we need some kind of stability within our system. host: we're almost out of time. guest: the libertarian view on the great depression is it existed in large part because of misguided federal policies. the tariff increase, federal reserve actions and injuring things like that would not happen and not injuring the stemming bank crisis as it was happening. misguided tax increase in the 1930's. the government did not in fact contribute to stability. we had the biggest recession by far that we had ever had. we have much more instability than had ever been experienced before we started engaging in these policies. if you compare the u.s. economy

pre-1914, before any federal reserve policy, to post-1945, the degree of instability is approximately the same. if anything with the recent crisis, it is worse. if the keynesian theory is something that has not worked out well, we have not been able to stabilize using this approach. host: this is the book -- it is called "libertarianism, from a to z." you can find his book in any place you buy books. thank you for being here this morning. on this tuesday morning we will take you now live to capitol hill. you will see senator john kerry. he is the chairman of the senate foreign relations committee. while we're about to bring you this live coverage of his hearing on the new start treaty. witnesses will include hillary clinton, robert gates, and the

chairman of the joint chiefs, admiral markell -- mark owen. host: caller[captioning performy national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> the senate foreign relations committee is meeting today. chairman john kerry is there.

president obama in april along with president medvedev spa signed the nuclear arms treaty. this is the first hearing on this treaty. you are watching live coverage here on c-span. >> the hearing will come to

order. thank you all for coming today. this is a terrific lineup for any hearing but obviously, they typically for this hearing on the start treaty. defense official, and our top military official. it is a lineup that underscores the obama administration's commitment not just to the ratification of the new start but to have an open and honest and thorough debate that moves beyond partisanship and sound bites. the administration's commitment is well-placed because at stake is the future of over 90% of the world's nuclear weapons and our credibility and the eyes of nearly 180 states that are party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. as the panel knows, i believe, and i think senator lugar shares this, that the new start agreement will make america safer because the day that this treaty enters into force, the

united states will strengthen its fight against nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation, gain a fuller understanding of russia's nuclear forces, and revitalize our relations with moscow. what is more, i have no doubt that the administration's plan to maintain and modernize our nuclear weapons infrastructure demonstrate a firm commitment and keeping our nuclear deterrence sake and effective for as long as is needed. this committee will continue to give the new start treaty the fall and consideration it deserves. we already apart from secretary perry and/center and in the coming days, we will hear from secretary baker and kissinger as well. when our review is complete, i am confident we can reach a strong bias partisanship consensus on advise and consent to ratification just as we did on start i the moscow trip. i believe the case for the tree is powerful. most the big lie, new -- of the

new start significant reduces the number of warheads, missiles, launchers that the united states and russia can deploy it eliminates surplus cold war armaments as we turn to face the threats of the 21st century. it eliminates those weapons in a transparent manner. the original start treaty had verification mechanisms that enabled us to see what the russians were doing with their missiles and bombers. that treaty expired on december 5 of last year. since then, we have daily been losing visibility into russia's nuclear activities. the new start treaty restores that visibility, providing valuable information about russian weapons and allowing us to inspect russian military facilities. by verifiably reducing the number of u.s. and russian weapons, we are strengthening the stability and predictability of our nuclear relationship. more than that, we are strengthening our diplomatic

relationship making it more likely we can secure moscow's cooperation like stopping the nuclear program in a ramp. the implications of this treaty extend far beyond u.s.-russia relations. as we hold this hearing, diplomats from dozens of nations are meeting in new york to review implementation of the nuclear nonpareil for asian trading. the crucial barrier against the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorist. far more than in recent years, those nations are rallying behind the united states and it -- and its efforts to lessen the nuclear threat. the new start has already helped us isolate iran and isolate its average to cast the united states as a threat to the mbt. this treaty is only the first step in a far more reaching effort. in announcing the negotiation of new start, president obama and

medvedev said they were trying to move beyond called for mentalities. the senate will speed up that the pollution. they will lay the groundwork for further on -- preparations. the original start treaty provided a signature effort led by our friend dick lugar which is to dismantle and secure nuclear weapons in the former soviet union. new start build on that foundation so that we may continue to quarterly secure nuclear materials in russia and beyond. if we do not approve new start, there will be serious consequences for america's vital non-proliferation actions. as james/centre testify to this committee, for the united states at this juncture to fail to ratify the treaty in the course of the senate's liberation, it would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to the non-

proliferation issue. we all understand the questions have been raised about new start. it is this committee's responsibility to give those concerns a fair hearing. we will. some have alleged it will constrain our missile defense plan which it will not. in fact, it allows us to proceed with all of our planned testing and deployment. some have charged that will narrow our conventional strike options. which it will not. we will still be able to deploy conventional warheads to promptly target any sites around the globe. others have argued that we cannot eliminate surplus weapons because our nuclear infrastructure is aging. the administration's plan to spend $80 billion to improve the infrastructure should lay those questions properly to rest. to explain the contours of this treaty, we are fortunate to have three very distinguished witnesses with us. as secretary of state, hillary clinton has worked tirelessly to

leverage america's progress on strategic arms control and our fight against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. secretary of defense robert gates has served presidents of both parties with great distinction in a remarkable range of roles. he is one of our nation's most respected voices on national security. admiral mike mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, is providing farsighted leadership to our ability at a time of great talent in transition. we fight two wars and faced the diffuse to threats of the post- 9/11 world. both admiral mullen and secretary gates were originally appointed to their current positions by the last administration. their support for a new start is a sign that the treaty is consistent with our long tradition of bipartisanship on strategic arms control very we thank you all for being here today. we look forward to your testimony and the opportunity to discuss this important treaty. senator lugar -- >> thank you very much, mr.

chairman. i join you in welcoming secretary clinton, secretary gates, and admiral mullen to the foreign relations committee once again. we are very pleased that our national security leadership is with us. to present the new start treaty an end to the questions of the senators. our witnesses have been deeply involved in the negotiation of the new start treaty as well as the formation of the broader context of nuclear weapons policy. secretary clinton's undertook many discussions on a treaty with her counterpart in russia. secretary gates has a long association with this tree going back to the meetings he attended in moscow in 2008. with secretary of state rice. admiral mullen has had several board meetings on the treaty and related issues with the chief of the general staff of russia as well as other russian officials. consequently, each of our leaders today comes to the tree

with unique experiences that can inform senate consideration of the pact. their personal involvement and commitment to this process underscores the consensus within the administration and the military leadership of our country that the new start treaty will benefit united states national security. as foreign relations committee and we begin to examine the new treaty and rear detail, i would urge the three of you as our witnesses today to devote personal energies to accelerating the timetable for producing the national intelligence estimates and a formal verification assessment related to the treaty. the president has declared the new start treaty to be a top legislative objective. he has called for senate approval this year. failing to deliver these reduced delays the start treaty.

this would diminish the priority of the tree and complicated the senate debate timetable. on april 29, our committee heard from the former secretary of defense william perry and james schlesinger, who voiced their support for ratifying the treaty. it was stated that," i think it is obligatory that the united states ratified." he continued," any treaty is going to have limitations. there are some industry. we need to watch them for the future but that does not mean this treaty should be rejected." secretary perry underscored the importance of treaty ratification to broader u.s. arms control objectives asserting," if we fail, to ratify this treaty, the united states will have forfeited any right to provide leadership in this field throughout the

world." secretary schlesinger said," to fail to ratify the treaty and a two course of the senate deliberations would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence others with regard to the nonproliferation issues." in my view as we carefully examine individual provisions of the treaty, the united states this choice to forgo its strategic nuclear arms control regime with russia would be an extremely precarious strategy. this would distance ourselves from nuclear engagement with russia and would greatly reduce our knowledge of what is happening in russia. and our ability to consult with moscow and a timely matter on nuclear and other national security issues. it would further strain our own defense resources, weaken our non-proliferation diplomacy

worldwide, and potentially heightened arms competition. during the post cold war era, the united states security has been helped immeasurably by the existence of the start treaties and related arms control endeavors. as an offer of they non-lugar program, i traveled to the russia -- to russia on numerous occasions to witness the safeguarding and destruction of weapons covered by the charter. the destruction of thousands of weapons is a monumental achievement for our countries. the process surrounding the joint effort is as important at the numbers of weapons eliminated. the u.s.-russia relationship has been through numerous highs and lows in the post cold war era. start inspections and consultations and the corresponding threat reduction

activities of the non-lugar program have been a constant that have served to reduce miscalculations and build respect. this is not preventing a highly contentious disagreements with moscow but it has meant that we have not had to wonder about the makeup and the disposition of russian nuclear forces during periods of tension. it has also reduced but not eliminated the proliferation threat posed by the nuclear arsenal of the former soviet union. in my judgment, the question before us is not whether we should have a strategic nuclear arms agreement with russia, but rather that the new start treaty meets the objectives and how they will be implemented in the context of our broader national security strategy. arms control is not a static enterprise covered by words on a treaty documents. the success or failure of a tree also depends on the

determination which is verified and enforced. it to pass on the rationality of the defense programs backing up the treaty. it depends on the international atmosphere in which. it which for these reasons, senators are interested in numerous reasons peripheral to the tree improving our plans for warhead modernization and missile defense. we are eager to hear the administration's perspective on these elements of our defense policy as well as the witness is used on the new start treaty and our relations with russia. i appreciate that our top national security leadership is personally invested in the senate ratification process. i look forward to working with you and members of this committee to achieve a timely treaty review that will fully inform senate consideration. thank you very much, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator

lugar. as i ask for your testimony, i would like to ask you each -- if each of you wants to, to address a question that as much in the news this morning. the deal brokered by brazil and turkey with iran is a deal that at first look, one might interpret as a swap of the 3% low-enriched uranium for the 20% medical isotope uranium. as we know, during the course of the months since the original deal was put on the table, iran has gone from about 1,800 kilograms to 2,300 kilograms per it is not the same deal. it is our understanding that the potential for a breakout to one nuclear weapon would exist

during the time of this swap. it would be absent a further details of the deal. they would avoid the answering of consequences. we would ask you at the top of your testimony, if you would address the question of the administration's attitude towards this at this point. is it your understanding that is indeed a swap in exchange for not going up to 20% enrichment or that would have to be a demand? we recognize you first, madam secretary. >> chairman kerry and senator lugar and members of the committee, thank you for calling several hearings on the new start treaty and for this invitation to appear before you. we deeply appreciate your commitment to this critical issue and i think both the chairman and the ranking members

opening statements made very clear what is at stake and how we must proceed in the consideration of this treaty in an expeditious manner pretty -- is a pleasure to testify along with secretary gates and at ramallah because we share a strong belief that the new start treaty will make our country more secure. this treaty also reflects our growing cooperation with russia on matters of mutual interest. it will help us in advancing our broader nonproliferation agenda. to that end, we have been working closely with our p-5 +1 partners on a draft of a new sanctions resolution on iran. today, i am pleased to announce to this committee that we have reached agreement on a strong draft with the cooperation of both russia and china. we plan to circulate that a draft resolution to the entire

security council today. let me say, mr. chairman, that i think this announcement is as convincing and enter -- an answer to the efforts undertaken in tehran over the last few days as any we could provide. there are a number of unanswered questions regarding the announcement coming from tehran and although we acknowledge the sincerey and brazil to find a solutio regarding iran's stand up with the international community over its nuclear program, p-5 +1 are proceeding to rally the

international community on strong sanctions resolution that will, in our view, send an unmistakable message about what is expected from iran. we can certainly go into more detail about that during the question and answer. let me turn to the matter at hand. as convincingly as i can make the case for the many reasons why this new start treaty is in the interest of the national security of the united states of america, the relationship with russia is a key part of that kind of security. as senator lugar said, during all the ups and downs, during the heights and depths of the cold war, one constant was our continuing effort to work

toward the elimination and the curtailment of strategic arms in a way that build confidence and avoided miscalculation. some may argue that we do not need the new start treaty. the choice before us is between this treaty and no treaty. governing our nuclear security relationship with russia. between this treaty and no agreed verification mechanism on russia's strategic nuclear forces, between this treaty and no legal obligation for russia to maintain its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level, and as secretary gates has pointed out, every previous president who face to this choice has found that the united states is better off with a treaty then without one.

the united states senate has always agreed. the 2002 moscow tree was approved by a vote of 95-0. in 1991 start treaty was approved by 93-6. more than two years ago, president bush began the process that has led to the new start treaty we are discussing today. it has already received bipartisan support in testimony before this committee. as the chairman and the ranking member acknowledged, former secretary james schlesinger, secretary of defense for nixon and ford and secretary of energy for president carter declared it is obligatory for the united states to ratify it. today, i would like to discuss what the new start treaty is and what it is not. it is a treaty that if ratified would provide stability,

transparency, and predictability for the two countries with more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. it is a treaty that will reduce the permissible number of russian and u.s. deployed strategic warheads to 1550. this is a level we have not reached since the 1950's. in addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers. these targets will help the united states and russia bring our deployed strategic arsenals which were sized for the cold war to levels that are appropriate for today's threat. this is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons with an extensive verification regime. this regime draws upon our experience over the last 15 years in implementing the

original start treaty which expired in december. the verification measures reflect today's realities including the fewer number of facilities in russia compared with the former soviet union. for the first time ever, we will be monitoring the act will numbers of warheads on deployed strategic missiles. moreover, by bringing a new start treaty into force, we will strengthen our national security more broadly including creating great -- greater leverage to tackle a core national security challenge, nuclear proliferation. i have not -- i am not suggesting that this treaty alone will convince iran or north korea to change their behavior. it does demonstrate our leadership and strengthen our hand as we seek to hold these and other governments accountable. whether that means further isolating iran and enforcing the

rules against violators or convincing other countries to get a better handle on their own nuclear materials. it conveys to other nations that we are committed to real reduction and to holding up our end of the bargain under the non-proliferation treaty. in my discussions with many foreign leaders including earlier this month in new york at the beginr,4çñ of the nonproliferation treaty review conference, i have already seen how this new start treaty and the fact that the united states and russia could a great has made it more difficult for other countries to shift the conversation back to the united states. we are seeing an increasing willingness to be held accountable and to hold others accountable. it ratified new start treaty would continue our progress toward broader u.s.-russia cooperation. we believe this is critical to other foreign policy priorities including dealing with iran's nuclear program, cooperated on

afghanistan, and pursuing trade and investment. already, negotiations over this treaty advanced our efforts to reset the u.s.-russia relationship. there is renewed vigor in our discussions on every level including those between a president, our military leaders, and between me and my counterpart. our approach to this relationship is pragmatic and clear eyed. our efforts including this treaty are producing tangible benefits for u.s. national security. at the same time, we are deepening and broadening our partnerships with allies. in my recent meetings in holland with other nato allies, they expressed an overwhelmingly positive and supportive of view of the new start treaty. there are also things this nut tree will not do. as the secretary gets an adult mullen will discuss more fully, the start treaty does not compromise the nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our allies.

the treaty does not infringe upon the flexibility we need to maintain our forces including the bombers, submarines, and missiles in a way that best serve our national security interests. the treaty does not constrain our plans for missile defense efforts. those of you who worked with me in the senate know i take a backseat to no one in my strong support of missile defense. i want to make this point very clearly -- nothing in the new start treaty constrained our missile defense effort. russia has issued a unilateral statement on missile defense expressing its views pray we have not agreed to this view and we are not bound by this unilateral statement. in fact, we have issued an hour on universal statement making it clear that the united states intends to improve and deploy a missile defense systems and nothing industry prevents us from doing so. the treaty's preamble acknowledges the relationship between strategic offenses and

defenses forces. this is simply a statement of fact. it does not constrain our missile defense program in any way. in fact, a similar provision was part of the zero original start treaty and did not prevent us from developing our missile defenses. the treaty does contain language prohibiting the conversion or use of offensive missile launchers for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. we never planned to do that anyway. as general o'reilly, our missile defense director has said," is actually cheaper to build smaller, tailor-made missile defense silo's than to convert offensive launchers." the treaty does not restrict us from building new missile defense launchers, 14 of which we are currently constructing in alaska. this administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile defense in the fiscal year 2011, almost $700 million

more than congress provided in 2010. this request reflects our commitment to missile defense and our conviction that4@o we e done nothing and there is no interpretation to the contrary that in any way undermines that commitment. finally, the new start treaty does not restrict our ability to modernize our nuclear weapons complex to sustain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. this administration has called for a 10% increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget for overall weapons and infrastructure activities and a 25% increase in direct stockpile work. this was not in previous budgets. during the next 10 years, this administration proposes investing $80 billion into our nuclear weapons complex. let's take a step back and put the new start treaty into a larger context. this tree is only one part of our country's broader efforts to reduce the threat posed by the

deadliest weapons the world has ever known. we owe special gratitude to senator lugar for his commitment through zero years on this issue. this administration is facing had on the problems of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. we have several corbet efforts including the nuclear posture review, the recently concluded security summit, and the ongoing non-proliferation treaty review conference. a ratified new start tree stand on its own terms in a reflection of the benefits of national support for our country, it is also a part of our broader effort. mr. chairman, senator lugar, members of this committee, thank you for having us here and for all of your past and future attention to this new start treaty. we stand ready to work with you as you undertake your constitutional responsibilities and answer all your questions today and in the coming weeks. we are confident that at the end of this process, you will come

to the conclusion that some many of your predecessors have shared over so many years on both sides of the aisle that this tree makes our country more secure and merits the senate's advice and consent to ratification. >> thank you very much. may i say also that secretary gotmuller and the whole team did a good job of keeping committee appraised and briefed. we had a number of sessions and we went to geneva so we thank you for cooperation in that. it was helpful in getting us here. secretary superdelegates -- >> thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the agreement between the united states and russia on the new strategic arms reduction treaty. this tree produces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the strategic stability of our relationship

and protect the security of the american people and our allies. america's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and partners. the first step of the year-long posture review was extensive analysis which determines how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. this provided the basis for our negotiations a start. the results of those studies give me confidence that the department of defense will be able to maintain a strong, effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure they are safe, secure, and reliable that is within the limits of the new treaty. the u.s. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on the triad of delivery systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear capable heavy bombers within the boundaries negotiated

in the new start treaty. there is an upper boundary of 1550 warheads, up to 700 deployed icbm's and nuclear capable heavy bombers and up to 800 deployed and non deployed icbm launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. under this treaty, we retain the power to determine the composition of our force structure allowing the united states complete flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protect our national security interests. the defense department has established a base line for structure to guide our planning. it is one that does not require changes to current or planned bass arrangements. the department will retain 240 deployed submarine launch missiles distributed among 14 submarines. each of which will have 20 launch tubes. this is the most survivable leg

of the triad and reducing the number of missiles carried a a summary from 24 to 20 will facilitate may be planning for the ohio class submarine replacement. recognizing the flexibility of the bomber light of the triad, we will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers including all 18 operational b-2's. we have to consider the air forces which is to convert a number of b-52's to a conventional only roper of the u.s. will retain up to 420 deployed single warhead minuteman 3 icbm's at three missile bases. let me also address some other things the new start treaty will not affect. first, the treaty will not constrained united states from deploying the most effective missile defense possible nor impose additional costs are barriers on those defennes.

i am speaking of stories in the news this morning and the last couple of days. i would be happy discussed the article in ""the new york times." the united states will continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners against ballistic missile threats. we made this clear to the russians in a unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty. the new start does not restrict our ability to develop and apply proper global strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere in the globe in one hour or less for the treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles combined with the associated killing of 5050 deployed warheads accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may need for this capability. we are also currently examining potential future long range weapons systems for prompt

global strike that would not be limited by the treaty. in my view, a key contribution of history it is provision for a strong verification regime. the intelligence community will provide a detailed and classified assessment, i would like to emphasize some of the key elements of this regime. they provide a firm basis for monitoring russia's compliance with its republications while also providing important insights into the size and of russia's forces for the allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-site inspections each year at operating basis for icbm's, and nuclear capable heavy bombers as well as storage facilities, test ranges, and conversion and the elimination facilities per the agreed establishes a base which will be initially populated 25 days after the treaty enters into force and updated every six months thereafter. it will help provide the united states with a rolling overall picture of russia's strategic operational forces.

this is supplemented by the large number of notification required which will track the movement and changes in status of the strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty. unique identifiers, for the first time, will be assigned to each icbm and other nuclear capable heavy bombers allowing us to track the disposition and patterns of operation of accountable systems throughout their life cycles. the treaty provides for not interference with national technical means of verification like reconnaissance satellites, ground stations, and ships. this provides an independent method of gathering information that validates the data declarations. a lemon tree is not needed to verify the conditions of the treaty, the terms call for exchange of telemetry up to 51 as per year per site. i am confident that the new start treaty will no way compromised the united states nuclear deterrent.

this is one we control ourselves. if we fail to invest adequately in our infrastructure, that is a point i have made in recent years. maintaining an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and reliable warheads require a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex. that is our infrastructure and science and engineering base. the to pardon of defense is transferring $4.6 billion to the department of energy's national nuclear security administration through fiscal year 2015. this transfer will system funding critical nuclear weapons like extension programs and efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. the initial applications of this funding along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear reactors are reflected in the defense and energy departments f y 2011 budget request which i heard the cop -- urged congress

to appropriate these investments represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our nations deterrence. i would close with a final observation. i first began working on strategic arms control with the russians in 1970, 40 years ago. the u.s. average that led to the first strategic arms limitation agreement with moscow two years later. the key question then and in the decades since has always been the same -- is the united states better off with a strategic arms agreement with russians or without it? the answer for successive presidents of both parties has always been with an agreement. the u.s. senate has always agreed, approving each treaty by lopsided bipartisan margins. the same after holds true for the new start. the u.s. is better off with this tree that without and i am confident it is the right agreement for today for the

future. it increases stability and predictability, allows us to sustain a strong nuclear triad, and preserves our flexibility to deploy the nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense. in light of all these factors, i urge the senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of the new treaty. >> thank you, secretary gates. >> i am pleased to add my voice in support of ratification of the new start treaty and to do so as soon as possible as we are in our six months without a treaty with russia. this treaty has the full support of york uniformed military. throughout the negotiations, secretaries clinton and gates ensure that professional military perspectives were thoroughly considered. during the development, i was personally involved to include two face-to-face negotiating sessions and several telephone conversations with my

counterpart, the chief of the russian general staff regarding key aspects of the treaty. the joint chiefs and i at also time to review the analytic work done in the nuclear posture of you regarding the shape of future u.s. strategic nuclear forces. the recommendations were transmitted as guidance to geneva regarding the three central limits on strategic systems and the war and its associated with them that are contained in the treaty. in short, the conclusion and implementation of the new start treaty is the right thing for us to do and we took the time to do it right. the chiefs and i believe a new start treaty achieves important and necessary balance between three critical items. it allows us to retain a strong and flexible nuclear deterrent. it helps strengthen the openness and transparency in our relationship with russia. it also demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the world wide risk of nuclear

incidents resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons. you should know that i firmly believe that the central limits established in this treaty and the provisions that allow each side of freedom to determine its own force makes provides us with the necessary flexibility to field the right structure to meet the nation's needs. we plan to retain our triad of commerce, ballistic submarines, and ballistic missiles in sufficient diversity to ensure strategic stability between ourselves and the russian federation. we'll also maintain sufficient capability to deter other nuclear states. the agreement provides for an array of important verification measures that are critical to both sides in a modern compliance with the new treaty. this tree is a critical element in the president's agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the unit states.

, our of allies and partners and a wider international community. we acknowledge the continuing role for nuclear weapons and the defense of america while placing additional emphasis on positive steps to prevent nuclear terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation. in summary, this new start agreement is important in itself and should also be viewed in a wider context. it makes many of reductions in the u.s. and russia strategic nuclear arsenals while strengthening strategic stability and u.s. national security. coupled with the administration's clear commitment that prudently invest in our aging infrastructure and in nuclear warhead life s,nshis treaty is a very meaningful step forward. i encourage the senate to fully study the treaty. i believe you will see the wisdom of ratifying it and i set before you today recommending that you do so. thank you, sarah.

>> thank you very much. secretary gates, you wrote last week about the unanimous support of the nation's military for this treaty and admiral mullen, you personally engaged with her counterpart -- with your counterpart in negotiations. you just testified in a list, both of you, of the things and i was impressed by the sequence of benefits you articulate it. i would like to ask each of you if you would summarize for us in a layperson's language why the military has such confidence that this, in fact, strengthens and does not present any of the challenges that some of the critics have raised? secretary superdelegates -- >> first of all, this tree, like its predecessors, brings four benefits that we would not otherwise have.

the first is transparency. knowing what the russians are doing and being able to track their systems and being able to count them, being able to observe them for the first time and actually look at the warheads themselves, having the unique tagging we have talked about, none of this transparency would be possible without this treaty. the second is predictability. this is an important feature of strategic arms agreements with russia since the very first one in 1972. we need to have some idea and for both sides to know the limits of the other and therefore avoid the need to hedge against anthe unknowns. the third benefit is strategic stability and the way this treaty is structured as to that strategic stability as the

number of warheads -- as the number of delivery vehicles comes down, putting one icbm put requires the russian to use a 141 or 241 attack mode if they were to come after our icbm's so they would use up a significant portion of their strategic delivery vehicles. all of this contributes to strategic stability finally, this treaty for the first time gives us actual access to russian weapons and russian facilities. we have had access to facilities but not the weapons themselves before. eight of theseíh4k four areas, e treaty brings benefits to the united states and frankly, enhances our security in ways that would not happen in the absence of such a treaty. >> throughout the negotiations and the ones i participated in, the focus from the military perspective and our ability to maintain a very strong

strategic review and it is my belief and the belief of the joint chiefs of staff that the treaty does that. the preservation of the triad is particularly important and the strength of that tribe which has been such a critical part of our arsenal historically. also, in my interaction with the chief of staff of the air force and the chief of naval operations, in order to continue to invest and sustaine the and for structure and the people and the kinds of things that we need to stay as overtime for the strength of that triad which has proven itself in the past is still very much of their even though some of the numbers are down. secondly, what we typically need

those weapons for is the ability to execute military operations should that of some point in time absolutely have to occur is that we are in very good shape with respect to any contingencies which are out there. that was a substantial underpinning for this treaty from the military perspective. can we carry out a mission that the president of united states has given us? i want to assure you that we can. in the negotiations with a russian specifically, to look at the white an array of initiatives including verification, the size of the arsenal, what we would look to the future and to reemphasize was secretary clinton said, we have done this in a way that has put -- that continues to put us in a great position of strength while being in a better position in terms of cooperation with russia. we keep our wives -- our eyes

wide open and cooperative with them in ways that has been a strength of this treaty. >> thank you. those were terrific summer breeze. secretary clinton, in the context of your efforts with respect to a number of the global issues and challenges we face and potentially non- proliferation, can you semele reduce -- can you similarly reduced the consequences of not ratifying this treaty? >> we would obviously lose all the benefits that both secretary dates and admiral mullen discussed. although there are benefits with respect to this treaty between the united states and the russian federation, they have many ancillary implications for our larger efforts against non-

proliferation. i would make five points -- number one, the intense efforts we have engaged in over the last year to reach this treaty has built a level of understanding between the key decision makers in the united states and russia and that has been very helpful in other arenas, most notably with respect to iran. i started my morning talking witabout finalizing the resolutn and the agreement and that it will be discussed later today. secondly, the impact of our resetting of a relationship that resulted in the treaty has had a very salutary of fact, many of our allies and our adversaries.

our allies particularly in nato as i said welcome this agreement because they have been historically on the front lines. it and our central and eastern european friends were very pleased to see this level of cooperation between the united states and russia. that has laid the groundwork for us to work on the strategic concept that will be introduced with respect to nato's future, to reestablish the tomato-russia council and to do some other confidence building measures after the very unfortunate events concerning georgia that build the feeling of alliance among our nato members but again, with a clear view that they expect us to continue to provide their defense. thirdly, with respect to adversaries or potential adversaries, the fact that the

united states and russia are working together is not good news. they are not happy to see this level of cooperation. they are not happy that china and russia have signed off on this resolution that we plan to introduce later. this is a real setback for them. wh"sit has a very positive effe- a fact on our dealings with our international friends about all of these other issues. number 4, having gone this far to achieving the benefits in this treaty, to lose them with not only undermine our strategic stability, the predictability, the transparency, the other points that we made, but it would severely impact our potential to lead on the board issue of non-proliferation. countries would wonder why we could not get across the finish line on the street. they would wonder if we could

not get across the finish line on other matters as well. i can only speak from personal experience in the many and those meetings i go to around the world that the fact that we have reached this treaty and have fulfilled our continuing obligations as an mpt member on the three pillars which are the foundation gives us more credibility on the nonproliferation agenda. >> thank you very much. senator lugar -- >> thank you. as you have already zeroed in on specific objections that have been raised, i want to mention again how important it will be to answer all of the questions that the centers may have for missile defense. each one of you categorically indicated that there is no way where our missile defense will

be inhibited at any way at any time. that does not get through all the time. we have people worry about something industry that will inhibit missile defense. i ask for your continued guidance as to how we make that point. the second point is that on the stockpile stewardship or the making certain that the warhead that we now have work, that in the event were called upon, we have a background in terms of our laboratories to continue researching and the personnel and some of them are growing old and we need some young ones, all of these things, those things we now have better guaranteed by our treaties and we verify everyone else in the world. this is for their confidence as well as their own. i mention that because we have written letters sometimes

bipartisan letters and sometimes just republicans and rock -- and secretary gates has been a regular recipient. his response today that $4.6 billion will be transferred to meet this is a significant commitment. i will not be labour the point. the verification procedure is very important even senators who are not enthusiastic about arms control treaties approached the chairman and myself and ask what happens now. there are no american boots on the ground. what about that? we have counted on this for years. we had american boots on the ground. our verification worked. i will make one personal point about the spirit on the wall in my conference room, we have a chart that the department of

defense contributes data each month for for the last 15 years. as at the start, 13,300 warheads on missiles were aimed at the united states. 13,300. it is a testimony that any one of those would have obliterated my entire city of indianapolis everybody would be dead. that is impressive to hoosiers. i hope it is impressive to the other 49 states [laughter] by and large, this has supported anything i could do to make certain that one by one of those missiles -- the war had missed the muscle -- left the missiles, the russians destroy the missiles and the silos in which the missiles were located, every vestige of this, even the roots and branches planted in many fields. it is critically important.

there may be americans who have not gone for the arms control talks who don't realize what one nuclear weapon can do. there were 13,300 of them and there are still by some counts as many as 5000, not all deployed but we have some distance to go. when december 5 comes and there are no boots on the ground and no treaty, some say you cannot trust the russians. we even have members who have said that we should not knocked out the very first of our weapons. we need everyone of them and we should build more. i don't agree with that philosophy. i understand that what i would say that as a counter argument, it was decided that russia would like me to go to a base where they had submarines.

. . we do now. ed this is the first time our intelligence has seen a typhoon at that stage. yet the agreement was they wanted us to help them destroy the typhoons. it has taken 10 years to get through at three of the six. they are very complex situations. to use 3 -- to leave three of the six out there is unthinkable. i become a emotional about it

because i have had experience. what if they hit us? we want to make sure we know what the verification is and why it is at this level. you have done your best thus far. without being tedious, i want to submit more questions that our staff has formulated in detail so there can be as complete a record of every nuance of this that we have. finally, i would say my own experience with these treaties has been even after the treaty has, and we have legislation, -- even after the treaty has come we have legislation, there are senators who perennially put all sorts of restrictions before any money can be spent. you have leveled the defense department with obligations. in fact, one year, no money at all was spent with regard to

disarmament in russia because there were so many letters that did not care britain and the appropriate money was off the table. ed -- so many letters that did not get britain and inappropriate money was off the table. i would just say this is so important that i ask your indulgence in sending over more and more questions and publishing all the results so that anyone who is slightly interested in this, academically, will have every reason to see the whole answer. and finally -- is this something that is good for my country? you have all the firms that's you believe it is. i appreciate your direct testimony today. questions will be coming in large numbers. thank you. >> the panel really appreciates that. [laughter]

that me just say from our point of view, we are enormously grateful to have your expertise. i think the questions you are going to publish are going to help the committee put together precisely the kind of record that is needed here. i know the panel as well as the committee appreciates that approach. senator dodd. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think the witnesses for their presence here today. let me just say, as far as the chairman does, this has been of longstanding issue for senator kerrey. he has done a remarkable job on it. but also dick lugar, wife had the pleasure of serving with on this committee -- who i have had the pleasure of serving with on this committee for 30 years. the story of mankind putting its common good over in stings,

the name of dick luga willr -- dick lugar will figure prominently. and i think the three of you as well. this is difficult work and you have done a remarkable job getting it done. i have two questions. one relates to the non-lugar opposes. i wonder if any analysis has been done in light of this new start accord? obviously it is a very valuable tool over the years, as senator lugar has just affirmed. secretary clinton, admiral mullin? >> actually, sir, i am not sure. from my perspective, i think we should look at it. >> secondly, you've answered

this, madam secretary clinton, but i wonder if you might just go a little further. congratulations on the news we are hearing about the chinese and russians being supportive of the international sanctions regime regarding iran. that is extremely important information. we are on the midst of a conference on iran sanctions and the iran sanctions bill. the chairman of the banking committee, we voted unanimously on the iran sanctions bill. the house as done so as well. we need to proceed with that issue. we are very interested in seeing what happens. national -- international sanctions make more sense than unilateral sanctions. we will continue to have unilateral sanctions every year. multilateral would be a

tremendous step forward. we commend you on that. i wonder if he might comment on the reduction in counter- proliferation efforts generally. i think specifically india and pakistan specifically. to what extent might it have a positive impact, causing other nations to move in this direction? >> senator dodd, thank you and thank you for all of your work on these and so many other important issues. we believe that the treaty history between the united states and russia is the bedrock of disarmament. as senator lugar eloquently outlined, it has been in our interest over all of these years. we believe in the current environment, in which we are putting forth this treaty for your consideration for

ratification, it strengthens our hand in talking with other countries that have nuclear weapons. the fact is that as far as we know, in the world -- and i think we are pretty good handle on it -- the united states and russia have more than 90% of all nuclear weapons in the world. we want to, as we said in the non-proliferation -- the npr, nuclear posture review -- we want to explore conversations with other nuclear nations, starting with china, and see what kind of opportunity for discussion could exist. the united states and russia have now a 30-year history of these discussions, but we need to begin similar discussions with others. we go into those with the credibility that this treaty

gives us. right now, as both the chairman and ranking member have said, there is no treaty. we have no so-called boots on the ground. we are not expecting anything. we are not acquiring the kind of information we think is in our national security interest. so this treaty is not only on its own merits in our interest, but the fact of it gives us the credibility to go and talk with other nuclear armed countries. it also gives is the credibility to reach agreements, as we now have, on a resolution in the united nations with countries that are concerned about the proliferation represented by iran. on this broad basis of how we can be more effective in making our case about what we see as the principal threat to the united states in the world, the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction, there used are rogue regimes or network of terrorists, this treaty gives us a lot of credibility going forward. >> thank you. we have questions to be asked and answered obviously, but i want to advance my strong support for this treaty. i think we need to move on this. my fervent hope is we will get this done in the next month or so. clearly before we adjourn. i cannot imagine adjourning and not getting this done. i think you for your work. >> thank you, senator dodd. senator corker? >> thank you for your service to our country. madam secretary, what recourse to the countries have in the case of violations in the treaties? >> senator, there are several approaches. one, there is a bilateral commission that exists to a near

knout differences, solve problems -- to iron out differences, solve problems. each country may seek recourse if there is a violation or perceived violation. >> what kind of recourse? >> you know, we have a long history with these treaties where at presenting information that we believe might violate the spirit or letter -- letter of the treaty leads to changes. this treaty is not a static document. it goes into effect, like the previous start treaty and others, and then it becomes implemented. under the treaty, we are not kidding -- if we believe under the tree, we are not getting access to what -- if we believe under the treaty, we are not getting access to what we need to get access to, we measure that. senator lugar is the expert in

the room, along with secretary gates. but the history has been, i would characterize as, positive. in the enforcement and implementation. the final recourse we have is to withdraw from the treaty. we have the right to withdraw, if we believe this treaty is no longer in our interest. >> basically it is an understanding between two countries and they act in good faith to live up to those. should it trouble us before we get started that each of the country's has a very different opinion of what we negotiated as reasonable missile defense? should we not what one statement from both countries before we began -- should we not want one statement from both countries before we begin? >> senator, again, there is a history. there were similar divergent views with the first start treaty, and that did not stop

us. it is a little bit like a political statements, i might suggest. if you make an agreement -- >> i know what you are saying. >> no, i think if you make an agreement, the agreement on the face of it and the terms set forth the obligations, but for various reasons, each side might want to characterize it differently. if you look at the statement, the unilateral statement made by the russians, they basically said they would have a right to withdraw if we continued our missile defense. they have a right to withdraw any way. with the original start treaty, they said similar things about missile defense, and here we are, billions of dollars later. it is not a part of the treaty agreement itself. >> as it relates to their ability to launch, it is my understanding they are already below the lateral that the

treaty stipulates, and we are above it. as it relates to the ability to deliver, do we really get anything in this treaty at all? >> senator, i think the significant reduction in overall nuclear weapons was a very clearly a benefit. >> but are they not already below the level? just specifically as relates to the strategic ability to launch? due to the age of their system, are they not already below the levels we agreed to do? >> they are below the launching levels, they are. >> it seems to meet their neighbors are pretty concerned about their technical abilities. -- tactical abilities. did we miss an opportunity, since they are already below on their strategic ability to deliver, we are the ones making

cuts, not them. did we miss an opportunity? i know we always monday morning quarterback. other senators say, "why did you not get this?" and i guess that is what i am doing now. did we miss an opportunity to get them to do something tactically that would make their neighbors feel more safe? >> from my perspective, senator, we have seized an opportunity to come together and get to this treaty. it is not everything that everybody could have wanted. certainly, we are very aware the tactical nuclear weapons that russia has. that has been discussed with them in terms of the future. in a broader context, i think the leadership position we're both in as a result of this, from the perspective of the overall weapons inventory, it is something that will be addressed

in the future. but it is not part of this negotiation. >> i would add two things, senator. first of all, what is important to our allies, and in particular those on russia's periphery, it is article 5 of the nato treaty, and the fact that nato continues to believe and attest to the fact that it must have a nuclear capability. the f-35's will deploy it will have a dual capability. we have protected our right, with respect to tactical nuclear weapons. there is no question there are concerns in eastern europe, particularly about russia and tactical nuclear weapons. that was not part of this negotiation. we have protected our own ability to do more. while there are strategic nuclear -- while their strategic nuclear delivery vehicles are under the tree, the number of warheads are above.

they will be reducing the number of warheads. >> i will move onto something you can address. i know these other things are look backs. the treaty is what it is. the modernization issue probably concerns all of us. i know my time is limited now. i know there is a 23-page report the talk a little bit about where we are. it is a secure document. it focuses on our sub-delivery system and not the others. our labs are telling us that they do not think there is any way the amount of dollars set aside, as you all talk about $80 billion in investment, many of us look at it and it looks like it is double counting. in other words, much of it is money that was already going to be spent. as we move ahead, and i know i am 13 seconds over now, i think that is an area where we want

clarification as to what the real commitment is modernization-wise. i think that is important to all of us. i think we know we have an agent system. for us to really be where we need to be, real investment in modernization needs to be where it needs to be. i think you all for your willingness to be here to testify. >> two quick comments. first of all, i have been dry for 3 1/2 years to get money for modernization of the nuclear infrastructure. this is the first time i think of -- i think i have a chance of getting some, and ironically, it is in connection with an arms control agreement. previous efforts have failed. we will get you all the budgetary details and everything with respect to this, but i would just quote tom d'agostino

who says the requirements in the president's budget are exactly what is needed, and he said separately it is what is required to get the job done. we will get you the details. >> thank you. senator feingold. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this treaty stands to reduce our arsenal and the russian arsenal. its ratification would also offer proof to the international committee of the commitment of united states to fulfilling our obligations under the non-proliferation treaty, which will help foster cooperation needed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. however, this treaty make significant changes to the verification and inspection regime that was in place for nearly two decades under the original start treaty. we have to ensure this treaty is verifiable. the guarantees -- it guarantees our ability to monitor russian nuclear weapons. as a member of the senate select

intelligence committee, we are reviewing that. let me go to secretary gates and follow on senator corker's questions. i know you're talking about funding modernization. let's get one clarification. some of my colleagues in the senate are concerned this treaty would jeopardize our ability to modernize our arsenal. it is my -- it is my understanding that nothing in this treaty prevents us from building new nuclear weapons. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> this treaty's verification regime differs from the one that was in place for nearly 20 years as i just mentioned. we will no longer maintain an on site inspection facility in russia. it would permit more vigorous on site inspections. admiral, on balance, with this decrease or increase our overall

understanding of the russian arsenal? >> i think it would increase it on balance. specifically with the regard to be russian inspection center -- they have to get verification to us 48 hours before it comes out of the factory. i think the verification procedures and industry are easier. secretary gates spoke about the number of inspections. the specifics, to be able to look into and see the number of weapons that are on top of any particular missile. we have not been able to do that before. we will be able to count weapons on bombers, which we were not able to do before. we will be able to confirm facility elimination. there are very robust national technical means, provisions in

this treaty, and provision which does not permit interference with that. there will be a unique identifier on every single weapon, a brand-new verification. as was mentioned earlier, the number of tests and lunches each year, we will have telemetry. -- and launches each year, we will have telemetry. but the telemetry we need, they are different from the launches in the past. we do not need -- we need to have -- the ability to verify the weight of a missile when we did not know what was inside. these verification measures are very robust and meet what we need today in the 21st century, and not the ones we needed in previous treaties. >> admiral, i am concerned -- the cause for maintaining a

large arsenal is based on a misunderstanding. independent students -- studies indicate a limited exchange of 100 warheads would have devastating consequences. has united states government evaluated the impact of so- called limited exchange, and is it true that it could have a devastating global impact? >> yes, sir, i think a limited exchange would have a devastating global impact. senator lugar spoke to that earlier. a single weapon would have a devastating impact. and yet we find ourselves over time reducing the size of our arsenal, but also sustaining it at the size that -- we do not do this alone. in a treaty with an -- an enormous number of nuclear weapons as well. clearly, the devastation that would occur with any release of a nuclear weapon, and we were

speaking earlier about the merging of terrorists with nuclear weapons, which is another big concern that has been put at the top of the list in any npr here. -- in the npr here. it is a very positive step, while preserving what we need in terms of overall strength. >> secretary gates, in your standee verification regime will supplement our intelligence gathering capabilities. to the extent the treaty skills back inspection activities, are we able to compensate -- scales back inspection activities, are we able to compensate with other activities? >> that is the judgment of the intelligence community. representatives of the dni and cia were involved in these

negotiations throughout and consulted in terms of the terms of the treaty and the verification terms. i think what you're likely to hear from them is that they have high confidence in their ability to monitor this treaty until toward the end of the 10-year term were that conference -- confidence level will go to moderate. that is what they do all long- term a valuations of intelligence capability. the further in the future you go, the confidence level begins to decline. back when senator lugar was talking about having his picture taken in front of a typhoon submarine and that was the first time we had seen one, i would only qualified saying that is the only time we have seen one -- i would only qualified that by saying that is the only time we have seen one by dry land. [laughter]

>> the general said this would reduce the constraints on the nuclear defense program. which to speak to that? >> obviously, this is very much in focus as a result of this. throughout the negotiations, there was, well we talked about it, it it was by and large a disconnect. the purpose of this treaty was not to get at missile defense. i see no restrictions in terms of our development of missile defense, which is an important system as well. i would actually hope that in the long term, given the relationship with russia, we would be able to see our way through to more cooperative efforts with them in terms of missile defense. very well, possibly in the future, the kind of impact the general was talking about. >> thank you.

>> all of you have bragged about or talk about the verification improvements or the ability to verify. i want to ask a couple of questions. admiral mullen, you talk about the verification system on each weapon. will that be like a transponder on each airplane? or do we know yet? >> i think some may know. i do not. it was clear it is going to be visible and verifiable. every single weapon would have it. there was a unique criteria laid on for each weapon because the weapons, in fact, are different. >> would be a technological verification compared to a visible one? >> i think -- i would have to get back. i think it is visible, but it could possibly be technologically verified as well. >> if you would, i would like to have that information, because that is impressive. secretary gates, thank you for

being here. you talked about the submarine and-launched missiles and the number of inspections -- the submarine-launched missiles and the number of inspections. >> yes. >> how many inspections did we have under start ii? >> i honestly do not remember. >> [unintelligible] >> under start ii -- [unintelligible] there was a quote of 28. >> and now they have 18? >> yes, sir. >> that is less. >> i was just informed the uid's are mechanical, not technically detectable. i think it is important under

this treaty -- under the previous treaty there were 73 facilities we inspected. russian facilities. under this treaty, there are only 27. based on the number of inspections, 18, there are almost twice as many inspections per facility per year as in the previous treaty. that speaks to moving us to where we are now, as opposed to where we were in the past. >> senator, that is a really important position. we spent a lot of time on the inspection issue. i have to confess, at first i was not quite sure what the numbers were. we went from 28 to 18. but then one of our very able negotiators showed me a map of all the sites in the former soviet union we were inspecting. then, thanks to senator lugar and other efforts, those sites have been closed. they have been dismantled. it was not just in russia. it was in, and belarus --

kazakhstan and belarus and other places. we have twice as many inspections because we have so many fewer sites to inspect. >> i think it would be great for an eight grade level memo on how much less is more. someone will take -- that could be taken either way. i think it would be helpful. >> senator, if i could elaborate on the answer i gave before on the number of inspections -- the 18 are divided into two categories. the first 10 are both at deployed and non-deployed size. eight are at non-deployed sites. in the first category, we carry out inspections that were required gavotte inspections under start ii -- that were required inspection the --

inspections under start ii. under this treaty, we do both in the same inspection. for all practical purposes, the number of inspections is about the same as it was. >> thank you. secretary clinton, thank you for being here. i seem to remember in a previous hearing on this issue of short- range tactical weapons, they are not included in the start agreement? and it was an issue for the russians because they're old eastern bloc satellites -- there -- their old eastern bloc satellites are so close to them. is this true? >> they were not willing to negotiate on tactical nuclear weapons. the negotiations were always on strategic weapons. we have always said we want to go back and talk about tactical

nukes. we would like to do this as soon as we can get this ratified if the senate will so advise and consent. in a very frank and useful discussion with our nato ally, because you may know that there was a move on -- there was a move by a number of european countries to put pressure on the united states to withdraw our tactical nukes from europe. we have said first, that has to be a nato decision. it is not a unilateral decision. and we're not going to withdraw our tactical nukes unless there is an agreement with russia to withdraw theirs. this is an issue that was very well vetted by our nato allies, our eastern european allies. they know russia has their tactical nukes close to their

borders. this is one of the reasons -- this is something admiral mullen 4 secretary gates can address -- this is one of the reasons we went to a phase-adaptive approach. we were looking at what kind of medium range missiles iran has, not the intercontinental. the issue of shorter-range missiles and tactical nukes is one we will address. >> so we can maintain the level of our existing weapons in europe as well as proceeding with missile defense? >> yes, we do. >> and our nato partners, i think you used the word "welcome" this treaty. is that correct? >> yes, it is. >> mr. chairman, thank you for this hearing. i want to express my appreciation to our three

witnesses for their service to this nation. i concur in the comments made by our -- by senator dodd and senator lugar about moving forward in our leadership on nonproliferation. i see this treaty as a critical part in our relationship between russia and the united states in providing world leadership on nuclear safety issues, non- proliferation issues, and responsible reductions of our nuclear stockpiles. i am pleased we're moving forward on this. i hope that we will be back prior to the end of this congress. madam secretary, i want to follow up on a statement he made earlier. i see russia and the united states as having a common interest, particularly with nuclear arms in other countries. you mentioned iran. put me in the category of being

concerned with what happens with brazil and turkey and iran. i think those two countries have worked -- have acted in good faith, but iran has not. we have been down this road before. we know iran can change its mind at any time with regard to nuclear material. with this arrangement, they will continue with the refinement and the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon. i was pleased to hear your status that we are moving forward with the security council resolutions and we have at least some cooperation from russia and china. that to me is good news. it seems like one of the byproducts of your negotiations of the start treaty. i think this all comes together. if you could elaborate on that now, i would appreciate it. if not, we certainly understand the timing you're going to. >> senator, thank you. i think there is no doubt our

cooperation and the intensive efforts we in the russian counterparts to put into the negotiations over the last year are part of the reason we plan to circulate a draft resolution to the entire security council today that includes russia and china and their agreement on the wording of the text. with respect to the efforts that were undertaken by turkey and brazil, we have acknowledged the sincerity of the undertakings by both turkey and brazil. they have attempted to find a solution to iran's standoff with the international community, and then made an announcement in iran -- and they made an announcement in tehran that includes certain commitments by iran. as we and the international community have made clear over

the past months, it is not sufficient for iran to make a declaration at a press conference. iran has to clearly and authoritatively convey to the international atomic energy agency what its position is and what it is prepared to do before any offer by iran can be legitimately considered by the international community. that has not happened. while the removal of a significant portion of low- enriched uranium from iran would be a positive step, we are seriously concerned about things that are missing from the declaration announced. the chairman began by listing some of those. chief among them, iran is refusal to suspend enrichment of uranium to nearly 20% levels. that is in clear violation of its international obligations. it is continually amassing

newly-enriched uranium, regardless of whether it comes to an agreement on the tehran research reactor concerns. as president--- medvedyev said yesterday, russia shares are concerns. we a further concerns which i conveyed to my brazilian and turkish -- we have further concerns which i conveyed to my brazilian and turkish counterparts. the way it was presented in this declaration, there could be months of further negotiation. that is just not acceptable to us, and to our partners. we're troubled by the continued failure of the iran inside -- iran yen side to -- iranian side to see a continuation of its nuclear program, despite an agreement to last october. we do not think it is an

accident that they agree to this declaration as we were prepared to move forward in new york. the fact we had russia and china on board and removing early this week, namely today, to share the text of that resolution put pressure on iran, which they were trying to somehow dissipate. senator, given our very serious concerns about iran's continued violations concerning its nuclear activities, we remain committed to move forward with the process in the united nations, and we are very committed to working with our counterparts at the united nations to get as strong a resolution as possible as soon as we can. >> thank you for that response. i share senator lugar are's concerned that a single missile could -- lou dart's -- senator

lugar's concerns that a single missile could be devastating. non-proliferation goes beyond russia and the united states. that is why i think these numbers are significant and the efforts of russia and the united states to work together on these issues is important for the international community. including what is happening in iran or north korea. the india-pakistan issues are also a major concern to all of us. i think it is extremely important we stay focused on the overall objectives as we look at the senate ratification of the start treaty, because it clearly has implications beyond russia and the united states. >> thank you. we are going to have the votes in a few minutes. i want to not interrupt the hearing at all. i would ask whichever senator is next in line on questioning, if they would leave, i will

also leave immediately and then turn around and come back so we can continue the hearing without interruption. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much. first of all, let me tell you where i come from on this. the first responsibility of of government is the protection of its citizens and the defense of the american people. secretary gates, i think, probably put this in about as simple and understandable terms as you can it by saying "are we better off with this or without it?" that is probably as good a way of looking at this as possible. secretary gets, the modernization that you are pursuing is critical. not only the number of weapons, the technology, everything else. keep up the good work there, and we will help you every way we can.

that absolutely needs to be done. secretary clinton, your discussion about pursuing a discussion or a treaty on tactical weapons, nuclear weapons, is certainly important, and i hope when this is over that will be pursued. secretary dates, -- secretary gates, you talked about starting this 40 years ago. that was a marvelous job. it was a huge step forward for mankind in getting a start treaty. but we have had 40 years of experience with this. things have changed dramatically over the last 40 years. we seem to have developed irreconcilable differences on the defensive missile situation. that is where -- and i do not think this is a secret -- secretary clinton and i have discussed this.

i have real difficulties with this. i would have hoped we would have taken advantage of this opportunity to smooth this over. 40 years ago when this started, you had the new treaty. we had the two parties having had dealt with this for the the last four years. both parties recognize what they have in their hands. how it would affect the world. this nonsense about a limited exchange. all anyone has to do is pull the trigger once. it does not matter if it is 100 or one. it would have profound changes on the culture of the world. at any rate, 40 years ago, we did not have iran pursuing nuclear ambitions. we did not have north korea. we did not have the chinese situation. we did not have india-pakistan nuclear arms. today, we do. to me, that is even on more

pressing need in this particular -- than this particular treaty. it is a good thing to have this treaty. the details of it, we can also are about how many inspections there should be and that kind of thing -- we can all spa are about how many inspections there should be in that kind of thing. we ought to be looking at what are these -- what are these other situations that they are not such that we can sit down at a table with iran or north korea and talk to them using common sense and reasonableness and reaching a treaty like we have with the russians. it really has been successful over the last 40 years. i do not think anyone can argue it has not. these others to not fall in the same category. to protect the american people, it is critical that we developed and we develop -- that we

develop and we develop with the best technology we have a defensive missile system. that is the only way we will protect ourselves from these other countries. that is why i am concerned. at the end of the day, after all the discussion, we have irreconcilable differences with the russians. we say this does not impede our abilities. the russians say, yes, it does. i have the greatest respect for the ranking member who says we need to say over and over again this does not affect our ability to do that. but yet when you read the preamble, when you read some of the language, and most important, when you read the unilateral statements, we have irreconcilable differences. this treaty means something different to the russians the means to us when it comes to protecting our people using a defensive missile structure.

having said all that, i am going to give you a couple minutes to again reassure me. i of listen to all of you reassure me before. -- i have listened to all of you reassure me before. i understand the bottom-line answer is we can get out the tree. that is not a legitimate answer. if that is the case to -- if that is the case, why have the treaty at all? that is the problem i have with this. i think it is a good thing to have this treaty. but anything we do to convince the world or suggest to the world that we are not going to do everything we possibly can to effect a legitimate defensive position really troubles me. >> senator, the russians have hated missile defense ever since the strategic arms talks began in 1969. in fact, those talks began with

the russians' primary interest in being in negotiating the anti-ballistic missile treaty. it was upon the insistence of the united states that we a company it with an agreement on strategic offensive weapons. from the beginning of this process, more than 40 years ago, the russians have hated missile defense. they hated it even more in 1983 when ronald reagan made his speech saying we were going to do strategic missile defense. the notion that this treaty is somehow focused -- has focused this antagonism on the part of the russians toward missile defense, all it would say is -- is the latest chapter in a long line of russian objections to our proceeding with missile defense, and frankly, i think it is because -- particularly in the 1970's and 1980's and probably now -- we can afford it

and they cannot. we're going to build a good one, and they probably are not. they do not want to move in -- reserve the resources, so they try to stop us. this treated as not accomplish that for them. there are no limits on us. we've made statements on other issues relating to virtually every other strategic arms agreement we have had with the russians on one subject or another. neither has ever considered them binding. we're putting our money where our beliefs are. as secretary clinton pointed out, our fy 2011 budget will add 7 million more dollars on missile defense. we are going for a second missile field. we're putting more than $1 billion into the two and three- stage ground-based interceptor programs. we are buying petrie it iii -- patriot iii's.

with a comprehensive missile defense program. we're going ahead with all of it. the russians consider what they want, but as secretary clinton said, these unilateral statements are totally outside the treaty. aetna standing. they are not binding. never have been. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> as secretary clinton knows well, the best laid plans of mice and men around here do not always work. the senate has delayed the vote until 12:00 a five -- 12:05. senator casey? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. we recently had a briefing that was very helpful. this is a continuation of the work that has been done by the work of each of you and those who work with you. first of all, we still have a

lot of debating and discussion about this treaty. that will continue. that is important, to have it -- to have questions over the next several weeks or months, depending on how quickly this treaty gets to the floor. i think it is apparent from the testimony you have provided, and others, people outside of government who have worked in other administrations of both parties, all being committed to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, but also, and just in summary fashion, highlighting secretary gates's four points. all under the umbrella of a safe, secure, and effective arsenal, but also under a broader umbrella of this treaty

enhancing our security. i think it is critically important to make that point. just by way review, because the three of you know better than not, because in washington we need to review. often to reemphasize. secretary gates, i want to review your testimony just by way of emphasis and repetition. but on page 3 of your testimony, you say "first, the treaty will not constrain united states from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers in this defense." the next paragraph -- the new start agreement -- of " the new start agreement will not restrict our ability to develop and deploy prompt conventional missile strike capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less."

further on you say, "we are currently examining potential future long-range weapon systems for prompt global strike that would not be developed -- limited by the treaty." all of those statements, i think, rebut the arguments that been made over the last couple of weeks on missile defense. i think it is amplified by what secretary clinton said on page two, but the treaty "does not compromise the nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our allies." second -- "the treaty does not infringe on the flexibility we need to maintain our forces, including bombers, submarines, and missiles, and with at best serves our national security interest." "the treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts." and secretary clinton added more

to that assertion. admiral mullen, in your statements as well. i think it is important that we confront that argument. i think it is also important we are very clear and unambiguous, as i think all three of you have been. the one issue that was raised in addition to missile defense, one of several, and it was raised in the context of a formulation committee hearing that we have a number of weeks ago. it has been raised by others, by no -- but i know former secretaries schlesinger raised it. one sense that i have is that prior to and during -- but especially prior to the start treaty -- i think it was very

clear that we entered into negotiations with the russians with an understanding that tactical nuclear weapons would not be discussed. but that would in fact take place later, and that -- i know secretary perry made this point -- that concluding the start treaty was a necessary prerequisite to having discussions about tactical weapons. i want to have each of you in the two minutes we have speak to that question about tactical weapons, and deal with the argument that has been presented. >> i think you put your finger on it. there was an agreement that these were not a part of the negotiation from the very beginning. but in the context of their number of tactical nuclear weapons, let me just emphasize one other aspect that has not

been mentioned in terms of where this treaty is of benefit to the united states. i believe the russians are in the process of changing, fundamentally, their approach to their own security. in the mid-1950's, president eisenhower decided that because of the vast number of soviet soldiers, the united states would not try to match the russians tank for tank and a soldier for soldier in europe, but rely on massive nuclear retaliation. so we invested very heavily in our nuclear capability. in 2010, the russians are facing both financial contracts come up but especially demographic constraint -- financial constraints, but especially demographic constraints, and they are reducing forces. they are in free seen the importance of nuclear weapons in defense of russia and leaving

conventional forces for handling problems on reporters and internal problems. this treaty constrains them in an area where i believe they are turning their attention as their population prevents them from having the kind of huge land army they have always had. keeping a cap on that and bring the numbers down in the strategic area and then, hopefully, turning to the tactical nuclear weapons where there's a number of hours and thousands to one, basically, in western russia, i think it gives us an advantage. >> secretary clinton? >> the nuclear posture review makes clear, and the president reiterated his commitment on april 8 at the signing of the treaty with president medvedyev in prague, the team -- that the

united states intends to pursue with russia broader reductions in strategic and tactical weapons, including non-deployed weapons. we cannot get to a discussion about tactical weapons until we get a new start treaty ratified, because obviously as secretary gates said, that provides the base from which we start. and addressing tactical weapons requires close coordination with nato, and we're in the process of working now the nato alliance approach to tactical nuclear weapons through the strategic concept. all these things are moving together. the first order of business is the new start treaty because that proceeds our ability to get into these additional discussions with the russians. >> thank you. admiral mullen, two brief thoughts.

it was known we were not dealing with this, but we needed to. that is not a message that is lost on them. secondly, in my experience with my last job with the head of their navy as well as this job with two separate sheets of the fence -- what secretary gates said -- two separate chiefs of defense, what secretary gates said, they will not invest in the kinds of forces they had in the past. there are investing in strategic forces, which to me, to strengthen the importance of having this kind of treaty with them, as we both move forward. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you, senator lugar. i want to thank all three of you for your service to the country as well. we got a copy of the treaty on friday. i look forward to getting into a lot of details. i would like to express

concerns, may be in more of the conceptual way today, just to get some quick response from you and make one request. the details are important, obviously, but it appears from what you've said already that aside from the treaty with russia, the signal to the rest of the world, our credibility, the appearances of what it shows as far as our good faith is important in making the world safer, reducing proliferation is key. i appreciate that goal and i think we all share it. the concern i have -- some of the assumptions in the treaty as suggest a different role for america in the future. i will express a few of these concerns. america does have a different role. as you all now over 30 countries count on us for their protection. -- as you all know, over 30 countries count on us for their protection. we play a different role than

russia. russia is a threat to many, but a protector of none. america also has the largest economic role in the world as far as our trade with other countries come and be used to help other countries. russia uses their energy, their oil, as a threat. i think we know as we look at nuclear weapons that the russians do not like a missile defense because they do not see it as a deterrent. they want to use it as a threat. that is why this treaty and what it says about missile defense is very important. . .

defensive missile defense as long as it does not threat their offensive capabilities. i mean, that's exactly what they said here. that's what they said in their statement. there's a clear disconnect between what you're telling us and what it says in this treaty and what the russians are saying. we have complete flexibility with missile defense. until it against to the point where it threatens their ability to deliver weapons. and once that happens, not only

for russia but all over the world, that we render nuclear missiles irrelevant if we can shoot them down. and for us to even include in a treaty the idea that these things are interrelated is somewhat frightening to me. and i don't believe for one minute iran is going to see this as a good sign. what i would like at this point -- and i think other members of the committee would too -- after the first start treaty was presented, members of the committee were given copies of the full negotiating record so that we can see the understandings that were discussed during the negotiations and that we can determine if missile defense is in fact interrelated. and if this parity issue is one that we have discussed openly with the russians. and i just want to ask secretary clinton, will you allow members of the committee to see the full negotiating

record? >> first, senator, let me say that the language you're referring to, similar language was included in the start treaty. and i hope we will be able to persuade you by the end of this process, and we will certainly make every effort to do so, that nothing in any previous treaty nor any unilateral statement or any preamble to a trotey has in any way constrained our development of missile defense up to this date, and nothing in the current new treaty does either. i think that the facts really refute any concerns that you and others might have because we have proceeded a pace over the last 40 years with the development of missile defense, despite, as secretary gates said, the 40-year opposition

with the russians. now, with respect to the information around the treaty, you know, we are submitting a detailed article by article analysis of the treaty, the analysis is nearly 200 pages long. it provides information on every provision of the treaty, the protocol and the annexes, including how the united states will interpret the various provisions. these materials were prepared by the treaty negotiators, and, therefore, are drawn from the negotiating history. they're intended to provide a comprehensive picture of u.s. obligations under the treaty, and i do not believe -- i will double check this, senator -- i do not believe that the negotiating record was provided with the original start treaty because negotiating records, going back to i think president washington bob told me the other day -- washington, bob told me the other day, has not

been provided. we will provide you extensive and comprehensive information and i hope that in the process we will be able to persuade you, just as in the past, despite the russian dislike of our missile defense efforts, we are going forward. i voted for missile defense when i was here when the start treaty that expired in december was in effect. i hope you and other members will continue to vote for missile defense in the future. >> thank you, madam secretary. i just have to take what's in the treaty and what the russians have said. it's clear that at any point that our missile defense threatens their ability to deliver offensive weapons that they feel completely free to walk away from this treaty. which means we effectively have no treaty and unless it is our intent to dabble with missile defense and not create a global umbrella that could protect us. but it seems to make only

common sense at this point, as we see what's happening in iran and around the country, our ability to stop the development of nuclear weapons is very limited. but our ability to develop a defense system that could make those irrelevant would be the best disincentive we could provide the world if they can't deliver them anywhere. so obviously there's a real concern here. the russians apparently have gotten the clore statement from this -- clear statement from this is that at any point our missile defense systems threatens their delivery system they are going to walk away from this treaty. i hope you can convince me with the negotiating records that that was not discussed. but i do know in previous negotiations of treaties that some members of the committee have had an opportunity to see full negotiating records, and i hope this is something that you'll consider. i thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> well, thank you, senator. just so the record is as

complete as all of us want it to be here, let me just state that we did not get the negotiating record under the start i process. we did get it with the i.n.f. treaty, but subsequent to that, the foreign relations committee decided, and i will read from the report, that with the i.n.f. treaty having been provided under these circumstances both the administration and the senate now face the task of ensuring the senate review of negotiating records does not become an institutionalized procedure. the overall effect of fully exposed negotiations followed by a far more complicated senate review would be to weaken the treaty-making process and thereby damage american diplomacy. a systemic expectation of senate perusal of every key

treaty's negotiating record would be expected to inhabit candor and induce posturing on the part of u.s. negotiators and their counterparts during sensitive negotiations. i would suggest to the senator that i think we are going to be given a very frank -- we will have a classified session with the negotiators. you'll be able to ask a lot of tough questions. a lot of answers i think will be fort coming, but i think -- forthcoming, but i think personally the rationale with the senate is a good rationale and i think it stands here today. >> thank you for the clarification. i would be happy at this point even if it's redacted to have some record of the discussion related to our missile defense and the linkage that was included in the preamble so that we can determine what both sides understood. >> let me suggest this, senator, and i'm not saying --

i think we all want you to be satisfied and we want you to -- we want you to vote for this. but i think that the better way to proceed would be to let's meet -- let's meet with the team, let's meet in classified session, let's see to what degree those answers could satisfy you. i just share with the senator, this is a preamble. the preamble merely says recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms. it's something we all recognize. there is a relationship. that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced. that stands to reason. if you reduce nuclear arms and you build up your missile defense you can in fact completely obliterate one party's sense of deterrence -- the existence of deterrence.

if their offense is totally obliterated by your defense they no longer has an offense, what happens? they build. that's where we spent 40 years and we decided when we had 50,000 warheads to move in the opposite direction. >> senator, you're making my point. obviously we're agreeing to keep our missile defense to the point where it does not render their weapons useless. >> no, all that's been said here is there's a relationship. there is no agreement not to do anything, and it simply says that the current level doesn't do that. it's just recognizing a status quo. it does nothing to prevent us unilaterally from doing whatever we want. is that correct, secretary gates? >> but you just told me -- >> it's simply a knowledge -- >> our missile defense can render theirs useless? >> i'm just speak being the common sense of the theory, but i'm not suggesting that this in

any way restrains us. i said in my opening comments it does not restrain us. >> isn't it desirable to have a missile defense system that renders them useless? >> if they get near there they'll do exactly what we both did over the course of 50 years. they will build to the point that they feel they can overwhelm your defense. and then you go right back not entire scenario we had throughout the cold war which took us up to 50,000 warheads each or more. >> we're still at the point of mutual sheer destruction. >> yes, we certainly are. that is accurate. >> and i think it needs -- i think it needs -- one point needs to be clarified here. under the last administration as well as under this one, it has been the united states policy not to build a missile defense that would render useless russia's nuclear

capability. it has been a missile defense -- capabilities. it has been a missile defense to protect against rogue nations such as north korea and iran or countries that have very limited capabilities. the systems that we have, the systems that originated and have been funded in the bush administration as well as in this administration are not focused on trying to render useless russia's nuclear capability. that in our view as in theirs would be enormously destabilizing, not to mention unbelievably expensive. >> so our ability to protect other countries is a pipe dream and we don't even intend to do that, is that true? >> our ability to protect other countries will be focusing on countries like iran and north korea, countries that are rogue states, countries that have shown aggressive intent, and so we are able to -- we are

putting in defenses in europe that will be able to defend them. we have defenses in asia. we're building defenses in the middle east. so we have missile defense capabilities going up all around the world. but not intended to eliminate the viability of the russian nuclear capability. >> senator, let me do this because we need to recognize senator shaheen. it's a good discussion. it's a very important one and needs to be clarified the context. i am going to leave the record open for two weeks so that we may submit additional questions in writing. the record from this particular hearing will remain open. the record for the entire process will still be built. i recognize senator shaheen to close out the hearing. >> we have about five minutes left for the vote. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you all for being here. i want to follow up a little bit to make sure that i'm clear on some of what i think i heard in your response to senator

demint. first of all, am i correct that the russians had a unilateral statement similar to what is on the current tartt treaty, on the first tartt treaty? -- current start treaty, on the first start treaty? >> these unilateral statements are very much a pattern. we make them, they make them but they are not binding because they're not part of the treaty. >> and is it correct that even as we developed our missile defense plans and pulled out of the a.b.n. treaty that the russians did not pull out of the start tretty? >> yes, that is correct. >> and would you expect a similar reaction as we continue to develop missile defense plans with this new start treaty from the russians? >> senator, we would. and furthermore, we continue to offer to work with the russians on missile defense. we have a standing offer, and we hope that eventually they will because we think we now

have common enemies. >> well, and just to one more time get it on the record. i think you answered this for senator rich. but secretary gates and admiral mullen, are you concerned that this treaty constricts in any meaningful way our ability to carry out our current missile defense plans? >> no, none whatsoever. we intend to proceed with missile defense. >> i have no concerns. >> thank you. secretary clinton, you recently spoke at the m.p.t. review conference and called upon all countries to help strengthen the n.p.t. and mentioned 40 years ago after the treaty came into force president kennedy warned by the year 1975 can he could have up to 20 countries with nuclear weapons. fortunately that hasn't happened. but can you talk a little bit about how we ensure that the

number of nuclear weapons states doesn't continue to rise and how ratification of the start treaty can help with that? >> well, senator, i think it begins with the cooperative relationship between the united states and russia because there are three aspects to the n.p.t. one is nonproliferation. one is disarmament and one is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. and the nonaligned movement states have historically come to their n.p.t. obligations with some criticism that the united states is not doing its part on the disarmament front. there was none of that at this conference in new york because of the fact that we had reached this agreement with russia. so it does provide a stronger platform which we stand to make

the case against proliferation. the cooperation that we have obtained with russia on both north korea and iran in our efforts to constrain and eliminate their nuclear programs has been very notable. and i think it is fair to say when this administration started our relationship with russia was not very productive but through many efforts and particularly the intensive efforts around the new start treaty, that has changed. i remember well the quote that you repeated because the fears were that once the genie was out of the bottle we would have a multitude of countries to have nuclear weapons. we are determined to continue our efforts to prevent iran from having a nuclear weapon. as i said at the beginning of the hearing, russia has joined

with us and is part of the agreed statement that is being discussed at the united nations now. >> thank you. and just a final question. i know in the earlier questioning someone brought up the tactical nuclear weapons question. and i wonder if any of you could speak to what you think our ability to negotiate an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons might be if we failed to ratify this treaty. >> well, if we failed to ratify this treaty, i think it's zero. once we ratify this treaty, which we're hopeful the senate will do, it will still be hard, but at least it is possible in the context of our nato obligations. >> thank you. would either of you like to add to that? >> i think that's exactly

right. >> ok. thank you all very much. >> secretary clinton, secretary gates, admiral mullen, thank you very, very much. very helpful. the record is open. thanks for your work. thanks for being here. we stand adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> and secretary clinton earlier in this hearing had announced that the u.s. had reached tentative agreement with china and russia on iran's nuclear program. we'll likely hear more about that at a state department hearing. we'll show you later in our programming schedule. coming up in about 10 minutes or so, the u.s. house will gavel in for morning hour speeches. general speeches. then they'll recess and come back at 2:00 eastern for some debate on 17 bills including one on federal grants for programs dealing with juvenile offenders. live house coverage coming up at 12:30 eastern, morning hour, and 2:00 here on c-span. and it is primary day in a number of states. c-span coverage tonight for -- a recap of the voting in pennsylvania, arkansas, and kentucky. we'll show you victory and concession speeches and get your reaction coming up later this evening on the c-span networks. also, coming up this evening on

the release of the c-span book, "the supreme court," a discussion at the library of coverage on the supreme court. panelists include associate justice stephen breyer and also "usa today" reporter. that's coming up tonight at 7:00 eastern on c-span3. again, the u.s. house coming in about 10 minutes. while we wait for that house to gavel in at 1:30, a discussion from this morning's "washington journal" on yesterday's supreme court ruling regarding life terms for juvenile offenders. ge calls. we're asking your thoughts on the supreme court's superseding the law in 37 states and the district of columbia on a life sentences for juveniles. they say it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. a big debate in this country

over crime and punishment. we would like to hear from you, especially ifyou live in one of those states where your law will be affected by this. let's begin with a call from clinton, north carolina. caller: i have a two-fold question. when will this decision to go into effect? will itffect the people who are incarcerated now in jail? will it be grandfathered? host: yes. according to the newspaper, 129 juveniles are serving such sentences. 77 of them are in the state of florida. this means they will have an opportunity to have their sentences revisited in those states.

you can expect that there will be follow ups. whato you think it is aof the decision? caller: i think it's a good decision. when will it ing to affect? host: it is now the law of the land. caller: ok. host: thank you for your call. salem, ore., david on the line for independents. caller: my brother is in youth corrections. i think this is a good change. youths become adults, and they

are still around other youths. it makes youth minor offenders into larger offenders. any thing that separates these major criminals from these minor uth criminals, i think it is important. life terms for youth is silly. unfortunately, when we are young, we are able to be influenced by things that we do not realize may be a wrong influence. host: dav's comments reflect some of t thinking of the court, which reflect that juveniles thinking and reactions mature over time, and that is why ty should be treated differently as a class from others. we are asking your reaction to the supreme court limiting a life terms, except in the case

of murder, a forger of an afor e offenders. we will move on to marino valley, calif., monica. you are on the air. caller: yes, my question is -- host: we are moving on. caleb on the line for independents. caller: goodmorning. my thought on the matter is that i think it should be left up to the states and n become a federal mdate. host: you are reflecting the views of the dissenters in the case.

37 states have laws on this. is that generally your view of the role of government? caller: yes, i think somebody in richmond has a better idea of what is calling on then somebody in washington. host: thank you for your call. here's some of that thinking from "the wall street journal ." we would like to hear your thinking on this. 128 juveniles have been incarcerated with this type of light sentencing. let me read from "the new york times" editorial.

but th

host: that is what our question is for you this morning. let's go back to telephone calls. thomas on the line for democrats. good morning. caller: good morning. st: please mute your volume. go ahead with your comment. are you there? caller: yes. host: do you have a comment for us on the supreme court ruling. caller: yes, i feel that they should give them a chance.

they should have a chance. juveniles should have a cnc cruel and unusual puniment. kids should have a chance. host: juveniles should have a second chance, says thomas. next, russell on the republican line. caller: i agree with thomas. this is not a state's rights issue. his is a national issue. at some point the federal government has to show responsibility for the country as a whole, and the people have to agree with the will that put out there. they have to believe that the federal government does have rights.

otherwise, we are nothing more than 50 individual countries. that is not the way the framers of the constitution wanted the country. they wanted one central government, and that is what they have. host: more >> watch "washington journal" online at the c-span video library. it starts at 7:00 a.m. eastern. we'll leave this house. the u.s. is gaveling in next for morning hour. general speeches. legislative work gets under way at 2:00 eastern. it's on 17 bills today including one on federal grants for programs dealing with juvenile offenders. now live to the house floor here on c-span. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

[captioning made possible by the national captioning institute, inc., in cooperation

with the united states house of representatives. any use of the closed-captioned coverage of the house proceedings for political or commercial purposes is expressly prohibited by the u.s. house of representatives.] the speaker: the house will be in order. pursuant to the order of the house of january 6, 2009, the chair will now recognize members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning hour debate. the chair recognizes the gentleman from oregon, mr. blumenauer, for five minutes.

mr. blumenauer: thank you, madam speaker. i just returned from a two-day livability tour thanks to the courtcy of my colleague, congresswoman allyson schwartz, a champion of sustainability. i visited perfect district in pennsylvania representing parts of philadelphia where we saw rural small township, suburban communities, dense urban areas, open space, and abandoned industrial land and aging but vital transit system, they illustrated all the challenges that we face in our efforts to rebuild and renew america. i have a special interest in their initiative for a trail network where their vision and hard work was rewarded by millions of dollars from the obama administration in economic recovery act to help

fill in gaps of an exciting trail expansion over the two-state area, including new jersey. amidst an impressive progress on mayor michael nutter's vision to make philadelphia the greenest city in america with innovative water projects, with creative private sector efforts in green development, township progress on revitalization and important progress in open space protection. the bicycle session stood out. the increase in ridership in philadelphia was impressive. and they have undertaken a spectacular program in all, 172 elementary schools, to train young cyclists and pedestrians. it certainly got my attention. but so did the challenges they face as cycling advocates. it didn't appear as though the regional planning agency or pen

dot -- penndot placed a high priority on bicycle safety. i hope i'm wrong, especially since bike fatalities doubled last year in philadelphia. but it would not be unusual if it didn't capture a priority. nationally bicycle and pedestrians represent 15% of all traffic fatalities, but only 3% of our spending on safety improvements and education. about 1/5 of the proportionate share that would be warranted. it's especially sad because the bike and pedestrian victims are more likely to be children and the elderly, a more vulnerable population should, if anything, command more of our attention. the cycling community is doing its part to change this

unfortunate pattn. as part of its effort to raise awareness, tomorrow in 49 states and 21 nations there will be rides of silence. 274 silent processions riding no more than 12 miles an hour to show respect for the families, friends, and neighbors of about 700 cyclists killed last year in america alone. as a reminder to law enforcement, to motorists, and government officials both the dangers and the opportunities for cyclists. you know, it doesn't have to be this dangerous. facilities, awareness, training, and courtesy can all make cycling safer. i have seen it firsthand.

i represent portland, oregon, the unofficial american cycling capital. we have had spectacular increases in bike riding. it's doubled in the last 10 years alone, the highest participation in any major american city. but the rate of injuries and death was cut in half. at a time when more and more americans want to burn calories not fossil fuel likele oil bubbling out in the gulf, when they want to fight congestion, obesity, and save money, cycling, let's work not just to make it convenient and fun, but safe. especially for our children. this is bicycle month. on friday we have bike to workday all across america. i hope americans will join us tomorrow. we are expecting the ride of

silence to raise awareness for cycling safety. the speaker pro tempore: the gentleman yields back the balance of his time. pursuant to clause 8 of rule 20 -- pursuant to clause 12-a of rule 1, the chair declares the house in recess until 2:00 p.m. today.

with current supreme court justice stephen breyer. also panelists include one from "usa today." that will be live from the u.s. library of congress. and it's election day, primary day in a number of states. we'll have results from pennsylvania, arkansas, kentucky and we'll have a concession and victory speeches and get your reactions, too, later tonight on the c-span networks. earlier today, indiana congressman mark souder announced his resignation admitting to an affair with a

staff member. he spoke briefly with reporters from fort wayne. this is about five minutes. >> it is with great regret i announce my resigning from the u.s. house of representatives. i believe it is the best decision for my family, the people of northeast indiana and our country. i will submit my resignation to speaker pelosi effective this friday. i can never fully thank all those who've worked so hard, given so much and supported me through eight contested primaries and eight general elections. only when you have been the recipient -- can you really feel the humbling power of such generosity.

it has been a privilege to be part of the battle for freedom and the values we share. it has been a great honor to fight for the needs, the jobs and the future of this region where my family has lived for over 160 years. it has been all consuming for me to do this job well, especially in the district with costly competitive elections every two years. i do not have any sort of normal life. for family, for friends, for church or for community. to serve has been a blessing and a responsibility given from god.

i wish i could have been a better example. i stand against god, my wife and my family by having a mutual relationship with a part-time member of my staff. in the environment of washington, d.c. -- in the poisonous environment of washington, d.c., any personal failing is seized upon, twisted for political game. i am resigning and put my family of a painful process of which i would have been exonerated but the personal price for my pamly was not worth it. diana and my family were more than willing to stand here with me. we are a committed family. but the error is mine and i should bear the responsibility. and quoit frankly, i'm sick of politicians who drag their spouses up in front of the cameras rather than confronting the problem that they have caused.

not only am i thankful for a loving family and for a loving god, my comfort is that god is gracious and a forgiving god for those who sincerely seek his forgiveness, as i do. but i am so ashamed to have hurt those i loved. i am so sorry to have let so many friends down. people have fought so hard for me. the ideas we advocate are still just and right. america will survive and thrive when anchored in those values. human beings like me will fail but our cause is greater than individuals. it is based upon eternal truths . by stepping aside my mistake to not be used as a political

football in a partisan attempt to undermine the cause for which i have labored for my entire adult life. i love this area. this is my home. it has been such an honor to serve you. for 16 years my family and i have given our all for this area. the toll has been high. as i leave public office, my plans are focused on repairing my marriage, earning back the trust of my family and my community pand renewing my work -- and renewing my work with my lord. i humbly ask you for the sake of my family that you respect our privacy in this difficult time. i have no further comments. here's my statement. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> and from fort wayne earlier today, mark souder announcing his resignation effective friday, admitting to an affair with a female staff member.

he spoke this morning, again in fort wayne. u.s. has agreed with china and russia and other major powers on a proposal for a new sanctions against iran on their nuclear program. secretary of state hillary clinton made that announcement this morning at the beginning of the senate foreign relations committee hearing on the new u.s.-russian nuclear arms street treaty. she was joined the with robert gates and the chairman of the joint chiefs admiral michael mullen. we'll start with their opening statements. for this invitation to appear before you, we deeply appreciate your commitment to this critical issue, and i think both the chairman and the ranking member's opening statements made very clear what is at stake and how we must proceed in the consideration of this treaty in an expeditious

manner. it's a pleasure to testify along with secretary gates and admiral mullen because we share a strong belief that the new start treaty will make our country more secure. this treaty also reflects our growing cooperation with russia on matters of mutual interest, and it will aid us in advancing our broader nonproliferation agenda. to that end, we have been working closely with our p-5 plus one partners for several weeks on the draft of a new sanctions resolution on iran. and today i am pleased to announce to this committee we have reached agreement on a strong draft with the cooperation of both russia and china. we plan to circulate that draft resolution to the entire security council today. and let me say, mr. chairman, i think this announcement is as

convincing an answer to the efforts undertaken in tehran over the last several days. there are a number of questions coming from tehran, and although we acknowledge the sincere efforts of both turkey and brazil to find a solution regarding iran's standoff with the international community over its nuclear program, the p-5 plus one, which consists of of course, of russia, china, the united states, the u.k., france and germany, along with the high representative of the e.u., are proceeding to rally the international community on behalf of a strong sanctions resolution that will in our view send an unmistakable

message of what is expected from iran. we can certainly go into more detail about that during the q&a. but let me turn to the matter at hand because i think as convincingly as i can make the case for the many reasons why this new start treaty is in the interest of the national security of the united states of america, the relationship with russia is a key part of that kind of security. and as senator lugar said during his remarks, of all the ups and downs of the cold war, one of our continuing efforts is to work toward the elimination of and the curtailment of strategic arms in a way that built confidence

and avoided miscalculation. now, some may argue that we may not need the new start treaty, but the choice before us is between this treaty and no treaty governing our nuclear security relationship with russia. between this treaty and no agreed verification mechanisms on russia's strategic nuclear forces. between this treaty and no legal obligation for russia to maintain its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level. and as secretary gates has pointed out, every previous president who faced this choice has found that the united states is better off with a treaty than without one. and the united states senate has always agreed that 2002 moscow treaty was approved by a vote of 95-0. the 1991 start treaty was

approved by 9 -6. more -- 93-6. more than two years ago, president bush led to the new start treaty that we are discussing today. now, it, too, has already received bipartisan in testimony before this committee. and as the chairman and the ranking member acknowledged, former secretary james sleshinger, secretary of defense for presidents nixon and ford, secretary of energy for president carter, declared that it is obligatory for the united states to ratify it. today, i'd like to discuss what the new start treaty is and what it isn't. it is a treaty that if ratified would provide stability, transparency and predictability for the two countries with more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. it is a treaty that will reduce

the permissible number of russian and u.s. deployed strategic warheads to 1,550. this is a level we have not reached since the 1950's. in addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and 800 demoid -- deployed and nondeployed strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers. these targets will help the united states and russia bring our deployed strategic arsenals, which were sized to the cold war, to levels that are appropriate for today's threats. this is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons with an extensive verification regime. this regime draws upon our experience over the last 15 years in implementing the original start treaty which expired in december. the verification measures reflects today's realities, including the fewer number of

facilities in russia compared with the former soviet union. and for the first time ever we will be monitoring the actual numbers of warheads on deployed strategic missiles. moreover, by bringing the new start treaty into force, we will strengthen our national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage to tackle a core national security challenge, nuclear proliferation. now, i am not suggesting that this treaty alone will convince iran or north korea to change their behavior. but it does demonstrate our leadership and strengthens our hand as we seek to hold these and other governments accountable. whether that means further isolating iran and enforcing the rules against violators or convincing other countries to get a better handle on their own nuclear materials. and it conveys to other nations that we are committed to real

reductions and to holding up our end of the bargain under the nonproliferation treaty. in my discussions with many foreign leaders, including earlier this month in new york at the beginning of the nonprolive lakes -- proliferation treaty conference, i've seen how this new start treaty and the united states and russia could agree has made it more difficult for other countries to shift the conversation back to the united states. we are seeing an increasing willingness both to be hold accountable and to hold others accountable. a ratified new start treaty would also continue our progress toward broader u.s.-russia cooperation. we believe this is critical to other foreign policy priorities, including dealing with iran's nuclear program, helicopter cooperating on afghanistan and per -- cooperating on afghanistan and pursuing trade and investment. this treaty has advanced our efforts to set the u.s.-russian relationship. this is renewed vigor on every

level, including between our presidents, our military leaders and between me and my counterpart. now, our approach to this relationship is pragmatic and clear eyed. and this treaty is producing tangible benefits for u.s. national security. at the same time, we are deepening and broadening our partnerships with allies. in my recent meetings in estonia with our other nato allies, they expressed an overwhelmingly positive review of the new start treaty. now, there are also things that this new treaty will not do. as both secretary gates and admiral mullen will discuss more fully, the new start treaty does not compromise the nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our allies. the treaty does not infringe on the flexibility we need to our forces, including the bombers, submarines and missiles in a

way that best serve our national security interests. the treaty does not constrain our plans for missile defense efforts. those of you who worked with me in the senate know i take a backseat to no one in my strong support to missile defense. i want to make this point. nothing in the new start treaty constrains our missile defense efforts. russia has issued a unilateral statement on missile defense expressing its views. we have not agreed to this view, and we are not bound by this unilateral statement. in fact, we've issued our own unilateral statement making it clear that the united states intends to continue improving and deploying our missile defense systems and nothing in this treaty prevents us from doing so. the treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. but this is simply a statement of fact. it does not constrain our missile defense programs in any way. in fact, a similar provision

was part of the original start treaty. and did not prevent us from developing our missile defenses. the treaty does contain language prohibiting the conversion or use of offensive missile launchers for missile defense interceptors and advicea versa. -- and vice versa. but we didn't plan to do that anyway. our general riley said, it's cheaper to build smaller, taylor-maded silos than offensive launchers. and it does not restrict launchers, 14 of which we are currently constructing in alaska. this administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile defense in f.y. 2011, almost $700 million more than congress proindividualed in f.y. 20 -- provided in f.y. 2010. this shows our conviction that

we have done nothing and there is no interpretation to the contrary that in anyway undermines that commitment. finally, the new start treaty does not restricts our ability to modernize our weapons complex to sustain a safe, secure and defective deterrent. this administration has called for a 10% increase in the f.y. 2011 budget for overall weapons and infrastructure activities, and a 5% increase in direct stockpile work. this was not in previous budgets. and during the next 10 years, this administration proposes investing $80 billion into our nuclear weapons complex. so let's take a step back and put the new start treaty into a new larger context. this treaty is only one part of our country's broader efforts to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world has ever known. and we owe special gratitude to senator lugar for his leadership and commitment through all the years on this

issue. this administration is facing head on the problems of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. we have several coordinated efforts, including the nuclear posture review, the recently concluded nuclear security summit, and the ongoing nonproliferation treaty review conference. while a rat feud knew start treaty stands on its own terms and the reflection of the benefits of national security for our country, it is also part of our broader efforts. so, mr. chairman, senator lugar, members of this committee, thank you for having us here and for all of your past and future attention to this new start treaty. we stand ready to work with you as you undertake your constitutional responsibilities and to answer all your questions today and in the coming weeks. and we are confident that at the end of this process you will come to the conclusion that so many of your predecessors have shared over so many years on both sides of the aisle that this treaty makes our country more secure and merit the senate's advice

and consent to ratification. >> thank you very much, madam secretary. we appreciate it. may i say, also, that secretary gotmiler and ellen tauscher, through you, kept the committee appraised and briefed, and we had a number of sessions and even colleagues that went to geneva. we thank you for the cooperation in that. it's very, very good. secretary gates. >> chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today on the new strategic arms reduction treaty. this treaty reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the strategic stability of our relationship and protects the security of the american people and our allies. america's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national security, deterring