>> because the decisions regarding continuation of the drilling operations or suspension of the drilling operations are typically tak at the rig si, the first place we want those alarms present is at the rig site. >> but you're aware that technology exists, it's used everyday in businesses all over the country, whereas soon as a bit of information is recorded at a central location, it can be immediately recorded at a distant site, justvoid this type of catastrophe to prevent that information from being lost forever? >> i'm aware of that technology existing. in fact the reason we have the records you're showing us now is because that technology was employed on this particular operation. >> for this function we're seeing on this chart but not the other recorded data that you've described in your testimony? >> not a realtime replication of the alarm logs. >> all right. thank you. questions? >> thank you, mr. chairman. what would have led to the

discrepancy between the blowout protector and the plans or the diagrams of the blowout protector, the differences? and if in flakt was a difference, was it a factor in whether or not this well could have been capped immediately? >> congressman, do you want me to respond to that or -- >> please, mr. moore. >> we were first aware of those changes when we were in the crisis room with bp, when we were trying to function the blowt preventer. but honestly, we do not know whether those would have any impact on whether the bop would function under the circumstances it was put in. we just don't have enough information yet to know the answer to that. >> thank you. how long had the horizoneen operating? >> the deepwater horizon went

into surface in 02. >> it's been operating safe lay good while? >> the horizon has drilled approximately 72 wells over that eight year history. >> at the ocean floor, at about 5,000 feet, which is approximately a mile, you continued down anoth 13,000 feet, another 2 1/2 miles to the reservoir? is that accurate? >> that's an accurate description of the well geometry, yes. >> so this rig has had an exemplary safety record in a sense, as far as its ability to drill and recover natural resources, is that fair? >> i think that's a very fair assessment, congressman. the deepwater horizon had a seven year history with no lost time accidents. the deepwater horizon in its past set the record for deep water operations for semi s submersible and holds the

deepest record in the industry. >> so we have a piece of engineering that has been fairly successful. as we hear testimony and questions about what red flags went up, as the gentleman referred to, in oxygen saturation, over a period of years, the safety mechanisms and the correction mechanisms on this piece of equipment or this well have been significantly tried and been found to be successful in most cases. i guess my question or my statement would be there's probably going to be a series of facts and time that led to this tragedy. we, of course, are well aware of how things can happen after the fact and we can point fingers and goodness gracious, america's

lived through 9/11 to go back over all the things we could have done to keep that from happening. things seemed to have happened at an opportune time and the stars lined up and so we're really interested in your future, as far as drilling is concerned, and what i being done with on other wells around the nation and internationally to double-check and see if all our proper safeguards are in place? mr. mckay? >> i can say in our international rig fleet, we have notified and increased the scrutiny under the -- on the blowout preventers. we've incrementally added testing to make sure they are on board and ships will actuate the blowout preventers and recommended and given ideas to mms on maybe what could be considered to enhance, at least,

reparation and testing around these things. >> in the reservoir that you were tapping into, the dynamic, the hydrolic and fluid dynamics of that reservoir, do those change significantly over time, as pressures change or is that pretty well-known and constant fact or variable on a day-to-day basis? >> on this particular -- >> yes. >> this particular reservoir is --we don't have much data on it. generally, reservoirs are different at different depths and dierent pssures so you can encounter them in different ways. the characteristics of this reservoir is different because we don't have any measure in terms of pressure. it looked to be -- so everyone understand, it was not a particularly difficult welln the sense of its pressure. it wasn't a very much overpressured well. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

i yield back my time. >> thank you, mr. griffiths. >> i was a little curious listening to your opening statement you felt compelled to respond to my opening statement when i talked about the mm srs study that said nearly half of all the wells that default are do to faulty cementing and i have a couple questions. first of all, how many wells drilled in the gulf at this period were at depths over 400 feet? >> i think, if i can provide some clarity to that. >> no. i'd like a short answer. how many wells were over 400 feet? >> i don't have that data. it is from the mms. >> was it more of them or less of them? >> i'm sorry? >> was it more of them or few of them? >> i don't know. >> you don't know. so are you saying, since thes

wa only one blowout incident at depths over 400 feet, you think there's no risk for cementing for deep water drilling? >> no. i think what i was trying to point out because the subject of the study here is clearly deep water gulf of mexico, i was trying to provide a reference point for the committee with respect to the data which the mms has provide to us -- >> so what you're saying is you're not saying -- you are saying that there still could be a risk, that it's not just because it's over 400 over 400 . right? >> i'm sorry. >> you're saying there could be faulty cementing over 400 feet >> i'm just -- >> yes or no? >> i'm sy pli reploying to -- >> yes or no. >> no. >> thank you. are you arguing that cementing is actually safer at offshore wells with depths over 400 feet? >> i'm sorry. i didn't understand your question. >> are you arguing that cementing is actually safer at

offshoreells with depths over 400 feet? >> i would say the information would suggest that, yes. >> it is safer? >> according to the statistics, yes, from the mms. >> because there have been few leaks? >> no. it's a function of the depth of the water and what causes and how the well construction process is undertaken between deep water and shallow water. >> okay. so, so you don't think we should then worry about the cement at the deeper ones? >> that is not what i said. >> okay. and you know, i do agree with you on one point and the point i agree with you on is there are very few accidents and that's the good news. but the bad news is that if there is an accident in this case if there's faulty cement, if there's other problems, then the results of that are catastrophic. would you not agree with that?

yes or no? >> to the extent that cementing was an issue, if you're referring to this particular incident -- >> would you agree if there's a faulty -- if there's a leak that the catastrophic results are such that we should -- that that's -- that even though there's very few accidents we should try to avoid those. yes or no? >> i do not agree with your assertion, no. >> you don't agree with that, okay. so it's a risk we should be willing to take. >> i'm sorry that i'm not getting -- you have to reste your question. >> let me move on then. you said that both positive and negative pressure tests were conducted on the cementing job in your testimony. several experts have stated that a cement bond log test might have additional indicated -- indicated aitional weaknses such as that the cement had not hardened properly. was a cement bond log test conducted at this well? yes or no? >> to the best of my knowledge,

the -- >> yes or no? >> to the best of my knowledge, the well unit did not request -- >> no. is it true that a cement bond log would provide assurance of the integrity of the cement bond? >> the cement bond log is certainly the only realistic way of assessing the bond -- >> so that answer would be yes. correct? >> correct. >> mr. mckay, is it bp's standard practice to only use basic pressure tests to evaluate a cement job? >> i can't speak directlyo this particular well but what i can say -- >> i didn't ask you. i asked you your standard practice. is it bp's standard practice to only use basic pressure tests to evaluate a cement job? >> i believe every well is engineered individually so i can't answer a standard practice for this type of -- >> so your answer is you don't know? >> can i check --

>> i would absolutely -- mr. chairman, if he could supplement his answer, i would apprecie that. >> so cement bond logs are not required on every well. they're utilized when there's an indication of a problem. >> why did bp not pay for a bond log test on this well? >> the -- because the better way to test positive and negative tests. cement bond log is an inference of bond. not an actual assurance of bond. >> thank you. for questions please, ms. sutton. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i have a lot of questions so if -- please stick to the question and if not, if you don't know the answer, just say i don't know and we'll move on. what was bp's operating budt in 2009? >> operating budget? where? worldwide?

>> sure. worldwide. >> we had -- we spent about $20 billion investment capital. >> okay. and what percentage of that 2009 budget was devoted to safety and preventive measures related to deep water spills? do you know? >> i don't know. >> okay. how much does bp inves in research and development in the management o deep water spills? do you know that? >> i don't have a number. >> okay. how many deep water wells does bp operate in the gulf? >> i don't know the number of wells but quite few. >> well, quite a few is a very vague term. can you give us any indication? >> can i give you an indication? there's been several thousand drilled in the world and we are in about 30% of them. >> okay. how many on the outer continental shelf? do you have a better idea there? >> well, we are only in the deep water on the outer continental shelf. >> very good. how many of those are operated by platforms leased from transocean?

>> we have -- curntly we have three transocean rigs working. >> okay. what actions have been taken currently to ensure that this is not a systematic failure in regard to the operations out platforms in a similar situation? >> we have -- what we have done is as i said earlier we have inituted some tests, incremental tes on perimeters and asked for modifications that may have been made in the history of the blowout preventer. >> so testing and asked about modificatio modifications. that's the sum total. okay. what is your spill response capability right now on the continental shelf? we heard discussion about this. >> we have 300 vessels skimmers and otr professional vessels for operating. we have a million feet of boom deployed. 2.4 million being staged or accessed around the coast and we have a supply chain being ramped up to supply 200,000 to 300,000 feet a week. >> okay.

what devices do you have on the oil rigs in the north sea? >> i've not worked in north sea in a long time but similar blowout preventers for t water depth condition and the reservoir conditions that are utilized in the north sea. >> when you say similar, that's different than the way i understand it so i'd like a little clarification because my question would be why don't we use thsame thing in the gulf? okay. so when you clarify that, for me. and what is your contingency plan for the wells and dth of water, if the depth of the water causes a question of how to stop a leak? what is the contingency plan? we have heard a lot about things we are trying now but what is the -- >> we have a spill response plan that's fed with the government and sits underneath the national contingency plan and one girl plan that indicates the equipment around the gulf coast to be utilized and priorities and structure to utilize. that's formed the foundation of this and it was approved last june 2009.

>> okay. approved. okay. will bp now keep coffer dams on the coast of all the platforms to increase the response time in the face of such a disaster? >> i think as we learned the les on thes from this think there will be capability to be looked at for the industry as well as for ourselves, yes. >> mr. mckay, bp stated and i think you did here today that you will pay for all legitimate claims resulting from the spill. what does bp define as a legitimate claim? >> we have been very clear. legitimate claims are folk who is are impacted or business that is are impacted and a substantiation of impact and that is legitimate claim. >> okay. so does that include the loss of profits for fishing and tourism? >> yes. >> okay. and will bp commit to exempting itself from any cap on the financial responsibility for dages resulting from this spill? >> yes, we have talked no cap. >> okay. bp has stated that they're very positive that the relief wells will work.

you concur? that's what they have -- >> we're confident they'll work. >> how many attempts for relief wells in the montera well to work? >> i am not familiar with the details of that. i have heard multiple -- >> four. four ibelieve. does bp expect to have the same difficulties for far deeper well? you can understand why i ask the question. >> we have the capacity to side track the wells and we have the -- set up to be able to have multiple attempts. >> okay. and as i said, mr. chairman, i have a lot more questions for the rest of our presenters and i'll hold them for the second round. >> very good. we'll be going a second round. for questions, please. >> i'm wasting my time here. let's see. and time was a critical element in this disaster. it's possible that a rapid

response on the deck of the rig could have prevented the catastrophe that continues today and a faster responsef bp and transocean might have reduced the size of the leak or cut it off faster. but we learned during the course of our investigation that, again, the critical modifications, we have talked about modifications, to the blowout preventer may have delayed significantly the response and might have been responsible for the failure of the device. mr. mckay, your company documents describe modifications that were made to the blowout preventer device. we were told by james duh prix who runs your gulf of mexico operationshat you found major modifications to the system and one case a module supposed to be connected to a critical piece of equipment called a bore ram, that's designed to seal tight any piece of pipe in the well, was instead connected to a test

ram that does not function in an emergency situation. do you agree with that finding? >> i was not in that review but i know that's what mr. duh prix said and he should know so yes. >> yes. in another case, two independent controls for rams were wired into a single control, possibly increasing the risk of failure. is that correct? >> if that's what mr. duh presaid, that's what he discovered with transocean and cameron and other folks in th intervention. >> okay. my understanding is that because of these modificatiomodificatiot nearly 24 hours attempting to activate the controls on the bore ram. is that correct? >> we discovered leaks and other things, the modifications that didn't match the drawings as we were doing these interventions and it did delay things, yes. >> so a useless test ram -- quoting now from the chairman, not the variable bore ram had

been connected to the socket that was supposed to activate the variable bore ram. so this was a useless test ram that you spent 24 hours trying to get at. right? >> if that's what mr. dupre said. >> so my understanding that this time is essential in an emergency response like this one, oil and gas is surging through the blowout preventer, it acts like a sandblaster i'm told and can degrade the rubber seals on the bore ram if you can't activate it quickly, the seals may not function properly. is that correct? and could this delay have an impact on the response? >> i think that's a question for mr. moore or mr. newman. i don't know. >> mr. moore, is it true? >> correct. if depending on what's flowing but that well, it could have abrasive materials that could take the elements and destroy them. >> so a 24-hourelay allowing the sand and stuff to come out

could have -- could do that? >> depending on what's in it. i'm not aware of materials were in the flow area so it would depend on what's in it. >> but it could? >> it could. >> so mr. newman, no one on this panel has actually owned up to making mistakes during this hearing. but the failure to connect the bore ram to the control model -- module, that seems like a mistake to me. do you agree that this was a mistake and that you are concerned about possible implications of the mistake on the response? >> if i could clari your question, congresswoman. >> i think it was a pretty clear question. is this a mistake that was made, that it was connected -- that

the bore ram was not connected to the control model? is that a mistake? >> in the original configuration, when the bop system was delivered from cameron, the rov port was connected to the lower most ram cavity. it is today connected to t lower most ram cavity. >> was it a mistake that it was connected to a useless in this case useless test ram in terms of preventi t disaster? this is a very simple question. someone clearly made a mistake. was this a mistake? >> in the event that the rov port is connected to the lower most ram cavity, and the lower most ram cavity is outfitted with a bop test ram, that will not serve to restrict or seal off the flow of hydrocarbons from the well. >> so in that case having it

connected to that, would that be a mistake? >> it would be a mistake to rely on that in a well control situation, yes. >> thank you. so i have very serious concerns about the modifications that were made. ansocean made modifications to the blowout preventer and could not provide bp with accurate specifications when itatters most. we don't know yet if these modifications actually caused the failure but what we do know that they caused delays in trying to stop the oil spill and identify its cause. which is very, very serious. thank you, mr. airman. >> thank you. that concludes questions of all the members of the subcommittee. there are members of the full committee who have been here and we appreciate them being here throughout this hearing. we'll turn to them for questions before we do round two. for questions, please. five questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

as well as rk and member burgess for allowing me to ask questions to the panel. we, of course, all in south louisiana are fighting every day to not only do what we can to urge and push bp and all the parties involved to stop this oil fromeaking into the gulf of mexico, but also to prevent it from coming into the marshland and seafood beds, such a vital part of louisiana's culture and clearly as we look at all of the things involved in the working coast, that the gulf of mexico and south louisiana is, it's not just an area where 80% of the all the continental drilling and exploration is done for the united states, but it's also an area where many people make their livelihoods in the seafood industry and all at risk right now and it is another reason that it really underscores why those of us in south louisiana have been pushing to get the fair share of royalties. we don't get that same share of royalties for the drilling that's done off of our coast as

ery other state gets and this is a glaring example of why it's so important to participate in the revenue sharing and do that immediately cause this has a dramatic impact on our livelihood. i have a number of questions for the panel i'll get into. i also have a number of questions for mms which i wish we had the opportunity to ask, as well. we had a closed hearing where th were asked some questions, but unfortunately, they have never participated in a public hearing. i have asked them for a number of documents that they have yet to get me on various processes related to the horizon and other exemptions that they have given in the past but let me ask you, mr. mckay, can you tell me how many exemptions were requested for the activits related to this well and how many granted by mms? >> i'm not sure i know what you mean by -- >> exemptions to various

processes. it is my understanding you were given exemptions on -- >> can i expla that real quick? the cat gorical exclusion is because statements have been done with the lease sale by the government. then -- >> so did you not get an exemption on that? >> you file for a cat gore call exclusion because those environmental assessments have been done, yes. >> you filed for that and granted that by mms? >> yes. >> were there any other exclusions or exemptions you filed through mms for this particular well? >> not that i know of. but i may not know of everything. >> please get those to me. i've asked that same information from mms. i have yet to receive it. >> okay. >> hopefully they'll be forthcoming in that, as well. mr. moore, t bop so in question here, there have been a number of studies done. i have a study back to 1999 that was performed for mms. there's another study in 200

that was done for mms tt described various problems with blowout preventers. not just in the outer continental shelf, but also, looking at other places around the world. are you familiar, first of all, with these studies? >> our teamsre familiar with those studies, yes. >> have you all made any changes in the design of the blowout preventer over the years as these deficiencies have been identified? >> well, most of those reports cover the results of testing in the field which is very regimented. and it's component failures that would result from -- could be maintenance. it could be just the life of -- you have a preventer with over 100,000 moving parts. they do from time to time have to be serviced and replaced. and so that's what those testing of come poe innocents -- >> served and replaced but in terms of design change -- this is the 1999 study on page 13. it said it was decided not to pull the bop to reir the

failure after mms had granted a waiver. typically failures backed up by other component in the bop stack and seems to indicate if they found a problem in a bop they would say there's other redundancies. something else will catch it. that doesn't seem to me to be a good process to handle a problem with a bop. if you have five redundant systems and say we have four others. you seem to meow fix that problem. >> well, i tnk those problems are repaired when the stacks are put back to surface if it's a deep water stack. >> okay. didn't seem to be the case in this one but i move on to m next question. mr. newman or mckay, how many times were operations shut down on the bp horizon, the drilling that was done on the horon in relation to ts well? do you know how many times operations were shut down because of various problems?

start with mr. newman and ask mr. mckay. >> during the life of the mississippi canyon -- >> that's correct. >> -- i don't have a record of how many times operations were suspended. >> mr. mckay? >> i'm sorry. don't know. >> let me ask you about a few specific problems. there was a story in "the times picuyane." they started to interview some ofhe people that were working on the well, talked about problems that go back to weeks prior to the explosion. they said a con staent theme was that gas kicks more frequent in this oil field than others that the crew worked on and members were concerned. quote, one gas kick occurred towards the bottom of the hole approximately 10,000 feet below the hole with such a large kick they had to shut down operations. they were concerned about sparks sources on the rig at the surface so they had to shut it down because there were so much -- there was so much gas

coming out of the rig and they were afraid of the explosion. now, are you familiar -- that was according to this report a few weeks prior -- >> this is your last question. >> okay. do you know about that that shout down and can you give me a list of a of the times this rig was shut down due to various problems prior to the explosion? >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> we look forward to that information at later time. you may want to put that in writing because we'll have ten days after this hearing to submit further questions in writing. member of the subcommittee, mr. green, for questions. fiveinutes please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. newman, it's recently ported that some of the transocean workers that were rescued were told to sign statements denying they were hurt or witnessed the blast before they were allowed to contact their families and leave and literally just rescued. additionally, mr. mackie's

testimony, talking to those they have access to. can you comment on the statements of these employees forced to take and is there a copy we could see? >> we absolutely will provide the copy of the statements. >> okay. >> and i can categorically deny they were forced to sign. >> okay. >> well, we're just going b pressure ports. that's why you are here today. and believe me, we know sometimes it is not always accurate. will transocean make all the workers that were on the rig at the time of the explosion fully available to investigators? >> congressman, we want to understand what happened just as badly as congress does and we will make anything available that will help in understanding what happened. >> okay. i appreciate that. mr. newman, halliburton maintains that the personnel were instructed to record the drill pipe pressure test but that the drilling operator told them tt the negative pressure test had been already -- had already been completed and they would put on stand by the drilling contractor displaced

the riser with sea water. is it common to perform the duties of the subcontractor and y did it happen in this case? >> i don't believe that the drilling contractor in this case transocean performed the duties of any other subcontractor. >> okay. mr. mac mckay, you acknowledge bp is a leaseholder has acknowledges the cleanup and pay all legitimate claims. i know just from experience, nobody has -- nobody can afford to drill the wells without partners and it's been reported in the press other minority leaseholders. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> okay. mr. probert, you said that contrary to earlier reports, the final cement plug in the well was not s and the plug would have been the final barrier before the well -- before the well would have been temporarily

suspended. is this correct? >> that is correct. it would have been necessary to set that plug before the blowout preventer could have been removed and the well secured. >> okay. and you said that the deep water horizon rig met or exceeded the number of safety devices required by the federal government including an independent method of making the blowout preventer function correct. is that correct? or the method of making the blowout preventer to function. >> i think that may be best directed at mr. newman. >> okay. mr. newman? >> the blowout preventer in the bop control system on the deep water horizon were fitted with a number of methods of actated the bop. >> okay. >> manual activation from the ri and where the regulations require two independent stations, the horizon was fitted with three independent stations. in addition to manual activation, the blowou eventer control system on the whorizon fitted with two

automatic resnse systems, one of which the industry refers to as a deadman and the other is referred to as an auto share. two systems under certain conditions, the o.p. will respond. and the b.o.p. was fitted with rov intervention. remote operated vehicle intervention. >> there's the benefit of east harris county, i have consultants, chemical engineers and lots of redundancies built in and you confirmed that the blowout preventer device to shut off the oil flow in the ocean floor but did fail. >> it has not been effective in shutting off the flow. >> okay. thank you. then you go in your testimony to say there's no reason to believe that the blowout preventer wouldn't work and might have been clogged by debris shooting up from the well. is thacorrect? >> that's a possibility that

eds investigated. >> i understand your argument the well is sealed with cement and casing. within a few days the blowout pretext would have been removed and according to to you at that point the well barriers were responsible for controlling any pressure from the reservoir so the b.o.p.'s failure could not be held responsible. is that a statement you made? >> the infe effecttiveness is not the root cause of the event. >> okay. so the cement plug would have to be set before the blowout prevention could be removed. >> setting a cement plug is a normal process of abandoning the well. >> okay. and i know it's too soon because the blowout -- to know exactly what happened with the blowout prevention but there are lots of redundancies and again this is not the first well we have drilled in deep water gulf of mexico and some folks in the industry maintain with the debris, blowout prevention

should have worked. after all, it's a secondary means of controlling pressure if the drilling mud is inadequate. is that generally correct? it should have worked, the blowout proventer. >> asked to function within the design specifications, there's no reason to believe it would not have worked within its design specifications. >> okay. mr. cameron, would you like to comment? >> i would agree with his comments. >> okay. thank you, mr. chairman, for your time. >> thank you, mr. green. there was a question the minority would like to see if you can answer it. he asked his last qution was six weeks ago according to the "times pick uni"yupgs there was a gas kick. do you have any information on that shut down when you add the gas kick about six weeks ago? is that a fair assessment of your question? mr. mckay, do you have any information on that? >> we'll get the da to the

committee. >> okay. >> mr. newman? >> i'm not familiar with the circumstances of that particular incident. >> okay. i would next turn to mr. sterns for questions, member of the full committee. five minutes please. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to participate even though i'm not on the subcommittee. mr. mckay, i was down there and we saw that the sombrero did not work and start to slant drilling. here's a basic question. when will you cap that well? what's your best guess? >> we have multiple efforts under way that -- >> no, no. i mean -- >> i can't give you a -- we have multiple efforts that we are working simultaneously. >> in 90 days, yes or no? >> i believe the relief well will be down in a roughly 90 days. >> do you think you'll cap it in 90 days with the slant drilling? >> or sooner with other methods.

>> what other methods? because -- >> we're still working on the blowout preventer and trying to do a top kill and could be successful. we are also trying to get a containment system sub sea to -- >> your best guess is within 90 days that you will close this rig of the evacuation of all the gasoline. that's your best guess. >> i believe we -- that or better. >> now, you're in a room all alone, you and the govern nor of florida and he asked you this question. he said, when is your best estimate when it will hit the florida coast. what would you say? >> i don't have any estimates of it hitting the florida coast. i don't know. >> do you think it will ever hit the florida coast in these 90 days you predict that there will be closing this -- the oil? >> i don't have a way of predicting that. all i can say is we're trying to get a containment system in such that that oil is collected before -- >> let's take a worse-case scenario. i understand the win doesn't have an impact. it's basically the current.

is there worse-case scenario where it could hit the florida coast? >> that is a possibility. that's why we're organizing -- >> let's say it's a possibility. if you had to be a betting man, would you say it would hit the florida coast in 90 days? >> i'm not speculating on that. >> okay. >> we are doing everything we can to make sure it doesn't. >> a constituent showed me a video. it showed a largeasin of water and poured oil into it. they took blue hay and other types of hay and dropped it in it and about a minute and a half it absorbed all of the oil in the basin of water. what's the possibility, can you drop hay in the area? take the hay out and then it's fuel. why couldn't you have just dropped something to absorbed all that oil instantly to give you more time to make decisions? have you ever thought of that? >> yes. some of that absorbent material

will be used if anything -- >> you could have dropped it right on the site and then take barges out, pick it all up, absorbs the oil off the top and en you could have made the oil into things that you could actually burn. has that ever occurred to you folks? >> we are under unified area command with the coast guard and i don't believe that's scaleable as it needs to be for the further fshore. >> if it was a good idea, do you need the federal government to approve it or can you do it on your cone o en? >> we work with the federal government and every decision is -- >> okay. >> -- authorized by the command. >> in tab 11 of page 7-1, in its application to explore site bp, do you want to get that tab or you just want me to read it to you? >> in this book? >> yeah. it reports it has the capability to respond to spills of 300,000 barrels per day. okay? this is you folks telling us

that you have the capability to respond cad adequately to spills of 300,000 barrels per day. it's on page 7-1, section 7.0. this is your oil spill information graph, worse-case scenario. this is you talking, worse-case scenario. and you say, volumes uncontrollable per day, 300,000 barrels per day. is that correct, the information in here? do you still stand by that? >> i see, yes. okay. what is the current spill per day right today? >> current estimate's 500,000 barrels a day. >> basically that's 60 times less than you say the worse-case scenario that you can adequately respond to. is that correct? >> that's the math, yes. >> so, why are you having so much trouble responding when you said you could handle up to 300,000 barrels a day?

you have something 60 times less and this thing is hitting the chandelier coast in louisiana and possibility it might hit alabama and going to florida. have why can't you -- why didn't you have an adequate response even when your worse-case scenario says you can handle up to 300,000 barrels a day? >> well, this particular incident is very difficult because we've got a -- >> this says worse-case scenario. this is your words. >> the mechanical configuration of this is very difficult and the relief efforts that we are doing include three drilling rig that is are working simultaneously to try to contain and stop this. >> are you saying today's situation is more than a worse-case scenario that you outlined in your report to us? >> no, i'm not saying that. >> well, you see why i'm -- i'm puzzled why you folks are sitting here saying you don't have a control when you said you could handle 300,000 -- >> would the gentleman yield for clarification? >> yes. >> is the reason you think you can handle the worse case

because the prevention actually works? >> it's part of the assumption in dealing with this. >> okay. >> thank you. >> i appreciate the chairman. i would conclude that i assume in the worse-case scenario that would take -- be part of the worse-case scenario so that's the only concern i have. thank you, mr. chairman. >> chair recognizes the gentleman from vermont for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. as we all know, we were told that what could never happen did happen. we were told that if the unimaginable happened we had a fail safe mechanism that would make certain there would be no harm and of course the tragedy is that these assurances prove wrong. pardon me. we are learning one of the reasons that they're wrong, drillers relying on the device known as a blowout preventer and in theory designed to sheer off the pipe and completely close the well as you all well know.

in the event of a catastrophe like a deep water horizon. mr. mckay, i want to quote from your testimony. you say, and i quote, the blowout preventer was to be fail safe in case of an accident. is that correct? you were counting on that blowout preventer as the last line of defense? >> that is considered the last line of defense, yes. >> okay. i want to ask you about that. and the basis for that reliance. as you know, we received a document that was part of our investigation called "the blowout preventer assurance analysis." this was something that you had, bp had. it was commissioned in march of 2001. the risk assessment of the blowout preventer of the horizon rig identifies 260 different failure modes. in this, it says specifically includes over 20 that pose high or very high risk.

on the blowout preventer. it describes a potential failure of the blowout preventer to unlatch from the riser, the failures of rams to close. the failure sheer pipe examples as the many possible quote high consequence failures of the blowout preventer. and these are exactly the type of problems that led to the uncontrolled leak on the deep water horizon. so the question i have is if bp had a report that it commissioned for review of the safety mechanism of the blowout preventer, and it contains 260 failure modes,nder what construction of the english language is a device with 260 failure modes fail safe? >> i'm sorry. i'm not familiar with that report. and is that a bp-requested report? >> it's an rb falco deep water horizon b.o.p. assurance report

dated march of 2001. and it literally lays out- >> may be a transocean report. >> but we'll get to that you. because what it does specifically outline are anticipated problems with the blowout preventer. we also learned about other critical problems with the blowout preventers. one problem as we understand it they can't cut joints in the drill pine and as i understand it they're referred to as tool joints. mr. moore, you made this blowout preventer and let me ask. is it correct it was not designed to cut joints in the drill pipe? >> no, it is not. >> so, this is not a minor risk because we have been told that the pipe joints can take up to about 10% of the pipe's length. does that sound about right to you? >> that's correct. >> so basically, we've got a blowout preventer that won't work on 10% of the mechanism it's supposed to operate on.

you know, there were multiple failures that led to the disaster in the gulf and one of the most critical obviously was that the blowout preventer on the deep water horizon just didn't work and bp and transocean were relying on the device as if it was the ultimate fail safe even though there was a report in march of 2001 outlining 260 separate failure modes. and obviousl we're all now left and most importantly the folks who live in the gulf region to deal forever with the consequences of this catastro e catastrophe. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> chair now recognizes gentleman from louisiana for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate the opportunityo ask some questions. first, let me start by saying my condolences to the families of the 11 victims.

we're all regretful of such an incident. on a lighter side, mr. moore, i understand your son daniel's engaged and i understand his friends are accepting and saying he has a good catch so being a father-in-law, good catch is a great phenomenon even though during the troubled times. i have been a pro oil and gas person here and i want to thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that have refrained fromaying i told you so because i have been a defender of offshore drilling. i think the record for the shallow water fshore drilling speaks for itself. i think it's very good, very reliable. i think this accident demonstrates that maybe our gornment and form of minerals management and in working with the industry that we have to figure out what do we need to do to this better?

because i can't in all good -- with a good heart encourage the continuation of deep water until i know that all safety precautions are there, that are all backup systems are there, that all systems will work under the conditions, whether it's depth, temperature or whatever. so, moving forward, you know, i guess one of the questions i have got is, when you went to apply for the deep water horizon and you received a cat gore call exclusion from the meap in 2009, what's the process of which you secured the exclusion and should we have looked at it even more? was there an exclusion that as companies, you knew you always had that option, even though the law said, didn't say exclusions were viable or acceptable?

was it a commonplace thing? i think that would be more for mr. mckay and mr. newman. >> exclusion that relies on the environmental impact statements that the mms and government has done for the lease sale itself and then mauler areas within that lease sale and environmental assessment done specifically for those areas by the government and the industry generally uses those environmental assessments in their permit and files an environmental statement with those so it's ud -- it's common, yes. >> is that where the as i understand it the comment came that we're 50 miles off. we'll have no impact because as you know my concern is the estuaries and marchlands of south louisiana that i grew up hunting and fhing in and while my heart is heavy, i know those folks that make their living and actually live in those marshes. the frustration, the helplessness that they're

feeling. so i mean, is -- should that have been in good conscience something that you are -- is that a negotiated thing between the companies and mms? >> no, it is not negotiated. i think -- i think through all of this we are going to learn a lot and need to look at the -- at the qualifications and the regulations and the permit tha is are required to do work. i'll acknowledge that. this is not something that's unusual. it's utilizing environmental assessments that have been done and it is in a conventional sense. conventional sense may not be right moving forward. >> as i said, i guess at the depth and we have a new animal we are dealing with and need to know what it is and better. mr. chairman, i guess my question to the chair would be, is there some mhod -- my concern right now especially after what happened in colorado, i think a year or so ago, brought to light with mms some ability for the committee to get

an independent auditor, investigator, inspector general or something to look into how we do this and to make some recommendations so that this never happens again to anyone in this country, much less this world. we're the united states and i would have thought if this was going to happen it would have been in maybe a south african continent or a third world country thatooked the other way or said, you know, if there's still such a thing and i'm sure there is as kickbacks. but that thatould have happened tre and n here in the united states and, of course, having come through katrina, rita, gustav, ike and now horizon, it is just -- i guess the anxiety is building on south louisiana as though there's a bull's eye on us. i'm running out of time. i have one other quick question

but thank u, mr. chairman. i turn back the time. >> thank you. this is only the first of many hearings we'll probably have on this issue and all avenues will be explored. five questions, please. member of the subcommittee. >> yes, mr. chairman. i preciate that. and mr. mckay, i wanted to talk with you on a couple of things. one, people that have come down from the federal government, do th have an understanding of offshore drilling? do they have any real world experience in that that has proven helpful or have you had to kind of give them a tutorial or an understanding of that process? >> well, i think it is in different categories for different folks a. lot of people are learning a lot about the oil business and the technolog and the issues that are being dealt with. coast guard, obviously, we drill with the coast guard.

they have en involved in lots of things in the gulf coast around the oil business for many, ma years so they're familiar with what they're doing. other government agencies, mms, very familiar with what we're doing, obviously. other government agencies are learning to be host. learning and understanding. and trying to help. >> i also want to ask you if very quickly because we have limited time and if you want to do some of this in submitting it, right, that's fine. your protocol for capping a well, if you can just step through that and was that protocol explicitly followed in this case? >> i think we'll need to get back to you as part of the investigation. what was the procede, how valid was it? would it have worked? the design, et cetera. then was it followed correctly and then the decisions made that we may be in a well control event. >> okay. and then on the controlled burns, i know you started some of the controlled burns and

there were some days that weather wasn't good. how much did you -- how many days did you use the controlled burns? if you eliminated those, why did you make that decision? >> it's weather dependent and it's been used when the weather permits and we think it's a very valid tool and trying to use it when we can but we have not had the weather available to use it as much as we would like. >> okay. and let's see. mr. moore, the b.o.p. system that you discussed. what is the bestecondary b.o.p. system? you know, you talked a little bit about what you all had developed. then what is the best secondary system? how often is it used? is there anything else for a

well that has a history of producing a lot of gas like it's my understanding that this one did tn what is the -- you know, what is the best secondary or alternative plan for that? >> other than using a b.o.p.? >> yes. >> i know of -- i know of no other one. there's sevel ways to control a well, obviously. when it's being drilled through the, you know, through various processes. mud is obviously the biggest one. >> what you're saying is what was being used is considered the best and the only way to address this? >> well, i think there's numbers of ways to control the flow of a well when you're drilling it. as isaid, mud systems are the most i think most common. b.o.p.s are put in a situation where they must close on a flowing well when certain controls are lost. and provided they're maintained, provided that they're activated and provided there's nothing put

in the flow path it can't close on, they're pretty reliable. very reliable. >> okay. mr. newman, i had one question for you. when the explosion first occurred, were yr s.w.a.t. teams notified and how quickly were they on the scene? >> if i could just clarify for the congresswam what an s.w.a.t. team is. this is a team that we use whe the b.o.p. is on surface, on the rig in between wells. and they are there to provide additional support to the normal compliment of rig crew for conducti the thorough program of between wells maintenance performed on the b.o.p. so in this particular situation where the b.o.p. is remains on bottom, the s.w.a.t. team in terms of providing actual on-site expertise, what they have done is mobilized to the offsre operations so they're

providing support and gdance to the remote operated vehicle operators as they continue to ntinue to manipulate. we have members of that same expertise or function providing support to bp in houston and similarly in our own continuing crisis response team in our offices in houston. >> so as soon as word came to you that there was a need, you all were in action? >> absolutely. >> thank you, sir. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. dingle for questions, please. member of the subcommittee. >> mr. chairman, i thank you. mr. mckay, how much has bp spent on the response so far? >> i don't have an accurate number. i saw it -- >> would you submit for the record? >> yes. >> how much do you anticipate that bp will spend before this matter is over? >> i don't know. >> this question for all

witnesses. was the blowout preventer modified in any way? yes or no? >> blowout preventer since it was delivered from cameron in 2001. >> you say it was to be specific for the particular installation? is that what you're telling me? tie blowout preventer was modified in 2005 as a result of an agreement of transocean and bp. it was modified at bp's request and expense. >> why and how was it modified? >> yes. i'm not hur the details of of that modification. i think the investigation should look into that, as as well as there were any other modi modifications made ore than that. >> were the modifications entirely in accord with the manufacturer's instructions? or were they at variance with the manufacturer's instructions? >> i don't know. >> sir, do you kn?

>> the modifications to the cameron b.o.p. performed in 2005 utilized cameron equipment. they were done under the direction of bp and in koord ration with oversight of the mms. >> now, this isor all witnesses. yes or no. were there sheer rams installed and were they tested to ensure functionalities at the depths of this particular well? yes or no >> the b.o.p. is outfitted with two sets of sheer rams. one of which is referred to as a super sheer ram. and the other one is referred to as a bnd sheer ram. >> mr. mckay? >> i don't know. >> next witness, sir, please? >> yes. mr. newman is correct. >> all right. did the deep water have a backup remote trigger to activate the blowout preventer?

yes or no. >> the answer to that question, congressman, is yes. the b.o.p. system was fitted with two automatic backup response systems. one of which is the iustry refers to as a dead man. other thene the industry refers to as an auto sheer. both of those systems were fitted on the b.o.p. control system. >> thank you. do the other witnesses agree with tt statement? >> yes. >> yes. >> now, mr. mckay and mr. obert, was the cement used in this case the same chemical makeup as the cement used by halliburton for other wells? yes or no. >> yes, the cement had been used. this type of cement used in approximately 100 applications in the gulf of mexico. >> mr. mckay? >> i don't know. >> for all witnesses, were the survivors of the explosions

asked to sign medical or legal liability waivers after the explosion? yes or no. >> the documents that the transocean survivors of the incident were asked to sign were categorically not waivers. >> mr. mckay? >> for the bp employees, no. >> next witness? >> no. >> next witness? >> congressman, we had no one on the rig. >> now, it is my understanding, gentlemen,nd this is for all of the witnesses, if you please, it is my understanding that local fishermen have been contacted by your companies to help with the cleanup in different ways. have these contractors been asked to sign any kind of liability waiver? >> we are the -- a responsib party operating with the coast guard.

there was originally a standard form that was put out. i've lost track of time. a couple weeks ago. that was a problem. that was torn up. started over and so the practical answer is, no. that was fixed. >> so the answer to that question is, no. >> they are not. >> is that a cat gore call or a qualified no? >> i believe it's a cat gore call. >> very good. now, i have a curiosity. i intended to ask, did the minerals management exempt bp's lease on the well from an environmental impact statement as required? bp apparently requested that exemption? >> there's a cat gore call exclusion utilized that makes use of the government's environmental impact statement that's done with the lease sale and then the government's environmental assessment that is are done by grid and smaller area within that lease sale and those are utilized with the

permit. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. miss caster for questions, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. mckay, in your testimony you state that bp recognized that beyond the environmental impacts there are also economic impacts to the people of the gulf coast states. bp will pay all necessary cleanup costs and is committed to paying legitimate claims for other loss and damages caused by this spill. andhat you are determined to do everything humanly possible to minimize the environmental and economic impacts of the resulting oil disaster. now, in florida, the deep water horizon disaster is causing losses and damages to our most important industries. to our tourism industry, to the fishg industry, vacations are being canceled.

hotels don't know what to do. they're very scared. this is having a devastating impact on the hard working people of florida, like the other gulf coast states. so when youtate that bp committed to taking responsibility for paying claims, are you willing to begin a high-level dialogue with the political leadership of the state of florida to talk about ameliorating and addressing the impacts on our industries? >> yes. >> thank you. mr. mckay, is there anyone who works for bp america or bp parent or any bp subsidiary who previously worked for the u.s. department of interior and or mms? >> i believe so, yes. >> who is that? >> i believe jim grant worked for the mms. >> and what role? >> in what role for the mms? i'not sure. >> could you awer that

question in detail for the committee? moving forward, go through your records and see? >> yes. >> okay. and what about vice versa. anyone currently employed by the department of interior or mms who previously worked for bp america or bp parent or a subsidiary? >> i know of one person. i'm not sure they're still employed but they were, yes. >> who is that? >> sill via baka. >> in what role? >> i don't know. i don't know what her role is exactly. i'll get that to you. >> mr. newman and mr. probert, same question except halliburton or transocean. >> i'm not aware of anybody but we can check our records and confirm. >> neither am i but we'll check our records and confirm. >> thank you very much. i wanted to ask some questions of how the blowout preventer was tested. mr. newman, in your testimony you say it was tested regularly and found to be functional.

is that correct? >> yes. >> mr. newman, i want to read a document we obtained late last night from february 10. and it is labeled as the deep water horizon blowout preventer sub sea test. we have been told that there were additional tests conducted after this february test in march and april but they went down with the rig. so this february test is the last detailed information we currently have on sub sea testing of the blowout preventer. in particular, i want you to focus on the test for their casing sheer rams. there are noest results here and it actually says do not function as per exemption. mr. newman, what does this mean? >> i'm not familiar with the particular exemption that would be in place so i can't comment right now. >>hat does it mean when the document states casing sheer rams open? >> casing sheer rams open would

be the test that would be performed to conrm that the casing sheer rams do, in fact, open. so the sheer rams retract. >> same thing for close, same explanation. so what does it mean when it says do not function? do not function as per exemption. >> i believe that it means that it's part -- as part of this test, those casing sheer rams are not functioned. >> so, i want to be fair. my understanding is that there is evidence that the casing sheer rams worked so this failure to test may not have had an affect on the response but it is indicative of the problems with the testing regime. the testing regime. you want to comment on that? we have other documents that discuss the testing of the blowout reventer. one is a document prepared by bp on april 27th after the blowout. one week after the explosion. i'd likeo bring that up on the

screen. this document makes a number of key points about problems with the b.p. tests. it states b.o.p. stack teequipmt is not tested after on the seab. is says the sub sea systems will show whether the system will work when installed and show there were no leaks that would diminish system integrity. mr. newman, what is your reaction to this document? >> while the b.o.p. is on the surface, prior to being deployed for well operations, all of the systems on the b.o.p. are tested including simulation of the conditions that would trigger the automatic functions on the b.o.p. control system. >> so were the emergency systems of the blowout preventer tested after the device was installed on the seabed? >> those systems are not tested, once the b.o.p. systems on the seabed. >> why not? the -- if we could talk about

the auto sheer function, the auto fear function -- >> i'm a little over my time, mr. chairman. >> if we could talk about the auto share function. the auto share function is installed on the b.o.p. control system to simulate the disconnection between the lower portion of the b.o.p. stack and the lower marine riser package. these are two sets of components that come together and taken together they constitute the entirety of the b.o.p. stac the auto sheer function is designed to activate when the lower mare riser package inadvertently disconnects from the b.o.p. the lower b.o.p. there is -- there is a way to do that, sub sea, but it introduces significantisk in the well cotruction operations. disconnecting the lmrp inadvertently from the b.o.p. is not an expected, not a normal part of the well construction

process. it's an emergency response. and so testing that emergency response while the b.o.p. is on the seabed would iroduce significant risk. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. >> mr. enzly for questions, please. >> thank you. mr. mckay, would you agree that the industry ought to be using the best available technology to avoid these cataclysmic blowou s s? >> yes. >> now i'm told other places in the world, let me back up for a moment. we've learned through some of the investigation that that a possible source of failure was a failure for activation signal in some sense to be given to the blowout preventer. there's some suggestion that's what happened. from some interruption of the connection to the activation switch. we're advised that in other places in the world in norway and brazil, an acoustically

triggered switch is available that is remote to the rig so that it's not dependent on a physical linkage between the blowout preventer and the rig, that it receives an acoustic signal of a blowout occurring and sends through a sonar system to activate the blowout preventer. and the safety that seems to me coon sense in the sense it's not dependent on a physical connection as this one was, and that physical connection may have been interrupted in the explosion, in the blowout, to me that seems to be another inherent safety feature that is used in other countries. was that syste used in this particular rig? >> well, i'm not a blowout preventer expert. maybe these guys can answer as well, but i think it's something that needs to be looked at. as i understand it the acoustic signaling is not always applicable in some of the places like the deep water gulf of mexico. we did have redundant systems here to trigger the blout preventer including physical

manual intervention -- >> i understand that. i guess those all depend on a physical connection to the rig platform. >> or the lack of. >> or the lack of. this one has a remote system, and it seemed to be used by giving you an additional redundancy, if you will. let's be clear, was this system in place on this rig? does anybody have a suggestion it was? no one's shaking their head yes, so we're assuming there was no acoustical-activated trigger. now, assuming that -- that -- i'll just ask mr. mckay. assuming this acoustically-triggered system would provided an added layer of redundancy that could operate in physical connection between the blowout preventer and the rig, would bp be willing to accept that technology as best available technology? >> we would accept anything that improve upon what we have in terms of redundancy.

i would ask experts that. we'd be willing to do that if looked like it would help anything. >> was it considered by british petroleum to require that in its operations at any time? >> i don't know. >> could you find that out and let us know? do any of the other witnesses have information about that as to whether or not the akustically-triggered device was ever considered by british petroleum? do you have any information or any other witnesses? >> i would not. >> no information, no. >> i don't think it would be appropriate for me to comment on what bp may or not may have considered. >> well, we'll look forward to your letting us know, mr. mckay. there's been some press reports that the cost dissuaded british petroleum from installing this additional safety mechanism. so we'll be interested to see what you find out in your review. i want to ask about the capability of this shang system. and i have to just tell you, as a layperson, i've been disturbed

by the lack of reliability of this system from what i have been able to look at. i'm looking at a document. it's a study done from the u.s. minerals management service by west engineering services of december 2002. and the report suggested they testedeveral of these blowout preventers, and said if you take in -- if operational considerations ofhe initial drilling program for accounted for sheering success dropped to 3 of 6, 50%. 50% is not something that gives u huge confidence. the report goes on to say, west, that's the contractor here who did the investigation, west is unaware of any regulatory requirements that state the obvious. that the b.o.p. must be capable of sheering pipe planned for use in the current drilling program. apparently there's no regulatory requirement that there's been a

demonstration of a particular b.o.p. to sheer a particular pipe of a particular situation. is that accurate? mr. moore, you might be the one most knowledgeable. >> let me respond to that, because cameron -- cameron took a position on this in 2007 with the study that we did with our own information on sheering capabilities where we plotted across a matrix of low, medium and high-sheer rates to sheer certain size drill pipe. we took the top end of that. we took the maximum range in which sheer pipes should be sheered. because sheer pipe is different strengths at different hardnesses, so it's not all together exactly consistent. >> thank you. i appreciate that, mr. moore. i have a real quick question i want to ask mr. mckay. in september 14th, 2009, bp sent a letter to u.s. department of

u.s. mineral management. you said, quote, while bp is supportive of companies have a sp in place to reduce sks, zentss, injuries and spills we're not supportive of the extensive prescriptive regulations as proposed in this rule, signed by richard morrison, vice president. gom production. do you plan on revisiting that production by bp in light of this incident? >> everything we learn in this incident will be relative in terms of what regulation should be going forward. >> i'll be introducing a bill here shortly that will require the use to best available technologies. it's most investigated in part because of the absence of this particular safety device, this acoustic device we're talking about. i would appreciate your consideration. thank you. >> i would thank you mr. inslee. ms. caps for questions, please. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. thank you for testifying today each of you.

today more than 1 million feet of barrier and servant boom has been deployed along shorelines in the gulf and in the open water. i guess i should acknowledge, first, that i'm from santa barbara, my district represents the central coast of california. i was a resident in santa barbara with my young family in 1969. i know a bit about boom. 3,000 gallons of oil dispersant has been applied from the air, this is a newer technology than i'm familiar with and nearly a mile under water. and controlled burns have been used to ignite oil on the ocean surface. which we have seen in the past. these measures sound impressive, but i'd like to hear from our witnesses art their efficacy. mr. newman, your company produced a document to the committee that outlines the advantages and disadvantages of different cleanup strategies. it's at tab nine of your

document binder. on the first page of the document, in a section that examines the strategy of using floating boom to contain oil, the last point warns that, quote, and this is a quote from that document, that recovery rate of oil under the best circumstances rarely exceeds 15%. and i canctually give testimony to that fact. it's the same technology that was usedn 1969 in santa barbara off the coast. mr. newman, am i reading this document correctly? is the best-case scenario for boom collection really only 15% of spilled oil? >> based on the information that i have reviewed since the incident occurred i believe that is -- that that percentage is directionally accurate, yes. >> and that's one of our best technologies that we have available at this time. it's not a very impressive rate of recovery. more disturbing is the fact that the rest of the proposed

techniques are not particularly effective either. the plan cautions that chemical dispersant, quote, and i quote, must be used within the first 24 hours to be effective. d that burning, quote, and i quote, causes air pollution. and, again, another quote, may leave tarry residue that will wash up on the shorelines or sink to the bottom. the plan also warns, in all capital letters, and this is another quote from the plan, experience has shown the shoreline cleanup operations often cause more environmental damage than if the oil were left alone. i -- i think -- it's really so shocking to me, having lived through this in my community, in 1969 that's 40-plus years ago. and as was given in an opening

statement, it's more than 100 years since the first offshore drilling was done along my coastline. that this multibillion dollar oil exploration industry has not come up with more effective strategies to contain the damage from a leaking deep-sea well. the technologies that i know others have said this. the technologies have been perfected to get down there and to go after it. why -- and i'm going to ask the rest of you, with whatever time remains, why was there not equivalent technology developed to clean up after a spill? whether a small spill or a huge spill, at the very same time. using some of the profits that have been generated in each of the companies that you represent. the cost of doing it now, after the fact, is the cost that you

will bear, but there's no way you'll come close to bearing the cost that our nation will bear. the shrimpers, the oyster folks, all of the people and not to mention untold disasters that lie ahead day after day after day. i represent a coast with oil drilling. we are still drilling. the same platform "a" that drilled and spilled in 1969 is pumping oil today. 20 platforms off the coast in my district. each spill, and there are many of them, and they are unique. the environment in the gulf is extremely complex. yet, we do not -- excuse me one minute. we don't understand, yet, how these symptoms -- systems interact with and respond to oil. these complex coastal areas that

we treasure. and i hope that this topic is something we will continue to explore in future hearings. and with -- ten seconds. i'd like to see if one of you has any further comment to make. >> i would just comment we're working very closely with all the government agencies, epa, coast guard, who coast guard deals with spills all over our coastal areas all over the countries. we're using the best available technology at scale. this is the largest effort that's ever been put together, so we're -- we believe we're using the best technology. if we have any other ideas -- >> you ner had any until it happened. >> well, we've been drilling with the coast guard for years, and -- >> did you develop technologies for dealing with this? >> not individually technologies for this, no. >> i rest my case. >> thank you. mr. engel, for question please. we have three votes but let's get to these questions. >> gentlemen, yesterday there was testimony, as you know,

before the senate, and what, you know, came out of there was a bunch of finger pointing. everybody pointed a finger at somebody else. everybody was making excuses and alibis, and the american public is obviously outraged. i'm outraged. it's very difficult to believe a lot of the things that we're hearing. i want to ask some very basic questions, because we've gone into a lot of the technical things and gone on and on. generally we've been told, for the past several years in congress, that offshore drilling is safe, that we need nt worry about what happens. if there any kind of an accident, don' worry because there are backuple systems and there's a backup system for the backup system. then we find out none of this is true. if there have been improvements in drilling techniques through the years, why apparently have there been no corresponding improvements in preventing oil

spills or is it -- is it there's simply no ironclad way to prevent spills like these in the future? is that what you're telling us? mr. mckay? >> this has been an unprecedented event. in the gulf of mexico, alone, there are have been over 42,000 wells drilled in the last 50 years, and this is an unprecedented event. we've got to learn what caused this and what to do to make sure this doesn't happen again. we're dedicated to do that. i know the committee is as well. all i can say is the industry has been safe and been clean for quite a while, and this is an unprecedented event we have to figure out. >> mr. mckay, i will bet that i could dig up congressional testimony after the exxon valdez mess, where people said literally the same thing you're saying now, that this is a once in a lifetime thing,t cannot happen again. we were told it cannot happen

again what happened up in alaska in 1989. so why should we believe you any more than we could have believed those people that told us the same thing after the exxon valdez spill in alaska? >> my confidence is because i think we're going to figure out what caused this. both the events that caused the explosion as well as why the blowout preventer didn't work. i think we will solve this and allow us to be safer going forward. >> would any of the other gentlemen care to comment? >> i think all of us -- all of us are committed to trying to find out what did take place and put steps in place that are necessary to make this a safer and -- safer and sounder future for us in terms of oil and gas exploration. >> there's currently a $75 million liability cap. i understand, mr. mckay, y say bp has not adhered to that. you're going higher. is that true? >> that's true. we'll go over that if it's

needed. absolutely. >> should the cap be raised? i know senator menendez introduced legislation to raise it to $10 billion. shld we just lift the cap? is that something that congress should consider? >> i was asked that question yesterday. i don't know the specifics of that legislation. i would just say it's not relevant in this case. >> we have an 8 cent a barrel tax assessed to oil companies and proceeds go into a cleanup service. should that tax be modified and that money be spent differently? >> i think that will just have to be revied in the context of what we learn through this. >> how about the -- an administration proposal to split the minerals management service into two parts? one with oversight responsibilities for the oil industry, and another that would provide drilling leases and collect federal royalties on the operations. do you have any comments on that or support or oppose it and why? >> i don't have any specific comments on that. >> anybody else? >> no specific comments other

than to say that that is not on unusual process in a number of foreign jurisdictions. >> i just want to say in conclusion that i'm just really agitated andaggravated. nobody in this room, certainly the four of you, didn't want this to happen. nobody wanted this to happen. this is a terrible tragedy, but when we get assurances from the oil industry year in and year out that this cannot happen and that we should drill, baby, drill, and we should keep expanding the drilling, and then the worst actually happens, i just don't know how we could ever believe anything that we hear from the oil industry. it just -- it just boggles my mind as to how this could happen and 20 years from now there will be another congress sitting here and there will be another oil spill and they'll be saying the same things that you gentlemen are saying now. i'm not convinced and i'm,

frankly, very, very angry. i yield back, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. engel. i want to sotart a second round of questions. at least try to get in the first round of questions then break and we'll come back. mr. newman, ms. caster was asking a number of questions about the blowout preventer and testing on the surface, the sea surface. it says that the testing of the emergency systems would show whether the system will work when installed and show that there were no leaks that would diminish the system's integrity. bp, in a memo of april 27th, has recommendations. it says that the risk in testing emergency systems in sub-sea testing are manageable and bp recommends these systems be tested in the future. i'm glad bp's recommending improved testing going forward, but my question is, this testing, what's done on the b.o.p. for testing when it's on the sea floor?

>> if i could clarify the response to the question. b.o.p. is an immense piece of equipment. it's about 55 feet tall. it's about 20 feet square. it weighs over 300 tons. it's a combination of a number of valves that are intended to close off the well, and it's got over 100 other smaller valves that function -- >> i realize all that. it's 45 tons. i realize all that. what testing is done when it's on the sea floor? >> componenty component we work our way up to ensure that the function closes and that it will hold pressure. >> okay. >> those are the required tests that are conducted every two weeks. >> okay. >> to confirm that the system functions and that it will hold pressure. in the intervening seven days there is another set of tests which served to confirm that the system still functions. >> that's just pressure tested? you don't check for the valves to see if they're leaking, right? like we have here, we have a leaked valve here, right?

>> those tests would confirm whether or not the system has any leaks in it as well. >> so this leaky valve, the hydraulic leaking valve that i brought up earlier in my opening statement and asked questions about, you're saying your tests uld have showed that? >> absolutely. >> then, mr. newman, in this thing, cameron officials told us the problem was that someone overlooked the tightening of a fitting. all these other fittings on the hydraulic system were snug, but this one had not been tightened and it was, lick, several turns backed off. so how can you explain -- how's this possible that one valve -- if your testing was there it would have showed the one valve was leaking would it not? >> if that one valve was leaking during the testing the testing would have demonstrated that. the document i was handed a few minutes ago which is a record of a b.o.p. function test that you will see that the gallon counts are recorded to the first decimal point, which is a very

accurate record of -- >> that's a pressure -- i'm talking about the emergency testing, like the deadmen's switch and these rams and that. what do you do ttest those when it's on the floor? what's the e her jans for the emergency teing? >> what the auto ser function and the deadman function do is serve to activate the b.o.p. they operate the control system and they close the valves. so the independent testing that we conduct on a regular basis confirms the same thing. that -- >> how about the emergency power source? that's where we found the leaky valve, the loose fitting. emergency power source. was that checked? >> the emergency power source, that's -- >> for the hydraulic line. >> that's a terminology i'm unfamiliar with, congressman, so i can't tell you specifically what that would be in reference to. >> mr. moore, is -- am i correct there's an emergency power system that could be checked while on the sub floor? >> would this behe system that sits in the sim that is kind of

like the brain that weights -- >> the control. yes. >> i'm not sure of how that would be tested by transocean, congressman. >> would your technical guy know the answer to that? >> we can surely ask him. david? >> go ahead. i've got to ask you to raise your right hand, take the oath. do you swear affirm the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, whole truth and nothing but the truth for this matter. >> i do. >> please state your name for the record and who you work for. >> david mcquarter, i work for cameron. should you repeat the question. >> state your name for the record and who you work for. >> david mccorter. i work for cameron international. >> there's a hydraulic power source. you want to explain that to us, do the emergency testing and shut things down? >> i believe you were referring

to the accumulating banks where the hydraulic energy is in effect satisfactoried for emergency operations. >> yes. >> what testing can be done to check that when it's on the sea flr? >> on the sea floor, you can fire that function. >> how do you fire that function? >> push a button on the surface. >> is that a test that would impair the jeopardy of the blowout protecter while on the sea floor? >> it would depend what was in the well bore at the time the test was conducted. >> this is one of the tests that was not done here in this -- in this -- you have no record of this test ever being donedo you? >> we have no records of any tests, sir. >> do you have any tests of that being done when they pushed the button to see if the hydraulic line worked in the emergency? >> if mr. mccorter is talking about large bottles attached to the b.o.p., they contain hydraulic fluid at pressure. those systems are recharged

using the surface system -- >> if there were a leak in the sub sea accumulators, that would require that the surface system be regularly operating to recharge the leak. that wub recorded as a volumetric leak. >> is there record you tested it, that you pressed that button? >> there's no way to test the susea accumulator system. >> after the explosion you did go and push into this little valve or dye test. you push the button. it didn't work. that's when you did the dye test, correct? that's when the dye test showed there was hydraulic leak and that the fitting was very loose, correct? >> during the post-explosion intervention efforts a number of operations were conducted on the b.o.p. >> right. >> where the remote-operated

vehicles through a variety of configurations supplied hydraulic power to the system. during one of those operations we did not -- we did not see the anticipated pressure response in response to that indication, we conducted troubleshooting operations. and those troubleshooting operations identified a leak on the system. >> and the leak was because the valve wasn't screwed on tightly, layman's term, right? >> i believe that's correct. yes. >> okay. is that correct, mr. mccorter? >> there was a leak that was discovered sub sea, yes, sir. >> any reason why it couldn't have been discovered before? >> i really -- >> other than the test not being done? >> there's probably a number of reasons, sir. okay. our time is up. we have votes. one more question. mr. mckay, in answer to mr. sullivan's question, you said the best way to stop this is a b.o.p., right?

that's your top kill, i think your exact words were. >> that's one of the big options, yes. absolutely. >> is there any way to put another b.o.p. on this? >> yes, we've been trying to get diagnostic determination inside that b.o.p. to understand what's happening, understand whether pressure's dropped. >> you'd have to take the riser off and put another one on top? >> yes. >> once you take that riser off it's possible you could have greater oil and gas gushing up through the hole? >> that's exactly right. that's why we're using gamma rays and pressure measurements -- >> if that riser came off and starts gushing up greater than what it's doing right now, can you get a b.o.p. back on there? >> that's one of the issues we're working. >> my time is up. when we come back, mr. burgess will be questioned. we'll be in ress for a half hour. weave three votes. gentlemen, we'll see you in a half hour. we're in recess.

mexico oil spill by the mmittee. resuming after a short break,

live coverage on c-span3. >> in answer to an earlier question that the obama administration, the white house and the cabinet had been helpful during this event. is that a fair statement? do i rememberou saying that correctly? >> yes, i think the administration and his cabinet, yes. >> have you been to the white house since the accident occurred? >> yes, i've not seen the president, but i've met with secretary napolitano and secretary salazar and other administration officials, yes. >> would -- mr. chairman, could i ask that the wte house make available to us the -- any minutes or notes or e-mails that would be relevant to that meeting? >> well, as the gentleman knows, he can ask. i'm not guaranteeing what kind of response you are going to get, but, yes, you can ask. >> i just think it would be helpful to -- were you the only executive of an oil company who was -- who was there, or were --

was this a collaborative response from many people who work in the industry to try to help solve a problem? >> this was the meetings that i am talking about were myself and tony hayward, big bp. both of us bp. >> are you aware of any other meetings that have occurred with executives of other companies? >> i'm not aware on this particular issue. >> when -- can ask you when that meeting occurred? >> there have been several over the last -- over the three-week period that we've been in. >> okay. when would the first meeting have been in? >> within the first week of the accident, i believe. >> and that information, mr. chairman, should be available to us with white house logs if they will furnish us that information. do i understand that correctly? >> well, again, mr. burgess, as you know, because you've used the procedure before.

i'll put the request in writing and submit it to the white house. i'm not sure with the extent of the discussions and what is appropriate, what is not. i know when we speak about energy or energy policy, there's been some reluctance of the courts because under the cheney energy committee -- >> i -- >> will the gentleman yield? >> no, because my time is limited. >> we'll give you back an extra 30 seconds. >> yeah, i know you will. thank you. it would just be helpful to us. we will put that in writing. beside from the secretary napolitano and secretary salazar, i assume department of interior was there. were there white house staff present? chief of staff? deputy chief of staff? >> no. >> just peoplerom the agency? >> there were another carolyn bro browner -- >> certainly to the extent that these involved agency personnel, department of interior, department of homeland security, we as the oversight body of this congress should have the ability to get that information.

that's not, in my understanding, that should not be covered under executive privilege. so i will make that request in -- >> will the gentleman yield, if you're going to make a request because it's going to come to me and i'd like a clarification. if the chairman will yield you an additional minute. >> i'll yield you an additional minute. >> sdwhat he wish to requt? the log of these visitors and the fact they were at the white house meet with people within the administration? >> yes, and i'd like to know what was discussed. >> i don't know that you are entitled to that. but the white house already posts its logs as to who comes and and meets with -- this is something we didn't have in the previous administration. they do have a posti of the log and you can easily find out who came in from the outside and who met with people in the white house. i don't know why you would be entitled to have the discussions or notes or anything like that. i don't know what the precedent is for asking that. >> we are having a great deal of difficulty getting to the actual causation. this is the second hearing.

we had one closed hearing last week. this is an open hearing. but we're really having a lot of difficulty getting to causation. a lot of people are talking past each other. i just think if there was a frank discussion at the white house that we might benefit from the information that was exchanged that day. >> the gentleman, i'll certainly take it under advisement. >> i thank the chairman for the consideration. i'm not sure if i'm going to pronounce your name correctly. mr. moor obviously, deals with the blow-up protector, but if -- i think if i understand the situation correctly, the blow-up protector is not the primary control of the well. that would actually be the material in the drill shaft itself, the mud that would be the primary control. is that correct? >> yes, that would be correct. >> and you in your testimony, talked about and it intrigued me because it was the same thing i read in the new orleans paper

last friday that was there a removal of the drilling mud from the stack. the initial plug, the -- or the -- one cement plug had been placed. the drilling mud was removed and replaced with sea water and before the second plug was placed, the accident occurred. is that correct? >> the process was, first of all, for a positive test which was conducted by transocean. the second procedure was then to do a negative test, which is also conducted by transaction but priors removing drilling fluid from the drilling pipe and then subsequently, after the -- after a successful negative test to the extent the tests were successful then, they would go ahead and evacuate and replace the drilling flu nid in the ris with sea water in advance of setting the plug and then ultimately pulling off the well. i would defer to mr. newman if i have any part of that process

incorrect. >> we reported in the "times picuyne" that it was removed at a point prior to where it would normally have been removed and replaced with sea water spp that an error on the part of the paper reporting that? >> i think the question and point that was raised and it was raised in testimony yesterday was that when you replace the drilling flu nid the riser with sea water you reduce the density, effective density effectively. had there not been a successful negative test, then that would clearly be a situaon which would be problematic for the wellsince you are reducing the hydrostatic pressure on the well. >> but the test wasn't successful. >> i have no knowledge of that. >> did anybody have any knowledge of that? that's the negative test 1400 psi applied to the drill stack

and the no pressure recorded in the chokes, the dead man's cut-off or whatever it is. is that a positive test or a negative? is that -- i got the impression that was not a good result. is that correct? >> the actual results of the test, congressman, were first reported to me by chairman waxman today in chairman waxman's statement. and, to my knowledge -- to my knowledge prior to this hearing, i was not aware of the resus. i think chairman waxman alluded to some confusion with respect to those test results. and that's what i know about the test results. >> but if i'm understanding mr. probert correctly if the test was not the expected result, then it may not be a good idea to pull off the drilling mud and reduce the hydrostatic pressure on the column over the drill shaft. did i understand your statement correctly about that? you said if the test was correct

then it wouldn't be a problem to reduce the hydrostatic pressure by removing the mud. but the test wasn't correct. the mud was still removed. is that the problem with what happened? and feel free to enter into the discussion. >> i think -- i mean, what i believe is there were discrepancies it appears in that negative test where you had 1400 psi on the drill pipe and zero on the choke and kill lines. i think the investigation needs to look hard at how that information was disseminated or used and decisions made off of it and who and what decisions were made after that point. >> wt wld be drilling best practice if you encountered an anomaly like that? to go ahead and remove the mud or find out what the problem is and then -- >> i can't speculate on that. i think this is one of the key things the investigation is going to have to look at. >> do you think it would ever be okay to have hydrostatic

pressure on the column -- would it ever be okay to remove that hydrostatic pressure of the mud column if that test wasn't satisfactory? would there ever be a reason, it's okay, do that because we go ahead and do it all the time. >> i haven't seen all the data. i can't speculate on that. >> okay, time, mr. burgess. >> thank you, mr. chairman. chairman waxman for questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. want to go back to this issue as well. the question of the negative pressure tests that we discussed earlier and the discrepancies and the negative pressure test performed on the well on the day of the blowout. and all of you seem to agree that this would be a significant issu and it would be a central question in the investigation. but i have a document. i think it's been given to you, mr. mckay. it's an e-mail. i thought it had been given to you in advance.

and the e-mail talks about the testing procedures. can you tell me whether these procedures were followedn the 20th? >> i cannot tell you whether they were followed. >> okay. and that the last line of the document, and this is -- by the way, this is an e-mail, an internal e-mail from bp, and it indicates the things that would be done if there was a negative test that wasn't -- that showed a discrepancy. and the last line says that we would send to houston for confirmation, send to houston for confirmation. i assume this refers to bp's office in houston?

>> i would imagine so. >> were the test results sent to houston for confirmation before you resumed well operations on the 20th of april? >> it looks like to me. i have to examine this. it looks like to me this is after the last plug would have been set. we'd have to review this. but i don't know if it was sent to houston or not. that last plug didn't get sent. >> this e-mail sets out the procedure as i understand it for bp when you have a problem with that negative test. they indicate the things that should be done and the last one is you send it to houston. do you know whether the results were sent to houston before the well was back in operation? >> i don't believe so. i believe the explosion occurred bere number six happened. >> so you don't -- is it fair to say you don't believe the officials in houston approved the resumption of the operations

of the well? >> i don't know. >> was mms involved in the discussions, to your knowledge? >> i don't know. >> okay. there have been reports that shortly before the blowout, the bp began displacing drilling mud with sea water. do you know it'sf that's accura? >> that's what i've been told but i haven't reviewed it. >> did bp's office in houston approve this procedure? did they sign off on the decision to displace mud with sea water after the negative pressure test discrepancy? >> i don't know. >> okay. do you know whether mms signed off on this procedure? >> i am not familiar with the procedure, nor am i familiar with who may have or may not have signed off on it. >> you aren't familiar with the predure itself within bp on how to deal with a negative test? >> notn this particular well, no. >> you have a technical expert

with you. could we -- could you ask your technical expert for information in thisregard? >> yes. could you repeat the question, please? >> well, i wanted to know if this document sets out the procedure within bp when there's a negative test that's indicates there's a problem. and i also want to know if the bp office in houston approved this procedure and whether they signed off on the decision to displace mud with sea water after negative pressure test discrepancy.

>> what my expert has told me, this is the procedure that would have been used with the mms procedure, the sundry procedure. he doesn't know, nor do i know whether this was communicated to -- confirmed to houston. what i would say reading this, it looks like it's a procedure to get through the setting of the last plug after a successful negative test. >> after a successful negative test? >> well, that's the way it looks to me. >> i see. so after a successl negative test, you would contact houston to have them sign off on the well >> the send to houston for confirmation looks like the last step after the final cement plug is set which never happened. >> why did it not happen? >> i don't know. that's what we all need to know. >> so i'd like you to get for the record, the information as to whether houston was notified, whethe houston approved the procedure, whether they signed off on the decision to displace mud with sea water after the

negative pressure test discrepancy d whether mms signed off on this procedure. am i correct in assuming your technical expert bieved that mms had to sign off on this as well do you know? >> the tempary abandonment, mms would have a broad procedure that mms would have signed off on. >> the broad procure. >> i can't say if this matches that or if it's exactly -- >> if you can get us more information for the record, i'd appreciate it. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. barton for questions, please. >> well, i thank you, chairman, and i thank our witnesses for continuing to be here. i want to take a little bit different tact this round of

questions. i think what chairman waxman just asked was very appropriate. i think those are good questions. and i think they deserve thoughtful responses. but i want to take a little bit broader view. my first question, does each of you at the panel support drilling in our coastal waters? is there anybody that thinks we ought to suspend drilling in the outer continental shelf because of this accident? say yes or no or nod your head. give some -- >> congressman, i think a pause, similar to what secretary salazar has asked for. i think a pause is prudent to reassess ongoing operation in the gulf of mexico. but i believe that energy is so important to our economy and the gulf of mexico is a domestic source of that energy that i believ that continued drilling in the outer continental shelf is fundamental to the u.s.

economy. >> do you all support drilling in the ultra deep gulf? >> i have confidence we're going to figure out what happened here and that if there are improvements and there probably will be some that need to be made, will be made, and i have confidence that the deep water and ultra deep water can be developed and it's important to be developed. >> if this accident had occurred onshore under exactly the same scenario, you had a well that was a 20,000-foot well that had the capability to produce somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 barrels per day, and in the switching it over, getting it ready for production, you had an unexplained event that caused a blowout. would that event onshore be fixed by now? if everything was the same except it wasn't in 5,000 feet of water it was on shore texas or louisiana, would you have the

well under control by now? >> let me try that. i think intervention is easier onshore, obviously, because you can get equipment and people around it easier than 5,000 feet of water. but there have been blowouts onshore that require relief wells to be drilled. so i don't think you can say on shore it would be easy and offshore it's not. relief wells are things that have to be used sometimes onshore. >> but the likelihood is that the complicating factor in trying to cap it, stop it, staunch it is that you are 5,000 feet down and you are operating everything with remote controlled submarines. is that not correct? >> as commandant alan has said you have no ability to have human intervention at 5,000 feet. >> has anybody in position of authority offered any suggestion that has not been accepted? in other words, we've had lots

of members say that y guys are just dopes that you haven't figured out what to do about it yet. that any good college petroleum engineering class ought to be able to figure out what to do and get it done. has anybody in the coast guard, the department of the interior, the mineral management service, office of the president, the office of the vice president, haanybody offered a suggestion that you all have rejected on what to do to solve this problem? >> i am not aware of any suggestions that we haven't been able to take in or to materially change what we're doing. this response is of massive dimension with technical experts from all over the world working, including the government. and there have been no incremental solutions that i know or other parallel paths that i know of topursue. >> well, i've only visited the site one time. we went to the command center for about a one-hour briefing. bumy analysis is that there is excellent cooperation between

the federal government and the private sector and that the coast guard, the admiral who is the on-site commander is making sure that everybody does the best possible to work togethe and that this is not a case where the federal government and the private sector are in an adversarial situation and it seems to me that there is excellent cooperation. do you all agree with that? everybody? >> i do. >> okay. i want to put this in perspeblthive, mr. chairman, before i have to yield back my time. this accident, as far as we know is releasing 5,000 barrels a day into the gf of mexico. it's been doing so for approximately three weeks. that's a little over 100,000 barrels. the largest spill in the gulf of mexico to date was a spill off the coast of mexico.

it produced 90,000 barrels a day for nine months. 90,000 barrels a day for nine months. exxon valid ease was a tanker that ran aground in alaska. that was a supertanker that was 300 to 400,000 barrels of oil. so far, this spill has produced a little over 100,000 barrels. now that's in and of itself a significant spill and it is a nontrivial accident. but it is nowhere near yet the order of magnitude of other accidents that have happened around the world. there is a natural seepage in the oceans around the united states on an annual basis of 4 million barrels a year. there is an annual seepage worldwide of over 40 million barrels of oil per year. so this, while it is an accident, it is nontrivial. it is not of the catastrophic consequences that some in the main stream media have made it out to be. if we workogether and this subcommittee is doing an

excellent job of getting the facts on the table for the american people there is no reason that in the next, hopefully the next week or so, but certainly in the next two months, we'll stop the oil from flowing. we'll come up with new best practices. and if necessary, new technology and new legislation to prevent this in the future. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. barton. mr. brayley for questions. >> thank you mr. chairman. my math certainly is not as good as the ranking member's because he is after all, an engineer. the briefing we received, we were inform these relief wells could take 90 days to complete. and if that is the case and we are not able to cap off the flow of oil and it gets worse, then we will easily in the next 90-day period exceed the quantity of oil spilled by the "exxon valdez." it is not a trivial problem to the people living and whoet their livelihood from the gulf coast. mr. mckabe, we have been reassud by the federal government and you stated today that bp will pay all necessary

cleanup costs and is committed to paying all legitimate economic damages associated with this spill. is bp self-insured for all of these items of loss and damage? >> yes. >> so your corporation will be on the hook. it has not insured any of that risk or reinsured any of that risk is that correct? >> that's correct. >> one of the things i am concerned about is reports that have come out recently, mr. newman, specifically national public radio broadcast dealing with efforts by your company to compel deep water horizon crew members toign forms the day after the accident stating they suffered no injuries from the incident or the evacuation. and yesterday, the committee staff was allowed to review several of those ciped forms. and i want to read for you the key passage for the record. the form states, quote, i was not a witness to the incident

requiring the evacuation and have no firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident. i was not injured as a result of the incident or the evacuation. is it your understanding that was the language in the forms that were presented to your employees? >> that is the language on those forms. >> are you aware of any information given to those employees before they were asked to sign those forms? >> between the time the individuals arrived on shore and the time they were presented with those forms, there was a tremendous amount of information provided to our employees in the form of support, medical care, clothing, food, hotel rooms, discussion with them about how we were going to facilitate their travel. >> okay. let me cut you off. because my question goes to the language in this document. was there a briefing given to them about what was the intent of the form and why they were being asked to sign it? >> because i wasn't there,

congressman, i can't tell you who -- >> who ge them these forms to sign? >>hey would have been presented by the support team that transocean mobilized to louisiana to facilitate the onshore assistance of those individuals as they came in from the wreck. >> how do we get the names of the individuals on that support team? >> we can provide that to you. >> okay. it says in the form, i was not a witness to the incident. what was the incident that was referred to in these firms? >> the incident would have been the well control problem on the rig floor and the subsequent explosions. >> all right. given that description of the incident, there were no witnesses to the incident, were there? >> there are no remaining transocean individuals alive who were on the rig floor at the time of the event. i don't believe so. >> and when it says no firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident, did anybody explain to these employees what that meant? >> again, congressman, because i wasn't there i'm not sure exactly what was explained to

the individuals. >> well, the press reports indicate that the crew members who survived the explosion spent 12 to 15 hours on a nearby vessel as they watched the rig burn and after the survivors made it to shore, your company escorted them to a hotel for questioning. these men, many of whom were exhausted, potentially traumatized and desperate to contact their loved ones had to decide whether or not to sign that form before going home. do you know, m newman, whether these employees were allowed to consult with their personal physicians, counselors or attorneys before they signed those forms? >> congressman, the transocean employees were not forced to sign the form. >> that's not my question. my question was were they allowed to const with a physician, a counselor or their attorneys before they signed the statement? >> because some individuals didn't sign the statement until a week or so after the event, they could have had consultation with anybody they chose to have

consultation with. >> how many individuals waited a week or so after the event to sign the form? i don't know that, but we can provide that to you. >> please, do. they also interviewed on npr, one of the deep water crew members, christopher choi, who did sign the transocean form. he says that he was angry because he wasn't able to talk to his physician or attorney. and let me tell you what his experience was. he saw multiple explosions and flames coming out. we saw men pile into one life boat while two others burned. he saw friends and co-workers with burning flesh and broken nes. he lived through this disaster and saw those things that i hope you and i never have to experience in our life. can you telluo us why he was asd to sign a statement that he had no firsthand or personal knowledge regarding the incident after experiencing that? >> one of our concerns in the aftermath of this ent congressman is to conduct as thorough a fact-finding exercise as we can. and part of the facilitation of

that fact-finding exercise is to identify individuals who might have helpful knowledge. >> wouldn't you agree a reasonable interpretation of the words firsthd or personal knowledge regarding the incident might mean people who had witnessed the aftermath of that explosion and the impact that it had on employees who were working on that ri >> i'm not sure i can. do you wanto engage in a debate about the terminology? >> i'm not trying to engage in a debate. i'm just asking if that wouldn't be a reasonable understanding that someone who had witnessed the things that mr. choi described would have firsthand or personal knowledgeegarding the incident. >> that might be true. >> i yield back. >> thank you. mr. gett for questions, please.

>> thank you very much, mr. chairman. mr. newman, many of the independent experts who looked at the initial reports from the oil spill came to the same conclusion which was that the failure o the cementing process was likely a cause of the blowout. and you said in your statement that we know, quote, with certainty that on april 20th, there was a, quote, sudden catastrophic failure of the cement, the casg or both. how in your opinion, do we know that the cementing or casing or both failed? >> congresswoman, the reservoir that we believe is flowing hydrocarbons is located 13,000 feet below the seabed. the pathway from the reservoir to the seabed should have been barriered off by cement and/or casing. in other words, in order for the hydrocarbon to get from 13,000

feet below the seabed to the seabed, you have to have a failure of one or both of those barrier mechanisms. >> right. and since -- okay. let me ask you this. who is responsible for determining the specifications for the cementing? do you know? mr. mckay? >> i'm speculing, but we would write a spec for what type of casing and the hole conditions, and we would look t halliburton in this case to -- >> your subcontractor? >> so you would do the specifications and then they would modify them as needed, is that correct? >> we would tell them what we want cemented, the type of casing, the hole conditions. >> and mr. probert, i wanted to ask you, halliburton is the largest cementing provider for the oil and gas industry, including both offshore and

onshore drilling. are the techniqs that halliburton uses to cement offshore wells similar to those it uses for onshore oil and gas cementing? >> it's really in many respects a function of the individual well. the basic principles are the same, obviously, a deep and challenging well like this will be cemented quite differently than a well thatill be onshore. >> so there is some difference? not just onshore and offshore but from well to well? >> each well has a unique program. >> mr. moore, i wanted to talk to you a few minutes about the emergency systems on the blowout preventer stack that cameron initial assembled. it seemed to me like several things might have gone wrong that could have been prevented. chairman stupak referred in his statement to the report that several crew members witnessed the emergency disconnect system being engaged. the eds was supposed to close

the sheer ramps and disengage the riser fromhe well. but the eds did not work because neither of thesehings happened. so my question is, cameron doesn't dispute that someone on the deep water horizon pressed the button for the emergency system, does it? >> no, we don't. >> and my understanding is that your technical experts think that something else went wrong. one possibility is that communications between the blowout preventer and the deep water horizon were destroyed before the system fully engaged. can you explain briefly how this would have prevented the emergency system from functioning? >> well, the control pods that function the blowout preventers is actuated. >> a time signal? >> well, it'sinstantaneous. so if you lose that electrical connection to the pod, then that signal would not make it.

>> my understanding is that the eds button wouldn't be hit unless the situation was dire and that would require the communication lines to be intact for another full minute to function. that doesn't seem to anticipate the type of emergency that happened on the deep water horizon. so i want to ask you about another part of the system that might have failed. and that is the emergency disconnect system had a dead man switch. that it would automatically close the sheer ramps and seal the well if sething goes wrong, even if the emergency button is not pressed. we were told by cameron during interviews that in order for the dead man switch to activate, three things had to happen. the communications had to fail, the hydraulics had to fail and the electrical power had to fail. is that correct, mr. moore? >> that is correct. the dead man system is really designed to function when the riser parts from the well head. >> right.

now your engineering expert told us that it's possible the dead man switch did not activate immediately after the explosion because the hydraulic line could have remained intact. is that correct? >> that could be a possibility. >> now, mr. moore, here's the important question then. shouldn't the dead man switch be designated to automatically seal a well once a catastrophic event happens, like the kind of incident that occurred on deep water horizon? >> well, i just repeat that it was designed to function when the riser parts. if the riser is still attached and there is a control line still attached, then it could allow that function to not -- >> right. but in this situation, everything failed and yet the dead man switch didn't activate immediately. >> the riser was still connected to the horizon rig for a couple of days, i believe. >> so you don't -- you don't think it should be automatic --

designed to automatically seal the well if there's a catastrophic situation like this? >> i think that's something we have to look at. >> yeah, i think so, too. >> thank you very much. mr. chairman, i juswant to say one last thing which is, i didn't want to get into a big argument with mr. probert about the liability. but i was a little -- i felt that the witnesses we a little more forth coming today about willingness to clean up the situation. but i was dismayed in his testimony when he talked about -- when he talked about deflecting blame from halliburton by saying that they were simply following bp's well construction plan. because it seems to me that with all of these systems, it's obvious there was a catastrophic failure and it might have been system on every level. and so i'm hoping every player here works collaborative with each other, not just to clean up and pay for these damages, but to identify how it happened, whether it was -- whether it was

a, you know, a perfect storm or whatever it was because otherwise we can't have that faith as we move forward, as i said in my opening statement. we can't have that faith in supporting offshore drilling until we know how we can prevent those failures because while they are rare, they are devasta devastating. thank you. >> if i could just respond and say we are committed to working closely with all parties to ensure that we understand exactly what took place, whatever it may be. anuse it as a basis for improving the safety of operationsoing forward. >> thank you. miss sutton for questions, please. before you begin, let me just -- mr. alese has asked that the article he referred to from the "times picyune" be made part of the record without objection. if you want to deliver it to the witnesses. he may follow it up with some questions. i thought i'd give you guys a chance to at least take a loo at it. miss sutton for questions. five minutes, please.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. i just have to start with some clarification. mr. newman, following up on my colleague, representative braley's line of questions and about the statements that people were asked to sign shortly after e incident, can we have that statement again on the screen. can somebody pull that up? my questn to you is this. are you telling us in this committee and the american people that this statement in asking people to sign this shortly after this unbelievable event had hpened in their lives that you were trying to find out the facts rather than trying to limit your liability? and this is the statement that was used to try n find out the facts? >> with all due respect, congresswoman, there is absolutely no limitation of liability in any of those statements. >> so by my question to you is

then that this statement was offered to these employees because it was an attempt to find out the facts. is that your testimony? >> in the immediate aftermath of the event, congresswoman, our first concern was on the health and well-being of our people. we mobilized a team to south louisiana to meet our people as they came -- >> it's just really a yes or no question. >> it had nothing to do with limiting our liability. >> okay. so again, the question was, are you telling us that this statement you ask them to sign it because you were trying to investigate the facts? and this is the statement you used to further that? >> a statement identifying -- >> it's just a yes or no question. >> a statement identifying individuals who might have helpful information. >> okay. let's move on since you're not going to answer the question. i'll take your failure to answer the question as your answer to the question. can you tell me, do you operate rigs off of norway or brazil? >> we do operate rigs in norway and brazil. >> okay. what kind of a blowout safety

systems do your rigs in other parts of the world have? can you share that with us? >> the rigs aund the world have blowout prevention equipment, similar to what was employed on t deep water horizon. the control systems in two regulatory regis, norway and canada, the control systems require an acoustic backup system as well. >> okay. so i understand. so how much would a duplicate blowout preventer cost. can you tell me that? >> a duplicate blowout preventer, the entire system? >> ye how much would that st? >> i haven't quoted one recently. my guess is in the realm of $15 million. >> okay. let me move on to halliburton and mr. probert. in an incident last year there was a well blown out near auralia. i mentioned it earlier in my questions to mr. mckay. the montero spill. what caused that blowout?

>> there's a commission of an inquiry, which is under way for the montero blowout in australia in the timor sea. the commission hasn't produced its findings. >> so we don't know yet. >> we don't know yet. >> was halliburton involved in the well's cementing? >> we were involved in the well's cementing. what we know from the public testimony is that a five-month period elapsed between the time that cemenng was completed and that the well control issue took place. we also know from the testimony that the well owner in this particular case did not put a surface plug in place torotect the well when the blowout preventer was removed, nor did they put a corrosion cap on t of the well. so the well was left open to the elements for about five months. so i think the inquiry is what we will need to look to to find t exactly what happened. >> so is it possible there's a

relationship to the causes of each of these blowouts in your opinion? >> it's impossible to say until we get details from the inquiry, but it seems unlikely that there's a link. >> does the testing of cement change with the increasing depth of the wells? >> i'm sorry with the increase -- >> does the testing of cement change with the increasing depth of wells? >> well, there are more casing strings which are run as you have seen from the schemeatic on this well. there were actually nine that were run, casing and liner strings. so each one of those is tested. the first eight are tested in a slightly different fashion because we drill out afterwards. because we're going to -- >> i'm just asking about in relation to the depth of the wells. does the testing change? >> as a result of the number of pieces of casing, yes. >> and just let me clarify one other thing. our distinguished colleague, the ranking member of the full committee had mentioned that he

thought that phaps you had been presented as some doltz because you don't know what to do in the aftermath of this incident. but i would just say to the contrary, you were certainly capable of figuring out how to develop and drill and profit from it, but what we're concerned about, what i'm concerned about is that you didn't figure out for whatever reason, and i haven't heard a good reason yet, about how to do it safely so as to prevent this kind of disaster. and the final question i have is at the beginning of the bush administration, there were closed meetings, and i'm glad mr. burgess reminded me of this, held by vice president cheney to discuss issues related to energy policy. and i know that bp participated in those from previous testimony. were any of the other companies, did they have representatives in those meetings, and can you just share with me whether or n you

know if there was any discussion of trying to find ways to responsibly prevent this kind of disaster? >> i don't know whether or not transocean was a participant in that. i think it would be very easy for us to confirm that for the committee. >> i am not aware cameron was either, but we can confirm it. >> i have no knowledge either, but again, we'll look into it and let you know. >> thank you. mr. scalis. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i gave you all a copy of the article that's titled "gas surge well shut." a couple of weeks before gulf oil spill. that was from yesterday. and if you could take a look at that because i still want to get those answers about not only the time that's mentioned in that article but how many times total that well was shut down.

i alsome menwant to refer yeste there was a hearing in new orleans, an investigation that's under way as well, as some of the ones happening here, but there was testimony there, and one of the -- i guess one of the suly ships, the bankston, i guess, supplied the horizon. there was testimony by the first mate of "the bankston" who said weeks before the accident they had to clear mud off the rig because of what they heard was a, quote, loss of circulation. are you familiar about -- with that, that incident where there was mud that had to be cleared off of the rig? mr. mckay or mr. newman? >> i am not aware of that. >> this was a public hearing yesterday, an investigation into this. i would imagine somebody at bp was monitorg this. >> i am sure they were. i am sure they were. i'm just -- >> does your technical expert have any information on that? >> no. >> well, get me whatever you have on it, mr. newman. do you know --

>> i'm not familiar with the details of that event. >> i'd be happy to provide that article as well. this was a hearing and investigation into this. i hopeomebody at transocean and bp know about this and can answer questions about this because this goes to the heart of, was there -- were there a series of problems prior to the explosion that weren't being dealt with. of course if you can't answer it, somebody at bp, somebody at transocean is going to know about this. get me all of that information, but also i want to know what saty changesere made after this one or multiple shutdowns occurred because if a shutdown occurs, that's not something that's supposed to happen, especially if mud is coming out because you aren't controlling the flow of the natural gas. it's a well that's been described here. this was a very difficult well, not a typical well. these are people who were working on this well saying this. you all should know about this because there are other wells that are out there. but if there's a well that's not a typical well that's causing

problems, i would imagine you would take other safety precautions to address that. maybe you didn't. but you need to get me that information as well as the number of times it was shut down. what safety changes were made after those problems were recognized. so moving , it seems like, and this is something else that's discussed in the first article i gave you. it seems like there was a disagreement, a serious -- it's described as a heated disagreement between bp, transocean and halliburton regarding the process of removing the mud and putting in the sea water. and this was -- this was described as being prior to the -- prior to the cement being completed. now, first of all, i'll let each of the three parties that are mentioned here there newman, do you know about a disagreement between the parties on what is the best way to install or to remove the mud and when to remove the mud and how much to

remove? your all in agreement or do you know -- >> congressman, i'm not aware of any disagreement. the first reference to any confusion with respect to what was happening on the rig, i learned of during chairman waxman's opening comments today. >> mr. mckay? >> same thing. that's the first i'd heard of that. >> mr. probert. >> halliburton would not normally be involved in that process, so i can't imagine that there would be any disagreement. >> well, again, i mean, there are people who were on that rig saying that this heated disagreement occurred. is it a standard protocol then for the process that was used to remove the mud and replace it with sea water? is this a permanent process? did you have a file a plan for just how that process was going to go because, clearly, there were some problems and it could be one of the main problems in relation to the explosion. is this a standard process for when to remove the mud or is it something that you all kind of

decided there on the spot? i'll go agai mr. newman. >> displacing the riser with sea water to recover the drilling mud is a normal part of the well abandonment process. >> so it's not something that should be disagreed upon by the parties involved? >> the removal -- the displaceament of the riser to sea water is -- should note a subject of disagreement. that -- >> mr. mckay, is that -- >> part of the normal process of abandoning the well. >> i believe the procedure is part of the temporary abandonmentundry notice that's filed with the mms. and it's -- >> so there as well have been a standard protocol filed with mms on this displacement procedure? >> i believe that the procedure would be filed with the temporary abandonment sundry notice, yes. >> okay. if you can give me a copy of that as well. and then mr. probert if you know of any disagreement there, or just is that a standard process? >> i believe it's part of a standard process.

>> okay. >> and was that the process, mr. mckay was that the point where you were when the explosion occurred? do you know exactly where in the process -- what operation was being performed on the rig at the time of the explosion? >> i don't know the exact time. i mean, this is what the investigation is working on. we have an investigation that started gathering the information that you oar some of it is witness accounts we haven't been able to talk to you. >> and this is -- i'm out of time now. but final question. in terms of the process of paying the fishermen and all others whose livelihoods are directly impacted by their inability to go and earn a living right now because of this, what is the process for getting them reimbursed? clearly, there are a lot of people very nervous. one more week, two more weeks might be the difference between them going bankrt or having their house foreclosed. what is that process and what kind of assurance can you give that those people directly impacted will be able to be made whole in a quick, reasonable amount of time? >> we have a process under way

to meet people's needs on the coast immediately. we've got claims numbers to call. we've actually got community centers to visit as we. we've paid out, i think, over 1,000 claims already. and most of it is to fishermen who aren't working. and need it for their cash flow. and that's where our emphasis has been so far. if you could provide that process to the committee as well. thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. scalise. thank you, mr. burgess. we have a few more questions and then we'll wrap up this hearing. so let's go one more round. five minutes each plp newman, i would like to ask you about the risk and hazard analysis that your company performed regarding the blowout preventer four days in august of 2003. transocean personnel examined every possible hazard on the deep water horizon rig to figure out what could possibly lead to a major accident. transocean evaluated the safety of the blp and fou that even though b.o.p.s had failed in the past, e likelihood of a b.o.p.

failure was low because it was not a frequent occurrence. transocean the rated the severity of a b.o.p. failure as extremely severe, which means the risk could result in multiple fatalities or a massive oil spill. your staff new years ago that the b.o.p. component failure would inflict major damage on your crew, your company and the environment. so my question is, why wouldn't you do more to protect against the b.o.p. failure? if i put your company's risk analysis on the screen, and tab seven in the book there if you want to look at it. it's the last page of tab seven of that document. the environmental catastrophe taking place now is one of those predicted as possible by your experts. first it says possible blowout with possible multiple fatalitiesnd possible loss of rig. second, possible environmental impact.

to preventive measures listed here including testing, inspections and maintenance. yet today as i mentioned in my opening, it's been mentioned a couple of times today, the b.o.p. had a leaky hydraulic system, dead battery and a configuration or design that interfered with the b.o.p. safety features. so, mr. newman if you knew the risk, did the company take the necessary safeguards for the b.o.p.? i mean, isn't there something more you could have done to make sure knowing the extreme severity of an accident to make sure this b.o.p. was working accurately? >> over the last several years we've continued to improve our maintenance practices with respect to blowout preventers and we preventers and continued to apply rigorou and strict testing protocols on a regular basis that would identify any failure. >> what about, you know, because we heard a lot about the deadman switch, just the batteries, do you have any tests developed to

make sure the battery also work, so if everything else works we it k close this? >> we test the batteries when the b.o.p. is on the surface. >> when was this b.o.p. put in the water? >> i believe it was put in the water the first week of february. >> that would be about two or three months. i guess my question is this. when you get done with this b.o.p., say we didn't have this problem, do you use b.o.p.s over and over? >> yes. >> okay. this is 2001 this b.o.p. was manufactured. have they improved since 2010 in the last nine years have we had improvements in the b.o.p.s to make them more safeguards so we don't have the failures of leaking valves and dead batteries and make sure they work, do we have n improved b.o.p.s? >> the technology that was deloped in the late 1990s, when the industry first built rigs capable of operating in

10,000 feet of water. >> sure. >> is largely the same as what's employed today. >> do you hav new, improved ones, mr. moore? >> congressman, over a ten-year period, yes, things do evolve but we built our stacks in the last 20 to 30 years and properly maintained and used in the environment in which there designed for. >> let me ask you this because it cam up earlier, acoustic b.o.p. would be a redundancy system. knowing what we know about this accident, if we had an acoustic b.o.p. as a redundant system, would they have shut off, pinched off this pipe so we uldn't have this oil coming out? >> the answer to that question, chairman, depends on what's inside the b.o.p. >> correct. >> if the b.o.p. is somehow being evented from functioning correctly, then another means of activating the b.o.p. would not have offered any implement -- >> would an acoustic b.o.p. be stacked or off to,omehow off to the side to crimp this pipe? how would that work?

>> what we're talking about, chairman, is an acoustic control system. >> right. >> it is another means of activang the b.o.p. it's not another b.o.p. >> okay >> it's simply another means of activating the b.o.p. >> here in order to activate this b.o.p., testimony has been they probably hit theutton on a rig when they realize the problem was going on, hit the button to activate the b.o.p. and you had to sever the communication, the power, and the hydraulic lines. two out of three we know did work, the communications and power were cut, the hydraulic lines are still intact, therefore, the deadman switch didn't work, correct? >> we're not sure the hydraulic line was severed but if it wasn't it would not know. >> if we had an acoustics on there, would that have shut down this b.o.p.? >> it would be a method to shu it down if there wasn't anything inside that b.o.p. that wasn't -- >> we'll never know that until we get the b.o.p. off. >> we won't know that until we see it. >> mr. mckay, we ask for your

risk registry. we still haven't received it. will you see weet your risk registry for gulf operations, would you please provide that to us? >> yes. >> i'm over my time. >> mr.burgess, five minutes for questions, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. lois capps was asking questions about the work that's gone on in the last 30 yearss far as the mitigation of a spill when it happs. now, there's a disbursement that was beinginjected, placed on the water and being injected at the site of the spill that, dispersa dispersant, is that something new or been around for awhile and anyone feel free to answer that. >> this technology is new. this is the first time it's been used at any scale and -- >> who's responsible for who has been responsible for the development of that product? >> nalco, i believe nalco chemical is the manufacturer.

>> i guess i'm a little confused. the epa, you all approached the epa for permission to use the dispersant below the surface. how long did it take to get the approval to use that? >> well, we've requested several attempts, and the have been three tests, the last one ended yesterday, i think, at 4:00 something in the morning, that was a 24-hour test. looks like the impact was really good. we've asked for the epa to allow us to continue. i don't know as of yet if we've gotten the approval yet but we're ready to go on connuous injection. >>ypically how long does it take to get epa approval to use a new material like that? >> i don't know. i don't know. >> now, i know of a college in my district in denton, texas, university of north texas does a lot of research on nano materials an they've got what they call noble medical -- noble metal nanoparticles as well as porous metal organic frameworks

that can absorb petroleum selectively and to a large differential, are you guys looking at using anything along those lines? >> absolutely. i think it was a bit misleading earlier on technology, this industry has massively, massively scaled up for oil spill response in the gulf coast using all technologies. >> right,oesn't have to be hay bales shot over the gulf. therere large scale, the ability to do large scale dispersion. massive amount of equipment on the gulf coast. >> okay. t me -- now just going back to the pressure differential for a moment, mr. mckay, mr. nean, either one of you. when you get -- you know, a lot of what's happened today or a lot of the questions that have come up today kind of relate to who's in charge. i guess, mr. newman, really it's transocean, the ofhore operations manager or whatever it's called, that is the person who is ultimaty in charge of everything on the rig. that's the captain of the ship, right? >> if i could clarify that,

congressman, an offshore drilling rig is a complex piece of equipment. there's a hotel out there to provide accommodation for the workers when they're not working. there's a power plant on the rig. there are -- >> but somebody's ultimately in charge of decisions, is there not? >> the offshore installation manager is ultimately responsible for the maintenance of the rig, for the material handling operations on the rig, for the condition of the hotel on the rig. the offshore installation manager cedes decision-making to the customer representative when it comes to decisions that respect the well bore. >> when you've got an amamalous result on the pressure differential, is it ever appropriate and really mr. newman or mr. mckay, either one of you can answer this, is it ever appropriate to seek the advice or the permission, what is the role of the middle management service when something like that occurs? >> i don know in a specific situation like that.

>> we're going to override an anamalous result and remove the drilling mud which is the primary protector, the blowout, the primary protector of the well blowing out, would you have ever consulted with any regulator at the federal level or is that just not done? >> i can't speculate on when a federal regulator would be contacted whether that situation would apply or not. i don't know. the investigation is going to determine a lot of this. >> but i guess that's really a question that's going to have to be answered and mr. chairman t brings us right back to where i started this morning, we're going to have multiple hearings on this, i suspect, and at some point, we have got to involve the department of interior, department of homeland security, mineral management services. we've got to involve these individuals, now the name carole browner came out, the white house's energy czar, it would be

interesting to have her come talk to us as well. we need to get the information and it is unfortunately going to involve getting the administration to be cooperative with this committee for a change. so just with that caveat in mind, i'll yield back the balance of my time and thank you for, and our witnesses for a very productive hearing today. >> thank you, mr. burgess. as you know, i don't believe in doing one hearing. i will get into an issue and we will have further hearings here and the administration may be appropriate at another hearing to have them here, including the mineral management service, and the administration on this issue and all the issues that's been before this subcommittee and this congress has been cooperative, even some document "you've sent in the past have been, was worked out between us, so we will continue to work on it. mr. skleece, any questions? >> just first on all of the information that i'd asked from the panel if they could get that to the full committee as well. >> correct, and i would just

maybe good just to follow them up with written questions, too, as i'll say i a few minutes, ten days for further follow-up questions. >> be happy to, tha you, mr. chair xhan. >> mr. chairman can i ask all materials on both sides be made available to the committee, be made available to the committee staff as well? >> yes. no objection. all information has been available, it's all been shared equally thus far. if there's anything furth or something you don't think was there, please let us know we'll make se it was there. let me ask one more question, mr. moore, if i may. the lessons we learned thus far what worked and didn't work with the b.o.p., the blowout preventer, the cameron company, do you think the design changes should be made to b.o.p.s and should there be modifications to the existing b.o.p.s in service now? >> i'm not sure, congressman. i think we need to see what happened to that b.o.p. i think it would be, to change something that's not broke, we

don't know what happened. weo know that we're going to have to look at a lot of different things differently ing forward in terms of how we move forward in this industry. >> look at the design, your communications, your hydraulics and the power, the power, seems all three have to be separate before it can work, one or two r it to work. >> the design of that as i said was the function to lose the riser from the b.o.p. >> we didn't lose the riser here. >> we didn't lose the riser here so we learned something and cameron is committed to make the changes to working with our customers and working with the industry to move forward. >> thank you, and thank you to all the witnesses. i know it's been a long day. this is not an easy subject and it's just beginning, we're in the early stages. there will be more questions and answers i'm sure, and unfortunately to the people who lost their lives, our hearts go out to them and their families and co-workers.

so thank you for being here. that concludes all questioning. i wanto thank all of our witnesses for coming today and for your testimony. the committee rules provide that members have ten days to submit additional questions for the record. i ask unanimous consent the contents of the document binder be enterednto the record, provided the committee may redact those in privacy concerns or law enforcement sensitive. that concludes our hearing. the meeting of the subcommittee is adjourned.

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[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> with little or no input, by his own admission in previous testimony. or, i know for a fact, by the directors or the senior management of nasa. if this were the case, it was quite likely promoting their own agenda, rather than that of nasa and the commitment to human space travel. the space program has never been an entitlement. this is an investment in the future. the inspiration and education of

our youth. mr. chairman, you were asking how much of the budget would go to education. this goes to the paperwork. the inspiration for the youth came with neil armstrong, when he was on the moon. this comes from space exploration. the best and brightest minds of nasa, they did not join the steam to design windmills'. but to live their dreams of once again taking us where no man has gone before. i would like to say that the human space flight program of america, for half of the century, has gone above partisan differences. the challenges and accomplishments of the past were those of the nation. never of a political party, and they were not of any individual agenda.

those flags on the moon are not red or blue. they are american. if we give up our leadership in space, but only is exploration at risk but i believe the future of this country and the future of our children and grandchildren as well. now is the time for the wiser heads in congress to prevail. this is the time to over real -- overruled a pledge to mediocrity. it is time to be innovative and wise in how we invest in the future of america. i want to thank you for allowing me to share with you my passion. this is, quite simply, the future of the country. >> thank you very much. >> members of the committee, i

would like to thank you for permitting me to speak, and represent my colleagues on the human space flight. i have a statement i would like to submit for the record. i should begin by saying that it would be very difficult to gather the group of four people who i admire more, treasuring their friendship, besides those who appear before us. we share one thing in common. we want a strong, human spaceflight organization for the nation. this panel tried to answer that. the science that will be derived is not unimportant, but the same could be said of the economic impact. and the engineering achievements have been very significant. all of these things are important but it was the view of this committee to take it by

ourselves to justify the cost of human exploration programs. you have to justify this program and i believe that you can justify this based upon the intangibles. this makes them no less significant. the human space flight program will make a path to move into outer space. this inspires the young people, with science and engineering and we have seen that so many were inspired by the gentleman beside you. but more important, this shows the world with the american people can accomplish with our system of government and free enterprise, that all this comes from 10 cents a day, for each citizen. and you could say, a great deal could be done with robots. this is certainly true.

but there are certain things that they cannot do. and one thing, would be to make the first repair to the hubble telescope. i cannot imagine a robot that could have done that. and there are also the intangibles. does anyone remember the name of the face -- the name of the first robot on the moon? launching a rocket to the top of mount everest is different than climbing to the top of mount everest. that is what makes this so important to so many of us. i was asked to make a few brief comments on some of these conclusions from the study that i chaired 20 years ago on the space program. some of these conclusions relate to the issue of today. the first one, 20 years ago, we concluded that nasa was being

asked to accomplish great goals, and giving -- given resources that did not match those goals. the second was reflecting the skepticism of the reliability calculations that were being done. we thought it was likely that we would lose another shuttle. we said the heavy-lift vehicle was the most important project because this is really the gateway to outer space. the united states has not had a master not go 300 miles from the earth since he left it some years ago. we think that strong technology programs -- we did not have the strong technology program 20 years ago. we said that one consequence would be that future decision- makers will have very few options. we said that we need to balance

the space program, with human spaceflight, and robotics and so forth. we have the recent review of the human space flight program that i was able to share. we had 10 members on the committee and the findings were unanimous with the 150-page report. the first question is about, why cannot continue the constellation program? and you could do this. but there are some problems. when the constellation program was begun, this was about five years ago, four years after the time that we did this study. they assumed the budget profile for 20 years. and talking to those people, they believed that they had a good reason to take the budget

profile. but they have received, each year, two-thirds of this amount. this is a reduction by one- third. consequence and the technical problems that they have encountered show that in the four years that this program has been going, this was between five years of scheduling, depending on the numbers that you take. we were also concerned about the goals of the program, focused on going back to the moon. this is different than eventually going back to mars. -- going to mars. speaking to people, many people who are young, we found that when we said, 20 years from now, we will be going back to the moon, they said, they will have done the 60 years ago. we were very concerned, that the

nation would not be able to maintain the financial support for the program, that would go through 18 budget cycles. let me turn to the program of the president, very briefly. this was modified a few weeks ago. this approximates one of the options, and i should emphasize that we were asked to provide options and not recommendations so that we could try to be neutral in this discussion, and we are trying very hard to do this. the program of the president, in our view, is reflected in this option and this is a little bit different. we believe that this is a viable program and this is ranked very highly in the overall assessment.

the first caveat is the funding profile. not just for the next five years but the entire program. and we want for the decisions to be made on the schedule that they were planned. i am sorry to report to you, that just as we try to find no interesting human space exploration programs, for something below the enhance budget level that we have described, this adds about $3 billion per year to the current budget. and this will have to be inflated, appropriately. the most important request that i would make to this committee, on behalf of my colleagues on the human spaceflight committee is that whatever program was approved, the goals match the budget. otherwise, we will be back here 10 years from now, having the

same discussion. this remains the hope of myself and the committee, that america will have a strong, human- spaceflight program, and this goes to whether this is worthy of a great nation. thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. augustine. i will ask the first question. you indicated that we are potentially on a journey to know where. and, i guess that i have, in all honesty, i am responding to say that i am a substantial skeptic of human spaceflight. we are of the same generation. i cannot support going into space as an end, in an of

itself. i agree with the president that we need to have a measured, globally-relevant human spaceflight program. not bound by the place and time in space. my mind is not closed. i am not an expert. i want to understand the value of human spaceflight. but i bring one another dimension to this. i am wanting to understand human spaceflight -- i am asking this of any of you, not all three of you, but any of you, that this will not just be a matter of space flight, but that this also will relate to the human condition, not only in the world but our own country. i think that nasa was conceived,

brilliantly, with the idea of simply doing something that had never been done before. and now we have done this a number of times. and -- i do not mean to say by this that we should stop doing it. but i believe that we should stop doing things exactly the same way. for a number of years, nasa has received criticism over how they run their programs, that they have not been kind and the different analysts are worried about overspending and things like that. i want to understand the value of human spaceflight. i want for one of you to tell me, how the human space flight program is advancing the

agency, and the overall mission. today, and in the future, and i also want for you to explain how human space flight, in the context of other priorities, how this helps the human condition sufficiently to its budget, in america. >> you are asking for a lot. i will do my best and i will let my colleagues tell me, if they would like. if you want to talk about technology -- and if you want to talk about -- the technology that you have today is technology to communicate across

the world, and the technology of communications itself. the technology that i have in my telephone is technology that was given birth to 30 or 40 or 50 years ago. i went over my comments about technology, that we are talking about in the proposal. exploration drives technology and innovation. you cannot block a group of the smartest young women and men in the world, and tell them that they will develop technology. there has to be a purpose, they have to know what they are trying to accomplish, and what the problems are, and then they have to develop the technology that will get the job done. going to the moon. the technology that we have developed.

go into our hospitals, and go into the classrooms. does this benefit -- is this a benefit to humans today? i believe that this will be. you can go deeper into this. but let me get a little bit more philosophical. curiosity is the essence of human existence. where are we, where are we going? is mars howard is going to look in a billion years? were we eat what they were like 1 billion years ago? i do not know what is there. i would like to find out. this is within our hearts and souls to find out and seek knowledge, because discovery is what this is all about. we have been there but we have not been everywhere. there is the bottom of the ocean. you can go on the highest

mountain and you can go to the deepest ocean, but you are still on earth. and there is a difference between the frontier of space, looking for knowledge. is there life on mars? there have to be other reasons, and this is not enough. but this is our destiny, to explore the unknown, and finance these questions. and for every answer that we get, we will come up with one dozen more questions. we have more questions about the mood right now than we did before we went there. i am not being x -- as explicit as you would like for me to be. but the benefits to the humans on this planet, with communications satellites and the weather satellites predicting storms. those things were given birth

to win kennedy said that we would go to the moon. he was asking us to do the impossible. he was asking us to do things that people did not think would be done. but we did not have the technology. this technology is obsolete today. but american industry has built upon that, so that we have, today, what we have, in our transportation. in every walk of life. i will turn this over to neil. >> i have run over my time. i thank you for your time. this was very helpful. >> i would just add to what the captain said, and i would say, is this an improvement of our life on earth, that we can put a satellite-guided missile into a

window, and instead of killing 500 civilians, you kill the enemy that you are looking for. is this an improvement? this has happened because we have explored in space. let me talk about the future. the nobel-prize winner from mit talked about what we could do in the space station in the future, to study the cosmic rays, the most intense in space and not on earth, as a possible source of energy production. we're not talking about going into space simply to go into space. if this is everything that we were doing, i would not be pushing for this. if we continue our priorities in space, we will be able to

capture this and have the energy, the renewable energy sources that will keep us from having to drill for oil and gasoline, going to the renewable energy of the future. this is the future, and we want to do this, rather than having others do this, so that we are the people who will harness this. i want to go to something that the doctor said in his testimony that he did not use, because there were so many others. so many other things that you did say. and this is talking about putting all the money into private contractors, and having them take the step back rather than being the massive project with the private contractors. and you had said that we assume that this goal, that the private contractors that are not yet tested, in a little bit more

than frites -- three years, that they will put people into low earth orbit, in a new vehicle. they will flight-test and develop this with the booster architecture, along with the infrastructure that is required. this involves the technical manuals for training, and the on-board procedures, developing a connection between the tracking network and the newly- designed space vehicles. these are a few of the requirements to put the new system into space. and what they have said that you predict is that this will be 10 years, not three years, for the private sector to do this. and the cost could possibly mean bailing out the company, because we could not really do all of this under $5 billion.

do you believe that this money should be spent with nasa, redoing their plans. so that they are in control, but not just with blinders on. within my budget, i can do this. what about not just giving constellation, but -- something that is not just a return vehicle, but something that will take people into space as well. putting the money not into the termination contracts, of $2.5 billion, and not into the programs that will try to help people who would move their jobs -- lose their jobs. we would develop our own techniques so that we could gain these advantages. would this be what you were

proposing in your statement? >> referring to what you asked about the infrastructure that is needed to support the commercial sector, this is one reason that i think the cost will go up as well as the time. the aerospace organization issued a report that said that this would take 10-$12 billion to support the commercial sector and it does not count the infrastructure. the read-configuration and mission control has to come down and may come down where you do not want for this to come down. the procedures and everything that you have to develop, many people believe that we played handball, and we were putting on a space shoes -- a space suit, and we went to the room. we spent years, helping the

engineers -- helping them design and develop and test this. we were out there, trying to get the spacecraft that we would find developed, and we would have confidence in. when will this be prepared for, and what is the commercial sector -- how will they handle this and how will they pay for this? is this going to be a program that nasa will pay for, that somebody else is going to run? will they respond to the regulatory requirements? these are things that have not been addressed, properly. i do not believe that you have been looking at this. when you ask is where i would go, and my opinion, this is probably not worth much these days -- but i am concerned about the disconnect. and in the long term, i am

concerned about exploration. going where no man has gone before. going and doing what others were afraid to do. this is exploration. in the near term, i know how you feel about shuttle extension. i think that we should close this from the front end. we have to have something that will close the gap in the back end. we have called these areas in in, and we should get them running, and said of the potential gap of one decade, this may be three or four or five years. at least we will be able -- and we will tell the rest of the world that we will not be slaves

to what they say -- we will not be slaves to what they say that we can do. we are going to get that from here. as we are in the process of doing this, if you want to redesign the long-term exploration objectives, to build a new booster, or whenever this will take, this is the time to do it. >> thank you very much. >> mr. chairman, i am wanting to answer your question. this is a good question. and i want to thank you for the personal attention that you have given to this hearing. being right here, the entire time. i am profoundly grateful to this. my answer to your question, what about space? my answer is because we, as

americans, are by nature, explorers. we have always had a frontier, and when this nation was developed, we had visionary leaders like thomas jefferson. and they paid, initially, $2,000 for lewis and clark to go westward. this ended up costing the extraordinary sum of $36,000. but this was filling -- by nature, we are explorers. if we ever give up that characteristic, we will be a second-rate nation. this is no longer westward, this is up.

and as he was talking about -- we are inquisitive and curious. look at what the telescope has done. this is going back to the history of the universe. we will be able to go back to the origin of the universe. is this valuable to us, as an inquisitive people? and as citizens of planet earth? i believe that this and ask a question of dr. augustine? dr. augustine, this goes without saying. thank you for your steady hand,

i have heard about the strong opinions by these american heroes. the committee that you are had it -- you are in charge of was across the entire spectrum of aerospace. and this included the military as well. and this included some astronauts. can you describe how this administration and their plan, and you can say how this has been amended, as the president changed this at the kennedy space center. >> i would be happy about this. we narrowed this to five main offices, with a few subsets.

and i mentioned this option, this is different from what they have proposed. there are two significant differences. they have the heavy-lift launch vehicle, right away, rather than waiting a few years. we had a funding profile, over four years, with $3 billion per year. and this goes beyond that with the aerospace -- and so the funding profile was substantially greater than what we would be offered last year. we could not find a good answer with the profile. and we have -- they have the launch vehicle, and we have the time for more technology.

this helps with the early budget pressure. and we have the five assists at the same time. and you lose time, and the biggest risk is when the five years come through, this would be a tragedy in my opinion. this may be the biggest risk. the option that we were looking at, this goes to the president's program. i have not seen the out-year funding. i cannot testify to this. this is fully funded, and i felt that this was a rather exciting program, rather than wait 15 years to get on the moon, they

accomplish the objective that you could talk about, you could go on an asteroid and you may move one a little bit. you can go conduct refueling operations, with maintenance on the telescope. you can navigate mars. and you can orbit mars, you can land on one of the moons of mars. deimos or phobos. and you can have robots on mars which will overcome this, because this takes 40 minutes to give the signal back and forth, from here to mars. this offers all of those advantages. and then, this brings me to two other aspects -- we did this to shut down the shuttle.

the gap was created five years ago. if you want to avoid the gap, the only way that i know about this -- we depend upon the russians to orbit. the idea is that this will be a seven-year gap, and out of five- year gap. as you continue to operate the shuttle, you should avoid much of the gap, because they will consume all the money that you will use, for the constellation on earth. this goes back to all the money that you have available. if you have the heavy-lift launch vehicle, this is that much that you have left to improve. and the one thing that is always a problem is that they had $3 million per year.

i do not know what this is like in the environment. >> i want to make one final statement. >> i have to do this. >> i have a speech, 10 minutes ago. what he indicated, with the word, exploration, i agree. this is the nature of what america has always been. what i think is also worth considering and why ask my question to the captain, how human space flight is going to contribute to the condition of humankind on this earth, there was another dimension to this. there are different forms of exploration. one of them is doing the undoable, the most exploration since lewis and clark.

and you gentlemen, when you have done with this across the world. the heart of the world was stopping. this was also stopping, but it was unnoticed, in 1878. this is when sir isaac newton came to open a new medical university, and this was called john hopkins. he had said that in the 2000 years previous to this day, there had been no advances in medicine, at all. and during the civil war, and the other words that -- often, the diseases would come from outside, into the body, which is why this was constantly applied to the wounds, but not

necessarily, the diseases came from inside the body. there was no federal funding for research. he is doing this 125 years ago. there were no requirements, and harvard had medical, they all have medical schools. he did not even have to have a high-school diploma to get the medical school. much less a college degree. and they took you and they would teach you nothing. what john hopkins did, when sir isaac newton said that you follow the truth, wherever this will take you, in medicine. there will be no compromise on that. you will do what you have to do

to follow the truth, in science and in medicine. and as a result of this, literally, the medical education in the united states has been completely changed. and we all understand this. this is also -- this is not space flight. this is doing what cannot be done, finding out what cannot be known, and challenging, with no federal resources, that private foundations had to be part of helping medical research, and -- you can read all -- you can read about this in a book about the great influenza epidemic of 1918. and this will tell you all about it.

i just want to say, not to offer a rebuttals for anything that has been said. exploration is a broad word. the american search for newness, it finds many outlets. most of them are quite glorious. but not all of them. i thank you. and he will continue to share the hearing. >> sen. brownback? >> this is a great discussion and we should have hearings like this all the time. why should we not do what he suggested, to stop the shuttle, and use this money to move forward with consolation? we have spent $9 billion in constellation. this is one thing that drives me crazy. we will go somewhere else.

this drives everyone crazy. you know that this was under- funded by one-third. so why not go the route that was suggested, as a way to move forward with constellation. >> this is a great question, and we spoke about this early on. i have read more articles that -- then i would like to admit about not starting and stopping program. if you will start them, finish them, unless there is a compelling reason that you should stop. and we believe that this is a very compelling reason. this is terry tragic, to have to write off $9 billion, were part of this. but this is the cost that contributes heavily to the launch vehicle that sometime in the future. the real issue comes out of the fact that when the program was

started, the area is at issue. the constellation program -- this has four parts. we have the capsule, and the lunar lander and the -- the habitat on the moon. the first to could not be started because the other 28 up all the money. one part of this is in, which i understand -- most of this will continue on. this is the area that is an issue. this was issued in 2005. there were two primary mission. one of them was to support the international space station. and the second was to -- the second was to be a part of the

space exploration program, 15 years from now. this will provide technology for the heavy-lift version of this. and the problem is, what immediately happened, and with the committee believes his five years, by the time that this is developed, at least on the plan that was being developed, the international space station is going to be in the ocean. and if you add -- five years to the loss of the international space station, by the time that this is developed, they will have two years to support the international space station, and subsequent to that, a 15-year hiatus, where this will be the most expensive way of the world to put people in lower orbit, where this will be useful again for the exploration program, but we will have down time.

the program made sense when this began. and today, this is not a bad program. the issue is not can we do this, but should we do this. >> and you do not believe that we should do this? >> i am trying hard not to choose sides. this was one of the most attractive as it -- most unattractive as this was laid out. >> in taking his comments, and we do not seem to have a plan right now. we do not have -- we have a lot of ideas but there is no plan. and i would agree with the low- earth orbit, that we should have a commercial sector, and i want to have a plan to continue. and this is putting off for five years. and usually, the budget -- the budgetary numbers are such that if she took the shuttle money,

you cannot get there with the plan that we were on, and so you are just better off going somewhere else. >> the budget that was submitted to us, there was really no way with the costs -- we talked about this. we will conduct the human exploration program that would be meaningful, to say this at all. >> i would hope that this is the beginning of the discussion, and we have some good thoughts that are laid out here. we are getting some elbow grease on this and digging in, as we move forward to these things. i thank you for your service. you are great american hero and i appreciate your willingness to come back to continue to fight for the exploration that you have started.

and giving us the exploration, and you do not give up. this is worth a huge amount, even if you do not measure this. this is the intangible but is worth a lot of money for us to do. and for the future generations. >> hutchinson? >> i was wanting to say that, i have heard of a budget as the reason for why we cannot keep the shuttle flying, to close the gap. if we are talking about putting $6 billion into a private sector company, some of these are not developed just yet, and these are not tested. if they do not make their

budgets, having to bail them out. i am asking about the best plan and determining the priority so that we stay within the budget. so this is not only one way of doing this, and determining the right plan to get us where i think all of our goals are. and that is to be able to use the space station, for exploration and to make certain that we are getting the scientific products that we have already invested $100 billion in. and if we let the space shuttle and space station -- if this is in jeopardy of being useful, but not having the backup system, that we control. i do not know if this is good budgeting. i have a problem with what i am

hearing, and the lack of creativity with what we do in this budget, that i saw in the first panel. i would like to ask mr. armstrong, on the safety issue, in your written statement, we talk about the taxi service that we saw -- this was being, perhaps, not necessarily the safety standards that we would have on our own shuttle. can you talk about the safety issue? >> the prime recommendations of the columbia accident investigation board, with

respect to the new vehicles in the future, was that safety should be considered the prime consideration. and who will argue with safety. but safety -- you cannot put all the money into safety. this has to be balanced with the program requirements and others. except level of safety has to be determined. this is what you are searching for. and we had good confidence on this right now. we had a number of safelights, and ever since the columbia -- this seems to be operating very well. this is an old, 30-year-old technology. i believe that this may continue to be operated safely, and we

have a good confidence level on this. this was projected -- by the outside safety experts. this is a few times better than the competitors, including the areies-5. they did not have enough information on those configurations, to project an accurate safety value. >> taking this -- the capability

that we have is the safety over the long term. we have the capability to discern this -- we have the commercial vehicles, the thing that safety would be at a disadvantage with the shuttle and the new space craft that has not been tested yet. do you have any concerns about this. you have this for the 7-10-year time, suggesting the real-time change for the gap. >> it is hard to project this answer, if the commercial vehicles have this in the flight

environment. this is the more carefully- configured and described. i think that this is a safe vehicle to return on. i think that the shuttle would continue to be used, and we could defend on this. this may take double the of extra commitment. the key to that is right here, and we have the recommendation that this safety-first. the commercial vehicles -- i just do not know about safety

considerations, it is certainly -- these are good. i just do not know. >> in the testimony, you talk about orion oight, which will bring people -- orion light, which will bring people back and does not have the capability to go to the other were bits. do you believe that this is the best use of the budget constraints, to have them with the limited capability as opposed to putting the same money into an orion, all the way, that would be able to do the things that the president said were his goals? and i believe are quite exciting? going into orbit around mars, or the other destinations besides

the space station? >> i do not believe that this would be the good use, with the funds in the budget. this would be an expert -- and expensive vehicle to test, and this would not be able to service the space station very long. this is probably not very good. this is for the most serious of emergencies, like the medical emergencies with the instant departure from the space station, to return to earth. this is because of the configuration of the orion vehicle. this has bad error-dynamic performance. and this cannot change the

destination to rise more quickly. this is going to come down on ocean or on the land. we have this immediately upon the departure. >> may i have a moment? we are having the contact. the redundancy for the right, that puzzles me, is the fact that they use this on land, they use this with their own lending facility. when they land on the runway, we have the ballistics and less capable spacecraft. we have the recovery forces, not the cost of having a vehicle

with people inside before you can add -- i use this generically, before you bring people home safely, you have to be ready, to start with. and you have to have the recovery forces standing by, somewhere, within reach, somewhere, that will have to recover the spacecraft. this is something that no one recognizes or acknowledges. they will have the capabilities of the one that we really need. we talk about the budget and the cost of everything. this was a little bit more than half penny of the money that we send it to pay for space. the space station, the hubble

telescope, the opportunity for exploration on mars, i am not certain that if we put a box on this, we would not be able to afford everything that we want to do. >> i think that people would believe that the investment that we would make, this would make the quality of the health and what people can get right now, the magnetic imaging has transformed health care. we have the space exploration and everything -- everything like this. we have to make certain that we do not lose this advantage. we have the quality of life in the world, and we will be

voting. we will close my part, and thank you very much for coming. and thank you for being so direct, especially. we have to speak out, to try to come together. i think that general bolten, he will try to work with us to try to come together with the right approach for america and our future. we see this for the scientific productivity that we hope to encourage our children to pursue. >> did your commission determined that aries would be much safer when the existing

shuttle, and was this by a factor of 10. >> i find myself in this situation, we have this in the hardware and we are very skeptical about the reliability of these models. most of the failures that we have, i would be reluctant to make a comparison. we have the reliability in line, i would have that in this regard. how would like to say this about the issues with this situation. one thing is that nasa was in

the plan that has been put forward. they would have responsibility to oversee safety and reliability for the commercial launchers, part of this was their responsibility to oversee this. we talk about the commercial launch companies, the big companies and the old companies, they can offer this and in the case of one of them, one of the larger companies as a vehicle -- hit -- has a vehicle with a 90% success rate. i would like to put things in perspective. we think that this is a big change for the industry, for the

release safe launch vehicle. i do not want to understate -- understood the vehicle of this. there is a risk everywhere in space. we have the best of technology over time. and how much the industry must have a graph -- who must have progressed since these gentleman went to the moon. this happened during the same time that we are at the moon until we return to the moon, this was the plan that was previously in place. this is kind of an interesting perspective. and this is disappointing. >> mr. armstrong, you made the case in your statement, and we will place in the record