unaware of the very real and prez danger posed by these weapons. that is why it is so important as a tool for education educating generations who haven't felt or been subjected to the terrifying implications of what we're talking about here today and that's why our efforts to mobilize people of all ages and of all sectors rs especially young people, in this -- in this movement, is i think of great importance. we're not just comprised of hundreds of political and security and faith and other leaders we include hundreds of thousaof