the apparent return of taliban intimidation and assassinations of local officialssthere. the failure of afghan government officials to deliver much-needed services to win local alllgiances. the delay in the kandahar campaign. the resiggation of two senior afghan security officials who seemingly were among the most competent members of the cabinet and had strong coalition support. the role of local powerbrokers, including members of the karzai family, and can the heart. the growth of militias and the counterproductive activities of some u.s.-hired private security contractors. and apparent differences with the karzai egime over approaches to reconciliation with the taliban. general mcchrystal acknowledged these press report -- press reports but emphasized that you have to step back and see the trend in direction. this morning we want to hear from our witnesses on how they see these trends. my focus is and always has been

on getting the afghan national security forces trained and equipped to take over the responsibility for their country's security. doing so is the key to success in afghanistan. as general mcchrystal said at a press briefing last week, the afghan security forces are "the strategic main effort, and they are key to the long-term stability in afghanistan." general mcchrystal has repeatedly set out the goal of putting afghans in the lead and making them responsible for their future. afghan leaders have said they want to be responsible both for the room security and affairs. at the console and active peace jirga -- the consultative peace of this month, the 1600 afghan delegates adopted a resolution calling on the international community "to expedite the process of equipping, training, and strengthening the afghan that they can get the capability

in taking responsibility to provide security for their own country and people." the progress toward the goal of afghans taking the lead has been unsatisfactory. peavily dependent on coalition forces. the camp plame plan for kandahar -- to day operations in afghanistan are excessively dependent on coalition forces. the campaign plan for kandahar anticipates increases in afghan forces in and around kandahar city toocreate a rising tide of security, but at a 1-2 ratio, one afghan soldier or policeman for every two isaf troops. that is not good enough.

having afghan units in the lead is critical in kandahar since the likelihood of success there is based on popular sport. that is at the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy. the afghan army has broad public support, and even the afghan government has more than twice the support that the united states does. polling numbers from the "new york times" in the case 99% of afghans support the kabul government over the taliban, while only 40% have are favorable view of the united states. the elders we met at a local shura in southern afghanistan told us that we should train and eqqip the afghan security forces to provide for their country's security and then depart. last week, general mcchrystal announced that i sat -- isaf

would slow the expansion of the afghan and coalition troop presence in canada are in order to allow time to secure the support of local tribal leaders for that effort. i trust general mcchrystal's judgment on the timing. his right that when you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them. i would rather delay a few more months and have more afghan forces in the lead when the security presence is exppnded and operations begin more forcefully. our top priority is the training, mentoring, and partnering in the field with afghan troops and placing them in the lead in operations according to isaf, the growth of the afghhn security forces is on track. the nato training mission-

afghanistan under lieutenant general bill caldwell reports that recruitment for the afghan army and police now actually exceedd monthly recruitment goals. these forces lord above -- these forces are above where they need to be to meet the end strength goals for october 2010. what is disturbing and hard to comprehend is that the training mission still does not have enough trainers to process all the afghan recruits signing up. figures show that of the more than 5200 trainers that we need, onny 2600 are on the ground. secretary gates as deployed 850 u.s. soldiers and marines to afghanistan to serve as a according to a may 29 report -- excuse me -- from lieutenant general caldwell, the training mission has yet to receive 750

trainers pledged by nato members. further, last week the nato's security general announced that an additional 450 trainers needed to meet training requirements it is totally unacceptable that this shortfall persists. for whatever reason that they do not send additional tramp -- combat troops, it should be willing to provide trainers who fighting. the question remains, why are more afghan forces not in the lead using forces that are trained and ready? according to figures, they are able to operate independently. 42 afghan kandaks can operate with coalition support. that is 67 of 113 total afghan

army kandaks. more recent data on capabilities cast some doubts on the accuracy of that assessment, but they do not explain why it is u.s. or coalition forces that are usually leadinn operations, instead of the other way around. the afghaa army has about 125,000 troops avaiiable, more than we do. but it is our troops who are concentrated in the areas where the fighting is heaviest and where afghanistan's future may well hang in the balance. so many questions regard -- regarding the afghan national army emain unanswered and perhaps we will hear answers today. why aren't more afghan army troops leading security operations in the south? how many combat battalions and combat troops are there in kandahar? why on large numbers of afghan army troops from other areas moving to kandahar in preparation for the push?

and why isn't the ratio of coalition to afghan troops in kandahar at least one to one. i know that american troops are better equipped and trained than afghan troops. but the issue is not forced-on- fours. if it were, i would accept our taking the lead most often in kandahar operations. who can best connect and protect the population of kandahar? as the afghan defense minister aptly decided -- described the situation, it is a different type of operation. it is not like marjah, it is not going to be that kinetic. the afghan army can handle the population protection mission adequately and is equipped to do so. afghans, particularly the pashtun population in kandahar, that must be won over. that population wants security. it was the security provided by

afghans. having afghan troops among the afghan people is more accepted by them. success in kandahar will be more likely with afghan troops in the region. i will put the balance of my statement in the record and simply conclude by saying that the afghan government and the people need to demonstrate a sense of urgency and commitment toosucceed in building a lasting peace in afghanistan. as they demonstrate a willingness to fight and assume increasing responsibility for their security and affairs, then the american people will be stepped past partners in that endeavor. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think our distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning to discuus events in afghanistan. and let me thank you for your leadership of our men and women in uniform, especially those in

harm's way. as is well known, i believe that winning the war in afghanistan is of vital national security interest. i've said for years that the best way to achieve success is insurgency strategy. backed by strong civil, military, and u.s.-afghan partnerships. for this reason i have supported and still do support this president's decision to increase our commitment in afghanistan. i'll be brief, mr. chairman, and come right to the point. as a gauge the process of any war effort, i look at the broader trend line. it is for this reason that i am campaign in afghanistan. many of the key trends eem to be heading in a bad direction, perhaps signaling a mounting crisis. as an example, 10,000 additional nato troops are supposed to deploy along with our forces,

but we definitely have only half that number. and it is not clear when or from override. at the same time, the dutch and canadian governments continue to plan for it imminent withdrawal of their forces, while just yesterday the government of poland, a major troop contributor, called on nato to draw up a timetable to in the alliance's mission in afghanistan can withdraw our forces. in marjah, the troops are performing exceptionally, but appears that our afghan partners have not provided durable and consistent security to their population. unsurprisingly, government and development seems to be lacking. general mcchrystal recently referred to marjah as a bleeding all sir. -- ulcer.

i feel that marjah is sending a much more troubling signal. in kandahar, the success of the war could be determined. i agree with the most recent comment by general mcchrystal, it is more important that we get it right than we get it fast. that said, the delay in our operation does not project an air of confidence and success. to get to kandahar, -- to get kandahar right, we need a strategy and the political part is not there. i hear a lot about the number of i have not heard a convincing explanation on how we change the complex balance of power within the province, the troubling behavior of key power brokers, the performance of the afghan police in the city, and the

counterproductive contracting practices that we are dependent upon. meanwhile, it is very troubling that president karzai has decided to remove his minister of interior and his head of intelligence, two of our most important partners in his government. i know them to be upstanding and effective. i do not know what president karzai made this decision. the explanation given by his former intelligence chief, which we read in the newspaper this weekend, seems to have a ring of truth to it. president karzai no longer believes that the and not a states will succced and he is shifting his results as a policy of accommodation with the taliban and the pakistani military. if true, this could be very dangerous. that is the larger trend that underlines all the others. a loss of confidence n it seems to be shared by both

our friends and enemies in afghanistan as well as its neighbors. as our witnesses know, this is a battle for the false and allegiances of people. it demonstrate those sitting on the fence that they should throw their lot in with our partners and us because we're going to win. no matter how much has been explained, the decision to begin withdrawing our forces from afghanistan arbitrarily in july 2011 seems to be having exactly the effect that many of us predicted it would. it is convincing the key actors inside and outside of afghanistan that the united states is more interested in leaving thhn succeeding in this conflict. as a result, they roll making the necessary accommodations were opposed-american afghanistan. this is not to say that we cannot succeed. i think that we can and we must.

it is to say that with the ongoing difficulties in marjah, a delayed offensive in kandahar, growing concerns about the afghan government, troop commitments still lacking from nato, and the final in units of our own search not set to reach afghanistan until the first of september, it now seems increasingly clear that hoping for success on the arbitrary time line set by the unrealistic.on is simply again, i would echo general mcchrystal. it is more important that we get it right then we get it fast. that goes for kandahar and the war itself. it is time for the president to state unequivocally that we will stay in afghanistan until we succeed. we need to begin our realistic debate about what it will take and how long it will take to achieve our goals. and i look forward to having that discussion with our

witnesses. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. >> thank you very much for inviting me here to testify today. i like to give yyu an update on recent progress and remaining challenges in afghanistan. as you know, president obama announced a number of key refinements to our strategy last september, including the deployment of additional u.s. servicemen and women. today, over 18,000 are deployed and the remainder will be in place by the end of the summer. our own troops will be joined by over 9000 international troops, approximately 60% in place in afghanistan and more will come in the coming months. currently the main operational efforts for isaf and our

partners ccntinues to be the central helmand valley and kandahar. we protect the population and foster afghan governance. so far i believe we have been making gradual but important process. the insurgency is contested in more places and with more forces. this insurgency is both resilient and resourceful. in april and may, we saw the insurgency resume in much of central helmand. nonetheless, much of the nature is indicating a possible reduction in some of their operational capacity. for example, the percentage of complex attacks, thhse deploying more than one means of attack, have steadily droppee since its peak in february. the average number of casualty is below 2009 levels. the show increased willingness to report itt's and insurgent

weapons caches, which suggest growing pockets of confidence among ordinary people and a willingness to support afghan efforts to support government. we're taking a deliberative approach, expanding our efforts to improve local governance in key districts, has operations improve the security situation gradually. some confidence have expressed -- some in congress have expressed concern. we share this concern and we recognize that there are ways in which our own contracting practices have had unintended consequences, concentrating wealth among are relatively smmll number afghans. general petreaus and admiral mullen have created a task force to examine our practices to reduce these unintended consequences.

when we have evidence of corruption, we will work with the afghan government to prosecute those who are on the law. let me return to our efforts to build the capability and capacity of the ansf. capacity remains key. this helps us drawdown our forces as conditions allow. we're still short about 450 institutional trainers. we have reduced the ratio from 1 to 80, to one to 30. we are meeting our goal for fiscal year 2010, and nearly 85% is now fully partnered with isaf forces as they operate in the field. the afghan national police is on

track to reach its goal of 109,000 police by the end of the fiscal year. we have increased the capacity to conduct training by 4% over the last 12 funds. follow-on training has been provided to those afghan uniformed police in key districts as well as the afghan border police. recent salary and benefit initiatives have addressed pay disparities between them, and they appeared to be improving retention and attrition. literacy programs have proven to be a positive offensive. we further believe that newly instituted rotation schedules will further reduce attrition. consequently, we believe the strength goals for 2011 are achievable. needless to say, the purpose of these efforts is to ensure a gradual transition of security responsibility to the afghan government. i want to emphasize here that

transition does not -- does not mean abandonment or withdrawal. we're committed to supporting the people of afghanistan over the long term, and we will not walk away from this commitment. nonetheless, we cannot and should not remain in the combat role indefinitely. has the international military presence begins to shift from combat role to advisory and excess, it will be vital to ensure a more robust and longterm international civilian assistance effort focused on governance and development. we're working closely with the afghan government to plan for this transition process. innmay, president karzai and 14 members of his cabinet were here for about a week in washington for strategic dialogue.3 july, they will present further plans for achieving progress in governance and development.

we will also expect to hear more from president karzai regarding actions taken to address corruption as well as plans for reconciliation and integration. let me say a few words about reconciliation and reintegration. i know it is generated a great deal of attention. all parties rrcognize that in the in some political resolution will be required to bring this conflict to close. this recognition has driven the afghan government to begin to develop plans to reconcile insurgent leaders and reintegrate low-level fighters. in early april, president karzai presented his interim plans for reintegration. in may, a concept of peace jirga it gave president karzai a conditional mandate to move forward in this area. the u.s. supports an afghan-lead process that will break ties with al qaeda and live under the

afghan constitution in all of its requirements. let me conclude by underscoring -- underscoring that our overall assessment is that we're heading the right direction in afghanistan. of the 121 key districts identified last year, if you were assessed at that time to be sympathetic or neutral to the afghan government. by march of this year, that number had climbed to 73 districts. this and other indicators suggest that we are beginning to regain the initiative and the insurgency is beginning to lose momentum. that said, the outcome is far from determined and these are still earlier days. his only a matter of time since the president's announcement. and i briefed this committee in february, i said that we will face setbacks even as we achieve progress. none of what we're doing in afghanistan in false easy fixes.

they are long-term solutions -- problems that require flexibility. we are making progress, sometimes slow but we believe steady. we're confident that general mcchrystal will show more progress by the end of the year. we greatly appreciate this committee's continueddsupport for our efforts from the budget to the supplemental request. in particular, we appreciate your support for full funding for the afghan security forces, for coalition support funds, and for the commanders of emergency response program authority, which we think is an absolutely critical tool in the counter insurgency fighting. thank you again for inviting us here today for this discussion. and for your support, your continued support for the men and women who serve in uniform, and your support to enable progress in afghanistan. i look for to your questions. >> thank you, secretary

flourney. general petreaus. >> thank you for the opportunity to provide information about afghanistan in the campaign being conducted there. i know that it is a pleasure to do this with michele flourney. she was a contributor to the conference at fort leavenworth in january 2006 that once the effort to develop the counterinsurgency manual. i will begin with some brief context. soon after the 9/11 attacks, an international coalition led by the united states conducted an impressive campaign to defeat the taliban, hawkeye, and other associated groups in afghanistan. in the years that followed, however, members of the taliban and other extremist elements gradually reconnected in the afghan-pakistan border region

and were able kind -- to conduct at -- insurgency operation. these increased in an increasingly violent people -- campaign against the afghan people and government. they developed a some bought it -- as some by audit relationship throughout the world. in response to the threat posed by these extremists, isaf forces are involved in a campaign to prevent sanctuaries in afghanistan like the one cockeyed enjoyed there when the taliban ruled afghanistan prior to 9/11. to achieve our objective, we're working with our partners to wrest the initiative from them. to improve security for the afghan people.3 quality of the afghan security forces. and to support establishment of afghan governance seen as

legitimate in the eyes of the people. over the past 18 months, we and our partners have worked harr to gettthe input right in afghanistan.+ we of work to build the organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil, military counterinsurgency campaign. be a put the best military and civilian leaders in charge of those of work -- of those and organization. we've developed a substantial -- we've deployed the substantial additional resources, military, civilian, funding, and so on, needed to implement the plans that have been developed. i note here that the deployment of the 30,000 additional u.s. forces announced by president obama last december and their equipment is slightly ahead of schedule. nearly 21,000 of the additional 30,000 -- those are the latest numbers -- are now in afghanistan and by the end of

august, all additional u.s. forces will be on the ground except for a headquarters that is not required until a month for so letter. the effort to increase the afghan army and police are also now on track. there is clearly considerable work to be done in that critical area and to sustain the gains made recently in recruiting and attrition. even as we continue the effort to get the inputs right, the actions taken over the last 18 months which include tripling the u.s. force contribution to an increasingly similar lead the u.s. component, have enabled the new effort in afghanistan. the initial main effort has been in the central helmand river valley, as forces have made progress there, but predictably the enemy has fought back as we take away the importance i

chores. in marjah and elsewhere. the focus has been shifting to3 there is an integrated approach to development. in the months ahead, we will see additional u.s. brigades, the 101st airborne division, deploy our round kandahar city together with afghan army brigades. we will see the introduction of additional afghan police in u.s. military police to secure the city itself along with other u.s. forces and civilians that will work together with the impressive canadian reconstruction team operating in the city. as you've heard general mcchrystal explain, the concept is to provide the kandahar is a rising tide of security, one that will expand overtime and establish the presentation of improved security on which local afghan governance can be built and improve services and