for several years, you have gotten a free ride on the to $15 billion in royalties not paid during the lifetime of these leases. and when you're free ride results in a major disaster, what we have seen is the collective answer that you cannot effectively deal with the consequences of the oil coming from the bottom of the ocean. this is an embarrassment that your response plan about walruses and seals -- it is an embarrassment that the billions of dollars ave been spent with less than one-tenth of 1% on the development of safer technology. the industry needs to step up to the plate and recognize the need for change. you have to change or emergency

response plan. you have to invest in new safety, with alternative energy technology. we must make certain that there is an independent capacity to guarantee that every claim is not going to be determined to be legitimate. pwe have to make certain that te legitimate claims are determined not by yourself interest, but the independent arbiter, to make certain thattthese people are not harming what they already have. this disaster is a wake-up call for your industry. you have to heed this call. you have to bring together the plans that will make certain that this never happens again and we never see a response like this.

we will be moving legislation that will accomplish this goal. it will be better if the industry was saying, this has to be mandatory. the safety features have to be mandatory. we cannot rely on a voluntary. we see the consequences for the gulf and this country. this hearing is adjourned. this hearing is adjourned, and we would ask that this destruction is taken outside of the room.

>> the ceo of bp, tony hayward, will be on capitol hill to talk to the subcommittee.

we will have this on c-span and c-span.org. >> television is on this one.

>> this is what it along the march to pick up the oil that has been pushed into the near shore. and what else we see, this is to try to protect us from hitting the shore. this has been working fairly well. this is looking like -- i am sing less oil on the shore. you see that this is all white.

you see that they are changing this out every way -- every day, and they put the fresh 1 in. >> if the oil touches the grass, this is going to kill it. this is eroding the marshes.

>> we should be on the land right now. this is how bad this erodes. this is going to go away that much quicker if we have a storm. we have to move the coastline further in. >> the position -- we see that we are on land. we are 50 feet away from the shoreline. this used to the land here. this is from over the years of the hurricane and the coastal erosion. >> what would you be doing here? ing.'d be shrimp >> i just want to have this back. >> i am upset about this.

we just need to clean this up, that is all. some people are angry, but what are you going to do? you just have to clean this up. >> there is a lot of oil out there that you see in the grass. this is extraordinarily thin, this is 0.00015 milimeters -- millimeters thin. and oil degrades.

if you have not seen a lot of this on the water -- this accumulates and this is where we have to treat this. >> none of these birds look like they have any oil on them. >> we have not had this to light we have elsewhere. we have the concentration of oil, -- >> this is a long process, where we move this diligently, we have this to clean everything, this is absorbent, when you catch3

we have the oil coming through and we have this again. the decision is that if we can clean this, we have a very finite amount, and this is affecting the entire march. >> where is this coming from? >> i am a reservist. >> any were essentially active. >> i am a college professor and i teach english. >> thank you very much. >> tony hayward will be on capitol hill to testify before

the house energy subcommittee. we will bring you live coverage on c-span 3 and c-span.org. this morning on "washington journal," simon lomax of bloomberg will join us to talk about the impact of the bloomberg oil spill. rep. scott garrett is working on the financial regulation bill. then walter isaacson will talk about the use of agent orange during the vietnam war. 3 million vietnamese people and 100 children are still feeling the effect of the contamination. this is live every morning at 7:00 eastern on c-span.

>> this weekend, ty byrd with " crossing mandelbaum gate." juarez, aboutju mexico, and then "matterhorn," which follows bravo company through vietnam. and join us on twitter. 30,000 viewers already have. >> we have the c-span video library. we make it easy to follow the primary season, from the debates to the victory and concessions be six -- speeches. online, any time. >> an hour hearing on afghanistan. there is the 2007 goal of withdrawing u.s. troops from the

country. the leader of u.s. forces, general david betray us, -- general petraeus, was here at the committee. he said -- he fainted halfway through this hearing, due to what he described as dehydration. >> we are receiving testimony on the progress in afghanistan, with the commander of central command. the troops deserve our support, and the committee gives them that full support.

and the support of their families as well. >> thank you. >> last month, it was announced for the first timm that more soldiers are in afghanistan and in iraq. year since general stanley mcchrystal took command of the naked-let the news from afghanistan has been largely negative. the increase in casuallies -- coalition, and afghan security forces. the mixed results in marjah and the apparent return of taliban intimidation and assassinations of local officialssthere. the failure of afghan government officials to deliver much-needed services to win local alllgiances. the delay in the kandahar campaign. the resiggation of two senior afghan security officials who seemingly were among the most competent members of the cabinet and had strong coalition support. the role of local powerbrokers,

including members of the karzai family, and can the heart. the growth of militias and the counterproductive activities of some u.s.-hired private security contractors. and apparent differences with the karzai egime over approaches to reconciliation with the taliban. p+general mcchrystal acknowledgd these press report -- press reports but emphasized that you have to step back and see the trend in direction. this morning we want to hear from our witnesses on how they see these trends. my focus is and always has been on getting the afghan national security forces trained and equipped to take over the responsibility for their country's security. doing so is the key to success in afghanistan. as general mcchrystal said at a press briefing last week, the afghan security forces are "the strategic main effort, and they are key to the long-term stability in afghanistan." general mcchrystal has

reeeatedly set out the goal of putting afghans in the lead and making them responsible for their future. afghan leaders have said they want to be responsible both for the room security and affairs. at the console and active peace jirga -- the consultative peace of this month, the 1600 afghan delegates adopted a resolution calling on the international community "to expedite the process of equipping, training, and strengthening the afghan that they can get the capability in taking responsibility to provide security for their own country and people." the progress toward the goal of afghans taking the lead has been unsatisfactory. peavily dependent on coalition forces. the camp plame plan for kandahar -- to day operations in afghanistan are excessively dependent on coalition forces.

the campaign plan for kandahar anticipates increases in afghan forces in and around kandahar city toocreate a rising tide of security, but at a 1-2 ratio, one afghan soldier or policeman for every two isaf troops. that is not good enough. having afghan units in the lead is critical in kandahar since the likelihood of success there is based on popplar sport. that is at the heart of the counterinsurgency strategy. the afghan army has broad public support, and even the afghan government has more than twice the support that the united states does. polling numbers from the "new york times" in the case 99% of afghans support the kabul government over the taliban,

while only 40% have are favorable view of the united states. the elders we met at a local shura in southern afgganistan told us that we should trainnand eqqip the afghan security forces to provide for their country's security and then depart. last week, general mcchrystal announced that i sat -- isaf would slow the expansion of the afghan and coalition troop presence in canada are in order to allow time to secure the support of local tribal leaders for that effort. i trust general mcchrystal's judgment on the timing. his right that when you go to protect people, the people have to want you to protect them. i would rather delay a few more months and have more afghan forces in the lead when the

security presence is exppnded and operations begin more forcefully. our top priority is the training, mentoring, and partnering in the field with afghan troops and placing them in the lead in operations according to isaa, the growth of the afghhn security forces is on track. the nato training mission- afghanistan under lieutenant general bill caldwell reports that recruitment for the afghan army and police now actually exceedd monthly recruitment goals. these forces lord above -- these forces are above where they need to be to meet the end strength goals for october 2010. what is disturbing and hard to comprehend is that the training

mission still does not have enough trainers to process all the afghan recruits signing up. figures show that of the more than 5200 trainers that we need, onny 2600 are on the ground. secretary gates as deployed 850 u.s. soldiers and marines to afghanistan to serve as a%- according to a may 29 report -- excuse me -- from lieutenant general caldwell, the training miision has yet to receive 750 trainers pledged by nato members. further, last week the nato's security general announced that an additional 450 trainers needed to meet training requirements it is totally unacceptable that this shortfall persists. for whatever reason that they do not send additional tramp --

combat troops, it should be willing to provide trainers who fighting. the question remains, why are more afghan forces not in the lead using forces that are trained and ready? according to figures, they are able to operate independently. 42 afghan kandaks can operate with coalition support. that is 67 of 113 total afghan army kandaks. more recent data on capabilities cast some doubts on the accuracy of that assessment, but they do not explain why it is u.s. or coalition forces that are usually leadinn operations, instead of the other way around. the afghaa army has about 125,000 troops avaiiable, more than we do. but it is our troops who are concentrated in the areas where the fighting is heaviest and

where afghanistan's future may well hang in the balance. so many questions regard -- regarding the afghan national army emain unanswered and perhaps we will hear answers today. why aren't more afghan army troops leading security operations in the south? how many combat battalions and combat troops are there in kandahar? why on large numbers of afghan army troops from other areas moving to kandahar in preparation for the push? and why isn't the ratio of coalition to afghan troops in kandahar at least one to one. i know that american troops are better equipped and trained than afghan troops. but the issue is not forced-on- fours. if it were, i would accept our taking the lead most often in kandahar operations. who can best connect and protect the population of kandahar?

as the afghan defense minister aptly decided -- described the situation, it is a different type of operation. it is not like marjah, it is not going to be that kinetic. the afghan army can handle the population protection mission adequately and is equipped to do ss. afghans, particularly the pashtun population in kandahar, that must be won over. that population wants security. it was the security provided by afghans. having afghan troops among the afghan people is more accepted by them. success in kandahar will be more likely with afghan troops ii the region. i will put the balance of my statement in the record and simply conclude by saying that the afghan government and the people need to demonstrate a sense of urgency and commitment

toosucceed in building a lasting peace in afghanistan. as they demonstrate a willingness to fight and assume increasing responsibility for their security and affairs, then the american people will be stepped past partners in that endeavor. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i think ouu distinguished witnesses for joining us this morning to discuus events in afghanistan. and let me thank you for your leadership of our men andwomen in uniform, especially those in harm's way. as is well known, i believe that winning the war in afghanistan is of vital national security interest. i've said for years that the best way to achieve success is insurgency strategy. backed by strong civil, military, and u.s.-afghan partnerships. for this reason i have supported and still do support

this president's decision to increase our commitment in afghanistan. i'll be brief, mr. chairman, and come right to the point. as a gauge the process of any war effort, i look at the broader trend line. it is for this reason that i am campaign in afghanistan. many of the key trends eem to be heading in a bad direction, perhaps signaling a mounting crisis. as an example, 10,000 additional nato troops are supposed to deploy along with our forces, but we definitely have only half that number. and it is not clear when or from override. at the same time, the dutch and canadian governments continue to plan for it imminent withdrawal of their forces, while just yesterday the government of poland, a major troop contributor, called on nato to draw up a timetable to in the

alliance's mission in afghanistan can withdraw our forces. in marjah, the troops are performing exceptionally, but appears that our afghan partners have not provided durable and consistent security to their population. unsurprisingly, government and development seems to be lacking. general mcchrystal recently referred to marjah as a bleeding all sir. -- ulcer. i feel that marjah is sending a much more troubling signal. in kandahar, the success of the war could be determined. i agree with the most recent comment by general mcchrystal, it is more important that we get it right than we get it fast. that said, the delay in our operation does not project an air of confidence and success. to get to kandahar, -- to get

kandahar right, we need a strategy and the political part is not there. i hear a lot about the number of i have not heard a convincing explanation on how we change the complex balance of power within the province, thh troubling behavior of key power brokers, the performance of the afghan police in the city, and the counterproductive contracting practices that we are dependent upon. meanwhile, it is very troubling that president karzai has decided to remove his minister of interior and his head of intelligence, two of our most important partners in his government. i know them to be upstanding and effective. i do not know what president karzai made this decision. the explanation given y his former intelligence chief, which

we read in the newspaper this weekend, seems to have a ring of truth to it. president karzai no longer believes that the and not a states will succced and he is shifting his results as a policy of accommodation with the taliban and the pakistani military. if true, this could be very dangerous. that is the larger trend that underlines all the others. a loss of confidence n it seems to be shared by both our friends and enemies in afghanistan as well as its neighbors. as our witnesses know, this is a battle for the false and allegiances of people. it demonstrate those sitting on the fence that they should throw their lot in with our partners and us because we're going to win. no matter how much has been explained, the decision to begin

withdrawing our forces from afghanistan arbitrarily in july 2011 seems to be having exactly the effect that many of us predicted it would. it is convincing the key actors inside and outside of afghanistan that the united states is more interested in leaving thhn succeeding in this conflict. as a result, they roll making the necessary accommodations were opposed-american afghanistan. this is not to say that we cannot succeed. i think that we can and we must. it is to say that with the ongoing difficulties in marjah, a delayed offensive in kandahar, growing concerns about the afghan government, troop commitments still lacking from nato, and the final in units of our own search not set to reach afghanistan until the first of september, it now seems increasingly clear that hoping increasingly clear that hoping for