afghanistan with these. and so in that sense, we are an enabler for them in certain respects, as well. >> mr. chairman, i have a couple other hearings but i'm going to just ask two more questions and then turn it back, the remainder of any time i have. sir, one of the things we also noted and i'm a subcommittee chair on afghan contracting issues with the afghan police and the like, what's your involvement, or military's involvement in curtailing the level of corruption with the security forces in afghanistan? any news to report on that? >> there is, senator, actually. in fact, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and i have pushed at general mcchrystal's request the establishment of a task force, led by two-star navy admiral who, in fact, she was the joint contracting command, iraq commander when i was the commander in iraq, now she has one more star. she is going to head a task force that will go in and

augment the contracting command that helps in iraq. that oversees this effort in iraq -- or in afghanistan. and thensubcontractors, but the subcontractors to the subcontractors. literally, where is the money going? and is it all above board? . dealing, again, with corruption issues, dealing with warlordism and a variety of other challenges that cause issues for afghanistan. >> because as you know, it's $6 billion and counting with many more billions forthcoming. and then on the final note, mr. chairman, what type of cooperation are we getting from pakistan with regarding, you know, regarding the -- some of the terrorist activities that the taliban and the like that we're experiencing on the cross-border situations? >> pakistan has over the course of the last year, senator, conducted impressive

counterinsurgency operations against thetalibani, pakistani taliban and some of its affiliates in the former northwest province in eastern south waziristan and currently in orexi. there is no question that this is an organization primarily threatens them, although it is linked to the would-be times square bomber. so there is an external component to this that has emerged. there clearly are other extremist elements that ttp has symbiotic relationships with. among them, certainly al qaeda, the hakani network, the afghan taliban and a number of others that do have sanctuaries in various parts of the border region of afghanistan. in some cases, the pakistani military has dealt with them as part of securing lines of communication for us and for

themselves in their fight against the extremists that are threatening their rit of governance. in some cases there is clearly more work that needs to be done. general mcchrystal, admiral mullen and i have met with general kiani in a recent meeting. we have shared information with him about links of the leadership of the hakani network located in north waziristan that had a -- that clearly commanded controlled the operation against bagram air base and the attack in kabul among others. and again, the challenge for the pakistani military, because i think it is important again to note what they have done over the course of the last year because it is significant, the challenge is a situation which they have a lot of short sticks and a lot of hornets nests and they have to figure out how to consolidate those to get through -- they've done good clearance operations. they've got to get further along in the hold, build and transitton phases as well so

that they can deal with more and more. they do realize, i believe, senator, that you cannot allow poisonous snakes to build a nest in your backyard with the understanding that those snakes will only bite the neighbor's kids. because sooner or later, they turn around and bite your kids. and i think that realization has grown during this whole period of their experience with the ttp and its affiliates. and as they recognize again what secretary gates terms a symbiotic relationship with the other extremist elements. they are all related. >> thank you for that very thorough answer, general. i appreciate it. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator brown. and thank you for raising the issue of the security contractors. you know that -- as you know, the committees, the middle of a year-long investigation into these activities or the private contractors, not only because of some of the problems that have been created by them, but also because of the corruption issue

which you raise and we're grateful for your bringing this to this committee's attention again. but also because they are a drain on the armed forces and the police. there's competition for those particular personnel and it creates a real issue as well. senator kaufman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. secretary, general petraeus, it's always weak when we say we thank you for your service. i just don't know what else to say, but it is incredible what you do and the country is blessed for doing it. and i've been one of the people that supported the counterinsurgency. i've spent a lot of time looking to everything about it and what we're doing here. but i just want to ask some questions because sometimes they kind of -- time passes and things change, but people's perception of things change. but i think it was pretty clear after our last set of hearings, pretty clear what everybody agreed to was the deal back

when. i don't think that's important because what does cause problems overseas if it looks like we're changing where we are. so i'd just like to make a few questions to get clear. in december, we're going to evaluate where we are, isn't that right? so december -- and this is -- and no one should be at the point of prejudging where we are now. december we're going to sit down and figure out where we are. next june 2011, we're going to begin to draw down troops. the question on conditions on the ground is just how many troops we draw down. is that correct? >> that is correct. again, that's the point, actually july 2011. that's the point at which, again, the point responsible drawdown of the surge forces begins at a rate to be determined by the conditions. >> exactly. >> so it's not whether we're going to draw down, it's the rate that is determined by conditions on the ground. >> that's the policy, correct. >> and there will be no more new introduction of troops? >> that is not the intention

right now. >> no, but i mean, i think both chairman mullens, the secretary gates and secretary clinton said in the foreign relations committee that this would preclude any drawdown of troops. secretary gates said there may be the 3,000 troops we may need for guards and things like that, but essentially this is not a situation where we're going to be increasing the troops in afghanistan. >> senator, as a commander, as a military commander who owes the commander in chief and our troops in the field my best -- i owe the president my best professional military advice. that's something that's a sacred obligation with our troopers. i would never rule out coming back and asking for something more. i think that would be irresponsible. the intention right now is the -- our consideration right now, our view is that with the additional forces ordered by the president with the flex that you mentioned that secretary gates

has and general mcchrystal has stated this in a letter to the ranking member of the house armed services committee that we will have the forces required to execute the strategy. >> right. and i think your role is perfect. i guess i should have directed this to the secretary because it was the -- the secretary of defense, secretary of state who said we do not have to introduce new troops. general, i totally respect the fact, and i would be -- i mean it goes without saying that you'd ask for more troops if you think we need more troops to provide our military objective. so that's -- but in terms of the official position of the president of the united states and the secretary of state, secretary of defense and the head of the joint chiefs, we put all the troops we're going to be putting into afghanistan. is that fair to say? >> i think at this point in time that is the policy. there is no expectation of introducing any additional troops. we are also talking about a period of time in the future. so i don't think anybody would

want to tie the president's hands either way, but as a matter of policy, our expectation is that in july 2011, the end of the surge will occur and we will begin a responsible drawdown. the pace and scope of which will be determined by conditions on the ground. >> and general, to try to get at where we do have potential problems or -- the u.s. troops in afghanistan are performing magnificently. is that a fair statement? >> that is correct. in fact, i have said, senator, that this is the new greatest generation of americans. our young men and women who are performing these tough tasks under very difficult conditions against a very difficult enemy. >> i mean, i think their behavior -- i think from top to bottom, when i go over there i am incredibly impressed with the fact you have been able to inculcate in troops from the bottom to the top that were in a counterinsurgency strategy and

we move from a counter -- i mean, just the fact you were able to do it in such a short period of time and the performance of our troops is naggive in cent at all levels. so if it was up to our troops, i have no doubt about how this would turn out. none, zero. and i think it's really incredible when you see our partnering with the -- and it's true in iraq, too. but the thing that makes it all work in terms of the partnering is they want to be on our team. the afghan national army and afghan national police, when they see our troops and spend time with our troops, they realize this is it. these are the big guys. these are the guys that know what they are doing. these are the guys i want to bow groh grow up and be like. i don't see anything in the performance of our troops that is anything except on mark doing great. we're doing fine. >> senator, if i can somewhat jokingly say, except the truth is it was serious, when i would talk to the transition team members in iraq before they

would join their iraqi counterpart units that that our troopers should know that the iraqis, and this is true for the afghans and really for many other forces. they see our troopers as the michael jordans of military operations. >> exactly. >> and i realized that was really the case when i saw them look exactly like our troopers, even to the point of wearing their knee pads around their ankles, rather than around their knees. >> the key is see. watch and see them look at our troopers and they say, you can see it in their eyes. that's what i want to be when i grow up. to the extent we have a problem, i think i would say we have to evaluate going forward and i think most of the people on the committee recognize in the beginning the fact that counterinsurgency is not just about our troopers. >> it is a -- at the end of the day it has to be a comprehensive civil military. really, we term it whole of governments with an s on the end endeavor. >> now before i leave the

troops, i went to dahlgren and saw the nonlethal weapons down there. i understand you were there, too. and i am, you know, when you go over there and see what the troopers are faced with, the idea that they either have to -- it's easy for us to say, but if there's a bus coming up behind your convoy at a high rate of speed and the only choice you have is to fire in the bus or take the chance it's going to blow up the convoy, that's a tough decision for any trooper to make. or at a forward operating base when you've got a car coming for you at a high rate of speed. and you got two choices. you can either fire into the car or let it crash into the barricade. so i am -- i say obsessed with nonlethal weapons in terms of ways to give our troopers a third choice at all times between deadly force and no action at all on putting themselves in danger. can you talk a little bit about that? >> i can, senator. if i could, i'd offer even a fourth alternative, i guess.

the third alternative is the various -- are the various tools that are employed in escalation of force circumstances. and as you note, some of these are nonlethal weapons. there are a variety of signaling devices, disabling devices and others. we've got to be very careful with this. we have to realize that there are points, obviously, when that vehicle is really coming at you. you really have to shoot at it to stop it. but there is another option as well, and that same group is examining this also as our other organizations. and that is equipment to shape the conditions so that you are not in a position where you have to shoot at the vehicle at all that if the vehicle keeps coming forward, it runs into a cement block or it -- you know, something else -- there's another alternative altogether. that's difficult. but we're working hard. that's a leadership challenge, and a training challenge and a doctrinal challenge as much as it is an equipment solution.

but the equipment is wrapped into this. we're looking at that as well as a way of just avoiding escalation of force situations altogether and not having to use either nonlethal nor lethal force. but that's all caught up in this. and we've been working it really very hard. i think since the very early days of certainly iraq, which is where we first had to encounter the suicide bomber threat in particular is where you are most concerned. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you, senator kaufman. senator wicker. >> thank you. thank you general, for being here and for your great work. i want to call to your attention an article which i'm sure you read in the june 12 "new york times." the headline is karzai is said to doubt west can defeat taliban. and this article talks about the firing of two of president

karzai's top aides mr. salai and mr. atmar. they were said to have quit because mr. karzai made it clear he no longer considered them loyal. the article goes on to say that mr. karzai has lost faith in the americans and nato to prevail in afghanistan, and one of the fired individuals, mr. saleh has spoken at length saying that president karzai has been pressing to strike his own deal with the taliban and the country's arch rival pakistan. the taliban's long time supporter, according to a former senior afghan official, mr. karzai's maneuverings involve secret negotiations with the taliban outside the purview of american and nato officials. what do you say to that?

i know senator mccain was pressing on this yesterday. is this happening at all in your judgment, and if it is, is it happening because the americans are giving an uncertain sound about being a long-term strategic partner with mr. karzai and his government? >> with respect to the very last point of that, senator, having talked with president karzai indeed about the meeting of july 2011, just as i started out today's session by explaining as precisely as i could what that means. that it's a message of urgency that went along with the huge additional message of commitment. senator lieberman reminded us of the words vital national interest used by the president with respect to afghanistan. and again, july 2011, the point at which a process begins that

is based on conditions to begin the responsible drawdown of the surge forces at a rate to be determined by those conditions at that time. based on advice and so forth. and also a process to begin transitioning some tasks to afghan forces and officials. but i am not sure that i share the characterization of the headline at least of -- about president karzai's feelings. i base that on conversations with president karzai. a number of them in the past month and a half or so in kabul, from kandahar and washington -- >> how often do you speak -- >> it's probably at least every couple of weeks. again, it depends on the travel schedule. there's a period where we saw him several times in a period of just about two weeks and then it may go a couple of weeks otherwise. but what we also do, of course, is at the very least, weekly video teleconferences that the

secretary of defense, undersecretary chairman mullen and i do with general mcchrystal and then lots of other conversations with him in exchanges. and he certainly does not share that sense. he just accompanied president karzai, for example, all day on sunday when president karzai flew to and from kandahar and held the sura council down there. as i mentioned earlier to the committee, i think it would be important that the committee see the talking points he used for that because this is a very clear statement by a president who is the commander in chief of his country, who is committing to taking the actions that are necessary and is rallying the people behind him. and who then at the end of this tells the isaf commander, also u.s. forces commander, you now have my full support for the conduct of these operations and the support of the people in

this area. now with respect to mmetings and so forth, president karzai, of course, just hosted the national consultative jurga, peace jurga, which indeed addressed reconciliation and reintegration. i believe that we are aware of the meetings that he has and that his representatives have. he typically either includes our elements or at the very least will back brief us. i would not characterize these as something that will culminate in reconciliation coming soon to a theater near us. reconciliation again being high level taliban leaders coming in from -- to accept the conditions that president karzai has established accepting the constitution, laying down weapons, participating in the process and so forth. on the other hand, there very clearly is a scope for reintegration. and that is the term used for the reintegration into society of reconcilable members of the

taliban network. now we're talking low and midlevel low. there are a number of cases in which that is ongoing. i was just reading in the morning book this morning the case in shinden out in the western part of the country. there's 80 or so coming with their hands up, weapons down, want to be reintegrated, and it's very important now, in fact, that the interim guidance that president karzai has provided then is promulgated as formal guidance and does move forward to provide what our troopers need in terms of legal structures if you will, and what the afghan government elements need to work together to take advantage of those kinds of opportunities. >> how likely is it, general, that secret negotiations could have been held with the taliban outside the purview of american and nato officials. >> i think it's very unlikely in

part because we are told about what goes on and we also have good insights as they say in the intelligence community into what's going on on top of that. and the insights tend to correlate with what we are told. >> well, let me touch on one other thing in my remaining time. and that's interpreters. of course, we need interpreters. but i'm told that in securing the services of talented linguists, they are being paid by the coalition anywhere from $50,000 to $200,000 a year which is a -- considered by some a distortion of the afghan economy. are you concerned that we're taking some of the best human capital that could be used in

the afghan government, in afghan civil society, in afghan business and taking them away so they can be interpreters for the coalition? >> the short answer is yes, senator. in fact, ambassador holbrooke and i discussed this with president karzai after we completed the two-day civil military review of concept drill in kabul about two months or so ago. and then went back to brief president karzai. very clearly, there is an issue. by the way, i don't think the salaries you quoted are correct for afghans. i think those may be for u.s. citizens or afghan-americans or something. but again, that we might want to verify for you. but the fact is your point, which is more important, the b substance of your point, is exactly correct. what happens in some cases is the afghan government, other countries, contributing nations, help build afghan human capital

by investing in them with education and then we -- to go back and to work in afghan ministries and so forth and then in some cases, the ngos hire them away. we hire them away. so we're competing with our own efforts and we have to figure out how to come to grips with this. this is another one of those tasks that this contracting task force is going to take a hard look at. in fact, the afghan government really needs some kind of either law or regulations on this. you know, when the u.s. government sent me to graduate school, i believe i had to give back three years for each year that i was in graduate school. and they need something like that. and president karzai is actually keenly aware of it, as are we. >> plan to be announced later. >> correct. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you, senator wicker. senator cacao.

>> thank you, mr. chairman. let me add my welcome to secretary flournoy and general petraeus. and i want to thank each of you for your leadership and also for your distinguished service. and also thank you to the men and women that you lead -- both of you lead at this service and commitment to our country is honored and really appreciated. general petraeus, you recently told members of the house armed services committee that training of afghan security forces is being overhauled. %-understand that training procedures for afghan police and security forces were being overhauled to avoid some of the mistakes made in iraq.

general, can you give us an update on training efforts in afghanistan and any lessons learned since implementing those changes? >> with respect, senator, the training is being overhauled to avoid mistakes being made in afghanistan or shortcomings in afghanistan. that's not to say that there weren't plenty of shortcomings in our effort in iraq. in fact, we tried to share those with our afghan counterparts at various times during my different tours in iraq. in fact, after the conclusion of one of those tours, after standing up the training mission in iraq, secretary rumsfeld asked me to go to afghanistan on the way home from iraq. we did. we spent time over there. and, indeed, identified -- shared what we learned but also, frankly, identified a number of areas in which improvements could be made there at that time.

some of those were made. some still, frankly, are being addressed now that general caldwell is in command. he's been in command about six months now. literally, the establishment of the nato training mission in afghanistan itself, which is an input, not an output, but that is a hugely significant development for all of this. but there are a number of initiatives that have been already begun now. just to give you one example. instead of a three-year afghan police for officers training program, they've now got an officer candidate school to complement this because there's a war going on out there and we need officers in the interim as well. it's a six-month program which we think will be good and will provide leadership on a more immediate basis to enable the kind of progress that we know we need urgently and not just have this very long process. there's also been a change.

there was a procedure with the police and the number of different areas where they were recruited assigned and then trained when they got to it. and now the process is very much to recruit, ttain and then assign. just the recruiting itself, there is the creation of a recruiting component. and that has significantly improved for the army as well. recruiting. and then there have been measures taken to improve retention to reduce attrition as well as various incentive packages and policies and so forth. and those on the basis of three months at least, and we don't want to declare that a true trend just yet, but those have enabled the building of the additional army and additional police elements to be on track for now after a period in which they were not on track. so that's just a few of the areas. there are enormous changes made

in the institutional training business. it used to be there was one trainer for every 80 trainees, obviously, inadequate. now it's closer to 1 to 29 or 30. and i could give you again chapter and verse across the board on this. and for those who are traveling there, and i know the chairman and ranking member both are going to afghanistan in the weeks ahead. general caldwell looks forward to briefing your groups as you come over and to describe them to you in one program the things that have been changed and the ones under development. >> secretary flournoy, the international security assistance force and afghan national security force are acting in partnership during operations in helmand province. it is the first large-scale

effort to fundamentally change how we are operating together. madam secretary, can you give us specific examples of how coalition and afghan forces have partnered together during the helmand province operations? >> i think the marjah operation really was the beginning of a very different way of doing business together. and i would say it was not only about the partnership between isaf and afghan forces, but between isaf and the entire -- well, i would say the broader coalition, whole of government capabilities and the afghan government as a whole. and so beginning from the planning stages, you had a combined afghan isaf team that was planning not onlyy for the military dimensions of the campaign but also for elements of different afghan ministries

to come in and immediately establish a governance presence in marjah and the surrounding areas. so that has really created a different way of doing business together that has now carried into other areas. as the planning and preparation and the early stages of shaping in kandahar unfold. that same kind of in-depth and multifacetted partnership is happening again. and i would just say that it's not only partnership. it's really putting afghans in the lead in helping to design the operation, in helping to determine the timing of the operation and setting the conditions for ultimate success in the operation. so that is a very different way of doing business than we've done in the past. and i think it's a -- an approach that general mcchrystal has pioneered with his afghan

partners, and i think it bodes well for the future. >> thank you. an average. >> senator, we do have an institutional trainer shortfall by echoing the comments of my colleagues that were very relieved to see you looking so well today. i was quite confident that it wasn't the probing questions of this committee which caused your problem yesterday. and today you have shown for certain that that is the case. ultimately, our success in afghanistan depends on the ability of the afghan forces to take over the fight and to provide security for the country. you've just had an exchange with my colleague senator akaka about the training and you indicated

that we've gone from having trainers in a ratio of 1 to 80 to 1 to 29 or 30. but the 12/31 report indicates that nato, overall, has the requirement for more than 2300 trainers and that there is a shortfall of almost one-third, of 32%. pimilarly, general casey recently noted that the lack of trained afghans was the major concern among u.s. troops in afghanistan. there are also stories of where our troops have expressed doubts about the willingness of the afghans to fully engage in the fight as long as we're there doing the work. what are we doing to fix the

shortage of trainers internationally and what is the status of the requirement versus the actual numbers now? and if madam secretary, if that's more appropriate question for you, whichever. >> actually, we can both do that, i think, senator. first, because i just wanted to add that the deputy supreme allied commander in europe literally just sent out a message that i got word on that this morning asking for additional trainers. the latest numbers that we have, by the way, and these do fluctuate as trainers come, trainers go, pledges are made and filled and, indeed, trainer requirements grow because as the forces grow, as we try to increase capacity for training, needless to say, the demand for trainers increases. but the latest that we have is 450 is the shortage. there are -- we are trying to bridge the gap in certain areas. soldiers and marines are doing some of that. and as i mentioned, the deputy

commander for the nato operational element has just asked for more of them. and then if i could also add before handing off, as i mentioned up front, senator, the afghan forces are very much in the fight. they are in the lead, indeed in some areas, limited areas, but kabul is one of them. other areas and other mission sets, there are some functional missions, convoy, escort and some other tasks that -- for which they're in the lead. but they are very much in the fight throughout the country. and there is no better, perhaps more tragic metric that shows that than the act that they -- their losses are typically several multiples of our u.s. losses on an average. >> senator, we do have an institutional trainer shortfall of about 450. we continue to press our nato allies to step up and fill those

gaps. that said, the secretary's made clear that he intends to deploy additional u.s. personnel to bridge the gap as necessary because this is such a critical mission. it is a long pole and attentive of what we're trying to do in afghanistan. in addition, there are some continued shortfalls, although we've made a lot of progress here in what we call omelets and palmlets, the mentoring teams that are embedded with afghan army and police units. you know, we started out with a requirement of about 180 omelets. we're now at a shortfall of 14 of those teams. we started out with a requirement of 475 palmlets. we're now at about 140 shortfall. in that case, we're taking two kinds of mitigation measures. one is with this much more intensive partnering between isaf and nsf units.

in some cases that partnering can make up for the fact you don't have an omelet or palmlet with a given unit. in other cases we've taken a train the trainer approach and we're actually having -- there are afghan police training teams that are now prepared to embed to train afghan police units. so we are -- there are a number of mitigation measures in place. we are leaning forward on this very hard because it is such an important part of the mission. >> thank you. counterinsurgency strategy as we've all learned over the past few years depends on a unity of effort by both the military and the civilian side. in an after action report in december of last year, retired general barry mccaffrey predicted that, and i quote, the international civilian agency surge will essentially not happen. although the state department

officers, usaid, cia and other american agencies will make vital contributions. afghanistan over the next two to three years will simply be too dangerous for most civilian agencies. madam secretary, what is the status of the international civilian surge? it's so essential that we not just rely on the military side. and that's why general mccaffrey's prediction is alarming to me. >> i think i would agree with your premise that the civilian surge is absolutely critical as part of this broader campaign. on the u.s. side, we have more than tripled our civilian personnel and that is likely to increase further as the campaign unfolds. we have developed very

cooperative concepts of operation so our civilians are partnered with and protected by military forces as well as their own state department security forces. internationally as we've gone out to allies, we have pressed them not only to increase their troop contributions but also their civilian contributions. and many, many have stepped up, whether it's growing the civilian contributions to their prts, which historically have been more military, or in cases like countries like malaysia where they are actually sending a whole new contingent of civilian medical personnel and so forth. so that is part of the effort. i think one of the challenges here on our side is that we have never resourced our own state -- or at least not recently, not since the vietnam era, we have not resourced our civilian agencies, state and a.i.d., to actually deploy -- rapidly

deploy civilian expeditionary people and capabilities with any frequency or with any sustainability. if we want to be able to do that as a nation, that's something we need to look at in the future because we've put the state department and the usaid in the position of having to throw together an ad hoc solution to a problem they've done exceedingly well. well, they haven't fully resourced them in the way they need to be resourced for this mission. >> general? >> if i could just add to what the undersecretary says, when i've talked about the inputs piece that we're trying to get the right organizations led by the right people with the right concepts and the levels of resources necessary to implement those concepts. among the right people, since, in fact, general mcchrystal and ambassador eikenberry going in have been the addition of a nato

representative, a very capable person. and then most recently, there's an eu rep there as well. in fact, when i was in the uk this past week, i talked to the eu foreign secretary, if you will, and she described her strong commitment to the mission there as well. and all of them were involved in our civil military review of concept drill that ambassador holbrooke and i coasted in kabul now about two months or so ago. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i'm going to take a minute to clarify some of the numbers that senator collins listed because there's been some confusion about it and it's a critical number when it comes to the trainers, the omelets, the pomlets. this is a critical mission to get them to take responsibility for their own security. i'm going to take a minute to go through those numbers. you said there's a shortfall of 450, what you call institutional

trainers essentially. these are what i kind of call the basic training. but that's 450 shortfall. there's also, i believe, not included in that number is a pledged number, which is not yet been forthcoming. is that correct? what is that number? >> i have 574 pledged, 235 pending meaning, you know, we're still -- they are still getting confirmation in capitals. >> is that on top of the 450? >> yes. that would be in addition to. >> that's a -- >> but i think -- >> right. but i think we -- and it's generally can count on those. >> maybe we can count on them but they're not there yet. 574 plus 234 plus 450. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> on omelets and pomlets, about how many in those units. if we're 14 short, but how many are there? five, ten, 20? >> omelets are between 11 and 28

personnel per omelet. it depends on the -- >> that's fine. >> they're tailored to conditions. >> pomlets, between 15 and 20. >> we can do the multi multiiplication. >> does that look right, general? >> it does. >> and that is down considerably since, as you know, we devoted substantial numbers of marines and soldiers do these and then also have used a brigade combat team from the 82nd airborne, for example, to help with the partnering effort, i.e., theomlets and pomlets in the regional command center. >> i think very appropriately done. it's a critical mission. so very supportive of it. thank you and thank you seniority collins. senator hagan. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and thanks again to sact flournoy

and secretary petraeus for being here today with us. i want to talk for a couple of minutes about president karzai's reconciliation and reintegration program. and i know it's important that reconciliation and reintegration efforts operate within the context of a broader counterinsurgency strategy. it's not possible for the afghan government to reconcile with senior level taliban or reintegrate low-level taliban fighters as long as the taliban remains militarily strong and convinced that they are winning the war. and i believe that we need to avoid a situation where warlords and power brokers retain their militias. it's certainly too high a price to pay for reconciliation. financial incentives alone are not sufficient to reconcile with low level taliban fighters because they will be subject to brutal retaliation against themselves and their families. and if the government of afghanistan cannot protect them from rett ribbution it would be suicidal for them to shift

sides. however, improved security conditions through afghanistan, coupled with financial incentives and job opportunities can lead to effective reconciliation. and i know that u.s. officials have expressed support for the inclusion of the taliban in a future afghanistan government, so long as any former militants joining the government break with al qaeda, lay down their arms and accept the afghan constitution. my question is, outside of the jurga on june the 4th, has president karzai begun translating his reconciliation and reintegration initiatives into program and policies? >> well, first of all, senator, if i could just say that's a very accurate and quite a nuanced description, frankly, of the situation and of the basic concepts behind all of this. it's exactly right. with respect to reintegration, there is interim guidance that our forces and afghan officials

are using. but as i mentioned earlier, it's important that president karzai now promulgate this formally. and that, we believe, will happen quite soon according to general mcchrystal in a video teleconference yesterday morning. with respect to reconciliation, an outcome of the national consultant of peace jirga is, indeed, direction to develop further reconciliation programs while noting that there are criteria that do exist. it's very clear. and you just stated those as well. what has to take place for groups oop former insurgent factions indeed to be eligible for reconciliation. but again, the promulgating instructions to provide the real governmental guidance and policies for that is -- are still under development noting that again, that is quite high

level and even though there may be talks going on periodically among emissaries or what have you, i think as you pointed out, that it is unlikely to see true reconciliation while the taliban still feels that it is in the ascendant or at least can wait us out. >> if i could just add, senator, on reintegration for low and midlevel fighters, based on president karzai's interim guidance, we have with thanks to this committee for making this possible, used the authority that you all helped to give us to use up to $100 million of cerp in support of reintegration efforts. we've actually released those funds. so those are you available for commanders work with their afghan partners at the local and district level to start making -- taking advantage of some of these reintegration opportunities. on the reconciliation side,

coming out of the jirga, one of the conclusions of the jirga was to establish a high -- what's called a high peace council or commission which will be the afghan mechanism that will really begin to start thinking through reconciliation as -- and a programatic sort of level. we have also made very clear how we're going to organize ourselves on the u.s. side so that we're joined at the hip. this is obviously an afghan-led process. it is very important that we say partnered with them as they consider how to move forward on this and that this is fully implemented with the broader insurgency campaign. >> has the low-level integration actually started, and is it successful? >> it has started. i would -- it would be premature, i think, to describe it as successful yet, but it is certainly a work in progress in

several different locations of afghanistan. there are as many as in one case, 80 that i read about this morning in an intel book, for example in the regional command west area that came in literally with their hands up, laid their hands down, wanted to be reintegrated. and their incentives are very much in line with what you laid out. in that particular area, a combination of afghan government, security forces and coalition forces, i think non-u.s., but i'd have to check that, brought about security conditions just put enough pressure on the taliban that they decided this is not what we want to continue doing for the rest of our lives and if there's an alternative that allows us back into society and then with a security arrangement does have some incentives, as well, then that's a course they are willing to take. that's basically where they are now. but the follow-on piece that. as you'll recall in iraq, ultimately, we ended up hiring

on our payroll using cerp for fixed site security contracts, 103,000 iraqi -- largely iraqi men. by the way, about 20,000 or more were shia, just so the record understands there's a shia awakening and a sunni awakening. we do not envision doing the same thing there. there's not the prospect, even though the great mineral wealth it's found, that's not going to be exploited in substantial form, we wouldn't think, for some years. so we don't want to saddle afghanistan with a very costly program. rather, we want to enable much more local programs with the amount of cerp that the undersecretary talked about being part of that. >> you mentioned the newfound wealth of the minerals. i know on the 14th, "the new york times" reported that the -- this discovery of nearly a trillion dollars in untapped mineral deposits. does this new mineral wealth

have the ability to fundamentally alter the afghan economy, but does it also have the opportunity to amplify the existing problems of government corruption and provide greater incentive for the taliban to actually fight for control of the government? >> i was just wondering, does afghanistan's newfound wealth alter the coalition the counterinsurgency approach, governance, support plan, development plan, and i know this could be years in the making, but on the ground now, how does this play into our strategy? >> well, first, to answer your first question, i think it's an all of the above potential is present. potentially it could be an incredible boon to afghanistan. it could enable them to pay for their own governmental officials, forces, programs and so forth in a way that i think prior to this, there was not that same expectation. but again, being very careful

about how difficult this will be. beyond that, we have been engaged. again, this was not a revelation to a lot of white house have been working this. again there was a keen awareness of the different copper deposits. china is already in trying to extract that and to build the infrastructure necessary and to get it out and so forth. but there is an awareness of these different opportunities that are out there. some of them are being exploited in small ways by either local strong men. i don't know if i'd quite go to warlords, but different power brokers and so forth, or officials. and it's very important that there be a legal regime that governs this as well. and this is something we're quite keenly aware and the civilian elements have been working. i give you one example. the timber. there's enormous timber resources in eastern afghanistan in particular.

there is a law. they haven't been able to implement it and that's the kind of effort that has to go forward if it's to become something that serves the state rather than just some interest within it. >> i would just add, when we became aware, when the survey results came in last year, i think what it has done, even though it's a very long-term proje project, it has helped to inform some prioritization. for example, putting more priority on capacity building in the ministry of mines, the ministry of finance. putting more emphasis on looking at this particular area of law and regulations so that we try to sort of -- if you're going to start with a sector, let's start with this sector. and it's also, we're trying to work with a.i.d. and others to make sure that the knowledge of these deposits and so forth actually inform some of our near-term projects and communities where these are located. so you start creating the

foundations that will position those communities to take full advantage of the wealth that's literally right underneath them. so i think it has formed some reprioritization of our efforts. >> i see my time sup. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, senator hagan. >> madam secretary, sernl, thank you. i want to welcome you back today. we're very pleased to have you back. i'm not sure i would have been anxious, if i were you, to come back in front of this committee. nevertheless, thank you for your great service. general, about a year ago, general mcchrystal restricted close air support operations in afghanistan in an effort to reduce casualties and damage. i fully understand the efforts by you and general mcchrystal to employ counterinsurgency tactics and strategy in this war. and that the mcchrystal closed air support directive is an

effort to restrain the use of firepower which is crucial to fighting an insurgency. however it seems to me that the directive can also elevate the risk to troops who are under fire and require the kind of assistance that close air support can provide. after a year or so of this directive being in place, what is your evaluation of the results of this directive and what kind of effect do you think it's had on the war? >> first, senator, in fact, general mckiernan was the first one to promulgate the so-called tactical directive. and he did that with the intent of reducing to an absolute minimum the loss of innocent civilian life in the conduct of military operations. and he did it in the wake of some instances in which substantial numbers of civilians were killed in the course of military operations and almost undermined the entire strategic effort there in afghanistan.

it was a -- it had a very serious impact. general mcchrystal did refine the tactical directive. also did issue counterinsurgency guidance as well. again, same intent. let me state up front, though, that we will drop a bomb or use attack helicopters or any other enabler, any time at any place if our troopers' lives are in jeopardy, if their safety and well-being is in jeopardy. if they are pinned down and cannot get out, we will do what is necessary. but there are a number of cases in which that is not necessary. where you are being engaged from a house. just to give you one example, and there are many of these. you are being engaged from a house. it may not be completely effective fire. you can break contact. you know, our predisposition is to close the infantry. to take the fight to the enemy.

but there are cases in which you have to balance that with the recognition that if you don't know who is in that house and taking the fight to the enemy ultimately means blowing up the house, which is sometimes what has to result if you are going to take out those bad guys that are shooting at you. but in the course of doing that, you kill a substantial number of civilians, that, quote, tactical success then becomes a strategic setback of considerable proportions. now as we have evaluated this and looked at it, and we have done after action reviews throughout the course of the year, there are clearly cases in which we need to continue to educate our leaderr. again, we want on the one hand to be absolutely responsive when that is necessary. as i said, we will never restrict the use of our fire power, our enablers if our troopers are in jeopardy on the ground. but also, you need a sufficient, very rapid review process so that folks really do look at

this and examine and make sure that again, we are not going to create a strategic setback in the quest for a tactical victory or advantage. and if that -- that's how we have come at that. we have worked very hard to educate our troopers to train our troopers in the predeployment process during the road to war if you will, the road to deployment. we've incorporated this in our combat training center mission rehearsal exercises, in doctrine, in various tactics, techniques and procedures. we'll continue to do that. we get feedback periodically that troopers feel that are being held back. we don't want that to be the case. that's not the intent. the intent is clearly just to reduce to an absolute minimum the loss of innocent civilian life which in a counterinsurgency operation in particular can unhinge you. >> let me interrupt you, if you would. a vote has just begun in the

senate. i would suggest the following. that after senator thune's questions that we take a ten-minute recess, that the rest of us that want to -- are able to come back, come -- go vote, come back immediately so that after that ten-minute recess we will have some people here to question you. so there won't be too long a gap. we want there to be about a ten-minute recess. thank you very much. >> general, is there any indication, though, that the taliban are engaging in direct or indirect fire attacks more often and with greater effect now that they know or with this -- that there is potentially a diminished threat from the air? do you see any evidence of that? >> well, first of all, counterinsurgents -- excuse me, first of all, insurgents historically have always tried to use our rules of engagement against us.

we know that. they did that in iraq periodically. we had people in iraq literally pushing through crowds shooting at us. this happened in -- this happened in a number of other cases in recent decades as well in these kinds of situations. but, you know, we are about living our values. and every time we have taken expedient measures, not only has it been wrong, we have also paid a price for it in terms of it biting us in the back side in the long run. and so that's, again, we have to be aware that they will use our reluctance to kill innocent civilians or to risk the lives of innocent civilians in the course of these operations. having said that, frankly, they generally are not engaging us directly as much as they are coming at us indirectly. they realize some years ago,

certainly last year, that if they engage our troopers in a direct firefight that they will lose. and so they are using ieds and much larger numbers than they have in the past. and that's where we see the increase in the violence incidents. >> it's my understanding that b-1 bomber aircraft are being used quite frequently in isr roles rather than in an on-call fire support role. i don't know if you know the answer to this or not, but could you provide us with ann idea of how frequently the air force and navy crews are being utilized by ground troops in afghanistan and -- >> well, we do that all the time, senator. b-1 bomb ear we have combat air patrols. so we always have c.a.p.s overafghanistan. while they are waiting to be called on for a bombing mission because that's the only way we can have responsive bombing. we want it to be available within ten minutes is the

metric. and i get a -- i review these metrics periodically for responsiveness of close air support and also, by the way, for responsiveness of medevac, which is the golden hour. and generally the average on medevac responsiveness has been to get from point of injury to the first treatment facility. lately it's in the range of 45 to 50 minutes, which is where we want to keep it. but as they are waiting for missions, we'll use the lightning pod or the other capabilities that b-1s, f-16s, fn-18s, whatever aircraft we have. they are very good in this role. we've all used this, frankly. and they are superb in this role. now would rather use unmanned aerial vehicles or something like that which are more persistent, cheaper, greater dwell time and so but we have

platforms overhead anyway and so we do put them to use while we're waiting to use them in a close air support role if indeed they are used in that role and mission. >> how many manned aircraft are there typically above the air over afghanistan at any moment in time? >> let me provide that to you. we can show you the unmanned as well. it's certainly in the dozens at the very least when you start talking about tankers, command in control aircraft, jammers in some cases in addition to those that are providing on call close air support in a variety of different locations around the country. you got to be in the south and the east and the center or what have you. and then, dozens of unmanned aerial vehicles as well. >> is the number of cats increased? my assumption is that the unmanned or i'm sorry the manned missions over there will reduced, is that a fair

statement? >>, no i'm not sure -- let me lay that out to you. in fact, we have put more cats, tried to put more cats over as we spread out our forces. so, and, again, they are somewhat different missions. obviously some of our unmanned aerial vehicles are armed, predator and rea pmpper but not rest. so some are doing full motion video or other tasks, not responsive with weapons. the weapons on those that are armed are not as large as those that are carried by say a b-1 or some of the other bombers. >> we do have a vote -- my colleague may want to say something here from florida but a final editorial comment if you will because you've answered this question many times to questions posed by other members of the committee. i share a concern too with

respect to the date next summer more withdrawal and there was a report last week of a wedding party that the taliban killed 39 people. the taliban executed a 7-year-old child in helman province. there's still a lot of evidence brutality. and the question i guess would be as a lot of these folks in these areas, critical areas to us, who are cooperating with and helping the government what happens when we leave? and then there was this report yesterday in "the washington post" which is being disputed, denied by the pakistan government, but i want to read you just one paragraph in this news story. u.s. officials say and these were releases of taliban leaders from pakistan that the releases

reflected pakistan's strategy of working closely with the united states on key fronts while also maintaining relationships with militant groups capable of serving pakistan's interest in afghanistan when u.s. forces are gone. i'm concerned that what -- the notion that we're going to be pulling down here in the not too distant future does shape the relationships not only between the people of afghanistan, and the taliban and the people of afghanistan and our u.s. forces and efforts there, but also the neighbors in the region. and, so, for what that's worth, i would just add that and echo a concern that's been raised by other members of the committee previously. thank you, sir. i guess with that we're on break. so thank you all.

>> i believe senator nelson is next. we appreciate your leadership in that effort. general petraeus, one of the things i thought was so important and i am pleased we are seeing this happening now is the establishment of benchmarks to be able to judge progress.

i am happy we are approaching this the same way in afghanistan. two of your major objectives that were submitted in the benchmark progress reports in april were two, one, develop a self-reliant security force and the, two, and more accountable government in afghanistan. i agree that these are critical to our success. if you were to use the metric at the present time to measure our current progress, which you think in respect to the self- reliant forces that we are 10%, 20%? is there some calculation in

your mind as to where we are, what we have achieved, and yet what remains as a goal? the same thing when it comes to reliable government. this could apply to the secretary as well. >> with respect to the afghan national security forces, there are lots of different types of forces, different rates of progress among them, not only between the different components but also throughout the country to be sure. i think the important point to make is we have made progress in getting the inputs right in this area as well in getting the right organization, the nato training mission in afghanistan, and its various elements and on the afghan side of their various elements as well.

adding, as an example, a recruiting element which was not present before. then, getting the right people in charge of them. general caldwell and his team and u.s. leaders is, i think, again another important step forward. the concept of have mentioned with the training of the police that it used to be an assignment when you got there. >> ready, fire, aim. >> that is about right. you'll provided at the request of the president to add 100,000 additional forces by the fall of 2011. he added to that the additional [inaudible]

it is now i wanted to 30 training ratio. additional omelets and having units partner have made a difference in that regard. if you want to characterize all of this and say, where are you and a certain percentage, i do not know if we are quite at the 50% mark certainly. i then there has been progress in this regard. i say there are some donations in which we can build more effectively than we have been able to in the past. we are still of the point of having got the input right now to see how the outputs come out.

not to say this is without enormous value, but we went to the same thing in iraq as well. >> on governance, i can tell you the kinds of things we're looking at in trying to measure. one is the general sense of the population as to the responsiveness of government to their basic needs. there is everything from a polling, participation, council meetings, and so forth. at the ministry level, we are very focused on making sure the minister is can actually receive and disburse money is in an accountable manner. we are in the process of working with various afghan ministries to help certify them

in terms of financial management. i think we have certified three or four and there are an additional three or four in the pipeline. at the local government level, it really has to do with, have we actually created a connection with the local people and then becoming the focal point for community decision making. there are a number of different metrics we are looking have. as a general petraeus has said, we are putting a lot of the right and puts in place, foundational pieces, and now we will start measuring progress over time. >> i wonder if someone could check out the sound system here. we have this coming and feedback.

[microphones off, no aduio] are other possible surveys on the support for the afghan troops? >> there is one i am familiar with, sir.

i do not think it is on. there is a recent poll that shows 59% of the afghans believe that their government is moving in the right direction. that was an improvement. [microphones off, no audio]

[unintelligible] >> the sound is off. we are all going to have to talk much louder during this interim period. thank you, senator nelson. >> good morning. thank you both. general petraeus, what would happen if in the future the television to cover part or all of afghanistan -- 50 -- if the taliban took over part or all of

afghanistan? [unintelligible] >> qana skill of 1 to 10, one being not very significant and 10 being very significant, what would that mean to his national security-wise? closer to 10 than one? if we were not there now, what would happen? > > [unintelligible] i think the talent and would

take control of certain areas -- i think the taliban would take control and you could end up with a couple of different civil wars going on between different ethnic groups, even sectarian groups. >> this is june, 2010. are we winning? >> that means making progress so in that regard i think we are winning. i think it is a slow process as i explained. we have just about got the inputs right in terms of getting the organization in place, the right people in charge of them, the right concept, the light -- the right resources under those leaders. >> what percentage of afghanistan is under central government control?

>> certainly much more than what is not. again, will have to talk about -- >> and effective police force from irresponsible army, local and national government. >> we have ways to go in that regard. there are areas in the country that have those characteristics. >> would you agree with me in june 2010 that most of afghanistan is not governed in an effective manner where you have an honest police force and a non-corrupt functioning government? >> i think that is a fair assessment.

i would want to talk a little more nuanced. >> i just won a baseline of where we are in june 2010. how many of qaeda members to rethink reside inside afghanistan? >> perhaps in the double digits if any. the nexus of al qaeda is in the tribal areas. >> how many are there? >> we are into the hundreds. this is a question of how do you talk about the symbiotic relationships between these two. we can extend into the thousands and there are training is moving through and there are relationships. how do you account for the support crews? as you recall, a number of these married into tribes over there. it becomes a very difficult

peril in a region where people are survived by being chameleons at times. >> so they move next door? >> that is correct. >> what is the number that we are fighting in afghanistan? >> again, in the thousands. i can provide you the entire laid down. it depends on how you define "afghan taliban"? du include all of these other networks. >> then you are well into the thousands in the have to start talking about the tears of these different operatives -- tiers of operatives. then you get all the way down through the mid level that can

clearly be broken off. again you can argue it. this is not unlike iraq. he had various strands of insurgent elements. >> long story short come into the thousands probably. >> certainly. >> our policy of the drawing out in july 2011. the only question is -- is that fair? >> i want to get a copy of the statement i made this morning because i tried to provide a very precise description. >> is what i said fair? >> july 2011 is when a process begins that includes the beginning of a "responsible drawdown of surge forces and includes the beginning of a process to transition some tasks to afghan officials and forces based on conditions."

all of this is based on conditions. >> i want to make sure they understand. you told senator kaufman it does not matter if we leave it just matters how quickly. is that not true? >> based on conditions. given current projections -- center, i would like you to read the statement i gave. >> i will. in june 2011 -- june 2012, do you anticipate us having more or less 50,000 american soldiers. >> i would not hazard a projection. i think that respect to live. again, we are when you're from the beginning of the process which is one year from the date you just stated. i think that is just not productive. it could be unproductive. >> how does the taliban view this policy? what antel do we have?

the fact we are withdrawing, is there any indication that they are encouraged by that plus the fact that nato forces are beginning to withdraw? >> of the enemy has a number of different emotions right now, senator. one is that the enemy is under greater pressure than at any time before. they are feeling this. we have insight into this, as they say. we have put some pretty big dense it into the afghan-taliban in afghanistan. there has been stressing in the tribal areas as well. having said that, there is an awareness of the july 2011 date. there is some sense among some of them that there are watching the nato allies as well.

we think at times they targeted certain elements of the coalition, certain countries. their strategy is to do with the have done in the past which is out last whoever is confronting them. that is why, as i said, we tried to be very precise this morning with what 2011 means. that is why your colleague senator lieberman mentioned the words "vital national security interest" which means of the u.s. and were featured at the president's speech at west point. we should come back to the fact is well that it was a message of urgency that complemented the message of enormous commitment. let's not commit that by the end of august this year, senator, the number of u.s. forces on the ground will be well more than three times than what was on the

ground in the beginning of 2009. that is substantial. that is that the more than the surge in iraq. the number of civilians has tripled as well. the authorization you have provided is a very substantial one. that is a symbol and a reflection of commitment as well. that is what we have tried to convey in the region. in my statement today, i said let's be clear what july 2011 is and what it is not. it is not when we race for the exit and reach for the light switch. [no audio] >> i think it is a huge mistake. thank you. >> one of the reasons we entered

into a very public, high- profile, strategic dialogue with our partners in afghanistan and pakistan as well, we are issuing declarations out of that. we're trying to both flesh out and communicate the nature of an enduring commitment in this region. we are not leaving in time soon. the nature of the commitment made changer time. >> before i: such a castle, anything else? -- before i call on senator? >> thank you. it is so cold in here. >> do you want to call the superintendent to check our heat? >> no, i am fine. but mr. briefly -- let me start

briefly on contract issues. we have had a number of members talk about the private security contracts. of would like to touch on that. on private security contract, i take it, general petraeus commend you are willing to say on the record that we need to get back to this being more of an inherrntly government section into -- a sense of the near contracting out. >> let me talk about private security contractors. there is a reason there is there. what we learned in iraq, we're trying to apply in afghanistan. but we want to make sure we get them under the authorities, that they understand the rules that you all helped us with with the

defense authorization act and we use those and did two cases where we brought cases to court based on those authorities under the military commander. we had the jurisdiction over them. we're doing that in afghanistan as well and also applying the efforts to coordinate their activities, and sure there are very clear on what their "rules of engagement or self-defense are," and that they are fully integrated with our situational awareness systems. general mcchrystal has said he would like to get rid of private security contractors. in a perfect world, that would be an inherently governmental function. effect is to do that, there is a reason they are insecure in convoys, logistics', and others.

i contract to doubt my own security in iraq when i was a three-star general because we did not have enough military police in the one mission. i had enough clout to be able to contract it out. they could not do that for themselves so we give them military police unit that was designed for me. it is a reality out there. it is a reality on the department of state front as well. >> i think it is something we need to continue to underline. if we are going to give our incredibly strong leaders missions to accomplish on behalf of the united states of america, we have to continually. the drum -- we have to continually and bang the drum.

it surprises me that you give up your mp unit, but i think a lot of americans would not be comfortable with that. you are an incredible resource to our nation. >> i was just a mere three-star general. >> there is a reason you are now a four-star general. it is important for us to acknowledge -- and i do want to get this on record, and a knowledge of the we are pulling people outtof the workforce in afghanistan that we need in our army and in our local police departments at higher pay. sometimes they are the guys. >> president karzai and i had a conversation on the side that in some cases we are investing in afghanistan proxy human capital, helping train, educate, provides skills. they return to their inherent

government function and the me compete with the government and in some cases take them away and put the money to me to put them on the contract to us. this doctor now becomes on some sort of team. that is a conflict. and as something that afghanistan has to address in our rules, regulations, and policies. we have to be sensitive. the task force that we have formed which is with the rear admiral. she was in a joint command. she is now a two star and will go out and complement what we are doing to get into the details of this and look at some of these issues that are out there.

this will get down to the contractors, to the sub- contractors, follow the money to find out him -- how this is. the of. >> that is great. we have asked you to put in the qdr. we ask that dean q -- the qdr include contracting. if we are going to be count -- fighting a counterinsurgency far away, contract. is an essential piece of the missing. -- the centerpiece of the mission. briefly on the afghan national police, i would certainly want there to be acknowledgments somewhere that we may need to hold on to train local police as part of our fundamental core competency in going against the counterinsurgency.

this notion that the state department had it come and give it back to the sense, the state department takes a back, now is back to defense them and now there's a problem with the contract, struggling whether or not we competed. here we are in the crucial months of a strategy that has been adopted by our commander in chief, the military in afghanistan, and we've frankly are flat footed as it relates to our ability to contract with the afghan trainers. >> i could not agree more. we see this when there are industrial strength missions. this is to take nothing away from the state or inl. fantastic armies of one in his organization's but they are not structured. they do not have the deployin ability.

in the counterinsurgency situation, they are for the global -- normal definitions in the past, but i went through this in iraq. i watched us try to do it with traditional organizations. i ended up having to be the guy to take it over. we ended up taking more and more tasks. after we tried to do it the "normal way," it did not work. there is doctrine there for interagency roles and missions. we have argued for more resources for these different elements that are trying to perform these missions. if i could, we have formed,

another hat was added for the joint center for international security assistance which is designed for the military to counter what it is we have learned about the industrial strength. traditionally we did this with special forces that would train some battalions, a brigade or two, in some country in africa, latin america, or something. now we are doing both industrial strife efforts. the dorsey members of our green berets and have taken over the both of these missions. we've sought to capture the lessons from them. the preparation of these forces for deployment in the rest of that as well. >> thank you. i am out of time, but i wanted you to know i will submit to

record that i am concerned about the stability of the government in kurdistan. the have arrested the former president's son in the u.k. and i know there are allegations about skimming in terms of a few contracts with that base. we have a backup of trains. the no. supply route, we have taken a long time to get that in place and it looks precarious to me right now. that is a great concern. i will address the questions to the record and look forward burning where you all think we are as it relates to the ethnic strife which are now seeing in the central asia and how this impacts our mission in afghanistan. >> the new no. distribution network, the both of which is on the ground, virtually all of it runs the cause of stem and is but the stand. it is functioning very smoothly.

-- runs through kazakhstan and uzbekistan. they rented the north distribution network which helps to take off the pressure for the routes the come to the shaman gate. the prices went down in pakistan as a result of having competition. it is quite a distance. we have had no security issues whatsoever. when we are responding to and handling if there is a determination of humanitarian assistance as we did in the wake of the riots that resulted in the displacement of the government. there is an osb team working on

the contract. we have been able to keep the fuel and we have our tankers back flying again. that will continue as we are sorting out the way ahead on the contract front. >> senator sessions. >> think you both for your service to your country. unlike to go back to the fundamental question that the american people have at the time of this hearing is that they're picking up information that things are not going well in afghanistan and there are concerned about members of congress picking that up. we are seeing that in the media, rightly or wrongly. first of all, secretary, i and the stand you believe the overall trajectory of our effort there is in the right direction. in a sense, i guess, that we are making progress toward the goal that we would like to see for

afghanistan. is that a fair statement? >> it is. i think we are moving in the right direction. the nature of the counterinsurgency will be setbacks along the way. it will be difficult. we are moving in the right direction. >> the reports from your perspective that are pointing out problems, and some are very real, still they do not dissuade you that overall we are still on the right trajectory? >> yes. we are still having the resources the president ordered coming into theaters, getting into place, and not fully engaged in the flight. as they come on line, i think double and to our stability to create some momentum. >> general petraeus, i remember vividly the decision to execute the surge rather than having to ask.

we extended for three months one of the most bitter things. i remember asking you did you think we could be successful in iraq. at the time, that was a matter of doubt. i guess we can say that the trajectory of drawing troops down so rapidly indicates that you were right at least at this point in time. again, i will ask you, do you think we can be successful in the afghanistan given the current state of affairs there? >> i do. it will not be easy. nor was it in any way shape or form easy in iraq. it was very hard in iraq. we have very tough losses. there were significant uptick in dens. i still remember, for example, way past the september hearings

well into the end of that year, for example as various government leaders came to a senior u.s. officials and called for a very significant change in governmental leadership there. this is way beyond the point that anyone was stating. this is a tough, tough business. as i described earlier, ittis a roller coaster experience. those who are living this need to keep their eye on the horizon to ensure that the trajectory is generally upward. i agree with the undersecretary that it is. >> to talk about the state department. you talk about their contribution which is very valuable. you also pointed out that the ngo's do not carry security and it is difficult for them to

fulfil their responsibility in an insurgency situation. i will say in this way and let you comment. in my opinion, the people who are in these prt's are most the military and we need to understand the have the ability and can effectively dispense aid for local causes. the can save lives. i have an interest because there are soldiers lives at stake. would you comments on that fundamental balance on how the reconstruction money should be allocated? >> i think your point is well

taken. prt's by and large are significantly military. provincial reconstruction teams are a mix of civilian and military, typically civilian leadership and a number of good civilian experts that bring in skills that are hard to find within the military. sometimes we have them in our reserve components. what we want to do is partner. we have submitted skills in uniforms. many of them are from our reserve components to perform civilian functions when not in uniform that lend themselves very well to these kinds of tasks. on top of that, we have the national guard and the cultural development teams that have been superb. these are individuals who are farming experts, some cases

leaders in the agricultural departments of their states, counties, and they have been a very valuable. they come as a self-contained units. if you have a unit that can move itself from a feed itself, secure itself, communicate, and provide expertise on the agricultural arena on top of that. there is a mix and that is the way it ought to be. the funds are substantial when you talk about $1.1 billion, that is significant to dispense. we coordinate very carefully with a the and the other elements doing -- we courtney very carefully with aid and the other elements of doing this. >> two things. i believe 90% of the prt's are

military. the chairman ask you about why we are not moving more on utilizing that money that is being asked for. >> we have a plan. it will obligate a very substantial amounts of this on top of what has been obligated already this year that is as our footprint expands. >> just briefly, there has been a slowdown in canada are -- in kandahar. karzai did go there very recently. he has not done that enough in my opinion.

key wins and had a meeting with the kandahar meeting that senator levin and i did. they are all respected in their local areas. he called on them for support in the majority of the audience stood and raised their hands and ask for their support. general mcchrystal saw that as a strong, clear call for unity and that karzai display quotes ownership of the operation." does that indicate that we are not doomed in kandahar but we are laying the groundwork for a successful operation? >> that was important. the results of another,

president karzai held the bonds some months ago. it had about 1500 to 2000 local elders, notables, and leaders. it was so inclusive that a number of them filled and a reluctance in standing up in criticizing the afghan government and in some cases president karzai himself who pointed the finger at himself as well. this latest one that i read, the talking points that president karzai used were very good. i tell the chairman we would get copies of them to the committee. we had a video teleconference with the general mcchrystal yesterday morning. and is the weekly done with the secretary of defense. he felt quite encouraged by in also. the fact is that i always felt that kandahar was going to take months and months. it is not a revelation to me

that this will go into the winter. that is what i have expected having been in the ground that: the harper and row -- having been on the ground at kandahar. again, he is going about these changes slightly. he will start by doing more focused training in partnering with afghan forces before they launch their portion of the technical operations. that is very sensible to me. i didn't see that as extending the overall timeline necessary any -- necessarily. the have every reason to adjust as they see fit. >> thank you very much, senator sessions. >> thank you for your service. good to see you again. about one month ago, you posted senator nelson and bob.

we talked about a variety of issues. i wanted to follow up with what my colleague from alabama of was just discussing. when we had the meeting, we talked about your confidence in president karzai as a partner for our country in this effort to fight the taliban and al qaeda. these comments he made in kandahar are welcome but to follow the comments reported around the 10th of this month that he lost faith in the u.s. ability to defeat the taliba n. i wanted to get an update from you. >> great to see you. if i could start of that i think the statement that he has lost faith in the u.s. is a newspaper account and not a quote directly from him. it is the characterization from

some second and third hand sources. it does not square frankly with my contacts with him in recent months or when general mcchrystal reports nor any others who have a contact with him in kabul. these are the next important my vote resume milestones for in the conduct of the military operation. these are related to economic disputes contentions, and so forth. it is a significant step forward. it does not mean they will step back and about in his direction. they will continue their campaign on doggedly of trying to intimidate and in some cases assassinate our soldiers and our

afghan partners. this is very important in getting the people on the side of the government, knowing what is going to happen, understanding. he did not hold out rosy futures. he said it will be difficult and we will need to fight the taliban together. at the end of the day, his success is our success. we indeed have to support the leader of the sovereign country that we are trying to help. >> your confidence in the partnership as you were last time? >> yes. clearly there is an issue with the resignation of the minister of the interior and their national intelligence service. we know those individuals. we have all worked with them.

they are all regarded as competent to. before we start judging what we will do to the ministries and the effort, we need to see who the replacements are, a judge of their competence, their efficiency. president karzai is very sensitive. for what is worth coming discussions we are aware of that americans have been dissipated in the various candidates have been considered indicates that the replacements will be competent individuals and individuals that we certainly have confidence in that we can work with. >> if i could, senator, we had president karzai and members here for a strategic dialogue. they left with a very clear sense of a longer-term u.s. commitment.

we were talking about activities that will extend over the next five to 10 years in security assistance, governance, education, economics, the full range of longer-term strategic relationship. they left with no question, i think, about understanding that we see that as a vital interest to the united states. >> that goes to the question of the time line. my other colleagues have already questioned you all about that. how many of the troops now are deployed from the search effort? >> of the final 30,000 that will take us up to the 98,000 figure, keep in mind that we started in january 2009 with roughly 30,000 so this will be more than tripling the forces on the ground. the secretary of defense has some flexibility as required for emerging force protection needs and the critical requirements.

we are at about 21,000 of the additional 30,000 on the ground. this is slightly ahead of schedule in terms of personnel and equipment which is somewhat remarkable. given the icelandic volcanic eruptions, the relief operations in haiti, and other challenges including the fuel concerns one month a so -- one month ago or so. we call it transportation nation, the logistics' nation. they have performed miracles. we are issuing equipment early to the belgrade -- to the brigade moving into kandahar. >> when you expect them to be

finished? >> all 30,000 required to be there by the end of august will be there. those not required will go in about one month later. it does not rotate until after that. it is part of the 30,000. >> you expect those troops fully deployed to be insufficient complement to what you need to accomplish the mission? >> that is correct. general mcchrystal has a letter for the ranking member of stating that this will enable us to be what is required to carry of the strategy recognizing that, as i said, if there are emerging means we will always ask for them. it is the obligation to our troopers. secretary gates has this flexibility that enables him to satisfy that at his level. >> as you come into summer 2011, if he felt he needed to keep that level of troops on the ground that you would make the recommendation to the president. >> that is correct.

it is a statement i made up front and i will make sure you get a copy of that. i stated that we will look at at the conditions on the ground. all of the other military leaders and i will provide our most forthright professional military advice. at the end of the day, we support the old ms. paula decision made by the president. >> thank you for your service. i also wanted to talk about you run -- about iran so i will submit this questions to the record. >> the point that has been fairly major that dean -- that the taliban knows we will have fewer troops. your answer is accurate.

how many fewer and the speed of the reduction will come as the president has directed, be based on conditions at that time is true. the taliban knows that the afghan army, an army of people, will be far, far bigger in july 2011 than it is now. i think it is also true that the afghan government understands that those reductions which will begin in 2011 , one of the points is, that it will give a greater sense of urgency about their responsibility to take their own security on as an obligation. would you agree with that, general? >> absolutely. >> they want to fully exercise

their sovereignty including providing security. >> we have done well. is there are any quick comments by my colleagues? >> mr. chairman, if i could follow up in terms of messages we could send to the taliban. and my correct that general mcchrystal understands that if for some reason between now and july 2011 he feels he actually needs additional american troops that he is free to request them. >> absolutely. >> the final question, there has been some discussion about different ways in which, as we head towards july 2011, we can reassure the afghans, their enemies, and the region of our longer-term commitment? i know the last time president karzai was here, there is some interest in the afghan's seeking

a long-term security relationship with us including potentially becoming designated as a major non-nato ally. that would go beyond july 2011 and might obligate us for some longer-term funding. secretary, is that on the table? >> it is. we are working together with our afghan partners on a strategic framework the relationship amid to long term. as we develop that, we will be consulting with you here. we would like to make that remark to a public framework so it is very clear our intention for an enduring and substantial relationship. we want it to be clear to everyone, afghans, taliban, everyone. >> are you supportive of that, in general? >> yes. i do not to prejudge the policy,

but decisions have been made. >> that is very encouraging. i think that is a constructive way to go. if i could just drive parallel that as new countries have come into nato, as you know, the understanding has been that this is an exchange. you get the value of being a major non-nato ally and one of the things you do in response is to improve your own military and reform your government. there might be a very constructive sort of quid pro quo here. i think you for that. i am looking forward to looking forward to that. thank you for a good morning of testimony. it was realistically encouraging. as we said earlier, you accept the goal in the principal that we have a vital national security interest in succeeding in afghanistan, as president

obama has decided, and now we just need to figure out how to achieve that goal. thank you. . . besided, then we' decided, then we've got to figure out how to achieve that goal. >> thank you very much.then we'w to achieve that goal. >> thank you very much. >> i have put huge importancen getting tha afghan army trained, equipped, enlarged and taking the lead in operations including in kandahar. that has been my focus since the beginning of this effort in afghanistan. i have very much felt that that decision to set a date forhe beginning of reduction in july of 2011 is essential in order to energi eergize the afghan gover to take principle rponsibility for their own security. i believe that deeply and i think it is a part of counter

insurgesy that, that happen. and it is going to make a huge difference in terms of success. i also very much support a long-term relationship with afghanistan. both security relationship and equipment economic and political relationship. and i don't believe that is inconsistent with my belief that the afghan government must get a message of urgesy ur jen urgenc taking responsiblresponsiblity. i think they depend on each other, because i think success in afghanistan is going to depend on the willingness of the government to take responsibility for descent

governance inside of afghanistan that will win the respect of all those in afghanistan. i do believe at the same time, that they should understand that we have a long-term commitment. and those of you who want to place greater response bity e i them share that. we thank you both. it has been a long couple of days. and it has been very, very helpful and constructconstructi. and we appreciate it. thank you very much, we stand adjourned.

[captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> sunday morning on "washington journal", james weakely on the merchant marine act of 1920 and the application to that gulf oil spill. then brian fisher and discusses his recent trip to afghanistan. then carrie severino, policy director of the judicial crisis there were, on why they are pposed to kagain'n's appointment to the supreme court. "washington journal", live on sunday at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> tomorrow, another chance to see thursday's hearing with bp's ceo. he was questioned by the house

subcommittee on oversight and investigations. it is at 10:45 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> the commission on wartime contrasting in iraq and afghanistan held a hearing looking of the role of private security contractors. one of the commission's goals is to determine which tasks are governmental and should not be delegated to the private sector. this portion is an hour, 30 minutes. [gavel pounds] >> good morning. [inaudible] thank you for attending this hearing, which focuses on the airport -- important question -- are private security contractors and forming of -- performing governmental activities?

-chairing the hearing is my colleague. the commission will hold a related hearing in this location on monday. we will hear testimony from government and industry witnesses and question them on the adequacy of planning and managing private security contract thing in iraq, especially as they relate to the troop drawdown and a handoff of security functions from the department of defense to the department of state. this opening statement is made on behalf of the co-chairman, who is not here today, our fellow commissioners, and myself. the other commissioners are grant greene, robert hankey, catherine, charles teefer and doug. our topic combines two important

issues -- the raw a private security contractors or psc's in support of american operations overseas and the limitations on the use of them that are required under the concept of inherently governmental functions. private security contractor and is a big business involving a lot of people. during the first quarter of 2010, the department of defense had roughly 14,000 psc's personnel working under contract in iraq. that is equivalent to the personnel strength of a world war ii american infantry division. the historic reference is appropriate because private security contractors are not new in u.s. history. agents from the pinkerton national detective agency for all of plot against abraham lincoln's life in 1861.

they were not providing security at 4's theater in april, 1865. theater in's april, 1865. we see them, whether armed or unarmed, at shopping malls, office buildings, and gated communities, warehouses, and government facilities. they do important work, protecting life and property and occasionally playing a role in the national system of justice. it was a private security guard not a police officer who discovered the break-in at the watergate complex in 1972 that led to the criminal convictions of white house staffers and the resignation of a president of united states. today, and southwest asia, psc employees are also doing important works under contract with the department of defense and state, for the u.s. agency for international development and other agencies.

they guard military bases, escort convoys, and traveling at vip's, protect diplomats and diplomatic facilities, safeguard reconstruction projects and more. through my 21 trips to iraq, my life was in the hands of private security guards. i felt very secure because their high level of training, professionalism, and courage was obvious. today's hearing and the related hearing on monday are not intended to attack or championed private security companies. this commission has explored cases of excessive cost, personal and corporate misconduct, and adequate training or documentation, and unacceptable performance by some psc contractors. we have paid close attention to civilianct of iraqui deaths inflicted in 2007 into

the upper reaches concept of afghan civilians by employees -- the outrageous treatment of afghan citizens by employees in 2008. many psc's are performing model work at high standard. we recognize the statutory limits on u.s. military strike. the extreme operational demands and the need to safeguard thousands of reconstruction and development projects and workers creates an enormous demand for security personnel. the question we tackle today does not depend on whether psc performance deserves praise or blame, on what they cost or how well their contracts are managed. the question here today is whether they are performing inherently governmental functions that should not be orntracted out in whole in part, no matter the demand. the answer to it -- involves a mixture of law, policy, and

prudence. the federal activities inventory reform act of 1988 defines an inherently governmental function as "intimately related to the public interest as to require%it involvement by a federal government employee." nt employee, end of quote. the language of the fair act closely parallels the office of management and budget's circular a-76 issued in 1966. the omb definition uses mandate rather than require and personnel rather than employee. the principle laid down in the law is nonetheless vague and open to subjective judgment. the 110th congress addressed this problem by requiring omb to develop consistent definition of inherently governmental

function. the bureau's office of federal procurement policy has taken comments on a policy letter to make that definition and is expected to publish is final version by october it this year. the officer of federal procurement policy draft released in march takes the fair act definition as a starting point. it also proposes asking whether a function involves direct exercise of sovereign power, or whether contractor it is kregs could commit the government to a course of action. the o fcht pp also discusses functions critical. the results that this filtering would determine whether a function must be performed by federal personnel, may be performed by contractors only under close government control,

or may be routinely performed by contracto contractors. the commission's interest in this policy evolution stemses from its authorizing language, legislation. congress instructed us to include in our final report recommendations for improving, quote, the process for determining which functions are inherently governmental and which functions are appropriate for performance by contractors in a contingency operation, including during combat operations. especially whether providing security in area of combat operations is inherently governmental. this is a challenging three layer mandate. we are not simply looking at the general process for determining inherently governmental functions, but also that the process as applied to contingency operations that may include combat. and then at pscs use in areas of combat operations. our assignment takes us into

fine distinctions. hiring private guards for a u.s. supply depot may be entirely routine and not controversial in a stable allied country. is it still prudent to in a con tip again continue against city response when command control and assured responsely valued attributes? is it still prudent if the con tips against ci contingency may be likely to use force with all the diplomatic and public wopinion consequence that follow? these questions involve real people who still real blood. whether they should be placed in life or death decision roles in foreign combat zones and under what circumstance is a serious question.

the commissioners have thought about and discussed the question. the commission staff has researched it and written briefs. now we are reaching out to gather other views from well informed and thoughtful sources. today's hearing brings together six distinguished witnesses with deep insight into the issues of security contracting and inherently governmental functions. they are alan berman, ph.d., president of jeffersons solutions consulting firm. allison stanger, ph.d., professor of international politics and economics at middlebury development and author of "one nation under contract." stan soloway, president and ceo of the professional services council trade association, former u.s. deputy under secretary of defense for

acquisition reform. danielle brian, executive director of the project on government oversight commonly referred to as pogo. debra avant, professor of political science at the university of california at irvine and the author of "private security, the market for force." and john nagl, ph.d., president of the center for a new american security, co-author of its newly released report, contracting in conflicts, the path to reform. our witnesses are notable not only for their deep involvement with issues before us today, but also for the different conclusions to which they did their research and thinking and to which it has led to their views tak vi views today. we welcome this diversity of informed judgment and we encourage our witnesses, in kt farkts i would like to demand our witnesses engage with one

another's arguments during the question period. vigorous debate will be a service to the commission and to the american public. we have asked our witnesses to summarize their testimony in five to seven minutes in order to ensure adequate time for questions, answers and debate. we also ask that witnesses submit within 15 business days responses to any questions for the record and any additional information they may offer to provide. the full sex of their written statements will be entered into the record and posted on the commission's website. so on behalf of the commission, we thank all of today's witnesses for participating in a very important hearing. now if our witnesses will rise and raise their right hand, he will swear you in. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give in this hearing is the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

we'll note for the record that all our witnesses have responded in the affirmative before and, again, i'm really looking forward to this hearing and it will be a better hearing if we are really candid. and none of you work for government. you don't have any boss that restrains you. and that's another reason why we like having you here. i don't think you had to have ten people approve your statement. so with that spirit, we'll engage in our first witness and, doctor, you start and we'll go right down the line. >> thank you very much. i appreciate the opportunity to testify before you and the commission today. i'm the president of jefferson solutions and my it firm provides acquisition and management consulting services to federal government agencies and as you mentioned, i'm a forger procurement administrator for the federal government and signed back in 1992 office of federal procurement policy policy letter 92-1 which really

forms the foundation for what is today's inherently governmental policy. what i'd like to do is submit my statement for the record and briefly summarize it. what i'd like to do this morning is discuss the basic tena tenet of the policy that was formed in the document that is also included in the fair act and the federal acquisition regulation. the document that is also included in the fair act and the federal acquisition regulation. talk about elements of the march 31st, 2010 document work reserved for perform afternoons by federal employees which is an attempt to modify those existing policies.afternoons by federal employees which is an attempt to modify those existing policies. and go from that to the issue of whether private security contractors are performing inherently governmental functions. many of the issues that we're addressing today were also prevalent in 1992. and it was senator david pryer who was a prime movener getting the administration to look at this issue and try come up with broad guidance that would apply

across the government. i met many different stakeholders at that time, members of the gao, people from congress, industry associations, members of national academy of public administration, to develop this policy. let me take just a minute to provide some definitions. as you mentioned, the fair act states requires performance by government employees. it involves exercise in discretion or making value judgments in government decision making. then there's a bhol list of activities that are identified in the fair act that would represent inherently governmental actions. i'm not going to go through the list, but it includes things such as binding the united states to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order or otherwise. what it also says is that it does not include fwatherring information for or providing advice, opinions, recommendations, or functions

that are primarily admin steer yal. the kinds of examples include direction, control of federal employees, determination of federal program priorities and budget requests, and determining supplies or services are to be acquired by the government. it also includes services that closely approach governmental functions including such activities as activities relating to the government of regulation, preparing budgetses or supportive acquisition planning. now the main concern that's being raised today is whether the government is adequately staffed to make effective independent decisions based on recommendations made from the private sector and also also the whole question of whether the capacity of the government exists to, in fact, perform these inherently governmental functions. and that moves us to the policy letter that has recently been released in draft form. they've been tasked by section

321 of the fiscal year 2009 national defense authorization act to come up with a single definition as you mentioned, mr. chairman, to establish criteria to identify critical functions that should only be performed by federal employees. and to improve internal management. essentially what they've done, they've used the fair act definition. but then they've added a new category of critical functions which means a function that is necessary of the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations. and i see this as the real change in the nature of the debate today. because now the issue is one of promoting a capable workforce that can effectively oversee contractor support. and if it's central to what the agency is doing, if this function is determined to be critical, then it can be done by federal employees and makes no difference whether the type of

activity is a commercial kind of activity or something that otherwise might have been identified as inherently governmental. the example i like to use is an agency like noaa that requires meteorologists. they can say that these are government employees and should be government employees performing this work. i think this approach helps to frame then an answer to the private security contractor question. back in '92, our policy letter looked at the request of whether or not an unacceptable transfer of responsibilities on to the private sector would be taking place and used this example. the contractor's ability to take action that will significantly and directly affect the life, liberty or property of individual members of the public including the likelihood of the need to resort to force. whether deadly force is more likely to be initiated by the contractor or some other person and the degree to which force may have to be exercised in public or relatively uncontrolled areas. it looks like exactly the issue that we're talking about today, but then it goes on to say note

that contracting for guard, convoy, security and planned protection services is not prescribed by these policies. many agencies use private security services over the years i visited many department of energy facilities that required private sector support in terms of supporting their activities. there isn't really a bright line test. essentially my conclusion is that this criticality test becomes the best approach to use today looking at the totality of circumstances and making a judgment using that kind of a model or an approach to make a determination whether or not private sector security should in fact be government employees or not. mr. chairman that concludes my prepared remarks. i'd be pleased to answer any questions you or the other members might have. >> thank you. dr. stanger. >> thank you. it is an honor and privilege to

be invited to share thoughts with you here today. i've submitted a longer statement for the record and will use my five minutes here to summarize the key points of its two major arguments. first, to the question posed by this hearing's title, armed security contractors have been performing in-hair rently governmental functions in iraq and afghanistan since even milton friedman's minimalist definition of the basic functions of government renders that verdict. second, congress should ban the use of armed contractors for moving security in combat zones and instead use direct hire employees. if the u.s. government is going to engage actively in countries where the lives of its personnel are at high risk, we will need to build up our in-house capacity to staff those missions appropriately. as i have argued elsewhere, it makes good sense for the government to harness the

energy, efficiency and creativity of the private secretary nor as many ways as possible up to the point -- in iraq and afghanistan. as many witnesses before me have testified, iraq and afghanistan are our first two contractors h involvement in vietnam, contractors represented 14% of the american presence on the ground, today they are the majority presence on the ground in iraq and afghanistan. why is this rise in percentage of contractor involvement in war important? it's important because our current degree of dependence on security contractors makes its far too expensive a habit and far too easy to overlook abuses. i also find moving security

contractors the most problematic since they are more likely to use their weapons. i want to emphasize the state department and department of defense should not be blamed in any way for they are reliance on armed security contractors with an all volunteer source and underresourced capability they are doing the best job they can. understanding how we arrived at our present predicament renders our current practices neither desirable nor sustainable. our short sighted and growing reliance on armed contractors in iraq and afghanistan compromises long term u.s. interests in at least six different ways and i go into this in greater detail in my written statement. first, it blurs the line between legitimate and illegitimate use of force which is just what our enemies want. second, the practices at odds

with building state capacity in iraq and afghanistan, the afghan surge has been successful. 90% of arm contractors in afghanistan today are local nationals. yet this policy at the same time is building up a force that could very well be a d destabilizing presence. third our current policies have had disastrous consequences for government accountability and transparency. local security contractors in afghanistan are hired through subcontracts and that information, the information on subcontracts is currently entirely unavailable to the public. fourth, the united states, i would argue, really has no interest in seeing others do as we are doing. medie vimpb l europe made extensive use of privateers.

fifth, the use of armed contractors for moving security undercuts troop morale and the value of disinterested public service. and finally, i would argue that our overuse of security contractors has fueled an overly ambitious international agenda. all of these lead me to conclude there's one thing congress could do that would immediately disrupt this vicious circle. ban the use of moving armed security contractors in war zones with the practical toe to phased out. thank you for your attention and i would welcome your questions. >> thank you, mr. mr. soloway. >> i'm stan soloway.

among our nearly 350 member companies there are a number of companies that provide security service and many more that because of the work they do on behalf of the united states government must procure such services. as such we have the opportunity to look at this important issue from the perspective of both customer and provider. in addition on a personal basis, i had the privilege of serving in the clinton administration and office of secretary of defense and looked at these issues to governmental questions broadly and use of contractors and contingency environments more specifically to some extent. so i have that perspective as well to offer. let me start by suggesting two things. first, i think it's important we dispense with simplistic labels. the term private security itself encompasses an array of capabilities and functions from facility protection, training personal protection and more. we ought to be careful not to treat all asuspects of private

security as being one. moreover while the public's perception is inaccurately formed, when looked at objectively and in light of the size of the mission and hundreds of thousands of private security personnel who have cycled through the theater of conflict, overall their performance has been highly professional and disciplined and sometimes even heroic. this is not to whitewash any incidents to occurred, to minimize the importance of the issue or to suggest their employees should not be held accountable for their actions opinion on balance their performance is impressive. second the size and scope of the private security involvement in iraq and afghanistan has been driven by the unprecedented nature of the concurrent missions being performed. active combat, reconstruction and development.

historically those missions have occurred sequentially. indeed the federal acquisition regulations make it clear that contractors performing on u.s. contracts outside of the u.s. for other than direct support of the u.s. military are responsible for their own security. with that as a foundation let me make five basic points. first, let's be clear. private security itself is not an inherently governmental function, the use of private security personnel both domestically and overseas is common and routine. as omb has suggested work that is not governmental does not have to be performed by governmental employees.

it is there i believe the commission's work to provide the most value. second, private security like other important human capital must being looked at. while it is clear that for reasons of cost available human resources and other mission related factors the government can't provide all the requisite security throughout the theater. that doesn't absolve the government. consistent with omb's guidance in the case of private security we should look at the total force requirement across all government entities in the region and deciding on a priority basis the available resources to those activities that are deemed to be most sensitive. third, consideration ought to be given to having dod or a combination of dod and state take control of the security requirement and management. in 2003 we recommended to dod that the department award a multiple award contract off of which those needing security

services be they governmental or nongovernmental entities could obtain them. recognizing dod may not want to take that step we recommended as alternatives dod create a bidders list or issue you a set of standards against which firms could be measured. none of this has happened. i believe these two steps would also directly address another key question posed anycommission, that's oversight and management of security contractors. as i mentioned before, by and large, looked through an objective lens they have performed impressively. but to the extent the government seeks to enhance its insight and ability to manage this vital aspect of the mission, establishing standards in which firms can be held accountable would help achieve that goal. fourth we cannot avoid the issue of cost and its many ramifications. cost alone is not a reason to determine any function is proper

for governmental performance. with regard to private security the military's manpower resources are already under enormous strain and as general petraeus said in the past if he has to replace the 15,000 private security personnel supporting just dod's activities he would need twice as many soldiers which raises substantial manpower and fiscal questions. the state department as well as the gao and cbo have concluded that providing this function could be very expensive. moreover the cost of security has a direct correlation to the amount of funds available for the execution of the core mission reconstruction and development. it's essential that over arching cost is considered. finally problems on individual contracts. the two are unrelated topics. work is either governmental or

not. the quality of an individual contractor's performance has nothing to do with that equation any more than the quality of the government's performance of governmental functions would justify shifting the source of performance. if and where contractors are not performing well or not meeting the government's established requirements there are a number of tools to drive better performance up to and including recompeting the work. since we became involved in this issue -- >> 30 more seconds. >> i'm wrapping up. >> 30 more minutes. seconds. >> i'll take the minutes. since we first became involved with contracting and security in iraq prior to the advent of the conflict things have improved but we've not institutionalized enough of the lessons that have been learned. we can and must seek to improve. it is in our interest that we work together to ensure we that have right process and management regime in place to

ensure optimal performance. thank you. >> thank you. if i hadn't interrupted you you would have finished in exactly seven minutes. you did nice. miss brian. >> thank you. >> you are an experienced testifier. >> i forgot to press the button. i want to thank the commission to ask to testify. we've studied governmental functions for years. we're in the process of completing a multiyear study of the extent and impact of privatization later this fall. we have concluded that personal security -- private security contractors are currently sometimes performing inherently governmental functions when they work in a combat zone. a number of jobs that are not necessarily inherently governmental become so when they are in a combat zone. why? the use of private contractors for security in a combat zone poses unique risks.

one is the inherent tension between the effective performance. we saw evidence of this phenomenon in the north america contract last year where, for example in order to save money the company hired people who did not meet language proficiency requirements. any operations that are critical to the success of the u.s. government's mission in the combat zone must be controlled by government personnel. in addition, in those areas that have not been brought under the rule of law it is an inherently governmental function to provide security. contrary to mr. soloway's testimony even the national association of security companies recently wrote to omb that perhaps in sourcing or much great are contractor scrutiny may be needed.

in the short term we need to deal with the current reality. they are there. ensure contractors are being overseen and held accountable. in terms of the oversight infrastructure set up to handle these contractors it is either based on self-reporting or too undersourced to provide data. in understaffing is a problem. for instance the adoc in iraq has been downgraded to a branch of three people. one of the biggest weaknesses is the inability to scrutinize the subcontractors particularly in afghanistan. there's rumors that there's massive corruption. real oversight requires resource and technical knowledge to know when a contractor is not

adequately performing their mission. we need investigators who are experienced in security operations in the oversight shops. as we've seen in the s.e.c.'s failure to prevent the wall street collapse and interior's failure to regulate the gas and oil industry -- in the combat zone the consequences are more dire. pending legislation would extend much needed protections to these employees and should be passed promptly. in the long run, rather than distinguishing different types of security services such as personal security details, convoy and security and asking which are these are governmental i suggest the commission look at the question doimpbt. the gao has noted that private security contractors provided advice and security. we need to restore control of the security operation.

meaning the planning and management of security operations to the government and allow those functions to be only supported by contractors. secondly, what is being secured and whether the rule of law is in place should be the other standard for determining if that function is governmental. the type of security function is less important to us. in other words, the security of government personnel, facilities and property in a combat zone not under the rule of law should be categorized as a governmental function. thank you for addressing this important issue and for asking forring thoughts on this issue. i look forward to answering any questions you may have and work with the commission. i just want to point out in terms of what mr. burman was mentioning with the department of energy facilities that's underi consideration.

>> thank you. in that spirit. thank you for your statement. dr. avant. >> yes. i want thooo thank you for aski me to testify much the question of whether private security contractors perform inletterly government services is both important and hard to answer. i draw on the work that's been mentioned several times in the office of federal procurement policies and consider how the activities of private security contractors relate not just to inherently governmental service but also to spectrum ranging from not governmental to closely associated with governmental to inherently governmental. my argument is that we cannot classify a service where it sits on that spectrum in a vacuum. whether an activity is inherently governmental, critical or neither depends on

several risk factors that elevate or lower the threat that the service provides either to private individuals, to u.s. policy or to both. these risk factors include the threat environment, the characteristics of a particular job and the level of command and control. now let me just elaborate briefly on these and outline how this way of thinking affects the potential responses. so in terms of risk to private individuals, this is the most fundamental way in which private security activities may encroach on what is inherently governmental through the exercise of deadly force. this is widely presumed to be a fundamental function of government and the fair act of the letter specifically state that activities at issues significant risk to private individuals are inherently governmental. now, all arms private security personnel have the potential to affect the lives of persons around whom they work. whether or not this effect is likely to be significant depends

on the three risk factors. first, the threat environment. a more permissive environment where private security contractors deter criminals is less riskier. tictu(áqr'g a warehouse is less risky than convoy security or personal security details. jobs that require moving as other people have mentioned from one place to another increase both contact with others and potential for threat. third, the level of command and control. the whole reason why a government employee is referable to a private contractor in carrying out tasks that are related to the public interest is because federal employees are under a clear and well designed system of control and accountability. though the control of private contractors is never as great as command and control of u.s. forces different regulations can yield more or less control. also important to the level of control are the skills,

background and training of the personnel that are performing the security jobs. in terms of the risk to the u.s. mission or policy, private security may also encroach on inherently governmental work, according to the draft letter if what contractors do or how they do it can undermine the functioning of the military or the overall policy of the u.s. government. this can work in a few different ways. some jobs are simply more critical to the military's ability to fight than others. a convoy carrying fuel is more important than protecting a warehouse. in a counter insurgency environment, though, the way private contractors function is also critical to the success of the overall mission. this is particular true for personal security details that frequently operate in highly populated areas.

finally there's a relationship between private security companies and other violent forces in the country, particularly militia and insurgents. if using private security enhance the compensate kpa it-- capacity -- in iraq there's a lot of speculation about the interaction between the people and the militias that toledo the insurgency and in afghanistan right now where tuesday has relied to a much greater extent on afghan personnel, there is speculation that some of them are, in fact, paying off the taliban in toward guarantee passage and this s-of course, be essentially funding u.s. enemies which is posing a significant risk to the overall mission of the u.s. the three risk factors also affect the degree to which private security could matter for u.s. policy in terms of

threat to security is more critical than guarding a convoy carrying supplies through a pacified area. second, in terms of particular jobs, you can alienate civilians more ease squli --e easily. so, in sum, all armed personnel working for the united states abroad potentially encroach upon inherently governmental territory simple lie by their

virtue to use deadly force. those that perform functions critical to the u.s. also have the potential to trespass on governmental roles. features are particularly threat environment, level of jobs can elevate or lower the degree of risk. all these features should be considered in determining where a job fits. the more features that are present the more likely the job is to be inherently governmental. looking at the issue this way pose as variety of options in dealing with jobs deemed to be sufficiently risky. they range from a standard in sourcing to a variety of steps that would reduce risk by increase command and control. i won't elaborate on these given the time but outlined them in my written comments. >> dr. nagl. >> i thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss whether private security companies are

performing governmental functions in support of u.s. military operations overseas. clarifying the roles of armed security personnel and contingency operations is very much in our national security interest. i'm pleased to have the opportunity to discuss it with you today. as you know, when our nation goes to war, contractors go with it. in both iraq and afghanistan there are more private contractors than u.s. troops on the ground. now and for the foreseeable future the united states will be unable to engaging conflicts or reconstruction and stabilization operations of any significant size without private contractors. the system within which this contracting takes place, however, has not caught up with this new reality. to adapt the u.s. government must embark on a path of ambitious reform. part of that reform has rules regarding outsourcing of functions related to the public interest, that is those deemed governmental. as you know u.s. laws long aim

to protect the core functions of government by prohibiting anyone other than federal employees from performing such tasks. but today, while there appears to be a rough consensus there are some functions that should never be outsourced there's no consensus on what those functions are. we've seen that today. until recently u.s. law and policy barred anyone other than a government official or entity from performing governmental activities, statues and regulations offered overlapping and ambiguous guidelines. as a result the fy-2009 required omb to give a definition. the draft policy letter released on mash 31 claimed, aims to clarify when work performed for the federal government must be carried out in whole or in part by federal employees but,

unfortunately, the government's draft guidance doesn't comment on the functions that have been contracted out including provision of security forces, interrogation of enemy combatants and coordination of federal contractors. omb's publication of the finalized letter is unlikely retrosolve the debate because there remains little consensus. and as dr. avant just noefted is a sliding scale. this is an enormously difficult task and the fact that it's so difficult is vividly demonstrated by congress's decision to pass the responsibility for defining the terms on to the executive branch. this matters because if a given function is deemed governmental it then becomes illegal for the government to contract it out even in extremists.

on the other hand, simply deeming a task not to be governmental and one that agencies could contract out in no way suggests that it is good policy to do so. for this reasons i believe that a better alternative is to focus on a core competency approach. while congress should deem governmental any acts should not be outsourced, a core competency approach would apply to all those activities that do not fall under that rubric. thus, for example, the government cozy that inter error investigating enemy price sners a core competency it wants to name. as it ramps up its interrogation capacity it would avoid contracting out this function but only in extremists be

permitted under law to hire contractors to interrogate price mers should the government workforce prove insufficient to carry out this task. the federal government will leave the option legally open to offer the flexibility to employ contractors. moreover, the core competencies approach would give others in the field the access to search capacity and swiftness often necessary in an unpredictable contingency environment while moving the u.s. government away from dependents on certain forms of contractors as a more general principle. the solution would also promise to cut through continued debates about what does or does not constitute an inherently governmental activity and instead concentrate on what the government should be doing and how it will ensure it's competency or oversee the performance of contractors it has decided have to perform the function. the inherently governmental term

seeks to draw a stark line between tasks and behaviors that can be contracted out. but such a delineation is difficult to carry out. by moving towards a hybrid solution to resolve the governmental conundrum and moving towards a core come psol. i'm going to ask the questions at the end but what i'm hoping at the end of this hearing we can box you all in.

in the sense that i will want to know what each of you think about the definition, if we have agreement there, do we have agreement that convoys are inherently governmental or not, go down that list and just that have this real gray area. that would be my interest. we're going to have eight minute questioning from each of the members. we'll then do a second round of five. and then we'll even do a third round and any member here who has the leave can leave. we'll be done before 12:00 to give you all a sense of how you can spend your afternoon. so, with that, i'll go to my co-chair. >> thank you. i want to add my own thanks to those of the co-chairman. i want to thank you all for being here. this is enormously important hearing, this whole issue of what is and isn't inherently governmental is particularly controversial and especially in

the area of private security contractors. i draw my question from witness statements and i'll do that today. i would like to delve into each of your statements. dr. burman, i think you did a very good job in your statement of laying out the government's struggle over time. it's evolving efforts to come to grips with this issue. i didn't get a sense of what your position is on this issue. the subject of today's hearing are private security contractors are performing governmental functions. what's your personal view about this matter? >> my personal view is i think private security guards are not performing inherently government functions. however, i do think that they are performing critical functions when looking at the totality of the circumstances. i agree with what a number of the panelists have stated. if you're looking at a situation with a war time setting with life and liberty being at risk

and all the needs for government accountability, seems to me there's a strong argument for the government fit has the capacity to perform that service itself and to have governmental employees doing that job. and so i agree with dr. nagl and i think dr. avant as well in terms of looking at the totality of the services, and then making a judgment based on that situation as opposed to making an all encompassing position across the board saying this is or is not inherently governmental. >> what about the specific area that dr. stranger raised in moving security in that specific circumstance, concerning all the circumstances, should that deemed to be inherently governmental? >> in my judgment in a war time set field goal you have the staff to be able to perform that function i think it would be advisable to use government employees to do that. again, you have to deal with the

practical question about the ability to, in fact, have the people to do the job and somebody needs to perform the mission and i think stan soloway raised some of those concerns as well. >> just to close with you on that point, certainly there are two issue here's, one is whether there's the organic in house government capacity to provide private security contractors. the government doesn't have that now. but if the government were to have it then private security contracting ought to be done by the government. now on the firmer point will the government zisht realistic to expect the government to develop this organic capacity unless and until private security contractors are phased out? as long as there's an alternative to be used, will the government move towards developingdevelop ing that organic inhouse policy?

>> whether you make that judgment across the board in all cases i'm not sure whether that's advisable. it seems to me that there is a strong argument for accountability purposes to say that that is where the government should be moving. >> dr. nagl, there were a few things in your testimony that i wanted to talk to you about. your notion that because inherently governmental defining i want has become such a conundrum we should give up on that. but chances are we'll don't disagree with that. let's focus on what we can agree are core competencies. that sounds appealing but as a practical matter won't we have the same problem? won't there be the same disagreement what is and is not a core function if tim

application >> there are some actions there's a consensus are inletterly governmental. for inassistance offensive combat operations is clearly governmental. there should be no question about whether that is a capacity that only the united states government should conduct. what about private security skroin? >> for private security contractors as we've seen on this panel it depends. so that there are -- there's a sliding scale, i believe, of conditions under which it becomes increasingly critical to the mission accomplishment, the performance of that security mission, and that is why i believe that a core competencies approach would say the ability to conduct security operations in particular the most difficult case i agree moving security operations, that is a core competency of the united states government we want to maintain that capacity, but it is not

inherently governmental depending on the threat conditions, depending on the kind of operation we're conducting. so depending on the degree of command and control we have, to use dr. avant's categories. therefore we would like in the most dangerous circumstances either to be conducted by u.s. government personnel or in those same circumstance if the u.s. government doesn't have the capacity we want the performance of that mission to be overseeing very, very closely by u.s. government personnel and that, i think, allows the flexibility to the government to acquire and develop the capacity, the capability it wants to have for those kinds of missions but gives it the flexibility if the demand exceeds supply or in less contend shourks less difficult stwigs contract it out. >> let's talk about the most contentious, the most difficult situations. i'll ask you the question that i asked at the end of dr. burman.

unless and until we at least establish the goal of phasing out private security contractors in these most difficult circumstances, as a practical matter will it ever develop the organic capacity to take over that function entirely? >> the u.s. government has an appreciable capacity to conduct security operations. it does not have sufficient capacity to, for instance, guard the u.s. state department in its missions abroad and so the state department contracts that out. the decision to bring all of that inside the government is an enormous one and i don't think the forcing function should be making the decision to call private security an inherently governmental function. instead, that would require dramatic changes in the structure of the department of

defense or department of state. >> i'll come back to you, dr. nagl, in the next round. mr. soloway, in your statement you mentioned the following. measured against a number of inappropriate incidents or even alleged unlawful actions. it's clear their record is far better than record understands, et cetera, et cetera. i want to talk about those inappropriate incidents. admittedly there's bean few. by the way what is your number for that? >> i don't have a specific number but based on the literature available -- >> do you have a ballpark figure >> no. >> relatively small? >> first of all i didn't want to excuse incidents that have taken place. the point i was trying to make it's not clear based on the evidence we've seen that there have been abuse and everyone should be held accountable. >> let me finish this one question. fair note i understand that. to what degree have firms been

held accountable for these incidents in terms of our judicial system, in terms of the government's withholding fees, not renewing contracts, not awarding additional contract, internal industry discipline? what degree of accountability has there been for the relatively few incidents that have existed? >> i'll leave it to the state department and dod to talk to you about how they make their procurement decisions. i think that's a very fair question and we as an industry have long supported expansion of tools in which to hold people accountable where there are criminal activities involved. so i think that from a criminal perspective it's much the same by the way for federal civilians. if you're not performing on dod contract where there's clear jurisdictional application, outside of that there are real questions relative to u.s. jurisdiction although establishes some jurisdiction in iraq. >> thank you, mr. soloway.

>> one more point. in the questions you asked dr. burman and dr. nagl were great. let me make one suggestion. >> hold that thought. i would like us to start out trying to be on time. hold thought. >> fair enough. >> i'll give you a chance to respond to me. >> mr. green. >> thank you. let me add my thanks to those already expressed for your attendance here. i can already see we have some slightly differences of opinion and i think it should make for an interesting hearing and interesting dialogue as we proceed with our work in making recommendations to the congress. let me -- and i think i have a pretty good sense of where each of you comes down on inherently governmental and the use of private security contractors.

let me focus on just one part of that, and that is the personal security details, because i don't think anyone on the panel would necessarily advocate that static embassy guards shouldn't be contracted out, and dr. burman said, some facilities here in the u.s. i think we accept that. dr. stranger did raise the movement issue the convoy security. but i want to concentrate on the personal security details that we see being used in theater now. and i want to also concentrate on the longer term. i think in the short term, whether we like it or not, we got to accept the fact that they are there. and they are going to continue.

and we also would agree that oversight and management and command of those entities, we should continue to try to improve that. those people who are functioning as private security details come from background where they received significant amount of training. as a minimum, a ds agent at the state department today without getting into the investigative training piece that they do is probably four months of training. i would like to get away, if i might, and follow on a little bit with what commissioner irvin started to talk about, get out of the hypothetical and the academic, what we like to see

happen. maybe what should happen and let's talk about reality. we've talked about budgets. and we've talked about structure. i would like to hear from any of you how you think this would be implemented if we did, in fact, in source private security details. dr. stranger? >> commissioner green, that's a great question. and i thought about it a good deal and i try to think about it from my testimony. i like the distinction between moving static security contractors because look at where the abuses have been committed, my understanding from the public u-know, publicly available information is that the majority of them are by moving security contractors and

the other interesting fact is that most them are committed by u.s. citizens. so, i wanted to think about how you could potentially transition to a situation where moving security would be in house. what i realize there is that i needed additional information that i do not currently have access to but perhaps you could get that information. i think you would need to know, first of all, the current number of moving versus static security contractors in iraq and afghanistan. how that breaks down. you would also want to know and i thait pretty small number but still important information how many moving security contractors are deployed elsewhere currently. and third you need to know the necessary footprint in iraq after the department of defense leaves. it doesn't take a rocket scientist know where national

security budgets are going to go. particularly as we phase out of iraq and afghanistan, assuming that happens on the timetable that's been suggested. secretary gates has already levied on the services, each service cuts for the next five years that will be taken out of structure, oust modernization, having sat at state for four years i know what problems they have ever lie year with budgets. defense is going to put whatever savings they accrue into the tooth side of things. so this is not going to be important. they are not going to put money against private security contractors and private security details. so, my question to you is, how do you in source this?

how do you train? how do you assess them? and how -- what do you do with them when it's over? mr. soloway. i think it's a wonderful way to frame the question and gets back to part of the broader issue. to dr. stanger's point, there's a lot of different ways to moving security. let me sort of go back to my testimony and actually if you sort of cut through some of our other comments -- >> we have two minutes, folks. >> you will find substantial degree of commonality on the panel. you approach private-sector holistically, strategical and in a heirarchal sense.

that's where i allocate my first order of resources that are going be available for private security, my training, my development, my pay and so forth. >> do we do this as an insurance policy? when we're out of iraq and afghanistan, are those departments going to be willing to put those resources as an insurance policy not knowing what the next crisis is? >> the answer is probably not and history suggests that. there's another layer to what i was suggesting. once we have done that allocation process you have to look across the resources available, what's an ongoing routine requirement and balance against the weakness of the government has always been strategic human capital alignment to resource to long term versus short term neends so forth. i would suggest that we start with this approach which is something we've all indirectly come to the same conclusion on also measured against cost but

not allow the bureaucracy or human capital system to be the reason for a policy decision, the policy doigecision ought to drive the human capital decision. this may be a case where balance has been reached. my understanding is security personnel when mission is critical they are conducted by governmenting agents and the vast majority of personal security details are for what would not necessarily be considered mission critical operation. >> well, my time is up. but i'll follow on with this line in my next round. thank you. >> we may get out at 12:30. >> i only went over 10 seconds. >> i wish you had been able to ask some more questions. >> thank you, mr. chairman. let me start with professor avant and miss brian because

you're oral and prepared testimony suggests it is possible, i'm not getting rid of the differences or distinctions but possible for me to draw some common lines and that is looking at the applicable negative or risk factors involved in some uses of private security, and i'll tick them off and then ask how much change you want to make in order to get away from where i might be wrong. the first factor is the risk to people around, especially host nations civilian, earth casualties or reliably measured incident levels. second, basket of negative factors or risk factors where there's weak command or control including a lack of rule of law discipline and prosecutability. third basket has to do with u.s.

policy objectives, whether these are mission critical tasks that were given to private contractors, whether having the private contractors there -- one of them orally referred to undermining the counter insurgency mission itself by what they do and that includes is there a real host country buy in or just a corrupt one or one involving payoffs? now, have i in some respect brought together the thoughts of the two of you? >> i feel good about it. >> generally, yes. >> okay. i'll take generally. good. because it happens to be very close myself to the way i think. i'm happy to take it. miss brian, why is it you worry about the rule of law application to this? you want someone who brings --

i'm from the university of baltimore law school, rule of law is spree show us to us. why is to it you? >> the basic reason is that is ultimately going be requiring more davis of the person having to exercise discretion if there's a less rule of law there's more likely to be some sort of incy dent where the person will be required to use force, frankly. >> okay. mr. soloway, i'll take a risk. you proved a glutton for time let's see if i can get a short one for you. give me one short one i'll ask you another, otherwise not. you speak both in your oral comments about how we have to look at objectively what these, what pcs are doing and in your written testimony you talk about and i'll quote leaving a kwu words measured against a number of inappropriate incidents it is clear that there, the pscs,

their record is far better than the public understands. or the firms get credit for. and i think the common language we're talking about there is the incident rates from the special incident reports that are what we all look at as the incident rapist because that's what's counted? >> based on the public available information the incident rates is also publicly available information. okay. i want to give you the second one. leapt me get to the second one. i'll take the second one. there's a current debate going on about what kind of third-party certification they have, the armed services committees have been fighting about it, the department of defense has written a report on. i think there are some things you wouldn't go for. i want to ask if a third-party certifier, let's say had the power to say blackwater you can't get any more contracts.

the expression is to black list blackwater. you do support that or my impression is you don't support that >> a third-party certifier for incident or qualification. >> eve argued for dod to establish a multiple award contract. >> i want to ask you if you would say that such a certifier could say to blackwater you're not to get more contracts and tuesday government would say that's good enough for us they won't get more contracts. a real simple one, blackwater, independent body could it have said no more contract? >> does the independent body have access to all the investigative information, all of the witnesses, all of the normal terms? >> submission by the black water

firm. >> you're against? >> others should make that judgment. >> let me get some reaction, miss brian, you know that the incident reporting system is a self-reporting system, that is the only way it gets in to the files of incident reporting is that a psc firm says to the government here we have nancy dent to report and there have been a number of studies that cast grave doubts about the completeness of these incident reports. these firms are not too eager to report certain things. would you consider it objective and reliable? >> not at all. self-policing is totally one acceptable as a form of accountability. >> secondly, about third-party certification. would you prefer a strong and independent certifier who would

have the power to say this firm should not, at least for some period of time not be providing private security? i'll make that a question for dr. avant as well us a. >> this may be one moment i agree with mr. soloway on something. that's something the government should be doing not a third-party that's not part of government. >> oh, my god. i'm afraid to ask dr. avant. that's too much agreement. well, do you think a judgment could have been made by a certifier, wherever he placed it that blackwater not receive? >> absolutely. >> okay. fine. good enough for government. we have a statement -- let me ask you professor avant. we have a statement from mr.

soloway that congress was told by general petraeus that if he had to replace the approximately 15,000 private security contractors that were protecting dod assets in iraq with soldiers he would have a great deal of difficulty. is that what you're suggesting that all 15,000 or do you draw distinctions among the 15,000 that it wouldn't be that kind of a burden? >> i would absolutely draw distinctions between different services. i don't think it would be that big of a burden. i would also suggest that the choice is not simply in source it entirely, or rely on contractors entirely. there are a number of ways in which the u.s. could set up potential reserve type system where qualified screened people perhaps by some certified body would go through a certain amount of training every year and be available.

>> my time has expired. i thank you for your answer. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to challenge dr. stanger on a point on her testimony. you say one fact is indisputable hiring moving security vastly more expensive than relying on our own arms and you krooit -- cite a gao study. and you cherry picked the one example from that report that seems comport with your views. the gao report, first of all, it cited a cbo study saying using army units would cost 90% more than using contractors. the gao's own report says they looked at five cases, four task orders and one contract, five

case and to quote their words, using contractors in iraq is less costly than the estimated cost for state department employees in four of the five cases we reviewed. four of the five cases they reviewed. in fact, one of the cases they reviewed was or is a situation where, for the baghdad embassy security contract to hire civilians would have cost $858 million and comparative cost for a contract for the same year would be $78 million. a factor of 11 times more expensive to in source it. the example you cite in your testimony where the comparison was in favor of in sourcing, actually if you read the next sentence in the gao report it says, however, because state department did not include the

bottom line is the costs are about equivalent. so, setting the issue of the accuracy aside, what i want to probe you on is i want to understand, do your views and the other views of witnesses here, do your views hold even when the costs are 11 times more expensive? >> absolutely not. i'm quite familiar with that gao study. and i wouldn't call it cherry picking. i just picked out the one cost comparison that involved moving security. the other ones are involving static security. and i'm not making an argument about static security. i would certainly like to see more research on the moving versus static security because everything that i know suggests that moving security will always be more expensive. >> but in the case where, do you

think that static security, then can always be outsourced? >> i started out believing that arm security contractors in the war zone will be the problem. as my thinking has evolved i've come to believe the distinction between moving and static is an important one. it will allow us to transition to where we can outsource some government functions and have a force that we could deploy beyond iraq and afghanistan. there's an argument that the problem with in sourcing is that these security contractors are providing a surge capacity. once we're done with iraq and afghanistan what will we use them for? that kind of a conclusion is based on cold war principal th the united states come from nonstate actors in a range of fragile states, in that sort of a world there probably will be a

need for moving security in other areas and if there is a need we should take step tones sure it can be provided by government employees. >> okay. mr. soloway, we're talking in this instance about what are called local guard contracts at the embassy around the world. i know ms. brian knows much about them from our previous hearings. the state department has a practice of in i think all embassies 240 or 230 or so to have local nationals generally provide that static, that building guard security force. and they do it as well obviously in afghanistan and in iraq. my question for mr. soloway is, is there a difference between static security in paris or sydney, australia or peru and in active combat zone? do you see a distinction there

do? or to you are they always the same thing where it's always okay to have contractors perform that level of security? >> severing different in an active combat zone, so i wouldn't make the statement it's the same as paris. the issue again is and i think dr. stanger's point, there's commonality here, the point i wanted to make earlier, ms. brian doesn't think we agree, but we all agree that the government has to exert control over this mission in whatever form it might take. >> right. >> the gradation is confusing that dr. nagl talked about which is absolutely never which are closely associated or core competentsies, whatever term we want to use that does have gradations and you have to make decisions based on availability of resource, costs, environment, risk, all of those things are part of the decision, so i wouldn't say as a flatout declare tif statement that all

convoy security is for all contractors nor is all building security appropriate to outsource. you have to make decisions in each individual case, which is why a simplistic definition and i think this was dr. nagl's point is probably not where we ought to be going. we ought to be driving dod and state to make broader human capital decisions. >> if a function is inherently governmental, if i understand the new policy letter correctly, cost does not matter correct? is that correct, dr. burman. >> that's how read it, yes. >> cost is not a factor. >> that's the policy level i worked on as well. >> where cost comes into play is where the function is closely associated or now the new term of critical, mission critical. and i think we all agree that at a minimum to use dr. avant's

scale of options from insource to provide better oversight, at a minimum mump better oversight, much better active planning, deaconfliction, thoughtful ways to integrate civilian and military forces has to be done. the question i want to mr. soloway is and dr. burman is in the case of -- it's too often cited. i take your point that it's not all nizer's square, i take that point and it's probably in the public mind mischaracterized, but in the incident of nizer square, mr. soloway, did state come close to losing control of their mission or operations as a result of that action? >> i do not have the in-depth knowledge, access to all

investigative reports to figure out where state was or was not. i think that we have seen too many incidents in iraq and afghanistan where the u.s. command and control structure has not functioned appropriately whether through contracts or internal, including within the military, i think that's a question for people who are really doing the in-depth analysis and investigation to look at. we all agree that greater management oversight of government and nongovernment actors in this environment is absolutely essential. >> ms. brian, what do you think on that issue? did state lose control of its mission or come close? >> there certainly have ban lot of comments about from the military about it. i don't know that state did. >> one last comment, dr. burman, would you like to comment on that issue? >> i don't know all the specifics but it comes into question the accountability of the government and whether the government is really accountable in those circumstance, i would say there are real questions on that. >> thank you very much. >> commissioner schinasi. >> thank you. i would like to add my thanks to

you all not just for appearing today and for your testimonies but for the writing that you do and the thinking that you do on the subject because as chairman shays said, you're not part of the governmental structure and i think it's important that we understand that there are diverse views outside the government on this topic. i will say my thinking on this changed pretty dramatically last month when we had a representative of the army come in and in his statement, he said the army has 15,000 positions that it's identified that are inherently governmental that are being filled by contractors. then he went on. maybe by 2013 maybe the army would do something about t so i don't think we can just put aside what is the definition. i think we have to really look at what is going on right now. and so i'm thinking about how the best way to frame this issue or maybe not best way but

different ways to frame it. and what i've gathered from your testimony today and from your other writings is that there are two ways, one is management issue and anning with sigs issue and i'll come back to that in a moment because i think that's where most of our questions are centered today. but dr. stanger, you also talked about the fact that this supports an overly ambitious international agenda. and dr. avant you've talked in your writings about how this could undermine some of the principles of democracy and dr. nagl you've used in your recent mono graph the example to bring in thousands of indian nationals in a contract in afghanistan without apparent recognition that there are some issues between the pakistanis and the indians we might want to be aware of before we make that decision or before we allow a contracting officer to make that decision. so i think those kinds of topics

are important as we move forward and think about this. but and so in that vein, there's one area that my thoughts are not yet set and that is the -- how usaid provides security or how the government provides security for development projects. i think with respect to the department of defense, were we have the capacity to do force protection, it's one of dods missions, whether or not they should is the question. but in the state department has the diplomatic security bureau, those are focused on some of these security missions, but how about the u.s. agency for international development? is there a different set of factors there with what the u.s. is trying to accomplish with its development mission that might make military presence unaccepted, acceptable or unwarranted. and then how do we deal with that issue? dr. staininger, i'll start with you because you write about this in your book.

>> it's a good question, because i think the way the state department and usaid employs security contractors is quite different. i think for most of the development contractors, it's the firm that contracts for the security. so it's one step removed from the government. but it's my understanding that if you would build up the in-house capacity within ds, it would be possible for ds agents to be deployed on usaid missions and i think that would be my vision for the future. >> thank you. mr. soloway? >> i think dr. stanger is correct that usaid, any contract other grant performed for the u.s. government overseas, it's the responsibility of the contractor to provide their own security so they're the ones procuring it one step removed and there's very clearly a cultural, sociopolitical and

socioeconomic reason to maintain separation. that's a fairly well established tenet of the military to create a different feel. so there's reason not to have military to do that. with all due respect it's difficult to say we could just build up the ds capacity to provide the security for the thousands and thousands of development projecting being performed all over the world in dangerous and high risk yafrs. it's not just iraq and afghanistan. even in iraq and afghanistan, we have thousands of development projects, small to large, ngos, we we've had ngos been assault and lost people. we've had companies who have lost people. diplomat security bureau does not necessarily have the expertise or providing that security. in fact, their principal security role is inside the land not outside the line. so the current structure where you have private security or others providing that capability

in the field is probably not one that is easily or simplistically change and and may not be "washington journal" continues host: joining us from that gingrich, louisiana is a lieutenant, a retired general -- rouge,l louisiana a retired general. he has joined us to give us insight and perspective on the response of bp and what they need to do. he is currently a cnn contributor. thanks for joining us on the program. caller: the morning.

host: -- guest: good morning. host: in the "tampa tribune would recce said we should fight the oil spill like it is need -- tamparibune", you said we should fight the oil spill like it is world war iii. tell me about that. caller: we need to continue to turn it around. by the time we got theacts on what was going on, bp had a brand with this like a gulf oil spill as opposed to the bp oil spill. host: here is this headline. base from your observation, who

is in charge of this situation? caller: i think the situation that continues to confuse people is bp saying what is going to geit done and what is not. it done. many are confused. the president was not in the louisiana. if a governor that is in charge with what happens in the state, -- at the end of the day, it is bp that approves whether or not something is going thappen. that has to change. host: we are talking with a retired lieutenant general for the next 45 minutes.

we like to get too involved in it the response to the gulf coast oil spill. the numbers are at the bottom of your screen. we are taking your messages through e-mail and twitter. if you were in charge of this operation, before we get into that, tell me about how the response to this bp situation and oil spill is different than the response to hurricane katrina? guest: katrina was a week of attendees and operations and intense operations in the city. this is a much want revenge. people lost their lives. homes were lost. this is an environmental based

tragedy where you have millions being destroyed. while both of them are national disasters, katrina had a letter signed by the president that was designed to take care of the people suffering from the effects of the disaster. this is being handled differently under the laws created from the exxon valdez. bp is based on the failure of equipment and the explosion that left 11 people dead. both are major tragedies. the bp oil spill could have a bigger impact on the gulf and the way of life. host: if you get a call from

president obama saying i want you to take over running this operation, what is the first thing you want to do? guest: let us change that question to say, what would be my ideas to move forward? i would switch the philosophy of defending the shoreline to attack in the o before it reaches the shoreline. in the last couple of days, they need to organize forces to attack the oil. they need to find it using small boats or vessels of opportunity. bring in the department of defense and use the army small boats to go out. they have a satellite based

system and responders to see where it is. finding oil and bring the skimmers to set the oil out. that is a 24/7 operation. i would say to support the government. when they ask for something, it is being ordered and delivered as opposed to going through fema. the constitution -- the governor is in charge of the state. right now, their hands are tied. they have to wait for bp approval every time they want to do something to protect the shoreline. we need to fix that. need more control in terms of dod assets that can be used.

there are not enough boats on the ground to fight the oil it the ocean to the shoreline and the three lines -- miles out where the governors have authority. host: let us go to the phones. red bank, new jersey, on our line for independence. -- independents. caller: i have to agree with the general. i do not see enough books on the shores. -- boots on the shores. they need to create more jobs and to send pple out there and start cleaning this thing up.

guest: i could not agree more. there is still people in the fishing business and associated businesses that have not gotten jobs along the coast that could use those jobs. i agree with you. we eventually might get there, but it is a slow process. host: our next call comesrom our democrats line, oklahoma. caller: i was calling to confirm or agree with what the general is saying. there has not been the urgency needed to take care of the situation. hopefully, they are gearing up for that. there should be more activity being done. there seems to be a sense of urgency thanhat we have seen over the last few weeks.

guest: in the last five or 10 days, there has been a change about to happen. the admiral is on the ground and directing the operation. there seems to be a plan. do not confuse a plan with execution. i think what the people living in the gulf are looking for is how our words meet o actions. how is our video meeting our idea. what is said on television does not match what is being seen on the ground. we want to decide and analyze and act. right now, there is a disconnect from analyzing, the

sighting, and acting. that is the frustration that people continue to see. i expect it to get better. give the assets to the general, so they can work with these county and other officialsaid that we can kill let oil before it hits the shoreline. host: virginia, independent line. caller: i would like to tell the general he is right about stopping the oil out there. i think we should stop it at the whole. like it at the hole. until we do that, we will have major problems.

i would like to hear his comments about that. guest: i think he is a spot on. the first job is to plug it, and set the oil out. right behind that is to get the oil out of the water as soon as it comes out. more of that is being done. is job one. whhole host: here is a headline. what are your thoughts on that? guest: i am not an oil expert. let usake that promise and see

if we can turn it into action. seeing is believing. host: indiana and. caller: i have a comment and then a question. bp, their control of information about this whole event, their denial of existence about underwater plumes, which is more oil. we are trying to understand what is going on. can you clarify exactly why it is in theosition to call the shots? this is an obvious danger for national security. why can't they tell bp what will be done? it should be simple. we can move in. guest: that is the dirtion of

the government. the approach that was taken was based on the loss created with the exxon about these. it says, you spilled the oil, you clean it and pay for it. somewhere along the way, that became the tagline. you are responsible, bp, for cleaning this oil up and paying for it. some are confusing that responsibility with authority in who is ultimately responsible. ultimately, the government is responsible. it happened onederaland. the american people voted for congress, governors, president to form a government that would protect us.

it should keep us secure in our homes and state. i think that confusion led people to stop believing that while the government said it was in charge, bp had to pay. let us not confuse with who has to pay and who is ultimately responsible. we need to try to turn that around. bp has to pay, but it is the government that will have to call the shots and priorities and resources this thing. whatever it takes, they will get the money back from bp. host: we are talking about the response to the gulf coast oil spill. .

they did that better than any country in the world. we can use two or three of them off the coast. they have the capacity for small boats to come off of the that of them. they have landing? , you can have helicopters. -- they have landing decks and

you can have helicopters. you can see where all of the boats are and can start turning the oil. you can look at them on the computer screen. where is the oil, where are the votes? eliminate the gap. you take the pressure off of the shoreline and use in the technologies to develop. i do also believe that if we get those young navy engineers out there with the vessel's and army people who have of vessels, they will figure wrote ways to get the oil love. -- they will figure out ways to get the oil up. history of our country and we get them into the fight and we will see a difference in terms of command and control and how we get that oil up. >> host: in the "wall street journal" they have a story,

oysters, a northerly staples -- norlse staple. in traveling around louisiana in norls and new oreleens and where you are, what are you seng this is starting to affect people on shore? guest: well, i rode down just a few days ago always way down to venyiss, and you should see the

number of fishing boats that are still tied, fishi boats that would normally be out in the ocean now capturing a bountiful harvest, they are tied up at the dock. that's a sad sight. and the number of people who are still hoping to get work but people are trying to adjust to the idea of not being fishermen but now maybe having to go out as a laboror as opposed to being their own businessmen now having to submit themselves as contractors, using their boats to try to adapt to find the oil and then get the oil out of the water. it is unnerving also when you go around and you talk to the restaurant people who serve all this great foodn louisiana because they are concerned about what is going to happen in the future to this great gulf fishing industry, which provides the fresh food, the

big difference in seafood is that when it comes out of the ocean, it comes out in the morning and it's on the table a restaurant that night. you know you have something special when you come to this region and you parts pate. and there is still a lot of that good seaod available because there's other parts of the gulf that they are still able to harvest in. but you see the tides turning in the attitude of the people because they see possibility of a way of life changing. and a culture change based on this spill. host: let's tak this call from pennsylvania. john on our line. go ahead. caller: good morning. when will fema get involved? guest: i don't know. we could see some action here with this 20 billion and how they're going to disburse it. i sure hope they don't do like they did in katrina and brought

someone in to run the road home program and that was a mistake. so i hope they set this system uptor disbursele, existing distuitions iide the government, which is fema being one of them. small business administration being one, and existing banks. this is not rocket science. we ought not go out and try to create somethings that so complicated that it further fruss traits the people from the time they apply to the time they get checks. we have a unemployment system that passed checks out to our folks when they need them. i hope we go go out and create something new that eats u the money that tries to eate something new. host: what do you see as fema's initial response to this and their overall responsibility in this situation? guest: well in this case i know

theye been working in support to a limited degree, but they actually respond once you vote to staff nite. the staff nite gets ioked when the governor requests a declaration for a disaster. something has happened. and you see them happen almost monthly now with the tornadoes and floods we've been having. so the gove requests, to the president, and the president approves, there by empowering the governor to use the laws and funds that come out of the stafford act to take care of the people and to make sure they have a place to stay, they have food, and they help people get back in their homes and help small businesses open back up. that's what the stafford act, that's the intent and that's generally how it's been used. but in this case, we have not declared this a national

disaster. we aresing the laws that were associated with exxon valdez as a way to deal witthis, oil incident. that's why you see airal allen and the coast guard in charge of dealing with this. that's the wayt's set up by the government. but fema is -- i know they're capable of doing it but they normally respond once the stafford act has been invoked. host: next up, north carolina. al on our line for republicans. you're on the wasngton journal with retired lieutenant general russell honore. caller: good morning, first, i would like to thank you for your service to our country. i'm a marine veteran myself. the question is, why hasn't the spill been contained? i heard the president saying

we're doing everything we can. i heard them say they're ordering skimmer boats and booms. there's open spill rponse teams at every major installation up and down the east coast, west coast, great lakes that are just sitting idle. skimmer boats, cherry point, north carolina has a skimmer boat, two barges, recovery barges with bladder tanks in them. the smaller boats, they've got boom, qualified people, these themes are already osha quality. they could send theems teams down to coast, train the people, get their qualifications, and then order the booms and order replacement barges, order the skimmers to replace those that re sent down instead of waiting six to eight weeks for a skimmer to

come to the gulf coast. i just can't understand why they're sitting idle. and no one seems to know they are. guest: sounds like a good plan to me. we've got to get everything to the fight. i think people use the word mobilize really know the associated, they haven't seemed to study that part of history much. they say mobilize for war. we did mobilize the country to a degree during katrina for a period of three or four weeks tonsure all the people were out and everybody was in a safe place and then we wen back and dealt with the remains. i mean, anything we asked for was provided once we put the command and control in place to make it happen. so we've got to continue to work the command and control, use technology to figure out where the oil is, maneuver the boats there, and get everything

into the fight. and we haven't done that yet. and the indication of that is because we still have got assets in the navy, the marines, and the army that could make a difference down there. and i don't know yet why we haven't employed them. host: next up, north carolina. on our line for democrats. go ahead. caller: there's two ways to plug that hole. you can either put a plug down there and hammer them into the pipe and stick it up. or you put a pipe with a cutoff valve and go around over it. anwhen they get it down there so far, shut the valve off and that's it if they ain't got the equipment to do it, ballard does. host: sounds like you've got experience in this, sir. caller: no. just figuring it out. host: general, your thoughts on that comment? guest: i tell you what,

thousands of people who are partnering how to do this and myself i receive two or three e-mails a day with good ideas that we forward on through louisiana system and they are forwarded up to bp. but there are people that just go to show to the heart, people want to help. how do we turn those ideas into action? and right now, the coast guard a week or so ago has set up a call center. so i would recommend to the gentleman call it in, get somebody -- if you don't have the skills, send it to me, send it to bp, which has the call center you can sd it i to. but act now. get that idea in there. and let's keep them coming. but i do think the future of how we are going to deal with this oil probably has not been invented yet. and within the, as we go forward into this crisis to mitigate the effects of that oil, we will invest new

science, we're going to invent new business opportunities to deal with oil one once it hits the water. and we need to capture and and get those technologies which will create jobs, a whole bunch of jobs cleaning that oil out of the ocean. host: sir, tell me about one or two of the ideas that you've gotten from people who have e-mailed you and that you have ssed on eets aer to government sources or to the people at bp. guest: i had a young man from lake charles who worked in the oil industry, he gave me a sketch of some barges that would set over the oil as it comes up and then with the jim the oil right here on the scene through use of a series of barges that had some drapes at the bottom of it. and as the oil comes up, and again, i have not -- i don't work in the oil business but his description and his animation is the oil comes sort

of strait up from the hole and his idea was to put som deep well barges there that sort of create a pool right there in the ocean over the top and immediately scr skimmers skimming t oil off. that was one. and tortsdze one w the product multiplication type products that cause the oil to dissipate in the water using biological but emulls if is the oias opposed to having it in its current state. and, again, i'm not expt to analyze these but we took them all and passed them on. host: next up is frirks, virginia, on our line for republicans. go ahead. caller: good morning. kind of question, comment. i'm just trying to understand why it takes so long, with all the technology that we have, all the resources that we have in the this country, have a large military, why we can't stop the leak and can it up.

and we have such a high employment rate in this country, you think there would be kind of a silver lining where we could get people back to work. but i just, that's kind of, i am having a hard time understanding why we can't move on this and take care of it. we've got a loot of resources and -- lot of resources. and with technology nowadays, i don't know why we can't stop the leak and take care of it. guest: trust me, having been faced with a few possible tests doing my 37 year career, if this was easy it would have been done already. this is hard work. some would say, looking back at all the reasons why we got to where we are, but trust me, nobody wants to get that hose stopped more than the united states government and bp itself. this is costing them a ton of money, as it should, but the

downside of it is the impact it is having on the gulf. so this is hard work as we say in the army, hard government work, and if it was easy it would have been done. so i do believe in my heart that they are trying as hard as they can to close it and let's hope and pray that those engineers who are sweating at the brow out there working day and night to try to figure it out, get it figured out and make it happen as soon as possible so we can start focusing on the impact of the oil that's already in the gulf. and i do believe that we will find more innovative ways just like the costa machine and others, it will spur innovation and n business and thought that people will go out and figure out ways how we're going to get rid of this oil. and we need to move on with that as quick aswe can. host: the general mentioned his career just a f seconds ago. he retired from the army on january 11, 2008. during his tenure in the

service he was the 33rd commanding general of the army at fort gill lam, georgia. also the task force katrina, and homeland security u.s. northern command. he is also served a variety of command and staff positions. back to the phones. alabama on our line for independents, ted,ou are on with lieutenant general russell honore. caller: you did a fine job with katrina. i was down there after you left and redid the crours there courthouse. but if you all don't hurry up and do something quick, you're going to ruin the whole gulf. i've lived in georgia just about all my life, moved to alabama. you keep dragging your feet, you know, not doing what you need to do as quickly as you can do it, the whole gulf is going to be ruined. and lieutenant, you've been

down there yoursel you've seen the beaches. you know how it is. why have a meeting with congress when you're trying to decide what needs to be done? hurry and get it done. by the time you decide and have meetings about what needs to be done, the beaches and the gulf is going to be ruined. and you know, maybe someby needs to just take the bull by the horns and just ru with it quick. it ain't going to be a matter of time before it's ruined. and it's probably already ruined. host: how close to the gulf are you and what's the first thing that you would like to see done? caller: well, dalton's about probably 70 miles from pans right on the man ma city. host: do you work in any kind of related industry down there eetsdz anywhere seafood or fishing or the oil business? caller: i'm in the pressure washing businesses up here. but really doesn't relate too much about what needs to be

done there. host: then what's the first thing that you would like to see done? caller: i would like to see somebody mobilize something and get it in there quickly and get it done, maybe more at the source than at the beaches. but all this bureaucracy and who did what, when it got done, let's have a meeting in congress and let's start pointing fingers, quit pointing fingers. like the lieutenant did, he took the bull by the horn and ran with it. host: general, sounds like mobilization is the key word. guest: we've got to give some context to what that mobile ation is. we use that word mobilize. we are going f going on the offense. but the key thing we have to spend a little time explaining to the american people because i think the more we tell them whate are ing in a nonbureaucratic context, they

will give us their sorpt. we needo spend more time talking about how we're going to do this, how we're going to find it. then we have the methods on the ground at the shoreline to empower those who are protecting our fragile shorlse where the oysters and the shrimp and the breeding grounds of the pelingens are located, to get the machines. there's no good idea that should be turned awayo determine how do we protect the shorlse sand how do we protect and clean the animals and how do we restore our beaches. right now it does not respond the needs of the governors. the governors are in charge of the land. most have the national guard out there. the national guard is doing great work, innovative work. but the national guard is

trained and equipped for land-based operations. this is why we need to bring the rest of the military in and help provide that command and control. then empower the go no, sir through the stafford act for them to request something and then get order. so they could use those assets, use those contracts to protect the shoreline. that needs to happen quick and we need to spend a little more time explaining to the american people how we are doing that and go from talking to action, go from talking to walking and make stuff happen and by putting more command and control in place in each stat with the power to command and control. right now, our system is set up still based on a mother may i. we want to do this. everybody studies it and then wee got to go ask bp. we should stop asking bp for resrc to get this job done

along the shoreline. bp needs to be providing the vessels, but the shoreline defense should be left to the governors and empower them to get the equipment and the man power they need to get the job done. host: sir, there's an editorial in this morning's "wall seet journal" that a addresses what's on a lot of folks' mind and that would be suspension of the jones act. tell us your understanding of what the jones act is and the fact that it was actually suspended dung hurricane katrina recoverry. guest: it has to do with the preparation a use of american-owned vessels when doing work for the united states host: and they are talking about suspending the jones act so they could bring in foreign flagged vessels so they can do some of the cleanup. guest: i've said before on many

occasions. based on the experience with katrina and other disasters we dealt with before that, the number one thing you've got to do when you go into a disaster a figure out what rules you're going to break, because most of the rules and laws were based with normal operation. and when you go into a disaster they won't work. i remember an incident in katrina where we were about to fly all the citizens, the survivors from the convention center and they had a call from one of my officers that the t.s.a. people wanted to wait because they wanted to get more scanners. i said no, they have been standing around for eight days, they are tired. they need to get someplace where they can be taken someplace to get take incare of. the other was that same operation that we were about the fly peoe out.

the pilots said we can't put the people on the plane because we don't have a manifest. i said we're going to waive the manifest. we're going to put the people on the plane. these are americans. these are our people. they need to get to a place where they can get taken care of. so as in the case of this oil spill, we continue to try to go by the rules of what i call peacetime rules. so we asked the osha guy, what do you think, how long, what can you do? then we ask the corps engineers? oh, we've got to get the books out, we've got to study this. what are we doing? it's a berm. can the berm cause more harm than the oil? i think not. so we are using peace timte rules to fight a war and they don't work. in a disaster when people's lives, property, animals and a way of life are at risk, some of these rules are hindering the operation. it's like let me see your fire