mr. abbott's allegations. so how do you account for that? you hire an ombudsman, he's a former federal district court judge. he comes in and does the evaluation and he substantiates the whistle-blower's allegation. how do you in any way justify -- then firing the person who actually brought these issues to your attention? . .

i think this is just another example of you running through all the red lights and all the warnings. he is one of the most expected -- respected people in this city. i am afraid once again it is a blistering indictment of the lack of a culture of safety, and i think it is something the house to end before we see another disaster. -- that has to end before we see another disaster. >> let me ask unanimous consent, provided that the committee staff has the information that

relates to privacy concerns. >> let me just ask for 30 seconds one question. >> let me finish what i am doing. the documents will be entered into the record. >> it is going to be really quick. >> will you shut down bp atlantis until discussion? >> i do not think that is the case. >> if i could just follow up with some question i. the first question is, what is the process when it comes to schedules for the offshore wells in the gulf? who makes the schedules bowman

>> the german program is out there. >> who is in charge of those? >> it is overseen by the vice- president for drilling and completion. in this case, the expiration in the gulf of mexico. >> are you consulted at all on the development and maintenance of these schedules? is there committee in consultant about the schedules? >> about the schedules of drilling?

>> it would be within the gulf of mexico units. >> with this well-being as deep as it is, it sounds like a drill. would that elevates it to a higher standing, or is it still kept in the gulf in that region rife there? >> -- that region right there? >> it would be signed off at the level of the vice president in the gulf of mexico. >> you would never be consulted on that then? >> no. >> thank you very much. i yield back.

>> mr. hayward, and the beginning of this hearing i showed you a couple of short video clips. one of the questions they pose was what they would tell their children about why their father died of this deep water horizon rig. you began your testimony with these words. the explosion and fire on the deep water horizon never should have happened. why do you think those young mothers should tell their children about why this happened based on what you know? >> based on what i know, this was a tragic accident involving many mechanisms. that is the reality.

>> is there blame to go around among all these companies working on this well site, >> i do not believe now is the time to apportion blame. i think now is the time to try to understand what happened. >> the reason i am asking is because during other hearings there has been finger pointing going on, and i assume you are aware of that. >> i do not believe this is the time to figure point. i believe this is a time to understand what caused the accident so the industry can learn for the future. >> i am glad you brought that up, because one of the things bp has been taking responsibility for is the cleanup cost and the payment of all legitimate claims. we have heard that over and over again, and we have also seen

press accounts were spokespeople have said, as the responsible party, we are required to handle those claims, and we will wait until some later date to wait for responsibility among the parties. are you aware of that? >> i am. >> let's talk about some of the problems that are currently part of that process. one thing we know is a claim cannot file suit until a claim is made. are you familiar with that process? >> we have set up an independent claims facility under ken feinberg. within that system, there will be an opportunity for anyone to

appeal to three judges. that system does nothing to deny anyone any rights with respect to any claims process. it is simply a way of expediting the process so it is fair, efficient, and fast. >> i want to talk to you about that, because this is what i have been hearing from people involved in the claims process. i have been informed bp's process is that a submission of a claim is not a resentment for a person with the claims process under that act, and the reason bp has taken that position is because they did not consider it certain if there are future losses that have not been yet determined or if there are ongoing economic losses with no

date certain. are you aware of this process. >> we are aware of the process. >> would you understand the problem that creates for someone with an ongoing economic loss like the straw vote officer that testified last week who is without work because -- let the officer that testified last week who is without work because it is not available to him. >> i believe we have put in place a process where it means nothing about future livelihoods. nobody has given away the opportunity to blame -- >> i am talking about a process that actually puts money in the hands of people who desperately need it, because their income source has been destroyed by this oil disaster at your read. do you understand their

frustration when they have gotten a check for $5,000, which represent a very small amount of the monthly gross income to feed his family? >> i have spoken to many on the gulf coast. >> can you understand why they are frustrated that bp is taking the position in this process that every time they cannot define their future economic loss they have to submit another claim as soon as that becomes defined and another claim and another? do you understand how that could be frustrating? >> i understand. if you would just let me finish. we have put in place a process for small businesses where they can project forward for the next month what they expect to lose by way of cash flow, and we will

pay it now. i am very conscious of the issue for businesses and who have ongoing cash flow demands, so we are trying very hard to insure money is paid in advance for commitments people have already taken rather than in arrears, and that is what we will continue to do. >> and in the fund judge feinberg has? >> that will be transferred to the process. that is the basis by which we will move lower. over the last week we paid out over $50 million to small businesses from that basis. >> your question? >> thank you. can you point to any single bad decision made in connection with deep water horizon?

>> as i have said often, i am not going to go into what was or was not a bad decision. there are many components in this accident. integrity tests that they are may not -- that may or may not have worked -- in all stages they decided the right thing to do was to continue. we need to understand how that came about. >> with the benefit of hindsight or investigatory work, this seven days after this event, is there anything you can identify that was wrong? >> i am unable to draw that conclusion. >> yesterday, i think bp took a constructive step in agreeing to

put $20 billion in an independently-administered fund to pay for cleanup. it was the first step in establishing confidence that bp's words would be matched by their deeds, but today, your appearance has done a good deal to erode that confidence. we know you're not an engineer, and we know you were not on the deep water horizon, but your answer 65 times that you do not know to questions that are reasonably posed to you by both sides of the aisle e. rhodes confidence. it does not inspire confidence. the question in the company has to ask itself is whether it has strict procedures in place to make disciplined decisions that

give it confidence that at a critical moment where the lives of its workers and investments of shareholders is at stake, critical judgment will be exercised, and that is the obligation of a ceo. however it is you accomplish that ability, that is the job of the ceo, whether it is a small company or a large company, and at that critical moment, the citizens had to be made about the ceiling of the well, -- decisions had to be made about the ceilsealing of the well, whether to circulate drilling -- it does not appear anybody was in charge, and that is the erosion of confidence, because the lack of procedures, the lack of people in charge and resorting to the least cost

alternative clearly played a major role in this catastrophe. i yield back. >> questions please. >> going back to the question, why was a cement bond not form? >> i do not know. i was not there. i did not make the decision. what i understand from discussion with the investigation team is that they had a good cement bond that got returns at the surface, and they

had pressure integrity. >> they base that on other tests they form? >> on the basis of those three, they determined they had that good. >> there is no bp procedure to perform that test. you leave it to the discretion of somebody on the raid? >> there is no requirement to perform the cement bond. >> are you going to change that policy? >> it is one of the things we need to look at in light of this accident. >> when we talk about all these different ideas, and i just gave you some. i did not know if you have seen the presentation of people putting hay in the water and the oil comes down to the hay and the water does not, and it rolls up and you can clear that away -- all kinds of ideas from that. what is your process for all

these people submitting ideas, many of which have tremendous merit and none of which we see being used in the water? >> we have used many of the ideas that have been submitted. we do have a process. there are hundreds of thousands of ideas that have been submitted, and we have a process to work through them and utilize them, and we have used very many that have been submitted from individuals across the united states. >> hopefully, we will be able to get some more of those implemented, because there is not enough you can do. if you have got more ideas, try them all, because if there is a lot of oil in the gulf, and if something works, do more of it, and if something does not work, do something else. is that structure -- is there some unified? >> it is probably unified

command structure. >> are there any federal agencies involved? >> there is a team of people, so as e-mails and suggestions come in, they are forwarded to a team of people, and they are evaluated and implemented based on what that people -- with that team of people has in command structure. >> we are still hearing from lots of local fishermen who can no longer fish, people that arhe oyster processing companies, so those beds are closed and they have no oysters to process. boat captains. these are people that want to work, but they cannot work. many are frustrated that they are not being engaged to work on the cleanup, and they are most on the ground that once this cleaned up with the most urgency, and it seems that many -- that want this cleaned up with the most urgency, and it

seems they are bused out again at night, and they do not have the same kind of passion. it is confusing, why are they not being employed? if they want to work, they are there on the ground. >> we have almost 10,000 vessels of opportunity for the local fishermen employed in the program. but this was reported in many places, but i actually spoke to the official on the ground who did this. a few weeks ago, there were 50 of those vessels of opportunity contacted by you that were supposed to be putting out booms. those were sitting idle on the dock. this official actually commandeered a number of those boats and did it themselves. there is no excuse for that.

what method did you have in place? we do not need the vote on the dock. we need it out there so the oil does not get into the marsh. it gets into this sense of urgency. it is not just about writing checks. that is important, but it is even more important that the work gets done in a quick time frame. there is no quick turnaround, and things like that continue to happen. are you going to change something on the ground to ease the fact that it is not just about running a pr campaign? we have things that have to happen quickly, because there is not the time for days to go by. >> we continue to improve the quality of the response and the engagement of people in the initial area. it has been the biggest challenge, and we continue to

work. >> is the casing damaged below the sea floor? >> we do not know that, because we have not been able to get their. we have no way of knowing that. >> i know that two days ago -- i apologize. mr. mccain was testifying at the same table you are at on tuesday. he said the spill response has been effective, and i strongly disagree. i would like to know, do you agree or disagree with his statement? >> i think if any oil gets to the shore to impact the environment, it is not possible to declare our response effective. in many cases we have implemented a significant method. it has been recognized as beyond

anything anyone has achieved in the past. >> we need the sense of urgency. i yield back. >> there's nothing to yield. >> you told both of them that the conclusion bp reached was that there was a good seamen's job. did there was no requirement to -- a good cement bond. there was no requirement, and he would look into whether that needed to be changed in the future. are you aware that halliburton's officer told a senate committee that a cement bond is only test that can really determine the actual effectiveness of the bond before making the casing itself?

the you agree with that statement? >> i am not qualified to disagree or to agree. >> is your technical expert qualified to answer that question. >> i can ask him. >> please. >> he is not a cement bond experts. >> i cannot hear you. >> he is not a cementing expert, but he is a drilling engineer. >> has he had experience with cementing as a drilling engineer? >> i am sure he has. >> yet he does not know whether this test is the only test that

can determine the effectiveness? >> they concluded they had three other mechanisms to determine. >> what were those mechanisms? >> it was the volume that had been pumped, that told them essentially where in the world the cement had gone, the returns to the surface, and a pressure test that confirmed there was sealant. >> as i mentioned in my first round of questioning, the internal document had six pages, which you referred to, but said because of the long string approach that you did not do the other approach, that it indicates it is likely -- not likely to be a successful job.

was that taken into account when it was determined the cement was likely to succeed? >> i cannot know that because i was not there. i we assume that the team looked at the data and determined they had achieved a successful job. >> they said the teams and the test crew away before the pressure testing was done, -- the team sent the test crew away before the pressure testing was done, so how would they know it was going to hold? >> i cannot answer that question. >> would you mind supplementing your testimony to let us not a would not have known that -- let us know how they would have known that? >> i cannot tell what happened on the rig. >> but you can ask them.

>> we could certainly as part of the investigation do that. >> previously i ask you how many deep water wells bp had. i asked if you had knowledge of this well, and you said no. how many wells had you drilled since you were c.e.o.? >> i do not know the precise number. >> you might be surprised to know of the deep water wells that are fewer than that, but you do not know the exact number, correct? >> i do not know the exact number. >> i want to ask you one last question. we have been hearing from health-care workers about the potential health consequences.

we have been talking about the economic losses. i want to ask you, will bp also commit to paying for the long3 result of this bill? >> we created $20 billion in claims. >> i know there is the fund, and we're glad you did that, but is bp committed to reimbursing the workers and residents of the gulf for their long-term health care costs as a result of this bill -- the spill? >> if they are valid, they will be paid. >> the only way you intend to pay is if it comes through this fund? >> $20 billion is a very large

fund. >> it is a large fund, and it is your view that part of what the fund will be used for is to pay people for their long term health care costs and? >> that will be the decision of an independent adjudicator. >> if they ask you, would you say yes? >> i will leave them to decide. that is why we appointed an independent adjudicator. >> if i may, this is what is concerning members of this committee and others about bp's response. u.s. executives who have said we will pay for all reasonable costs incurred, but when we ask direct questions about health care costs, you devein the

questions, and all i want to know, is this part of the reimbursement of all reasonable costs, health care costs that are incurred by workers and residents of the gulf? >> i believe if they are a direct consequence of the oil spill, the independent adjudicator will find them to be it legitimate. >> would you support that? >> i clearly would. >> thank you very much. >> it is up to the independent adjudicator is to make the decisions. -- a judicatures -- adjudicator s to make the decisions. >> we could go all night, but that concludes. >> i want to ask one last question.

on the june 14 question, you indicated you were briefed on this letter. is that correct? is there any part of this letter you would dispute? are there parts of this letter you actually do not agree with? >> i think this is a statement with your conclusions at this time. >> you dispute the facts? >> i do not dispute any of the facts, and as i have said all along, i would like to wait until the investigations are complete. >> if there are facts to be disputed, you would provide those? >> down on this side you are going to want more questions, and we will be here until at least midnight, and we are not

going to be here. i know we are the most important committee in congress, but things must come to an end, and right now it is coming to an end. i want to thank you for coming here. you did come voluntarily. i appreciate that. members are frustrated because the answers we have heard is, i do not know, i cannot recall, we need to wait for the results of the investigation, and we had really hoped by giving you information you would be better prepared to answer the question. i think the e evasiveness only serve to increase frustration, not just a decrease in frustration. i thank you for being here. this is going to conclude our series. i want to thank all members for participating, and this

subcommittee is adjourned. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> tomorrow morning, an update on the house campaign finance bill. a number of interest groups

received the disclosure exemptions in the legislation. later, stephen more will talk about congressional spending, politics, and the economy. that is each morning at 7:00 a.m. eastern. >> the environmental protection agency is here as well. we have the wildlife and fish service here to talk about how they are cleaning birds. back here is kirk hanson. you have an idea how to clean this up? kirk is here to take your ideas. we hope this'll be an educational opportunity for you

to learn something tonight, and if you are concerned, we also want to hear on that perspective as well, but this is a better format for all of us. i want to say something. i took command over two weeks ago, and i was here during katrina, so i saw them rescued 33,000 people from their houses, and i saw how tough that was. and here to tell you that is what this is about. this about a new way of life. -- this is about a new way of life, and i am here to fight for you and your way of life, so thank you very much. [applause]

>> we will try to figure out where it is we would like to clean up the oil so it will not keep moving through that area. >> i have a question. thinking about hurricane season, what gering would this will have on her kids out there in the gulf region what effect would this have with -- and what affect would this have with a hurricane with all the oil? >> what are you doing in general? >> we are here as part of the medical element. we are organizing, establishing policies for the care of the primarily occupational workers that are down here dealing with the cleanup offshore and onshore and inland.

>> you did it with that company. if you want to sign a contract, you have got to call this number, and they will tell you how to get a contract, and you will sign a contract directly with bp. >> this was supposed to be signed. >> i am a biologist with the emergency response division, and i am here to answer questions people may have about the biological impact associated with this oil spill. >> we talked to some fishermen, and many are concerned about their way of life. >> people do ask about that, and i fall back on a historical spill that occurred. there was this bill in 1979 -- a

spill in 1979, and it went on for nine or 10 months and spewed out something like 140 million gallons of oil into the gulf of mexico before the relief well was in place to stop the flow. dispersants were used. over 2.5 million gallons were applied at that time, and the fisheries recovered from that. >> i started out doing town meetings when i got here, and i realized we were not getting the information now to the public like we wanted to, and we were not able to answer some of the questions about this person's and what are we -- dispersants and what are we actually doing. the whole approach is to better inform the public about oil spills, and what we are doing in louisiana is like the oil spill. -- quite an oil spill.

>> up next, and rolf thad allen talks to reporters -- thad allen talks to reporters about the oil spill. after that, the merger of united and continental airlines. later, tony word testifies about the company's response to the -- tony hayward testifies about the company's response to the oil spill. you can connect with us on twitter, facebook, and youtube, and sign up for our alert e- mails at c-span.org. not to louisiana, where admiral thad allen brief reporters on the gulf oil spill response after returning from a tour of the region. this is 10 minutes. >> hello, i have a guest today. this is billy. billy is a fist down.

he is offering an opportunity. he is from louisiana. we just spent a couple hours looking around, the rich, the barges. we were looking at some areas that had been foiled -- oiled. he has some expertise, and i wan to thank yo -- i want to thank him very much. he had to have his 15 minutes of fame. a great day today. kind of an interesting day for me. i just a bicameral meeting of legislators in congress. i talked about some of our current issues, which are vessels of opportunity, how to best take advantage of their

expertise, and a control structure to get the massive affects from the efforts on the water. if you are out in these boats and you see what is happening on the barges and the stream flows, you would know the people in louisiana -- and the boats, you would know the people in louisiana take it seriously. they still have their passion to work with us, and we are happy. we need everything where it is that, and we cannot move things around anymore. everyone needs to be ready for the oil to come back. we have to keep bringing reinforcements. we have over 40 skimmers that

are self-contained. we have a lot that are just the equipment. they are pulling behind boats to get oil. our goal is to ramp up. we will continue that and surveillance. we have to match our forces along that line, which is what we continue to do. out on the wellhead is our best day yet. we were able to produce about 18,000 barrels of oil between the discover enterprise and the other drilling unit we brought in. the q 4000 is bringing in natural gas and oil at the same time, and it has the capacity of between 5,000 barrels and 10,000 barrels a day, and we hope we can get discovery of to

18,000 barrels a day. that is 28,000 barrels a day. we can produce the show klein from the blowout preventer, and that should be in place by june. we hope to have 53,000 barrels a day. at that point, we have to make a decision to shift the containment device to a true cap. that would be some other way to remove the pipe that was sheared. it was actually bolten on a new severe if -- new system. we are bringing in shuttle tankers from the north sea and brazil and other places. they are capable of dynamic positioning where they can provide the stability they need to transfer that oil. if we can get that in place, we can have multiple things in place to have better ability as we move into hurricane season. it is not going to protect us

from a hurricane. we can stay out there longer, and it will give us redundancy so if one side goes to maintenance, we can keep producing with the other. this is important because the revised flow rates were able to set rates with a high of 60, but we think it is around mid 30's. we will not know that until we are able to actually assess the flow rate, but in the long run, the final solution is the relief wells. the first relief well as between 8000 and 9,000 feet. it will pass within 10 feet of the well board and then turn and go about 1,000 feet down. that allows them to do the exact measurements to know where to come in.

the last 1,000 feet will take a significant amount of time. the original time frame was for the second week of august. with time lines, you should always under promise and over the liver theory and we are not backing down. it is great to be back in louisiana. i hit all four states this week. i can tell you we are creating responses. we have officers out working and will continue that moving forward. i will take a couple questions. >> [inaudible] >> we will do a waiver if we need it. we will only require it if we will have transit of four vessels inside 3 miles. most of the skimmers that come from abroad are offshore boats. if they will be used outside 3 miles they do not require a waiver.

we have posted a background on our website, but as it stands, there are no waiver requests because the vessels we need are made to operate outside 3 miles, although i will tell you we need skimming e equipment. we need skimming he could and we put on shrimp boats and use those as the fact those skimmers. >> what about the status of -- [inaudible] >> it is my understanding we are looking to clear those and release those. we do not want to have an accident and hurt someone, so we were making sure they were safely use. once they can be safely employed, there is no problem employing them.

that has to be our number one priority, safety of life. >> [inaudible] >> he said he could not get any answers. >> i just gave you the answers. we need to make sure nobody gets hurt. we have reached a combination of how to move forward. we are going to run into new technology, things that have never been tried before. we want them to try new things. we have to make sure it is a spirited we will redouble our efforts. -- make sure it is safe. we will redouble our efforts. next question. >> [inaudible] >> we are accepting offers. we will make a detailed listing available in our website.

we have some boom that has velcro. you know that is probably not what we need, and if somebody offers one that came from halfway around the world, that is not within the realm of possibility. >> [inaudible] when you talk to him in private, do you get better answers? >> we have very frank conversations, and i would not want to compare them until i hear the testimony. >> they are out there -- [inaudible] how you respond to complaints

that the federal response is not quick enough. >> the president and i met with local officials in florida we also met with delegations. a lot of this has to do with reporting back to command. a few weeks ago we made an adjustment where we delegated authority for a lot of these folks tune take quick action and response. we have established a tepid day -- a deputy incident commander, and i told gov. chris we would put a team in the center in tallahassee. if they sense we are not moving quickly enough, we can fix that. these are the hardest things we deal with. we got the four passages into

the bay. the president was in grand isle awhile back. he had these ideas. we have to make sure we really know what we are doing, and we have to come up with effective solutions. to really put a rock jetty across the past where we have ecological issues, we need to come up with a reasonable way to move forward. we're going to come up with an alternate combination to be about to close that when we need to but not restrict the waterway. we're going to sit down and have a conversation about what we are trying to achieve and what is the safest way to do that. we also need to understand these are fairly navigated waterways. this is -- federal navigated

waterways. the safety of those waters is the responsibility of the coast guard, so we need to have a frank, open conversation and arrives at the effects we want to achieve. one more question. >> [inaudible] >> that is like trying to herd cats can you address that? >> i went up and down the dock, and i talk to the operators. i said, what do you do, and how do you work. maybe they do not talk to the same people i talk to. folks are trying to do the best they can. is it like herding cats? you can probably say that because it is federal, state, local. everyone has a say in this. wildlife, environmental issues. we are trying to create unity of

effort. there are different equities at stake, but if we cannot come up with the way forward to manage this correctly, that neither of us is serving the public very well, and that is my goal. thank you, folks. >> to learn more about the bp oil spill, go to c-span's web page. watch hearings, including tony word's testimony -- tony hayward's testimony. next, a look of the merger of the united and continental airlines. lamarck -- lawmakers hear testimony froabout the impact on competition. if approved by the justice

department, the merger would create the world's largest carrier. the panel is 1 hour 50 minutes. >> the next panel will consist of both ceos. gentlemen, we appreciate you coming before the subcommittee to offer your testimony. as you know, your entire statement will appear in the record. we would ask you to summarize your statement in approximately five minutes, and then we will give you an opportunity for myself -- we will give an opportunity for myself and others to ask questions and

follow up. >> good morning, chairman, ranking members, and members of the committee. we appreciate the opportunity to offer our common this morning. -- our commonents this morning. let me start by saying the status quo is the unacceptable. it is insightful this industry has lost $60 billion and 150,000 jobs in the united states in last 10 years delivering the worst financial performance of any major industry, along with 186 bankruptcies over the last 30 years. both before and after

deregulation, this industry has been systemically incapable of learning even a modest profit, let alone a reasonable return from a large investment we have made in aircraft facilities and technology. it is ironic that this industry, unable to cover its cost of borrowing, is expected to be and must be the key enablers of the country's economic recovery. as leaders, you all know, the critical role we all play, creating commerce, tourism, jobs common -- jobs, and contributing to the overall economy. regardless of personal

perspectives, we can likely all agree serial bankruptcy's and the asset distribution of failed companies cannot be an acceptable industry strategy. we must create economic stability through the business cycle. it has been very consistent to put our company on a path of profitability. without profitability, we cannot provide a stale environment for the employees mentioned. we cannot maintain service to communities large or small or invest in customer service, nor can we create values for our shareholders. to be profitable, we must successfully compete in the global market of today, a very different market than the market

of 10 years ago or the market of 30 years ago today low-cost carriers are established across the united states. southwest airlines will continue to be our country's largest domestic airline in terms of number of passengers carried after the united-continental merger. in the marketplace of today, international competitors have merged, and powerful new entrants continue to gain ground across the globe. today the largest airlines by revenue are lufthansa and air france. with more than half the capacity and to assess three of trans-pacific capacity provided by foreign carriers.

united and continental have taken significant actions to improve our performance, competing across international and domestic markets, and finding a way to connect small u.s. communities into our combined network. in this dynamic environment, these actions have not been enough. our proposed merger is a very logical and essential next step for our objective of sustained profitability. let me be clear. without this merger, we would not have the $1 billion to $1.2 billion to improve products or services for our customers, nor would we have the financial means to create a better career opportunities for our employees. we would not be as successful as we need to be to enable economic development across the country.

our merger strengthen service for those who rely on our network in nearly 148 communities, by providing economic benefit they otherwise would not have. carriers compete vigorously on price and service, and our merger will not change that reality. there is significant low-cost carrier competition at every one of our homes, including the 15 nonstop routes on which we overlap. over the last decade, ticket prices across the united states have declined by 30%, adjusted for inflation, with fares to small communities also declining. are expected revenue synergies are derived from better services and expanded network. they are not based on fare

increases. this represents an extrovert -- excellent value and more destinations for consumers across the country. consumers will benefit from intense price competition across the industry due to the prevalence of low-cost carriers, other network carriers, and fair transparency. the competitive landscape has changed, and to be a company that attracts and provides value for customers, shareholders and employees, our companies also have to change. we are creating the leading global airline with a platform for a healthy company, a profitable company that can compete in the reality of today's global marketplace, provide job opportunities, and provide vital activity that the many customers and communities together we serve. thank you very much.

>> vitter thanks you. >> a 12 thank you for letting me be here today. this merger -- i want to thank you for letting me be here today. this is good for consumers and competition. .

this meeting will come to order, we're going to ask the press to please clear.

this hearing of the subcommittee of the energy and commerce committee, the subcommittee on oversight investigations will commence our hearing. today we have a hearing titled bp's role in the deep water horizon energy spill. i welcome the members of the energy and commerce committee and they will be allowed to submit written statements for the record, but will not deliver verbal opening statements and in addition aftmembers who are not

the subcommittee or on the energy and commerce committee are will be to observe, but they will not be allowed to ask questions due to time constraints, the chairman, the ranking member and the charity emeritus will be recognized for three minute opening statements. i will yield to the chairman of the full committee mr. waxman for the first opening statement. >> thank you very much mr. chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing. and mr. hayward, thank you for being here today. yesterday bp pledged to establish a $20 billion escrow account and to suspend its dividend payments for the rest of the year. i'm sure these were not easy decisions for you, but they were the right ones and i commend you for them. congress has multiple committees examining the gulf oil spill,

some are evaluating the impact of the spill, some are working on the reorganization of the regulatory agencies and some including chairman markey's subcommittee are drafting legislation to reform our oil exploration laws. you are testifying today before the oversight and investigation subcommittee and this subcommittee has a special role. so examine the facts and determine what went wrong and to make recommendations to prevent future spills. when it's time for questioning, i and other members of the suommittee will ask you about a series of internal bp documents. they appear to show that bp repeatedly took shortcuts that endangered lives and increased the risks of a catastrophic blowout. and i sent you a letter in advance indicating that we're going to question you about those issues. but what is equally important is

what is missing from the documents. when you became ceo of bp, you promised to focus like a laser on safe and reliable operations. we wanted to know what you had done to keep this promise. so we asked what e-mails you had received, what documents you had reviewed. about the deep water horizon rig or to the mccondo well before the blowout. deep water drilling is inhently dangerous, as the entire country now knowses, an uncontrolled blowout can kill rig workers and cause an environmental disaster. we wt to know if you were briefed be the risks and were monitoring the safety of the drilling operation. we can find no evidence that you paid any attention to the tremendous risks bp was taking.

we have reviewed 30,000 pages of documents from bp including your e-mails, there is not a single e-mail or document that shows you paid even the slightest attention to the dangers at this well. you are the ceo. so we consider the possibility that you may have delegated the oversight responsibility to someone else we reviewed the emails and believing documents received by the chief executive for exploration and production and doug suttles, the chief operatinofficer for production. according to bp, these are the senior officials responsible for the mcdon kcoo well, but they t were apparently oblivious to

what was happening. we can see no e-mails or debriefings about the deep water horizon. bp's cporate complacency is astonishing, the drilling engine for the rig, called mccondo, a nightmare well. other bp employees predied that the cement job would fail halliburton warned of a severe gas flow problem. these warnings fell on deaf ears. bp's corporate attitude may best be summed up in an e-mail from his operations drilling engineer who oversaw bp's team of drilling engineers. after learning of the risks and bp's decision to ignore them, he wrote, quote, who cares? it's done, endf story, we'll probably be fined, end quote.

there is a complete contradiction between bp's words and deeds. you were brought in to make safety the top priority of bp, but under your leadership, bp has taken the most extreme risks. bp cut corner after corner to save a million dollars here a few hours or days there and now the whole gulf coast is paying the price. today's hearing will focus on bp's actions, but we learned from our hearing earlier this week that the other oil companies are just as unprepared to deal with a massive spill as bp. we are see in the oil industry the same corporate indifference to risk that caused the come lance on wall street. and that is why reform is so urgently needed, part of this reform must be legislation to put teeth into our regulatory system but part must also be a

trsition to a clean energy economy. we're addicted to oil, this addiction is fouling our beaches, polluting our atmosphere and undermining our national security. we can't snap our fingers or transform our energy economy overnight, but we need to start down a path to a clean energy future. mr. chairman, i look forward to today's hearing and mr. hayward ihank you for appearing and cooperating with our investigation. >> next go to the full committee remember bart stupak of tes. >> thank you, mr. chairman, thank you mr. hayward for appearing before us. we have kind of a dual track underway in my opinion. we obviously are trying to gather the facts, what happened in the oil spill in the gulf of mexico a month and a half ago,

tryi to find out the close. we have a system built up based on the british tradition over 200 years of due process and fairness where people that do bad things or in this case a corporation that's responsible for a bad accident, we want to hold them responsible, do what we can to make the liable parties pay for the damages. mr. stupak and mr. waxman are doing an excellent job working with dr. burr negligence and myself in conducting i think a fair fair oversight investigation.

boar going to get into a number of tse issues. i'm speaking totally for myself, i'm not speaking for the republican party, i'mot speaking for anybody in the house of representatives but myself. but i'm ashamed of what happened in the white house yesterday. i think it is a tragedy ithe firks proportion that i would characterize as a shakedown, in this ce a $20 billion shakedown, with the attorney neral of the united states who is conducting a criminal investigation and has every right to do that to protect the american people. participating in what amounts to a $20 million slush fund which i

think set aster ribl precedent for the future. if i called you into my office. avshtd and i had the subcommittee chairman mr. stupak with me who was legitimately subjecting an oversight investigation on your compa and said if you put so many millions of dollars in a project in my constitutional district i could go to jail and should go to jail. no there is no question that british petroleum owns this l k leak, that bp made decisions that people may question. there is no question that bp is liable for the damages, but we have a due process system where

we go through hearings, in some cases court cases, litigation and dermine what those damages are and when those damages should be paid. so i'm only speaking for myself, i'm not speaking for anybody else, but i apologize, i do not want to live in a company where any time a citizen for a corporation does something that is legitimately wrong is subject to some sort of politic pressure that is again in my words amounts to shakedown. so i apologize. so on this hearing today, i am with mr. waxman, with mr. stupak, there are questions that need to be asked that are legitimate because we don't want another oil spill of this magnitude or of any magnitude in the gulf of mexico and if this

subcommittee can do things that make it much more difficult for this type of an incident to occur in the future, then we will have done our work for the american people. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> today is the 59th day of the bp oil spill that has devastated much of the gulf of mexico. 11 men lost their lives the day the deep water horizon drilling rig exploded and in the 59 days that have followed, countless people have los their livelihood as the oil pollutes fishing grounds and damages the beaches of the united states. our first hearing exposed problems discovered with the blowout preventser and several other factors that contributed to the dister.

our second hearing was a field hearing in new orleans where we heard from the widows of two women whose husbands died in the deep water horizon. we have been sitting through more tn 50 hours of briefings of corporate, governmental experts to determine what went wrong with exploration of the mccondo well. we have reviewed several questionable decisions made by bp in the days and hours leading up to the explosion and what we have learned so far is alarming. we have learned that time after time, bp had wning signs that this was as one employee put it a nightmare well. for example, bp disregarded questionable results from

pressure tests after cements in the well. bp selected the riskier of two options for their well design. they could have hung a liner from the lower end of the casing already in the well and install a tie back on the top of the liner which would have provided additional barriers to the release of hydrocarbons, instead they lowered a full string of the new casing which took less time and cost less but d not provide the same protection of escaping hydrocarbons. bp was warned by halliburton could have a big problem if they -- bpejected halliburton's advice to used additional centralizers in an e-mail on april 16. a bp official involved in the decision explained and i quote, it will take ten hours to install them, i don't like this.

bp chose not to fully circulate the mud in the well from the bottom to the top, which was an industry recommended best practicehat would have allowed them to test for gas in the mud. bp chose not to use a casing hangar lockdown sleeve which would have provided extra protection against a blowout from below. these are just a few of the issues that led to the disaster. once deep water horizon eloded and san to be the bottom of the sea, bp's decision to clean up the spill was equally as poor. they issued estimates which may have led to a scaled back response. we discovered that bp's oil spill response plan was virtually identical to other oil companies' plans, in a hearing tuesday, exxonmobil ceo rex tillerson said that once the

spills occur, we're not equipped to handle them, end quote. our witness today mr. tony hayward is a chief executive officer of bp, shortly after mr. hayward took over as the ceo in 2007, he held a town hall meeting with employees in houston that. meing he discussed the need for bp to be a leader with fewer people in decision making process. this article and i ask you to put up the guardian article. in an articll from september 2007, guardian newspaper, hayward says o company has become too cautious, assurance is killing us, mr.ayward told u.s. staff noting that too many people were engaged in decision making leading to excessive cautiousness something that critics of its safety performance in the u.s. might question. let me put up these other notes from the same meeting. we received notes from bp of

employees and their note taking from this meeting. the employee notes summit rised mr. hayward's statements as follows. i don't think having all these layers of assurance reduces risks and it can actually increase it. individuals need to be accountable for sk and to manage it, end of quote. i find this cavalier attitude toward assessing risk unbelievable, given the fact that at the time of these statements, bp had just been responsible for the largest oil leak in alaska history on the north slope as well as the 2005 texas city refinery explosion which killed 50 workers and injured another 170. i must ask mr. hayward whether it was wise to adopt this leaner decision-making process with input from fewer people and a new approach to managing risk. under the leadership of the former chairman of bp america,

bp created an independent office of the ombudsman. the ombudsman office was established because line workers reported fearing retaliation if they reported safety concerns to management. when the current chairman and president lamar mckay took over, i met with him and he suggested that he hoped to improve the culte enough to make the ombudsman office unnecessary so he could shut it down. i urged him not to eliminate the office because it serves a significant role in investigating employee complaints. i'm more concerned than ever about bp's safety and the role they take in assuming risk. i'm concerned that the corporate culture, the chairman of president of lamar mckay that there's a willingness to cut costs and take greater risks, i look forward to hearing the aners of mr. hayward our many

hard hitting committee member also hear today. i hope we will hear honest, contrite and substantive answers. mr. hayward, you owe it to all americans, for the americans who live and work on the gulf coast, it may be years before they get their lives back, for the americans who lost their lives on the rigs, their families may never get their lives back. mr. hayward, i'm sure you will get your life back and with a golden parachute back to england. but we in america areeft with a terrible consequences of bp's reckless disregard for safety. i yield back my time. >> today it does open our third hearing and a very critical hearing in the deep water rizon oil spill.

this hearing provides the subcommittee with an important opportunity to directly question the man who ultimately leads bp, mr. tony hayward and bp's role has been central to the causes of the incident and to the response over the course of our inquiry today, committee investigators working in a by partisan fashion have conducted numerous interviews and briefings and reviewed tens of thousands ofages of documents, our subcommittee has done an excellent job and this sub committee has been focused on gathering e facts rather than rushing to judgment. and from this intensive effort we have begun to have a series of questions, exploring these and related questions today will help us identify for congress and identify for the country what went wrong on april 20th and the days thereafter, and while we are investigating, a picture of the chain of event leading to this incident is emerging.

mr. chairman, you and chairman waxman recently outlined some critical questions that we hope mr. hayward will address, for example you noted the investigation has identified questionable choices by bp engineers to use a particular well design over another one that would appear to have provided more built in barriers to an uncriminaled gaddis charge. there was the choice made by bp to move forward with what appears to be an inadequate cementing plan and the related failure despite clear warnings to test that the cement was properly in place. and it appears there may have been a rush to mov off this well, whether there may have been economic or other time and performance measures or some combination thereof, it is not clear burks that clarity needs to emerge today. the question outlined in the central role of bp's decision making appears that bp's decision making appears to have had in this incident. we need to understand that

decision making, mr. hayward. what factors influenced it, whether the decisions reflected a management and an operational mind set that failed, failed to maximize safety in a challenging deep sea environment. it is important to note that the picture developing fm this investigation is not one of technological limits in deep sea drilling, the construction of an 18,000-foot well was not pushing the envelope of engineering know how so far as we identified, but the picture developing is one of unsafe industry practices, although clearer more focuseded industry standards may be able going forward, the bestndustry practice would have resulted in more cautis designs and more testing, more safeguards and ultimately no loss of control of the well. rather and quite clearly the picture is questioning decision making by people charged with designing and successfully

drilli, and contrling a well that is a mile under water. it is a series of choices which taken together created an oil well particularly vulnerable to a blowout and of all the people who may have been distracted, unaware or resistant to recognizing the problems around them. documents show that bp was prepared to run a test on the quality of the cement shot, but chose not to. i can't understand why given the history of this particular well with four previous well controlled incidents in the two months pry you to april 20. the rig personnel appear to have taken their eye off the ball. bp employees were the key decisi decision makers. certainly others may have contributed to this incident. the overall effectiveness of the response and the effort to help those harmed by the incident is

something we must -- but it is bp's decision making about the well design, the cementing program, the preparation, the integrity tests or just the generalack of curiosity as to why these would be necessary t failure to follow best praices that our investigation to date is showing were critical factors in this incident. but this decision making is difficult to square with the priorities of bp's chief executive. before you became chief executive you described out the depth of a worker shaped your opinions, you said and i'm quoting, i went to the funeral to pay my respects. at the end of the service, his mother came up to me and beat me on the chest, why did you let it happen, she asked. it changed the way i think about safety. leaders must make safety of all who work for them a priority, end quote. mr. hayward, i respectfully request that you answer this question in your opening

statement if not for me, then for the two ladies who testified before our committee on the field hearing who lost their husbands on the deep water horizon. you have been chief executive since 2007, you said safety is your number one priority and you would focus like a laser beam on safety. we have now learned from this investigation that bp employees made five critical decisions that may have contributed to well faire where well safety was traded off. in fact it was not the priority. so today, will you assert before this subcommittee that all decisions by bp employees related to the deep water horizon reflected your priority, your priority of safety first. mr. chairman, the disaster in the gulf of mexico shows a series of unchecked bad decisions, we in congress and the federal government must also be mindful of the consequences

of bad decision making. the subcommittee heard some of the administration's decisions are threatening the livelihoods of workers and families who depend upon the energy industry. we have killed half of their fishing with the deep water horizon spill and it looks like we're going to kill the other half of their commtee with our moratorium. our hearing today looks at the consequences of bad decisions and the lessons learned, may we have the wisdom and humility to take some of those lessons and apply them to ourselves? and i yooeltd yield back the balance of my time. >> i would like to turn to chairman of the energy and environment subcommittee and chairman of the subcommittee on climate mr. markey, five minutes for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. i want to begin by disagrees in the strongest possible terms with what mr. barton said in his

opening statement. not only is the compensation fund that was created yesterday at the white house in an agreement reached by president obama, not a slush fund and not a shakeup, rather it was the government of the united state working to prote the most vulnerable citizens that we have in our country right now. # we cannot wait as infortunately so many citizens whoere victims of the "exxon

valdez" spill had to wait years in order to see those families compensated. we can't lose sight of the fact that the 1984 bopaul disaster and the lawsuits that were related to it were only settled last week. after examining the documents bp

gave the family $5,000. the families in the gulf will be crushed financially unless this compensation fund is put int place. as each day and week and month goes by, the history of these families are going to be altered. and permanently altered unless they are given the financial capacity to take care of their loved ones, their children, their families. is that's why this compensation fund is so important, that's why it is not a shakedown. it is in fact president obama ensuring that a company which

has spoiled the waters of our nation is made accountable for the harm which is done to our people. a company which said for the first week that it was only 1,000 barrels of oil per day when we now know that they knew it was at least 1,000 to 14,000 barrels. a company which continues to deny that there were underwater toxic plumes, a company which has not been providing the proper protective gear, a company that says they could -- this is not a shakedown of their country, this is the american government, president obama ensuring that this company is made accountable and sending a signal to all other compani

that seek to treat ordinary american families in a way that can destroy their entire family history. this is in my opinion the american government working at its best. this is creating truly the kind of partnership between the public and private sector. that can make sure that innocent victims are not road kill as a result of corporate plans that did not actually factor in the harm that can occur to ordinary families. so i just could not disagree more strongly. i think that this is in my opinion one of the most important hearings that this congress will ever have because it is ending a signal t any corporations out there including the ones that testified on tuesday that they had to respond

to the harm which could be done in the gulf if one of their rigs had the same kind of catastrophic event that they will be made accountable. so i thank you, mr. chairman for holding this hearing and i thank you mr. hayward because yesterday was the day where the page began to be turned and we move to a new era, where in fact ur company is made accountable and the citizens of the gulf are made whole. thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. sullivan, hold your opening statement to three minutes, please sir. >> chairman, stupak, thank you for holding this hearing today. on april 20, 2010, a fire -- this terrible disaster resulted in the loss of 11 lives and injured many more members of the

6-person crew. there is no question that the bp oil spill is a tragedy. in fact it is the worst environmental disaster in our nation's history. i believe we must do everything in our power to cap the leak, find out what caused the explosion and ensure nothing like this ever happens again. bp must bear the entire financial burden for this dister and the american taxpayer shouldot be on the hook for a dime. according to the occupation safety health administration, there's mounting evidence that bp has one of the worst safety records of any major oil company operating in the united states. to this end, i'm looking forward to examining with mr. hayward ether there is a deficient safety culture at bp that led to this disaster and other recent ones including the bp refinely explosion in 2005 in texas city, texas and a bp pipeline spill in

2007 we released 200,000 glons of oil into the alaskan wilderness. mr. hayward why is bp's record on safety so spotty? what is equally as important to mbat the spill is the knee jerk legislation reaction from the congress. right now the administration and their allies in the house are more focussed on putting the oil and gas industry out of business on solutions to the problem. instead of working in a buy part an way for rigorous safety standards on all offshore rigs, the m is exploiting this disaster to aance this disastrous cap and trade energy policy, which won't stop the well from leaking but rather will only serve as a national tax on -- crippling our economy and making the unemployment lines longer. i believe congress should work towards safety inspections on

all offshore wells. a ban on offshore drilling will only put americans out of work. but it will send a -- it will send energy and gas prices through the roof and increase our reliance on foreign, imported oil. we still have work to do to uncover exactly what went wrong and mr. questions remain on the ongoing efforts to plug is leak. this should not be an excuse to -- as we will need more oil and natural gas to meet the crucial needs of our nation, and i yid back the balance of my time. >> i would like to hear from the chairman emeritus of the energy committee, mr. dingle for five minutes, please, sir. >> chairman, i comnd you for holding this important hearing today. we sit here on day 59 of the worst environmental disaster in the history of this country. 11 people are dead, the already

fragile economy of an entire region is in real danger of shattering. we will be feeling the environmenting consequences for years to come. and god almighty alone knows what the health and environmental effects of the containment and cleanup strategies will be. millions of gallons of chemical dispersants and controlled burns. sadly we can't even get a decent estimate of the amount of oil and gas that's spewing out into the water. bp has been before this committee many times. and rarely has it been apleasant meeting. because in variably they have appeared here to defend serious failures on the part of the company. the company has a history of cutting corners, apparently, for the almighty dollar. texas city, they paid there $50

million in criminal fines, alaska's north side slope which was investigateby this subcommittee, where a pipe corroded, allowing 1 million liters of oil to spill. in each instance, we were hoping that the assurances given by bp that this would not happen again have been regrettably untrue. in reference to a decision on how to secure the final 1,200 feet of the well, a single casing or tie back of bp engineer said not running the tie back 15i6s a good deal of time and money. in reference to installing for centralizers, a bp inspector said, it will take ten hours to install them, i am concerned, i don't want to use it.

so were we. even if the hole is perfectly straight, as straight piece of pipe, even in tension will not seek the center of the hole unless it has something to centralize it. i want you to listen to this, but who cares? it's done, end of story. it will probably be fine. and note the word probably. and we'll get a good cement job. i would rather have to squeeze that gets stuck, so guard right on the risk-reward occasion. mr. chairman, the comments of our witness today reveal little sorrow for the events thatave occurred. and here he said, the gulf of mexico is a very big ocean, the amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting in is tiny in relation to the total water volume and then the environmtal impact of the disaster is likely to be very, very modest.

i wonder if he wishes to stand on that statement today. when mr. hayward responded to the claims that cleanup workers were becoming ill because of oil fumes and such, he said this, food poisoning is clearly a big issue. finally most famously, mr. hayward informs us he wants his life back, last year mr. hayward enjoyed a splendid 40% pay raise even though bp's profits dropped. i just happen to be a poor polish lawyer from detroit. but it seems to me that this is a curious response to a drop in ofits. it makes me wonder what the compensation package of our witness will be this year. mr. chairman, again, i thank you for your diligence and hard work on this issue. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and look forward to working with you on this matter. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

next ms. blackburn, if you will make your opening statement please. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i thank you and ranking member burgess for holding the hearing today. mr. hayward, i thank you for your willingness to testify before this committee. you know, when news of the bp spill began and information about the well started to circulate, it seemeda there was problems not only with , but also with mms bureaucracy and maybe the problem lay there rather than with anything that could have gone wrong with bp, that it was there with mms. what welearned and confirmed that that is not correct, that the problem does lie with bp and what went wrong, while there are many faults with mms on safety and oversight, most of the data points to wrong decision making by bp's management and this is not the

first time and we have talked about that in several of our opening statements this morning. it's not the first time we have been before this committee on safety problems, and most recently as the texas city 2005 and alaska incidents which revealed insufficient protocols in bp's management and safety hierarchy, there was a statement from bp that you all would quote, unquote focus like a lizzer on safety. and it is concerning to us that the appearance is, mr. hayward that bp has not learned from previous mistakes, so it leaves us asking the questions of you and of bp, was this accident caused bnegligence? was it caused by risk taking? was it caused by cost cutting measures? by bp decision makers and unfortunately for citizens, beaches and wildlife all along the coastal gion, they are

paying a price for those misplaced decisions. bp cannot blame mother nature or equipment failure or even other subcontractors. their actions have put at risk the livelihood of communities and businesses that depend on the gulf, not only for seafood and tourism,ut also energy production that this nation as a whole relies upon. in addition, the current administration also shares a significant portion of the blame for the oil spill. i mentioned mms earlier and the mms officials approved inadequate spill response plans and field inspectors rubber stamped inspection papers submitted by oil companies. this is another area where we as members of congress in doing our due diligence will ask you all and mms why. but what is the most damaging is that the president and senior officials knew on day one the

blowout preventer was not working and knew of the potential spillage. while bp shoulders much of the responsibility for this spill, the lack of effort by this administration to contain the spill has doomed the economy and wildlife of the gulf coast from an oil spillhich could have been contained. and now recently imposed drilling moratoriums will further devastate america's energy produion and will destroy hundreds of thousands of jobs in e gulf coast region. thank you for being with us today, mr. chairman, i yield the balance of my time. >> thank you. i next turn to ce chairman of the subcommittee, opening three minutes sir. >> mr. hayward, you're not going to get a lek schur from me today and you're not going to get an apologies. quite frankly the peopleho

live along the affected area of the gulf coast deserv answers from you. we were in louisiana last week and we had the opportunity to hear from a variety of individuals whose lives have been devastated by this oil disaster and i use the word disaster specifilly because i don't think spill quite captures the magnitude of what's going on. the american people are frustrated because we were first told that this was a 1,000 barrel ber day release and about a week later that was updated to 5,000 barrels per day. and at thend of may it was adjusted upwards of 15,000 to 19,000 barrels a day and this week it shoucould be as high as 60,000 barrels a day. that's 17.5 million gallons ber week and over the length of this disaster it could be the largest release of oil in the north american continent in history, unintended. one of the things i think we need to know about today is the

decisions that your company made and who ahead them that led to this explosion and subsequent disaster, wt your company is doing to fix this problem and what your company is doing for all the families and communities that have been devastated by this disaster and i think it would be help follow for you and everybody in this hearing room to hear from those women who testified last week, because they raised very pointed questions that were directed to your company, sir, and they were questioned that were raised after they gave passionate testimony of wanting the oil and gas business to continue in louisiana and the gulf coast region. so i would like to have you listen to their kments in the hearing. this is natalee rosco. >> i would like to leave here today knowing that because of my husband's tragic death, we can begin to focus on making safety the most important priority.

not to focus on making more safety regulations, but on ways to safely implement the ones that we already have. this challenge will not be in vain because right now my husband's death issin vain. it wil not be in vain if it make the top priority and cause these powerful oil companies to know they will be held accountable for their action >> wile i understand companies must make a profit. >> this is courtney. >> i do not believe it should be at the expense of risking lives or destring families i'm asking to you please consider harsh punishments on companies who choose to ignore safety standards before other families are destroyed. my family can never and will never be adequately compensated for our loss. >> these are now widows with

small children to take care of and they are the symbols and the faces of this disaster and i look forward to your testimony. yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you. next turn to mr. gingrey of georgia for opening statements. >> first of all, i want to express my condolences, we must remember those lives and the lives of their families as we just saw tt were forever changed on that fateful april day and we must continue to keep them in our thoughts and prayers. further, we have an obligation not only to those families but to everyone affted by the aftermath to get to the bottom of the causes of this accident and the failure to sece the situation and stop the devastation wrecked upon the gulf coast. mr. clarm, we have an opportunity in this oversight

hearing to ask questions to get to the facts of what happened. however, today's hearing is incomplete. we can only ascertain half of the story today because we do not have anyone representing the administration. the mineral management service to discuss their oversight role and their responsibility in ensuring that an accident like this didn't happen. deep ocean drilling is not new. in fact, we been doing it for decades in the gulf coast. why did this happen now? i've heard some assert that it was a lax oversight of the previo administration that led to this accident. well fw, that's the case, why did this not happen during the last decade. why did this occur almost a year and a half into the current administration. we need to hear from our own department of interior. and the mineral management services. certainly, mr. hayward should be prepared to answer bp's responsibility but we will also need answers from the administration so that we can demand accountability and implement prudent reforms to

return us to safe drilling in our oceans because simply saying no to further and new drilling is not a realistic answer. i further realize there are in in this administration who have a pen clant for not letting a crisis go to waste, but for a nation dependent on foreign oil, for a nation with unemployment hovering at 10%, we can't just say we can't do this. we can't take our ball and go home whether the consequences mean a weaker america. everyone depending on foreign fuels, all too inclined it seems, to let jobs leave this country. no, mr. chairman, we have to understand what happened on and leading up to april 20th. we need to answer those questions to determine if the rules or agency overnight win sufficient or if this was purely an act of negligence or wanton disregard for sound regulations. now we can try to enact the perfect reform that ensures this never happens again bought it will not change the past or the

toll upon the lives forever changed. mr. hayward, the responsibility to make these families whole falls to you and your company bp you have an obligation to right this wrong and not only the public trust but also to believe in the free market and entrepreneurship demand it. mr. chairman i wait the opportuny to ask questions with the hope that we will soon discuss these same matters with our own administration. and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. gingrey. mr. gett for an opening statement. >> as this san investigative hearing. lie submit my excellent opening statemenfor the record in order to have more time to question the witness. >> very well. mr. doyle, opening statement. >> mr. chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today so we can begin to understandhat went so tragically wrong on the deep water horizon. we're now 59 days into this tragedy and oil continues to

gush into the gulf of mexico. the estimates for how much oil spills into the gulf each day continue to rise and we still have no way to cap the well in the near future. we sit helplessly as we wait for a relief well to be completed. as the details and facts about deep water horizon come to light it is clear to us all that the decisions made by officials at bp that refleked bad judgment at best and criminal nemps at worst, thrgh this committee's investigation, we've learned that at nearly every turn, bp cut corners. and n well design, the number of centralizers they used, whether to run a cement bond lock, circulating drilling muds and securing the well head with a lockdown sleeve, bp took the path of least resistance. on tuesday, colleagues and competitives from the oil and gas industry provided sworn testimony that they believed bp delinquencies in well design and failed to follow the best

practices of the industry. now we learn that bp had several warnings about the mccondo well with one of their own engineers calling it a nightmare well. but instead of treating the well with caution it seems that bp's only interest was in completing the well quickly and cheaply. many questions still need to be answered. were bp employees on the deep water horizon give orders from bp officials to speed up the mccondo well? were they told to slash costs wherever possible? why would a team on board the rig to test the cementing of the well be sent home before performing the test? surely if a cement bond locwas ever necessary, it would be in a nightmare well situation. but sending the team home, bp saved $100,000 and nine or ten hours of work. mr. hayward, i hope you're here today to answer questions about th decision made on deep water horizon that led to this tragic and deadly blowout.

earlier this week, this committee sent you a letter with detailed information about topics we would like you to address today. in reviewing your statements submitted for today's hearing, i'm extremely disappointed in your avoidance of the requested topics. i certainly hope that you use the opportunity today to answer our questions only and truthfully. i know bp committed to clean up the gulf region and i expect that commitment to be ongoing. i welcome your pledge to pay damps through a $20 billion escrow fund but that's just the tip of the iceberg. rebuilding the public's trust in your company and your industry will take years and many serious changes in theay you do business. when you operate on our land and in our waters, you're only there because the public's trust has allowed you to be there. you violated that trust in the wot possible way. mr. hayward, i look forward to your testimony.

i look forward to answers to our questions and your ongoing efforts to gain america's trust. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. doyle. mr. griffith for opening statements. three minutes, please. >> thank you. mr. chairman and ranking member for calling this important hearing today. mr. hayward for taking time to come before our subcommittee to discuss what happened on the deep water horizon. i know that like us, your number one priority is stopping the flow of oil. congress and this committee owe it to the american people do whatever we can to aid the unified command ineaching this goal. this is a time for engineering and action i hope you wil let us know what we can do in congress to be helpful. there are still many questions to be answered about what happened on the deep water horizon and unfortunately we do know that the the documents that we're reviewing it does not look good. my hope for our hearing today is that we will be able to put political public relations

shenanigans aside and focus understanding why decisions were made and how bp and the industry can ensure that they learn from this incident so that drilling safely for our valuable resources can continue. and i might say this to you, you're never as good as they say you are or as bad as they say you are. so this hearing will go back and forth. the other thing i'd like to remind the committee is that the greatest environmental disaster in america has been cigarettes. 60,000 americans today this year will die from cigarette related cancers so if we're going to talk about the environment, let's be sure we don't leave that out. i'm a cancer specialist, by the way, by training and i never fail do bring that up. so the environment is an important concept, we regret the loss of life, but there's much that we can do and we'll put this in perspective. this is not going to be the worst thing that ever happened to america. thank you.

>> three minutes opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. at this very moment, oil is gushing from the deep water horizon blowout at a rate between we learned 35,000 and 60,000 barrels a day, wiping out entire population of fish and along with it the jobs of hundreds of thousands of people. most upsetting about this travesty is that it could have been avoided. as the ongoing investigation by this committee has already discovered, bp executives create and atmosphere where safety concerns we ignored in order to ensure that the company's already staggering profits this year, approximately $93 million a day in the first quarter continued unabated. this appalling disregard for the gulf coast and its inhabitants is one of the most shameful acteds by a corporation in american history. it's the most significant example of bp's disregard for

the environment and well being of its workers. a report published by the center for public integrity found that between june 2007 and february 2010, bp received total of 862 citation from the occupational safety and health administration, of those a stgering 76 were' grecian and will wilful. compared with eight at the two oil companies tied for second place. this pattern of behavior continued in the spill's aftermath. ihold in my hand a document called voluntary waiver of release that bp made unemployed fisherman sign before they could be hired for spill cleanup t states i hereby agree on behalf of myself and my representations to hold harmless indemny if i and forever discharge the bp exploration production inc. from all claims and damages that i or

my representatives may have with regard to the participation in the spill response activities. i know that you said this was an early misstep and that this was just a standard document, but this is was the first response that you had to people that were hired. and outrage does not begin to express my feeling. these are people who are unemployed because of the recklessness of bp, forced to take jobs cleaning up bp. 's mess in order to survive, yet to qualify for those jobs they had to hold bp harmless for everyone further damages they may suffer in bp's employ. this from a company that made $93 million a day. fortunately a court trumped your fancy lawyers who wrote this doment but still it begs the question how could you do that? i'm glad that you're here, mr. hayward. i skbekts youo explain why your company has operated in such a wholly unacceptable manner.

in the final analysis the simple fact remains if bp thought more about the residents as these widows assistant workers, as these widows said, rather than the already exorbitant profits of its shareholders, we would not be here today. i yield back. >> mr. lotta s for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking member burgess, i want to thank you for holding this subcommittee hearing on the role of bp in the oil rig explosion and the ongoing explosion in the gulf of mexico. i also want to extend my heartfelt condolence to the families of those who love one luved ones an have been injured. the scale of the spill and impact on the gulf economy environment demand a thorough examination of bp's actions and inactions as well as bp's current and future plans. the flow of oil must be stopped. every day anywhere from 35,000

to 60,000 barrels are spilling into the gulf and only 15,000 barrels a day a being  captured. the environmental effects on the oil spill are harming shorelines and coastal wetlands, fisheries an fishery habitats as well as sea mammals aed turtles. what's worse, we will not fully know the ecological ramifications of the oil spill until years down the road. further more, businesses suffering great losses including job and revenues dependent on tourism are being threatened. the noaa announced a revised fishing closure in the oil affected portion of the gulf of mexico accounting for 33% of the gulf of mexico's exclusive economic zone. as oil continues to flow this yeah is sure tone large further exasperating the economic damage. a recent economic impact study by the american sport fishing association indicated that the

enfire gulf were closed to recreational fishing from may through august. leaving $win.win billion of revenue which supports $2.5 billion in total sales, and 18,785 jobs. this is devastating to an area that has already suffered greatly from the aftermath of natural disasters. americans continue be to be frustrated from the lack of solution from all parties involved and i'm interested to hear more about the coordinated efforts between bp and the administration. the economic and environmental magnitude of this disaster necessitates a clear understanding of what went wrong and bp needs ton held accountable for the disaster. i also look forward to having mms and the department of interior before this subcommittee to also for them to answer some tough questioning. i look forward to the hearing, mr. hayward's testimony and i

yield back the remainder of my time. thank you. >> thanks, mr. latta mr. ross, three minutes opening statement, please, sir. >> thank you. chairman stupak for holding today's hearing to examine bp's actions and decisions that directly led to the tlach magic explosion and oil spill that continues to gush and wreak havoc on the gulf coast. at a rate of up to 1700 gallons we are minute. since this hearing began a little over an hour ago, up to 112,847 gallons have been dumped into the gulf. on day 59 of this economic and environmental disaster, with up to 60,000 barrels of day spilling into the gulf, i continue to be frustrated and

downright angry by bp's response and lack of a clear and productive plan to stop the leak or efficiently clean up the oil that is destroying the ecosystems that surround the gulf. reports have surfaced revealing that in the days and weeks before the explosion bp knowingly made a number of decisions that increased the danger of an explosion and spill occurring. it seems apparent that bp put profit before safety, many people are dead. millions of gallons of oil continue to spew into the gulf. i'm hopeful that mr. hayward can explain today why these decisions were made, how this company's actions led to this disaster and what they are doing to remedy it. as oil floats into t marshes and onto the beaches, as shrimping vessels sit tied to docks, as restaurants and businesses during their peak

season remain without tourists and customers, and as homeowners see their property values plummet, the people and wild life of the gulf coast wait and wonder about how extensive the damage to the ecosystem or the economy will be. this bill is not only affecting the gulf coast, the jobs and economies of this surrounding states are hurng as well. my state of arkansas borders louisiana. and many of my constituents, people i know in my hometown work on offshore rigs. these jobs are also at risk and i hope bp will take responsibility for all those who are affected by this spill regardless of where they live. and work to help pull them through this disaster as well. this spill is a wake-up call that must result in better

government oversight. more advanced technology, stronger response plans and improved safety standards. not only by bp and every oil company in america but also by our government. above all, this disaster is a learning experience that will help us prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again. and i'm hopeful this hearing can provide the answer and solutions necessary to begin that proces mr. hayward, i truly hope that you'll give us open and honest answers today and not those prepared by your legal team. with that mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. ross. next i would like to call on miss christensen from virgin islands for an opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this important hearing. the explosion on the deep water platform and the sub subsequent outpouring of hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil into one of the most sensitive and important bodies of water in

this country is indeed a tragic accident which caused 11 deaths, many injuries left-hand have deep, long lasting debilitating and expensive repercussion, the people of this country need it know what happened and who is responsible. all that has transpired since april 20th says to me that not only bp but no country drilling in our outer continental shelf is prepared to deal with a spill at this depth. they're all, there using the best available technology a still 59 days later an end is not in sights. this is not skaementable. what has also become clear is that while bp reportedly used shortcuts they were warned not to which may have caused the spill, they're not the only one at fault. they could not have cut those corners without the complicity of employees at some of the responsible government agencies who did not do their job. we're all appalled that lives are lost by decisions made apparently in the interest of

cutting costs, but also by the lack of adequate preparation for this worst case scenario we are facing today. the fact that the industry does not ensure that response technology kept pace with deeper drill wells lays blame at all of their feet, but we can still not ignore the decisions bimade by bp, if they had been different 11 people might still be alive today. we with our congress along with the fred who has had more of his share of crisis not of his making have make challenges and critical ahead. i hope the many who die the affected families and now who now depend on ocs platforms for their livelihood, this and of the hearings will help us go beyond a knee-jerk reaction to do the right thing for the region and our country. that bp and any other responsible party will be held fully accountable and responsible and that petroleum d natural gas companies will

learn important lessons to ensure this does not happen again. i want to thank you, mr. hayward for being here, i look forward to to your testimony and full answers to the questions we will ask on behalf of the people in the region and on behalf of the american people. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. welch, opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. hayward, in the 49 days since the deep water horizon explosion 'caused this extraordinary environmental ppcatastrophe, we've heard time and again from bp this was an abration, the facts regrettably tell a different story. in 2005, when bp's texas city operation blew up, 14 workers lost their lives n 2006, a bp oil pipeline in texas ruptured and spilled 200,000 gallons of crude oil n in 2007, the year you became ceo, the bp corporation settled a series of criminal charchgs not civil charge, krill unanimous charge

and paid $370 million in fines. according to risk met tri, an independent okay, bp has one of the worst health, environment and safety records of any company in the world n only one year, the occupational safety and health administration found more than 700 violations at bp's texas ty refinery and bp paid a record $87 million in a fine. bp was charg with putting profits before safety. earlier this year, a refinery in toledo was fined $3 million for willful safety violations including the use of valves that contributed to the texas city blast. finally, of course, the deep water horizon catastrophe and more evidence that comes in, the more it's clear that that event was foreseeable and it was avoidable. after the explosion, bp said there was no o leaking, then it said there was 1,000 barrels a dye. then