had a similar situation on friday and dave were able to drain the oil and -- and they were able to drain the oil and contain most of it. host: has agreed to your beaches in fort myers? caller: no, it has not. host: has it affected the tourism? caller:, it has because of the media -- yes, it has because of the media. there have been a lot of cancellations and people who are afraid to come. host: this is the front page of the miami herald. an ominous turn for the

panhandle. this is a picture on okaloosa island right there on the front page of the "miami herald." next call is bill on the democrats line. the what do you think of the congressional hearings? i had caller: watched the hearings and everyone is -- caller: i have watched the hearings and everyone is up in arms about barton. if bush was in office, that $20 billion would not have been secured. host: a littleater in the hearing yesterday, joe barton apologize for his comments. very quickly, here is what he had to say. all right, we do not have that

quite yet. if we will move on to falls church, va. -- we will move on to falls church, va. on the republican line, go ahead. caller: it seemed a bit of a circus to me yesterday, really. once the guy was not going to comment on open investigation matters, you know, they had five good points that they had to say to bp. he was just not going to comment on >> he can mosh pit -- you can watch washington journal any time. we are taking live to join dr. rajiv shah. will be talking about reconstruction efforts six months after the earthquake in haiti. we join us live on c-span. >> we've committed $1.5 billion

at a donors' conference in april. of this funding, usaid contributions entitle -- in, and $5 million. conditions in haiti remain dire as the six-month anniversary of the earthquake approaches. dr. rajiv shah is managing aid and development programs and more than 100 other countries. shah has says the goal of usaid is to create communities where it is no longer needed. before leaving usaid, dr. rajiv shah served as the chief scientist for the department of agriculture. it he established in international financing program for childhood immunizations. he served as health care policy adviser on a presidential

campaign and as a british policy adviser in british parliament. please welcome to the national press club, dr. rajiv shah. [applause] >> hello. good afternoon. ed thank you, alan, for and that's kind invitation -- introduction. and thank you for the kind invitation to be here today. thank you, andrew, for your support for this event. i would like to start today's discussion by sharing something you might not usually hear from a public servant in the aftermath of a crisis. thank you. your unstinting coverage of the haiti's earthquake helped rally the american people behind it because of helping our neighbors at the time of real need and

crisis. in fact, more than half of all citizens in the united states and more than half of all families contributed directly to relief programs. it was an of inspiring a demonstration of american compassion. although americans may be familiar with our logo by seeing it on the evening news, our focus as an agency is also on long-term, sustainable economic development. we work to ensure all people have a chance to be a healthy and productive life -- lead a healthy and productive lives. we believe this is an indispensable ingredient for global stability and prosperity. the president's recently- published strategy on national security strategy set an ambitious agenda. it calls on us to help prevent

conflicts, spur economic growth, strengthen failing states, lift people out of poverty, combat climate change and epidemic disease, and strengthen the institutions of democratic governance. that is a tall order. it is also a challenge that animates our entire team. president obama and secretary clinton have made it my mission to remake usaid into the world's premier development agency. today, i hope to discuss how we hope to achieve that goal. let me take you back to haiti for a moment and explain how that experience helped me shape our reform agenda, which is now under way as an agency. within the first week of my arrival at usaid, the earthquake killed more than 200,000 haitians. it left millions hungry and

homeless. just in thinking about the scale of the strategy, we continue to think about the victims and honor their memory and resilience spirit. before i was sworn in, i heard lots of grumbling about usaid. a lot of people said we moved slowly, that we lacked the ability to innovate, that we had lost in-house expertise and capacity. as i witnessed in those early days, the agency mobilized energy with astonishing speed in haiti. i realized that many of the agency's detractors were overstating the case just a little bit. we helped pull 132 people from the rubble. within days, our military got the airport operating at more than three times the standard operating capacity. our team work was essential to meeting the urgent need in this critical first few days and

weeks. rather than waiting to work through channels, we purchased local food stockpiles and immediately distributed them. with our partner, the world food program, we helped 3.5 million people, the largest feeding program ever attempted. to date, and we were quite concerned about this, there has been no major outbreak of disease. today, are professionals are helping haitians build back better. we are harnessing the power of the private sector and the innovation as we do so. just last week, we launched an initiative with the gates foundation to encourage the provision of financial services and cellular phones. mobil banking transactions are cheaper and faster than

traditional banking and safer from disruption due to natural disasters. in the early weeks, getting money to people in haiti was our real channel -- was our real challenge. mobile banking has the ability to reach hundreds of thousands of people around the world. this new effort will make haiti a hub for the mobile banking revolution. we are also working to strengthen haiti's resilience against future natural disasters by helping local construction firms learn how to direct low cost, but stronger homes. a practice we learned from an earlier earthquake in peru. at president obama and secretary

clinton's insistence, we are undergoing audits by the officer of the inspector general in -- on the ground in port-au-prince. the effort is just starting. development is a difficult long- term endeavor and we face significant challenges, especially as hurricane season approaches. in some cases, we did meet -- need much more capacity as an agency to respond to a crisis of this magnitude. the early results of the government's effort has been encouraging and it has helped shape the agenda for reform for the agency at large. i learned that we needed to unleash the pent up entrepreneurial energy within the agency and within our staff. we need to apply the latest earnings to the most pressing problems. we need to encourage staff to work shoulder to shoulder with

beneficiaries and partners in government, civil society, and the private sector. our staff can succeed by acting like development of entrepreneur worse. by finding ways to strengthen and stretch the dollar, and focus on impact instead of getting money out the door or other process indicators. for example, based on studies that showed people were more likely to use chlorine tablets ,,,, will change as we enable

real rotations. we're also looking at ways to

,,,, and the u.s.a.

are in the middle of overall policy review. the white house is doing this as

well. will either or both of these be released to the public? what is your role in this process? >> that is a great question. both of these will be released to the public as soon as possible. i believe the presidential study directed will perhaps be public sooner. the quadrangle development and diplomacy review, which was launched by secretary clinton will be excessive will publicly this fall, but to route these processes, we have been consulting with stakeholders partners on our -- our partners on the hill to exchange a set of ids to develop a policy. of the -- >> does this mean control of

policy could be given to secretary clinton rather than at your office. is that something you would look forward to? state says they are in a better position of control. do you agree? [laughter] >> now your turn to get me in trouble. i have great respect for secretary clinton. ed everyone has followed the arc of her commitments to these issues. it is tremendous. she is elevating development, making usaid a more significant and important and better resource organization. i just had a chance to meet with her yesterday, i believe, and all the aspects of the reform agenda are very much part of her belief system. in fact, she demands greater accountability and greater outcomes for programs we put resources into for development.

this administration is committed to elevating development in a fundamentally different and important ways. secretary clinton is a tremendous champion for development. the president himself has the unique relationship to development and to this agency and has a deep knowledge and understanding of the sport and his incredibly supportive -- understanding of this work and is incredibly supportive. he is insistent that we put all the best practices that have evolved in the last few decades to work on behalf of american taxpayers. and perhaps uniquely, u.s. secretary of defense and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff better out there talking consistently about how we need to -- that are out there talking says to me about how we need to have more resources and development and need to do that with a greater focus on outcomes and results. i see all of this coming

together, elevating development, all of the different parts of policy, and certainly elevating usaid. >> how much of usaid's role is diplomatic compared to humanitarian? how has that changed under your leadership? >> i do not know if diplomatic is the right term. we are a development agency. we have significant activity in humanitarian relief. of course, usaid is the lead responder in humanitarian emergencies. we do that in coordination with some many other parts of the federal government that bring unique capabilities or other assets and skills to the table and we can optimize our efforts where we work. at the end of the day, it is not about what agency is doing what. it is about how many people in

haiti u.s.-supported in what manner -- how many people in haiti have you supported in what manner? we're committed to long-term, sustainable development. we have missions around the world that are actively building expertise and partnerships and relationships to carry out that mission. we have a lot of work to do. i would frame it that way. >> as you mentioned, your background comes from the gates foundation where you work for several years. you talked about creating greater accountability and accomplishment and more entrepreneurs. increasingly, foundations and humanitarian groups seem to be getting into the foreign aid business. the question is, how does that affect usaid the work affect? -- how does that affect the work of

usaid? >> that is a great question, wherever it came from. it is a different world a new development today than it was 10 or 15 years ago. private conditions are part of that, and organizations like the gates foundation is a unique attributes in a landscape. you also have organizations like the lund campaign and bono who are engaging actively in different development strategies and suggesting a more transparent approach would make a big difference going forward and in the future. you have different kinds of partners, big corporate partners like pepsico and others, batting cage on value chain programs. coca-cola launched a program in

haiti for fruit juice. in terms of private foundations, i think they play at unique and important role. they can take tremendous risks. they can work for a long time in a focus area like getting a big breakthrough, like getting a vaccine -- if you look at 30 million people around the world with hiv aids, the way we will solve that problem is with prevention and treatment and hopefully a breakthrough like i new vaccine that can be used more cheaply and effectively. they play an important role. that should only highlight that the public sector should be doing more and more effectively. we can also invest in science and technology. we can also take risks and stay focused. we should be oriented around using resources in our results-

oriented way and getting as much leverage as we can from every investment we make so we are not reaching 7000 farmers in senegal. we are reaching 200,000 because we've attracted the private sector and build a new public- private partnership that can take that forward. i think there are also opportunities for development agencies to partner with the aids foundation or any other foundation or enter -- with the dates -- gates foundation or any other foundation. they often bring other resources to the table. for big breakthroughs, if we are really going to have ia mobile banking program that will give a hundreds of thousands of rural women a safe place to save, that would be a big breakthrough. that will require public sector

investment, regulators in different countries. you need to build those partnerships to get the big win, and i am thrilled our agency is+ jumping into that. we have been doing public- private partnerships for more than a decade, and that is paying off now. >> yes several questions on food security as -- we have several questions on food security as a topic. a comprehensive approach to addressing hugger should include emergency response -- under should include emergency response activities. >> that is a great question. i love these questions. [laughter] that is exactly what you're trying to do with the feed the future initiatives. we're going to a wonderful event

this week -- what date is it? earlier this week, we had an event that honored the father of the green revolution, a tremendous leader. those of you who have known him, you know his absolute commitment to winning the war on hunger. to do that, we will have to use every tool at our disposal smartly. that includes systems to get goods and services to farmers to help them produce more. it means creative ways to reach women who have been left out of agricultural programming and are the key to success and in the future. it also means being -- bringing the private sector in, bringing policymakers on and said they can make the tough, but important decisions to reinvest in agriculture, as some many

partners around the world are now doing. and it includes providing safety net programs to vulnerable populations. i like pointing out that the usda budget is more than $60 billion, i think, that goes into supporting programs that make food accessible to the needy populations here in the united states. if you look across in this country the ninth food system, tackling -- if you look across any country's the system, tacklinghunger needs addressing the vulnerable population for out of five kids in bangladesh are stunted. that will slow their brain growth for the rest of their lives. it does not have to be that way. that is why we are so committed

to bringing in oall of the tools of the federal government to win this war on hunger. >> in your address, you mention efforts in terms of reducing barriers for food transportation two countries. one of the issues deals with the issue of local and regional purchase. one of your predecessors has been very vocal that the u.s. has to shift its food programs to a local and regional-based purchase program where you will be putting cash in supporting local agricultural development in getting food to needy populations quicker. do you share his opinion that the u.s. needs to make a shift it to local purchases? where does that fit in your hierarchy of food purchases? >> first, let me say i have

benefited from knowing him for some time, and before i started, i went to him at georgetown and i asked for guidance. he said, you know, your agenda is great and exciting. you have to be prepared because if there is a major emergency, he will have to drop all that and focus on an emergency -- you will have to drop all that and focus on that emergency for as long as it takes. >> i said thank you, but i do not think it is likely. [laughter] what are the chances that will happen in the first 100 days? he said, i do not know. i saw him shortly after the earthquake and pointed out he was quite right. we have to have both food assistance -- the food we provide and the food assistance program, i will give you one example. we have the corn flakes program that has a higher protein content then many food programs

in schools. we went to kenya and met with 300 kids a new school, getting a little red cup filled with corn filler blend. we asked kids what was the most important part of school for them, and it was getting bad cup of hi-protein food. our food assistance has been critical in supporting populations around the world. at the same time, we have real opportunities to create opportunities for farmers to lift them out of poverty through their own hard work and ingenuity. the usda has invested in the status of efforts, as has usaid. it is important to have those

tools at our disposal. we need to use every tool at our disposal. >> you have stated on several occasions that in agricultural development, women are central to usaid goals and activities. what specifically are you doing to promote this? >> that is a great question. usaid is one of the agencies that two decades ago started the drum beat that women and girls are critical to development. we know that we have seen study after study that shows every additional $1 of income that goes to a woman is far more likely to be invested in the children, improving their nutrition, access to school, their ability to pull the community out of poverty and into a more successful life. and yet, when we look to the millennium development goals, the established goals for

development and education, across the board one area where the goals have been slower are those things that touch on women and girls. maternal and child health is an example. this administration has tried to focus on concrete things we can do to support women and girls and their access to programs and policies that will enable their success. we are doing a lot of specific things. in our health program, we are focused on maternal and child health and really trying to invest in this specific types of prevention that can be protective, critically -- particularly in the critical 1000-day window. in that window, we know that is where you win or lose the fight against nutrition for both mothers and children. we are focused on the problem. we can to a range of other things. we can focus on concrete

operational decisions that will drive benefits and programs to women and girls specifically. in our feed the future effort, we will collect women's income in a desegregated way so we can track outcomes for women. as we will insist that people that are hiring extension women are more likely to reach out to other women and are more affected -- effective in providing benefits in that context. there are a lot of different things we can do. we have to be strictly operational about making the secretaries commitment and our general commitment -- secretary's commitment and our general commitment to women and girls and the knowledge that it is important. >> finally, security. the administration suggests it wants to work with the private

sector on food security. what does that look like? how does the government leverage private sector innovation and leadership? but there are so many ways to answer that, but let me give you one example -- >> there are so many ways to into that, but let me give you one example. i was in senate called at a company that was among the first to do the distribution of milk in that area. there's a huge unmet need for dairy products in senegal. they have a program for collecting milk from small-scale dairy producers around the country, most of whom are women and otherwise will have a little bit of milk for their family and will take the rest and either give away or just lose it to waste and spoilage. instead, this company together with usaid and our partners are

creating specific collection hubs. so people can go get a voucher, get a return for collecting their excess milk and putting it into a formal diary system. in country after country, if we can make that available to thousands of small producers, we can see the large scale change -- and in india, for example. it has been called a dairy revolution. it has changed the and the profile of hundreds of communities. it has been very large scale. it can succeed if we're smart and strategic. that is just one example. >> variations of the most commonly-cent in -- sent in question today. are there ways to insulate and monitor projects to make sure

funds go where they need to gut? >> that is a great question. we have no tolerance for corruption in any of our programs. that is why we have the inspector general on the ground in port-au-prince, helping oversee disbursements and contracts. that is why we have teams of inspector general's in afghanistan, very rigorously evaluating the flow of funds. in addition to that, we to a number of things to address that issue. we address civil society and organizations that can make fun ds flow more transparent and build real accountability for public resources. usaid does have a number of contracts we can use to protect the flow of our funds. we recognize it is imperative to not put them at risk.

at the same time, we do want to partner with countries. one thing we can offer countries working actively to improve their public management systems, to build transparent systems and applied practice and sound and transparent financial management, once they do those things and we certify they have done it and we have a system for monitoring that, we can invest in those vehicles as well. it is a nuanced approach. we are committed to protecting u.s. tax dollars against corruption at all costs. >> can you describe this specifically in the context of afghanistan? >> sure. afghanistan is a great example. we have gone from 8.5% of our overall spending going into public-related mechanisms to about 13.5%, and we expect that to go up.

the ministry of health is a great example. we spent years building a procurement system, working with the industry and betting with our own partner's expertise to build the kind of vehicle we can use to invest resources. once we ensure that is transparent and safe and we could monitor, we started bringing in other partners as well. the benefit of that is a lot of the other partners could use the same funding pipeline, and it allowed much better coordination with the ministry. it allowed us to define a basic package of health intervention. the results have been dramatic to scale to 85% of the population. the agency can do extraordinary things, but sometimes it takes time and we have to make sure we can build accountability into everything we did.

>> this morning, the administration announced global health working in other countries. what can be expected? >> that is a timely question. we just made that announcement today. we were proud to have those ghi plus countries. this is really about how we work with other countries and getting more from our collective investments, across usaid's investments, investments made by the centers for disease control, and so many other aid programs, including the national institutes for health. it is about bringing our work together and getting more outcomes for the resources going in. it is a way to live out the principles for our agency. we want to work in partnership. we do not want to develop a

parallel system for delivery in a country. how can we help them build the capacity to sustain these our commitments are not in less? -- endless? what the country teams are in the process of doing is developing a shared health system strengthening approach, reinvesting in smart, evidence- based strategies for reaching women and children, maternal and child health and in particular, and focusing on where to get the most leverage by working together. what that means for our partners is that we would ask you work with us to design programs that are going to abide by those criteria, that you were with us across agencies and programs, and fundamentally you work -- as some many of you already do -- you work with country ministries

and systems said that we can make the work that we do really country-fund and managed and over the long term, we can see a path for success. >> the reconstruction effort in haiti will require multi sector approaches. how will usaid shelter be construction assistance? >> that is a great question. i might ask paul to help address it. part of this is what i talked about in my remarks. helping to train local firms in modern and coated-specific construction meant kids -- code-specific construction methods is one example. this will ensure its leads to

local economic opportunities in of a vibrant private sector that can sustain the haitian economy over time. if you look at sectors that take that approach, that is a big part of how we are trying to do that. by marrying expertise from here with management and expertise in haiti. we think we can use this model. we have learned from using this in other parts of the world what works and what does not. we are trying to build a sustainable and one day prosperous haiti as a result of this tragic event. >> one of the challenges of haiti is it has the highest per- capita tuberculosis burden in the latin america region. what support main usaid aid -- may usaid aid in the

development of new tb vaccines? >> hiv, tuberculosis, and malaria vaccines are among the most important in terms of having the kinds of technology that can, over time, eliminate the is diseases. there have been big breakthroughs on the development pathways for each of those. we continue to work with the global export community to do that and continue our engagement with other federal finance -- science partners. there have been other breakthroughs that are even closer, like improved diagnostic technologies that can help rapidly assess at low cost the kind costtb -- the kind of tb someone has and that can help with outcomes. you're working with our partners to do that work and we will

continue to expand efforts in that area. >> more globally, looking at aids prevention, the u.s. has been funding organizations that view aids prevention through a strictly heterosexual lynns. how does usaid try to meet diversity requirements for aids prevention. >> it is important to realize how important is prevention is. all lot of what treatment has enabled is giving people a sense of hope, and that encourages voluntary testing and counseling. it encourages a broader access to prevention programs. we have to do a better job of getting more cases and infections averted, if we are going to be successful at changing the epidemic read large. of course, there is a lot of science and research going into

the best methods. in particular, there have been recent insights into everything from male circumcision to help particular behavioral programs and engagements can be effective in a large scale. we are trying to learn from all of those and we calibrate our programs so we are learning from an evidence-based approach. this is one of the big challenges in global health, really understanding what the preventions are in making these reductions. i just came from senegal, where the early in the course of the epidemic, they have a lot of public leadership. very forward-looking policies. used access to condoms and other interventions and they were very successful in keeping the prevalence rate below 1%. i think it is 0.7% today. we need to be more aggressive about getting the new infections

diverted. >> we are almost out of time. the for the last question, we have important matters to take care of. first, to remind the audience of future speakers. on monday, the doctor -- dr. edward miller will discuss aspects of the new health care law. on tuesday, oliver stone will speak about his new movie, making it and the political views and addresses. and venus williams will be here on october 12. [laughter] do not forget, the national press club will once again be assisting -- hosting the national press club 5k. beat the deadline. to register, go to www.press.org. now the moment we have been waiting for. the traditional national press

club mog. -- mug. [applause] now our final question. it is inevitable when you reach the position of national press club the speaker at a relatively young age, compared to some people we have had speaking here -- no commentary on them or you. [laughter] you are the head of the usaid, but for some people, that is not enough. final question. development experts have said the usaid chief position should be elevated to cabinet status or a seat on the national security council. do you agree? [laughter] >> i thought you were going a different place for that question. in case anybody wants to know, i

was not the running for president. i think it is incumbent upon us to get this reform agenda enacted in may usaid the most -- and make usaid the most effective strategic enterprise anywhere in the world. i have seen what people are capable of. i know we can be successful. i know in this administration, we have a huge amount of support for development at all levels. i have been fortunate to have as much access as i could ask for to help carry out this mission. secretary clinton has been to our building to express her support. michelle obama did the same. we have supporters everywhere. what we need to do is execute on our mission. i really believe this -- it is the best mission in the world. which makes this one of the best jobs in the world. i love it and i am excited about it. thank you. >> thank you for coming today.

[applause] we would also like to thank the national press club's staff for organizing today's event. for more information, check out www.press.org. thank you. this meeting is adjourned. . . [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

this didn't >> he was a volatile, emotional, very complicated kind of a depressive young man, and very adventuress. he was having an adventure. >> take a look at the 1831 tour of america. leo on his new book. that this sunday. >> it is campaign 2010 your way with the seas -- with the seaspan video library. you can follow the primary season. it is all free online anytime.

>> seaspan, our public affairs content is available on tv, radio, and on line. and you can connect with us on twitter, facebook, and youtube and sign up for our schedule alert e-mails @ c-span.org. >> secretary of state hillary clinton said thursday they ratified treaty -- she appeared alongside secretaries of defense and energy, the chairman of the joint chiefs. carl levin and chairs the senate armed services committee. this is about two hours in 20 minutes.

>> would like to welcome our witnesses. hillary rodham clinton. secretary gates. steven chu, an admiral michael mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. it is a pleasure to have all of you with us this morning. at the this secretary chu's first appearance at this committee. the new strategic arms reduction treaty before us today is an important treaty. and it will, as admiral mullens said earlier this month, make our country more secure and advance our core national security interests. this treaty is in keeping with a long tradition of bilateral, verifiable, arms control agreements with russia and its predecessor, the soviet union. and it strengthens the u.s. commitment to non-proliferation. the united states senate has previously approved 10 bilateral arms control agreements with russia and before that, the soviet union,

with overwhelming bipartisan majorities. only one was opposed by more than six votes. in that case, there were 19 boats opposed to it. and that was in 1993. three of these treaties were considered during some of the most difficult days of the cold war. yet, there were all approved with overwhelming support. this new start treaty supports a credible nuclear deterrent and maintains the nuclear triad, while allowing both the u.s. and russia to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons. between them, the u.s. and russia have more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. while each country clearly has more weapons than needed, reductions will happen only through treaties as neither side wants to be unilaterally disarming. this new treaty will help ensure that needed reductions continue one measured step at a time. reductions of both nations'

nuclear inventories are also required by the nuclear non- proliferation treaty, the npt. that is a treaty that we strive to have non-nuclear nations adhere to. this treaty continues the reductions started in the moscow treaty, which president george w. bush negotiated. unlike the moscow treaty, however, this treaty is a verifiable treaty with inspections and other mechanisms that will ensure transparency. in the nuclear arsenals of each side. this treaty will continue, although with different mechanisms than the start 1 treaty, the means to allow both of the u.s. and russia to monitor each other's nuclear systems. this new treaty and the attention that president obama has brought to the threat from the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials are critically important. the proliferation threat is real and includes the possibility

that nuclear weapons and materials could fall into the hands of terrorists or others who wish to threaten the use of or use of nuclear materials. through this treaty and the related efforts to secure weapons-grade fissile materials, these dangers will be reduced. fundamentally, this treaty is a treaty that limits its strategic offensive nuclear arms. it does not limit anything else. some might want it to limit more. some might fear that it does limit more. but it does not. for instance, there have been statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints on our missile defense plans and programs. that is simply incorrect. from the very beginning of the negotiations, this administration has been clear that this treaty limits the strategic, offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses.

the unilateral statement made by russia concerning missile defense does not limit or constrain our missile defense efforts. indeed, a u.s. unilateral statement makes it clear that our missile defense systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with russia and the united states missile defense systems would be employed to defend the united states against limited missile launches and to defend its allies and partners against regional threats. the unilateral statement that we may also states that the united states intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against a limited attack and as part of our co average of approach to strengthening stability in key regions. the unilateral statement of the united states will be made part of the record at this time. the united states must maintain that the stockpile with or

without this treaty. this treaty does bring renewed attention to that nuclear stockpile. this new focus on maintaining the nuclear stockpile through increased scientific and technical rigor ensures a credible nuclear deterrent and paves the way to future reductions. in the early days of the stockpile stewardship program, significant strides are made in the ability of the nuclear weapons complex to maintain nuclear weapons without testing. it has been almost 18 years since the last explosive nuclear weapons test was conducted, and still the stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. in many ways, the scientists and engineers know more today about nuclear-weapons and how they function than they did in the president obama, secretary gates, secretary clinton, secretary chu have laid out a

plan to increase funding for the nuclear weapons complex and ensure a robust capabilities for the foreseeable future. the former administrator of the national nuclear security administration has said that he would have truly welcomed the budget as robust as this budget planned by the obama administration. so we look forward to a good discussion of all these issues with our distinguished witnesses, and i call upon senator mccain. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and i thank your distinguished witnesses for their service to our country and for joining us today to discuss the next tree and its implications for our national security. i have supported previous bipartisan efforts to reduce our nuclear weapons in step with the russian government, and i have been proud to do so. as we evaluate the new start treaty and consider how to vote on it, i think they're three areas of concern the need to

resolve to. first, we need to be confident that the treaty is verifiable, and we will have a better sense of that once congress receives the new national intelligence estimate. second, we need to be confident that the treaty in no way limit the administration's ability and willingness to deploy a missile defense capabilities regardless of the statements made by the russian government. finally, we need to be confident that any future reductions in our nuclear stockpile will be accompanied by a serious long- term commitment to modernizing our nuclear stockpiles so we can have confidence in its safety, security, and reliability. on missile defense, as we are all aware, the concern that the new start treaty could constrain our capabilities is an issue of significant importance. secretary gates, you have been quite clear that "the treaty will not constrained united states from deploying the most

of the act of missile defense as possible. we will impose additional costs and barriers on those defenses. while such assurances are welcome, they do not change the fact that the treaty text not just the preamble but article 5 of the treaty itself includes a clear, legally binding limitation on our missile defense options. now this may not be meaningful limitations, but it is impossible to deny that it is a limitation, as the administration has said. i continue to have serious concerns about what the administration agreed to this language in the treaty text after telling the congress repeatedly during the negotiations and that they would do no such thing. and i fear it could fuel russia's clear desire to establish unbounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons. i look forward to discussing the rationale behind a tree these references to missile defense. and as we do, i would reiterate my long-held view that any notion of a russian veto power

over decisions on our missile defense architecture is unacceptable, and we should oppose any attempts by any administration to do so. as part of the administration's the middle of the new start treaty to the senate, fiscal year to does intend defense authorization bill required a report on the plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex and delivery vehicles. with respect to the nuclear weapons complex, i am is skeptical that the 10-year funding plan for nnsa adequately addresses the needs of the weapons complex. the double counting of funds, combining those already planned for a sustained and with the modernization effort, paints a misleading picture. $80 billion over the next 10 years is certainly a substantial sum. however, only a fraction of that amount is actually above what would be allocated is simply to sustain the current stockpile.

given the long-term neglect of the past decade, it is imperative that our investment fulfills our immediate and future national security needs. the administration's proposal establishes an adequate base line and while more funding is likely needed, affordability must be closely scrutinized. a blank check is not an appropriate way to recapitalize our strategic return. modernizing our nuclear delivery vehicles, enhancing missile defense, and developing conventional weapons to augment our nuclear force far exceeds the necessary costs for the weapons complex alone. this future financial commitment is daunting, so we need to allocate each and every dollar wisely and to the greatest benefit of our national security, careful not to simply pass the funding burden on to future administrations and congresses. if we must have a clear understanding of these priorities from this administration as well as a

commitment that such investments will be represented and the/forthcoming budget requests. let me conclude by saying this treaty will have implications on our nuclear force structure, and i look forward to hearing additional details on the composition of our strategic forces from our witnesses this morning." thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator mccain. now let me start with secretary clinton. >> thank you very much. it is a great pleasure for me to return to testify before a honored to serve on. very%- and we're here today, secretary gates, secretary chu, admiral mullens and myself because we share a strong belief that the new start treaty will make our country more secure, and we urge the senate to ratify it expeditiously. i know that some argue we do not need a new start reidy, but let's be clear about the choice

before us. it is between this treaty and no obligation for russia to keep its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level. and between this treaty and no on the ground and verification of russia's strategic forces. as secretary gates and as chairman 11 have pointed out, every previous president of both parties to face this choice has concluded that the united states is better off with a treaty that without one. and the u.s. senate has always agreed. more than two years ago, president bush began this process that led to this treaty that we're discussing today. and the new start treaty has already received broad bipartisan endorsement. as the secretary of defense for president nixon and ford and secretary of energy for

president carter declared recently in his congressional testimony, if it is obligatory that the united states to ratify. why do so many people who have studied this issue over so many years coming from opposite ends of the political spectrum agree so strongly? well, today i would like to discuss briefly what the new start treaty is and also what it is not. this is a treaty that if ratified will provide stability, transparency, and predictability for the two countries with more than 90% of the world's nuclear weapons. it is a treaty that will reduce the permissible number of russian and u.s.-deployed strategic warheads to 1550, a level not seen since the 1950's. in addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles and

800 deployed and non-deployed strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers. these limits will help the united states and russia bring our deployed strategic arsenals, which were sized for the cold war, to levels that are more appropriate for today's threats. this is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons with an extensive verification regime. now this regime draws upon our experience over the last 15 years in implementing the original start treaty. the verification provisions reflect today's realities, including the much smaller number of facilities in russia compared with the former soviet union. and for the first time, we will be monitoring the actual numbers of warheads on deploy strategic missiles. so by bringing the new start treaty into force, we will

strengthen our national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage to tackle a core national security challenge, nuclear proliferation. this will also demonstrate our leadership and strengthen our hand as we work with others told irresponsible governments accountable. whether it is further isolating iran and enforcing the rules against violators or in persuading other countries to implement better controls on their own nuclear materials. and it makes clear that we are committed to real reductions and to of holding our into the bargain under the non- proliferation treaty, which is already brought about important benefits in my discussions with foreign leaders about strengthening the non- proliferation regime and a range of other topics. but i want to also be very clear that there are numerous things this treaty will not do. as secretary gates and admiral mullens will discuss more fully, the new treaty does not

compromise nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our allies. it does not infringe upon the flexibility we need to maintain our forces, including bombers, submarines, and missiles in a way that best serves our own national security interests. this treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts. and i want to underscore this, because i know there have been a lot of concerns about it and i anticipate a lot of questions. but this is something this committee recently reiterated in the fy 2011 national defense operation it -- authorization bill. section 231 reads -- it is the sins of congress that there no constraints contained in the new start treaty on the development or deployment by the united states of the fact of missile defenses, including all phases of the phase-adapted approached

a missile defense in europe and further enhancements to the ground-based midcourse defense system as well as future missile defenses. now i work with some of you on this committee when i had the honor of serving in the senate on behalf of the ery strong missile defense system. so i want to make this a very clear. russia has issued a unilateral statement expressing its view, but that is not an agreed upon in view. that is not in the treaty. it is the equivalent of a press release, and we're not in any way bound by it. we have issued our own statement which is now part of the record, making clear that the u.s. in tens and is continuing to improve and deploy effective missile defense systems. the treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces, but that is simply a statement of fact. it is not in any way constrain

our missile defense programs. now the treaty also includes language, and i think this is senator mccain's reverence to article 5, prohibiting the conversion or use of offensive missile launchers or missile defense interceptors and vice versa. but in fact, we had no intention of doing that anyway. as general o'riley, our missile defense director, has made clear in testimony, we reached the conclusion it is actually cheaper to build smaller, tailor-made missile defense silo's than to confer -- than to convert offense of launchers. we could have had a long list. we're not going to launch from any moving vehicle like a car or truck or a cow. we could have said a lot of things that we're not going to do. but the fact is, we were not going to do them, and we were not going to do this either. the treaty does not restrict us in any way from building new

missile defense launchers, 14 of which are currently being constructed in alaska. i think the very fact on the ground undermine and refute any argument to the contrary. now the obama administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile defense in fiscal year 2011. that is almost $700 million more than congress provided in 2010. finally, the new treaty does not restrict our ability to modernize their nuclear weapons complex to maintain a safe, secure, and effective deterrent. as secretary chu will discuss, this administration has called for a 10% increase in fiscal year 2011 for overall weapons and infrastructure activity in a time a very serious budget constraints. and we have called for a 25% increase in direct stockpile work. during the next 10 years, this

administration proposes investing $80 billion in our nuclear weapons complex. so let me conclude by taking a step back and putting the new start treaty into a larger context. this treaty is one part of a broader effort to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world has ever known, especially the potential intersection of violent extremism and nuclear proliferation. we have several coordinated efforts that have been briefed to this committee including the nuclear posture review, the nuclear security subject -- not -- senate, and extensive bilateral engagements. while a ratified a new start treaty sounds -- stands on its own terms, and when you look at the real benefits it provides to our national security, it is part of a broader strategy. so mr. chairman, senator mccain, members of the committee, we stand ready to work with you as

you undertake your constitutional responsibilities with respect to this treaty, and we're ready to answer any and all questions. and we hope that at the end of your deliberations, you will come to the same conclusion that we and many others have reached, including many others who have sat in these chairs and voted in the senate chamber, that this treaty makes our country more secure and merits the senate consents for ratification. thank you. >> thank you very much. secretary gates. >> members of the committee, see whether the opportunity to speak today regarding the new strategic arms reduction treaty between the u.s. and russia. an agreement that reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two nations in a manner that strengthens the stability of our relationship and protects the security of the american people. america's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national security, deterring potential adversaries and

reassuring allies and partners. the first step of the yearlong nuclear posture review was an extensive analysis, which among other things, determined how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed. this in turn provided the basis for our negotiation of new start. the results of those studies give me confidence with the department of defense that they will be able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure that they're safe, secure, and reliable, all within the limits of the new treaty. the u.s. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on the triad of delivery systems, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear capable of heavy bombers within the boundaries negotiated in the new start treaty. these are an upper boundary of 1550 deployed warheads, up to 700 deployed icbm's nuclear

capable heavy bombers, and it to 800 deployed in non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. under this treaty, we retain the power and the freedom to determine the composition of our force structure, allowing the united states complete flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best protect our national security interests. the defense department has established a base line force structure to guide our planning, one that does not require changes to current or planned basing arrangements. the department will retain 240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles distributed among 14 submarines, in each of which will have 20 longitude. this is the most survivable leg of the triad. recognizing the need for flexibility in the bomber like, we will retain up to 60 deploy heavy bombers, including all 18 operational b2's. the u.s. will retain up to 420

deployed single warhead minuteman icbm's at three missile bases. i will also address some of the things the treaty will not affect. first, a secretary and said, the treaty will not constrain the united states from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible. nor impose additional koster barriers on those defenses. i remain confident in the u.s. as of events program, which has made considerable advancements including the testing and development of the sm3 missile, which will deploy in the year. as the review and budget plans made clear, the u.s. will continue to improve our capability to defend ourselves, are deployed forces that and allies and partners against ballistic missile threats. secretary clinton has pointed out our request for missile defense in the 2011 budget is fiscal year 2010 number.acted%- and we're looking at an increase beyond that of potentially to

another $1 billion for 2012. we have made all this clear to the russians in a unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty. it is not surprising the russia continues to object to our missile defense program as they have objected to all u.s. missile defense efforts for decades. the russians know that our missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic missiles launched by countries such as iraq or north korea. our missile defense is to not have the capability to defend against the russian federation's large advanced personal. consequently, u.s. missile defenses do not and will not affect russia's strategic deterrent. to build such a capability, and missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980's is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive, and the stabilizing therefore, we have no plans to do so. separately from the treaty, we're discussing missile defense cooperation with russia, which

we believe is in the interest of both nations. but such talks had nothing to do with the opposing any limitations on our programs or deployment plans. the new treaty does not restrict our ability to develop and employ a conventional strike capability second attack targets anywhere on the globe within an hour or less. the treaty to limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles combined with the ceiling of 15 dicty deployed warheads accommodates the limited number conventional warheads we may need for this capability. we are also concurrently examining potential future global strike systems that would not be limited by this treaty. in my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its provision for a strong verification the intelligence committee will provide the talcum classified assessment, but i will a to emphasize some of the key elements which will monitor russia's compliance with the treaty. i will provide important insights into the science and

composition of russian strategic forces. the treaty allows each party to conduct a to 18 on that inspections each year at operating basis for icbn's and nuclear capable heavy bombers as well as storage facilities, test ranges, and conversion and elimination facilities. a database is updated every six months which will help provide the united states with a rolling overall picture of russia's strategic offensive forces. unique identifiers for the first time will be assigned to each icbm, slbm, and heavy bombers, allowing us to track the life cycle. the treaty provides for non- interference for national technical means of verification. elementary is not needed to verify the provisions of this treaty, but the terms call for the exchange of telemetry on up to five launches per year from each side. it is confident that the new start treaty will in no way

compromise america's nuclear deterrent. maintaining a credible deterrent requires an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, reliable nuclear warheads. this calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex. our infrastructure and science technology and engineering base. i have been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for this, and this is the first time i think i have got a fair shot of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal. to this end, the department of defense is transferring $4.6 billion to the national nuclear security administration through fiscal year 2015. this transfer will assist in funding critical nuclear weapon life extension programs and efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. the initial applications of this finding, along with that additional $1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear reactors, are reflected in the president's 2011 budget request, which i urge the congress to

approve these investments in the nuclear posture review strategy for warhead life extension represent a credible a modernization plan to assist in the nuclear infrastructure and support our nation's deterrent. many close with a final personal observation. i first began working on strategic arms control with the russians in 1970, 40 years ago. a u.s. effort that led to the first strategic arms limitation agreement with moscow two years later. the key question then and in the decades since has always been the same, is the united states better off with a strategic arms agreement with the russians are without it? the answer for success of both parties has always been with an agreement. the u.s. senate has always agree. the same answer holds true for new start. the u.s. is better off with this treaty than without it. i am confident that it is the right agreement for today and for the future. it increases stability and predictability, allows us to

sustain a strong nuclear triad, preserves our flexibility to deploy the new cleric, non- nuclear capabilities needed for deterrence. in light of all the sectors, i urge the senate to give its advice and consent to ratification and the new treaty. >> thank you very much. secretary chu. >> thank you. thank you for the opportunity to testify. new start, if ratified and entered in force, the treaty will commit the russian federation to lower levels of deployed strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable way. this will increase stability between our countries while demonstrating our joint commitment to nuclear nonproliferation treaty. secretary clinton, secretary gates, and admiral mullen are testifying to the diplomatic and security advantages of this

treaty. i want to focus on how it will allow us to continue to modernize our nuclear security enterprise and to maintain its scientific capability that ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. the successes of our nuclear programs depend on the incredible technical capabilities at the department of energy's national laboratories -- our capabilities in the stockpile extending nuclear weapon lifetimes, to assess other nominations and nuclear capabilities, and to dismantle retired weapons as the stockpile decreases in size, overall science, technology, and engineering and turns will increase in importance. the new treaty will enhance, not harm, our ability to maintain the safety, security, and of active list of our nuclear weapons stockpile. this conclusion is based on three important considerations. first, the treaty supports our

modernization agenda. yesterday i delivered a detailed stockpile stewardship and management plan that provides a multi-decade investment strategy, easy to extend the life of key nuclear weapons systems, rebuild and modernize our facilities, and provide for the necessary physical and intellectual3 these modernization efforts provide a strong foundation to the limits on deploy nuclear weapons under the new start treaty. nothing in the treaty will constrain these efforts. none of the department's energy sites will be subject to inspection under the new start treaty, and none of our operations will be subject to limitations. we will be able to maintain and improve the signs of a base of our nuclear weapons activities. second, the u.s. will remain free to determine the size of the stockpile. the weapons in the active stockpile will continue to be retired in dismantled consistent with the defense department's

requirements and presidential direction. we remain on track to meet our programs requirement to dismantle all the retired warheads currently in the dismantling cuba in 2020. nothing in this treaty imposes any restrictions on this work. third, the treaty provides the exclusive right of both parties to determine the composition and structure of their nuclear forces within the treaty's overall limits. further, the new start treaty contains no limitation that could constrain our warhead life extension program options or work to assess and correct any future warhead issue. as it was made clear, the nuclear posture review, this administration is committed to starting all options available for future life extension programs, including reuse, refurbishment, and replacement on a case by case basis. we are committed to fully funding the ongoing life extension program for the w76 submarine based warhead for completion in 2017.

and for the full study for the b61 bomb to insure first production begins in 2017. we will also be displayed in the nuclear-weapons council on the study of the lep options for the w78 icbm warhead. the new start treaty does not place limits on any of these programs. i believe it enhances u.s. national security without jeopardize the the nuclear deterrence that helps underwrite it. as you consider this treaty, even be certain that the nation's nuclear stockpile will remain safe, secure, and effective. to modernize our enterprise, we are investing in science, technology, and engineering. the president's fiscal 2011 budget requests will increase science funding by more than 10%. we are investing in the infrastructure we need. the highest infrastructure parties are the construction of major new nuclear ffcilities for plutonium and uranium.

and we're investing in human capital and creating an environment that can attract highly trained and motivated personnel. these personnel, over one-third 50 of them for over 40 days and 40 nights, have been returning their attention to the gulf spill, and it has been remarkable to see that more. we have begun as were already, but it will take sustained leadership from this congress to see it through. the fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects a 30% increase over fiscal year 2010 and includes more than $7 billion for weapons activities and infrastructure. over the course of the next decade, our plans call for investment of $80 billion. with the support of congress, will transform from a cold war based infrastructure to make moderate capabilities-based+ nuclear security enterprise. this will provide the confidence and tools that allow

the u.s. to consider further nuclear-weapons reductions as we work toward a world without nuclear weapons. thank you. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, secretary chu. admiral mullens. >> i am pleased to add my voice and -- in support of the ratification of the new start treaty and to do so as soon as possible. we are in our seventh month without a treaty with russia. this treaty has the full support of your uniformed military. throughout its negotiations, secretaries clinton and engaged in sure that professional military perspectives were thoroughly considered. during the development, as personal involved include two face-to-face negotiating sessions and several conversations with my counterpart, the chief of the russian general staff, regarding key aspects of the treaty. the joint chiefs and i also have time to review the analytic work done in the nuclear posture

review regarding the shape of future u.s. strategic nuclear forces. its recommendations were transmitted as guidance to the negotiating team in geneva regarding the three central limits on strategic systems. in the warheads and associated with them that are contained in the treaty. in short, the conclusion and implementation of the new start treaty is the right thing for us to do, and we took the time to do it right. the chiefs and i believe the new start treaty issue is an important and necessary balance between three critical aims. it allows us to retain a strong and flexible american nuclear deterrent. it helps strengthen openness and transparency in our relationship with russia. it also demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide risk of a nuclear incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons. i firmly believe that the central limits established in this treaty and the provision that allows each side the freedom to determine its own

force mixed provides us with the necessary flexibility to feel the right future force to meet the nation's needs. we plan to retain our triad of bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. in sufficient diversity in numbers to ensure strategic stability between ourselves and the russian federation. we will also maintain sufficient capability to deter other nuclear states. in addition, the agreement provides for an array of a born verification measures that are critical to both sides in monitoring compliance with the new treaty, and those have been spoken to in earlier statements. this treaty is also a critical element in the president's agenda for reducing nuclear risk to the u.s. it also our allies and partners and the wider international community. it recently included npr acknowledges the continuing role of nuclear weapons in the defense of america, while

placing additional emphasis on positive steps to prevent nuclear terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation. in summary, this new start agreement is important and should also be viewed in a wider context. it makes meaningful reductions in the u.s. and russian strategic nuclear arsenals while strengthening strategic stability and the united states national security. coupled with the administration's clear commitment to prudently invest in our aging nuclear infrastructure and in the warhead life extension programs, this treaty is a very meaningful step forward. i encourage the senate to fully steady the treaty. i believe you will see the wisdom of ratifying it. and i said before you today recommending that you do so. thank you. >> thank you very much, admiral mullen. because of the large number of senators that are here this morning and because secretary gates must leave a few minutes after 11:30 a.m., we're going to have a first round that will be

limited to five minutes. and then if there is additional questions and there is time after that first round, we will try to have the second round which might be a few minutes each. secretary clayton, let me start with you. during the course of the negotiations on the new start, were there any side agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any limitations on u.s. missile defenses or any other subject? >> no. >> admiral, let me ask secretary gates. article 5, paragraph 3 of the treaty would prohibit the feature conversion of icbm silos or slbm want is to be used for missile defense interceptors and vice versa. you testified, i believe, that

we have no plans to do such conversions, and it would not make any sense to do so because the cost is greater than a new silo for purpose of missile defense. but there's also a larger issue of the potential misunderstanding or miscalculation. it seems to me that if either side could use silos of one type for the other purpose. would you agree, secretary, that could be potentially destabilizing and dangerous if either side or to launch missile defense interceptors from icbm silos or from a ballistic missile submarines? and because such launches could appear to the other side to be launches of icbm's or slbm's. >> first, i would like to reinforce secretary clayton --

clinton's testimony to the fact that not only did we not have any plans currently to do -- transform, convert icbm silos into missile defense silos, as you said, because it does not make any sense from a financial standpoint. it is a lot chipper -- cheaper to build missile defense silos on iran, as we are doing. yes, i think it would be destabilizing if you did not know what was coming out of a missile silo. this is one of the challenges, frankly, that we face as we go forward with conventional strike. any of these things that are confusing to a party on the other side i think needs to be dealt with very carefully. >> and you made a brief reference to that comment to

what we are planning to build in alaska, and i believe that references to the plans to build eight spare silos of there, and does that not make it clear, even more clear than i think it already is, that there is no constraint on our ability to build those missile defense silos or even more if needed? >> yes, we're not only building out the second site in -- at the fort, but there will be eight spares those ones that work is complete. >> let me ask you a question about the verification issues, admiral. you do not yet have a national intelligence estimate on verification. but is it your judgment that this treaty is verifiable? was the intelligence community involved during the negotiations?

>> yes, sir, the intelligence community was involved throughout. obviously internally in our discussions as well as with our negotiations with the russians. it is my judgment that this treaty provides the necessary means to adequately verify, consistent with the previous treaty, that even though some of the verification means are different -- secretary gates pointed out the numbers of infractions, something that is specifically different, is the agreement in that treaty to put unique identifiers on every single weapon. clearly, continue to support the national technical means in an ability to verify and speaking specifically of telemetry, while not required, it also included the exchange of telemetry on

five missile tests or launches every single year. in totality, i am very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in the treaty right now. >> and as a matter of fact, is there not a concern from the intelligence perspective as to the status quo that there are no verification provisions that currently exist and there are no inspections that currently exist? >> the meet -- >> without this treaty? >> absolutely. we are in our seventh month in now with no treaty with the russians. and as secretary gates said, we're much better -- it is my view we're much better off with it than without it. >> including from the verification perspective? >> yes, sir. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. i think the witnesses. secretary clinton, i understand we have yet to receive requested data on russian complaints and

verification since 2005. when do we expect that data to be available to the senate? >> senator mccain, that will be available shortly. we're moving as quickly as possible. i know how important it is for your consideration, and we will get it to you very shortly. >> thank you. both you and secretary gates have talked about article 5 that would never be considered, that it would be not something that we would ever plan on. why is it in the treaty then? >> well, it is in the treaty in effect, i would argue, because there has been longstanding discussions paterson between -- discussions between the russians and the u.s., specifically there were questions asked about whether or not these silos that

cover the countryside in the many of our states that are no longer operative were going to be converted, and we said no. we had no intention of continuing with the conversion, and this would now be no longer a subject of continuing contention or discussion. it seemed to us to be a smart negotiating decision to put something in that frankly we never intended to pursue. and there were a number of issues that were very, very difficult to resolve in this treaty. the kind of verification. the numbers of visits. and telemetry. so in the course of the negotiation, to say that we're not going to do something we're not going to do seemed to be an appropriate position for us to take. >> well, if we are going to state in a treaty everything we were not going to do, it could be a very heavy document.

here's my fundamental dilemma that i think many of us face. at the time of the signing of the treaty, the statement was made by the russians that the treaty -- this treaty between russian federation and the u.s., signed on april 8, 2010 may be effective and viable only in condition where there is no qualitative or quantitative build up in missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america. that is a strong statement at the time of the signing of the treaty. then dmitry medvedev, president medvedev, made the statement on april 12 in an interview, said two countries negotiated a formula in the preamble of the new start treaty that states there is an "interconnection

between the strategic offensive arms and missile defense." so these circumstances will change, then we will consider. it is the reason to jeopardize the whole agreement. that is what mr. medvedev said. the foreign minister said on march 30 thin a press conference in canada that their obligations regarding missile defense in the treaty text and the accompanying entertainment text would constitute "a legally binding package, etc." i will have to get some kind of statement from the russians as to exactly what this treaty means in their view. because if the statement, the signing statement at the time that states there is a connection between this treaty and missile defense systems that

clearly states that there is only in condition that there is no qualitative or quantitative build up in the missile defense capabilities of the united states of america, that is a pretty clear statement. president medvedev has made the same statement. the need for a minister made the same statement. some russian leadership have all made this statement that this treaty is contingent upon the united states not changing or qualitative or quantitative build up in the missile defense systems. that is bound to be worrisome to anyone, particularly in light of the decision that was made concerning the polish and czech missile defense systems cancellation or replacement with another system that was done earlier in this administration.

so it is clear from the many statements that russian leadership has made that there is a very different interpretation of this treaty from what has been stated here concerning the connection to missile defense systems and that of the russians. so i would be more than happy to hear your response. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you for giving us the opportunity to respond. let me start by saying that historical the there have been these kinds of unilateral statements made by the russians. in fact, in connection with the signing of the original start treaty, the russians made similar statements that it would consider u.s. withdrawal from the abm treaty as sufficient grounds for its withdrawal from start. the u.s. withdrew from that treaty in 2001. the russian federation, as a successor to the soviet union, did not withdraw.

secondly, these unilateral statements have no binding effect, no legal effect. the agreement that president obama and medvedev signed is the treaty. and as with many other arms control treaties, it provides that either party, including obviously us, may withdraw from the treaty if that party decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its security interests. the russian unilateral statement merely reflects its current view that they disagree, as we have heard for years, with our commitment to building up on missile defense system capabilities. and it is ot in any way affecting us by undermining that

commitment. we remain committed, as you heard, in word and most particularly in financial ways. finally, what we read from medvedev in an april statement. i am not sure it is the one you read from. when asked about the unilateral statement, he said "that does not mean that because of this, if the american side starts to build up of the missile defense statement, that the treaty would automatically lose its power." he went on to say, "i would like to make sure that there is no impression that any change in the u.s. missile defense system would be reason to abandon a signed agreement." so i view the unilateral statement, and we have one of our own which is now on the record, as really a kind of

press release, if you will. here is our position, but we just signed a treaty. even the president of the russian federation says it is truly the agreement that we're going to be following. i understand the question, but i think that both historic ly and even in the words of president medvedev, this is not an issue that in any way constrains our limits our commitment to missile defense. >> i would like to very quick comment. first, to reinforce this. the russians can say what they want. it is not in the treaty, it is not binding on the u.s. what is interesting is even in their own unilateral statement, they hedged. because of the end of the statement they say about the buildup in the missile defense capabilities, such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the russian federation. since i said in my initial opening statement that we have no intention of creating such a

capability that would threaten the strategic deterrent capability of the russian rocket forces, even they basically gave themselves and out. >> of course, that is in the eye of the beholder. we obviously have a situation here where an official statement of the russian government states unequivocally and follow-up statements by members of the russian government that this treaty would be directly affected by "only in conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative build up in the missile defense system capabilities of the united states of america." is best an ambiguous situation. thank you. >> thank you. senator lieberman. >> thank you for being here. then me begin with this statement. my feeling is that if the new start treaty is ratified, it will be a small step forward for

mankind. but a long way, i am sure you would agree, from the dream that people harbor of having a nuclear-free world. the sad fact is that the current state of international relations as well as human history suggests that we're not on the verge of seeing a transformation of human behavior to lead us to a point where we will have a nuclear-free world. so as we take this small step forward in reducing the number of deployed strategic warheads, it of course makes the status of our nuclear stockpile smaller, somewhat smaller, as a result of this treaty. it is ratified even more important. i want to state the observation that there will be a lot of issues, some already raised today, about this treaty.

but ultimately, i think that whether or not the new start treaty is ratified will depend on members of the senate of both parties having the confidence that the administration is committed to modernizing our nuclear -- our current nuclear stockpile. . >> i assume you will be asking for this money because you feel our current nuclear stockpile is

aging in various ways -- is aging. and is in various ways, in need of modernization. secretary gates? >> i will ask dr. chu to chime in. the short answer is yes. we are the only nuclear power in the world that is not taking out these kinds of modernization programs. we have never claimed to want any new capabilities. simply to be able to make our weapons more safer, more reliable, more secure. the a/singer-pirie study conducted here in congress late out in detail a lot of the worries we have. not a ballots our stockpile today, but where we might be -- not about our stockpile today,

but where we might be in 10 years. ehaving to do with the componens age. we have needed this for quite some time. congress voted down be reliable replacement warhead program. there has been no progress to providing any funding for nuclear weapons modernization programs since that time. i think you put your finger on it. frankly, just basically realistically, i see this treaty as a vehicle to finally be able to get what we need in the bay of modernization we have been unable to get otherwise -- in the way of modernization that we have been unable to get otherwise. dr. chu? >> while we are not seeking a military capability, we seek to make the weapons more secure and more reliable. that means we are replacing old

electronics you cannot even buy any more. so they will be much less likely to ignite in a fire. something of that nature could set these weapons off. should any terrorist or anybody get ahold of these things, it would be impossible for them to set it off. modernization includes all of these factors. we are improving the safety, security, and viability of these weapons. no new military capability. >> ok. i appreciate the answer from both the year. as you know, when the nuclear posture review came out, there was language in net -- in its, o keep the nuclear stockpile secure and affected. the language in the review seemed to make it harder to

replace. even parts, it sounded like. i think in section 1251 of the report which he made to congress, he clarified that. and when to ask two questions. one is the obvious one -- which you have said dr. chu, there are some parts that cannot be replaced or refurbished. no one is asking for a replacement warhead now. there is nothing in the language or any administration documents that says to the scientist beeline here -- the " tonight even think about it." -- "do not even think about it." to protect our security, we need to build a replacement warhead, the need to be free to make that recommendation -- they need to be free to make that recommendation. >> absolutely. scientists are asked to look at

all the possibilities with and that many of refurbishment and replacement and new designs. there is something that says, ok, before you go to the detailed engineering design, there is a pause button. certainly, to look to the scientific capabilities, it would be prudent to not hold them back on any of those options. that is the position we are taking. >> thank you. my time is up. >> thank you, senator lieberman. >> secretary clinton, you were very clear in answering the chairman's first question about whether there was any secret agreement or side deal associated with the negotiation of the new start treaty that would affect missile defense. you were very clear in saying,

no, there were not. there is a press report that came out last night that claims that the administration is secretly working with the russians to conclude an agreement that would limit u.s. missile defenses. it goes on to say that the administration last month presented a draft agreement to the russians. is this report accurate? >> no, i am not aware of the report, senator collins. as secretary gates said, we have consistently told the russians that if they want to work with us on missile defense, we are open to working with them. maybe there is something lost in translation here because we have consistently reached out to them. we would like them to be part of a broad missile defense system that protects against countries like iran, north korea

-- both of which the border, by the way -- so it is in their interest. secretary gates mentioned that in his opening remarks. if i can ask him to add on to what i said. >> i have seen just a reference to the newspaper story that you described, and what i added in my opening statement was that whenever talks are going on are simply a bowel -- about trying to elicit their partnership with us in terms of regional missile defense, but there is nothing that in any way, shape, or form would impose any limits on our plans. >> thank you. secretary clinton, and perhaps secretary gates and dr. chu as well, one of my chief concerns

is that tactical nuclear weapons are not addressed by this treaty. the commission noted that russia has 3800 tactical nuclear weapons. that is about 10 times what has been our inventory. my concern is not just about the number. study after study has pointed out that tactical nuclear weapons are particularly vulnerable fourth half and diversion, and the administration -- for the theft, and the version. and the posture review admitted the fear of nuclear terrorism. if the administration believes the most immediate danger is seen nuclear terrorists, and i would agree with that assessment, why does the new

start treaty not address tactical nuclear weapons at all? since they are by far more vulnerable to the theft and the version? >> we share your concern, senator. the new start treaty was always going to replace start. that was the decision made by the bush administration which we decided to pursue in order to deal with strategic offensive nuclear forces. but we share your concern about tactical nuclear weapons, and we have raised with the russians and our desire to begin to talk with them, now that the new start treaty has been negotiated, about tactical nuclear weapons. we need to do this in conjunction with nato allies, because our principal use of tactical nuclear weapons has

historically been in europe, and that is where most of the russian tactical nukes are located, close to their border with europe. i raised this issue with the last nato ministerial. i received a positive response from our nato allies that we will work on our posture toward tactical nukes, because there are some in nato who have wanted to withdraw our own tactical nuclear weapons from europe. it is the position of the obama administration that we will not do that. we will only pursue reductions in our tactical nuclear weapons in concert with cuts in a rush as tactical nuclear weapons. that was well received by the majority of nato allies. >> i will just add that the personal opinion i think any

negotiation on tactical nuclear weapons with the russians is going to be a very difficult one. principally because they have such a disproportionately larger number deployed and we do in europe. -- than we do in europe. far more are deployed. getting the russians to agree to anything that ends up providing an equitable status on both sides, if you will, will be a very steep hill to climb. of just add, and in terms of our own capabilities, the f-35, including the aircraft we are selling to some of our allies, will be dual-capable. >> if i can add one more point, mr. chairman, i agree with secretary gates that negotiating with the russians on tactical

nuclear weapons will be difficult. we will need to ratify the new start treaty to have any chance to have a discussion on tactical nuclear weapons. i would add if you look at what we have done in reaching out to our nato allies, it is to prepare as to have that discussion within the context of our strategic concept review within nato, so that we can work toward a unified nato position when we began having serious discussions with the russians. i would underscore the importance of ratifying this treaty in order to have any exchange with the russians that could lead to verifiable reductions. >> thank you. >> thank you, senator collins.

senator ben nelson. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thank you to all of you for your service and for being here. i want to follow up on your response about working cooperatively with the russians in missile defense. in april, i hosted the u.s.- russia into a parliamentary group, which is a combination of u.s. senators and the russian federation council. we had meetings in moscow as well as here. they have been called the discussions of the prospect of missile defense cooperation. it seems to be a very strong thoughts with the federation council that they are interested from the parliamentary side, from the legislative side. they are clearly interested in

working cooperative lee with the sun missile defense. i understand it come from their own perspective and we come from ours. at least, not only at the executive level with president medvedyev, but also at the parliamentary level. i thought i would mention that. there are going to be all kinds of rumors going on. characterization's of those discussions are not always as accurate as we would hope that they might be. secretary gates, secretary clinton -- the question was raised by senator mccain, and it relates to whether there is a meeting of minds on this treaty between the russians and the united states. president made it if and -- medvedyev and president obama, about what is in the contract.

it appears there is a meeting of the minds on the contract, but posturing going on outside the contract. perhaps it would be helpful if you could, if not today, after word submit something to show this is nothing new. there is always posturing around the agreements. there have been instances of posturing in the past. we entered into agreements, and as to say, even in spite of some of the comments about whether or not we did certain things or did not do certain things, they would do certain things. those examples might put this to rest, because the question seems to be, is there a meeting of the mines? let me ask bluntly -- is there a meeting of the mineds, in your opinion? >> just two comments. i think there is a meeting of the minds between the two

presidents. second point, there is no meeting on missile defense. the russians have hated it. they have hated it since the 1960's. it will always hated. mostly because we will build it, and they will not. on the issue of the house, there is a meeting of the minds. on the peripheral issue, the contract, there is no meeting of the minds. >> secretary clinton, can you be as candid as that? >> of course i can. [laughter] >> of course. >> i think secretary gates said it very well. we have an agreement. someone can have an enforceable agreement to buy and sell a car or house, and they can go out and make all sorts of statements, but it has nothing to do with their obligations under the agreement. the only point i would add to what secretary gates has said it

is historically and in these agreements, the russians have said things like that. in my opening testimony, i talked about the original start treaty, where before it was signed, same sequence. the russians said if the u.s. pulls out of the abm treaty, we are pulling out of start. well, the u.s. pulled up the -- out of the abm in 2001, and the russians did not allow up start. i do not think we would all of us be telling you how comfortable we are about how we believe the meeting of the minds, and as admiral mullen has said twice and in this hearing -- we have no treaty, we have no verification going on at this moment. is it a perfect treaty? i do not know of such a thing

exists. in our considered opinion, it is so much in america's interest to get on with entering into the street. >> contract when no one. >> as an old law professor, i could not resist. thank you come up for participating in these inter- parliamentary activities. i have to confess, i was not as aware of the importance of these counterparts -- of the importance to our counterparts these meetings will. i do not know if we appreciate the significance of the potential opportunities they offer to us. thank you. >> thank you. >> if i could just briefly go back to the meeting of the minds, as i participated and watched these negotiations, the number of times the two countries' leaders personally engaged each other in the details of this i thought was

extraordinary. to the points that have been made in terms of within the bounds of the treaty, the meaning of the minds was evident to me, right through it very difficult negotiations. again, the commitment was extraordinary from my perspective, in terms of their understanding, participation, and the negotiation. >> thank you very much. >> senator nelson. >> secretary clinton, will come back to the committee. secretary gates, nice to have you. admiral, thank you for your service. secretary chu, welcome to the armed services committee. section 21 of the report explains the u.s. force structure of the treaty could consist of a certain number of bombers. since deployment has a maximum

level adding up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is mathematically impossible for the u.s. to make such a deployment and be in compliance with the treaty limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. clearly significant additional decisions will have to be made with respect to the u.s. force structure and the treaty. i would be reluctant to cast the vote in favor without more precise detail about the plans for our nuclear delivery structure. my question is, when dennis committee receive a more precise outline of how the -- when can this committee receive a more precise outline of how we can adhere to the treaty limits of 720 vehicles, and will the administration provide a classified briefing to those of us concerned on the specific plan for these deployed nuclear delivery vehicles?

>> certainly, we would be happy to provide a classified briefing in terms of the options we have to consider. from the outset, we do not anticipate any changes in the force structure under this treaty that would affect current basing, either of aircraft or missiles. here in the united states. the reductions in the treaty to not need to be made until the seventh year. -- do not need be made until the seventh year. i will ask admiral mullen to chime in here. my opening statement, as the fact sheet said, here are the categories and the numbers we are working men. frankly, i see no reason for us to make final decisions within less narrow frame marks -- frame

works until we have a better sense of strategic developments with russia and other countries as well, especially since we have all this time under the treaty. i think he -- the key reassurance i can is under all the options we are looking at, the ones that we think are likely to employment, it would not involve closing any of our missile bases or changing the basing of our bombers at this point. >> sir, i would just add that the uniformed leadership feels very strongly about not making those decisions before they are due. that is really seven years out the strength of the treaty, as -- that is really seven years out. the strength of the treaty, as defined, gives us some flexibility.

we are beginning to look at what the next submarine looks like, in that part of the triad. what we wanted was as much flexibility for as long as because have to make that decision, and we saw no need to do that now. i understand the math. i understand exactly where you are. we felt very strongly we wanted to wait as long as we could it to continue to assure the certainty of each leg of the triad as they doubt any in the street. >> the press has reported the administration will spend $100 billion over the next 10 years in nuclear delivery systems, about $30 billion of which would go toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine. according to estimates by u.s. strategic command, the current cost of maintenance is approximately $5.6 billion at

year, or $56 billion over the decade. that leaves $14 billion of the $100 billion the administration intends to invest. even last if you factor in inflation. that is not enough to acquire a next generation, and develop a conventional global -- a next generation bomber and develop a conventional global strike capability. why do you believe that $100 billion is a sufficient investment in our delivery systems over the next decade? >> from my perspective, senator, the current investment is a projection of what we understand right now. we are undertaking in the department a very thorough look of what the future, with respect to long range or the next

generation bomber is, recognizing the entire infrastructure -- sorry, all the systems will go to modernization of for the next couple of decades. from what i have seen in said the department over time, when those decisions get made, resources are made available to support them. one of the big challenges and concerns right now is the next generation missile submarine. it contains, quite frankly, replacing it, containing it, containing its costs, and making sure that we can sustain that part of the leg, as we look at how we're going to move ahead with the next generation bomber, as well as the next generation icbm. i am comfortable that the investment supports moving ahead and we will have to make adjustments overtime based on where the triad goes

specifically. >> i would say with the figure you mentioned, there are place holders for each of the modernization programs, because no decision has been made. they are basically to be decided. along the lines admiral mullen has just described. those are decisions we will have to make over the next few years. we will have to modernize the systems. we will have to figure out what we can afford. >> at this point, we do not know if the administration will pursue some of these programs? is that what you're saying? >> i am saying we have not yet made decisions on how we're going to modernize long-range strike, how we're going to modernize the icbm force. we are in the process. we have money in the budget for a new nuclear reactor for the navy, for the next generation nuclear submarine. we are on track in that particular area of

modernization. >> it seems my time has expired, mr. chairman. there may be questions that would like to submit for the record. >> so ordered, and thank you, senator. thank you for your thoughtful comments. chairman levin has taken a much more dangerous step in his support for ratifying this treaty. he has appointed me to serve as chairman of the committee until his return. i recognize myself for five minutes. dr. kissinger testified about this treaty last month, and he said it was an evolution of trees that have been negotiated with previous administrations of both -- evolution of treaties that have been negotiated with previous administrations of both parties. he said a rejection would indicate a new policy had started that might rely largely on the unilateral reliance of its nuclear weapons and would

create uncertainty in the calculations of adversaries and allies. would any of you like to comment on his statement? i recognize the secretary of state. >> senator, we agree with that assessment. our department has been briefing, along with our colleagues from the defense, from the joint chiefs, and from energy, a series of former diplomats and defense officials and energy officials, increasing -- including dr. kissinger. i think the over running sentiment is this treaty is in our national security interests, and a failure to ratify it this treaty would have foreseen and unforeseen consequences. one of the foreseen consequences is a return to a period of instability and unpredictability between the united states and russia, which

would not be in our security interests because given what we view as the major threats we face today -- nuclear war with russia is not one of them. thank goodness. you know, that is an evolution, as dr. kissinger has said, of political and strategic and economic changes since the cold war. but human nature being what it is, as senator lieberman said, if you introduce instability. -- if you introduce instability, there is no way we could be responsive. i think you will hear from all of us, we think this treaty continues the tradition other trees have exemplified -- other treaties have exemplified, making it possible to have an understanding with, legally- binding agreements with the russians that are very much to our interests, as well as

theirs. we are working with the russians on a range of matters. i think it would have been very unnikely a year ago we would have seen russia supporting our sanctions in the united nations against iran. we have been building consonance with russia along our range of important issues, and this negotiation over the new start treaty, especially as admiral mullen said, bringing in both of our presidents at a very high level probably a dozen times to hammer out a particular sign the treaty, has really been to our national security interest. the thing that is very much in support of what dr. kissinger testified to. >> secretary clinton talked about the contribution the treaty provides an in terms of transparency, predictability, and stability. one of the strategic developments we see going on

that has not been mentioned in this hearing is that the russians are, over time, reducing their reliance and the size of their conventional forces. for a variety of economic, demographic, and other reasons. as they reduced the size of conventional forces, they are focused on the modernization of strategic forces. in particular, their nuclear capabilities. from our national security standpoint, having this treaty provide the transparency, predictability, and stability in that kind of evolving environment is very much in the interest of the united states. >> admiral mullen, which you care to comment? are the ramifications for relationships? >> actually, i have worked on this multiple times with my counterpart and our staffs. i guess it would characterize it

the same way as i did between the two countries' leaders. very challenging positions. many issues have been raised here. the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. the issue of nuclear defense. the issue of telemetry. in the end, i was a very encouraged, the negotiations were difficult, with the willingness to move to a position to get to the street. from a russian military perspective -- obviously the two countries, but particularly the russian military perspective. i am encouraged. part of that is also represented an increase relationships across the board. this being a big piece of it iran for myself -- this being a big he said that. for myself and my counterpart, when we get to what we can do in

many other areas -- counter- terrorism comes immediately to mind. from where we were to where we are, even over the last couple of years, it has improved dramatically. >> my time has expired. i will recognize senator brown next. let me make two out final comments. it is a powerful picture to have the four of you sitting here, representing a broad set of viewpoints, supporting the treaty. thank you for taking the time to be here. i think secretary chu and secretary clinton are aware of our hearts policy work with russia. there are ways they point out we can work with russia. ways we can not to read their cultural and historical differences. the point make about expanding our relationship through the --

the point you make about expanding our relationship through the approval of this treaty -- the points you make about expanding our relationship through the approval of this treatt and are important. senator brown, you're recognized. >> thank you. thank you, secretary clinton for everything you are doing. i have a great concern about iran. i find that their nuclear ambitions are more destabilizing. i am wondering, in your negotiations with russia, have you been able to approach that subject with russia? i cannot imagine it would like a nuclear iran to help destabilize the region and potentially export their brand of terrorism, in many instances, around the world in the region. any comment on that? >> thank you, senator. welcome to this committee.

>> thank you. >> i think your concerns are well placed. the four of us and many others in the government spent a great deal of our time thinking about iran, how to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. i believe that our close cooperation with russia on negotiating this new start treaty added significantly to our ability to work with them regarding iran. three quick examples. because we developed very good working relationships, despite our disagreements, between our military and civilian leadership, i think it gave us a better base on which to raise concerns about iran. is it awhile. -- it took a while to make the

case to the russians that iran was pursuing not just a peaceful nuclear capacity, but in our view, poised to pursue nuclear weapons. once they became convinced there was some concern there, they began working with us. in the fall, we reached an agreement with russia and france to try to get iran to demonstrate some good faith by shipping out its low-enriched uranium outside of iran, to be enriched and returned, and the russians stood with us. they stood with us to all the ups and downs of that negotiation. finally, the russians have consistently made it clear that they share our concerns now about a nuclear-armed iran. it is hard to draw a straight

line from the many ways we have been " operating with them, but i think -- from the many ways we have been cooperating with them, but i think it is human relations, senator. we have to develop the highest level of cooperation between our presidents and our counterparts. you will see president medvedyev coming here next week for a summit with president obama. we have a very comprehensive set of issues the in taejon, openly, candidly. not always -- be in taejon, openly, candidly. not always in agreement. we think we have made a strong basis for our work on major threats. certainly a country like iran getting access to nuclear weapons. but russia is working with us. >> thank you. i would encourage you to continue that relationship, because i find it disturbing

with all the issues -- with all the efforts we are trying, iran is still circumventing sanctions. i appreciate your continued leadership. >> senator, you just put your finger on a schizophrenic russian approach to the us >> russian approach to this. >> glad you said that. >> when i was in moscow years ago, then-president putin said he considered iran russia's greatest national security threat. at the same time, i was told they do not need to have a missile to deliver a nuclear weapon to russia. and yet, they have these commercial interests in iran that go back more than 20 years.

in 1992, when i visited moscow as the first head of cia, i raised this with my counterpart about their support for the nuclear reactor in iran. we went back and forth, and finally, they said it was all about the money. it is this balancing act. in russia, they recognize the security threat iran represents, but there are commercial opportunities, which rank the, are not unique to them in europe. >> thank you. i have one final question, and that is among our wrestling with the strategic warheads, while the russians will deploy at least 3800 tactical nukes their warheads, in addition to strategic nuclear warheads, and as a result russians maintain a 10 to one superiority in tactical nuclear weapons.

we're outnumbered by two to one in terms of strategic nuclear weapons. you can deploy some of these weapons on submarines. it seems -- in trying to get a handle on ow all that is creating stability? i direct this to the secretary of -- how is this creating nuclear stability in a favorable manner for us and our allies? >> it is a concern, obviously. the strategic arms talks have always focused strictly on the strategic weapons. icbm's, long-range heavy bombers. i think the europeans are clearly concerned about this. there is a huge disparity in the number of those deployed weapons in europe, as you suggest.

i think there is a general feeling on our part and on the part of our european allies that the next step needs to involve this issue. i would echo something secretary clinton said earlier. we will never get to that step with the russians on tactical nukes if this treaty on strategic nuclear weapons is not ratified. >> thank you, mr. chairman. my time is expired. >> thank you, senator brown. just a quick comment on something that was just raised. i came back in the middle of the answer. on the commercial relationship between russia and iran, i understand it secretary clinton -- i understand -- secretary clinton, perhaps you can confirm this -- russia has finally cancel the sale of the best-300 -- s-300.

there are different reports to that. the sale to iran of those anti- air systems. do you know if that is accurate? >> i will check. my recollection is they announced once again a postponement, an indefinite suspension. i think we have to separate out, and we can get more information for both senator brown and the committee, iran is entitled to civil, peaceful, nuclear energy. >> we understand that. but the russians have consistently been working on the reactor at-year -- bashir and providing support. until the recent u.n. security

resolution, he could make the argument they were also entitled to defensive weapons, which the s-300's are claimed to be. the russians over the last 15 months, i would argue in part due to our relationship building, have never delivered those and have consistently postponed it. i will double check. if they canceled the sale, i am not aware of it. i am very much aware and supportive of their continuing suspension. >> is a very significant development. we are very happy they have this bond it. i think there was a report that they actually would go beyond that, following the un resolution. >> but they said was they would not deliver the system. is that a cancellation or an indefinite suspension? either way it is good news. it will not deliver the system. >> thank you. >> senator hageman -- hagen.

>> thank you to all of you for the work you're doing for our country. we appreciate that very much. i want to talk about the retention of nuclear scientists and engineers. this requires a modernized infrastructure and a highly- capable workforce to sustain nuclear deterrence. our labs cannot reduce impact on our nuclear arsenal without being appropriately resources. -- appropriately restores -- resourced. i am concerned about a perceived lack of them orphans. -- importance. secretary chu, can you describe

what has been said about the negative impact budgetary pressures are having on the ability to manage our nuclear arsenal without testing? >> certainly. senator of, this is the very big concern. when i became secretary of energy and looked at the fraction of the nsa budget devoted to science and technology programs, i think it goes directly to what you speak of, the intellectual capability. that faction was declining. it was a 10-year path to going in half. so, i said we have to stop this. we have to reverse this. within the last year, we have had to rebuild that. there's a population bulge nearing retirement. we need people to carry the stockpile.

our obligations are to provide safe, secure, and reliable weapons coming forward. we believe we can do this. in 2011, and the out years, that is the path we are taking. in order to recruit the best and brightest, they have to be convinced the country cares about this. they have to be condensed -- because essentially, they disappear. they cannot publish in a lot -- a lot of their best work cannot be published in a lot of open literature. if they are convinced he 9 states does beat the care about this, and it is such -- the united states does care about this, and it is such a vital part. also you have the facilities. you have to maintain and modernize the facilities.

>> it is also interesting. i was talking to individuals with an energy company. due to the fact we have not been building nuclear powerplant, there is a vacuum of nuclear engineers. this company is helping fund nuclear engineering programs at universities because of the need for nuclear engineers and scientists. >> that does not directly impact the ennis a mission, but certainly -- the nsa mission, but certainly on the energy side, we have consistently given now a skilled $1 million to students. there has certainly been -- we anticipate there it is now a shortage and the will be an increasing shortage as the world looks to nuclear energy as part of the solution to decrease in

carbon emissions. >> some experts indicate that the senate does not ratify the new start treaty, it can send conflicting messages about the administration's commitment to the non-proliferation treaty. some experts add that ratifying will send a positive mention message to other countries in nuclear issues. in other words, if the two countries that possessed the most nuclear-weapons agree on verification and compliance and are committed to non- proliferation, it is possible to achieve consensus with other countries. it is important to encourage non-nuclear states to sign and abide by the nonproliferation treaty, and ratifying will demonstrate our commitment to nonproliferation, sending a message and isolating iran. in april 2009, during s senate

foreign relations committee, it was indicated that if the u.s. were not sealed ratify the treaty, it would have -- or not to ratify the treaty, it would have a detrimental effect on our relations with other countries. if we do not ratify the treaty, what implications will that have on gaining international consensus on the non- proliferation treaty? >> think your question really summarized our concerns -- i think your question really summarized their concerns. we've seen positive response because of our commitment to this treaty, because the president obama's speech in prague, because of our active involvement in a non proliferating -- and non- proliferation treaty review conference. because we have worked towards further disarmament goals with

russia, that has given a boost to non-proliferation efforts globally. speaking personally from minor exchanges with my counterparts in nato and elsewhere, -- from my exchanges with my counterparts in nato and elsewhere, it was a great move of leadership in the nonproliferation agenda. i think we saw that in getting added the npt, which the united states was not able to do in 2005. a very positive response from our nato allies, many of them clearly have doubts about russia. those in eastern and central europe. and in our conversations coming out of the news -- nuclear posture review, the national security statement that has recently been put out. i think your question is absolutely the case. if we have been able to move

this agenda for word, it has been because of our -- forward, it is and because of our work with russia on the street. >> i have nothing to add to that. >> thank you. >> senator chambliss. >> thank you to the panel, for what you do, not only on this particular issue, but your service to our country. we appreciate very much. it is pretty obvious, based on the questions being asked, as senator mccain has said, the comments from the russians have been so strong and iraq -- i do not know if there's been a challenge to that. certainly president needed if is going to be here -- medvedyev is going to be here next week.

there'll be an opportunity to clarify this. i hope the president challenges him on it, because it is a key issue with respect to where we go. with that in mind, secretary clinton, secretary gates, i want to focus on what i see as are relevant decision point with respect to missile defense and what factors the u.s. will consider when making decisions. first of all, some of my colleagues have stated in the overall context of u.s. national security, the issue of missile defense may be more important than any agreement the u.s. and russia enter into regarding nuclear weapons. that is because we are much less likely, as both secretary clinton and gates have alluded to today, to face a nuclear conflict with the russians that we are to be attacked or threatened by a rogue nation or terrorist group that possesses nuclear weapons. i agree with that perspective. that is why we need a robust

missile defense system -- not to protect us from the russians, but primarily to protect us from are rogue nation. secretary gets, and you spoke to this issue directly in previous -- secretary gates, you spoke to this issue directly in previous testimony. the plan to deploy the missile in europe intended to defend against launches in the least, it will have a nice ebm intercepted ability, and could represent from the russian perspective a qualitative improvement in u.s. missile defense that could provoke a withdrawal from the treaty. assuming the u.s. and european allies still want to deploy the sm-3 block 2b missile around the time frame, would you recommend

the united states deploy the system, regardless of the russian response? >> yes, sir, i would. i think the kind of missile threat we face from rogue states such as iran and north korea is such a problem, and i think by 2020, we well may see it from other states. especially, if we are unsuccessful in stopping iran from building nuclear weapons, i think you'll see a proliferation in the middle east of nuclear-weapons and probably missiles. i think the need will be even greater. i am fast for redeemed 10 years. -- i am fast forwarding 10 years. the path laid out, plus keeping

the ground-based interceptors in alaska and continuing to upgrade those for the longer- range missiles, it would be absolutely essential. there is one other point we need to do this. that is because one of the elements of intelligence that contributed to the decision on the phase-adaptive array was the realization that if he iran were to launch a missile attack on europe, it would not be one or two missiles or a handful. it would more likely be a salvo kind of attack, where you would be dealing with scores or hundreds of missiles. the kinds of capability we are talking about with the sm-3 block 2b would give us the ability to protect our facilities and allies in europe. that would be my recommendation if, god forbid, i were in this job in years from now. [laughter]

>> mr. secretary, you did not think he would be there now, so who knows. secretary clinton, do you concur with that? >> yes, i do, completely. the whole thing, mr. chairman. >> that makes it much more comforting. i assumed that was the case, mr. secretary. my time is up, so i do not have time to get into the issue of rail-mobile launched weapons, which this treaty is silent on. we know the russians have a history of that. as i read the treaty, those would be exempt. that could be a serious issue for a number of us. i will submit a question for the record relative to rail as well as sea and air-launched icbm's.

one final point. with regard to the flux -- to this issue, and the administration lacks commitment as expressed today, i do not know if you have given any thought to this, but i would hope he would maybe give some thought to -- you would maybe give some thought to having a red team take a look at this so we can move as quickly as you folks want estimate. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator chambliss. senator burris. >> i would like to thank you for your service to our country. will we still be able to respond to a provocation if our nuclear arsenal is reduced to the level

indicated in the treaty? >> the analysis done prior to and in support of the negotiations with respect to that from a military capability standpoint was extensive. the uniformed leadership was aware of that and it certainly took that into consideration as we arrived at our positions. and our comfort level with the provisions in the treaty. >> secretary chu, you just heard secretary -- senator hagan is the question of training of our nuclear engineers. does the department need to be assisted in their training process? so they have the brain power to deal with this new technology? >> anti-american research university has trained the type

-- i think the american research universities train the type of people we seek. it is really a matter of recruiting the best of those people -- >> is money a problem? >> no, i think it is the intellectual challenge, the importance of the work, the facilities you'll have access to. those are the real issues. if you were going into money, you would not go into this. [laughter] >> secretary clinton, you said the treaty will reduce the number of nuclear weapons. i am not one to depend on newspaper articles. let me see what yours and secretary cates is the ninth thoughts are on this article. there was a piece in the a " washington times." it says that the new start treaty does the require any real

reduction in the russian nuclear arsenal. "the new treaty is an agreement to reduce the american, and not the russian, at strategic nuclear force. in fact, the latter will be rid deuced, and because the -- the latter will be reduced, and because of the massive removal of obsolete arms and a one at a time introduction of a new system" a russian defense journalist noted a " russia will fulfill its pledge without eliminating a single actual weapon." is there any truth to this article, secretaries? >> it looks like three of us are ready. i will just comments in very --

i will just, and in very simplistic terms. the number of their delivery vehicles is below the treaty limits. . .

>> that is interesting how they can have these conflicting analyses of what is there. you answer the question on iran. i would like to raise one here. as you know, iran and north korea are pursuing technology for nuclear weapons. will there be any changes in with russia? >> no. we think the north koreans already have them. as we talked earlier in the hearing, we committed to preventing iran from getting them but it would have no impact on the street. >> thank you very much. thank you, mr. chairman.

my time has expired. >> it is now 11:30 a.m. we will have time for a couple more rounds. secretary, is there any military need for a new nuclear weapon at this time? >> to the best of my knowledge, no. >> admiral? >> same answer. >> i want to go back to this language in these statements. i went back and look at the statements for s.t.a.r.t. one and they are similar. the opening words to the statement are exactly the same.

the soviet negotiations, they said the the soviets may be effective and viable only in the conditions of compliance with the abm treaty. they said the extraordinary events referred to in such and such an article, which is a supreme national interest about withdrawal, including events relating to withdraw all 01 of the party is -- related to withdrawal of one of the parties, we have issued a statement that it is not. the same format, it is the same words for both of them. this tree was started with president bush. is that correct? the same unilateral statements were made. you both indicated that either side has the right, under that

tree, to withdraw its supreme national interest indicated. is that correct? so, if the russians, for toatever reason, decided tha withdraw, they can withdraw. if they do not withdraw, we can withdraw if it was in supreme national interest. >> yes. >> can we take you're nodding of your head? >> yes. >> so we can take these unilateral statements with the current administration has the same as with president bush. they are so close that they are almost perfect. nothing is perfect in this life, but that is about as perfect as you can come. finally, on this statement that cooperating with russia in terms

of missile defense, the cooperation which you are talking about to the russians is the possible addition of information from their radar to a missile defense system. they are essentially joining a to make more capable what we are going to proceed with in an area of missile defense. is that correct? >> yes. >> it is not a limitation on us. it is a possible addition to the capability of art antiballistic missile system. >> it would be an expansion. >> that would be a very powerful statement to iran, despite the recent sanction vote in the u.n.. it was a powerful statement to iran. they are more and more isolated, not just from people who have traditionally been outspoken about the threat, but now even from the russians and the chinese. if we could negotiate something with the russians for them to

expand and add to the ability to a missile defense system that was basically a defense against the iranian threat, would you agree that that would be an extraordinarily powerful statement to iran about their training and finding a solution? >> i do -- about their tightening and tightening isolation? >> i do. >> i want to ensure that the record is clear on one additional point. senator collins raised a certain press report about a u.s.-russia deal to limit u.s. missile defenses. i want to be as clear as i possibly can. number one, there is no secret deal. no. 2, there is no plan to limit u.s. missile defenses, in either industry or in any other way. the story is dead wrong i wante,

to be very clear about that. i do not want anybody using what is yet another inaccurate story to argue against this treaty. as secretary gates and i have said, we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with russia. but the talks are not secret and there's nothing on the table or even in the wildest contemplation that would involve any limits in our missile defense. instead, we are seeking to see if they can be expanded for our systems. >> which then would be an additional powerful weapon against the the great threat that is out there, which is iran. >> that is correct. >> thank you. senator brown. >> i wanted to continue listening and learning. i know we will have additional hearings. i do want to throw this out there. for me, it s a trusting verification issue. in the back of my mind, we're

going to do all of these wonderful things, but how are we going to ensure that we are not being misled. i do not have a question. i just want you to know that that is where my head is at. if you can reach of line and let me know, that would be great. >> thank you, senator brown. senator mccaskill has questions, but apparently not a view -- but apparently not of view secretary gates. they are of view admiral -- but apparently not of you, secretary gates. they are of you, admiral. >> i know secretary gates said 2's willthat all 18 b-t

be retained. talk a little bit about the practical perspective. what should white men expect in terms of inspections and verifications and visits from russia? how can i reassure all the great folks at whiteman that the technology's very gays and are involved with of the be-to fleet will not be compromised? >> with respect to the capability is absolutely critical one of the areas that we looked at carefully after the analysis and negotiation was the preservation of the [unintelligible] in the future, what does that mean for the future course

structure? we do not have to make any decisions until we are three years into the treaty. the capability that we have, the technical capability that we have, there is nothing from my perspective in this treaty, in terms of verification which would threaten that understanding. the treaty has a provision for 18 inspections a year. 10 of them are what i would call operational kinds of inspections and eight are in administrative kinds of inspections in support of the verification regime. there are more in terms of verifying the number of warheads, it you will, the provision for each system.

i think that is an important strength of this verification treaty on both sides. in terms of protecting our capability and the investment we have made it in both technology and systems and people, this treaty will more than do that. we do have a great, great group of people at whiteman as well as in the enterprise throughout the military. i don't think we need to worry about that at all. >> secretary clinton, let me reiterate again for the record how proud you make our country, the job you do around the world. i think you reflect so well on our nation, and i think you are doing a masterful work under very difficult circumstances. we have so many places to worry about right now.

what do you see as the consequences of not ratifying the treaty, particularly as it relates to the deterrents of the arab extremes -- of the road of the rogue- f extremists around the world? >> i cannot put into words what our greatest fear is. we believe that the consequences of not ratifying this treaty would have very serious impact on our relationship with russia and would give aid to the adversaries we face around the world. with respect to the first, it would not only disadvantage just. we would not have the

transparency or the regime to , but would is going undermine the relationship that president obama has been leading us to establish more confidence between the united states and russia so that, together, we can tackle the threat posed by iran, north korea, and in networks of terrorists. secondly, it would, fortunately, turn back our efforts to try to unify -- it would, unfortunately, turn back our efforts to try to unify against those threats. russia has influence with the number of other countries. to begin to recognize that the cold war is over, the standoff between the united states and the four former -- and the

former soviet union is a thing of the past. at the nuclear security summit, for the first time, we got more than 45 nations to come together to acknowledge the obvious, that we all face the threat of these nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. therefore, we have to come to some new understandings and work more closely together. i think russia is an absolutely critical partner in our efforts to do that. >> what is the confidence level that we have in terms of the russian military, their ability to implement? if you look at the current economic state of russia, do we have the kind of confidence we need to have in their ability to

implement within the russian military? >> yes, overall, yes, ma'am. since 2004, i have watched the evolution of the russian military, both when i was stationed and in dealing with them more directly from an operational force perspective. from my perspective, they have made a significant decision and a shift to invest in their strategic forces. i have watched them modernize them and put the money and, conduct the training where they certainly have been challenged this the budget. i have seen it reaffirmed by the head of the navy when i was the head of our navy as well as when i was in europe in my navy job and from the current -- action,

the last two heads of the general staff in my current job. they are very committed to getting this done. >> i think this is another very key point that secretary gates referred to. this treaty may seem modest in scope, but given the changes in russian military posture where they are moving away from reliance on a large land-based army and conventional weapons to focus what must be more scarce resources on their capacity, i think this treaty is actually more significant. as the russian military makes the changes, our relationship with them in this agreement on strategic nuclear offenses

weapons gives us more insight into what their future plans are. we can look forward as opposed to static look for a look backwards. >> i think this treaty represents another opportunity where we have to talk about proving a negative. what are we doing by preventing it? i am firmly convinced that this treaty is so much preferable to the alternative. i appreciate all of you being here today. secretary, too, thank you for all of your work. you are wearing lots of different hats right now. it is a relief to not sit all morning talking about oil. we thank you all here and we thank you for your service to your country. >> senator brown had a question or request.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. i hope i can submit some questions for the record a little later. >> those questions will be welcome and the witnesses will provide prompt answers. we are grateful to all of you for, again, your service. we do not want to not mention that, not just for being here today, but for your service. we probably all want to get to lunch, but please delay a couple of moments before you leave. the immediate -- a hearing is adjourned. it was a very useful hearing. we thank all of the witnesses. [captioning performed by

national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> you have been watching this week's hearing on the s.t.a.r.t. treaty. if you missed any of this, we will show it again tomorrow. later tomorrow, an update on the war in afghanistan from general petraeus. he testified before the senate services committee. >> c-span, our public affairs content is available on television, radio, and all mine. you can also connect with us on twitter, youtube, and facebook. >> the commission on wartime a contract in in afghanistan and iraq held a hearing today examining the world a private security contractors in those wars shows.

one of the goals is to determine which security caps are clearly governmental functions and should not be delegated to the private sector. the commission was formed in 2008 to identify waste, fraud, and abuse. this is about three hours. [gavel] >> good morning. thank you for attending this hearing which focuses on the important question -- are private security performing government security functions? the commission will hold a related hearing in this location on monday. we will hear testimony from government and industry

witnesses and question them on the adequacy of planning and managing private security contract in in iraq, especially as they relate to the troop drawdowns and the handoff of security function from the department of defense to the department of state. this opening statement is made on behalf of co-chairman mike t. bell who is not here today -- mike tibo who is not here today. our hearing topic combines two issues, the role of private security contractors in support of american operations overseas and the limitations of use of under the use of

governmental functions. private security contract is a big business involving a lot of people. during the first quarter of 2010, the department of defense had roughly 14,000 tse's personnel working under contract in just iraq. that number is nearly equivalent to the personnel of world war ii military and equipment. the role of private contractors is not new. private security guards are a fixture of modern everyday life. we see them whether armed or unarmed at shopping malls, office buildings, banks, gated

communities, where houses, industrial plants, and government facilities. they do important work, protecting lives and property. ok accommodate play a role in the national system of justice. -- occasionally, they play a role in the national system of justice. today, in southwest asia, tse employees are also doing important work under contracts with the department of defense and state for the u.s. agency of international development and other agencies. they guard military bases, andrt -- escort convoys traveling vip's. during my 21 trips to iraq as a member of congress, my life was in the hands of private security

guards. i felt very secure because they are high-level it -- because of their high-level training. they are not intended to leave their attacker champion private security companies. this commission has explored cases of excesses, inadequate training or documentation, and unacceptable performance by some tse contractors. we have paid close attention, for example, to the impact of iraqi civilian deaths inflicted by tse employees in 2007 and to the outrageous conduct and the mistreatment of afghan civilians by tse employees guarding the u.s. embassy in kabul in 2008. we also recognize that many tse's are performing vital work at a high standard and we recognize the statutory limits on the military strength.

there is the need to safeguard thousands of reconstruction and development projects and workers and it creates an enormous demand for a security personnel. the question we tackled today does not depend on whether tse performance deserves praise or blame, on what they cost or how their contracts are managed. the question here it today is whether they're performing in her early governmental functions that should not be contract it out in whole or in part, no matter what the demand for work load. the answer to that question involves a mixture of law, policy, and prudence. the reform act of 1988 defined an inherently governmental function as one "so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by federal government employees."

the language of the fairfax parallels the budget circular a- 76 issued in 1966. it uses mandate, rather than require, and personnel rather than employees. the principle laid down in the law is nonetheless vague and open to subjective just tip -- subjective judgment. the bureau's office of federal procurement policy has taken comments on a policy letter to make that definition and is expected to publish a final version by october this year. the office of federal procurement policy draft was released in march and takes the ferret definition as a starting point. it -- takes the fair act

definition as a starting point. it also discusses functions that are closely associated with four critical for the success of government functions. the results of this will determine whether a function must be performed by federal personnel, may be performed by contractors only under close government control form may be routinely performed by contractors. this stems from the authorizing language legislation. congress instructed us to include in our final report recommendations for improving "the process for determining which functions are inherently governmental and which

functions are appropriate for performance by contractors in a contingency operation, including during combat operations, especially whether providing security where combat operations purely governmental." we are not looking at just the process of determining their mental functions, but using the process has applied to contingency operations that may include combat and the tse use of combat operations. hiring private guards for a u.s. supply depot may be entirely routine and not controversial in a stable allied country. is it still prudent to have a contingency response for a natural disaster or terrorist attack when command control or

assured response are high attributes. is it still prudent if the contingency makes it likely that the guards would be exposed to attack and may be likely to use force with all the diplomatic and public opinion consequences that follow? these questions are not abstract or academic. they involve real people who still real blood. whether they should be placed in life or death decision roles in foreign combat zones and under what circumstances is a serious question. the commissioners have thought about and discussed the question. the commission staff has researched it and written briefs. now we are reaching out together other views from well- informed and thoughtful sources. today's hearing brings together six distinguished witnesses with deep insight into the issues of security, attracting and inherently governmental functions.

they are alan berman, ph.d., president of jefferson solutions consulting firm, former administrator of the office of federal pacoima policy and the government's office of management and budget. allison said danger -- alison stanger, the overly -- milbury college. stan soloway, professional services council. deborah avant, univ. of california, irvine.

and john nagl, center for a new american security. we welcome this diversity of informed judgment and we encourage earwitnesses -- in fact, i would like to demand air witnesses engage with one another's arguments during the question period. a vigorous debate will be of use to the commission and to the american public. we have asked our witnesses to summarize their testimony in five minutes to 7 minutes in order to assure adequate time for questions and debate. we also asked that witnesses

said it responses to questions for the wreckage in 15 days -- for the record in 15 days. on behalf of the commission, we thank all our witnesses today for participating in a very important hearing. now, if our witnesses will rise and raise their right hand, i will swear u.n.. -- i will swear you in. do you swear that the testimony you are about to give is the whole truth and nothing but the truth. they have responded in the affirmative. i am really looking for to this hearing. it will be a better hearing if we are really candid. i would also say something else. none of you work for government. you do not have any boss that restrains you. that is another reason why we like having you here.

i do not think you needed to have 10 people approve your statement. with that spirit, we will engage in their first witness. dr. bermurman, you may start. >> thank you. as you mentioned, i am a former procurement administrator. back in 1982, i signed a letter that formed the foundation for what is today's inherently governmental policy. i would like to submit my estimate for the record. when i would like to do this morning is discuss the basic tenets of the policy that was formed back in the 1992 policy document, which is also included

in the fair act and federal acquisition regulation. i will talk about elements of the march 31, 2010 office of procurement policy work for a performance of federal employees in an attempt to modify those existing policies. then there's the issue of whether private contractors are performing their mental functions. it was senator david pryor in the congress who was a prime mover in getting the administration to look at this issue and tried to look at what would apply to the government. let me take just a minute to provide some definitions. as you mentioned, the fair act is something so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by

public employees. it involves such as indiscretion are making value judgments in government decision-making. then there's a whole list of activities that are identified in the fair act that would represent inherently governmental actions. i am not clear to go through the list. but it includes things such as binding the united states to take or not to take action by contract, policy regulation, order, or otherwise. what it also says is that it does not include gathering information for or providing a vice, opinions, recommendations, where ideas to the government for functions that are primarily at ministerial -- primarily ial.nister

of the major concern that is being raised today is whether the government is adequately staffed to make independent decisions based on recommendations made from the private sector and whether the capacity of the government exists to perform these inherently governmental functions. that moves us to the policy letter that has recently been released by the office of federal for chemical see. -- federal procurement policy. they have been asked to come up with a single definition to establish criteria, to identify critical functions that should only be performed by federal employees and to improve their mental management of these functions. essentially -- improved governmental management of these

functions. they have added a new category of critical functions. a function that is necessary for the agency to be performed in may control of its mission and operations. i see is the nature of the debate today. the issue is one of performing a capable workforce and effectively overseeing contractor support. if it is central to what the agency is doing, yet this function is determined to be critical, then it can be done by federal employees. it makes no difference whether the activity is a commercial activity or may have been identified as something purely governmental. i would like to use an agency .ike noaa they can say that these are government employees and should be government employees performing this work.

back in 1992, our policy letter look at the question of whether a transfer to the private sector would be taking place. the contractors' ability to take action that would significantly and directly affect the public, whether force, especially deadly force, would be initiated by the contractor or some other person and a decree would have to be [unintelligible] it looks like the issue we're talking about today. but then it goes on to say that the contract in have convoy and security protection services, armed or unarmed, are not policy.ed by thesis essentially, my conclusion is that this test becomes the best

approach to used to day, looking at the totality of circumstances and making a judgment using that kind of a model or approach to make the determination whether or not a private sector security guard should be governmental employees or not. that concludes my prepared remarks. >> thank you, dr. burman. >> thank you. cochair and commissioners, it is an honor to share thoughts with you today. i have submitted a longer statement for the record. i will summarize the key points of the two major arguments. first, to the question posed by the hearings title, arms security officers have been

performing in afghanistan since before the definition of the basic functions of government. second, determine should ban the use of contractors for moving in combat zones. if the u.s. government is going to engage actively in countries where the lives of its personnel are at high risk, we will need to build up our in-house capacity to staff those missions appropriately. as i have argued elsewhere, it makes good sense for the government to harness the energy, efficiency, and bottom- up creativity of the private sector in as many ways as possible, up to the point where marked imperatives begin to undermine the public interest. we have reached such a tipping point in iraq and afghanistan. iraq and afghanistan are our

first two contractors wars. at the height of vietnam, contractors made up 40% of the presence on the ground. today, they are the majority presence on the ground in iraq and afghanistan. why is their involvement in more important? our current degree of dependence on security contractors makes it far too expensive a habit and far too easy to overlook abuses. i also find moving security contractors the most problematic. they're the most likely to use their weapons. i want to emphasize that the state department and the department of defense should not be blamed in any way for their current reliance on armed security contractors. with an all volunteer force and an under resourced civilian capabilities, they're doing the best job they can with of the

resources currently available. understanding how we arrived at our present predicament renders our current practice is neither desirable nor sustainable. our short-sighted and growing reliance on armed contractors in iraq and afghanistan compromises long-term u.s. interests in at least six different ways. i go into this in greater detail in a written statement. first, it blurs the line between legitimate and illegitimate use of force, which is what our enemies want. second, it is at odds with state capacity in iraq and afghanistan. 90% of armed contractors in afghanistan today are local nationals. but the policy is building up a force that could very well be a destabilizing presents in the region in the future.

third, her current policies have had disastrous consequences for the government accountability and transparency. local security contractors in afghanistan are hired for subcontracts. that information is currently entirely and available to the public. fourth, the united states really has no interest having others do as we are doing. medieval europe made the use of private tears and it was not the most desirable -- use of private and it was not the most desirable practice. fifth, it undercuts morale and the value of disinterested public servants. finally, i would argue that our over-use of contractors is overly ambitious in the international agenda.

this leads me to conclude that there's only one thing that congress can do to disrupt the suspicious circle -- ban the use of moving contractors in war zones so that it does not leave our civilians and military forces short-handed and compromise. thank you for your attention. i would welcome your questions. mr. soloway., doctor. >> thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. among their nearly 350-member company, there are a number of companies that provide security services and many more, because of the work they do on the back of the united states government, off must procure such services. -- must procure such services. on a personal basis, i had the

privilege of working in the clinton administration and look at these questions broadly and the role and use and management of contractors on a -- in a contingency environment, specifically. let me start by suggesting two things. i think it is important that we dispense with simplistic labels. the term "private security" encompasses un array of capabilities and functions. -- encompasses an array of capabilities and functions. moreover, while the public perception of private security has been a naturally formed by both the news media and film fiction, when looked at objectively and the hundreds of thousands of security personnel, overall, their performance has been highly professional, discipline, and even sometimes

heroic. if this is not to whitewash any incidents that have occurred or to suggest that the firms or their employees are not to be held accountable for their actions. but their performance has been impressive. without them, there would be no reconstruction. second, the size and scope of security a moment in iraq and afghanistan has been driven by the unprecedented nature of the concurrent missions being performed in theater. active combat, reconstruction, and development -- historically, those have occurred sequentially. in this case, they are doing it concurrently.

let me make five basis points. omb has stated that private security itself is not a governmental functions. the use of private security personnel is both common and routine. as omb has also suggested, work that is not inherently a governmental does not have to be performed by federal employees. it is there that i believe that the commission's work can provide more value. while it is clear that the cost of human resources and other mission-related factors cannot provide all of the security [unintelligible]

consistent with the guidance in the case of private security, we should be looking at the total requirement across all government vacancies in the region and assign priority resources to those activities that are more sensitive. third, consideration not to be given to having dod or a combination of dod and state control of the overall private security requirements and management. in 2003, recommended that the department toward a multiple- short contract -- multiple-award contract. we recommended alternative that dod create an equivalent of a bidder's list or issue a set of standards. none of this has happened.

by and large, those firms have performed impressively and the management of them has proven generally effective. but to the extent the government seeks to enhance its inside and its ability to manage and oversee this vital aspect of the mission, clearer standards for which firms could be accountable and managing requirements for a awarded contracts can achieve that goal. while costs alone is not a reason to determine contract performance, it must be considered. with regard to private security, manpower and resources are already under constrained. -- are already under constraints. the state department has

concluded that the cost of performing the security function in house could be more expensive than providing security personnel. it has a direct correlation to the amount of funds available for the execution of the core mission, reconstruction and development. it is not only reasonable, but essential that implications be considered in any sourcing decision. work is neither inherently governmental or not. the quality of an individual contractor's performance has nothing to do with that equation any more than the quality of the government's performance would justify shifting performance. if the contractors are not performing well, are not meeting the government to establish requirements, there are any number who can. since we became involved in this

issue -- >> 30 more seconds. >> since we first became involved in this issue associated with contrasting and security in iraq, things have improved. but we have not institutionalized the lessons learned. we must seek to continuously improve. it is in all of our interest to work together to ensure we have the right process in place to ensure optimal performance. >> thank you. ian.bry >> we have studied inherent

governmental functions for years. we are in the process of completing a multi-year study of the impact of privatization later this fall. we have concluded that personal -- private security contractors are currently sometimes performing in her early governmental functions when they work in the combat zone. and number of jobs that are not necessarily inherently governmental become so when they are convicted in a combat zone. the use of private contractors for security in a combat zone poses unique risks. one is the inherent tension between the effective performance of the mission and the financial interest of the contractor. we saw this last year where, in order to save money, the contractor could not ethically -- could not adequately communicate with english- speaking guards.

any operations that are critical to the success of the u.s. government mission in a combat zone must be controlled by demint personnel.%+ in addition, in those areas -- controlled by government personnel. in addition, in those areas -- even the national association of security companies recently wrote to omb that perhaps in- sourcing for much greater contract scrutiny may be needed for combat and combat-support roles. we need to deal with the current reality. they are their current ensure -- they are there. the conaks reply on security

officers for independent reporting. the adok n iraq has been downgraded to a branch of three people. there is the inability to scrutinize its subcontractors, especially in afghanistan. real oversight requires having the resources, technical knowledge, and experience necessary to know when the contractor is not adequately performing its mission. we need investigators who are experienced in security operations. when and the regulated industry is in the driver's seat, the public is in jeopardy. i would be remiss if i did not

point out another tool that is lacking. pending legislation would extend much-needed resources to these employees. rather than the squinching -- rather than distinguishing security details and which are inherently criminal, i suggest the commission looked at the question differently. private security contractors provide planning-related security. the planning and management of security operations must be headed to the government and allow them to be supported only by contractors. what is being secured and whether the law is in place should be used to determine whether that function is governmental. the security of their men personnel, facilities, and partly in a combat zone not

under the rule of law should be categorized as an inherently governmental function. private security contractors will always have their role to play, but that must be clarified and contained. i look forward to answering any questions you may have. i just wanted to point out, in terms of a bur mr.man was saying, -- in terms of what mr. brurman was a [unintelligible] saying. >> thank you. >> i want to thank you for asking me to testify this morning. the question over whether private security contractors perform in nearly governmental services is both important and hard to answer.

i draw on the work that has been mentioned several times from the office of federal procurement policy and consider whether the activity for contractors relate not just to inherently governmental services but also ranging from not-in so-governmental to mostly- governmental. whether an activity is inherently governmental, critical, or neither depends on several risk factors that elevate or lower the threat that the service provides either to private individuals, to u.s. policy, or to both. these risk factors include the risk environment, the characteristics of the particular job, and the level of command and control. let me elaborate briefly on these.

in terms of risk to private individuals, this is the most fundamental way in which private security activities may encroach on what is inherently governmental through the act of deadly force. this is a sin to be a function of the government and the fair act specifically states that activities that issue significant risk to private individuals are inherently governmental. that armed personnel have it ability to affect the lives depends on three risk factors. first, the threat environment -- the particular job -- guarding a warehouse is different from security detail.

third, the level of command-and- control. the whole reason why a government employee is preferable to a private contractor is that federal employees are under a designed system of control and accountability. different regulations can yield more or less control. . u.s. forces different regulations can yield more or less control. also important to the level of control are the skills, background and training of the personnel that are performing the security jobs. in terms of the risk to the u.s. mission or policy, private security may also encroach on inherently governmental work, according to the draft letter if what contractors do or how they

do it can undermine the functioning of the military or the overall policy of the u.s. government. this can work in a few different ways. me jobs are simply more critical to the military's ability to fight than others. a convoy carrying fuel is more important than protecting a warehouse. in a counter insurgency envinment, though, the way private contractors function is also critical to the success of the overall mission. this is particular true for personal security details that frequently operate in highly populated areas. finally there's a relationship between private security companies and other violent forces in the country, particularly militia and insurgents. if using private surity enhance the compensate kpa it--

capacity -- in iraq there's a lot of speculation about the interaction between the people and the militias that toledo the insurgency and infghanistan right now where tuesday has relied to a much greater extent on afghan personnel, there is speculation that some of them are, in fact, paying off the taliban in toward guarantee passage and this s-of course, be essentially funding u.s. enemies which i posing a significant risk to the overall mission of the u.s. the three risk factors also affect the degree to which private security could matter for u.s. policy in terms of threat to security is more critical than guarding a convoy carrying supplie through a pacified area. cond, in terms of particular

jobs, you can alienate civilians more ease squli --e easily. so, in sum, all armed personnel working for the united states abroad potentially encroach upon inherently governmental territory simple lie by their virtue to use deadly force. those that perform functions critic to the u.s. also have the potential to trespass on governmental roles. features arearticularly threat environment, level of jobs can elevate or lower the dree of risk. all these features should be

considered in determining where a job fits. the more features that are present the more likely the job is to be inherently governmental. looking at the issue this way pose as variety of options in dealing with jobs deemed to be sufficiently risky. they range from a standard in sourcing to a variety of steps that would reduce risk by increase command and control. i won't elaborate on these given the time but outlined them in my written comments. >> dr. nagl. >> i thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss whether private security companies are performing governmental functionsn support of u.s. milita operations overseas. clarifying the roles of armed securityersonnel and contingency operations is very much in our national security interest. i'm pleased to have the opportunity to discuss it with you today. as you know, when our nation goes to war, contractors go with

it. in both iraq and afghanistan there are more private contractors than u.s. troops on the ground. now and for the foreseeable future the united states will be unable to engaging conflicts or reconstruction and stabilization operations of any significant size without private contractors. the system within which this contcting takes place, however, has not caught up with this new rlity. to adapt the u.s. government must embark on a path of ambitious reform. part of that reform has rules regarding tsrcing of functions related to the public interest, that is those deemed governmental. as you know u.s. laws long aim to protect the core functions of government by prohibiting anyone other than federal employees from performing such tasks. but today, while there appears to be a rough consensus there are some functions that should never be outsourced there's no consensus on what those

functions are. we've seen that today. until recently u.s. law and policy barred anyone other than a government official or entity from performing governmental activities, statues and regulations offered overlapping and ambiguous guidelines. as a result the fy-2009 required omb to give a definition. the draft policy letter released on mash 31 claimed, aims to clarify when work performed for the federal government must be carried out in whole or in part by federal employees but, unfortunately, the government's draft guidance doesn't comment on the functions that have been contracted out including provision of security forces, interrogation of enemy combatants and coordination of federal contractors. omb's publication of the finalized letter is unlikely

retrosolve the debate because theremains little nsensus. and as dr. avant just noefted is a sliding scale. this is an enormously difficult task and the fact that it's so difficult is vividly demonstrated by congress's decision to pass the responsibili for defining the terms on to the executive branch. this matters because if a given function is deemed governmental it then becomes illegal for the government to contract it out even in extremists. on the other hand, simply deeming a task not to be governmental and one that agencies could contract out in no way suggests that it is good policy to do so. for this reasons i believe that a better alternative is to focus on a core competency approach. while congress should deem

governmental any acts should not be outsourced, a core competency approach would apply to all those activities that do not fall under that rubric. thus, for example, the government cozy that inter error investigating enemy price sners a core competency it wants to name. as it ramps up its interrogation capacity it would avoid contracting out this function but only in extremists be permitted under law to hire contractors to interrogate price mers should the government workforce prove insufficient to carry out this task. the federal government will leave the option legally open to offer the flexibility to emplo

contractors. moreover, the core competencies approach would give others in the ield the access to search capacity and swiftness often necessary in an unpredictable contingency environment while moving the u.s. government away from dependents on certain forms of contractors as a more general principle. the solution would also promise to cut through continued debates about what does or does not constitute an inherently governmental activity and instead concentrate on what the government should be doing and how it will ensure it's competency or oversee the performance of contractors it has decided have to perform the function. the inherently governmental term seeks to draw a stark line between tasks and behaviors that can be contracted out. but such a delineation is

difficult to carry out. by moving towards a hybrid solution to resolve the governmental conundrum and moving towards a core come psol. i'm going to ask the questions at the end but what i'm hoping at the end of this hearing we can box you all in. in theense that i will want to know what each of you think about the definition, if we have agreement there, do we have agreement that convoys are inherently governmental or not, go down that list and just that have this real gray area.

that would be my interest. we're going to have eight minute questioning from eachf the members. we'll then do a second round of five. and then we'll even do a third round and any member here who has the leave can leave. we'll be done before 12:00 to give you all a sense of how you can spend your afternoon. so, with that, i'll go to my cohair. >> thank you. i want to add my own thanks to those othe co-cirman. i want to thank you all for being here. this is enormously important hearing, this whole issue of what is and isn't inherently governmental is particularly controversial and especially in the area of private security contractors. i draw my question from witness statements and i'll do that today. i would like to delve into each of your statements. dr. burman, i think you did a very good job in your statement of laying out the government's struggle over time. it's evolving efforts to come to

grips with thisiisue. i didn't get a sense of what your position is on this issue. the subject of today's hearing are private security contractors are performing governmental functions. what's your personal view about this matter? >> my personal view is i think private security guards are not performing inherently government functions. however, i do think that they are performing critical functions when looking at the totality of the circumstances. i agree with what a number of the panelists have stated. if you're looking at a situation with a war time setting with life and liberty being at risk and all the needs for government accountability, seems to me there's a strong argument for the government fit h the capacity to perform that service itself and to have governmental employees doing that job. and so i agree with dr. nagl and i think dr. avant as well in

terms of looking at the totality of the services, and then making a judgment based on that situation as opposed to making an all encompassing position across the brd saying this is or is not inherently governmental. >> what about the specificrea that dr. stranger raised in moving security in that specific circumstance, concerning all the circumstances, should that deemed to be inherently governmental? >> in my judgment in a war time set field goal you have the staff to be able to perform that function i think it would be advisable to use government employees to do that. again, you have to deal with the practical question about the ability to, in fact, have the people to do the job and somebody needs to perform the mission and i think stan soloway raised some of those concerns as well. >> just to close with you on that point, certainly there are

two issue here's, one is whether there's the organic in house government capacity to provide private security contractors. the government doesn't have that now. but if the government were to have it then private security contracting ought t be done by the government. now on the firmer point will the government zisht realistic to expect the government to develop this organic capacity unless and until private security contractors are phased out? as long as there's an alternative to be used, will the government move towards developingdevelop ing that organic inhouse policy? >> whether you make that judgment across the board in all cases i'm not sure whether that's advisable. it seems to me that there is a strong argument for accountability purposes to say that that is where the gornment should be moving. >> dr. nagl, there were a few

things in your testimony that i wanted to talk to you about. your notion that because inherently governmental defing i want has become such a conundrum we suld give up on that. but chances are we'll don disagree with that. let's focus on what we can agree are core competencies. that sounds appealing but as a practical matter won't we have the same problem? won't there be the same disagreement what is and is not a core function if tim application >> tre are some actions there's a consensus are inletterly governmental. for inassistance offensive combat operations is clearly governmental. there should be nouestion about whether that is a capacity that only the united states

government should conduct. what about private security skroin? >> for private security contractors as we've seen on this panel it depends. so that there are -- there's a sliding scale, i believe, of conditions under which it becomes increasingly critical to the mission accomplishment, the performance of that security mission, and that is why i believe that a core competencies approach would say the ability to conduct security operations in particular the most difficult case i agree movg security operations, that is a core competency of the united states government we want to maintain that capacity, but it is not inherently governmental depending on the threat conditions, depending on the kind of operation we're conducting. so dependingn the degree of command and control we have, to use dr. avant's categories. therefore we would like in the

most dangerous circumstances either to be conducted by u.s. government personnel or in those same circumstance if the u.s. government doesn't have the capacity we want the performance of that mission to be overseeing very, very closelyy u.s. government personnel and that, i think, allows the flexibility to the government to acquire and develop the capacity, the capability it wants to have for those kinds of missions but gives it the flexibility if the demand exceeds supply or in less contend shourks less difficult stwigs contract it out. >> let's talk about the most contentious, the most difficult situations. i'll ask you the question that i asked at the end of dr. burman. unless and until we at least establish the goal of phasing out private security contractors in these most difficult circumstances, as a practical matter will it ever develop the organic capacity to take over that function entirely? >> the u.s. government has an

appreciable capacity to conduct security operations. it does not have sufficient capacity to, for instance, guard the u.s. state department in its missions abroad and so the state department contracts that out. the decision to bring all of that inside the government is an enormous one and i don't think the forcing function should be making the decision to call private security an inherently governmental function. instead, that would require dramatic changes in the structure of the department of defense or department of state. >> i'll come back to you, dr. nagl, in the next round. mr. soloway, in your statement you mentioned the following. measured agast a number of inappropriate incidents or even alleged unlawful actions. it's clear their record is far better than record understands,

et cetera, et cetera i want to talk about those inappropriate incidents. admittedly there's bean few. by the way what is your number for that? >> i don't have a specific number but based on the literature available -- >> do you have a ballpark figure >> no. >> relatively small? >> first of all i didn't want to excuse inciden that have taken place. the point i was trying to make it's not clear based on the evidence we've seenhat there have been abuse and everyone should be held accountable. >> let me finish this one question. fair note i understand that. to what degree have firms been held accountable for these incidents in terms of our judicial system, in terms of the government's withholding fees, not renewing contracts, not awarding additional contract, internal industry discipline? what degree of accountability has there been for the relatively few incidents that

have existed? >> i'lleave it to the state department and dod to talk to you about how theyake their procurement decisions. i think that's a very fair question and we as an industry have long supported expansion of tools in which to hold people accountable where there are criminal activities involved. so i think that from a criminal perspective it's much the same by the way for federal civilians. if you're not performing on dod contract where there's clear jurisdictional application, outside of that there are real questions relative to u.s. jurisdiction although establishes some jurisdiction in iraq. >> thank you, mr. soloway. >> one more point. in the questions you asked dr. burman and dr. nagl were great. let me make one suggestion. >> hold that thought. i would like us to start out trying to be on time. hold thought. >> fair enough. >> i'll give you a chance to

respond to me. >> mr. green. >> thank you. let me add my thanks to those already expressed for your attendance here. i can already see we he some slightly differences of opinion and i think it should make for an interesting hearing and interesting dialogue as we proceed with our work in making recommendations to the congress. let me -- and i think i have a pretty good sense of where each of you comes down on inherently governmental and the use of private security contractors. let me focus on just one part of that, and that is the personal security details, because i don't think anyone on the panel would necessarily advocate that static embassy guards shouldn't be contracted t, and dr.

burman said, some facilities here in the u.s. i think we accept that. dr. stranger did raise the movement issue the convoy security. but i want to concentrate on the personal security details that we see being used in theater now. and i want to also concentrate on the longer term. i think in the short term, whether we like it or not, we got to accept the fact that they are there. and they are going to continue. and we als would agree that oversight and management and commandf those entities, we should continue to try to improve that. those people who are functioning

asrivate security details come from background where they received significant amount of training. as a minimum, a ds agent at the state department today without getting into the investigative training piece that they do is probably four months of training. i would like to get ay, if i might, and follow on a little bit with what commissioner irvin started to talk about, get out of the hypothetical and the academic, what we like to see happen. maybe what should happen and let's talk about reality. we've talked about budgets. and we've talked about structure. i would like to hear from any of

you how you think this would be implemented if we did, in fact, in sourcerivate security details. dr. stranger? >> commissioner green, that's a great question. and i thought about it a good deal and i try to think about it from my testimony. i like the distinction between moving static security contractors because look at where the abuses have been committed, my understanding from the public u-know, publicly available information is that the majority of them are by moving security contractors and the other ieresting fact is that most them are committed by u.s. citizens. so, i wanted to think about how you could potentially transition to a situation where moving security would be in house. what i realize there is that i

needed additional information that i do not currently he access to but perhaps you could get that information. i think you would need to know, first of all, the current number of moving versus static security contractors in iraq and afghanistan. hothat breaks down. you would also want to know and i thait pretty small number but still important information how many moving security contractors are deployed elsewhere currently. and third you need to know the necessary footprint in iraq after the department of defense leaves. it doesn't take a rocket scientist know where national security budgets are going to go. particularly as we phase out of iraq and afghanistan, assuming that happens on the timetable that's been suggested. secretary gates has already levied on the services, each

service cuts for the next five years that will be taken out of structure, oust modernization, having sat at state for fr years i know what problems they have ever lie year with budgets. defense is going to put whatever savings they accrue into the tooth side of things. so this is not going to be important. they are not going to put mon against private security contractors and private security details. so, my question to you is, how do you in source this? how do you train? how do you assess them? and how -- what do you do with them when it's over? mr. soloway. i think it's a wonderful wayo frame the question and gets back to part of the broader issue. to dr. stanger's point, there's

a lot of different ways to moving security. let me sort of go back to my testimony and actually if you sort of cut through some of our other comments -- >> we have two minutes, folks. >> you will find substantial degree of commonality on the panel. you approach private-sector holistally, strategical and in a heirarchal sense. that's where i allocate my first order of resources that are going be available for private security, my training, my development, my pay and so forth. >> do we do this as an insurance policy? when we're out of iraq and afghanistan, are those

departments going to be willing to put those resources as an insurance policy not knowing what the next crisis is? >> the answer is probably not and history suggests that. there's another layer to what i was suggesting. once we have done that allocation process you have to look across the resources available, what's an ongoing routine requirement and balance against the weakness of the government has always been strategic human capital alignment to resource to long term versus short term neends so forth. i would suggest that we start with this appach which is something we've all indirectly come to the same conclusion on also measured agast cost but not allow the bureaucracy or human capital system to be the reason for a policy decision, the policy doigecision ought to drive the human capital decision. this may be a case where balance has been reached. my understanding is security personnel when mison is

critical they are conducted by governmenting agents and the vast majority of personal security details are for what would not necessarily be considered mission critical operation. >> well, my time is up. but i'll follow on with this line in my next round. thank you. >> we may get out at 12:30. >> i only went over 10 seconds. >> i wish you had been able to ask some more questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me start with professor avant and miss brian because you're oral and prepared testimony suggests it is possible, i'm not getting rid of the differences or distinctions but possible for me to draw some common lines and that is looking at the applicable negative or risk factors involved in some uses of private security, and i'll tick them off and then ask

how much chae you want to make in order to get away from where i might be ong. the first factor is the risk to people around, especially host nations civilian, earth casualties or reliably measured incident levels. second, basket of negative factors or risk factors where there's weak command or control including a lack of rule of law discipline and prosecutability. third basket has to do with u.s. policy objectives, whether these are mission critical tasks that were given to private contractors, whether having the private contractors there -- one of them orally referred to undermining the counter insurgency mission itself by

what they do and that includes is there a real host country buy in or just a corrupt one or one involving payoffs? now, have i in some respect brought together the thoughts of the two of you? >> i feel good about it. >> generally, yes. >> okay. i'll take generally. good. because it happens to be very close myself to the way i think. i'm happy to take it. miss brian, why is it you worry about the rule of law application to this? you want someo who brings -- i'm from the university of baltimore law school, rule of law is spree show us to us. why is to it you? >> the basic reason is that is ultimate going be requiring more davis of the person having to exercise discretion if there's a less rule of law there's more likely to be some sort of incy dent where the person will be required to use

force, frankly. >> okay. mr. soloway, i'll take a risk. you proved a glutton for time let's see if i can get a short one for you. give me one short one i'll ask you another, otherwise not. you speak both in your oral comments about how we he to look at objectively what these, what pcs are doing and in your written testimony you talk about and i'll quote leaving a kwu words measured against a number of appropriate incidents it is clear that there, the pscs, their record is far better than the public understands. or the firms get credit for. and i think the common language we're talking about there is the incident rates from the special incident reports that are what we all look at as the incident rapist because that's what's counted? >> basedn the public available

information the incident rates is also publicly available information. okay. i want to give you the second one. leapt me get to the second one. i'll take the second one. there's a current debate going on about what kind of third-party certification they have, the armed services committees have been fighting about it, the department of defense has written a report on. i think there are some things you wouldn't go for. i want to ask if a third-party certifier, let's say had the power to say blackwater you can't get any more contracts. the expression is to black list blackwater. you do support that or my impression is you don't support that >> a third-party certifier for incident or qualification. >> eve argued for dod to

establish a multiple award contract. >> want to ask you if you would say that such a certifier could say to blackwater you're not to get more contracts and tuesday government would say that's good enough for us they won't get morecontracts. a real simple one, blackwater, independent body could it have said no more contract? >> does the independent body have access to allhe investigative inrmation, all of the witnesses, all of the normal terms? >> submission by the black water firm. >> you're against? >> others should make that judgment. >> let me get some reaction, miss brian, you know that the incident reporting system is a

self-reporting system, that is the only way it gets in to the files of incident reporting is that a psc firm says to the government here we have nancy dent to report and there have been a number of studies that cast grave doubts about the completeness of these incent reports. these firms are not too eager to report certain things. would you consider it objective and reliable? >> not at all. self-policing is totally one acceptable as a form of accountability. >> secondly, about third-party certification. would you prefer a strong and independent certifier who would have the power to say this firm should not, at least for some period of time not be providing private security? i'll make that a question for dr. avant as well us a. >> this may be one moment i agree with mr. soloway on

something. that's something the goverent should be doing not a third-party that's not part of government. >> oh, my god. i'm afraid to ask dr. avant. that's too much agreement. well, do you think a judgment could have been made by a rtifier, wherever he placed it that blackwater not receive? >> absolutely. >> okay. fine. good enough for government. we have a statement -- let me ask you professor avant. we have a statement from mr. soloway that congress was told by general petraeus that if he had to replace the approximately 15,000 private security contractors that were protecting d assets in iraq with soldiers he would have a great deal of difficulty. is that what you're suggesting that all 15,000 or do you draw

distinctions among the 15,000 that it wouldn't be that kind of a burden? >> i would absolutely draw distinctions between different services. i don't think it would be tt big of a burden. i would also suggest that the choice is not simply in source it entirely, or rely on contractors entirely. there are a number of ways in which the u.s. could set up potential reserve type system where qualified screened people perhaps by se cerfied body would gohrough a certain amount of training every year and be available. >> myime has expired. i thank you for your answer. >> thank you,r. chairman. i want to challenge dr. stanger on a point on her testimony. you say one fact is indisputable hiring moving security vastly

more eensive than relying on our own arms and you krooit -- cite a gao study. an you cherry pked the one example from that report that seems comport with your views. the gao report, first of all, it cited a cbo study saying using army units would cost 90% more than using contractors. the gao's own report says they look at five cases, four task ders and one contract, five case and to quote their words, using contractors in iraq is less costly than the estimated cost for state department employees in four of the five cases we reviewed. four of the five cases they reviewed. in ct, one of the cases they

reviewed was or is a situation where, for the baghdad embassy security contract to hire civilians would have cost $858 million and cparative cost for a contract for the same year would be $78 million. a factor of 11 times more expensive to in source it. the example you cite in your testimony where the comparison was in favor of in sourcing, actually if you read the next sentence in the gao report it says, however, because state department did not include the bottom line is the costs are about equivalent. so, setting the issue of the accuracy aside, what i want to probe you on is i want to understand, do your views and the other views of witnesses here, do your views hold even when the costs are 11 times more

expensive? >> absolutely not. i'm quite familiar with that gao study. and i wouldn't call it cherry picking. i just picked out the one cost comparison that involved moving security. the other ones are involving static security. and i'm not making an argument about static security. i would certain like to see more research on the moving versus static security because everything that i know suggests that moving security will always be more expensive. >> but in the case where, do you think that static security, then can always be outsourced? >> i started out believing that arm security contractors in the war zone will be the problem. as my thinking has evolved i've come toelieve the distinction between moving and static is an

importt one. it will allow us to transition to where we can outsource some government functions and have a force that we could deploy beyond iraq and afghanistan. there's an argument that the problem wh in sourcing is that these security contractors are providing a surge capacity. once we're done with iraq and afghanistan what will we use them for? that kind of a conclusion is based on cold war principal th the united states come from nonstate actors in a range of fragile states, in that sort of a world there probably will be a need for moving security in other areas and if there is a need we should take step tones sure it can be provided by government employees. >> okay. mr. soloway,e're talking in this instance about what are called local guard contracts at the embassy around the world. i know ms. brian knows much

about them from our previous hearings. the state department has a practice of in i think all embassies 240 or 230 or so to have local nationals generally provide that static, that building guard security force. and they do it as well obviously in afghanistan and in iraq. my question for mr. soloway is, is the a difference between static security in paris or sydney, australia or peru and in active combat zone? do you see a distinction there do? or to you are they always the same thing where it's always okay to have contractors perform that level of security? >> severing different in an active combat zone, so i wouldn't make the statement it's the same as paris. e issue again is and i think dr. stanger's point, there's commonality here, the point i

wanted to make earlier, ms. brian doesn't think we agree, but we all agree that the government has to exert control over this mission in whatever form it might take. >> right. >> the gradation is confusing that dr. nagl talked about which is absolutely never which are closely associated or core competentsies, whatever term we want to use that does have gradations and you have to make decisions based on availability of resource, costs, environment, risk, all of those things are part of the decision, so i wouldn't say as a flatout declare tif stement that all convoy security is for all contractors nor is all building security appropriate to outsourc u have to make decisions in each individual case, which is why a simplistic definition and i think this was dr. nagl's point is probably not where we ought to be going. we ought to be driving dod and state to make broader human

capital decisions. >> if a function is inherently governmental, if i understand the new policy letter correctly, cost does not matter correct? is that correct, dr. burman. >> that's how read it, yes. >> cost is not a factor. >> that's the policy level i worked on as well. >> where cost comes into play is where the function is closely associated or now the new term of critical, mission critical. and i think we all agree that at a minimum to use dr. avant's scale of options from insource to provide better oversight, at a minimum mump better oversight, much better active planning, deaconfliction, thoughtful ways to integrate civilian and

military forces has to be done. the question i want to mr. soloway is and dr. burman is in the case of -- it's too often cited. i take your point that it's n all nizer's square, i take that point and it's probably in the public mind mischaracterized, but in the incident of nizer square, mr. soloway, did state come close to losing control of their mission or operations as a result of that action? >> i do not have the in-depth knowledge, access to all investigative reports to figure out where state was or was not. i think that we have seen t many incidents in iraq and afghanistan where the u.s. command and control structure has not functioned appropriately whether through contracts or internal, including within the military, i think that's a question for people who are really doing the in-depth analysis and investigation to look at.

we all agree that greater management oversight of government a nongovernment actors in this environment is absolutely essential. >> ms. brian, what do you think on that issue? did state lose control of its mission or come close? >> there certainly have ban lot of comments about from the military about it. i don't know that state did. >> one last comment, dr. burman, would you like to comment on that issue? >> i don't know all the specifics but it comes into question the accountability of the government and whether the government is really accountable in those circumstance, i would say there are real questions on that. >> thank you very much. >> commissioner schinasi. >> thank you. i would like to add my thanks to you all not just for appearing today and for your testimonies but for the writing that you do and the thinking that you do on the subject because as chairman shays said, you're not part of the governmental structure and i think it's important that we understand that there are diverse views outside the government on this topic. i will say my thinking on this

changed pretty dramatically last month when we had a representative of the army come in and in his statement, he said the army has 15,000 positions that it's identified that are inherently governmental that are being filled by contractors. then he went on. maybe by 2013 maybe the army would do somhing about t so i don't think we can just put aside what is the definition. i think we have to really look at what is going on right now. and so i'm thinking about how the best way to frame this issue or maybe not best way but different ways to frame it. and what i've gathered from your testimony today and from your other writings is that there are two ways, one is management issue and anning with sigs issue and i'll come back to that in a moment because i think that's where most of our questions are centered today.

but dr. stanger, you also talked about the fact that this supports an overly ambitious international agenda. and dr. avant you've talked in your writings about how this could underme some of the principles of democracy and dr. nagl you've used in your recent mono graph the example to bring in thousands of indian nationals in a contract in afghanistan without apparent recognition that there are some issues between the pakistanis a the indians we might want to be aware of before we make that decision or before we allow a contracting officer to make that decision. so i think those kinds ofopics are important as we move forward and think about this. but and so in that vein, there's one area that my thoughts are not yet set and that is the -- how usaid provides security or how the government provides

security for development projects. i think with respect to the department of defense, were we have the capacity to do force protection, it's one of dods missions, whether or not they should is the question. but in the state department has the diplomatic security bureau, those are focused on some of these security missions, but how about the u.s. agency for international development? is there a different set of factors there with what the u.s. is trying to accomplish with its development mission that might make military presence unaccepted, acceptable or unwarranted. and then how do we deal with that issue? dr. staininger, i'll start with you because you write about this in your book. >> it's a good question, because i think the way the state department and usaid employs security contractors is quite different. i think for most of the development contractors, it's the firm that contracts for the security. so it's one step removed from

the government. but it's my understanding that if you would build up the in-house capacity within ds, it would be possible for ds agents to be deployed on usaid missions and i think that would be my vision for the future. >> thank you. mr. soloway? >> i think dr. stanger is correct that usaid, any contract other grant perrmed for the u.s. government overseas, it's the responsibility of the contractor to provide their own security so they're the ones procuring it one step removed and there's very clearly a cultural, sociopolitical and socioeconomic reason to maintain separation. that's a fairly well established tenet of the military to create a different feel. so there's reason not to have military to do that. with all due respect it's difficult to say we could just build up the ds capacity to

provide the security for the thousands and thousands of development projecting being performed all over the world in dangerous and high risk yafrs. it's not just iraq and afghanistan. even in iraq and afghanistan, we have thousands of development projects, small to large, ngos, we we've had ngos been assault and lost people. we've had companies who have lost people. diplomat security bureau does not necessarily have the expertise or providing that security. in fact, their principal security role is inside the land not outside the line. so the current structure where you have private security or others providing that capability in the field is probably not one that is easily or simplistically change and and may not be realistic to even do that at this point. >> did you weren't to -- >> point of clarification, i'm speaking of moving security. those numbers are much smaller. okay. >> either the smaller set or the

larger set i think is something that i'm interested in. dr. avant, i'm going to ask you next. >> i do think that there are issues when you're thinking about the management of security that usaid has a more difficult time with and not just usaid as a government but also the people that it contracts with, the ngos, et cetera. there has been quite a lot of development of principals among many ngos of security management but one of the things i think would be really beneficial and that a certification body could do is to highlight those firms that routinely contract with personnel that have the adequate training that have the sort of adequate management because one of the difficulties for ngos not having that kind of expertise in-house is how do you develop it? and some kind of certification body that could say these are the good firms, these are less good firms would be something that would be very beneficial, i

think, to them. >> thank you. just one minute if i can. so something that we have not talked about and i may come back and ask in the second round about. enforcement of any of these things. so i'll go back to the army already has 15,000 inherently governmental functions dez des spite what dr. nagl says about that being illegal apparently it's still going on. any of these other prescriptions that you all have, the question is not whetherr not they make sense to begin with, the question is how do you make sure they work if the end? so enforcement and for that kind of issue, that would be my question to you as well. but ms. brian? >> although, as was mentioned before, afghanistan is an unusual circumstance where we're clulgly doing some usaid reconstruction at the same time we're fighting a war. in theory, this skervgs about what will happen in the future. i don't think anyone believes we'll resolve this in the ne year, but if year looking as a policy into the future in theory, when we're talking about usaid and reconstruction, it's much less like think those are

going to b happening in a hot zone. that is from our perspective the kind of example writs less likely to be mission credit colorado and less likely to be in a place where there's a rowel of law. >> thank you. i'm going to turn to another question now. i think one of the things that i worry about a little bit is that this discussion revolves around acquisition and acquisition regulations because i think we've seen in many of the issues we're deang with at the commission and over time that the acquisition function is really relegated to a secondary status an does not raise to the level of a mission critical importance and i think some of what you've heard about budgets and how budgets are allocated and workforce and all of that is evidence of that. but dr. nagl, you make a recommendation in your monograph about establishing a three positions across the three agencies to do better job of sort of monitoring and setting policy, but you cite -- you cite those in the acquisition kind of

functions. can you talk a little bit about why you don't -- >> is going to be a very little bit. >> i'm sorry. then we are going to go to -- >> ma'am, i believe that the u.s. government actually has enormous enforcement capability and when it writes the contracts correctly and provides the right contracting officer representatives to ensure compliance with the terms of a well written contract, it can then ensure that it gets the kind of behavior it wants. it can punish bad behavior and reward good behavior. i think that our failures in the contracting -- in writing the contracts at the start and in overseeing the performance of the contracts are very large part of problems we're seeing. >> i just note you used the term "if" to start that statement. >> thank you very much i would also like to thank the panel. i've known a number of you for quite some time and i appreciate what you're doing.

you're writing, reasonable people are going to differ. that's what we are going to sort through. i also want to welcome two young gentlemen all the way in the back. you look like you're just interested citizens back there and i hope you guys will see democracy at work and stay treved in serving your country as you get bigger. so welcome. >> that won't count against your time. >> thank you. >> will the gentleman yield so we can identify that -- >> could you guys stand up, please. i just saw you walk in. there you go. >> nice to have you here, gentlemen. >> one of the things that seems to come out fromhat all of you are saying is that it depends. context. and so on. but somebody has got to make the decision. and what i haven't heard from any of you is who is going to make the decision? who's going to make the decision that something is inherently governmental? who's going to make the decision that the risk is too high. ? is it the commanding officer in the field?

is the commanding officer say in baghdad or kabul. is it osd or the state department? how do you do this practically? it's what grant green was talking about as well. let's say we follow what seems to be a consensus that we can't have hard and fast rules. i happen to agree with the commissioner schinasi that we do need hard and fast rules precisely because i'm confused as to who is going to make these decisions. let me just go down the road here starting with al burman. who would make these decisions? >> i think that the agency would make the decision and i think they would do it based on this critical function aspects of addressing the question as opposed to the inherently governmental function. i think critical function allows the flebility to make judgments across the spectrum of e kinds of activities and i think it would make sense at the senior level of the agency too through the kind of sets of

risks, the kinds of things that dr. stanger is talking about, the kinds of things that dr. avant is talking about, to lay out the considerations and then make that judgment. >> so you think it should be somebody back at headquarters? >> i think it should be somebody back at headquarts. >> so there's a commandern the field out there in helmand province and he or she has taken something over and now rethe want to have protection, they have convoys going back and forth. they've got to make a pretty quick decision. that going to throw through 26 million layers? >> no, but presumably, if you're getting private security guards, you have to go through a process of acquiring them. >> and you have to have some sort of contracting effort to bring them on board. having those rules in place to bring them on board makes sense. >> so you want some rules. >> i'm suggesting there should be some rules. >> okay. dr. stanger. >> article i section viii of the

united states congress allows issuance of letters of mark. none have been issued to date. so congress has implicitly endorsed our curre policy but has not done so. >> i'm delighted you mentioned letters of mark. last time i checked they got a piece othe action. walter dra francis drake, walter raleigh. they don't go and capture something and take part of the gold. i think that's a highly inflammable statement, ma'am. i think that kind of hyperbole doesn't help us at off. there were a couple of statements, one was the reason we have contractors is so we can fight two wars simultaaeously. i've been in the analysis business a couple of years myself, but i'll ask dr. nagl, if we didn't have the contractor policy we had, could we no longer fight two wars

simultaneously? >> sir, as you know, the foresizing con instructed the department of defense used to size itself is based on very different kinds of wars. >> that's right. >> so we could in fact fight the kind of wars we prepad to fight, small high intensity nventional combat against a conventional enemy. what puts the strain on the force is the protracted nature of the wars we're fighting now. in fact, we could not fight two protracted wars of the kind we're fighting now without the assistance. >> it's probably reasonable to say we couldn't have done it with or without contractor, frankly. >> the strain on the force is still very high. >> now let me get bk to the it depends question p since you also said it depends. do yougree there should be some fixed rules, i think you do but then how do you deal with the critique that several of your cleagues at the table has made that your approach is just as vague as the governments?

>> sir, i think there are certainly inhently governmental functions. i think combat operations is one of those. i think there are some things that are overseeing the performance of contractors is inherently governmental. and those are clear bright lines. so for the other question, the critical functions question, the core competency question where we would like the u.s. government to maintain capacity and capability but where we don't necessarily want to have as much as we might ever need and where there are varying circumstances on the ground that demand different levels of government control, different levels of sensitivity, i believe it's it should be the departments who make those determinations and i think the department heads are accountable for those decisions in this, in the halls of this body, sir. >> thank you. stan soloway? >> i think i take a -- keep it short. i got another question. >> why is it always me you pick on? >> i think that i take a slightly different perspective

on this. the basic rule, we all agree there may be rules and standards, but we're generally agreeing that the definition is a relativel narrow one. it's beyond that where the judgments come n in our view, those jumplts need to be made as close to the front as possible. that the contracting officers we've talked about, the gansler commission talk about, we need to enhance the acquisition presence in theater so they have the situational awareness and the connectivity to the commanders on the field to make rapid, knowledgeable inciteful decisions particularly over decisions as to is this convoy going to be in a in a pass fid area or a hot zone? those are granular decisions and the closer we can make those decisions to the front, the better we'll be. >> except that's where we've had problems up to now. >> because they haven't been made up front. >> not necessarily -- let's move on. maybe we'll come back to it. one of the things i heard, i don't know if it was avant and by the way, is it avant.

when you have a name like zakheim, you want to make sure people have the right pronunciati pronunciation. >> the correct pronunciation is avant. but my family is from texas so we pronounce it avant. >> give me ten seconds back for that. afghan subcontractors, now on the one hand we're hearing that if you bring inndians or whatever, they're not attuned to the culture. we heard that it's the americans who seem to be the ones that are the most guilty of some of the more egregious violation. yet, we are also hearing that the afghans may be work for the taliban, they're corrupt and not yet again, the governmmnt wants to give as much business as possible to afghans. so things are -- the wires are crossed 20 million ways. very quickly across the board, would you hire afghan subcontractors, al burman?

>> it -- >> yes or no. >> it depends. >> thank you. dr. stanger. >> it depends, but i would insist that the information on subcontracts be made publicly available. >> as a government contract, the answer would be as much as i could because i think one of the lessons we learned in iraq was our file you're to do just that. >> ms. brian. >> only if we have transparency into who they're hiring. >> dr. avant. >> thank you. i agree we can we could do it. it requires not only transparency but significant management capacity. >> dr. nagl. >> we absolutely should do it to the maximum extent possible with that oversight and control. >> thank you very much. >> if you. i was just ying to clarify what dr. zakheim so concerned dr. staininger in your comment. i just wanted to thank you for your comment because it provides a little bit of color to this

hearing. and with that -- >> i don't disagree with that at all. >> i know. dr. stanger, you're at one end of the book end as far as i'm concerned and mr. soloway you're at the other end of the book end you all are not necessarily in the middle, see, i'm doing something that we don't allow our law en forcement to do. i'm profiling you and i'm also going to try to box you in. so first, let me ask you, do we have a disagreement on the definition? and by the way, the federal activities inventory form act, i said of 1988. it's 1998. john brosman, who was working at gao is probably the most

knowledgeable on contracting in general not just contingency, he worked with alan brown on the staff of senator fred thompson and they wrote the fair act. he basically said we took the omb definition and when counsel got it, they changed require to mandate and employee to personnel -- excuse me, they required mandate -- to require and personnel to employee. but let me read the definition and see if we disagree. the definition of inherently governmental is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by a federal government employee. that's it. the disagreement isn't over the definition, correct? for the record, no have said there's disagreement here. so you all agree. so it really now is a judgment calls to how this definition applies. we appear, aren't looking to change the definition.

we are interest to see how it applies now in practical terms. so hence i want to box you in. you got facilities, convoys and personnel. within static facilities, you have bases, government buildings, and private facilities. within convoys you have private vehicles, but you could have u.s. government vehicles. within personnel, you have government personnel that you're protecting and contractors need to be protected. and under i think my listening to you all, you have basically said sometimes it's all government, sometimes it can be private and then there can be this combination of government/private. so mr. burm, in terms of convoys, is that inherently governmental? or not? i'm not looking for long answer because i got -- >> again, i would look at critical function rather than inherently governmental but i think that's a better

formulation for to you deal with and i would s it would depend on whether it's a war time setting. >> first of off, this is war time. we're talking war time. >> in a war time setting in convoy, i think an agency could sathat as a critical function and that would be how i would interpret. >> that so would it be all government? >> all government agencies you mean? >> would it be government security? >> all government. an agenc could make that judgment, yes. >> ok. mr. stanger -- dr. stanger? convoys? >> yeah. i think carrying weapons and moving around with them in a war. >> mr. soloway? >> it is not inherently governmentalal. >> put you down as private. >> it's a critical function some of which needs to be performed by the government and some of which would be cob private. cabilities. >> i'm going to put you down for both. >> it depends on the circumstances. i'm sorry i can't do the box. >> so sometimes it could be government and sometimes private.

so give me an example of government and give me an example of private convoy. >> fuel going to a forward operating base is clearly a critical function that would have to be from our perspective governmental. whether it is going through a hot zone or not. on the other hand -- >> but in all cases, i'm talking contingency. okay. next? what's the other case the other way around? >> laundry services. >> okay. but this is a convoy though. >> right. but i mean a lot of what happens is -- >> so let's just saying moving cinder blocks, doesn't need to be government. >> if it's not mission critical, because it's not cinder blocks it repair and critical function then it wouldn't be. >> yield for ten seconds. >> if you were moving cinder blocks into gaza, what would the israelis say? they would say this is an s a act of war. so i think we need to be very careful about what we mean when we say that something is not inherently governmental? you can pretty much turn around anything.

i'm not saying i agree with the israeli, i'm saying you could pretty much turn aund anything, you noenchs and seay that it's inhereny governmental. that's what worries me about the distinction you're making. >> but i think it's for us to decide not the israelis, right? i mean we're talking about -- >> that wasn't my point. i think you know what my point is. >> but i'm saying we need to be focused on when we happily or not in engaged in that conflict and weeed to be focused on what would be happening -- >> it's not not going to be on my time. let me just clarify, the point isn't the israelis or gaza, the point is the cemt or cinder blocks. any military could argue that getting cinder blocks is important for the functioning of the military. >> but in your case. >> that's all. you're saying it's not inherently governmental. >> i'm saying if the military sez it's a critical function, it would be inherently governmental.

>> i'm leaving it. >> i'm boxing you down a little bit and not giving you a lot of time to respond and i think you've described your difference here. >> how in the world if you're going to slice and dice missions like that, whether they're going out 50 miles or going 10 miles or you're carrying cinder blocks or ammunition or water, how in the world are you ever goingo build a force structure to accommodate that? >> he asked if it much better than i did. >> well, i think the bottomine is we have to build some force structure that is capable of handling these mission ctical security functis. >> but when you're not moving ammo are folks going to sit around or u're moving a lot of ammo and all you've got is guys capable of protect the brick vement. >> my thought on having more people than we need in the long run is we've outsourced all of our functions domestically,

military bases, all of the functions suppted by the military here. >> i know that. >>n the long run if your concern is their we create a force larger than in the long run we need, we have all kinds of needs at home that we can be using them for. >> well, you're much me san gmt uin about the resource that are going to come to department of defense and department of ste than i am. >> well, isla would just want t mention on that it's not that the contractors are free, the government is paying for them as well. >> we're having a terminology problem. we don't did a lot of high-end, high-risk security domestically, at least i hope we don't, moving food and fuel. >> first off, let's just talk contingency. >> i understand. i think the terminology gets confusing. mission critical, food is mission critical. sanitary facilities is mission credit, you've got to support the troops. what abo the thousands of movements every day of food and

supplies to the reconstruction folk to the folks doing development prochts. that's all you can define it as mission critical but the security around those movements is itself may orr may not be it depends on where the security is taking place, and frankly you have to look at the available assets and the costs you're willing to incur that will come from the mission itself because at the end of the day to mr. green's points, i have x amount of dollars, it comes away from the mission itself and you have to balance all those things out and make a rational tigs zigs and that can only be made as close to the front as possible. just because you're sporting something that is mission critical, doesn't mean it's inherent a government activity. >> i'm going to claim my time back and go to you dr. avant from texas. >> i'm actually from california. >> i'm going to call you avant. >> but roots. roots. no. i think that -- >> we're talking convoys now. >> yes, there's a great danger in making decisions at the field

level different ways, different times. in terms of the how it affects the morale of the troop, having contractors and troops doing the sa thing, you know, day to day is swhaf a problem. >> you're losing me here. >> you need to prepare, you need to decide whether you're going to prepare for the balkans or you're going to prepare for iraq. >> you know what i'm going to do i'm going to define it iraq, afghanistan, contingency, okay? >> right f it's an iraq, afghanistan contingency,hen convoy security is going to be something that is critical to government function. >> therefore is government? >> well, i think it could be government or it could be some sort of commissioned force that is under command and control-- >> so government/private mixture? okay. dr. nagl. >> government/private mixture?

>> pardon me. >> government/private mixture, sir. >> i'm not going to get through all mine. but let me just take rsonnel. when i look at personnel, you're guarding government personnel but contractors need to be protected. i talking not security, just the people doing construction. so we're got two kinds of personnel. and you could make the argument, well, if they're out in the field, even if they're guarding contractors, if there's an incident, it impacts the mission of the united states. so i'm going to ask you, dr. burman, i'll start with, dr. nagl, we'll go the other way around. personnel is that in government, government/private or private? >> government/private. >> dr. avant? >> agreed, government/private. >> okay. we'll go down with you ms. brian. >> i just can't handle these boxes. >> this may be the last time i

invite you. >> doesn't it depend? hostly. >> so tell me how it depends. >> if they're building a school, if the contractors are building a school far away from activity, is that something that's considered mission critical? and maybe those contractors don't need to have government protecteding them? >> so it's interesting. mission critical but we do get to this i thought and i thought you made it as well that if private security misused their capability, that in end, it impacts our mission in a very critical way. so i'm going to take you off the argument that security folks, if they carry a weapon, even if they're private, they could be -- it's okay, even if they end up causing a serious incident. >> no, i would never say that's okay. but what i'm saying is -- but my point is simply are we actually asking the government to be engaged in protecting krangters when what the contractors are

doing is not necessarily centrally important to the government's mission? >> mr. soloway? >> the development contracts and reconstruction contracts are the bulk of our mission in nation building soer mission critical it's so it's a mix. the question back to ms. brian there are people carrying guns all the time. they all affect our mission, whether they're military, civilian, contractor, whomever. >> so personnel -- >> mixed. absolutely. >> my mixed, i'm hearing two things, sometes it's just government, sometimes it's just private and sometimes it could be a combination of both like what state department does. >> it could be any of the three. >> all three. dr. stanger? >>. remember you're the other end of the book end here. >> i don't want to let you down here. but i'd just like to say the reason i'm trying to draw a clear line is i'm fearful that if a clear line isn't drawn nothing will happen. >> yeah. that's a good point.

okay. so where is the clear line here? all government. all government security? >> moving security should be performed by the military or government employee. >> and personnel? guarding peonnel? >> same thing. >> okay. so a private contractor building a school, the security should only be government? that would be your position? >> it's a good point to clarify. i don't think that would be considered moving security. >> i'm not talking moving. well it could be. >> it would be a static guard and i think that would be time to be a contractor. >> you have to get someone to the site. i'm explain it to her. the government, these contractors live in a base in many kaiss and then they go out. so in that case, tell me who you would use. >> to escort them out, i think

it should be military or government employee. >> okay. >> dr. burman. thank you for being true to that bookend. >> i'm give a short answer. mixed. >> thank you. thank you. and we'll start again with you mr. ervin, my co-chair today. >> thank you so much, mr. co-chairman. i'm so glad that you ended that last exchange, dr. stanger, by arguing for the need for clear raouls, either government or not. i think there's considerable support for that kind of bright line test because i have the %-me concern you do, if we continue to leave it uncle, contue to have the consequences we're living with right now, so that's with i want to return to my discussion with you earlier, dr. nagl. if i understand your position correctly, it's that we don't want to call, we shouldn't call the use of private security contractors inherently governmental because if we do, that will mean that -- >> can i interrupt you a second. i want the time keep tore know we're ing eight minutes this

whole round. that's what mr. everybody and and i have decided. each of us are going to eight. >> if i understand it correctly, dr. nagl, we shouldn't call the use of private security contractors, governmental because it would make it illegal and we wouldn't be able to use them and we have to use them. there's no in-house government capacity rate now. so let's call it core competency so we can continue to use private contractors until we develop that core competency. it relates to what you just said dr. stanger,nless and until we establish a bright line test that we're going to move towards phasing out private contractors, the government will never develop the in-house capacity. what your -- is that -- what's your reaction to that comment on my part? >> it's your restatement of my position is correct. i did not believe that it is necessarily in the interests of the government to completely take over the private security

role. i think that there are tuations in which we want the u.s. government to have that capacity. but there are many other conditions in which it is cheaper and more efficient for the taxpayer to do it throu private contractors. i think the single most important factor and one that we have not, i don't think adequately kufcovered today is there are inevitably are going to be incidents of perceiveds in use of force and in many cases actuals in use of force whether it's private contractors or u.s. military -- >> but in the difference there though that there is clear legal accountability for thes in use of force by government personnel, be they military or civilian and there is still considerable legal ambiguity as to accountability of private contractors fors in use of force? >> i believe that is partly the case, but i believe we should solve that problem and hold

pele responsible regardless of who it is and what category they fall under that's why media makes sense for all contractors. i thk the single most important thing we can do in order to demonstrate to the people whose lives we are trying to improve, to whom we're trying to provide security is that we hold people accountable, whatever uniformg or lack of uniform they wear. we have enormous power do that under contracts if we write them correctly. i think buy we have failed to an abysmal extent in enforcing %-ose contracts and holding peopleresponsible. >> thank you. dr. stanger, do you have any comment about this in particular? >> i have no comment. >> i am struck by, i have kind of the opposite view of co-chairman, i'm struck by the degree of consensus among everyone here. i'll state what i think is the consensus, if i misstate it please tell me. but butt it sounds like everybody is agreeing that the optimal outce ultimately is

some degree of insourcing of private security contractors at least in the riskiest circumstances. then the question is what are those risky circumstances do what degre of insourcing should there be? and long-term and medium term, how do we develop the organic capacity that we need to provide whatever level of goverental takeover for private security contractors there's consensus for? is that a fair summation of everybody's point of view? mr. soloway? >> it's close. i think the piece you're missing in there, just to be clear about it, i think we would all agree on this, it's not about how much of the current requirement to you insource? there would be some gradation there. also what resources do you need to putn place to effecvely manage and oversee whatever you're going to do. that's not currently -- >> oversight is a critical issue, i'm not talking about about that what i'm struck by, tell me if i'm wrong, all of you, including you mr. soloway,

which is most striking to me,agreeing that the optimum outcome is some degree of insourcing, is that wright rite? >> i'm not prepared to say it it is or isn't insourcing. i don't know what the balance is today. >> in your view, are there some circumstances, under which optimally, if we h the organic in-house government capacity today that private security should be -- that the function now provided by private security contractors should be performed by government if we -- >> i believe the possibilities exist, yes. >> does anybody disagree with that? >> no. >> all right. dr. avant, i haven't really engaged you in discussion much this morning. but i was struck by your testimony and i personally like the nuance that your testimony shows. my concern about it show thoe is given the record of government in this area in particular and given the record of gernment jaenlly taxpayer particularly in the last few years with a whole

wide range of issues, i question the ability of the government to apply a nuanced risk basis test like you've laid out there. do you think the government is capable of weighing these factors and coming unwith the right outcome in each circumstance? >> well, i think the government would be better if it were able to do that and i do think we have to decide were where to putt our energy. do we want to draw bright lines or do we want to focus on these magement issues? and then the legal issues? new focus on management and legal issue and you actually create rules and more bright lines for those, i think you're more likely to get effective management in the field and and i think that would yield better policy in the long run than simply establishing categories and expecting the government to function as it always has. >> what about the risk of having inconsistent standards applied from one government agency to

the other? >> actually, that's a very good point. i'm glad you brought it up, i think that while i do think that it's important for each government agency to be making decisions in the contingency environment, the thing that's come up again and again is the fact that you have state and dod and justice usaid and you will of these entities need to function together. there's a number of things being abandoned about town about ways in which you can improve coordination, but i thi that is crucial to the functioning of the management of not just private security contracteders but contractors in contgency environments. >> who would optimally provide that kind of coordination among agencies so you don't have inconsistent standards? >> right. i think there are three different ways you can do it. one is what the inspector general has suggested that you have some sort of new entity.

another is to give it to the agency that's doing itost effectively which would definitely be dod. there's some political issues with that the third is to try to use some sort of government-wide commission independent agency to sort of decide on governmental features. i think the first two, the special inspector has suggested or a dod thing would be probably the best. >> thank you. did you have a comment on that, dr. nagl? it sounded like you did. >> i think there's a fourth option which is a senior director at the national security counsel who could coordinate the actions of the three executive branch agencies. >> thank you. thank you all. >> thank you, mr. ervin. mr. green. >> dr. stanger, you are an advocate of something referred to as smart sourcing. >> that's correct. >> would you explain how you

relate that to the performance of the security function. >> i would be happy to do so, sir. by smart sourcing, i'm simply trying to -- it relates to the bright line i've been trying to establish in these hearings today. i think it's pretty common to look at circumstances in iraq and afghanistan and to come up with the conclusion that something needs insorsd. it's gone too far. we need insourcing, we've heard that here today. smart organization is, i'm looking f the careful consideration of what function should actually be insourced and why as opposed to reaching the conclusion that simply insourcing of any sort is going to get us where we need to go. that's the main gist of smart sourcing. >> dr. nagl, doesn't that sort of track with your core competencies? >> it did z, sir.

in particular, i think smart sourcing points to the extraordinary importance that i think everyone on the panel would agree of more contracting officers, more contracting officer representatives, more education for executive branch personnel in how to use and oversee and hold accountable contractors in contingency operations. >> okay. thank you. ms. brian, let me just correct one thing for the record. i think you made a comment earlier or a statement about dmplt s agey in iraq running personal security details. diyou not? >> no, i was saying that tho diplomats, i was actually thinking mofr afghanistan -- >> well, whatever. >> but those diplomats that are mission critical are protected by ds agents. >> but they're not. theye protected by contractors with one ds agent in the movement team. >> right. i'm sorry, that's cct