60,000 barrels. for 59 days, bp has told the american peopthis was abration. it's da vu again and again and again again. the question many of us have is whether a ceo who has presided over a company that has incurred $370 million in fines, a company with one of the worst records in the world for safety and consistently puts money ahead of safety, who's peers including mr. tillerson from exxonmobil who testified where you are two days ago, said they never, that they never would have drilled a well the way bp did at deep water rizon and who has ceos to hass presided over the

destruction of over $100 billion in sharehold ever value. does that leader continue to enjoy and have a valid claim on the trust and confidence of employees, shareholders, public regulators and most important lit families and small business of the gulf coast? or is it time frankly to that ceo to consider to submit his says rig nation? i thank you and yield back. >> thank you. mr. greene for an opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. hayward, i appreciate your testimony or being here this morning. and most people on this commite know i'm a big supporter of outer contineal shelf drilling and domestic energy production. and i understand from your testimony in our other hearings we've held in meetings with the administration that efforts to cap the well are going as expeditiously as possible however like many of my colleagues here, i'm frustrated that did it's been almost two

months and we still have thousands of barrels of crude oil gushing in the gulf of mexico. i'm frustrated by the threat of disaster impacts our wildlife and coast line. i'm frustrated that one well out of thousands of wells is threatening my constituents' lively hood and most communities on gulf coast. literally from alabama back to brownsville, texas. this disaster has caused the oil and gas industry to shut down even if the moratorium does not last six months it will be too late for many of these folks, but these people are not the ones to blame. they're the hard working people with a work ethic like none other than take their responsibility on these rigs seriously. however, koording to the investigation this subcommittee conducted it's obvious many bp officials on and off the rig did not take their responsibility of this rig seriously. halliburton warned the decisions

could lead to serious problem and now people are losing their jobs. they could have been prevented if bmplt p had not chosen exped yensy over say. which brings my next point. whether it's the fire where 15 people died, time after time, it's shown that bp chooses exped yensy over samplt yet, mr. hayward, in your testimony you write, none of us knows why it happened. yet this subcommittee uncovered five air years where bp made mistakes. i add up the hours that these extra precautionary actions would have taken and it comes to be to about three to four day that's assuming many of tse actions would not have occurred simultaneously, which they could have. for an extra three days of work, men's lives would have been sarchd an industry record of safety and responsible production would still be in place which brings me to my last point. in your testimony, mr. hayward,

you say this incident kaul $into question whether the oil and gas industry did explore for oil and gas in safer more reliable ways and what the appropriate regulatory framework for the industry should be. mr. hayward, the decisions made by handful of bp individuals called this into question, not this accident, and you should take the responsibility for the workers who did nothing wrong and are now losing their jobs. and mr. chairman, i yield back my time. >> thank you, mr. green. miss sutton for around opening statement. three minute, please. >> thank you, chairman stupak. it's been nearly two months since the explosion of the deep water horizon drilling rig resulting in the death s of 11 workers and injured additional workers. since then, we've witnessed the worst environmental disaster in our nation's history, that continues to pour an estimated 60,000 barrels of oil a day into the gulf of mexico. that has led to over 66,000 victims filing claims to receive

compensation. through this subcommittee's work, several alarming decisions by bp have come to light to save money and time. it's unconscionable when companies pay more attention to their comforts andheir profits than to their own workers' safety and to our environment. at our last hearing one witness from transocean testified that a duplicate blowout preventer system comforts rough $15 million not used on the deep war horizon rig. bp also utilized a risky option for steel tubing saving $7 million. bp did not circulate drilling mud or secure casing hangers between biopsies of different dime terse and critical signals were brushed aside. when standard methods were not followed to center the steel pipe in the drill hole, one of bp's operations drilling engineers remarked in an e-mail,

quote, who cares? it's done. end of story. but these cut corners have been anything but the end of the story. as the workers and volunteers from around the country help clean up the oil from the disaster, manyre becoming ill. between april 22 and june 10, 8 485 of bp's own employees he been ill. and the moneyas long been lost as they already paid $81 million in claims. mr. hayward, like many americans, i feel physically sick when sii see the clips of e oil gushing in the gulf. witnessing the devastation of our waters and our coast. and the wildli. thinking about the lives of the workers killed. and hearing and seeing the pain in the face and the hearts of the people, the milies, the

small businesses, the fishermen and others in the gulf. all consequence of this catastrophe. this culture of carelessness and taking shortcuts to maximize profits at the expense of safety, this come what may, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it attitude is unaccept ability, it's outrageous. bp must be accountable for the consequences of that approach and we must take actions necessary on behalf of the erican people to makeure that such a reckless approach will be forever abandoned. the risks and costs to our environment and to the workers in the gulf coast, to the workers throughout our economy are simply too great to allow otherwise. i yield back. >> thank you, miss sutton that concludes the opening statements of all members of our subcommittee. as i noted in the opening, as i noted in the opening, we have

members of the full committee here, i would like to recognize them. they will be allowed to ask questions by order of seniority. mr. e mr. ensly is here. miss cast, mr. gonzal, miss capps, mr. harmon, ms. wiener, and mr. scalise. th also host the field hearing in new orleans, we had nine members go down in one of the largest field hearings we've had so you can see the interest here. i also also note, miss jackson lee is with us, not a member of the mmittee, she will not be allowed to ask question, but we welcome her and she's sat in on previousearings we've had. so our first witness is mr. tony high hayward who is the chief executive officerf bp plc.

you have a right to be advised by counsel during your testimony. do you wish to be represented by legal counsel? i'm sorry, you have to just press that button right there, sir. >> positive dye not. >> we also asked if you would have a technical person with you so you could consult if we ask some questions that you want to run it by your technical person. do you have a technical person with you? >> i do. >> could you state his name and position for the record, please. >> mike zangey, drilling engineer. >> during your testimony, if you want to consult with that individual, please let us know, we'll give you a moment to doo before you answer but you'll be only one who could answer the question. is that clear? thank you. mr. hayward, i'm going ask you to please rise raise your right handnd take the oath. do you swear or affirm the testimony you're about to give

to be the truth, the whole truth and notng but the truth, the matter pending before this committee. >> i do. >> let the record reflect the witness answered in the affirmative. mr. hayward, you are now under oencht we would like it hear an opening statement from you. you may submit a longer statement if you will for the record but if you would, please begin your opening statement and let me again on behalf of all members of the committee we appreciate your biwillingness tr here today. >> chairman stupak -- ranking members. >> suspend, ease, sir. >> you need to go to jail! [ inaudible ]. >> ma'am --

>> she's a shrimper. her whole life is -- >> be careful. let them get through.

>> before we begin again with mr. hayward, let me just again mention those viewers in our audience, emotion run high on this issue. but we have a hearing to conduct here. we're going to conduct our hearing. it's going to be done with proper decorum. mr. haard, when you're ready we're growing to start the clock over, you may begin. >> chairman waxman, chairman stupak, ranking member burgess, members of the committee. i'm tony hayward, chief executive of bp. the explosion and fire aboard the deep water horizon and the resulting oil spill in the gulf of mexico -- >> excuse me, mr. hayward, i'm going to ask you to pull that up, some of the members are having trouble hearing it's probably over the clicking of

the cameras, but we're vag trouble hearing you. if you could just pull it closer. >> the explosion and fir aboard the deep water horizon and the resulting oil spill in the gulf of mexico. never should have happen and oar and i'm deeply sorry that it did. when i lernt that 11 men had lost their lives, i was personally devastated. three week $ago, i attended a memorial service for those men and it was a shattering moment. i want to offer my sincere condolence to their friends and families. i can only begin to imagine their sorrow. i understand how serious this situation is. it is a tragedy. i want to speak directly to the spem who live and work in the gulf region. i know this incident has had a profound impact on your lives caused great turmoil and i deeply regret that i also deeply regret the impact the spill has

had on the environment, the wildline of scrimmawild life and the ecosystem of the gulf. i want to acknowledge the questions that you and public are rightly asking. how could this happen? how damaging is the spill to the environment? why is it taking so long to stop the flow of oil and gas into the gulf? we don't yet have all the answers to these important questions, but i hear and understand the concerns, frustrations and anger being voiced across the country. and i know that these sentiments will continue until t leak is stop and until we prove through our actions that we are doing the right thing. yesterday, we met with the president of the united states and his senior advisers. we discussed how bp could be more constructive in the government's desire to bring more comfort and assurance to the people of the gulf coast

beyond the activity we've already done. we agreed in that meeting to create a $20 billion claims fund to compensate the affected party and pay for the cleanup and environmental mitigation said all along we would pay these comforts and now the american people can be confident that our word is good. i've been to the gulf coast. i've met with fishermen. business owners and families. i understand what they're going through and i promised them as i'm promising you that we will make this right. after yesterday's announcement, i hope that they feel we're on the right track. i'm here today because i have a responsibility to themerican people to do my best t explain what bmplt p has done, is doing

and will do in the future to respond to this terrible accident. first, we're doing everything we can to secure the well and in the meantime contain the flow of oil. we're currently drilling two relief wells, we believe they represent the ultimate solution. we expect this to be complete in august. simultaneously, we've been working on parallel strategies to minimize or stop the flow of oil. while not all haveeen met with success, it appears that our latest containment effort is now containing about 20,000 barrels a day. by the end of june, we expect to have equipment in place to handle between 40,000 and50,000 barrels a day. second, i've been clearhat we will pay all necsary cleanup comforts. we've mounted what the coast guard has recognized as the

largest spill response in history. we've been working hard on the leadership under unified command to stop the oil from coming ashore. whilst we're grateful these efforts are reducing the impacts of the spill, any oil on the shore is deeply distressing. we wilbe vigilant in our cleanup. thd as i have made clear from the beginning, we will pay all legitimate claims for losses and damps caused by the spill. those are not just words. we've already paid out more than $95 million and we've announced an independent claims facility headed by ken feinberg to ensure the process is as fair, transparent and rapid as possible. fourth, we need to know what went wrong. so that we as a company and we as an industry can do better. that is why less than 24 hours

after the accident i commissioned a nonprimpd investigation. die it because i want to know what happened and i want to share the results. right now, it's simply too early to say what caused the incident. there is still extensive work to do. a full answer must await the outcome of multiple investigations including the marine board. to sum up, i understand the seriousness of the situation and the concerns, frustrations and fears that have been and will continue to be voiced. i know that only actions and results, not mere words, ultimately can give you the confidence you seek. i give my pledge as the leader of bp that we will not rest until we make this right. we're a strong company and no resources will be spared. we and the entire industry will learn from this terrible event

and emerge stronger, smarter and safer. thank you. >> thank you, mr. hayward. one of the bad parts of conducting a hearing we get interrupted now and then by votes. we have three votes pending right now. there's ihink about ten minutes remaining on this vote. i would suggest instead of trying to get in the questions, we take break right now, let's stand in recess for 30 minute, we'll come back at noon and continue this hearing. well start with questions all the members. okay? this committee will be in recess until 12 noon.

committee will come back to order. when we left off, mr. hayward had finished his opening statement. we'll begin with questions. i'll begin. mr. hayward, when i heard about the explosion in the gulf, the immediate company that popped in my brain was bp. and that's because last number of years from texas city where people have died and 170 people were injured, the north slope, the problems we had there, in bp's own 2007 report on the management, accountability project in which it stated there was a culture that evolved over the years that seemed to ignore risk, tolerate noncompliance and accepted incompetence. i wasn't surprised when we heard about the explosion in the gulf and bp was part it. since then this committee, the oversight investigations committee of the energy and commerce committee we methodically looked at this

issue and i know you have and your company has also. on may 12th we had a hearing which we looked at a number of things that went wrong. on may 25th, our committee, chairman waxman and myself put out a memo and based on bp's preliminary report and i'm sure you're familiar with that report. are your not, sir? >> i am. >> on june 14th, chairman waxman and i sent you a letter where we talked about the crazy and women nightmare well. quite frankly bp blew it pup cut corners to save mean time. and as the chief executive officer of bp, as i stated in my opening, you called for a leader decision making process u-called for fewer people in the decision making process, you stated individuals need to be accountability for risk and to manage risk. therefore, bp's leadership managed their risk in this well? did you manage the risk

properly? >> since i've between ceo of this company, i have focused on safe reliable operations. the i've set the tone from the top by making it very clear to everyone in bp that safe, reliable operations are our number one priority. of course it's much more than about words. safety is about three things. it's about plans, it's about people and it's about process. in the last three years we've invested more than $14 billion in plant integrity. . what happened here? the june 14th letter we put out the other day, we went through five major areas. the head of the ceos of the oil companies that were before this committee on tuesday all said you did it wrong. they never would have done a well this way. you made decisions whether to a casing or the tie back, which everyone said the tie back would have been safer. the lock down sleeve. centralizers instead of doing 21 as recommended you only do six. that defies this safety

emphasis, does it not? >> we've launched an investigation, which which have shared with yourself, mr. chairman and all of your members, which is identified seven areas. it's identified areas around cement, casing, integrity pressure measurement, well controlled procedures, and three areas around the blow-out preventer which failed to operate. this investigation is ongoing it's not complete. >> you're the ceo of this company. you said you were here to answer questions of the american people. you were an exploration manager with bp. you were the director of bp's exploration. you were vice president of bp's exploration and production. you hold a ph.d. from the university of edinboro. based on the may 12th hearing and may 25th memo, our june 14th letter to you, based on all

those facts are your trying to tell me you have not reached a conclusion that bp really cut corners here? >> i think it's too ear try to reach conclusions, with respect, mr. chairman. the investigations are ongoing. they've of identified seven key areas, and when they are complete -- >> every one of those seven key areas, sir, dealt with saving time and saving money and accepting the risk. so if we use your own words f-you're going to hold bp accountable, then we have to manage the risk. should leadership at bp be held accountable here? >> there is no doubt that i've focused on safe reliable operations. we've made major changes in everything we do over the last three years. we changed people. >> what changes how far made since april 20th when the bp deep water horizon exploded. what changes were made then? >> based on what we know so far,

we have made changes with respect to the testing and valuation of blow-out preventers. we made changes with respect to ensuring that people who are likely to be dealing with well control are up to date and fully validated for well control procedures. and as we learn more about what happened here we'll continue to make changes. >> look my time is just about up. let me ask you this. last five years, your safety record, 26 people dead, more than 170 injured, you that have largest spill ever in alaska, largest environmental disaster to hit the united states with no end in sight with this disaster. do you believe the u.s. government should don't allow companies that have poor safety records, poor environmental records to explore minerals or oil exploration in our country? should thereabout a ban on

companies that have miserable safety of and environmental records? >> in the three years that i've been ceo i focused on safety and environmental performance. the price of this accident, that is, indeed the case and that is why, amongst all the other reasons i'm so devastated by this accident. >> i agree. under your tenure you said you had the 2007 report that was talking about bp's culture, still have problems with alaska, you said you will hold people accountable. who will we hold accountable here? >> we've engaged in a systematic change at bp. we've begun to change the culture. i'm not denying there's more to do. but we've made dramatic changes in the people we have in our organization, the skills and capabilities they have, we've invested heavily into that. we've changed significantly the

processes that we use to manage our operations and most importantly, perhaps, we've made safe reliable operations the core of the company. it is the thing that i talk about every time i talk internally and every time i talk externally about bp. >> not to play games, in your opening statement you said as long as you were ceo of bp these things would occur. do you expect to be ceo of bp much longer? >> at the moment i'm focused on the response. i think everyone here believes that the highest priority is to stop the leak, contain oil on the surface and clean it up. and that is what my to discuss. >> mr. burgess for questions? >> thank you, mr. chairman. highest priority stopping the leak. let me ask is your presence here today in any way interfering with that number one task of stopping the leak? >> it is not. >> thank you. leapt me ask you or just make a statement for clarification. i am not going to apologize to

you. it was, afttr all, bp executives who were on that rig. bp executives who ultimately could have made the call to stop operations when things became unsafe and youly you are the person at the top and you are responsible. we lost 11 men on that rig, transocean and other companies lost 11 men on that rig. i don't feel apologies are in order. i have serious questions about this fund we heard about yesterday. i hope this committee will stay engaged in the oversight of that activity as well. it's still a disturbing to me that we've not had anyone from the federal regulatory side. we brought a ton of other people in here to question them. we need mr. salazar. we need the minerals and management people here who approved that exploration plan that bp submitted that was woefully inadequate. now i've got some questions i do need to ask. bp, unfortunately, is not the

first time you've been in front of our committee and in 2006, although you were not ceo in september of that year, i pulled the transcript last night and looked through it again. big oil spill in alaska had to do with not proper maintenance on the pipelines. and when you came in you said you were going to focus like a laser beam on safety. and certainly that had to be welcomed news after texas city -- after the north slope accident. so what safety of briefings do you get as your office of chief executive officer and who provides them to you? >> the basis of our management of safety performance is through something that we call our group operating risk committee. ate committee i set up, i chair. it involves the heads of all of the business streams. and we meet on a bimonthly basis to review the safety performance

across the company. that process is mirrored down through the company. >> and what type of safety directives then or what type of directives do you issue in terms of safety as a result of those meetings and perhaps would you be willing to share some of that information with the committee as we go forward >> we can share that information. they range in changes to procedure to requirements to have people many where there are issues with safety to come and froent us. >> but somebody records minutes in those meetings and your directives that come as a consequence of those briefings are written down and delivered to the appropriate managers? >> there are minutes of those meetings. >> let me ask you this. mr. stupak already alluded to the fact should we allow someone who perhaps is not following the best practices to don't drill. is there any other well, to your knowledge, in the gulf of mexico that is, has been done in the

same manner as this well that was being drilled under the deep water horizon? >> there are many wells in the gulf of mexico. >> are there any other wells where you haven't put the proper number of centralizers. there are many wells in the gulf of mexico with the satisfactioning designs. there are many wells drilled with the same cement procedures. >> have the mms people been there and looked over it with a fine tooth comb the >> we are -- >> are you changing your procedures as a result of things you have jointered. . i'm sorry. as we learn from our investigation, we will make appropriate changes. as i've already indicated. >> are there any of those changes that are wrong going right now? >> the ones i've talked about are ongoing. >> let me ask enthusiast. the question came up about centralizers and someone said

that they would rather push some more, squeeze more cement than get something stuck. i'm not technically savvy enough to know about that. but if that's the statement and you'll push cement and deal with a fewer number of centralizers to hold this thing steady in the center of the column, is there any way to find out if in fact where that cement went where you intended to and that rod didn't get off to one side or the other? >> wasn't part of the decision making process on this well. . i've looked at the material -- >> that's not the question i asked. was there a procedure dhoot have been followed that would have given that information? >> can't answer that question. i'm not a cement engineer, i'm afraid. >> there is. those people were available and for whatever reason they decided not to do that. would that have made a difference >> i'm not prepared to speculate on what may or may not make a difference until such time as multiple investigations that are

ongoing are concluded. >> prior to april 20th when the well blew up were you briefed on the progress of the drilling of the well? >> the only knowledge that i had of the well occurred in april when it was evident to the team drilling it that we made a discovery and they notified myself that we made a discovery. that was my only prior involvement in the well. >> who briefed you. >> the person who would have briefed me would have been the chief executive of expiration of production. >> and were you privy ethipoian any other information, difficulties they had, the multiple gas kicks, losing tools over the hole, the decisions to move quickly because we spent too much time over this well? >> notice prior information. >> who would have had that information? >> certainly the drilling team in the gulf of mexico. >> but you're the ceo of the

company. do you have any sort of technical expert who helps you with these things who might have been there? >> with respect, sir, we drill hundreds of wells all around the world. >> i know that's what's scaring me right now. did you have a technical expert that was advise us there on this well. we heard from other people it was a bad well, dangerous well, gas kicks and the mud was not degassified. did you have a technical expert advise ug snipe had no knowledge of the drilling of this well. >> who was. if you're the ceo of this company, if i'm a shareholder of bp which i'm not but if i am how can i then have comfort that the ceo knows what's going on as far as safety on the rigs? or is it true that it's just all about profit? >> there was a drilling team providing oversight of this well. >> there was a drilling team. >> i have to go to mr. waxman. mr. waxman for questions please. >> thank you very much.

mr. hayward when you became ceo three years ago you said safety of was going your top priority. you would focus on it like a laser. your website said safe and reliable operation are integral to bp's success. i want to ask you whether you think bp has met that commitment that you made when you became ceo? >> since i became ceo we have made a lot of progress. we have made it very clear to everyone in the company that -- >> have you met that commitment that you made? >> and, we've made major changes. we made major changes. >> we now see this disaster in the gulf. does that indicate that you didn't keep that kmipt? >> one of the reasons that i am so distraught -- >> can you answer yes or no? >> is that -- >> don't know whether you're distraught. i want to know whether you think you've kept your commitment >> we focused like a laser on safe and reliable operations. that's a fact. every day.

>> let me follow up on that. we had an hearing earlier this week with ceos from other oil companies. they were unanimous in their view that you made risky decisions that their companies would not have made. and in particular they criticize your decision to install a long single string of casing from the top of the well to the bottom on april 19th, the day before the blow-out. they said this well design choice provide an unrestricted pathway for gas to travel up the well in the space that surrounded the casing and of course it blew out the -- it blew out the seal. how do you respond to their criticism? did bp make a fundamental misjudgment in selecting the single string of casing? >> i wasn't involved in any of that decision make. >> i want to know your view about it. now that you know what your company did pursuant to your

laser request that they be atuned to safety, do you think that was a mistake >> the original well design was to run a long string. it was approved by the mms. there was discussion. in the course of the drill of the well whether a long string or a seven inch line would be most appropriate. that is what i understand based on having looked at the documents and listened to our investigation team. the decision to run a long string, at least in part was to deal with the long term integrity of the well. >> let me be fair to you. because i'm asking you to look with hindsight as to what happened and the decision that was made. but, your own engineers warned in advance that this was a risky approach and i would like to put on the screen what's called a plan review that your engineers prepared in mid-april warning against the long string of casing as you can see. your engineers said if you use a

long string of case, quote, it is unlikely to be a successful cement job. you would be unable to fulfill mms regulations and there would be an open annulus to the well head. those are serious risks, a failed cement job, violation of mms safety regulations and open pathway for gas to travel to the top of the well. the same document says that if you use the liner and tie back approach which is what exxonmobil and other companies said you should have used you would have avoid or lessened these risks and here's what the plan review said. if you used the liner there would be less issue with landing it shallow. it would be a second barrier to gas in the annulus and higher chance for a successful cement job. now you said bp was supposed to be focused like a laser on

safety yet bp overruled the warning of its own engineers and chose the more dangerous option. how can you explain that decision by bp? where were the safety recommendations of your own engineers ignored? >> i wasn't involved in any of the decision making. it's clear there was some discussion amongst the engineering team and an engineering judgment was taken. it's clear to me that you don't want to answer our questions. because isn't it true that you've served your life in bp? you've only recently become the ceo. haven't you been in this business most of your professional life? >> i've been in this business 28 years. 28 years. you should have some knowledge about these issues. and, i sent you a letter in advance asking you, said you'll be asked these questions and be prepared to answer it. how can you explain this decision when you ignore people

that work for you that should have known that your directive to be laser on safety, how could they have ignored these warnings from people right within your company? >> there was clearly a discussion between the engineering team as to what was the most appropriate course of action to take. and an engineering judgment was taken that involved long term integrity. more than an engineering judgment because on april 15th, there's a document, which is five days before the blow-out that said using the safer liner will add an additional seven to ten million dollars to the completion cost. same document calls it the single string of casing the best economic case for bp, and the conclusion i draw these documents is bp use ad more dangerous well design to save $7 million. what do you think about that? what's your response? >> i believe that document also highlights that the -- >> what? >> i believe that document also

highlights that the long term integrity of the well will be best served bay long string. the long string is not an unusual well design in the gulf of mexico. as i under it -- >> say that again. >> the long string is not an unusual design in the gulf of mexico, as i under it. hadllibu they wouldn't proceed this way. others said they wouldn't proceed this way. bp knowingly risked well failure to save a few million dollars, and drilling 18,000 feet below the sea. if you made the mistakes the consequences of those would be catastrophic and in fact turned out to be catastrophic. don't you feel any sense of responsibility for this

decision? >> i feel a great sense of responsibility for the accident. >> how about for the decisions that made the accident nor likely? >> we need to determine what were the critical decisions, and -- >> did you get my letter detain review. >> it's >> i've read your letter, chairman. >> we asked you to be prepared to discuss these issue? >> as i said, i've seen the documents following your letter. and i can't past judgment on those decisions. >> even though you've worked 28 years in the oil industry, you're the ceo and said like a laser you're going to -- safety is the biggest issue and you have people under you making these kinds of decisions and now you're reviewing them. do you disagree with the conclusion that this was riskier, to use this particular well lining? i'm not prepared to draw conclusions about this accident

until such time as the investigation is concluded. >> this is an investigation. that's what this committee is doing is investigating. your failing to cooperate with other investigators as well because they will have a hard time reaching conclusion if you stonewall them. >> i'm not stonewalling. i wasn't involve in the decision making process. i looked at the documents. until the investigation is complete both yours and others -- >> somebody's els conclusion, what is your conclusion? >> i haven't drawn a clourngs mr. chairman. >> i see. my time has expired. i'm just amazed that this testimony, mr. hayward. you're not taking responsibility. you're kicking the can down the road and acting as if you had nothing to do with this company

or the decision. i find that irresponsible. >> along those lines do you disagree with the conclusions of chairman waxman's june 14th letter the one we sent you. do you disagree with those five conclusion, five areas we hit? do you disagree with it? >> they are areas for concern. >> what? >> they are legitimate areas for concerns. >> we reached legitimate conclusions that people could then base the decision, yet cut corners to save money and we had this accident, correct >> doesn't appear you're very concerned about them. are you? >> i'm very concerned that we get to the bottom of this incident and understand exactly what happened such that want we can assure that it never happens again. >> easy to say. >> mr. chairman, just a request, please. if mr. hayward could move the microphone a bit closer i'm having difficulty hearing. >> right. i think we all are.

just pull at little closer if you could, please. mr. sullivan for questions. i should mr. upton is here from michigan member of the full of kmeeft and -- >> mr. hayward, according to the occupational safe taken health administration there is mounting evidence that bp is one of the worst safety records of any major oil company operating in the united states. is there a culture that led to disasters like the refinery explosion in texas city, texas and the alaska oil pipeline spill? >> i think we've acknowledged in 2005 and 2006 that we had serious issues and as a consequence set out to implement systematic change in the culture and safety of bp.

i set the tone from the top by saying very clearly safe, reliable operations were our number one priority. we invested billions of dollars in the integrity of that plan. we've recruited many thousands of engineers and technologists into our company including many from other industries such as the nuclear industry and other parts of the chemical and oil and gas industry and we have changed fundamentally a whole approach to the management of our operations through the implementation of significant changes to our processes. >> doesn't seem like that. if you look at the reports on what happened on the deep horizon doesn't look like many safety procedures have changed much at all. mr. hayward, do you feel that your safety record compared to other major oil companies is comparable? >> as i said, it's clear that we had some serious issues to deal with in the 2005-2006 time frame. and we have worked hard to

improve that safety performance since that time period. that doesn't seem to be changing, mr. hayward, your safety performance doesn't. here's some highlights of your safety procedures. bp had 760 safety violations and you paid millions of dollars, $373 million in fines to audiotape void criminal prosecution. also if you look at other industries, sir, let's take some of your competitors, for example. sunn sunoco had eight. conocophillips had eight at the same time you had 760. citgo had two safety violations the same time you had 760. and exxonmobil had one safety violation the same time period you had 760. how in the heck do you explain

that? >> as i said, we acknowledged the problems we had in 2005 and 2006. the vast number of those things that you've referred to date from that time period. and we have made major changes in the company over the last three to four years. >> you think the changes you made in that time period you're talk about while air pressure ceo -- do you think that they were using those measures and protocols on the deep horizon? >> to my best knowledge they absolutely were. >> up don't think they shortcuted anything on the deep horizon? as ceo of a major company -- looking back, sir, do you think that they cut corners? >> i believe we should have wait the result of the investigations before we draw conclusions. sir, you had to have looked at some of your investigations. internally your investigation did it show any kind of break down? >> it shows -- >> that you with your protocols you said you couldn't place,

were any of those shortcuted? >> the investigation is still ongoing. it's identified seven areas. the cement, the casing, the integrity pressure, well control procedure, and three failures of the blow-out preventer. and when the investigation is concluded we'll make the judgment. >> well, i'd say that this problem is with your organization and your safety and the culture of your company, safety culture and not a culture of our domestic oil and gas producers as we can see they haven't had the kind of problems you've had with cutting corners on safety. they have a lot of redundancies, contingency plans. this may not have happened if one of these other companies was operating that rig. would you say that would be true. >> don't think i can make that judgment. >> do you think the other companies have different or stricter or stricter guidelines

with their safety and spend more money on it? you probably compare yourself to other companies, i'm sure. >> i can't make a detailed comparison, but i can be clear what we've done, we've invested billions of dollars, recruited thousands ever people and evening changed significant leadership our processes, systems and procedures in the course of the past three years. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thank you. before mr. dingell begins questions we have votes on the floor again. there's less than ten minutes remaining. so i'm going to get through mr. dingell's questions and then we'll recess. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. hayward, you had two choices. using single casing or tie back. the risks are substantial associated with single casing which is what bp chose. please answer yes or no. can you assure us that under oath that that was not a

decision made to save time and money? >> i wasn't part of that decision making process. . i'm sorry? >> i was not part of that decision making process. so, i can't possibly know the basis on which that decision was taken. >> how much money was saved by using the single string casing? >> i believe the documents refer to a sum of, i think, i think, $7 to $10 million. they refer to the fact that the casing would as a screen. >> please submit that for the record. how much time was saved? >> i don't recall how much time was saved. there would have been some time saved. >> would you submit that for the record, please? you had the option of using a number of single edgers to keep the casing in center of the bore

holy. haliburton recommended 21. you ultimately chose to use two. can you tell us under oath that the decision to use six centralizers instead of the recommended 21 was not made to save time and money? >> i was not involved in that decision, so it's impossible for me to answer that question. >> all right. can you tell us how much money bp saved by not using the proper number of centralizers? >> i'm afraid i can't recall that. >> would you submit that for the record. how much time was saved? >> i don't recall that, either, i'm afraid. >> please submit that for the record. you at bp decided not to conduct a cement bond log in a test to find out if the bonding was cemented despite regulations. can you state under oath to the committee that bp did not decide against using this cement bond

log to save time and money, yes or no? >> my understanding, from what i've read -- again, i was not involved in the decision making -- is that the team on the rig, the transocean team, the bp team and the haliburton team concluded they had sufficient evidence that the cement bond was good and decided not to use the cement bond log. >> does that mean yes or no? >> it means i cannot answer your question in that form. >> how much would this test cost bp? >> i can't recall that number, i'm afraid. >> please submit for the record. how long would the test have taken? >> on the order of hours, i believe, but i'm not certain. >> please submit that for the record. would bp -- well -- now, you were supposed to circulate drilling mud in the well bottom when the case is on the bottom

and before submitting. this is referred to as bottoms up. did bp fully circulate the mud, yes or no? >> i don't believe the mud was fully circulated. the process the team on the rig were following was on line and approved by mms. >> thank you. did bp -- can you assure us under oath, again, that the decision not to fully circulate the mud was not made to save money and time? >> i can't answer that question because i wasn't there. >> thank you. how much money did avoiding this procedure save? >> i'm afraid i can't recall. >> would you submit for the record, please. >> how long would the fully circulating of the mud have taken? >> i'm afraid i can't recall that, either. sdp . >> would you submit that for the record, please. now, bp made the decision not to install a casing hangar lockdown sleeve. can you secure the committee under oath that the decision not

to install such lockdown sleeve was not made to save time and money? >> that was not a decision i was privy to. >> how much savings did the lockdown save bp? >> i don't know. >> how much time did the lockdown sleeve save? >> i'm afraid i don't know that, either. >> oyou've received a letter frm the chairman of the subcommittee and the full committee asking some questions. when will the committee have the response to that letter? >> you'll get them as soon as we can make them available to you. >> now, did bp have an emergency response plan in the event of a failure? >> an emergency response plan or a spill response plan, congressman? >> sorry? >> sorry. what was the question, please? >> did you have a response plan in event of a failure at the well? >> we had a response plan which was -- >> what was the date of that response plan?

>> the response plan was last approved, as i recall, in june of 2009. >> please submit to us the date of the response plan and the number of times in which it was updated and who it was that did the formulation of the plan. please inform us for the record whether or not that plan was approved by the mineral management service and on what date. thank you. mr. chairman? i look forward to seeing those answers in the record. >> thank you, mr. dingle. letting members know we're going to stand in recess for one hour. the good news is when we come back, these are last thoughts of the day. we'll be able to finish the hearing then. mr. burgess? >> mr. harris has brought up a point that he followed the procedures of mms. once again, it is critical thaa we get the federal regulatory

agencies to ask them questions. no information after all these hearings is really disturbing to me. >> mr. burgess, as you know, we have a methodical method we've used in this investigation. you know we have at least two more laerhearings. one was scheduled for tuesday, but at your request and my request, we've moved it back a little more. we'll have all parties here before this committee at the appropriate time. >> clearly, mr. hayward is not prepared to answer the questions, and we need to get mms in here as well. >> mms is not going to help mr. hayward answer the questions. he needs to answer the questions himself. >> any one of us could do his job. >> we're in recess for one hour.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> more about the bp oil spill on the cspan web site. you can see all of tony a word's hayward's testimony from thursday. >> our public affairs content is

available on television, radio, and online and you can connect with us on facebook, a twitter, and youtube. you could also go to our website, c-span.org. "washington journal" is next. later this morning we will hear for a man -- from a member of the afghan parliament. this afternoon, the head of the u.s. international agency for international development will be at the press club. he will talk about haiti and u.s.aid priorities at 1:00 eastern. the house of representatives pushed back a vote on a campaign finance bill. a number of interest groups have received disclosure exemptions and the legislation. this hour, we'll talk about the measure. later,