time line set by the unrealistic.on is simply again, i would echo general mcchrystal. it is more important that we get it right then we get it fast. that goes for kandahar and the war itself. it is time for the president to state unequivocally that we will stay in afghanistan until we succeed. we need to begin our realistic debate about what it will take and how long it will take to achieve our goals. and i look forward to having that discussion with our witnesses. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. >> thank you very much for inviting me here to testify today. i like to give yyu an update on recent progress and remaining challenges in afghanistan. as you know, president obama announced a number of key refinements to our strategy last september, including the

deployment of additional u.s. servicemen and women. today, over 18,000 are deployed and the remainder will be in place by the end of the summer. our own troops will be joinedby over 9000 international troops, approximately 60% in place in afghanistan and more will come in the coming months. currently the main operational efforts for isaf and our partners ccntinues to be the central helmand valley and kandahar. we protect the population and foster afghan governance. so far i believe we have been making gradual but important process. the insurgency ii contested in more places and with more forces. tthis insurgency is both resilient and resourceful. in april and may, we saw the

insurgency resume in much of central helmand. nonetheless, much of the nature is indicating a possible reduction in some of their operational capacity. for example, the percentage of complex attacks, thhse deploying more than one means of attack, have steadily droppee since its peak in february. the average number of casualty ppis below 2009 levels. the show increased willingness to report itt's and insurgent weapons caches, which suggest growing pockets of confidence among ordinary people and a willingness to support afghan efforts to support government. we're taking a deliberative approach, expanding our efforts to improve local governance in key districts, has operations improve the security situation graduallyy

some confidence have expressed -- some in congress have expressed concern. we share this concern and we recognize that there are ways in which our own contracting practices have had unintended consequences, concentrating wealth among are relatively smmll number afghans. general petreaus and admiral mullen have created a ask force to examine our practices to reduce these unintended consequences. when we have evidence of corruption, we will work with the afghan government to prosecute those who are on the law. let me return to our efforts to build the capability and capacity of the ansf. capacity remains key. this helps us drawdown our

forces as conditions allow. we're still short about 450 institutional trainers. we have reduced the ratio from1 to 80, to one to 30. we are meeting our goal for fiscal year 2010, and nearly 85% is now fully partnered with isaf forces as they operate in the field. the afghan national police is on track to reach its goal of 109,000 police by the end of the fiscal year. we have increased the capacity to conduct training by 4% over the last 12 funds. follow-on training has been provided to those afghan uniformed police in key districts as well as the afghan border police. recent salary and benefit initiatives have addressed pay disparities between them, and

they appeared to be improving retention and attrition. literacy programs have proven to be a positive offensive. we further believe that newly instituted rotation schedules will further reduce attrition. consequently, we believe the strength goals for 2011 are achievable. needless to say, the purpose of these efforts is to ensure a gradual transition of security responsibility to the afghan government. i want to emphasize here that transition does not -- does not mean abandonment or withdrawal. we're committed to supporting the people of afghanistan over the long term, and we will not walk away from this commitment. nonetheless, we cannot and should not remain in the combat role indefinitely. has the international military presence begins to shift from combat role to advisory and excess, it will be vital to

ensure a more robust and longterm international civilian assistance effort focused on governance and development. we're working closely with the afghan government to plan for this transition process. innmay, president karzai and 14 members of his cabinet were here for about a week in washington for strategic dialogue.3 july, they will present further plans for achieving progress in governance and development. we will also expect to hear more from president karzai regarding actions taken to address corruptton as well as plans for reconciliation and integration. let me say a few words about reconciliation and reintegration. i know it is generated a great deal of attention. all parties rrcognize that in the in some political resolution will be required to bring this conflict to close.

this recognition has driven the afghan government to begin to develop plans to reconcile insurgent leaders and reintegrate low-level fighters. in early april, president karzai presented his interim plans for reintegration. in may, a concept of peace jirga it gave president karzai a conditional mandate to move forward in this area. the u.s. supports an afghan-lead process that will break ties with al qaeda and live under the afghan constitution in all of its requirements. let me conclude by underscoring -- underscoring that our overall assessment is that we're heading the right direction in afghanistan. of the 121 key districts identified last year, if you were assessed at that time to be sympathetic or neutral to the afghan government. by march of this year, that number had climbed to 73 districts.

this and other indicators suggest that we are beginning to regain the initiative and the insurgency is beginning to lose momentum. that said, the outcome is far from determined and these are still earlier days. his only a matter of time since the president's announcement. and i briefed this committee in february, i said that we will face setbacks even as we achieve progress. none of what we're doing in afghanistan in false easy fixes. they are long-term solutions -- problems that require flexibility. we are making progress, sometimes slow but we believe steady. we're confident that general mcchrystal will show more progress by the end of the year. we greatly appreciate this committee's continueddsupport for our efforts from the budget to the supplemental request. in particular, we appreciate your support for full funding

for the afghan security forces, for coalition support funds, and for the commanders of emergency response program authority, which we think is an absolutely critical tool in the counter insurgency fighting. thank you again for inviting us here today for this discussion. and for your support, your continued support for the men and women who serve in uniform, and your support to enable progress in afghanistan. i look for to your questions. >> thank you, secretary flourney. general petreaus. >> thank you for the opportunity to provide information about afghanistan in the campaign being conducted there. i know that it is a pleasure to do this wiih michele flourney. she was a contributor to the conference at fort leavenworth in january 2006 that once the effort to develop the

counterinsurgency manual. i will begin with some brief context. soon after the 9/11 attacks, an international coalition led by the united states conducted an impressive campaign to defeat the taliban, hawkeye, and other associated groups in afghanistan. in the years that followed, however, members of the taliban and other extremist elements gradually reconnected in the afghan-pakistan border region and were able kind -- to conduct at -- insurgency operation. these increased in an increasingly violent people -- campaign against the afghan people and government. they developed a some bought it -- as some by audit relationship throughout the world. in response to the threat posed by these extremists, isaf forces

are involved in a campaign to prevent sanctuaries in afghanistan like the one cockeyed enjoyed there when the taliban ruled afghanistan prior to 9/11. to achieve our objective, we're working with our partners to wrest the initiative from them. to improve security for the afghan people.3 quality of the afghan security forces. and to support establishment of afghan governance seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people. over thh past 18 months, we and our partners have worked harr to gettthe input right in aafghanistan.+ we of work to build the organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil, military counterinsurgency campaign. be a put the best military and civilian leaders in charge of those of work -- of those and organization.

we've developed a substantial -- we've deployed the substantial additional resources, military, civilian, funding, and so on, needed to implement the plans hat have been developed. i note here that the deployment of the 30,000 additional u.s. forces announced by president obama last december and their equipment is slightly ahead of schedule. nearly 21,000 of the additional 30,000 -- those are the latest numbers -- are now in afghanistan and by the end of august, all additional u.s. forces will be on the ground except for a headquarters that is not required until a month for so letter. the effort to increase the afghan army and police are also now on track. there is clearly considerable work to be done in that critical area and to sustain the gains made recently in recruiting and attrition. even as we continue the effort

to get the inputs right, the actions taken over the last 18 months which include tripling the u.s. force contribution to an increasingly similar lead the u.s. component, have enabled the new effort in afghanistan. the initial main effort has been in the central helmand river valley, as forces have made progress there, but predictably the enemy has fought back as we take away the importance i chores. in marjah and elsewhere. the focus has been ssifting to3 there is an integrated approach to development. in the months ahead, we will see additional u.s. brigades, the 101st airborne division, deploy our round kandahar city together with afghan army brigades. we will see the introduction of additional afghan police in u.s.

military police to secure the city itself along with other u.s. forces and civilians that will work together with the impressive canadian reconstruction team operating in the city. as you've heard general mcchrystal explain, the concept is to provide the kandahar is a rising tide of security, one that will expand overtime and establish the presentation of improved security on which local afghan governance can be built and improve services and other areas as well. the one they did nothing easy about any of this. -- there will be nothing easy about any of this. the going was likely to get harder before got easier. that has already been the case as we've seen recently. it is essential that we make progress in this critical southern part of the country, where in fact and 9/11 attacks were planned by al qaeda during the period when the taliban controlled it and the rest of the country. .

>> and to help achieve greater equality as well as greater quantity, we have directed a much greater partnership with the ansf, an emphasis that is on display daily throughout operations in afghanistan. we get the concept right for developing the ansf, and developing the structures for those concepts. improving the ansf been

facilitated by the establishment last november of the nato treaty commission that was created to help expand and professionalize. it is worth noting that the mtma commanderrhad afghan progress in reversing adverse trends in the growth and professionals asian. as general caldwell has also observed, there is a way to reduce attrition fuuther through considerably augmented partnering, training, education, and recruiting. initiatives are being pursued in each of these areas. in all of our efforts, we and president karzai are emphasizing the importance of include city on the part of the afghan government and its leadership. especially in linking local

governing strrctures to the decision making in financial resources in kabul. much more needs to be done to help the afghan government as irresponsibility for addressing the concerns and needs of afghan citizens. the national consultant of peace held at earlier this month was a constructive step in this effort, providing an opportunity for president karzai to address some of the political tensions that fueled the insurgency and promote reconciliationnand local reintegration as means to contribute to a politicall resolution of some of the issues that exist. the council he conducted on sunday further this process, and the effort to set political conditions for progress. another critically important part of our joint civil military campaign in afghanistan is promoting broadbased economic

infrastructure development. we have seen improvements in the government's ability to deliver basic services such as electricity, education, basic health care, and provides positive effects in other areas including security and economic development. we've worked closely with the international community and the afghan government. water, governance, energy, wrote programs. we are now embarking on a project with various u.s. government agencies to dramatically increase production of electricity for the kandohar area and parts of eastern and southern afghanistan. we also promote agriculture and economic programs to help them bring products to market rather than continuing to grow poppy. none of this is easy or without

considerable challenges. the mission is hugely important to the security of the region and to our country. we are obviously doing all that we can to achieve progress toward accomplishment of our important objectives in afghanistan. we're seeing early progress as we get the inputs right in that country. in closing, i want to thank the members of this committee for your unwavering support and abiding concern for the more than 215,000 troopers deployed throughout the area, that for their families as well. >> we will try a seven-minute first round. general, let me start with you about the afghan army not being the south were the major fighting is taking place and

where is going to take place in the months ahead. with approximately 94,000 u.s. troops in afghanistan, but half of them are deployed down in the south. that is the main focus of our counterinsurgency effort. how many afghan troops are there currently in kandohar, and about how many afghan troops to expect will be there in september? >> i'll be happy to get that for you for the record. if i could rather just provide the overview of what it is that we are trying to accomplish in that area. you ceetainly touched on the importtnce of getting the afghans in the lead. we had a video conference this morning, a weekly one that the secretary does. the chairman and i parttcipate in that. he described, for example, how

he will use some of the elements of the additional brigade going into the districts around kandohar city to work with theer afghan partners so they can do what president karzai wants them to do. there are 500 or so local leaders there, discussing what is coming to the province, hat afghan forces lead wherever that is possible. >> what percentage of time do you think they will be in the lead? most of the time? roughly half of the time? how often will it be afghan troops in the lead? can you give us some estimate? >> it will depend on the component. >> with respect to the police, they are in the lead.

the civil order police will be in the lead. with partners, but not by any means full members alongside them. they will be conducting the operations and they will be leading in nos. %%>> give us an idea. are the operations going to be led by afghan troops? >> i believe that the presence patrols, if you will, will be ones that are led by the afghan forces, and that the high-end operations that require the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems are an important component of this overall efforts, still led by u.s. forces. >> the numbers that we have are that more than half of those

battalions are capable of operating either independently or dependent with coalition support. even if you reduce that number down to 30%, which is what i think the staff is going to be doing, there is a lot more battalions of afghan army that are able to operate independently than we are down in the south. why are the afghans not moving more of their troops down to the south for this upcoming campaign? >> they have moved more of their troops to the south, mr. chairman. second, they are going to move more of their trips to the south. there are other missions that require afghan troops. >> are they capable of leading most of these operations as you call high and operations? are there enough capable of leading those high-end operations? >> the very high and operations

we have afghan partners on and we are developing. not the very high end. those are dependent on u.s. intelligence, and surveillance, and reconnaissance that they do not have the ability to pull down at nor does any other force in the world, for that matter. what i think is probably more relevant would be more of the standard activities, the standard patrols. i think they have the capability to do them and they are doing them. they secure large numbers -- large numbers of convoys. the presence patrol as a framework activity, but when you get into the more challenging scenarios, certainll in the difficult operations, u.s. forces ended up leaving the bulk of those. >> let me ask you whether or not you continue to support the

strategy of the president which has additional forces coming in, but you continuu support that july 2011 for the start of reduction in u.s. forces from afghanissan? >> i support the policy of the president, mr. chairman. as i have noted on a number of occasions, my sense of what the president was seeking to convey at west point in december were two messages. one was a message of additional commitment, culminating in the more than tripling number of u.s. forces, tripling the number of substantial funds that you all have authorized for the national security forces. and also a message of urgency, the urgency was the july 2011 peace, noting that what happens

issa beginning of a prooess for transition that is conditions based and the beginning of a process of responsible drawdown of u.s. forces. >> when you said you continue to support the presideet's policy both in terms of additional troops and also the setting of that date to begin the reduction for the reasons the you just gave in terms of laying out the urgency for the afghans to take responsibility, is that represented of your best personal professional judgment? >> in a perfect world, mr. chairman, we have to be very careful with time lines. we went through this with iraq, as you recall, and i did ask to set a time line ultimately in

iraq. testifying before this body, i said we would start the drawdown of our search forces in december. based on a prediction of projections that we will establish. we are assuming that we will have those kinds of conditions that will enable that by that time in july 2011, that is the projection, and that is what we have supported. >> do i take that to be a qualified yes, a qualified no, and not answer? >> a qualified yes. there is a nuance to what the president said that was very important that did not imply a race for the exit, a search for the light to turn off, or

it did imply the need for greater urgency, and that target was, i think, and number of targets that included the leaders in afghanistan, it included some of our partners around the world, it may have >> general, just to follow upm. here, there is a great deal of confusion about this. you just said that beginning with a droll, there were deconditions based, contingent upon certain factors. there is a recent work by jonathan alter that basically quotes, inside the oval office, president obama said that, be honest with me. you can do this in 18 months.

sir, i am confident that we can hand over. if you can't do the things you say in 18 monnhs, no one is going to suggest we stay, right? yes, sir. an agreement. he goes on to say that he was trying to turn the tables on the military and box and then after that spent most of the year boxing him then. if after 18 months, the situation stabilizes, he expected troops to begin to come home. conditions did not stabilized enough to begin an orderly withdrawal of u.s. forces. that would undermine the pentagon goes to believe of more troops. at the inclusion of an interview, referring to vice president biden, he