yet. >> do you know whether bp made that decision? >> because bp are the operators of the well and the permit lder and have the relationship with the mms, it there was a discussion about whether or not there was -- whether or not it was appropriate to proceed, that conversation would have taken place between bp and mms. >> i concur with that view. >> that is his view, but what do you know? >> we haveo knowledge of that discussion, however if the discussion took place, bp would

be the leaseholder. >> what knowledge do you have about the decision being made to remove the mud and replace it with seawater? >> the only inrmation we have is what i told you. >> but it is unusual, is it not? >> >> it was not utilized previously. 'm afraid i cannot tell you -- >> but it was not a normal procedure, yes or no? >> it has been used on multiple occasions in the gulf. >> hasn't been used on less than 10% of procedures? you are under oath. i am askingou a simple question. what percentage of times today removed and the mud before they

finished the plug? is it less than 50%. >> i do not know. >> you do not know? >> know. -- no. the responsibility for that decision lies between the leaseholder -- >> i did not ask you about that. do you know? >> i would not be able to quantify the percentage of wells. >> well, this article indicates that it is unusual. are you aware of any times that this has been done before? . .

>> it's also my understanding that if you are found to be grossly negligent you will automatically be pressed by the law to exceed the $75 million liability cap. if you are not found to be grossly negligent, is bp prepared to pay the full extent of real economic damage, not just to the individual businesses, but to parishes and other government entities that

are expending huge amounts of money to try to contain this incident? >> the intent is to be fair, responsive, and expeditious. as to the $75 million you mentioned, we think will -- we think we will exceed that, obviously and that is irrelevant. we have been clear. we will pay the claims. the entire resources of bp are behind this. >> i am happy we made this step yesterday. there are many small and large businesses affected by this

catastrophe along the gulf coast. the small business administration yesterday has made clear that on an individual basis, the 6000 small business disaster loans that are still pending in the same area from the last disasters we had can be deferred and new loans can be given until these claims can come full circle. >> are you the largest drilling operator in the world? >> we are the largest offshore drilling contractor in the world. >> to your knowledge, is a

blowout of this magnitude in terms of volume spilled in an uncontrolled fashion for this length of time ever happened in the offshore waters in the united states or anywhere else, to your knowledge? >> the only incident that come to my mind is the well in mexico which i believe that the 1970's. >> do you know how deep the well was. >> this bill is in 5,000 feet of water. given that, what are the regulations for these old threat

deep wells that you can comment briefly on that gives our people confidence that this deep drilling can be done safely. obviously, it has but it was not in this case. is there anything you can offer that shows -- do not know this would happen? >> with respect to regulations which have to do with the blowout preventer, the regulations in the u.s. require two control stations on the oil rig and on the deep water horizon there were three. the regulations require that you have three ram presenter and one annuler preventer.

the regulations require there be an independent means of activating bop and in the case of deepwater horizon, the system on that oil rig was fitted with two automatic response systems and an rov interest belgian system. -- intervention system. we certainly complied with regulations. >> thank you, mr. chairman. with bp, there has been a series of horrific accidents over a number of years. again and again, major safety problems, problems that have 8bfresulted in hundreds of mills of dollars of fines being paid by your company, settling criminal charges, and in each

case, as far as i can tell and i look backkf:w at the explosion f the texas refinery, the violations at the toledo refinery, the failure to reach -- maintain the pipeline system on the north slope, the company says the same thing. i want to have your reaction. we have all said that we understand the specific cause for the deepwater horizon disaster is not known but this sure fit, in my view, a pattern a series of safety and environmental patterns at the bp. they always say we are going to toughen up our standards. and then anothern up standards and deal with risks. and then another such accident takes place and we have yet more finger-pointing. my question to you is -- why

hasn't bp been able to change its corporate culture and and this pattern of accidents? >> in 2005 and 2006, you mentioned some incidents that were serious, extremely serious. i believe that we are changing this company. it is being changed to its core. our ceo's in 2007 took over the reins with the single mantra of safety and operations. we are changing this country. we've put in management systems that are covering the world in a consistent and rigorous way. >> tell us what management systems you put in and that would have taken all possible precautions in this kind of problem? it seems to me -- i'm hearing about reports of various things that others in the industry are doing, various types of computer models and the like that they

test. what specifically have you done to put in place changes that reduce the likihood of these times of accidents, that bp has a history of being involved in? >> i believe our operation and management system is agood as anyone. i cannot point to any deficiencies to point out to you. the investigation will be important in terms of something mess. i know of nothing that points me in that direction such as deficiencies in the operating system. >> and with respect to the changes that you put it into thousands the -- 2007, and i am looking at the comments from tony hayward, operations failed to meet our own standards. improved risk-management -- these are just quotes. you're telling me that you know of no deficiencies but i am still not clear what changeshe

company has made sense those comments from tony hayward. we know for a fact -- what is on the record? we cannot pinpoint the cause of this disaster. everyone stipulates that. we know that there has been a pattern of problems at bp, and i am trying to get you to tell me what changes -- concrete changes have been implemented since tony hayward made that statement in 2007. >> several -- we have board level safety and normal and ethics audit that is very active. we have group organizational risk committees that have been installed by tony hayward at the very top. we had an operational management system that has been standardized and is being put in place in every single location in the world. i believe it is very rigorous and very complete. i will let knowledge that we have had issues and we have got to change some of the areas of

the company. >> what has to change in the company? you say you have to make changes at the company pared that is what i want to hear about. >> the operation and management systems we are installing everywhere in the world that are consistent and rigorous to a higher extent than they have been in some areas of the world. in the gulf of mexico -- in the gulf of mexico, we've been extremely safe. we have a tremendous track record of compliance. what i am telling you is that i am not aware of or seen deficiencies in the gulf of mexico system. >> and i am still not clear what changes have been made after tony heyward said that there were going to be changesade. >> it gets down to the culture of the company. >> insured does and the culture of this company has been one accident after another. >> we're not finished and we will never be fished. >> i will hold the record open at this point. i would like to see an itemized

list of what actually has been change when tony heyward said that there were going to be changes. he told me there are no deficiencies. i am not clear about the changes. >> center mendes. -- senator menendez. >> we are sitting in the room where the hearings were held in the sinking of the titanic. that ship was so technologically advanced that it could not sink. unfortunately despite these claims, but technological marvels ended in tragedy. when i looked at this tragedy, is not only the course of the loss of those lives which will amend and the enormous damage bein done to the gulf region, but i looked at the peace

response here. -- a vp's response here. bp certified that it had "capability to respond to a worst case discharge resulting from the activities proposed in our exploration plan." what i see as a company not prepared to address the worse case scenario. a company that is flailing around trying whatever they thk of next to try to deal with the worst case scenario that you all had the ability to do. you seem to be jumping from action to actn, which we all hope and pray can work. that does not give me the sense of a plan that was ready to be implemented in the way -- in the worst-case scenario. is that not a fair conclusion? >> let me explain what we're

doing. we have multiple parallel efforts at every level of this column -- crisis. we're working on the blowout preventers. we have eight remote operated submarines around the blow out the better trying to get it to command. we're dealing with a unique and specific situation. we have aggressive spill response as part of the national contingency plan for the gulf and the bp response plan which i think works well. 're fighting aggressively offshore. we are skimming and protecting the shoreline with bones. we're prepared to clean up and deal with anything that gets to the shore. we're prepared to deal with the econom impact. >> i appreciate your let me of what you are attempting to do. once is more credible than the other.

there was first that don't that you tried to lower over the spill. -- the dome that you tried to lower over this bill. and then there is going to be good job shot, or tires and golf balls would be shot down the blowout preventer to claude the lead. i do not get the sense that you are truly prepared for what the certification you made

>> all of those people armed will have to file. is that what you intend to do? >> we made it clear we will deal with the people and communities affected directly. we have made that clear. >> the lease by bp at the border horizon received a categorical exclusion from the process last year. why would this not require the mandate under the environmental legislation? how can such an inherently dangerous activity not go through the environmental review of that process? >> the exclusion you are referring to is essentially when the lease sale is done, there is an environmental impact with the lease sale. then there are assessment done

within that lease sale. the order -- those are utilized as the assessment for wells drilled in those areas. that is a common industry practice. >> were employees given an opportunity to consult with their doctors or lawyers before signing these waivers? i want to include this in the record. >> include that in the record. >> if so, why was there a rush?

>> if i could put that question into context -- immediately after the disaster happened on the oil rig, we mobilized the team of trans ocean people to louisiana to begin preparation for the arrival on short of those crewmembers. that preparation included providing them with clothing because many of them were awakened from their beds when the explosion happened. it included providing them food and water. it included providing them with medical care because they had left the oil rig under such extreme circumstances. many of them did not have identification so it included consultation with the tsa to make sure that when the crew members were put on planes to reunite with their families, they would have no identification issues at the

airport. they would have no identification issues with the tsa at the airport. it included a preliminary gathering of facts and the statement you are referring to is an exercise in our attempt to facilitate that. we ask our workers if they had any information related to the cause of the event, and we ask our workers if they were injured. i do not think it is appropriate to characterize the statements as waivers. >>e will leave that jgment as the investigation unfolds. it has certainly left a sour taste in many people's mouths. the questi was of deepwater horizon, whether it was to support the workers or deepwater horizon from potential liability. i know that each of you are conducting your own investigations. i am curious whether the results

and the analysis as well as a testimony you generate in your company, will that be available to the federal government and the congress? mr. mckay a start with you. >> yes, it will. >> i think that this has such an impact on our business and our industry that it behooves us to share everything we can with respect to understanding exactly what happened, so that we can prevent it from ever happening again. >> similarly, i would add that we will share in the affirmation and hopefully use it as a basis for insuring that the industry is safe and the environment is sound. we look for to that in the future. >> if i might with the final question directed to all three, i had the great honor to chair the subcommittee in the house of space aeronautics, so i am familiar with working in the extreme difficult conditions like nasa were sen.

nasa has had its share of disasters and experiences emphasizing that accidents, about u and barbara heat -- few and far between, does not make them any less tragic. it seems unfathomable to me that we did not have any technological improvements in spill container technology since the exxon valdez more than 20 years ago. we seem to be using 20th-century technology to respond to what has happened. again i welcome your comments from all three of you. >> i think the improvements are in deployment and usage of some of the technology, as well a what we were talking about earlier one new potential technology that can be effective and used a lot less dispersal for the impact. i think there is quite a bit of new technology being used.

>> under the provisions of the international maritime organization, which we are obligated to comply with because we operate marine assets, every one of our rigs is required to have a pollution plan which deals with the chemicals and materials that we use on rig, such as diesel for our injuns, cleaning products, and things like that. we work very closely with the providers of these materials to ensure that our shipboard pollution plans are as robust and comprehensive as possible to deal with materials we have on our rigs. >> mr. provost? >> our primary focus has bn intervention that may be challenged as a result of some kind of control issue. that is where most of our technological efforts are focused on three >> i know senato shaheen asked a similar

question and her understanding and mine was that no one has done any research to address deep water spills. i think that is something that stands out as something that needs to be pursued in the short term and immediately. >> senator campbell. >> i want the follow up on -- my colleague senator andlandrieu's question. i understand you stated you would pay all viable claims. what are viable claims? are you talking about all legal standard if you were found with gross negligence and a case? >> we want to be very responsive and directed the claims with people and businesses that are affected. we have been clear that we will stand behind that. we have that as our ient.

the only way we say legitimate claims is that claims have to have some basis in substantiation. we've been clear about the $75 million, that that will not be a limit for this record -- for this. yesterday's was closing on 1000 claims. mostly fhermen who are out of work, people who do not have cash to make ends meet because they are o of work, and that is what we're trying to concentrate on right now. i think we're being very responsive with that and we have to make sure that we kee getting better and better at it. but so far i think we've met the local needs. >> how are you determining a viable claim? i am assuming a lot of the discussion this morning or it sounds light -- it sounds like bp has said may be the fault lies with the rig operators and improper cementing by halliburton, and halliburton

saying transocean may not have properly operated the drill. is that an ongoing part of the discussion? or are you saying in a legimate claim in this incident will be paid by bp? >> liability, blame, fault -- that is over here. we are the response of party. our obligation is to deal if this bill, clean it up, and make sure the impact of that spill is compensated. and we are going to do that. >> no matter if that is $14 billion? >> i will not speculate on the numbers. every legitimate claim the full resources of bp are behind. >> there have been judgments that it could be as high as $14 billion. are you saying that the people pay all claims? >> we will pay all legitimate claims, yes. >> mr. chairman, i think that is

the question before us. this is a panel and discussion about how we're going to move forward from this and i think it reminds me in this very hearing, you have this room for big investigative hearings, and the last time i was in here, the challenger blew up and we had a discussion about the fall behind the challenger system. we found out that there were system failures. yes, there was a freezing of the temperature and the o ring but there were many other problems that led to dead. and i think that is what we're going to find here as well, that there is too cozy a relationship with mms and the oversight within the industry and the various things by colleagues have been talking about with the blowout preventers and other things. there is much more oversight a detailed that needs to be made here. i think the question that is going to remain is how we are going to clean up $14 billi of oil spill or whenever the number is, and that we really have an

accounting here of how that is going to work. we have to move forward with preserving that area. mr. newman, i do not know if you have any comments about that, because i definitely el the case for defense is being built here this morning. >> i guess i would agree with the way mr. mckay has characterized it. liability and culpability and altman responsibility for the events that resulted in the incident or one thing, and responding to the economic impact of the event is another thing. i thi the way the senator explained it coincide with my understanding which is as police operating -- police operator and a well honor, that falls on pp. -- lease operator and the well owner, that falls on bp.

>> there needs to be a safer environment to develop oil and gas resources. it is in the interest of all of us, the nation's energy security, that we learn from this and continue to take those learning and build them into our future operating procedures and technologies. >> 41 opinion, what i've learned from this situation is time for us to diversify of oil. thank youmr. chairman. >> you wish to put something in the record. >> i just have some domentation about the value of the louisiana seafood industry which is more than $3.4 billion. i want to put that in the record. >> i think all senators have had a chance to rest around of questions. let me now start on the second round. senator murkowski, did you have questions? >> i will be very brief, mr.

chairman. mr. mckay, there was an associated press article the referenced -- that reference of comprehensive blow out a plan for the deepwater horizon. the article states that bp had not filed a specific comprehensive blow out volume -- plan. it indicated that it was not required to file because it got trigger certain conditions triggered in the mms report. the article goes on to speculate that if there had been on site- specific plan, it would help to facilitate a quicker response. can you comment on this? was there in fact an exemption? did you file a side-specific

corehensive blowout plan? >> in reference to the exclusion granted by nss -- mms for specific wells in the area, when the sale is conducted an environmental impact statement is done, and extensive anbar most study, then there are brit in formal assessments in areas within that lease sale. that environmental assessment is utilized as the informal assessment for internal wells and you apply for an exclusion because they are already done. that is what they did. that is a industry practice and in assess practice. -- andms practice $3 would it have help bp, transocean, halliburton in this instance had there been a specific plan?

>> i do not think it is called aid blowout prevention plan. >> i am going off of an ap article. i apologize. >> we filed our scenario around as well and the anbar mall assessments that were done, impact to spill response plans, those are clear and very extensive. i do not think the individual well location within an area of an informal assessment would have been any different. i do not know that for a fact but that is what i believe. >> you maintain because mms did not require this, there was no necessity for bp's part in doing anything? >> i do not believe so. i think we were under the standard and practice. >> the same question to all three -- given where we are after this incident, had you ordered any additional safety

measures or modify procedures for operation outside the u.s. based on this incident? >> yes, we of requested that all of bair -- -- we have requested that all of our rig modifications that may of been made to a blowout preventers, we have instituted some incremental testing on a blowout preventers worldwide, and sent notices to all of our businesses worldwide that are doing deep water drilling, and we have communicated with m everything we understand about that. they are incorporating what we are learning here into new testing -- i do notnow what will come out, but new ideas around how to ensure safety around these incidents. >> the you have any reason to believe that the deepwater horizon gop was modified? -- bop was modified?

>> we do have reason to believe that they were modified. i do not know the extensive -- the extent of that modification $3 assuming there were any modifications, would they have been verified? >> they were notified and never perford in 2005. that were done at b's request and that bp's expense. >> what were those modifications? >> as i mentioned in a comment earlier, bop on the deepwater horizon is fitted with five lem from vendors on the rig. -- preventers on the rig. one preventer to test ramp. it allowed for more efficient testing for the bop. >> while with that my face it --

modification have been requested? >> testing and perhaps the well construction process. it has an impact on the efficiency of the operation. to the extent that we can make the process more efficient, it has clear benefits in terms of the overall time required to drill the well. >> have you ever done such a modification? >> yes, ma'am. >> multiple times? is this standard one deeper water wells? >> on rigs that have blowout preventers that are prevented -- fitted with a number of ram the vendors that exceed requirements, we have converted rams boto bop's. >> have there been any incidents? >> no incidents related to that

modification. >> let me ask you the same question. within your interest outside the united states, you requested any additional safety measures or modification procedures as a result of this incident? >> we operate a consistent standard of policies and procedures, maintenance practices, and operating practices across the transocean lead throughout the world. in the aermath of this incident, until we find out what may of contributed to the cause of events, we have not changed any of that standard transocean system of policies and procedures are around the world. >> other than to alert our organization around the world to this incident, firstly, and condly we operate with a standard set of procedures. it is certainly our expectation that as we learn from this and didn't, there will may well be

some changes in the process and procedures or other approaches which we would then imement as part of the global standard. the way on the findings of the analysis of the reports of this incident. -- that will wait on the finding of the analysis of the reports of this incident $3 let me ask this question. one of the issues the first panel talked about was the known limitations on the ability of these share ram sheer rms to function under these circumstances, whether there were joints and the drill shout, that they are expected to cut, that sort of thing. do you agree that the sheer ram cannot cut the stool joints these -- cannot cut these tool

joints? and is that not a severe design flaw? public there are several drills that the sheer rams are incapable of sharearing? >> i do not support the contention that that is a design flaw because the industry recognizes those implementations and are strict operating procedures in place to account for the inability of the shear rams to aear every tool. >> they would apply to every proceed -- every personnel operating under that bop? >> they understand what those operating procedures are free billboard do you believe that they were following them in that case chris des moines >> i do. >> even though the proper operating procedures were followed, the failure of the

shear rms to stop the explosion from occurring, it is not a problem with the design of bop, not a problem with the wavy bop was operated, or managed? how do youxplain the fact that this bop was not able to prevent this blow out? >> the operating procedures i referred to earlier were applied to the process these our people used when they are manipulating pike in the bop or through the bop. running drill pipe sat down to the bottom to put the drill bit on the bottom of the bolt to continue drill, pulling that drill bit back up through the bop, running casing down through the bop to progress at casing

operation, the operating procedures i am referring to that our people were following relate to situations where our people are in control of the pipe that is goinghrough the block. >> that were not in control of the time that this accident occurred? >> without knowing today senator what is behalf -- inside the bop, it is entirely possible that there is material inside the bop that would haveome from well bore, not from the transocean people on the rig. >> from the well itself. >> yes, sir. >> l me go ahead. >> let me put an additional information into the record. i think it will be important. the commercl fishermen in the gulf of mexico harvested 1.2 7 million pounds of fish and shellfish, and generating $69

million in revenue. 68% of our commercial arguses from the gulf of mexico. that is one industry at risk. both have been pushed into slips and harbors, unable to operate. the amount of economic damage continues to mount. i am encouraged by what you say, that there will beo limit to true economic damage, because it will be substantial, whether it is $14 billion or something up to that map, we do not know. it ismportant that the gulf coast, for the people of the gu coast, from florida all the way over to texas, to know that bp and the operators will be there to prote their economic interests. we want to make sure that the government agencies like the small business administration, like commerce, like other industries can step up and help us do this difficult time.

but because my eyes are leaning forward even despite the fact that, i want to ask a question about all tread deep drilling. -- ultra deep drilling. there are currently 120 ultra deep sites drilling today. is that correct? that is my information. do any of you dispute that? ok. awesomely 120 drilled as we speak. -- approximately 120 drilled as we speak will be required internationally to make sure that this does not happen. the reirements that you say you exceeded that mms requires for the deep water drilling, are our requirements the highest internationally, or are there other nations thatequire higher safety standard them what

mms requires of us to do this type of exploration and production? >> theegulatory regime that we operate around the world, and we operate in about 30 countries. they very from very minimal to quite stringent. i would characterize the u.s. has closer to the end of being quite stringent in terms of very well described rolls. -- but we're not the most skirt --tringent. >> i think there are aspects of the regulatory regime in places like the u.k. and norway that might be characterized as being more stringent than the u.s.. the board you are also testifying that there are some places where the regulations could be quite collapse. bridging lax --ou are also testifying that there are some places were the regulations could be quite lax $3 some

operating practices are consistent throughout the world regardless of the regulatory environment 're operating in. >> you would say that the requirements -- and we have a great deal of responsibility in this subcommittee -- you would say th the standards that we promote in this committee and here in this congress has international implicatns because what we require you to drl in the gulf, you normally would follow those around the world. it is important for us to get this right. would you say that is true or not? >> because of the opportunity that the administration and the congress have to influence the way things are done in the u.s., it does have international implications. >> let me ask you this, mr. newman. your company just recently acquired another drilling operator which i think caused you been to become the worl's largest. my question that some of my constituents might be thinking,

are you too large to be safe? what kind of paters are in place -- and you said, mr. mckay, you've acquired other companies to be a quite large operator. what would you say, mr. newman, to give usonfidence that with this most recent acquisition, did you double your safety operators? could you coent about that? >> europe concerning -- the combination that took place in november 2007. the combination of those companies in the integration of such a large work force, i think, in hindsight it went extremely well. i think that was due in large part to the strong operating cultures and strong safety culture that both of those organizations had. both organizations prided themselves on the focus of

safety, a focus on customer satisfaction, and a focus on quality and performance of our drilling equipment. so i do not think it had an impact on our ability to operate safely -- safy. >> and this committee has to give some focus on emerging on some of these companies and to thextt in which they operate to make sure that they have consistent policies throughout. thank you. >> senator sessions. >> the follow up a bit on the removal of the mud, the wall street journal today says that it is common practice to for wet cement down in the pipe. the wet cement which is heavier than the drilling mud sinks down through the drilling mud. the mud is then roved after the plug is in place. in this case, a decision was

made shortly before the explosion to perform the remaining task in reverse order. which is to take the money ou first. but the chairman of the department of petroleum engineering at texas tech agrees that this is an unusual apoach because normally you would not evacuate the pipe from the sea floor to the raid until you were done with the last plug at the sea floor. he said that in an interview. i guess i will ask you, mr. mckay, do you agree that normally you would not do that? >> i do not have specific knowledge of the procedure for this well. and whether refer circulating was part of the procedure or not, that will be part of the explanation. >> mr. newman, was that normal? >> it is normal pracce to

remove the drilling mud from the riser prior to disconnect think re -- disconnecting the triser from the well. i don't have any specific knowledge of the order of the events as they took place on tuesday evening the 20th, because our record of a man's ends earlier. -- of events ends earlier. >> would you agree that that was normal? >> i certainly don't want to be non responsive to your request, send a third, concerning your question which was is this normal procedure and is this undertaken on a regular basis? that is something i do not have knowledge of today but i would be more than willingo gather -- attempt to gather the information forou, it should it be helpful to you. >> mr. mckay, had the mud not

beenemoved first and replaced by sea water, would that have made the blow out more less likely in your opinion? >> i do not know. >> mr. newman? >> i think that calls into question the actual mode of failure. until we can determine that, i think any hypothesis about the impact of the mud that indeed -- in the riser would be premature. >> we need to gather the informion, reconstruct the sequence of events, to be in position to establish exactly what took place. >> mr. newman, i suppose you work for a number of companies. you drill for them. i'm intrigued by my colleaes $10 billion cap on strict

liability legislation. i think it is something we should consider. but i understand that there could be a result that it would favor only the super major oil producers, because the sum of money is so large. you think that large of money, of maun for that much -- a bond for that much, would that keep competitors out of the business? >> i am not sure i want to comment on public policy, but i think congress ought to take into consideration all the potential ramifications, including the commercial ramifications of such a policy. >> did you have additional questions? the worst i know that we're trying to wrap this up. i wanted to go back to mr. mckay because i think this issue of who pays for this cleanup is still critically important.

mr. mckay, it just going back -- happy to have other witnesses chime in. it was literally last year it that the last part of the exxon valdez clean-up was settled. when all the way to the supreme court. aryou going to avoid that by paying legitimate claims in advance? i know you cannot stop anybody from suing you, but would you pay in advance of the procs? >> we are paying legitimate claims right now. yes, i am. obviously we cannot keep that but we are saying exactly what we maine. we're going to pay legitimate claims. >> the harm to the fishing industry, both short-term and ng-term, all you're going to pay. >> we're goi to pay all legitimate cims $3 if it is an impact from tourism you're going

to pay. >> all legitimate claims 're going to pay. >> long-term damages to the fishing industry? >> i cannot quantify or speculate on long term. i do not know how to find it. >> additional troubles from depleted fisheries in their recovery. >> we're going to pay all legitimate claims. >> shipping impact. >> legitimate claims. >> impact on further drilling operations. i am talking about things that were part of the exxon valdez. what i am saying is that i think the american people are most anxious about this. let me go back. they sd in to frame a process of liability. we obviously only have so much money in that. i know my colleagues are not going to waive that. to make the rich reactive -to

make that retroactive is probably impossible. you have the best buys that money can hide but -- by behind you, so i want to make sure that we really understand what you're saying you're going to be committed to today, because a long-term impact of this is going to be for 20 years. we cannot sustain this kind of behavior or cost, and i want to make sure that we're getting full answers to the coverage that you are really signing up for today. >> i am trying to give you a clear answer as i possibly can. we're trying to be extremely responsive, expeditious, meet every responsibility we have as a responsible party, and that means pay all legitimate claims. that is our intent, and i cannot speculate on every individual case, but i can tell you this is not about legal words. this is about getting it done and getting it done right.

>> and impacts to the pristine beaches that we have in this area, those are legitimate claims? but yes, it impacts the beaches, it impacts commerce, yes. >> mr. chairman, i am one who hopes that we never get into the situation where we are in court debating about what is now a legitimate claim. you're making a big presentation here that you are stepping up to these responsibilities and i hope that that is true. and i hope, mr. chairman, that we will go back on the legislation we have passed out of this committee, that included an opening up further of the gulf, and passed legislation to reconsider that. this is clear evidence that the beaches of destined don't need to be subject anymore will threaten the future. >> thank you very much. if there are no other questions, you have any more, senator sessions? >> i thank senator cantwell for

pursuing that line of inquiry. i think there is some confusion about it. i try to look at all law on it. legally use still remains subject the all the normal trespass and pollution walls of the state if you damage property or beaches. is that correct? of course i do not under spawned that law in detail but we're skeptical all laws. >> the provisions in the pollution that that provide for these damages, strict liability damages, expressly stated in the act that that does not abrogate existing state law. i do feel that that is part of it but i believe again for answer is you should do what is right and compensate fully and not try to utilize technical defenses that are not legitimate.

thank you, mr. chairman. >> let me just thank the witnesses for their testimony and indicate that if members have additional questions, that they want to submit for the record, they should do so by the end of business tomorrow, thursday. if you folks would be able to respond to those in the next week, that would be appreciated. thank you all very much and i will conclude the hearing. [unintelligible] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] oq&,

[no audio] [no audio] >> today's headliner calls live on "washington journal,"cvoa and the house is n for legislative business at 10:00 a.m. eastern. greece. -- l.] to greece. -- l.] to greece.