nine sitting justices. you have people with real continuuty. i think the most interesting person to watch or one of the most interesting people is articlen specter. he has lost his primary as a republican before switching parties. he had voted against kagen and it will be interesting to see does he come off as sort of the hard edged prosecutor as he has in the past? does he just toe the party line on the way out of the senate? so that will be interesting. >> you asked about abortion in row versus wade and he said he suspects that she will say it's settled law. do you think that's the big issue that will be controversial in these hearings? >> i don't know if it's the big issue, it's always a big issue or has been in recentyears. i think along with other issues that could come up that are hot buttons such as affirm tiff action, we heard the chairman

talk about campaign finance and free speech, the place of religion and separation of church and state. those are all issues. but as you heard him say that he thought she would say that it's settled law. that's sort of code speak for the supreme court decided on that and i'm not going to go any further. and she has written in the past and i think a lot of members of the committee feel and have said thatst not enough. you don't learn much from that answer. so it will be interesting to see if they can break any new ground that hasn't been broken in recent years in these hearings. >> you're the legal affairs reporter for congressional quarterly. how have her sitdowns with senators going? >> the sense is that they are going pretty well. i mean, they are not necessarily determine ti. they can cause real problems for a nominee, certainly the case for harriet myers. she ran into real trouble not sowing a familiarity with

constitutional law. i don't think there's any question with elena kagen and her legal smarts. so i thinks that sort of a given going into her hearing. >> what are you hearing from the ranking republican of the committee about his strategy and does he, jeff sessions, does he represent the republican voice on the committee? >> he does. i think he is clearly the point man on this. and he i think has been careful as he was with the hearings last year to say publicly that he is not prejudging anything. he wants to be fair, thorough. but he is starting to push back a lot more forcefully now as the hearings approach about concerns he has about elena kagen's political views, about the role that may play in her judging. and as you heard, this whole issue of military recruitment and the harvard controversy and

what that might say. i think we're going to hear a lot more from him about that and it may be a snrtpiece about what republicans try to do to try to highlight the hearings. i wouldn't be surprised from some military folks who have strong views about how it made them feel that the harvard made the decision that it made in that case and dean kagen did. >> you're the co author of a new biography. >> of justice william brennan, who senator leahy mentioned. it's coming out in october. and called justice brennan, liberal champion. >> thank you both for being here.

>> president obama met with executives from bp on wednesday to discuss compensation for those affected by the gulf coast oil spill. following the meeting the president confirmed that bp will set aside $20 billion to pay damage claims. that fund will be administered by ken feinberg who previously managed the 9/11 victims funds

and the tarp pay funds. bp has agreed to compensate oil workers affected by the oil workers moratorium. >> and in the coming days and weeks these efforts should capture up to 90% of the oil that is leaking out of the well. now, that's not good enough, so we will continue to press bp and draw on our best minds and resources to capture the rest of the oil until the company finishes drilling a relief well later in the summers that expected to stop the leak completely. the second topic revolved around the issue of claims. as i traveled across the gulf,

i heard growing frustration over the pace at which claims have been paid. and i also heard concerns about whether bp will make resources available to cover legitimate claims resulting from this disaster. so this discussion today was essential. currently, under federal law, there is a 75 million dollar cap on how much oil companies could under certain circumstances be required to pay for economic damages resulting from a spill such as this. that amount obviously would be insufficient. that's why i am pleased to announced that bp has agreed to set aside $20 billion to pay claims for damages resulting from this spill. this $20 billion will provide substantial assurance that the claims people and businesses have will be honored. it is also important to emphasize this is not a cap.

the people of the gulf have my commitment that bp will meet its obligations to them. bp has publicly pledged to make good on the claims that it owes to the people in the gulf, so the agreement we reached sets up a financial and legal framework to do it. another important element is that this $20 billion fund will not be controlled by either bp or by the government. it will be put in an escrow account, administered by an impartial independent third party. so if you or your business has suffered an economic loss as a result of the spill, you will be eligible to file claim for part of this $20 billion. this fund does not superseed either individuals' rights or states rights to present claims in court. bp will also continue to be libel for the enviral disaster it has caused and we will

continue to work to make sure that they address it. additionally, bp voluntarily agreed to establish $100 million fund to compensate unemployed oil rig workers affected by the closure of the deep water rigs. we have mutually agreed that ken feinberg will run the independent claims process we are putting in place, and there will be a three-person panel to adjute kate claims that are turned down. every effort will be made to expedite these claims. ken has long experience in such matters including running the fund that compensated the victims of 9/11. and i am confident hell ensure that claims are administered, as quickly, fairly, and transparently as possible. now, bp's liabilities for this spill are significant. and they acknowledge that fact. we will continue to hold bp and all other responsible parties accountable. and i am absolutely confident lpbp will be able to meet its

obligations to the gulf coast and to the american people. bp is a strong and viable company, and it is in all of our interests that it remain so. so what this is about is accountability. at tend of the day, that's what every american wants and expects. the structure we are establishing today is an important step towards making the people of the gulf coast whole again. but it is not going to turn things around overnight. i want all americans to know that i will continue to fight each and every day until the oil is contained, until businesses recover, and until the gulf coast bounces back from this tragedy as i know it will. one last point. during a private conversation with chairman sponberg, i emphasized to him that for the families that i met with down in the gulf, for the small business owners, for the

fishermen, for the shrimpers, this is not just a matter of dollars and cents. that a lot of these folks don't have a cution. they were coming off rita and kate na, coming off the worst economy that this country has seen since the great depression. and this season was going to be the season where they were going to be bouncing back. not only that, but this happened from their perspective at the worst possible time because they are making their entire income for the year in the three or four months during which folks can take their boats out, people are coming down for tourism. and so i emphasize to the chairman that when he is talking to shareholders, when he is in meetings in his board room, to keeping keep in mind

those individuals. that they are desperate. that some of them, if they don't get relief quickly, may lose businesses that have been in their families for two or three generations. and the chairman assured me that he would keep them in mind. s that going to be the standard by which i measure bp's responsiveness. i think today was a good start and it should provide some assurance to some of the small business owners and individuals down in the gulf who i was visiting with that bp is going to meet its responsibilities. but i indicated to the chairman that throughout this process as we work to make sure that the gulf is made whole once again, that the standard i'm going to be applying is whether or not those individuals i met with, their family members, those communities that are vulnerable, whether they are

upper most in the minds of all concerned. s that who we are doing this work for. all right? thank you very much, everybody. >> the chairman of bp announced that his company would delay didend payment to investors until oil spill claims were met. >> ladies and gentlemen, we have had a very constructive meeting today with the

president. we appreciate his deep concern and we appreciate the deep concern that he feels for the people in the region. and you could hear on his speech today how his frustration. i trust also that we through the meeting, that the president senses the sadness and the sorrow that we feel for this tragic accident that should never have happened. bp, we have always met our obligations and responsibilities, and we have made clear from the first moment of this tragedy that we will live up to all our legitimate responsibilities. we have agreed today with the president a framework that

should assure the american people that we mean what we say. we will look after the people affected and we will repair the damage to this region, the environmental damage to this region and to the economy. we are announcing today as you heard from the president a $20 billion commitment to make sure that all proper claims are handled swiftly and fairly. we have also announced an independent adjudicator that will make sure that the right people will get the right money at the right time. the bp board has today decided

that we will not pay any further dividends this year. we made it clear to the president that words are not enough. we understand that we will and we should be judged by our actions. what has been clear today is that this administration and our company are fully aligned in our interests of closing this well, cleaning the beaches, and care for those that are affected. finally, i would like to take this opportunity to apologize to the american people on behalf of all the employees in bp. many of whom are living on the

gulf coast. and i do thank you for the patience that you have in this difficult time. through our actions and commitments, we hope that over the long term that we will regain the trust that you have in us. thanks a lot. and i will take a couple of questions. >> did pp [inaudible] on the deep water horizon. >> we are going through a series of investigations and we in the board will do our own independent invest congregation where we will scrutinize everything that we do to make sure that we understand the root cause of this tragic accident. because it shouldn't happen. i have no further comments on that. >> that was a long meeting.

what were the sticking points of disagreement that had to be resolved? are you concerned about i will legitimate payments? >> i think it was a very constructive meeting and includes many different parts and it is important to get to all the language right. but the determination and the ambition to get through this was clear from the beginning. >> how long did you spend with the president himself? >> i spent a fair amount of time. and i must say that he comes across as a -- he is frustrated because he cares about the small people and we care about the small people. i hear comments sometimes that large oil companies are greedy companies or don't care, but that is not the case in bp. we care about the small people. >> was there tension in the meeting? >> thank you. >> you said [inaudible]

>> on thursday, bp's c.e.o. tony heyward was on capitol hill to answer questions for members of the house energy and commerce subcommittee. the bp c.e.o. apologized for the deep water horizon oil spill and offered condolences of families of rig workers. friday it was announced that mr. heyward was returning to

london and robert dudley would take charge of the operation. you can see the entire five and a half hour hearing at our website. but today we will show you parts of the hearing. . this is three hours, 45 minutes. ask the press to please clear. this hearing of the subcommittee of the energy and commerce committee, the subcommittee on oversight

investigations will commence our hearing. today we have a hearing titled bp's role in the deep water horizon energy spill. i welcome the members of the energy and commerce committee and they will be allowed to submit written statements for the record, but will not deliver verbal opening statements and in addition aftmembers who are not the subcommittee or on the energy and commerce committee are will be to observe, but they will not be allowed to ask questions due to time constraints, the chairman, the ranking mmmber and the charity emeritus will be recognized for three minute opening statements. i will yield to the chairman of

the full committee mr. waxman for the first opening statement. >> thank you very much mr. chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing. and mr. hayward, thank you for being here today. yesterday bp pledged to establish a $20 billion escrow account and to suspend its dividend payments for the rest of the year. i'm sure these were not easy decisions for you, but they were the right ones and i commend you for them. congress has multiple committees examining the gulf oil spill, some are evaluating the impact of the spill, some are working on the reorganization of the regulatory agencies and some including chairman markey's subcommittee are drafting legislation to reform our oil exploration laws. you are testifying today before the oversight and investigation subcommittee and this subcommittee has a special role.

so examine the facts and determine what went wrong and to make recommendations to prevent future spills. when it's time for questioning, i and other members of the subcommittee will ask you about a series of internal bp documents. they appear to show that bp repeatedly took shortcuts that endangered lives and increased the risks of a catastrophic blowout. and i sent you a letter in advance indicating that we're going to question you about those issues. but what is equally important is what is missing from the documents. when you became ceo of bp, you promised to focus like a laser on safe and reliable operations. we wanted to know what you had done to keep this promise. so we asked what e-mails you had received, what documents you had reviewed. about the deep water horizon rig

or to the mccondo well before the blowout. deep water drilling is inherently dangerous, as the entire country now knowses, an uncontrolled blowout can kill rig workers and cause an environmental disaster. we want to know if you were briefed be the risks and were monitoring the safety of the drilling operation. we can find no evidence that you paid any attention to the tremendous risks bp was taking. we have reviewed 30,000 pages of documents from bp including your e-mails, there is not a single e-mail or document that shows you paid even the slightest attentionnto the dangers at this well. you are the ceo. so we consider the possibility that you may have delegated the oversight responsibility to someone else we reviewed the

emails and believing documents received by the chief executive for exploration and production and doug suttles, the chief operating officer for production. according to bp, these are the senior officials responsible for the mcdon kcondo well, but they were apparently oblivious to what was happening. we can see no e-mails or debriefings about the deep water horizon. bp's corporate complacency is astonishing, the drilling engine for the rig, called mccondo, a nightmare well. other bp employees predicted

that the cement job would fail. halliburton warned of a severe gas flow problem. these warnings fell on deaf ears. bp's corporate attitude may best be summed up in an e-mail from his operations drilling engineer who oversaw bp's team of drilling engineers. after learning of the risks and bp's decision to ignore them, he wrote, quote, who cares? it's done, end of story, we'll probably be fined, end quote. there is a complete contradiction between bp's words and deeds. you were brought in to make safety the top priority of bp, but under your leadership, bp has taken the most extreme risks. bp cut corner after corner to save a million dollars here a few hours or days there and now the whole gulf coast is paying

the price. today's hearing will focus on bp's actions, but we learned from our hearing earlier this week that the other oil companies are just as unprepared to deal with a massive spill as bp. we are see in the oil industry the same corporate indifference to risk that caused the come lance on wall street. and that is why reform is so urgently needed, part of this reform must be legislation to put teeth into our regulatory system but part must also be a transition to a clean energy economy. we're addicted to oil, this addiction is fouling our beaches, polluting our atmosphere and undermining our national security. we can't snap our fingers or transform our energy economy overnight, but we need to start down a path to a clean energy future. mr. chairman, i look forward to today's hearing and mr. hayward

i thank you for appearing and cooperating with our investigation. >> next go to the full committee remember bart stupak of texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman, thank you mr. hayward for appearing before us. we have kind of a dual track underway in my opinion. we obviously are trying to gather the facts, what happened in the oil spill in the gulf of mexico a month and a half ago, trying to find out the close. we have a system built up based on the british tradition over

200 years of due process and fairness where people that do bad things or in this case a corporation that's responsible for a bad accident, we want to hold them responsible, do what we can to make the liable parties pay for the damages. mr. stupak and mr. waxman are doing an excellent job working with dr. burr negligence and myself in conducting i think a fair fair oversight investigation. boar going to get into a number of those issues. i'm speaking totally for myself, i'm not speaking for the republican party, i'm not speaking for anybody in the house of representatives but myself. but i'm ashamed of what happened in the white house yesterday.

i think it is a tragedy in the firks proportion that i would characterize as a shakedown, in this case a $20 billion shakedown, with the attorney general of the united states who is conducting a criminal investigation and has every right to do that to protect the american people. participating in what amounts to a $20 million slush fund which i think set aster ribl precedent for the future. if i called you into my office. avshtd and i had the subcommittee chairman mr. stupak with me who was legitimately subjecting an oversight investigation on your company and said if you put so many millions of dollars in a project

in my constitutional district i could go to jail and should go to jail. no there is no question that british petroleum owns this l k leak, that bp made decisions that people may question. there is no question that bp is liable for the damages, but we have a due process system where we go through hearings, in some cases court cases, litigation ts are and when those damages should be paid. so i'm only speaking for myself, i'm not speaking for anybody else, but i apologize, i do not want to live in a company where any time a citizen for a corporation does something that

is legitimately wrong is subject to some sort of political pressure that is again in my words amounts to shakedown. so i apologize. so on this hearing today, i am with mr. waxman, with mr. stupak, there are questions that need to be asked that are legitimate because we don't want another oil spill of this magnitude or of any magnitude in the gulf of mexico and if this subcommittee can do things that make it much more difficult for this type of an incident to occur in the future, then we will have done our work for the american people. with that, mr. chairman, i yield back. >> today is the 59th day of the bp oil spill that has devastated much of the gulf of mexico.

11 men lost their lives the day the deep water horizon drilling rig exploded and in the 59 days that have followed, countless people have lost their livelihood as the oil pollutes fishing grounds and damages the beaches of the united states. our first hearing exposed problems discovered with the blowout preventser and several other factors that contributed to the disaster. our second hearing was a field hearing in new orleans where we heard from the widows of two women whose husbands died in the deep water horizon. we have been sitting through more than 50 hours of briefings of corporate, governmental

experts to determine what went wrong with exploration of the mccondo well. we have reviewed several questionable decisions made by bp in the days and hours leading up to the explosion and what we have learned so far is alarming. we have learned that time after time, bp had warning signs that this was as one employee put it a nightmare well. for example, bp disregarded questionable results from pressure tests after cements in the well. bp selected the riskier of two options for their well design. they could have hung a liner from the lower end of the casing already in the well and install a tie back on the top of the liner which would have provided additional barriers to the release of hydrocarbons, instead they lowered a full string of the new casing which took less

time and cost less but did not provide the same protection of escaping hydrocarbons. bp was warned by halliburton could have a big problem if they -- bp rejected halliburton's advice to used additional centralizers in an e-mail on april 16. a bp official involved in the decision explained and i quote, it will take ten hours to install them, i don't like this. bp chose not to fully circulate the mud in the well from the bottom to the top, which was an industry recommended best practice that would have allowed them to test for gas in the mud. bp chose not to use a casing hangar lockdown sleeve which would have provided extra protection against a blowout from below. these are just a few of the issues that led to the disaster.

once deep water horizon exploded and san to be the bottom of the sea, bp's decision to clean up the spill was equally as poor. they issued estimates which may have led to a scaled back response. we discovered that bp's oil spill response plan was virtually identical to other oil companies' plans, in a hearing tuesday, exxonmobil ceo rex tillerson said that once the spills occur, we're not equipped to handle them, end quote. our witness today mr. tony hayward is a chief executive officer of bp, shortly after mr. hayward took over as the ceo in 2007, he held a town hall meeting with employees in houston that. meeting he discussed the need for bp to be a leader with fewer

people in decision making process. this article and i ask you to put up the guardian article. in an article from september 2007, guardian newspaper, hayward says oil company has become too cautious, assurance is killing us, mr. hayward told u.s. staff noting that too many people were engaged in decision making leading to excessive cautiousness something that critics of its safety performance in the u.s. might question. let me put up these other notes from the same meeting. we received notes from bp of employees and their note taking from this meeting. the employee notes summit rised mr. hayward's statements as follows. i don't think having all these layers of assurance reduces risks and it can actually increase it. individuals need to be accountable for risk and to manage it, end of quote. i find this cavalier attitude toward assessing risk

unbelievable, given the fact that at the time of these statements, bp had just been responsible for the largest oil leak in alaska history on the north slope as well as the 2005 texas city refinery explosion which killed 50 workers and injured another 170. i must ask mr. hayward whether it was wise to adopt this leaner decision-making process with input from fewer people and a new approach to managing risk. under the leadership of the former chairman of bp america, bp created an independent office of the ombudsman. the ombudsman office was established because line workers reported fearing retaliation if they reported safety concerns to management. when the current chairman and president lamar mckay took over, i met with him and he suggested that he hoped to improve the culture enough to make the ombudsman office unnecessary so he could shut it down.

i urged him not to eliminate the office because it serves a significant role in investigating employee complaints. i'm more concerned than ever about bp's safety and the role they take in assuming risk. i'm concerned that the corporate culture, the chairman of president of lamar mckay that there's a willingness to cut costs and take greater risks, i look forward to hearing the answers of mr. hayward our many hard hitting committee member also hear today. i hope we will hear honest, contrite and substantive answers. mr. hayward, you owe it to all americans, for the americans wh% live and work on the gulf coast, it may be years before they get their lives back, for the americans who lost their lives on the rigs, their familiis may never get their lives back. mr. hayward, i'm sure you will get your life back and with a

golden parachute back to england. but we in america are left with a terrible consequences of bp's reckless disregard for safety. i yield back my time. >> today it does open our third hearing and a very critical hearing in the deep water horizon oil spill. this hearing provides the subcommittee with an important opportunity to directly question the man who ultimately leads bp, mr. tony hayward and bp's role has been central to the causes of the incident and to the response over the course of our inquiry today, committee investigators working in a by partisan fashion have conducted numerous interviews and briefings and reviewed tens of

thousands of pages of documents, our subcommittee has done an excellent job and this sub committee has been focused on gathering the facts rather than rushing to judgment. and from this intensive effort we have begun to have a series of questions, exploring these and related questions today will help us identify for congress and identify for the country what went wrong on april 20th and the days thereafter, and while we are investigating, a picture of the chain of events leading to this incident is emerging. mr. chairman, you and chairman waxman recently outlined some critical questions that we hope mr. hayward will address, for example you noted the investigation has identified questionable choices by bp engineers to use a particular well design over another one that would appear to have provided more built in barriers to an uncriminaled gaddis charge. there was the choice made by bp to move forward with what appears to be an inadequate

cementing plan and the related failure despite clear warnings to test that the cement was properly in place. and it appears there may have been a rush to move off this well, whether there may have been economic or other time and performance measures or some combination thereef, it is not clear burks that clarity needs to emerge today. the question outlined in the central role of bp's decision making appears that bp's decision making appears to have had in this incident. we need to understand that decision making, mr. hayward. what factors influenced it, whether the decisions reflected a management and an operational mind set that failed, failed to maximize safety in a challenging deep sea environment. it is important to note that the picture developing from this investigation is not one of technological limits in deep sea drilling, the construction of an 18,000-foot well was not pushing

the envelope of engineering know how so far as we identified, but the picture developing is one of unsafe industry practices, although clearer more focuseded industry standards may be able goong forward, the best industry practice would have resulted in more cautious designs and more testing, more safeguards and ultimately no loss of control of the well. rather and quite clearly the picture is questioning decision making by people charged with designing and successfully drilling, and controlling a well that is a mile under water. it is a series of choices which taken together created an oil well particularly vulnerable to a blowout and of all the people who may have been distracted, unaware or resistant to recognizing the problems around them. documents show that bp was prepared to run a test on the quality of the cement shot, but chose not to.

i can't understand why given the history of this particular well with four previous well controlled incidents in the two months pry you to april 20. the rig personnel appear to have taken their eye off the ball. bp employees were the key decisi decision makers. certainly others may have contributed to this incident. the overall effectiveness of the response and the effort to help those harmed by the incident is something we must -- but it is bp's decision making about the well design, the cementing program, the preparation, the integrity tests or just the general lack of curiosity as to why these would be necessary t failure to follow best practices that our investigation to date is showing were critical factors in this incident. but this decision making is difficult to square with the

priorities of bp's chief executive. before you became chief executive you described out the depth of a worker shaped your opinions, you said and i'm quoting, i went to the funeral to pay my respects. at the end of the service, his mother came up to me and beat me on the chest, why did you let it happen, she asked. it changed the way i think about safety. leaders must make safety of all who work for them a priority, end quote. mr. hayward, i respectfully request that you answer this question in your opening statement if not for me, then for the two ladies who testified before our committee on the field hearing who lost their husbands on the deep water horizon. you have been chief executive since 2007, you said safety is your number one priority and you would focus like a laser beam on safety. we have now learned from this investigation that bp employees

made five critical decisions that may have contributed to well failure where well safety was traded off. in fact it was not the priority. so today, will you assert before this subcommittee that all decisions by bp employees related to the deep water horizon reflected your priority, your priority of safety first. mr. chairman, the disaster in the gulf of mexico shows a series of unchecked bad decisions, we in congress and the federal government must also be mindful of the consequences of bad decision making. the subcommittee heard some of the administration's decisions are threatening the livelihoods of workers and families who depend upon the energy industry. we have killed half of their fishing with the deep water horizon spill and it looks like we're going to kill the other half of their committee with our moratorium. our hearing today looks at the consequences of bad decisions and the lessons learned, may we

have the wisdom and humility to take some of those lessons and apply them to ourselves? and i yooeltd yield back the balance of my time. >> i would like to turn to chairman of the energy and environment subcommittee and chairman of the subcommittee on climate mr. markey, five minutes for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman, very much. i want to begin by disagrees in the strongest possible terms with what mr. barton said in his opening statement. not only is the compensation fund that was created yesterday at the white house in an agreement reached by president obama, not a slush fund and not a shakeup, rather it was the government of the united states

working to protect the most vulnerable citizens that we have in our country right now. # we cannot wait as infortunat they had to wait years in order to see their families compensated. we cannot lose sight of the fact that the 1984 disaster and the lawsuits related to it were only settled last week. disaster and the lawsuits that were related to it were only settled

last week. after examining the documents, bp only give them $5,000. the families in the gulf will be crushed. they will be crushed financially unless this compensation fund is put into place. as each day, week, month goes by the history of these families are going to be altered permanently unless there are

given the financial capacity to take care of their loved ones, their children, their families. that is why this compensation fund is so important. that is why it is not a "slush fund." that is why it is not a "shakedown." president obama is ensuring that a company which has been spoiled the waters of our nation is made accountable for the harm that is done to our people, a company which said the first week that it was only 1,000 barrels of oil per day when we knew -- when we now know it was at least 1000 to 14,000. a company which continues to deny that there are under water toxic plumes, a company which has not been providing the

proper protective gear for their workers in the gulf, a company which contended it could respond to a spill of 250,000 rolls per day. no, this is not a shakedown. this is the american government, president obama, and sharing this company is made accountable and sending a signal that seek to treat ordinary americans, families, in a way that can destroy their entire family's history. this is, in my opinion, the american government working at its best. this is creating truly the kind of partnership between the public and private sector. this could make sure that innocent victims are not run until -- are nnt road kill.

i could not disagree more strongly. this is, in my opinion, one of the most important hearings that this congress will never have because it is sending a signal to any corporation out there including the ones who testified on tuesday that all admitted they had no plans to respond to the harm that could be done in the gulf if one of their ranks had the same kind of catastrophic event that they will be made accountable. thank you, mr. chairman, for holding this hearing. i think you, mr. hayward, because yesterday was the day when the page began to be turned and we move towards a new era where, in fact, your company is made accountable to the

citizens of the gulf who are made whole. thank you, mr. chairman. and the citizens of the gulf are made whole. thank you, mr. chairman. >> mr. sullivan, hold your opening statement to three minutes, please sir. >> chairman, stupak, thank you for holding this hearing today. on april 20, 2010, a fire -- this terrible disaster resulted in the loss of 11 lives and injured many more members of the 126-person crew. there is no question that the bp oil spill is a tragedy. in fact it is the worst environmental disaster in our nation's history. i believe we must do everything in our power to cap the leak, find out what caused the explosion and ensure nothing like this ever happens again. bp must bear the entire financial burden for this disaster and the american taxpayer should not be on the

hook for a dime. according to the occupation safety health administration, there's mounting evidence that bp has one of the worst safety records of any major oil company operating in the united states. to this endd i'm looking forward to examining with mr. hayward whether there is a deficient safety culture at bp that led to this disaster and other recent ones including the bp refinely explosion in 2005 in texas city, texas and a bp pipeline spill in 2007 we released 200,000 gallons of oil into the alaskan wilderness. mr. hayward why is bp's record on safety so spotty? what is equally as important to combat the spill is the knee jerk legislation reaction from the congress. right now the administration and their allies in the house are more focussed on putting the oil and gas industry out of business

on solutions to the problem. instead of working in a buy part an way for rigorous safety standards on all offshore rigs, the m is exploiting this disaster to advance this disastrous cap and trade energy policy, which won't stop the well from leaking but rather will only serve as a national tax on -- crippling our economy and making the unemployment lines longer. i believe congress should work towards safety inspections on all offshore wells. a ban on offshore drilling will only put americans out of work. but it will send a -- it will send energy and gas prices through the roof and increase our reliance on foreign, imported oil. we still have work to do to uncover exactly what went wrong and mr. questions remain on the ongoing efforts to plug is leak. this should not be an excuse

to -- as we will need more oil and natural gas to meet the crucial needs of our nation, and i yield back the balance of my time. >> i would like to hear from the chairman emeritus of the energy committee, mr. dingle for five minutes, please, sir. >> chairman, i commend you for holding this important hearing today. we sit here on day 59 of the worst environmental disaster in the history of this country. 11 people are dead, the already fragile economy of an entire region is in real danger of shattering. we will be feeling the environmenting consequences for years to come. and god almighty alone knows what the health and environmental effects of the containment and cleanup strategies will be. millions of gallons of chemical dispersants and controlled

burns. sadly we can't even get a decent estimate of the amount of oil and gas that's spewing out into the water. bp has been before this committee many times. and rarely has it been apleasant meeting. because in variably they have appeared here to defend serious failures on the part of the company. the company has a history of cutting corners, apparently, for the almighty dollar. texas city, they paid there $50 million in criminal fines, alaska's north side slope which was investigated by this subcommittee, where a pipe corroded, allowing 1 million liters of oil to spill. in each instance, we were hoping that the assurances given by bp that this would not happen again have been regrettably untrue.

in reference to a decision on how to secure the final 1,200 feet of the well, a single casing or tie back of bp engineer said not running the tie back 15i6s a good deal of time and money. in reference to installing for centralizers, a bp inspector said, it will take ten hours to install them, i am concerned, i don't want to use it. so were we. even if the hole is perfectly straight, as straight piece of pipe, even in tension will not seek the center of the hole unless it has something to centralize it. i want you to listen to this, but who cares? it's done, end of story. it will probably be fine. and note the word probably. and we'll get a good cement job. iwould rather have to squeeze

that gets stuck, so guard right on the risk-reward occasion. mr. chairman, the comments of our witness today reveal little sorrow for the events that have occurred. and here he said, the gulf of mexico is a very big ocean, the amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting in is tiny in relation to the total water volume and then the environmental impact of the disaster is likely to be very, very modest. i wonder if he wishes to stand on that statement today. when mr. hayward responded to the claims that cleanup workers were becoming ill because of oil fumes and such, he said this, food poisoning is clearly a big issue. finally most famously, mr. hayward informs us he wants his life back, last year mr. hayward

enjoyed a splendid 40% pay raise even though bp's profits dropped. i just happen to be a poor polish lawyer from detroit. but it seems to me that this is a curious response to a drop in profits. it makes me wonder what the compensation package of our witness will be this year. mr. chairman, again, i thank you for your diligence and hard work on this issue. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and look forward to working with you on this matter. thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. next ms. blackburn, if you will make your opening statement please. >> thank you, mr. chairman, i thank you and ranking member burgess for holding the hearing today. mr. hayward, i thank you for your willingness to testify before this committee. you know, when news of the bp spill began and information about the weel started to circulate, it seemeda there was problems not only with bp, but

also with mms bureaucracy and maybe the problem lay there rather than with anything that could have gone wrong with bp, that it was there with mms. what welearned and confirmed that that is not correct, that the problem does lie with bp and what went wrong, while there are many faults with mms on safety and oversight, most of the data points to wrong decision making by bp's management and this is not the first time and we have talked about that in several of our opening statements this morning. it's not the first time we have been before this committee on safety problems, and most recently as the texas city 2005 and alaska incidents which revealed insufficient protocols in bp's management and safety hierarchy, there was a statement from bp that you all would

quote, unquote focus like a lizzer on safety. and it is concerning to us that the appearance is, mr. hayward that bp has not learned from previous mistakes, so it leaves us asking the questions of you and of bp, was this accident caused by negligence? was it caused by risk taking? was it caused by cost cutting measures? by bp decision makers and unfortunately for citizens, beaches and wildlife all along the coastal region, they are paying a price for those misplaced decisions. bp cannot blame mother nature or equipment failure or even other subcontractors. their actions have put at risk the livelihood of communities and businesses that depend on the gulf, not only for seafood and tourism, but also energy production that this nation as a whole relies upon.

in addition, the current administration also shares a significant portion of the blame for the oil spill. i mentioned mms earlier and the mms officials approved inadequate spill response plans and field inspectors rubber stamped inspection papers submitted by oil companies. this is another area where we as members of congress in doing our due diligence will ask you all and mms why. but what is the most damaging is that the president and senior officials knew on day one the blowout preventer was not working and knew of the potential spillage. while bp shoulders much of the responsibility for this spill, the lack of effort by this administration to contain the spill has doomed the economy and wildlife of the gulf coast from an oil spill which could have been contained. and now recently imposed drilling moratoriums will

further devastate america's energy production and will destroy hundreds of thousands of jobs in the gulf coast region. thank you for being with us today, mr. chairman, i yield the balance of my time. >> thank you. i next turn to vice chairman of the subcommittee, opening three minutes sir. >> mr. hayward, you're not going to get a lek schur from me today and you're not going to get an apologies. quite frankly the people who live along the affected area of the gulf coast deserve answers from you. we were in louisiana last week and we had the opportunity to hear from a variety of individuals whose lives have been devastated by this oil disaster and i use the word disaster specifically because i don't think spill quite captures the magnitude of what's going on. the american people are frustrated because we were first told that this was a 1,000 barrel ber day release and about

a week later that was updated to 5,000 barrels per day. and at the end of may it was adjusted upwards of 15,000 to 19,000 barrels a day and this week it shoucould be as high as 60,000 barrels a day. that's 17.5 million gallons ber week and over the length of this disaster it could be the largest release of oil in the north american continent in history, unintended. one of the things i think we need to know about today is the decisions that your company made and who ahead them that led to this explosion and subsequent disaster, what your company is doing to fix this problem and what your company is doing for all the families and communities that have been devastated by this disaster and i think it would be help follow for you and everybody in this hearing room

to hear from those women who testified last week, because they raised very pointed questions that were directed to your company, sir, and they were questioned that were raised after they gave passionate testtmony of wanting the oil and gas business to continue in louisiana and the gulf coast region. so i would like to have you listen to their kments in the hearing. this is natalee rosco. >> i would like to leave here today knowing that because of my husband's tragic death, we can begin to focus on making safety the most important priority. not to focus on making more safety regulations, but on ways to safely implement the ones that we already have. this challenge will not be in vain because right now my husband's death is in vain. it will not be in vain if it make the top priority

and cause these powerful oil companies to know they will be held accountable for their actions. >> wile i understand companies must make a profit. >> this is courtney. >> i do not believe it should be at the expense of risking lives or destroying families i'm asking to you please consider harsh punishments on companies who choose to ignore safety standards before other families are destroyed. my family can never and will never be adequately compensated for our loss. >> these are now widows with small children to take care of and they are the symbols and the faces of this disaster and i look forward to your testimony. yield back the balance of my time. >> thank you. next turn to mr. gingrey of georgia for opening statements.

>> first of all, i want to express my condolences, we must remember those lives and the lives of their families as we just saw that were forever changed on that fateful april day and we must continue to keep them in our thoughts and prayers. further, we have an obligation not only to those families but to everyone affected by the aftermath to get to the bottom of the causes of this accident and the failure to secure the situation and stop the devastation wrecked upon the gulf coast. mr. clarm, we have an opportunity in this oversight hearing to ask questions to get to the factssof what happened. however, today's hearing is incomplete. we can only ascertain half of the story today because we do not have anyone representing the administration. the mineral management service to discuss their oversight role and their responsibility in ensuring that an accident like this didn't happen. deep ocean drilling is not new. in fact, we been doing it for

decades in the gulf coast. why did this happen now? i've heard some assert that it was a lax oversight of the previous administration that led to this accident. well fw, that's the case, why did this not happen during the last decade. why did this occur almost a year and a half into the current administration. we need to hear from our own department of interior. and the mineral management services. certainly, mr. hayward should be prepared to answer bp's responsibility but we will also need answers from the administration so that we can demand accountability and implement prudent reforms to return us to safe drilling in our oceans because simply saying no to further and new drilling is not a realistic answer. i further realize there are in in this administration who have a pen clant for not letting a crisis go to waste, but for a nation dependent on foreign oil, for a nation with unemployment hovering at 10%, we can't just say we can't do this. we can't take our ball and go

home whether the consequences mean a weaker america. everyone depending on foreign fuels, all too inclined it seems, to let jobs leave this country. no, mr. chairman, we have to understand what happened on and leading up to april 20th. we need to answer those questions to determine if the rules or agency overnight win sufficient or if this was purely an act of negligence or wanton disregard for sound regulations. now we can try to enact the perfect reform that ensures this never happens again bought it will not change the past or the toll upon the lives forever changed. mr. hayward, the responsibility to make these families whole falls to you and your company bp you have an obligation to right this wrong and not only the public trust but also to believe in the free market and entrepreneurship demand it. mr. chairman, i wait the opportunity to ask questions with the hope that we will soon discuss these same matters with our own administration. and i yield back. >> thank you, mr. gingrey.

mr. gett for an opening statement. >> as this san investigative hearing. lie submit my excellent opening statement for the record in order to have more time to question the witness. >> very well. mr. doyle, opening statement. >> mr. chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today so we can begin to understand wwat went so tragically wrong on the deep water horizon. we're now 59 days into this tragedy and oil continues to gush into the gulf of mexico. the estimates for how much oil spills into the gulf each day continue to rise and we still have no way to cap the well in the near future. we sit helplessly as we wait for a relief well to be completed. as the details and facts about deep water horizon come to light it is clear to us all that the decisions made by officials at bp that reflektded bad judgment at best and criminal nemps at

worst, through this committee's investigation, we've learned that at nearly every turn, bp cut corners. and n well design, the number of centralizers they used, whether to run a cement bond lock, circulating drilling muds and securing the well head with a lockdown sleeve, bp took the path of least resistance. on tuesday, colleagues and competitives from the oil and gas industry provided sworn testimony that they believed bp delinquencies in well design and failed to follow the best practices of the industry. now we learn that bp had several warnings about the mccondo well with one of their own engineers calling it a nightmare well. but instead of treating the well with caution it seems that bp's only interest was in completing the well quickly and cheaply. many questions still need to be answered. were bp employees on the deep water horizon give orders from bp officials to speed up the

mccondo well? were they told to slash costs wherever possible? why would a team on board the rig to test the cementing of the well be sent home before performing the test? surely if a cement bond lock was ever necessary, it would be in a nightmare well situation. but sending the team home, bp saved $100,000 and nine or ten hours of work. mr. hayward, i hope you're here today to answer questions about the decision made on deep water horizon that led to this tragic and deadly blowout. earlier this week, this committee sent you a letter with detailed information about topics we would like you to address today. in reviewing your statements submitted for today's hearing, i'm extremely disappointed in your avoidance of the requested topics. i certainly hope that you use the opportunity today to answer our questions openly and truthfully. i know bp committed to clean up

the gulf region and i expect that commitment to be ongoing. i welcome your pledge to pay damps through a $20 billion escrow fund but that's just the tip of the iceberg. rebuilding the public's trust in your company and your industry will take years and many serious changes in the way you do business. when you operate on our land and in our waters, you're only there because the public's trust has allowed you to be there. you violated that trust in the worst possible way. mr. hayward, i look forward to your testimony. i look forward to answers to our questions and your ongoing efforts to gain america's trust. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. doyle. mr. griffith for opening statements. three minutes, please. >> thank you. mr. chairman and ranking member for calling this important hearing today. mr. hayward for taking time to come before our subcommittee to discuss what happened on the deep water horizon.

i know that like us, your number one priority is stopping the flow of oil. congress and this committee owe it to the american people do whatever we can to aid the unified command in reaching this goal. this is a time for engineering and action i hope you will let us know what we can do in congress to be helpful. there are still many questions to be answered about what happened on the deep water horizon and unfortunately we do know that the the documents that we're reviewing it does not look good. my hope for our hearing today is that we will be able to put political public relations shenanigans aside and focus understanding why decisions were made and how bp and the industry can ensure that they learn from this incident so that drilling safely for our valuable resources can continue. and i might say this to you, you're never as good as they say you are or as bad as they say you are. so this hearing will go back and forth. the other thing i'd like to remind the committee is that the

greatest environmental disaster in america has been cigarettes. 60,000 americans today this year will die from cigarette related cancers so if we're going to talk about the environment, let's be sure we don't leave that out. i'm a cancer specialist, by the way, by training and i never fail do bring that up. so the environment is an important concept, we regret the loss of life, but there's much that we can do and we'll put this in perspective. this is not going to be the worst thing that ever happened to america. thank you. >> three minutes opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. at this very moment, oil is gushing from the deep water horizon blowout at a rate between we learned 35,000 and 60,000 barrels a day, wiping out entire population of fish and along with it the jobs of hundreds of thousands of people. most upsetting about this

travesty is that it could have been avoided. as the ongoing investigation by this committee has already discovered, bp executives create and atmosphere where safety concerns were ignored in order to ensure that the company's already staggering profits this year, approximately $93 million a day in the first quarter continued unabated. this appalling disregard for the gulf coast and its inhabitants is one of the most shameful acteds by a corporation in american history. it's the most significant example of bp's disregard for the environment and well being of its workers. a report published by the center for public integrity found that between june 2007 and february 2010, bp received total of 862 citation from the occupational safety and health administration, of those a staggering 76 were' grecian and will wilful.

compared with eight at the two oil companies tied for second place. this pattern of behavior continued in the spill's aftermath. ihold in my hand a document called voluntary waiver of release that bp made unemployed fisherman sign before they could be hired for spill cleanup t states i hereby agree on behalf of myself and my representations to hold harmless indemny if i and forever discharge the bp exploration production inc. from all claims and damages that i or my representatives may have with regard to the participation in the spill response activities. i know that you said this was an early misstep and that this was just a standard document, but this is was the first response that you had to people that were hired. and outrage does not begin to express my feeling. these are people who are unemployed because of the recklessness of bp, forced to

take jobs cleaning up bp. 's mess in order to survive, yet to qualify for those jobs they had to hold bp harmless for everyone further damages they may suffer in bp's employ. this from a company that made $93 million a day. fortunately a court trumped your fancy lawyers who wrote this document but still it begs the question how could you do that? i'm glad that you're here, mr. hayward. i skbekts you to explain why your company has operated in such a wholly unacceptable manner. in the final analysis the simple fact remains if bp thought more about the residents as these widows assistant workers, as these widows said, rather than the already exorbitant profits of its shareholders, we would not be here today. i yield back. >> mr. lotta s for an opening statement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ranking member burgess, i want to thank you for holding this

subcommittee hearing on the role of bp in the oil rig explosion and the ongoing explosion in the gulf of mexico. i also want to extend my heartfelt condolence to the families of those who love one luved ones an have been injured. the scale of the spill and impact on the gulf economy environment demand a thorough examination of bp's actions and inactions as well as bp's current and future plans. the flow of oil must be stopped. every day anywhere from 35,000 to 60,000 barrels are spilling into the gulf and only 15,000 barrels a day are being  captured. the environmental effects on the oil spill are harming shorelines and coastal wetlands, fisheries an fishery habitats as well as sea mammals aed turtles. what's worse, we will not fully know the ecological ramifications of the oil spill until years down the road. further more, businesses

suffering great losses including job and revenues dependent on tourism are being threatened. the noaa announced a revised fishing closure in the oil affected portion of the gulf of mexico accounting for 33% of the gulf of mexico's exclusive economic zone. as oil continues to flow this yeah is sure tone large further exasperating the economic damage. a recent economic impact study by the american sport fishing association indicated that the enfire gulf were closed to recreational fishing from may through august. leaving $win.win billion of revenue which supports $2.5 billion in total sales, and 18,785 jobs. this is devastating to an area that has already suffered

greatly from the aftermath of natural disasters. americans continue be to be frustrated from the lack of solution from all parties involved and i'm interested to hear more about the coordinated efforts between bp and the administration. the economic and environmental magnitude of this disaster necessitates a clear understanding of what went wrong and bp needs ton held accountable for the disaster. i also look forward to having mms and the department of interior before this subcommittee to also for them to answer some tough questioning. i look forward to the hearing, mr. hayward's testimony and i yield back the remainder of my time. thank you. >> thanks, mr. latta mr. ross, three minutes opening statement, please, sir. >> thank you. chairman stupak for holding today's hearing to examine bp's actions and decisions that directly led to the tlach magic explosion and oil spill that continues to gush and wreak havoc on the gulf coast.

at a rate of up to 1700 gallons we are minute. since this hearing began a little over an hour ago, up to 112,847 gallons have been dumped into the gulf. on day 59 of this economic and environmental disaster, with up to 60,000 barrels of day spilling into the gulf, i continue to be frustrated and downright angry by bp's response and lack of a clear and productive plan to stop the leak or efficiently clean up the oil that is destroying the ecosystems that surround the gulf. reports have surfaced revealing that in the days and weeks before the explosion bp knowingly made a number of decisions that increased the danger of an explosion and spill

occurring. it seems apparent that bp put profit before safety, many people are dead. millions of gallons of oil continue to spew into the gulf. i'm hopeful that mr. hayward can explain today why these decisions were made, how this company's actions led to this disaster and what they are doing to remedy it. as oil floats into the marshes and onto the beaches, as shrimping vessels sit tied to docks, as restaurants and businesses during their peak season remain without tourists and customers, and as homeowners see their property values plummet, the people and wild life of the gulf coast wait and wonder about how extensive the damage to the ecosystem or the economy will be. this bill is not only affecting the gulf coast, the jobs and

economies of this surrounding states are hurting as well. my state of arkansas borders louisiana. and many of my constituents, people i know in my hometown work on offshore rigs. these jobs are also at risk and i hope bp will take responsibility for all those who are affected by this spill regardless of where they live. and work to help pull them through this disaster as well. this spill is a wake-up call that must result in better government oversight. more advanced technology, stronger response plans and improved safety standards. not only by bp and every oil company in america but also by our government. above all, this disaster is a learning experience that will help us prevent a tragedy like this from ever happening again. and i'm hopeful this hearing can provide the answer and solutions

necessary to begin that process. mr. hayward, i truly hope that you'll give us open and honest answers today and not those prepared by your legal team. with that mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you, mr. ross. next i would like to call on miss christensen from virgin islands for an opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for holding this important hearing. the explosion on the deep water platform and the sub subsequent outpouring of hundreds of thousands of gallons of oil into one of the most sensitive and important bodies of water in this country is indeed a tragic accident which caused 11 deaths, many injuries left-hand have deep, long lasting debilitating and expensive repercussion, the people of this country need it know what happened and who is responsible. all that has transpired since april 20th says to me that not only bp but no country drilling in our outer continental shelf is prepared to deal with a spill at this depth.

they're all, there using the best available technology and still 59 days later an end is not in sights. this is not skaementable. what has also become clear is that while bp reportedly used shortcuts they were warned not to which may have caused the spill, they're not the only ones at fault. they could not have cut those corners without the complicity of employees at some of the responsible government agencies who did not do their job. we're all appalled that lives are lost by decisions made apparently in the interest of cutting costs, but also by the lack of adequate preparation for this worst case scenario we are facing today. the fact that the industry does not ensure that response technology kept pace with deeper drill wells lays blame at all of their feet, but we can still not ignore the decisions bimade by bp, if they had been different 11 people might still be alive today. we with our congress along with

the fred who has had more of his share of crisis not of his making have make challenges and critical ahead. i hope the many who died, the affected families and now who now depend on ocs platforms for their livelihood, this and of the hearings will help us go beyond a knee-jerk reaction to do the right thing for the region and our country. that bp and any other responsible party will be held fully accountable and responsible and that petroleum and natural gas companies will learn important lessons to ensure this does not happen again. i want to thank you, mr. hayward for being here, i look forward to to your testimony and full answers to the questions we will ask on behalf of the people in the region and on behalf of the american people. i yield back. >> thank you. mr. welch, opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. hayward, in the 49 days since the deep water horizon explosion 'caused this

extraordinary environmental catastrophe, we've heard time and again from bp this was an abration, the facts regrettably tell a different story. in 2005, when bp's texas city operation blew up, 14 workers lost their lives n 2006, a bp oil pipeline in texas ruptured and spilled 200,000 gallons of crude oil n in 2007, the year you became ceo, the bp corporation settled a series of criminal charchgs not civil charge, krill unanimous charge and paid $370 million in fines. according to risk met tri, an independent okay, bp has one of the worst health, environment and safety records of any company in the world n only one year, the occupational safety and health administration found more than 700 violations at bp's texas city refinery and bp paid a record $87 million in a fine.

bp was charged with putting profits before safety. earlier this year, a refinery in toledo was fined $3 million for willful safety violations including the use of valves that contributed to the texas city blast. finally, of course, the deep water horizon catastrophe and more evidence that comes in, the more it's clear that that event was foreseeable and it was avoidable. after the explosion, bp said there was no oil leaking, then it said there was 1,000 barrels a dye. then 5,000, we're now up to 60,000 barrels. for 59 days, bp has told the american peopthis was abration. it's deja vu again and again and again again.

the question many of us have is whether a ceo who has presided over a company that has incurred $370 million in fines, a company with one of the worst records in the world for safety and consistently puts money ahead of safety, who's peers including mr. tillerson from exxonmobil who testified where you are two days ago, said they never, that they never would have drilled a well the way bp did at deep water horizon and who has ceos to hass presided over the destruction of over $100 billion in sharehold ever value. does that leader continue to enjoy and have a valid claim on the trust and confidence of employees, shareholders, public regulators and most important lit families and small business of the gulf coast? or is it time frankly to that ceo to consider to submit his says rig nation? i thank you and yield back.

>> thank you. mr. greene for an opening statement, please. >> thank you, mr. chairman. mr. hayward, i appreciate your testimony or being here this morning. and most people on this committee know i'm a big supporter of outer continental shelf drilling and domestic energy production. and i understand from your testimony in our other hearings we've held in meetings with the administration that efforts to cap the well are going as expeditiously as possible however like many of my colleagues here, i'm frustrated that did it's been almost two months and we still have thousands of barrels of crude oil gushing in the gulf of mexico. i'm frustrated by the threat of disaster impacts our wildlife and coast line. i'm frustrated that one well out of thousands of wells is threatening my constituents' lively hood and most communities on gulf coast. literally from alabama back to brownsville, texas. this disaster has caused the oil

and gas industry to shut down even if the moratorium does not last six months it will be too late for many of these folks, but these people are not the ones to blame. they're the hard working people with a work ethic like none other than take their responsibility on these rigs seriously. however, koording to the investigation this subcommittee conducted it's obvious many bp officials on and off the rig did not take their responsibility of this rig seriously. halliburton warned the decisions could lead to serious problem and now people are losing their jobs. they could have been prevented if bmplt p had not chosen exped yensy over say. which brings my next point. whether it's the fire where 15 people died, time after time, it's shown that bp chooses exped yensy over samplt yet, mr. hayward, in your testimony you write, none of us knows why

it happened. yet this subcommittee uncovered five air years where bp made mistakes. i add up the hours that these extra precautionary actions would have taken and it comes to be to about three to four day, that's assuming many of these actions would not have occurred simultaneously, which they could have. for an extra three days of work, men's lives would have been sarchd an industry record of safety and responsible production would still be in place which brings me to my last point. in your testimony, mr. hayward, you say this incident kaul $into question whether the oil and gas industry did explore for oil and gas in safer more reliable ways and what the appropriate regulatory framework for the industry should be. mr. hayward, the decisions made by handful of bp individuals called this into question, not this accident, and you should take the responsibility for the workers who did nothing wrong and are now losing their jobs. and mr. chairman, i yield back

my time. >> thank you, mr. green. miss sutton for around opening statement. three minute, please. >> thank you, chairman stupak. it's been nearly two months since the explosion of the deep water horizon drilling rig resulting in the death s of 11 workers and injured additional workers. since then, we've witnessed the worst environmental disaster in our nation's history, that continues to pour an estimated 60,000 barrels of oil a day into the gulf of mexico. that has led to over 66,000 victims filing claims to receive compensation. through this subcommittee's work, several alarming decisions by bp have come to light to save money and time. it's unconscionable when companies pay more attention to their comforts and their profits than to their own workers' safety and to our environment. at our last hearing one witness from transocean testified that a duplicate blowout preventer

system comforts rough $15 million not used on the deep water horizon rig. bp also utilized a risky option for steel tubing saving $7 million. bp did not circulate drilling mud or secure casing hangers between biopsies of different dime terse and critical signals were brushed aside. when standard methods were not followed to center the steel pipe in the drill hole, one of bp's operations drilling engineers remarked in an e-mail, quote, who cares? it's done. end of story. but these cut corners have been anything but the end of the story. as theeworkers and volunteers from around the country help clean up the oil from the disaster, many are becoming ill. between april 22 and june 10, 8

485 of bp's own employees have been ill. and the money has long been lost as they already paid $81 million in claims. mr. hayward, like many americans, i feel physically sick when sii see the clips of e oil gushing in the gulf. witnessing the devastation of our waters and our coast. and the wildlife. thinking about the lives of the workers killed. and hearing and seeing the pain in the face and the hearts of the people, the families, the small businesses, the fishermen and others in the gulf. all consequence of this catastrophe. this culture of carelessness and taking shortcuts to maximize profits at the expense of safety, this come what may, we'll cross that bridge when we come to it attitude is unaccept ability, it's outrageous. bp must be accountable for the

consequences of that approach and we must take actions necessary on behalf of the american people to make sure that such a reckless approach will be forevee abandoned. the risks and costs to our environment and to the workers in the gulf coast, to the workers throughout our economy are simply too great to allow otherwise. i yield back. >> thank you, miss sutton that concludes the opening statements of all members of our subcommittee. as i noted in the opening, as i noted in the opening, we have members of the full committee here, i would like to recognize them. they will be allowed to ask questions by order of seniority. mr. e mr. ensly is here. miss cast, mr. gonzalez, miss capps, mr. harmon, ms. wiener, and mr. scalise.

they also host the field hearing in new orleans, we had nine members go down in one of the largest field hearings we've had so you can see the interest here. i also also note, miss jackson lee is with us, not a member of the committee, she will not be allowed to ask question, but we welcome her and she's sat in on previous hearings we've had. so our first witness is mr. tony high hayward who is the chief executive officer of bp plc. you have a right to be advised by counsel during your testimony. do you wish to be represented by legal counsel? i'm sorry, you have to just press that button right there, sir. >> positive dye not. >> we also asked if you would have a technical person with you so you could consult if we ask some questions that you want to run it by your technical person.

do you have a technical person with you? >> i do. >> could you state his name and position for the record, please. >> mike zangey, drilling engineer. >> during your testimony, if you want to consult with that individual, please let us know, we'll give you a moment to do so before you answer but you'll be only one who could answer the question. is that clear? thank you. mr. hayward, i'm going ask you to please rise raise your right hand and take the oath. do you swear or affirm the testimony you're about to give to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, the matter pending before this committee. >> i do. >> let the record reflect the witness answered in the affirmative. mr. hayward, you are now under oencht we would like it hear an opening statement from you. you may submit a longer statement if you will for the record but if you would, please begin your opening statement and let me again on behalf of all members of the committee we appreciate your biwillingness tr

here today. >> chairman stupak -- ranking members. >> suspend, please, sir. >> you need to go to jail! [ inaudible ]. >> ma'am -- >> she's a shrimper. her whole life is --

>> be careful. let them get through. >> before we begin again with mr. hayward, let me just again mention those viewers in our audience, emotion run high on this issue. but we have a hearing to conduct

here. we're going to conduct our hearing. it's going to be done with proper decorum. mr. hayward, when you're ready we're growing to start the clock over, you may begin. >> chairman waxman, chairman stupak, ranking member burgess, members of the committee. i'm tony hayward, chief executive of bp. the explosion and fire aboard the deep water horizon and the resulting oil spill in the gulf of mexico -- >> excuse me, mr. hayward, i'm going to ask you to pull that up, some of the members are having trouble hearing it's probably over the clicking of the cameras, but we're vag trouble hearing you. if you could just pull it closer. >> the explosion and fire aboard the deep water horizon and the resulting oil spill in the gulf of mexico. never should have happen and oar and i'm deeply sorry that it did. when i lernt that 11 men had lost their lives, i was personally devastated. three week $ago, i attended a memorial service for those men and it was a shattering moment.

i want to offer my sincere condolence to their friends and families. i can only begin to imagine their sorrow. i understand how serious this situation is. it is a tragedy. i want to speak directly to the spem who live and work in the gulf region. i know this incident has had a profound impact on your lives caused great turmoil and i deeply regret that i also deeply regret the impact the spill has had on the environment, the wildline of scrimmawild life and the ecosystem of the gulf. i want to acknowledge the questions that you and public are rightly asking. how could this happen? how damaging is the spill to the environment? why is it taking so long to stop the flow of oil and gas into the gulf? we don't yet have all the

answers to these important questions, but i hear and understand the concerns, frustrations and anger being voiced across the country. and i know that these sentiments will continue until the leak is stop and until we prove through our actions that we are doing the right thing. yesterday, we met with the president of the united states and his senior advisers. we discussed how bp could be more constructive in the government's desire to bring more comfort and assurance to the people of the gulf coast beyond the activity we've already done. we agreed in that meeting to create a $20 billion claims fund to compensate the affected party and pay for the cleanup and environmental mitigation said all along we would pay these comforts and now the american people can be confident that our word is good.

i've been to the gulf coast. i've met with fishermen. business owners and families. i understand what they're going through and i promised them as i'm promising you that we will make this right. after yesterday's announcement, i hope that they feel we're on the right track. i'm here today because i have a responsibility to the american people to do my best to explain what bmplt p has done, is doing and will do in the future to respond to this terrible accident. first, we're doing everything we can to secure the well and in the meantime contain the flow of oil. we're currently drilling two relief wells, we believe they represent the ultimate solution. we expect this to be complete in august.

simultaneously, we've been working on parallel strategies to minimize or stop the flow of oil. while not all have been met with success, it appears that our latest containment effort is now containing about 20,000 barrels a day. by the end of june, we expect to have equipment in place to handle between 40,000 and 50,000 barrels a day. second, i've been clear that we will pay all necessary cleanup comforts. we've mounted what the coast guard has recognized as the largest spill response in history. we've been working hard on the leadership under unified command to stop the oil from coming ashore. whilst we're grateful these efforts are reducing the impacts of the spill, any oil on the shore is deeply distressing. we will be vigilant in our cleanup. thi,d as i have made clear from the beginning, we will pay all

legitimate claims for losses and damps caused by the spill. those are not just words. we've already paid out more than $95 million and we've announced an independent claims facility headed by ken feinberg to ensure the process is as fair, transparent and rapid as possible. fourth, we need to know what went wrong. so that we as a company and we as an industry can do better. that is why less than 24 hours after the accident i commissioned a nonprimpd investigation. die it because i want to know what happened and i want to share the results. right now, it's simply too early to say what caused the incident. there is still extensive work to do. a full answer must await the outcome of multiple investigations including the marine board. to sum up, i understand the

seriousness of the situation and the concerns, frustrations and fears that have been and will continue to be voiced. i know that only actions and results, not mere words, ultimately can give you the confidence you seek. i give my pledge as the leader of bp that we will not rest until we make this right. we're a strong company and no resources will be spared. we and the entire industry will learn from this terrible event and emerge stronger, smarter and safer. thank you. >> thank you, mr. hayward. one of the bad parts of conducting a hearing we get interrupted now and then by votes. we have three votes pending right now. there's i think about ten minutes remaining on this vote. i would suggest instead of trying to get in the questions, we take a break right now, let's

stand in recess for 30 minute, we'll come back at noon and continue this hearing. well start with questions all the members. okay? this committee will be in recess until 12 noon.

>> mr. hayward, a have been approached by several members of the committee who are extremely disappointed by your lack of candor. we have agreed to give you an additional week so that you could be adequately prepared for this hearing. in addition, we sent you a 14- page letter outlining the issues you should be prepared to address in today's hearing. you did not address any of them

in your opening statement, and thus far, you have responded to our questions with low substance and many claims of not knowing, or not being part of the decision-making process. you have given responsibility for your actions to staff in your town hall meetings, but you have not taken responsibility today. i sincerely hope that you will reconsider your approach to these questions. i hope you wwll be more forthcoming and less evasive up for the remainder of this hearing. we should be able to get through the rest of this hearing, and will probably go a second round if members want to push on some of these issues. you have a phd. you have been head of exploration. you know what is going on. we had hoped that we would have more candid responses to our questions. with that, we will have five minutes of questions.

>> thank you. and indeed, mr. hayward, we are frustrated with hearing you saying that you were not a party to certain decisions or were not in the chain of command or that you cannot comment because of ongoing investigations. so, i am going to try a little bit of a different tact, because i do want to get some answers. i want to go back to the safety issue. i mentioned that in my opening statement to you. i am one of those individuals that grew up down on the gulf coast. then i moved away. i am familiar with people working offshore, if you will. what i would like to know from you, have you been briefed on at the safety issues and the safety concerns? if you were a part of the decisionmaking process, on what would be considered the best operating practices, where you are part of the chain of

command, and what is at the chain of command for dispute resolution when there is a different about how to approach safety? >> i clearly them the ultimate in the chain of command, but as i have said, i was not involved in the decisionmaking. >> if you were not involved in the decisionmaking of house safety is approached on these rigs and platforms, would you submit to us in writing, for the record, a description of what the chain of command is, and whht the process is when there is a difference of opinion on how you approach a rig safety? would you be willing to submit that for the record? in addition, have you been briefed on the significant safety incidents that have occurred in the pepos the exploration in alaska and production facilities -- in the

in alaska andon the production policies the -- production facility safety violations in the past year. >> we took actions in alaska to change both the organization and some of the processes. >> thank you. since the deepwater horizon incident, have you made changes, and would you submit those to the record? >> we have made changes to our testing procedures. we have made changes to the intensity with which well site leaders are aware of it will control procedures and a variety of other interventions. as we learn more, we will make more changes. i would be very happy to submit to the congress, and the changes

that we have made. >> did you ask other companies for help in cleaning up the bp oil spill? did you approach the other companies or other countries and ask for their help and expertise in plugging the leak and participating in the cleanup? >> we sought help from both the immediate peers and competitors in the gulf of mexico, as well as from around the world and across america. there are several hundred entities involved in the effort, all of the major operators in this country, a major operators from elsewhere in the world, many of the major academic institutions in this country, some of the greatest minds in the country are involved in trying to deal with this

problem. >> did they participate at your invitation or the government's invitation? >> in the first instance, at our invitation, and subsequently, several authorities brought great academic institutions to bear. >> is bp currently working on an industry-wide effort to look at rig safety? >> we have made recommendations with respect to the things that we have learned so far, particularly with respect to blowout preventers. we will continue, as we learn what the realities of this accident are, to make our recommendations to authorities. i believe that in the course of the coming month, the industry will work together to determine what is the best way forward. >> we hope that you are working

together, because i hope you understand our frustration. when you have stated before that safety would be a priority for bp, and we expect you all to take action on lessons learned, and when you tell us that you're taking that action and then you return because of what has occurred, mr. hayward, i cannot even begin to tell you how disappointing it is to us that you're saying -- and you your testimooy. but sir, you are giving their rhetoric. what we want to see giving forward is the action, that indeed you have learned these lessons. the bp has learned these lessons, and that you are going to share these best practices with the industry. that would be very helpful. thank you for being before us today. i yield back. >> you indicated that you did

recommendations on the blowout preventer. could you provide those to this committee? >> we certainly can. >> more questions. >> a thank you. the existence of a large cloud, a plume of oil deep beneath the ocean's surface is of deep concern because of that poison to the aquatic plants and animals, and also consumes oxygen, potentially asphyxiating marine life. on may 30th, you stated that there was no evidence of such plans. on june 7th, you again denied the plumes existed, submitting a document saying that there were no, -- no hydro-carbons beneath the surface. on june 8th, york cboe zero went on national television and

continued -- york -- your coo went on television and continued to deny the plans. umes. it is not just university scientist data, we also have an epa evidence of these plumes that was prepared using bp's data. 17 red dots show that your own data shows evidence of these plumes. are you prepared, once and for all, to concede that there are plumes deep beneath the surface of the ocean? yes or no? >> s i understand, it indicates

that there are very low concentrations distributed through the column. the analysis that has been conducted in three locations around his bill shows that one location has 0.5 parts to 1 million, clearly attributed to this bill. >> are there plumes deep beneath the ocean surface? >> there are small amounts. some is related to this bill, other amounts are related to other oil. >> so, you do not define those as plumes? >> i am not a scientist. >> i will take that as a continuing a note from you, and your test -- as a continuing

"no" from you, and your testimony continues to be at odds with all science. bp has been asked for a roster of all workers multiple times. bp has failed to give that information, information that is critical to tracking chemical exposure. a representative from the department of health and human services is outraged about your failure to protect the health of your workers. will you commit to immediately provide the national institute of occupational health and safety and the centers for disease control with all of the information they need to evaluate health impacts and to protect these workers? >> we have been moving to provide all information request as quickly as possible, and we will provide that information as well. >> the head of occupational health and safety testified that you are not doing that. will you provide all of the

intermission that they have requested of you? >> we endeavor to provide all the information request that we received. >> the non- -- the equivocation in your answer is not reassuring to the workers to have been exposed to these ways that cann impact their health. bp has dumped 30,000 gallons of drilling mud into the ocean. this is made using synthetic oils and other chemicals, and in this case may have used into trees, which is toxic. will you -- used anti-freeze, which is toxic. will you commit to disclosing all of the ingredients in the+ drilling mud? >> yes. >> wilk you also disclose all of

the mess it -- will you also disclose all of the methane and chemical ingredient you have put in the water immediately? >> we will make that available in whatever form is appropriate. >> and you will give us all of the measurements. >> all of the measurements have been made available, and we will continue to do that. >> mr. hayward, as demonstrated by the number of cameras in this room, interest in this hearing is at a fever pitch. anger at bp is palpable. look at the polls. have an obligation to get to the bottom of this and to address the frustration of the american people. the chief executive of exxon

mobile testified just yesterday that "we would not have been drilled the well away they did expert." in addition, the chief executive of shell said, "is not a shell that we would have drilled, and there are occupational concerns." if i had delivered a baby that resulted in of bad outcome, a seriously bad outcome, and two of my friendly competitors, a well-respected peers, and said that i had practiced below the standard of care, i would be in a serious world of hurt.

reflecting on the fact that two of your major competitors said drilled a well in a what isdard oway, your reflection on the way that bp drilled the well? >> there are clearly some issues that our investigation has identified, and when the investigation is complete, we will draw the right conclusions. >> well, with all due respect, you have had 59 days, and you are not exactly moving with a fever pitch here. do you believe that bp was a drilling the well following the best safety practices and that you claimed to reinvigorate when you were promoted a few years ago? >> if i sound at any point that anyone -- if i found at any

point that anyone at bp put cost ahead of safety, would take action. >> do you believe the decisions made regarding deepwater horizon, such as the decision to use only six centralize years instead of 21, the decision to not run a cement bond, do you consider those of normal operating procedures or an exception to normal operating procedures? >> there is nothing i have seen so far that suggests that anyone put cost ahead of safety. if there is evidence of that, we will take action. >> let me put this forward in the remaining time that i have left. if you had been physically present on that rig, along with the 11 men who were killed, would you have made the same decisions that were made?

or would you have made the decision to use 21 centralizers instead of six? would you have used a cement bond? >> i am not a drilling engineer, so i would not have been asked to make those decisions. if our investigation determines that at any time people put cost ahead of safety, then we will take action. >> well, with all due respect, mr. hayward, i think you are copping out. you're the captain of the ship, and it has been said on both sides of the aisle in this committee, we had a president once to said "the buck stops on my desk." a very distinguished president.

the buck stops on your desk, and i do not think we are getting the answers from you that need to be presented to this committee in a forthright answer. it has spent -- it has been a little frustrating to this committee. >> i want to follow up on my friend from oklahoma's questions about the culture of safety at bp, because you have stated repeatedly that sends you took over that safe, reliable operations are your number one priority.. you have been ceo for three years, correct? >> correct. >> then explain to us why between june of 2007 and occupational health and safety administration checked 55

refineries in the u.s., two of which were owned by bp, and bp racked up 750 safety violations, accounting for 97% of the worst violations that pochette monitors in the workplace. that does not sound -- that osha monitors in the workplace. that does not sound like a culture of safety. >> we had serious problems in 2005 and 2006. >> i am not talking about 2005 and 2006. between 2007 and 2010, osha classified 750 violations, many of which were considered egregious and willful, the worst violation they can identify. they said there was intentional

disregard for employee safety and health. 97% of the egregious violations at u.s. refineries, on your watch, or by your company. that does not sound like a company that, to use your words, is as committed to save and reliable operations -- is committed to safe and reliable operations as your number one priority. do you understand that? >> i understand what you're saying. >> we also have a comment earlier about what happened at the white house yesterday. were you there for the conference at the white house? >> i was. >> do you think that bp was shaken down by the obama administration to come up with a $20 billion escrow fund? >> we accepted the invitation by the government to form a way

forward and try to work together to deal with the leak, the response to the leak, and to return the gulf coast to its past, and that is what we are going to do. >> i realize that we speak the same language, but it is not always the same language. we speak english in the united states and great britain, so i want to make sure i am clear on this. here in this country, the words shaken down mean that someone at a disadvantage is forced to make a decision against their will. is that how you view these negotiations? >> as i said, we came together to figure out a way of working together to resolve what is clearly a very serious situation. >> and the reason you came together is because it was not only in the best interest of the united states taxpayers and the citizens of this country, it is also in the best interest of the

bp to try to get this problem solved so that you can move forward. is that not true? >> is undoubtedly true. we would like to resolve this issue, as would everyone else. >> and when the ranking member referred to this compensation fund, which i applaud as a positive step forward, as a slush fund, i want you to know that in this country that implies a very negative connotation as something illegal or below the surface of what is acceptable. do you consider the compensation fund for people who have lost their lives, lost their businesses, lost their environment, lost their ability to earn -- do you consider that to be a slush fund? >> as i said yesterday, we have a commitment to do it right, to ensure that individuals, fisherman, a charter boat captains, small business owners, everyone who has been impacted by this is kept whole.

that is what i have said from the beginning of this. that is what we intend to do. as i said in my testimony, i hope that people will now see that we are good for our word. >> can we take that as a note in response to my question search, -- a no in response to my question, that you do not consider it to be a slush fund? >> i do not consider it to be a slush fund. >> thank you. >> earlier in the morning you said that everything you do is subject to regulatory oversight. who is that, when you talk about regulatory oversight? >> that is the mineral management service.

>> in the federal government, who would be out on the rig for that oversight? >> the inspector from the mineral management service, i believe. >> when was the last time that the mms would have been on the rig? >> i am afraid i am not aware of that date, but it would have been shortly before the incident. >> are you aware of any citations being issued? >> i am not aware of any citations. >> i have learned from members of the gulf coast and also from a news report that it takes about five days for a turnaround. there is a chain of command out

there, and it takes five days, and a lot of times people are told to talk to bp. why is this that people are being told they have to ask bp and the turnaround time takes so long? >> i am afraid i cannot answer the question. i do not know. >> can you get that information for us? >> i can try. >> the next question then is to set the procedure up this way that we have a situation where there is a five day turnaround time? do you have any knowledge of that? >> i do not. >> after the disaster occurred, have you had direct contact with the white house? do you have a person you have been dealing with in at the white house when problems arise?

>> my primary contact through all of this has been with admiral allen, the national incident commander. we talk on a regular basis. >> how often would that be? >> typically once a day. >> again, as does the lady from tennessee, we have a frustration level on getting a good response, but i yield back. >> mr. hayward, in your initial testimony you testified that bp had drilled hundreds of wells around the world. how many are deep water wells? >> i do not know the precise number. we've drilled deep water wells in various parts of the world. >> but you do not know how many.

do you believe that these wells should be drilled at the highest industry standard? >> i believe that is what we are trying to do. >> so your answer would be yes? >> yes. >> were you informed of the progress of the wells? >> i was not. >> you were not. ok. before i continue, i know you have had trouble answering some technical questions, but you brought it technical expert with you. would you like us to swear him in so that he can help you answer some questions? >> i think that depends on the question. >> well, let's see how it goes. you received a letter on june 14th that talked about five decisions that compromised the safety of this well. design, mud circulation,

lockdown, cement bond blog, and blow up an inventor. -- cement bond log, and blowout preventer. you wrote a memo that said "this has been a nightmare well -- the memo was written that said "this has been a nightmare well." have you seen this memo? >> i saw it when it was brought up by your committee. what that is the first you heard of it? >> that is the first. >> is that the first you heard of it being a nightmare well? >> that was the first. >> that was the first.

let's talk about the cement jobs. all of the testimony we have heard indicates that the choices be pete made -- bp made in order to save money led to blind faith in the cement job. first of all, you chose a riskier well as design. the best practice would have been to use a airliner and a tie back which provides for barriers to allowing hydrocarbons into the well head. instead, you chose a long string approach which only has two barriers. an internal document warned that this approach was not recommended because "cement simulations indicated it is

unlikely to be a successful cement job." you can look at have six of the note but you have in front of you to see that, mr. hayward. it says "cement indications -- simulations indicate it is unlikely to be a successful cement job." have you seen this before? >> i saw it as a result of this investigation. >> but you did not see it at the time? >> i did not. >> but people at your company did. >> yes. >> secondly, bp chose a riskier option.izeer

the best practice would have been to use 21, but bp only used six. take a look at have eight. -- tab 8. you did this, even though halliburton said this would create a "severe risk that the cement block would fail." your operations drilling engineer wrote about this decision, "the carrot? it is done. the end of story -- who cares? it is done. end of story. you will probably gee a good segment job."

were you aware of that memo? >> i was made aware of it by your committee. >> but you would not deny that there were people in bp who were aware of it. >> of their work. >> would you say this is the best safety practice? >> i think that e-mail is a cause of concern. >> i would think so. >> i would like to understand the context in which it was sent, and as i have said many times, if there were any compromises made regards to safety, i will take action. >> bp failed to perform the most effective test to determine whether the cement was sealed. there was a contractor on board hired to provide this test,

which was described as the only test that could truly determine the bond. and experts said this should always be used. another expert said it was unheard of not to perform the test. called your decision "horribly and negligent." do you think it was a mistake to not conduct this test? >> that is what you're investigation -- that is what our investigation will determine. >> so your answer is yes? >> i do not want to answer yes

or no until the investigation -- >> so has your lawyer told you not to answer? >> i just want the investigation to be complete. >> do you think it was all right to not conduct that test? >> i think we need to complete the investigation. >> let me ask you this. are you aware of the fact that it would have cost about $128,000 and take a 9-12 hours to complete the test. >> i am aware of that, yes. >> bucket. ok. i yield back.

>> mr. hayward, i know you have tried to reassure us that everything possible was being done, but we wonder who was making key decisions before the accident. one of these key decisions was which type of pipe to insert into the well. the second design offered more barriers to unintended gas flow, and on tuesday, the other oil companies we talked to told us they would have chosen that design. looking back, the decision that your company made appears to have serious consequences. were you involved in that decision? >> no. >> were you aware of that decision? >> i was not aware of any of the decisions around this well as it was being built. >> we ask you was responsible for this well? we were told it was the chief

officer for exploration and the chief expert on exploration. were they involved in this decision? >> i would be surprised if either were involved in any decision. >> we have reviewed their e- mails and communications. we find no record that they knew about this decision. we find no record that they ever received briefings on the activities aboard the deepwater horizon before the explosion. these decisions all seem to have been delegated to much lower ranking official spirit who was the one who made the decision to use a single tube in the well from top to bottom? >> i am not sure who made the decision. it would have been made in the gulf of mexico by technical experts to have the technical knowledge and understanding to make the decision. >> but you cannot tell this

committee who that person was? >> i cannot do so today, i am afraid. >> i think it is pretty amazing that this is a decision that had enormous consequences and you cannot even tell the committee who made the decision on behalf of your company. your industry is different than many. you are not the chief executive officer of the department store chain, where it is fine to leave decisions about running a store to a branch manager. if the department store middle manager makes a mistake, there are not life or death consequences. what you do is different. you are drilling into a region that is more like outer space than anything else. the consequences are huge. it a mistake or miss judgment is made, workers can get killed and an environmental catastrophe can be unleashed. the best minds and the senior leadership in the company should be paying close attention to those risks, and it did not

happen here, and now we are all paying the consequences because those of you at the top do not seem to have a clue about what was going on on this rick. i am sitting here thinking that ceo of an oile the company, because it pays better than being a member of congress, and you do not have to know anything. you say that you are doing everything to stop this wealth from leaking -- stop this well from a leaking, but now we are being told that the best solution will not be in place until august. back in 1979, the leaking well took over nine months to cap. can you tell us today, have you

abandoned any other efforts to kill this well? are we at the point now where bp is doing nothing until the relief wells get drilled, or are you trying any other technology or some way to kill the well until you get relief wells down there? >> i am afraid there are no other options. as you are all aware, we tried to kill the well from the top, and the pressures are such that we cannot do that. we have to rely on the relief wells. we are continuing to contain as much of the oil as we can. we are currently containing 20,000 barrels per day. by the end of this month, we will have the ability to contain 40 calls and-50,000 per day -- 40,000-50 ca