it is not the same world. it is instant. people react instantly. it is not something that is going to go away. >> i would now like to recognize a former attorney general he never known what is going to say the jun. >> i will be a diplomat. i cannot add to what has the been said except to tend the credit to provide an impetus to of the resurrection of the congress. and you both deserve unrestrained praise clinton back

to life and what will be a useful tool. this will be part of your collective legacy. by guess my one observation would be that we hear much about accountability and transparency in government and the government of being out of control. this is a very significant vehicle to ensure accountability, another check that is under the radar screen. even with you a presence here, one does not see a mass of cameras here today. there might be one allah two members of the region might be one more two members of the -- there might be one or two

members of the press. the availability of the conference i consider immense -- something of a men's of value. -- immense value. it is important to half a profile. we ought to be able to deomnstrate that this is a good bargain. this is a real good investment. maub may be there is the opportunity to establish the cost savings that are affected by the will of

the conference over an extended time. and did you have a comment? >> a good way to do it would be to have the private lawyers keep track of the hours that day spent in committee meetings and in the assembly and to charge $500 an hour or whatever their normal rate is and add it up and see what it comes to/ you will find -- >> i've not even talking about those kinds of services from . i'd talked about the benefit of the recommendations. >> that is harder to quantify. that is why most of this of this under the radar. it is hard to quantify most of it harder. much of what the do here goes

entirely unoticed. this is the an opportunity to say to the american people "government is working." it can function in an efficient way. i see it as a small step in some somerestoring a confidence in government, that it can function, that it can work. i am glad you are here. it might be in some things. for example, suppose you change

some of these process he is so the bottom line comes out more quickly. you can make an estimate with that. a longer time takes a lot of money. there is a measurement of satisfaction. there might be raised they have -- they say the country x- billion dollars. some would lend itself to that. how many people actually filed court cases as a result of the rule? there is greater satisfaction. thought must be quantifiable, too, the i suspect there will be some method of quantifying some of them as minimal savings and maybe more. i think that might help.

>> the conference publicist in annual report. i am sure it'll continue to do that. it tries to set forth the most important recommendations. also, the most important accomplishment from the prior year. i am sure that will continue i am sure it will not make the front page of the "washington post hope." it is hard to grab the public's attention with it. >> thank you. >> thank you for engaging in the responses. there were 13 people that came through the gallery that had been in my office within the past few hours that are

interested in the dialogue from theathrough dialogue. -- interest in the dialogue. we are looking out commons but would go in the is it your printer government. the comments also have the view from the judicial and legislative branch. . >> i am not aware of any of the chairman's tenure and continues were requested from the courts. and i an not aware that that ever happened. i am not sure of soliciting and views from the congress either. when congress had the use, i am sure they made then known. i do not think we have solicited

them. >> in the it mr. the conference itself -- the administrative conference itself, i list the judicial liaison. there was a method of finding out what judges thought of the process these they were considering. there were people from congress. i know that congress has often provided comments on rulemaking by different agencies, whether it was epa or others. >> within this context, a as rules are proposed by the agencyies, they are making a

recommendation as to looking at it from all three branches of government, a perhaps an evaluation of where constitutional problems may arise. navy recommendations to the legislative branch as far as the template that may come from the policies side. i bring this up because i've watched us pass legislation that turns into the rules of how the law. once it leaves congress and goes to the president's desk, it is completely out of our control. our constituents have to live with the consequences. i am looking for a way that i have introduced legislation. i have a response that the sponsor from kentucky -- it

requires all the rules to come before congress before it a high -- and they can be loaded voted in-block. if congress could vote them in, that would allow all of us with our constituents to have input source of aid to our members. that could go to the conference to be evaluated and the couple with a recommendation before the would vote on such rules. i see justice scalia with an answer to that. >> please, do not into it. we did not get into the substance of rules. i think it would be the kiss of death. the only thing we look to that opular are the

procedures the agency's use. they could come up with garbage. that is not our business. that is your business. i think if you try to make a conference's business, it would alter the character of the organization enormously. it would be ineffective. it would become politicized. the substance would get into what people favor or do not favor. procedures are pretty much efficient, fair. you can get people to agree on those things. >> it is a very big topic with the history. i would bet you go about 100 years, you will find people with the same concerns with 100

years. we have to delegate a lot of the ability to the president or to the agency predicts a then we really do not have much of a tap on how they exercise it a one of the ways of solving that was something called the legislative veto. there was a two-house veto. the court said it is unconstitutional. i did not do it. >>i did. >> i was not there. >> are there ways in replicating procedures like that? that is a big question and difficult to do. i will leave you with the problem. yes, of course it's a problem. interestingly enough, there have been complaints in a famous

article written by lloyd years ago. you are in the position of giving this power to the agency. the way to not know if they will do with it her . he does not run the agency. he has limited time. this is bipartisan. they have different names under different presidents. it is this same effort. you are trying to figure out a to do that in congress. say to not do it. good luck. it is important my comment was in an advisory and capacity. we can take care of that year. -- here.

>> it is an interesting topic for me. it was not a criticism of congress. i do not know how i would write a step to assist the want to -- i do not know how i would write a statute that says he wants the court to died in in just this much. what is "just this much?" how do you write that? it is so difficult to . i can just make the tried observation that it is no less a big problem today than it was six years ago. >> island is common that the endangered species act mean something entirely different today than when they were passed. thank you. i appreciate it purd. >> i want to think each member

for their time, interest in the subject letter, of their testimony to night. we are going to recess this hearing. the votes. we will come back. the dresses are in the powers i have and dismissed. i want to thank you for your testimony produced you give me a lot of new ideas on how to file in the towers. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> carell a hearing on the deep water horizon " re explosion. >> you wonder if it'll of the the the same d. i have admiration for the system proje.

>> learn more about the nation's highest court in c-span's latest of a "the supreme court of." and provides unique insight about the court. >> tonight we will show you a hearing on the deep water horizon oil rig explosion with remarks from a bp operation manager. later, when this account from will break workers. we begin with an economic update on the oil spill. what's happening in the gulf of mexico. good morning. guest: good morning. how are you? host: good. thank you so much for joining us.

guest: they're trying by pumping at a very high rate of velocity, drilling fluid into the well. right now it's not been successful, i don't think. they were cautiously optimistic. yesterday they changed their tune slightly and said that they were going to keep trying until either they were successful or they could see that they were not going to be successful. we did see the chief executive talking yesterday. what is their comment to residents in the gulf area? guest: i don't think they're speaking too much to the residents. i was in grand isle the last couple of days, and people down there are just so angry and frustrated. there's little exchange of conversation on the b.p. person in that area was wearing a local fireman t-shirt as

opposed to the b.p. logo on his shirt. host: talk to us about the president's visit to the gulf region. tell us what he did down there and who was on hand. guest: well, he first visited port, which also has oil come onshore, and he met with local leaders there. he had a long meeting. he was an hour and a half late for a news conference with reporters because he was behind closed doors with leaders. they've been very hard hit with oil. apparently he chewed out billy, who's been very vocal about what's gone right, what's gone wrong. but i think it was well received. i do. i think this visit was well received. host: we saw images of him actually picking up a tar ball

from the sandy shores there. guest: i think the more connection was made with the local leaders who have been very, very frustrated and upset, whether they were getting enough boom which corrals the oil and keeps it off shore. they've been frustrated with how many people they're getting to clean up the beaches, and i think he had a long meeting with them, and i think it helped calm him down. the president promised to put three times the man power on the beach whenever oil rolls in . he also promised that whatever materials they needed they would get. can you talk to us about what officials are hearing on the rig? guest: i've been mostly covering top kill and what's going on in grand isle. i'm sorry.

i just don't know what part. host: one thing maybe you c reflect on us. as the news comes down to the area you're in, how are local people reacting? guest: well,hey're upset. they think b.p. was taking shortcuts to make more money. they see b.p. as a very greedy company. they're very angry, because this has happened at the worst me possible. it's the beginning of the fishing season, the beginning of the tour season is may, and it runs through november. there's big fishing tournaments that have been cancell this weekend. i was down in grand isle wednesday and thursday. there's a marina there with 65 boat slips in it. there was threeoats in the slips, and two of those were owned by the marina. they're devastated. this is killing their season. host: what are you going to be watching now in the next 24 hours or so? guest: i'll be watching weather top kill is successful. i think it's very shaky right now. i think they've had some successes with it. i mean, it's a simple premise. you shoot something into the

well that's heavier and faster than the oil leaking out. you try to push it back down into the well. once you get that to occur, then they're going to put a cement plug in it and try to plug it up permanently, but it's proven to be difficult. i mean, it's a mile below the surface of the water. the pressure down there is enormous. it's enormous, and it's all about the pressure. host: the president has tried to emphasize that many beaches in the gulf are open for business. it's not like the entire area is shut down in an attempt to get tourism going there. have you gotten a sense from beaches that are not yet affected if they're seeing a drop in visitors? guest: yes, they are. they're getting cancellations. people are staying away. they're very, very worried about it. i don't know if you know about this, a quarter of the waters have been closed to fishing. when people hear those kind of things, they're staying away. they're staying away from our

area. and it's true. it's not all the beaches that are affected. it's certain sections. pensacola, destin, all of those places, many even in louisisian they'r >> now hearing on the deep water horizon oil rig explosion. the operation manager testified over the phone. falling out, you will hear from a number of workers, the coast guard, and the mineral management service who are conducting a investigation. this is the fourth day of testimony. they will meet again in july. this is to 0.5 hours.

>> are you on the line? are you on the record? as a result of the explosion of the deepwater horizon, the secretary of homeland security convened a joint investigation into the incident. are you aware of that? >> yes, sir. >> we have my co-chairman, right is the captain. in the audience, we have a representative of the interest.

can place you under oath. false testimony given to an entity of the united states is punishable by fine or imprisonment. knowing this, do not swear the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? >> i do. >> you may be seated. >> before we begin, we just want to remind you that you are represented by transocean attorney. is that ok with you? >> yes. and you confirm that we will have been in the room with new stock >> we do.

>> do you have a personal lawyer? >>no. only eddie is representing him personally. >> members will begin questioning. >> could you please state your name? >> david sims. >> could he and identify himself since he cannot see? >> jason matthews. by to are you employed? >> bp. >> what is your current position? >> i am the operations manager for the relief well.

what is your normal day-to-day operations? >> my previous close of drilling operations manager for exploration and appraisal in the deepwater gulf of mexico. >> how long have you been with them? heritageeen with a since 1982. since 1982. bp officially since 2000. >> what is your educational background? >> science in mechanical engineering. >> from where? >> texas a&m university. >> how long were they in

operation? >> i was in that position for approximately three weeks prior to the event in question. what were you doing prior to those three weeks? those three weeks? >> i was engineering team leader. quite often you please describe your position. >> as engineering team leader, my primary responsibility was to develop well plans for wells that we would be drilling with

the deepwater horizon. as an operations manager, it changed to execution and of exploration and appraisal of wells in the gulf. >> i was engineering team leader and the plan for that well and was developed. >> where you aware of any problems on the well, sir, prior to your arrival on the 20th? >> are you speaking of prior to my arrival on the rig on the

20th? >> from around march up until april 20. >> lost returns. >> i am sorry. prior to mine job as operations manager? >> no, i am sorry. as operations manager, were you made aware of any problems of the mississippi canyon to 52 well? >> i was aware of driven problems that have occurred up until the point, yes. >> what with those problems? >> we had had some blood circulation problems. a kick.taken int the first part of the well was that hadrans ococean

been damaged in a hurricane. it had to be removed from the location on horizon. they came back in to resume drilling >> when rescheduled to go out to the deep water horizon? >> you are referring to? >> to the trip on the 20th. the scheduled trip was on the 20th. into return on the 21st. >> when did you make the plans to travel there on the 20th? >> iw ould say at least a week before, if not longer. >> what was the intent of that term, sir? t? trip was a schedule to for

leadership to visit the horizon and other rigs. we have a monthly scheduled trip that goes to two different rigs. it is a scheduled flight devoted to leadership. anyone in houston with either transocean or bp can get on that flight. the purpose os the visits is to acquaint midget with personnel or for management to personnel or for management to do safety audits to conduct

talks about performance, plans, to reinforce messages, to a variety of things like t hat. >> was set to a first fiddle to let the? but it was that your first settled trip like that? >> it was the first scheduled trip i had made in that capacity, yes. >> you said you are going to reinforce messages stocks? >> in a broad sense, that is one of the reasons for those visits, is for leadership to reinforce messages that are delivered, goals that aboth bp and

transocean have. >> who was on that helicopters with you? >> myself, pat o'brien, bp of dnc in the gulf of mexico, don winslow with transocean, buddy trehan with transocean. >> youtube a flight out of houston and did you took that flight out of his indhouston? >> those trips were out of our base in homa. the reference to houston with a service to nearly four of his leadership.

usually for office leadership. >> usually thbp [unintelligible] >> normally, it is a wide range of leadship from teamleaders up to vice presidents. >> is a typical for mr. o'brien to go out there? >> it to the typical for his position. he had not been in that job very long. this was his first trip to the horizon, but other directors and vp's went on those trips. >> how do you know when he actually took over as the position as vice president?

>> it was very early in 10 or late 09. >> do you know who is in a position prior? cook'>> that would have been ken lacy. >> did he frequent the deep water horizon in that capacity? >> i do not recall a trip that he made to the horizon. >> once you got to the deep water horizon on the 20th, can you walk me through what time you bryant and up to the incident? >> we arrived about 2:30 p.m.

i went to speak briefly with the site leader. >> who was well site leader? >> bob kalooza. spoke with him for a few minutes. i went to jimmy for awhile. i found my room assignment. took my gear to my room, spent some time there. some time there. i went back up stairs to the well site leader's office. mr. o'brien was there. he had completed his safety

orientation. we were assembled there to go on a tour of the rig. we toured the rig for about 2hours. we had dinner around 6:00 p/m/ meetingow et uset up a for a gneral rig leadership that was available. it was not a mandatory meeting, but anyone available to visit with us to talk about a variety of things -- there was no set

agenda. >> there is no set agenda prior to arrival at? >> there was no set agenda for that meeting. we had some things but we wanted to talk about. to talk about. we were just there tovisit visit with leadership and talk about any issues they had or visit about the things we wanned to talk about. >> what did you want to talk about? >> we had dropped objects. as well as transocean. we talked about dropped object programs. we talked about rig maintenance

programs. we had a few safety related issues that we were going to touch on, learnings that had come from events on both the horizon and other rigs that we wanted to make sure had reached the horizon and see what they were doing about those. we wanted to talk about control of work, pat's first trip. i was going to include a bit about horizon's performance in

comments and some about what made the horizon a good rig. we would also then leave it up to don. he had a few things he wanted to talk about. see where the conversation went. went. >> you had dinner at 1800 hours and went directly to the meeting? >>yes, don had set that up before 7:00. that was the in to the commencement of the meeting. >> folly the meeting, what transpires? >> it went until 9:00. we broke up the meeting.

pat and i headed down the hall to the well site leader's office. don winslow followe us and asked if we wanted to go to the bridge. we had not made it on our tour yet. we did. we went up to the bridge and talked to the marine crew up there. a wide range of conversations. we talked about sation keeping and all of the instrument on the bridge. it is an impressiveplace if you have not been there. lots of technology. we have a long,, nice visit

there. we also got a chance to work with a dynamic position in a simulator that they have a fair used for training and the demonstrations purposes, to give an idea of how difficult it is to remain on station in a m anual sense, trying to keep it with a joystick and the way the stsytem works. so, thduring that time is when the event began. wh >>at happened, sir?

what did you notice? what did you see? can you take away to the point that you were able to adopt rig the rig?uate >> here is the vibration that was felt. it had a high-frequency vibrations that the captain and the lead was alerted to. the house rhetorically, what is the, if something up against a stock us? presumably boat. that lasted for a few seconds.

then there was hissing, spewing sounds, like you imagine gas escaping at high pressure in the direction of the rig floor, the best i could tell. the only windows -- the only wall without windows is in the direction of the rig floor. after that subsided, a few seconds, captain looked out the port door of the bridge and i could see the bangston next to us. it looked like everythiung was

covered with , mud. the rig looked like the boat had some on it. it was fairly calm at that moment. i have a recollection of the boat moving slowwy away from the rig at that point. door and saido thd the to not go out there. at that point, i recall hearing a relatively small explostion or boom toward the rig floor. the scene in the bridge was fairly excited.

shortly after that, not many seconds there was a louder explosion and all the power went out at that point. no lights, electronics, screens. i remember looking over at the redpanel, and i saw one light -- 3 >> green? all >>the lights i saw were green and yellow on the panel. it was dark and difficult to

read anything. i did see one red light toward the top of the panel, which i the top of the panel, which i assumed to be an prevent hig panel.highup on the i would not swear to that. that is what it all looked like. people started coming in from outside. there was an interior access to the bridge from the living quarters. people came up from there. i remember that one of the bp

"mayday" was collalling in the radar with our court and it. i remember jimmy came in from the starbird side of the bridge. i could not swear to that. that is where i saw him first. that is where i saw him first. i asked ji,,y mmy if the well was shut in. he was confused at that moment. in a split second, he shook that off and headed over toward the preventer panel.

i do not have a continuous picture of him walking over there and doing something. i remember at some point, and i do not know if it was right then, i do recall seeing all red lights in addition to other lights on the paenl. i cannot remember if i said we should "eds" or someone else. should "eds" or someone else. i remember the captain seemed to hesitatefor a moment and then seemed to agree that was teh th the thing to do.

i remember him distinctly saw 1:56. at 2 1:56. at 2 at some point, i saw the light from the flames over north toward the rig floor. someone looked out the port door and said they could see someone in the water. i stuck my head out and looked in that direction. ng in someone swimmin gi the water. it hhdmoved further away, but had lights in our direction. there was some discussion about

things like going to the lifeboats. there was not an immediate consensus to do that. then some short period of time later, i looked at pat. comment was, "ok, let's go." it seemed that is where everyone was headed. i followed him out the starbird door. we went down a couple of flights of stairs to the lifeboats. very orderly down there. pat and i were among the last to get in one of the life boats.

then the was made to lower the boat and close the door. we lowered the boat down. that went well. we drove aw ay from the rig. we spend a while on a off everybody. -- getting everybody off. >> thank you a lot. upon arrival, you said you went and spoke with kalloza. can you tell me what you discussed? >> what we were doing and. he said we were getting lined

up for-tests. for negative testes. we proceeded to talk of but a lot of other things. most were arco days and alaska days, no more talk about business. >> you went to talk to mr. harold? what did you talk to him about? >> i talked to jimmy. just some general . i had not seen him in about five months.

he showed me their 2010 goals and some of their performance indicators. indicators. he had a new tracking chart he was putting together. briefly spoke to randy, senior tool pusher. we stopped in the galley for something to drink. then i went to find my bags and get room assignments. >> were you aware of any problems neg with theative test? no. >> >> a real where they ran a second one? , >>no at the time.

>> was there any discussion at all about the negative test? >> there was no discussion at that time. don, our night well site leader, came to me when we were eating in the galley and asked if i wanted him to attend the 7:00 meeting. i told him, "no, we are not rolling out any new material." nothing that he probably had not heard. he seemed happy with that.

that is what i recall of that. >> you save you discuss made his between welles. a gun in a knit were you going to be doing? >> -- what kind of maintenance were you going to be doing? >> rig about plans maintenance. i do not recall any specific maintenance we were discussing. it was more of a plan that transocean was implementing a bit of the new strategy around, prevented his maintenance. that played into buddy's

visit. there was the rig equipment. maintenance is one of those stains. >> do you know [unintelligible] >> would you repeat that? >> do you know where the deep water horizon was going after the mississippi canyon to 52? 252? >> the plan i recall was to go to a well that we called "nile/" it was a well that we were going to plug and abandon. it could be.

i do not recall that ocs number. >> do you know when it was supposed to ride? >> whenever it got finished from mccondo. >> and dob [ you know when cemented -- to do you know when bp said they would stop operations? >> i do not know the date. >> i have no further questions. >> no questions at this time. >> no questions at this time. >> excuse me. good afternoon. i am with the coast guard. and i had a key questions for

clarification. >> would you say your name again? >> hausler wheatley. ross wheatley. vips went into the burden on the clock. is the correct? i was there with pat o'brien and don winslow. bridge, you're on the you indicated that some of the personnel participated in use of the simulator. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> who was given instruction on how to use the simulator?

>> certain conditions, ocean conditions are programmed in that exert forces on a simulated picture of the rig, and try to force it off location, and use the data to try to keep their with in a watch circle. >> was the captain participating in this exercise? >> i do not recall that he participated in that. i believe it was another of the marine croup would -- marine crew to would photograph the

conditions and start the simulation. anyone could work with the simulator. >> was the captain observing what was going on? >> the captain was observing everything that was going on on the bridge. i was not watching him the entire time, nor was i talking to him the whole time. i know that he was not standing there right next to me or pat when we were using the simulator. >> do you recall which members of your party participated in using the simulator? >> i tried it once, and i know that pat tried it.

i cannot say for sure if anyone else did. >> in your estimation, how much time was spent by members of your party in the instruction and participation in the simulator? simulator? >> 10 minutes. 15 max. >> was that per person or total participation by all of the members? >> that was total participation. >> at the time that you indicated that the incident began, was anybody utilizing the simulator? >> i cannot say for sure that i know. know. i was not, so i was not really paying attention to what was going on at the simulator.

i know that pat was not that the simulator, because i remember where he was standing when we first heard the -- felt the vibration. he was standing up close to the front of the bridge looking at some screen up towards the front of the bridge. >> sir, if i recall your earlier testimony, you indicated that part of your trip out to the deepwater horizon on this occasion was to conduct safety audits. is that correct? >> that is correct. as it presents itself, that is one of the things that we would do. >> on this particular occasion, did you conduct any safety

audits, and if so, what type? >> we went to an area on the aft deck of the rig, where the riser would be laid down if the riser was not in operation, not in use. we discussed an incident that had occurred, and talked about how it that same situation should have been on the horizon, what the differences were, what they had learned, or if they had adopted any earnings from that incident. we were asked to look at the --

there is a thing called the skate that moves pipe from that area up to the rig floor and back, and an area underneath it, kind of a day -- kind of a bay. it was the scene of an incident that had happened on another rig just a few days or a week before. we went to that area to see, again, how the horizon would be different or similar to this other rick -- to this other rig. we detected whether learnings

from the other incident had been communicated, and how horizon had dealt with those learnings. >> you mentioned that one of the areas you visited was eight skate. could you give us more details about that incident and what the lessons were? lessons were? >> well, the incident was a hydraulic line that had been leaking in that area on the other rig, and one of the drilling contractors had stepped down into that area to clean up the leak and lost his footing. in catching himself, he had hurt his shoulder. the learning's from that were

around, as we always find learnings are around hazard recognition, making sure that you think about where you're going to step or where you are going to put your hand. having access to that area that could be improved. again, these are investigations that are led by transocean. bp participate sometimes in bp participate sometimes in these, but we do both embraced the learnings and try to make sure those learning's get passed from grieg to rig -- from rig to rig. those were a couple of the learnings. we went to a rise in -- we went

to horizon to see if those same learning's would apply, whether access to the area was the same. in fact, on the horizon, it was a little bit deeper skate. a little bit more difficult to get into. we discussed what transocean was going to do relative to the event and the incident. >> you mentioned that this was part of your safety audit. all was participating in the safety audit besides yourself? >> well, pretty much the group that was walking around was that was walking around was myself and pat o'brien , buddy,

jimmy, and i cannot recall with 100% certainty the other folks who were with us. i think in total we were seven or eight. >> now, it is our understanding that you all have the safety measure program in place. is that correct? >> transocean has a safety management system that is followed on the rig. >> you mentioned that there were a number of lessons learned from this and prior incidents. how are those lessons learned communicated to the crew members on board a rig such as the

deepwater horizon, and how do you validate and ensure that those lessons learned are being incorporated in all safety procedures of the future? >> that is the challenge that we are always trying to improve. transocean, when they have an event, an incident, has their own internal communications methods that share learnings and any actions from -- that results from investigations or analyses of the events. of the events. bp will also share with

transocean learnings that have been in other operations, other dp operations. if there are places that we think are pertinent or relevant, we will share those in a variety of ways with transocean, who then will tranche -- who then will pass along learning to the crew. >> during the course of your safety audits, do you utilize interviews, for example, drill core members, to try emphasize the safety members are actually being put in place and the crew members on the drill core are aware of those and enforcing those? >> to the extent that we can do that without interrupting anything, we do that.

anything, we do that. there is no -- there is no forced participation, i guess would be the best way to describe it. if we happened upon someone who appears to be doing something extremely critical, we might take the opportunity to have a conversation with them, but otherwise we generally try to be -- we do not cross any be -- we do not cross any barriers, and we do not interfere, for lack of a better word. >> i guess my question is a little more directed towards the practice and execution of your audit plan.

our queries or interviews of crewmembers part of your audit plan in trying to determine how effective your safety measures are being? >> in general, that would be a method of doing that. i can tell you that i do not recall on this trip having an opportunity to do that with anyone other than the group that was walking around with us. so, any questions that i had or pat had were answered by one of our party rather than someone else. >> thank you, sir. i have no further questions, but i am sure other members do.

i am sure other members do. >> hello, i am lieutenant robert butts, united states coast guard. >> it seems like you are coming in very broken. could you change my profound -- could you change microphones? >> sure. how is that? >> better. thank you. >> mr. sims, in the discussion over the last couple of days, i have heard of this visit from a corporate as a vip visit, even as a dignitary visit. does that seem surprising to you? >> you are coming in very broken. it is in and out. it is in and out. could you change your

microphone? it is very scratchy. >> how is this? >> try that. >> well, is it clear the? >> it is working now, but what happens is, when you start talking, it comes in and out and we can only hear parts of the conversation. >> my wife says that too. [laughter] mr. sims, over the past couple of days we have heard the characterization of your visit as a vip visit or even a dignitary visit. it does that surprise you? >> it surprises me, but i can understand possibly how that might be characterized by folks on the rig. it was not advertised as such. there was no agenda sent out there was no agenda sent out ahead of time, and so i cannot

say anything other than what i know, which is that it was a routine, scheduled trip. >> yes, sir, and i am understand that. from your perspective, i imagine that is exactly how you would speak of it. but from the perspective on the rig, the guys doing the actual work, a kind of characterized as myself being in a unit and an admiral coming to visit us. i passed the gentleman the other day as you were going through your tour. he commented that there was a discussion, and he was talking with the gentleman, and due to the tour -- >> could you hold on for just a

second? is it possible that we could hang up and call again? i do not know what is happening, but it is very difficult. >> maybe you could use somebody else's microphone. >> how is that? >> that is a little better. >> ok. the visit. the tour of the rig. well going across the drill bored, one of the gentlemen was confronted about the situation. we will not go into that. he said that in hindsight, if the tour was not going on, the gentleman would have stayed with the crew on the drill rig. i just wanted you to recognize that the visit did have some impact on the way that folks were actually doing their job. you had said that you went to

reenforced goals. reenforced goals. was that bp's goals or goals that the rig had set for themselves? >> that would be generalized, maybe a characterization of what we were doing. we have goals to reduce hand injuries. we and transocean together had a hand injury prevention program that we were, you know, that was going on. >> i wrote what you had said were the goals. from your perspective, they were company goals that were just

being refreshed? >> bayh worm -- they were, yes. >> good enough. that is good enough. usually when i want to refresh a goal, it means that i have potentially missed a goal, and someone needs to remind me of it. i just wanted to touch on that. was the corporate office providing any recognition of the day, or identifying any persons on board that did something above their normal job or any of those other things? >> we, again, did not have that as an objective for the trip, but during that time after 9:00

p.m., we talked about a number of things. one of those was pointed out that one person had been awarded, had been given a transocean award, so everybody said, "great job. keep up the good work. " there was a bit more conversation about that, but then we went on to another topic. >> it has been my experience on board transocean and regs and the past -- transocean rigs in the past that rewards are given to individuals, whether it be walmart gift cards or things

like that. i was wondering if that was the flavor of the day? >> not intentionally. >> good enough. >> when you were in at the bridge, and you went through a very good description of the events of the night, and i appreciate that. you had mentioned that a bp operator had put out a mayday. was that a verbal mayday across the radio? >> it was a radio. i do not know what type of radio it was. she, i believe her name was andrea, plus speaking into what looked like a radio. >> -- was speaking into what looked like the radio. >> was she given any instructions for doing so or criticized for doing so? >> i was not aware of any instructions or any criticism.

>> all right. as you were going through, you made several comments about a general question that went out to the room, and overhead question to all. it was some reference to ees? was that true? >> i think he said eds. >> was there a general question to the room regarding something about e.d.s.? >> i apologize for and in complete memory about all of the events at that moment, but that is what it seems like i said. >> after that, at someone hesitated. >> again, there were a lot of things going on. we were thinking about something else, thinking about that, i don't know. very shortly thereafter, within

seconds, very few seconds -- and i doubt even know why i noticed. i am just telling you everything the kind of came through my head. i remember he went straight over towards the panel, is my recollection. >> we appreciate your clarity, because it is extremely important when we are putting a time line together. you said that the captain hesitated and then later said that the captain agreed to e .d.s. we do have some records e that.d.s. -- we do have some record that e.d.s. was activated. >> i do recall that.

>> there was also some discussion about going to the light post. >> probably a portrait of words, but there was not -- when the words first came out it was not a, not a command or an order. i do not know how to spell it -- who spoke it, but in general the feeling was, i guess, that we were starting to head in that direction. >> yes, sir, i am understand. you went on to say that there was not a consensus on the bridge to actually move forward with that. you said mr. pat -- is that pat o'brien? >> pat o'brien.

>> he said let's go. >> i remember looking at him, and i think that is what he said. >> also in the testimony you provided, you mentioned something about john -- >> john winslow. i am not sure. could you be specific about which comment? >> he was wanting to excuse himself and you had made a comment something like, that is all right. all right. >> that was in reference to him asking if i wanted him to participate in the 7:00 meeting. >> did he explain to what he may not want to attend this vip

dignitaries visit? >> i cannot recall with 100% certainty if he said anything about what was going on outside or not. >> outside meaning the drill floor? >> yes. >> thank you very much, mr. sims, for making yourself available. i believe someone else has a few questions. >> we have no questions at this time. >> we're not getting new at all. >> and thank you, captain. we have no questions at this time but would reserve the right to present questions at a later time. >> did he say no questions? >> yes, but he reserves the

right to ask questions when the witness appears before the board at a later time. >> ok, and who said that? we did i get it at all. >> that was the counsel for the republic of marshall islands. party of interest, bp, do you have any questions for your witness? >> [unintelligible] >> thank you, sir. >> what was that? we missed that? >> could you relate to anything they are saying. we cannot hear them in the audience. >> yes i can. bp did not have any questions. >> council for anadarko?

no questions from anadarko. douglas brown? >> does he have questions? >> yes, he has questions for mr. sims. >> what is his name? >> mr. steve gordon. can you hear me sir? >> and not real clear. >> steve gordon. counsel, can you hear me? >> yes, what is your name? >> steve gordon.

mr. sims, once again, your drillings operations manager for bp, correct? >> currently for the elite well by the d d three. >> what is your other title? >> that is it right now. >> that is it right now. before -- >> was the word "completion of" title?rt of her title stocyour >> iw ould say it has been -- the title has been written a number of ways. the wells ops manager.

both ways. written >> has the word "completion" ever bombarded your title? >> that is what the "c" sants for, yes. >> thank you can you tell me rew fort look of the c the deepwater horizon? >> would you explain? >> i have been told by bp they thought they were considered the "a" team. is that true? >> what bp said? >> what did he income of the deep water rise in crude? -- deepwater horizon crew?

>> i think the crew and the rig had good performance. associated with that rig. >> do you have knowledge of whether people in had management in ha asked transocean to try to clone the deepwater horizon crew because they were so efficient? >> clone? >> put them on the other transocean vessels. >> would you ask the quesion over? >> into you have knowledge that management in bp stock transocean to try to "clone othercrew so the

transocean vessels would be able to operate as effectively? cannot honestly say i recall that word being used. i think that bp felt like it was a good rig, crew and i do not recall the word "clone." >> would you have like to have a a crew like deepwater on other vessels that drill wells for you. >> you are asking him to

speculate? >> i am asking his opinion of the crew. >> it was a good crew. >> you were there for a routine safety audit, correct? >> i would call it a leadership visit. >> it is not for a safety ward? >> that is correct. >> who did go out there with? , donbuddyrien, don trehan. >> would you agree with me that those people might be considered executives of bp and transocean? >> let me run an objection. >> objection. >> the witness answered "i

suppose pep." >> we thought we heard an objection. hold on. [laughter] >> i could tell it was ned. [laughter] >> let me have your objection. >> my objection is that this witness is being asked to render an opinion about whether certain people with in a different organization might be viewed in a certain way by certain people it is well beyond this with this is ability to make that judgment. i would think that on his own he will answer that he cannot make this judgment. i want the record to make addition not be made. >> he is awkward to answer that.

he is only saying he thought it was a good rig and crew. he will not say what someone else might have thought of them. >> at this point, he is asking about certain people and whether they could be considered executives for the upper management. that is the question i am objecting to. >> ok. >> i agree. i can -- >> i just want to ask another question then i am good. >> ok. [laughter] >> is transocean had been -- if two memebers from transocean had been given a safety award, and they certainly would have told you about that when you traveled with them out there, right? classes are a good answer -- he classes are a good answer -- he is not good to answer any question about speculation. >> did you ask the u.n. to do

out there? was everybody quiet? >> not to sound flip sense, but in a helicopter you cannot have a conversation. before, the onlyform thing that i recall don winslow saying was that he wanted to leadershipeeting with sometime during the visit and that is the meeting that was set up for 7:00. >> thank you so much. two questions appear do you know a lady by the name of rachel klingman.

>> i do not know her. >> she is a lawyer for transocean. tuesday for the house judiciary committee on may 27. >> he did not know. >> this is a question. >> he has indicated he did not know. >> i'm just good to ask him the question without referring to her. >> fine. >> did you know -- >> did you know -- >> how i knowrachel klingman. he want to read something she may have said the for a panel in washington -- hold on. you do not know what is going to ask. >> let's hear your question. did mr. sims know that rachel under oath says that the transocean executives were on board to give a safety award?

did he know that? >> if you can answer yes or no. >> did i know she said then? >> no. >> thank you. >> transocean, and do you have any questions? cried not at this time. -- >> not at this time. >> we did not hear that. >> in the questions from transocean. this is not a legal proceeding. i note denotation of being an"honor." an"honor." >> good afternoon.

my name is david jones. i represent cameron. i believe that you testified earlier that it was after the second explosion at the lights went out on the bridge. is that correct? >> that is correct. >> i thought you said that the lights went out on panels on the bridge. is the corrected text again? rk in, i said it was dart the bridge and difficult to read or determine any worse on the bop panel.

>> how did you ever observe the right to go out on the bop panel? observe thet lights go out. >> how did you know when you said you turned and attacked the gop panel? how did you know you are looking at the bop panel? had you seen it before? >> i had seen it before. >> it is a fairly large panel, correct? >can you describe it for me? >can you describe it for me? probably 5 feet high and i guess 3 feet wide. >> ok. it has two sides that are 5 feeet high and 3 feet wide.

is this your understanding? >> i don't know. >> whatever the panel you were looking at the you believe to be the bop was about 5 feet tall and 3 feet wide? is that fair? >> the panel that i of a tent that had buttons that i believed were associated with individual eop components but to me to be about 5 feet high and about 3 feet wide. >> i in hughes said that use of green lights, a yellow light, and one red light. is that correct? >> that is correct. i saw a green and yellow light side by side, and green on left

i believe and yellow in the middle. or what appeared to be the bop component in the stack. >> then you said the one red light you saw was at the top of the panel. is that correct? a i would characterize it as toward the top of the panel. >> de know if there any light above the red light that you saw the suspec? >> i do not recall any of but it. >> ok. i understand you have a red light in the middle toward the top. going down beneath it, you have a yellow light and green light side by side as you are going down. >> that is my recollection that the red light of the uppermost

light that i recall seeing and below that and what flights were there were green and yellow light side by side. furtherwer discussion about seen the captain and the captain going over to the bop panel. indeed you actually see someone active a e theate the eds? >> i did not see the hutton pushed specifically. >> at some point after the captain and went toward bop panel, you said you looked at the panel and you still get the lights were no different. is that correct? >> i glanced at the panel shortly after that. my recollection is that there were now red lights on what

looked to me to be all of the green and yellow lights. >> where the green light off or on? >> i can't remember. >> were any lights plinking? >> i did not notice any blanket plight. >> when the plans said the panel, how long did you look at it? was it a quick glance at? >> i would consider that a quick look. a couple of seconds. o >>k. i believe that is all i have.

thank you and ridd. clyde thank you. we reserve the right to ask questions when the witness appears in person. >> halliburton is not have questioned at this time pitaha. >>mi has no questions. >> no questions at this time. >> no questions at this time. >> thank you for your testimony today. are there any questions so we did not ask ind? >> np, sir.

we will need to appear before the board, will you make yourself available? >> i will do everything i can. i appreciate the grayson that was given to me verbally. i appreciate that. you are dismissed. >> thank you. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] cable satellite corp. 2010] to allow for the party interest we have, we have time for evident for the board to consider and the technical

verification phase. we are planning to hold the next sessions in the later part in july. i request that of a party interested to submit a request to the board by the end to an impossible. throughout our investigation, we will identify identify additional parties as appropriate. is on the conduct of the captain well operating under the deepwater horizon, the board will issue letters to each individual as a party of interest. this meeting is adjourned. thank you.

>> raise your right hand so i can place you under oath. false testimony given to an entity of the united states is punishable by fine or imprisonment. knowing this, do not swear the testimony you're about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? >> i do. >> you may be seated. >> before we begin, we just want to remind you that you are represented by transocean attorney. is that ok with you? >> yes. >> can you please state your name? >> my name is paul james meinhart iii.

>> by him are you employed? >> transocean. >> what position do you currently hold with them? >> motorman. >> how long have you been a motorman with them? >> three months. >> did you have any experience prior to this? >> i worked on another transocean rick prior to working on deepwater horizon. >> said you have about six months working with transocean? >> yes. >> did you have any special training for the job? >> prior to coming off shore, and worked as a diesel mechanic with a dealership. with a dealership. >> as a motorman on the

deepwater horizon, warrior day- to-day operations and responsibilities? -- what were your day-to-day operations and responsibilities? >> i was shadowing another mechanic, assisting as needed under the engineering staff. >> who was your supervisor? >> it changed from day to day. willie stoner and terry sullers. >> how long had you been on the rig prior to the explosion? >> four days. >> were you aware of any problems on the rig? >> no.

>> could you give me a brief summary of your day on april 20th from the time you woke up until the explosion? >> i got up at approximately 5:30 a.m., got my daily pass from our first engineer, went and performed the daily rounds on the pumps, came back. at that time, some of the other crew were installing a cooling ps of piping. i went with them and installed -- a cooling piece of piping. i went with them and installed it. i went to isolate the equipment, tested and return it to service. fill out paperwork, but it signed -- it got it signed, came back and gathered everybody to isolate the equipment and

test it. that is when the incident occurred. occurred. >> where you located at the time of the incident? of the incident? >> in the engine control room. >> was anybody else there with you? >> yes, three people. >> prior to the incident, did you hear any type of indication that something was going on? any lights or something blinking to make you aware of a problem? >> prior to the explosion, we had an alarm for combustible gas. that was the very first alarm. that was the very first alarm. we overheard a transmission on

the radio to disconnect been moved off the vessel 500 m. after the transmission, three to four more alarms came up. >> what type of alarm, visual, audio? >> both. >> you just referenced that you had some type of communication. how long prior to the first explosion did that communication takes place? >> i perceived it to be 15 to 20 seconds. >> then how much longer was the second explosion after the first explosion? >> 10 to 15 seconds, i believe. >> was there any communication to the engine control room to perform a shutdown? >> no. >> did they have that

capability? >> we had the capability of shutting down the engine, yes. >> did the bridge communicate to the control room to shut down the engine? >> we had both radios and telephones. >> which engines were running at the time of the incident? >> 3 and 6. >> i know you said you had only been on the deepwater horizon for three months, but were you aware of any safety devices on the engine themselves? the engine themselves? >> they had mechanical and electrical. >> who was responsible for doing preventative maintenance and inspection on those? >> i believe our first engineer. >> in the three months that you're out there, do recall any preventative maintenance or inspection on those devices? >> i recall doing a test and

testing of the systems on one of the engines, yes. >> de remember which engine that was? >> not exactly, no. >> do you know what the settings were for the over speed? >> not the exact settings, note. >> when the alarm sounds, does that shut power to the engines at all? >> the alarms notify us. the engines provide power to the rig over hydraulics, the rig over hydraulics, thrusters, for all of the equipment on the rig. if we shut down the engines, the rate has no power to perform any operations. -- the rig has no power to perform any operations. >> are there backup generators? >> yes. the emergency generator has to be manually started.

>> have you ever seen mms or the coast guard on the rig? >> wii's. >> did an of those indivi -- >> yes. >> did any of those individuals perform inspections while you were there? >> non- during the shift that i worked. >> can you tell me where you were during the explosions? >> the first explosion, and was standing port side with my back to the door. i got blown in. i believe that it came from the port side of the vessel from where we were at. >> and the second explosion?

>> the second explosion, at that time i had just moved over, but i still had my back to the port side. there was another door coming from the center of the rig. during the second explosion, that door got blown open. >> do you know what exploded? >> no. >> de know what happens in an engine scenario when there -- do you know what happens in an engine scenario when there is a run away? >> depending on the extent, a bearing failure can occur on any of the rods which can cause the head to be blown off the engine. >> when you were in the control room, was there a presence of gas? >> and do not recall that. >> are you familiar with the

saver?" >> that is a valve on the engine that is supposed to close in the event of an over speed. >> do have any indication that that device it activated? >> that would be on the sbc consoles. it is the main consoles that controls all the power and the generator systems. >> do you have any will control procedures in your role as a motorman? >> no. >> were you ever in any type of a well control scenario?

>> not that i know of, no. >> if you were in a well control event, do you know what you would do as a motorman? >> assist as needed, as directed. >> who would be directing you? >> the watch engineer or the first engineer. >> that is all the questions i have. thank you. >> sir, can i just follow up with a couple of questions. after the second explosion, when you made your way out of the engine control room, can you just tell us what happened? what did you see? >> as i was making my way out of

the engine control room, i assisted someone in getting out, and willie stunner out, and willie stunner insisted -- willie stoner assisted in getting him out. there is a phone on the deck. willie attempted to contact the bridge. the phones or dead. -- the phones were dead. at that time, we knew that we needed to get to our primary lifeboat station. myself, willie and brent made our way onto the deck and then to the port side of the vessel, and then moved up to the bridge. >> did you notice any damage? i know it was pretty confusing at the time, but did you notice any damage along the main deck area? >> on the main deck, i did not

take a survey of any damage other than just observing our direction of travel, to observe any obstructions. >> did you step over anything that was blown down? >> there were bits of debris. >> did you notice any holes or missing rails? >> on the main deck, no. on the below main deck, there is a set of steps, three or four steps down to a walkway. initially, i wanted to stay below main deck to get to the starboard side of the vessel to avoid any danger, but the small steps going to the walkway were damaged. >> that was at the rear of the vessel? >> yes.

>> i have no further questions. thank you. >> when you exited out of the engine control room onto the life boat deck, where the life boats packed, or were they gone? >> i do not recall ever taking a survey of the lifeboats. and do not recall if they were there or if they were packed. my initial concern at the time was making the phone calls, attempttng to make the phone calls to the bridge. brent had a severe it laceration to the scalp, bleeding quite bad. my first thought was to assess his injuries and to try to see if there was anything i could do for him. >> thank you. >> sir, i have a few questions for you, specifically about the emergency generator you described. on board the deepwater horizon indicated in your testimony that

the emergency generator had to be manually started. did it switch on automatically? >> the systems on the rig, you have the primary generators running to provide power. in the event that the main generators trip off or over speak for whatever reason, the system was designed to then start any other main generators that were not running at that time. >> is that a what you are referring to as your emergency generator, the generator you attempted to start? >> know. no. the damage to the system prevented the other generators from starting. >> there was yet another generator separate and distinct from those generators? >> yes. >> and that is what you're referring to as the emergency generator?

>> yes. would it be fair to -- >> would it be fair to referred u.s. a standby generators -- would be unfair to refer to it as a standby generator as opposed to an emergency generator. i am not trying to put words into your mouth, but there is a difference between one that is automatically generated and one that has to be manually started. >> from the time that you got on board the deepwater horizon, d recall whether there was any maintenance performed on that generator? >> on this particular raid?

>> yes. >> no. i had not been on the rig enough days at that time. >> according to your statements you provided, you indicated that you had gone to the bridge, and then you went to this auxiliary generator room to try to started. do you recall that? >> yes. >> how did you try to start it? >> the generator has a battery starter, an electric starter. the battery systems were turned on. it has a start button. the start button was then switched on. we tried to start the generator. nothing happened. we were not sure if maybe we were not doing something right. as an operating manual -- there was an operating manual that we then read it through to verify we were performing correctly. the generator still would not start. >> how many times did you

attempt to start the generator? >> the generator was attempted to start several times, five or six times. >> based upon your experience as a diesel mechanic and now a motorman, did you have any idea what was causing the problem? >> something electrical, because the generator would not even attempt to turn over. >> thank you. i have no further questions at this point. >> you had gotten everyone. i think it was mr. paul. you had made it back up to the bridge, and ensure your buddies got up there and taking care of. where, from the bridge to the generator check, where is that located? how did you get down to that? where is that located?

>> is on the main deck on the port side behind the bridge. >> the kit. thank you. -- ok. thank you. >> transocean? >> no questions. >> douglas brown? >> no questions. >> halliburton? >> no questions. >> no questions. >> did you say that you tried to

start the generator that night? >> after the incident, when we needed power to possibly run fire equipment, yes, we did try to started after the incident. >> when was that? when did you start to do that? >> are you asking? >> time wise. >> time was, after the initial blast, i cannot say exactly. i would say less than 10 minutes. >> had mr. mansfield been taken out of the engine control room? >> yes, sir. as i said, myself and willie assisted mr. mansfield to the bridge. >> and then, did somebody direct you to try to start the generator? >> whenever i got up there at the time, i got up there, mike

williams was up there. doug brown was up there. we had all of us up into the bridge. the captain said that we needed power to attempt to fight the fire. we then informed him of the damage that had occurred, and that we were not going to be able to attempt to get main power back on the bridge. he then asked if it would be possible to possibly get emergency power from the backup generator. >> and then he sent you to go try to do that? >> myself, mike williams, and steve then went to attempt to start the standby generators. >> and where did you have to go to do that? >> as i stated, the standby generator room is on the main deck on the port side of the vessel behind the bridge. >> in a prior emergency, it did any one of the three of you have

this assigned task or any other assigned task other than that? >> the watch engineer, the first engineer and the mechanical supervisor have assigned tasks. i assigned task is to assist as directed. >> do know what the other assigned tasks are for the other gentleman? >> they are primarily supposed to assemble in the engine control room, assess the situation, and then proceed as needed to either set -- either shut down any equipment or start any equipment in whatever situation is. >> did you hear at any time anybody tell the captain that attempting to fight the fire would be a futile attempt? >> i do not recall that. >> as you sit here today, do you think there was a china meant chance to put that fire out? >> could you repeat the question?

>> yes. >> i think you're standing too close to the microphone. >> i'm sorry. would it have been possible for anyone on the deepwater horizon, if you had had power, to put the fire out? >> i cannot make that assumption. i do not know. >> of caper in -- ok. can you describe the capt. as far as his demeanor at that time? >> my opinion of the capt.'s demeanor is that he was very direct and organized, and getting information from the crew that were in different parts of the vessel to assess the damage of the vessel, and then directing people as what

needed to be done. >> the panel back in the engine control room, before the explosion -- actually, let me ask you. were you trained at all to utilize the emergency shutdown buttons? >> myself directly, no. >> ok. were you ever personally trained on that vessel on how to somehow shutdown electrical power? >> electrical power? no. >> all of your training regarding power, either taking it off line or on line, was to bring power up if it went down. is that correct? >> yes.

>> or you ever trained for -- trained or alerted to the fact that the ventilation into the engine control room was such that if there was a gas leak on deck, the gas would come into the engine control room? were you ever told that? >> i was not told directly, no. >> was there ever any discussion by the captain that if you, when you were sent to initiate the emergency generator system, that there may be cast in the area, and that by doing so you could actually cause an additional explosion? explosion? >> the question is did the captain say that? >> know. -- no. >> did anybody say that? >> at the time, no. >> looking back, do you understand the concept that that

could have happened? >> yes, understand that, but due to the fact that the reagan was on fire at the time -- on fire at the time -- >> -- that the reaig was on fire at the time -- >> one more fire wouldn't matter? >> known not that. -- no, not that. >> you would not put it like that. was there another first engineer on the rig? >> yes. >> who was that? >> i do not know his name. i believe that on the shift i did not work on, that person would have been a jerry. as i said, i did not work on days. i do not know.

>> in this dan you are under oath, and i do not want you to guess, -- i understand you are under oath, and i do not want you to guess, so let me rephrase. do you understand that there was a first engineer who was a counterpart to james mansfield? >> wii's. >> but you did not know who he was -- >> yes. >> but you did not know who he was? >> as i said, i did not work on it days. >> let me ask you another question. it is my understanding that he was working for his engineering license. is that possible? >> anything is possible, but i think we are getting really far afield here. >> i just want to verify whether

he knows whether he had a license or was working towards it. >> [unintelligible] >> ok, fine. thank you so much. do you recall hearing jet engines at three or six or revving up in power? >> yes. >> do you know what they are set to run at? >> the exact setting, a normal run at speed is 780. >> how about 720. >> ok. >> can you tell me what they read up to? >> i do not know. >> did you have the ability to look on the screen to determine that? >> the ability to monitor what the engine rpm was is possible on the console, yes. >> do you have an opinion -- and

you may have answered this, and i am sorry if i do not recall, whether things function on engine 3? >> i do not know for sure. >> engine 6? >> i do not know for sure either. >> did you go dark? >> yes. >> is it your belief that the reason you went dark is because the frequency trip on engine three or six? >> i do not know exactly the cause of us going dark. >> but the engines and never stopped running before the explosion, correct? >> i do not believe so. >> they were winding up when the explosion occurred? >> yes. >> thank you so much. >> thank you, sir. >> bp? >> no questions. >> cameron?

>> no questions. >> drill quit? >> no questions. >> brought the third -- rutherford? >> no questions. >> just to follow up, or the engines winding up or were they winding down? >> i believe that they were winding up. >> how long have you been a diesel mechanic, including your time with deep water? >> including my on short time and this, about six years. >> if gas was going into the turbo, with the engines revved up or read down?

>> they would rev up due to the fact that they're receiving an internal, unregulated source of fuel. >> thank you, sir. a couple of questions. what would have been damaged for the other primary generator to come on line? >> what would have been the damage to the primary generated? >> if they went down, other primary engines should have come up and they didn't. what would have been damaged for them to come up? >> i do not believe that during the time that the raid went dark -- the reagan went dark -- the rig went dark.

there is always a delay in registering the equipment has failed. there was not enough time between the reagan and going and dark and the first explosion -- the rig going dark and the first explosion. >> so if the consol was damaged, the other primary would not come online? >> yes. >> can the primary generator, can it be shut down from the bridge or any other location, or is it only in the engine control room that you can shut these things down? >> the bridge and the engine control room have the ability to control the engines as far as starting up engines and shutting down engines. >> so, if personnel on the bridge felt that some of the

engines should have stopped ignition, they could have done that from the bridge. >> at the time, the engine control room was in control of the equipment, so we would have had primary control of the equipment, and then the bridge could have taken control, but the amount of elapsed time, and the other issues that the bridge was dealing with, i do not know. >> a does do not understand, if you have primary control -- i just do not understand, if you have primary control down there, could the bridge take control? i am trying to understand the configuration. at no time did the bridge in four knew that they were taking control and shutting it down? -- at no time did the bridge inform you that they were taking control and shutting it down? >> no. >> thank you for your testimony.

>> you have lived on a rig for three months. do the terms think and start come to mind? >> wii's. >> -- "-- yes. >> could you elaborate on what they are? >> start is maintaining control of a task. think is executing control of a task. >> is there any question we did not ask you or any information relevant to this investigation that you would like to offer? >> i do not believe so. >> in the future, if we need you to come back to provide additional information, would you make yourself available? >> yes. >> thank you. you are dismissed.

we will take a break, a 10 minute break, and reconvene at 9:00. thank you. >> the board will now call on

mr. charles corridor with drill quest -- charles credeur with dril-qip.

do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? what i do. >> thank you very much. >> for the record, can you please state your name. >> charles credeur. >> by whom are you employed? >> dril-qip. >> what is your job title? >> service technician. >> how long have you been employed with them? >> 12 years. >> how long have you worked as a service technician in total? >> 30 years. >> for the other 18 years, what

did you do? >> i spent some time with other companies. >> did you have any special training for your job with deepwater horizon? >> yes. >> could you elaborate? >> we go through training on the installation of the equipment. >> what date did you arrive on the deepwater horizon? >> it was a monday of the week before. i think it was the 12th. >> what actually were you doing at the deepwater horizon, certification? >> uighur installing a hangar -- we were installing a hangar. i was also there to run a lockdown. >> you were going to run a lockdown? >> yes. >> we have a drawing of your

location from your written statement. we assume that you can confirm that. >> sure. >> wait, we are going to give you a microphone. >> i was out on the main deck, port act, approximately here. -- port after, approximately here. >> you were the only drill quip representative on the rig? >> yes. >> could you please give me your best recollection as to what took place up until the time of the incident? >> i worked at night, so i had gotten some sleep that day. that afternoon, i woke up and went out on the deck.

i gathered up tools and what not, the stuff we were going to need for the operation we were going to be doing later on. >> what happened after that, right around the time of the incident? >> at approximately 9:00 that night, we had gone out to the port house deck, to put together these assemblies. we were doing that, and we had just completed that operation, bucking the lockdown sleave, and mr. don clark came to me and told me he had to go to keep its. >> who was that? >> he was one of the hd's with withocean -- ad's

transocean. approximately 30 seconds to one a minute later, someone said the well has gone out. i turned and observed drilling mud -- the only way i could describe it would be like a waterfall of mud coming onto the main deck. it appeared to be filling up with drilling mud. we proceeded, myself and the other gentleman, proceeded to walk along toward the forward life boats. >> who was that other gentleman? >> brad. my first thought was, we are getting rained on by this drilling mud. my first thought was to get under the heliport, away from

the mud. at that point we would see what we needed to do. which we did. on the horizon, we had a walkway all the way around to the bridge. we went back to the bridge and there was a comment that we needed to go to the lifeboats. there was no one at the lifeboats that we could see. we walked back along the bridge area. when we got back to the main pipe deck and turned the corner , all the lights went out. a second or two later i heard the first explosion. >> do you know where that first explosion came from? >> i have no idea. i just heard a loud explosion and proceeded to walk down the stairwell going down to the lifeboat areas. i was approximately halfway down at this set of stairs when i heard a second explosion, and the watertight door right in front of me -- well, let me

reword that, not directly in front of me, maybe 10 ft. in front of me, just blew open. i observed people coming out of the other door. i proceeded to the lifeboat box, got a life preserver, put it on, and when i got to live but number two, me and another gentleman, and i really did not see who it was at the time, we proceeded to open the door, and i got into lifeboats two. >> when you left the area and were going towards the deck, were you continuously getting rained on by this mud? >> i seem to recall initially that when a the gentleman said the well had blown out, i cannot really recall getting rained on at that time. it seemed more like on at the port side, you got about halfway, that is when i first realized the mud was hitting us,

just kind of bringing down on us. >> was the mud? muddy water? >> to my recollection, it was mud. >> prior to leaving the area, did you hear any gas or air released noises? >> no. >> did you look back at the derrick and identified that mudd was coming directly out of the derrick? >> yes, when we were back on the backside of the bridge area. >> so come up from the time you got from where you were to the lifeboat area, you could still see it flowing through the derrick? >> yes. >> how long was that? >> maybe a minute. it was pretty quick. >> did you set the field

assembly? >> yes sir. >> what was the procedure for that? >> the procedure for that was to -- we basically -- to released the tool, we put 20,000 down on to the tool and rotated six returned to the right. -- six turned out to the right. that indicated that it was in a position for seal assembly. we put the seal assembly in place to be set. from that point, i was on and the rigger floor. i proceeded to the halliburton unit, which we used to set and test the seal assemblies. we went through the normal steps, testing the lines to make sure they were good. when we did the actual seal

assembly test, we did a 4,000 ft test and held that for 30 seconds. then when that was looking good, it was holding, we proceeded to go to $10 and. we held up for 10 seconds, and then from that point, we put it back down to 6700. that was the test pressure that the customer had indicated that he wanted to do the actual test to it. >> and who was that customer? >> pp. -- bp. >> and did they provide you with the procedure or was this a dril-qip procedure? >> the test procedure is chosen by the customer.

>> the first test was a success? >> wii's. >> the third test was a success -- >> yes. >> the second test was a success? >> yes. >> did any of the test on that assembly indicate a problem? >> not at all. >> what is the pressure rate for it to fuel assembly that you were doing? >> 50,000 ft.. >> is it designed to hold negative pressure from above? >> i am not sure -- >> is the steel assembly designed to hold a negative pressure from above? >> i do not know. >> is it designed to hold pressure from below? >> what that pressure is, i do

not know. >> can you please explain what a casing a lot downslide is? >> -- a casing lockdown sleeve this? >> ziplocs everything into place. >> without that, is the steel assembly more likely to fail. >> [unintelligible] >> why was the casing of block sleaved not run at that time -- the casing lock sleeve not to run at that time? >> that was a decision made by pp. -- by bp.

they were going to go in with a drill pipe and and a set of plug and displaced. >> i have no further questions. >> i just have to do follow-up questions here. just for clarification, when you're trying to set the seal assembly, was there a period of about 40 minutes when you held pressure when you're picking up drag? >> i am not sure i understand the question. >> the first or second time you were trying to sheer out, did you hold the sheer into the track for about 40 minutes? >> no sir. if by understand your question correctly, the answer would be no. >> so when you sheer out, does it come in clean?

you do not pick up gradually? >> yes, you share out and you continue to pick up. >> how long does it take you to pick up? >> just a matter of seconds. >> then do you set back down and retest? >> yes sir. >> how many times? >> you might feel a little bit of a drag when the seals come out. by the seals, i mean the seals on the running to spirit >> at that point and do a 30 minute test or anything? >> and no sir. >> you have to do it when you're sitting down -- setting down. >> yes sir. >> at some point, is the casing

exposed to any pressure? >> know, all pressure is released at that time. >> what is the size of the running to on the bottom, approximately? >> approximately 14 in., i think, something like that. maybe 12. >> is there anything possibly that the running it tool could make the string pulled wet? >> i do not recall that. >> do you recall if they had to slug of the whole -- slug the hole? >> they typically would have come to the slug, yes. >> and the purpose is? >> just for that reason.

>> to keep from pulling a wet string? >> wii's. >> would that be any kind of indication that there is some sort of lead in that the system? >> not necessarily. >> could you explain that? >> it does not do anything for the idea of the hangar. >> you could be pulling something from the inside of the casing or something like that? >> is possible, but not likely. >> in your experience setting this seal assembly, do you normally see the string of being pulled wet after you have set it? >> no certification.

>> thank you. -- no sir. thank you. >> normally, when you are running the lockdown, what is the next step. >> it is completely the customer's decision. i have done it both ways. >> your company leaves that strictly to the customer? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. >> when you were on the deck back to their -- dec back there, you said you saw some blood or -- deck back there, you said you saw some blood or fluid. what prompted you to go to the

helicopter landing? >> that is where it seemed i should go at the time. >> you said you saw a door blowout. do you know what that door was? >> it went right by the galley in the living quarters. >> how did it come off? was it abruptly? >> i seem to recall either immediately or as i heard that a second explosion it just flew open. >> what did it look like in the open position? was it distorted at all? >> i never got a good look at the door itself. >> good enough. how was the lifeboat area? was it orderly in the evacuation? >> yes, considering the situation. >> considering your experience offshore so many years. , how was the order of it?

a typical? >> yes. >> have you not been in this situation before? >> one other time, actually. >> what was the previous experience? >> approximately 20 years ago. this one was better organized, actually. >> how you feel the training and drills on board the deepwater horizon are conducted? how were they administered? >> we went to weekly fire abandon and drills. we had a routine safety meetings and what not where things were discussed. i feel they were adequate. >> thank you very much.

[inaudible] >> bp. >> no questions. >> transocean. >> no questions. >> halliburton. >> no questions. >> weatherford. >> no questions. >> anadarko. >> no questions. >> douglas brown. >> no questions. >> are there any questions that we did not ask you or any information related to the investigation that you would like to offer at this time? >> nothing comes to mind. >> thank you for your testimony.

if we need you to come back in the future, will you make yourself available? >> yes. >> thank you there. -- thank you, sir. >> good morning. thank you for being here. please raise your right hand so we can put you under oath. do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth,

and nothing but the truth, so help you god? >> i do. >> aggressive, sir. please be seated. >> -- thank you, sir. please be seated. >> good morning. before we begin, our standard question. are you comfortable having a transocean rep? >> yes i am. >> could you please state your name and spell it for the record? >> michah burgess. >> who are you employed with? >> transocean. >> what is your title? >> in driller. >> how long have you worked there? >> two years. >> have you done any other work

for transocean? >> yes, i worked for transocean nine years. >> were you always on the deepwater horizon? >> yes. >> what other positions did you hold? >> floor hand, and derrick hand, assistant driller, driller. >> can you tell me your educational background? >> high-school. >> what was your role as a driller on deepwater horizon? >> my role as a driller would be just to maintain, you know, watching the well. i had the authority to shut the well any time i had a doubt about anything. i was responsible for my crew. >> how many would you consider your crew?

>> there were nine of us. >> as a driller, i am sure you have had multiple well-control training. can you tell me when your last one was? >> i think it was december of last year. >> what do you learn in your well-controlled courses? >> you learn procedures. you do a simulator training on gigs and shutting the wells in. you have to know to detect the flow pickup, a shut the well in, kill mud weights and all of this. >> do you recall any specific training on the subsidies stacks? >> yes, that is what we specialize in. >> how long had you been on the rig prior to the incident? >> one week.

>> can you give me a brief summary of the day from when you woke up to the time of the incident? >> actually, i was still in bed at the time. i heard a faint sound that sounded different. i turned my tv on. i was strolling to the -- scrolling to the reagan floored channel when the first explosion -- the rig floor channel when it the first explosion happened. i went to the engine control room. they come over the intercom and said for everybody to muster to the lifeboat station. so i went to the lifeboat station. >> when would you have begun your day? >> i would have come on around 11:30 p.m., midnight.

>> and that is when you worked the night before? >> yes, i got off a 11:30 a.m., noon. >> so you were working all morning? >> yes. >> can you please give me some background on that day? >> that day we set an assembly. we tested it twice. we called a released from the hangar. pulled out of the holes. laydown my tools and picked up my cubing and proceeded to the top where we stopped and conducted a casing test. that was where i was relieved at, doing the chasing test. >> what test was that? >> that was the positive casing? >> were you aware of any vips coming on board at a time?

>> yes. >> or they are around? >> no, they had not made it gets -- no, they had not made it yet. >> what did you see on the television that you were looking for? >> i never made it to the channel. i was strolling down, looking for it. >> and you said you went to your assigned station? >> the alternative station would have been the galley. they told everybody just to proceed onto lifeboats one and two. >> but did i hear you correctly that your first muster was the engine control room? >> that would have been where i would have went. >> but they said not to. >> they said everybody to go to the lifeboat station. >> the notice you were given was

do not go -- >> yes, they said don't go that way. they said it over the intercom, for everybody to go to the lifeboats. they did not say go to your master station. they said everybody go to the lifeboats. >> how long had you been on the deepwater horizon prior to arriving one week before? had you always been on the deepwater horizon? >> yes. >> did you ever have a problem with lost returns? >> yes. >> did you have any problems with stuck by it? >> yes sir.

>> how often did that happen? >> it had happened about a month ago. it would have been march. >> did you have any problem with cementing the casings? >> not that i am aware of. >> were you aware of a nitrous problem on a string? >> yes on the last producing strain. >> you are aware of that? >> the only one i was aware of was the last one, that was a 7 in. by 9 and 7/8. >> did you hear anything about the casing test?

i mean, the cement test, sorry. >> know. -- no. >> is there any policy to lock out a stack during the test? >> it shouldn't have been. i don't know if it would, but it shouldn't have been. >> were you aware of any stack issues prior to your test? >> there was one kohl told we had. -- one coil fault we had. it was a minor leak, possibly hydraulic. it wasn't nothing on the well board ceiling. >> who brought that to your attention? >> and engineer. >> when was that?

>> it had better weeks prior. >> was there any plan to modify that issue? nothing that would stop anything. >> as a driller, can you please tell me the well control procedures when you have an emergency disconnect scenario. >> when we go to a red alert, i do not have to have the authority of nobody. i just disconnect. >> what do you do? >> you just push one button. you push hold. >> is there any way that that system can be over rutted by another system? >> not that i am aware -- over- rided by another system?

>> not that i am aware of. >> do you know about an auto shearer system? >> your super shares, your casing shares, and then you're blind is close behind it. >> the note of anything during the cross stack of the incident that would have prevented it from closing? >> no. >> no you do not know anything, or no it would not have prevented it from closing? >> i do not know. >> what is the normal flow to the rig and out to the vessel? >> it goes out your flow line,

back to the sugar house, to the pump, and they would have to physically line it up and pump it to the boat. >> to your knowledge, is there any way to divert that system? >> no. >> why is that? >> it has to go through there where you can monitor. >> is it possible? >> no. >> why is it not possible? >> they just can do it that way. -- they just cannot do it that way. >> as a driller, i am sure you are very familiar with all of the gadgets and computer systems in your consoles. do you ever have a hard time understanding what is going on in real time on the rig floor? >> no. >> what is your role and the

assistants role? >> the assistant gets me whatever information i need, figures and drilling equipment. they're there to help me. they run the wracking equipment too. >> about how many screens does a driller normally monitor in a driller console? >> 30. >> what are on the those screens? >> we have a sun screen and other screens. we see the flow, volume, smart tools, radioactivity and gamma rays. >> if there was any kind of a volume issue, would that send some kind of information to the driller? >> yes. >> do you