>> last week, the security firm z, formally known as black water, received a contract from the state department. .

>> the commission looks at tasks that are better but formed by the military and which should be delegated to the private sector. witnesses include those from the state department and the pentagon. >> good morning. i am mike seybold -- titled -- thibault., co-chairman of the commission on wartime contract

in iraq. thank you for attending this hearing, which will explore timely and important issues regarding america's use of private security contractors, or pscs, in iraq. this opening statement is the hate -- made on behalf of christopher shays, our fellow commissioners, and myself. the commission met in this room friday for a hearing on the question of whether private security contractors in iraq -- and we make talk a little bit about afghanistan, that is principally in iraq -- might be performing inherently governmental functions. as co-chair shays noted in opening that hearing, the office of management budget -- management and budget is preparing new guidance on defining inherently government functions, plus "closely associated" for "critical" functions that my name -- that may need either government

performance or close oversight of private contractors. we're looking into that issue as part of our overall mandate from congress. there are about 19,000 psc employees working in iraq. about 14,000 are under defense department -- department of defense contracts, and roughly 5000 work for the department of state and the u.s. agency for international development, or usaid. the massive drawdown, secondly, of u.s. forces in iraq aims at cutting our military presence to less than 50,000 by the end of august this year, and to zero by the end of 2011 -- obviously next year. most of the security duties currently executed by the u.s. military in iraq and by dod contractors are being handed off to the department of state. state will need more security contractors, many of them with

special skills, and we will explore that today. the drawdown and security function hand off will put strain on our system for planning, acquiring, overseeing, contract and program managing, and evaluating performance -- we will talk about that a fair amount -- related to psc work. let me give you some specifics to clarify the foundations and the implications of these facts. commissioner grren knight, a company by some compassion -- green and i, accompanied by some commission staff experts, were in iraq last month to prepare for this hearing. we visited four ford operating bases. our fact-finding visit confirmed what our research and our hearings have already documented -- there are already weaknesses and america's use of pscs, especially with respect to

effective internal controls to in full -- to ensure full and proper vetting of security contractors. the problems may get bigger and more costly with the challenges in the months ahead. we saw significant problems at three of the four fobs that we visited. at one fob, we found 17 iraqis and more than 53rd country nationals -- 17 iraqis, 53rd, nationals -- third country nationals -- had been on guard duty protecting a u.s. military base for about two weeks without proper vetting. and another, a contractor ceo intervened personally to try to get third country nationals posted to guard duty before they were properly authorized. fortunately military officers were on the job in turn him down. and i will have some comments about that in a moment. these lapses and others like

them could turn into very bad situations if on all the rise, unvetted pscs turned out to be sympathetic to insurgents. such concerns will only grow for at least four reasons. first, the state department lacks the personnel, equipment, experience, and training to take care of some of the security functions that have been provided through dod or by dod previously. these could include quick reaction combat teams -- dod is going to be gone. route-clearance capabilities, recovery of wounded personnel and damaged vehicles, a countee- rocket and counter-battery teams that return hostile indirect fire within seconds -- a critical deterrent for hostile fire -- and the experts and vehicles that detect and dispose of improvised explosive devices, or what we all refer to as ieds. the iraqi government currently lacks many of these

capabilities -- and we are trying to develop them, but they currently lack them as well as a robust and consistent system for monitoring and regulating psc operations in the country. while the military planning for its part of the iraq drawdown habit -- appears to be thorough and well executed, and i was impressed by the fairness and the execution, we've found plans for contractor management during and after the drawdown much less developed, and have made that concern known to the executive branch. the dramatic expansion of state paul security responsibilities in iraq could lead to weakly managed -- state's spoussecurity responsibilities in iraq could lead to weakly managed contractors performing inherently governmental functions and a combat zone, a scenario with large downside

risks on both policy and practical grounds. these are the huge challenges, driven by both the scale and peculiarities of our engagement in iraq. excuse me. the united states has used pscs in other scale such as the balkans, but never on such a scale as in iraq and afghanistan. the exigencies of the iraq drawdown and the defense-to- state hand off aggravate the problems already created by the scale of contractor use, including the use private security contractor oversight practiced by usaid. and we will discuss that more today. today we will explore processes, internal controls, and current issues related to psc management and oversight. we will probe the many challenges ahead at the military-managed security environment in iraq transitions to state department control. at this time, the bottom line appears that a lack of timely

and the effective coordination between defense and state could undermine the progress achieved by the u.s. military -- and there has been progress -- embolden insurgents, and jeopardize the safety of americans left in iraq. this is a troubling prospect. with the true drawdown under way, and on -- and operational demands in afghanistan rising, we cannot simply return to the "wild, wild west" days of 2006- 2007 in right. today's hearing has two panels of witnesses. the first panel comprises four government witnesses who can speak to roles, responsibilities, planning, and program management of pscs in iraq. the witnesses are gary motsek, assistant deputy under secretary for defence for program support, charlene lamb, deputy assistant secretary of state for an internal -- international programs, bureau of diplomatic

security -- david blackshaw, overseas security division chief, office of security, united states agency for international development, and edward harrington, deputy assissant secretary of the argument -- of the army for procurement. the second panel brings together four industry witnesses. don ryder, vice president of civpol, dyncorp international, kristi clemens rogers, president of age as defense securities -- aegis defense services. it may still balderas, director and chief executive officer of trouble can be, and jerry torres, chief executive officer of torres advanced enterprise solution. we've asked our witnesses to summarize their testimony in 5 to 7 minutes.

we will meet with all witnesses for their key staff as a retained function. mr. torres confirmed on june 7, two weeks ago, that he would be testifying today. our staff meeting was scheduled for last tuesday. late last monday, his assistant canceled that meeting and last wednesday, mr. torres told commission staff that torres aes was a small company and not needed on the panel. he said that he had army reserve duty this week and might not be able to reschedule. that is the last the commission has heard from mr. torres. last friday, his lawyer informed us that mr. torres had reserve duty and had key staff out of the country, and he said that he

was nervous about a to hearing. mr. torres ought to be nervous. this commission was one asked him under oath why his firm agreed in january to pursue private security responsibilities and forward operating base shield with several red bark -- several bart that had not been properly vented and approved. a diligent cor prevented them from sending their duties. the contractor who has lost the contract, but was very well rated, was quickly hired so there would not be a loss of transition for $1.5 million to stay on the post for an additional 16 days. and in an additional number of tories employees perform duties even though they were approved.

we're also going ask mr. torres y he personally flew to harass to shield and strongly suggested to the cor that he be allowed to pose the unapproved cards anyway. he said that he would catch up the approval process. i personally asked the or if he tried to intimidate the cor into allowing on authorized guard duties into duty. he said that intimidated was too strong a word but he said for a continuous amount of time that this was just paperwork and what was the big deal? and i've heard that before, what is the big deal?

what we need control? we can now report that the same company was awarded the next four lowest price technically acceptable contract to protect american troops at four additional bases. this raises an interesting question. what is technically acceptable for private security contractor? during the trip, we raised that question and the issue of past performance during a meeting with the joint contract and command, or the jccai. how did he try to put -- how did that impact the award of four additional security contract were to mark where told and i was there along with another commissioner and staff that these were competitive, lowest priced, technically acceptable

-- torres had the lowest price. and that past performance was not considered in this case jccai during the award a new competitive orders. we're told the wall this -- that is passed orders, that is the way we do business in iraq and afghanistan. that is what is a competitively bid and awarded. since we only do past performance on the contract and not the orders, we did not consider it. they are competitively awarded. it is the wrong answer. after an extended discussion with the commander, the knowledge that past performance should likely have been considered and be considered on competitive task orders, and that she would look into this. in my view, sitting there and listening, this is a major m iss on the part of jccai.

after saying that he was nervous about testifying, we have a major issue that needs to be addressed in our primary witness has hunkered down in iraq. the issue today becomes, what does it take for government contracts in leaders to say that all lowest price or any contractor, what does it take to demonstrate that they are not performing adequately? and that their past performance dictates that a contractor is not technically acceptable? we do know that trying to post under it -- hundreds of unapproved cards to protect american lives has no consequence in this, so we have to see what does. we will see whether this has consequences. what does it take for poor contractor performance to resulting contract termination or non-award of future

contracts? mr. blackshaw, i know you are a valued government employee. i haven't seen so many qualifiers about what you can and cannot talk about. i realize that senior officials can talk about it, and having worked the government side all of my life and participated in testimony for couple of decades, that each word is crafted to be consistent with the agency's intent. but when you say -- you hope your testimony clarifies the middle management role and answers questions in a limited role and things like that, i realize thaa when we coordinated with usaid, we wanted a counterpart to the

other witness that can speak for the state department. we did not get that would usaid. it will impact the kinds of questions that we will last because ultimately you will take back -- and very early on in my career, i testified at hearings, and they told me, don't mess up. and i was at a low level. i am not looking for comment. what i am looking for here is you to take back our disappointment that state department put you in this position. i don't want you to take the hit that they contacted me and i thought would work could take -- it would work out ok. we thought u.s. it -- usaid would be more engaged and have the right person here. if you would like to put some

comments on at the end, please do, but we are going to continue on with the question. mr. zakheim? >> i share the co-chairman of views. but i want point something out for the record. when i was undersecretary of defense, i was asked to testify. i normally showed up unless i was overseas. i'm not shooting you. you're the messenger. but that is the problem -- you are the messenger. and if i could not testify or did not want to testify, which was rare, because the congress wants you, you come. i would kick it down to my deputy. and if my deputy did not want to, he would kick it further down the chain. everybody knew what was going on. and so this is not you -- you're just down the food chain. but it is reasonably outrageous that an agency that is so involved in the work that we're trying to look at did not see

fit to send a deputy assistant administrator, say, or these other people who are just as busy as your bosses are. that is all i want to say. >> thank you. i hope you won't try to match our dissertation, but go ahead. >> of like to claaify. u.s. for security representative and i am the appropriate person, but you have to understand, we have all which makes diplomatic security responsible for overseas security. you say process pscs does protect security did tell all provided by diplomatic security. i work closely with them. i of worked in several situations. the rule is our implementing

partner. they are basically private citizens that could be institutional contractors, ngos, cdos, subcontractors. >> we appreciate that. if any commissioners want to explore that with you, i would give you free time. we can be on record. the way we're going to do this process is that i am going to lead off and the staff always comes up with this mystifying order of commissions, and i will follow staff recommendations because that is what i do. i am going to start off, mr. harrington and mr. mostsak, with our addendum to the disappointment to mr. torres. what does it take to terminate the security contractor's

contract for some work for what does it say from a policy viewpoint, mr. mott saimotsek o. harrington. you're in a good position. what does it take to terminate a contractor for obviously -- it did not take appointing a bunch of unapproved cards? can you talk to me about what is the policy and the execution guidance that you give your field representatives? >> your point is well taken, sir. what does it take? it takes a clear specific evaluation of a contractor the represents capabilities that is not adequate. it takes the judgment of the contracting officer on the

ground observing that. it takes the contracting officer there interacting with the contracting officer representative to confirm that the contractor's actions are the lack thereof make it inapppopriate to select that contractor for a function. i'll research that further also have right now specifically we focuses on document contractor performance, good or not good. >> let me ask you to build on that, mr. harrington. do you agree that if you have a contract with the taurus contracts, and each had -- and each task order is competitively awarded, that past performance might be a consideration for smart >> yes, sir, i do. >> because it was not. i was there and that commander

and i had a testy discussion. it is something that we will consider in the future or ought to. and that is not good enough. mr. motsek, can you talk about the policy? sometimes it is difficult to understand it but i know you are the key player on much of the policy direction and regulatory action associated with past performance, especially private security contractors. can you elaborate greshem mark >> it should be considered. there is no doubt abouttit. you brought three issues in this discussion. number one, the good news is there was a trained cor out there who actually did his job properly. i would hazard a guess that 1.5 years ago, we would not have had the same out, as this time.

there are two challenges regards to this. one is an issue to be addressed earlier in hearings with the commission, and that is the one godly turn -- ungodly churn of cor's in the operating field. they were the only ones that we have and we're starting to begin to see the fruits of the army's push about two years ago to rapidly increase their contract in officer capability, and in particular, some deployable capability. it is not an excuse, it is a reality. when you have the contract officer churning every few months, we have this challenge. that is one of the fundamental lessons learned that we got.

you cannot expect to have consistency like that. >> i will say, we had a contractor who was performing well who is asked to say on for 16 days in order to assure there was adequate security. it's easy for people to say, if it was made -- but i will say that if it was made, i may not make the decision that you can never work for the united states government again. i may say that his past performance considerations. but realizing that all these approvals and authorizations are contractually required -- if there was an ever ks for termination for default, which is you all go home and we will debate about you about who pays about who pays -- about who pays for your way home -- if this kind of behavior does not affect termination, then i guess not

much. ms. lam, thank you for your tehran -- for your testimony. i want to ask you a specific question about the state department capability. i appreciate the current policy decisions and some of the batons that you're being handed, very important batons, related to security. of the four view, how many of you saw or heard about academy award winning movie "her walker ?" 55. -- "hurt locker." five for five. when i was describing it to someone, it looked like the vehicle involved with the army management, they look like oversized motor homes with

intent of bringing all over them. when we were coming back or writing, and there was some environmental dustup of activity and we could not get the easy ride, the helicopter. we got into a few enwraps -- mraps, but we stop for a while on a major road, because there was a ied traffic. there were three of these very large vehicles, one blocking, one in back up, and one with soldiers doing what they do to assure the safety of soldiers. and the people like us, civilians. and iraqis. we waited an hour and a completed it. when we were in iraq recently, we met with the staff and they gave us a list of 14 items. one of them was ied removal that was going to be inherited by the

state department. and so we as the inevitable question -- the army goes home. have you got anybodd that can run an ied like they do? no. what are your options? what the iraqis run it, and they do not have the skills. in a perfect world, they would. that would have to get a contractor. we had a list of fought -- wha14 items. and contractors are standing ready to fill this vacuum. and it does not make a bid a sense -- a bit of sense, and we're worried about the planning of transition, and now we're told that there is a lot of coordination -- what are you doing, realizing that under the current plan on all of these, but i use ied's, putting anti- counter-battery -- it happens

all the time. , another example. who is going to run it? not the iraqis. the contractors. what are you all doing -- and does that make a bit of sense to bring contractors into an environment where the united states army has been exceptional in their performance? and now we're going to have them leave. can you talk about that, beyond the fact that we have been told that they have got to leave? >> thank you very much for that question. we have done a lot in that area already. two of the biggest on your list of 14 will be the vehicles and all the equipment that come with them, as well as tactical -- tactical command centers, the

hub of transportation that keeps everyone moving and the security moving. we have met within the last -- ongoing for a year now, we have two contracts with private contractors that are looking to consolidate all of the equipment that we need in our vehicles to match the capabilities as fast as possible to the military's. we are designing a footprint for our command centers to go into the rotations were we will have the responnibilities. we are coordinating these efforts with the ilitary and in many cases, there are military ties to these countries -- companies that are currently designing this for us. our end goal -- we're not just going to turn the light switch out. this is a phased withdrawal, and we will pass but consol slowly at first, but i am sure it will be hectic toward the end.

and we're making a lot of plans as we move forward, consulting with each other to do this. but at the end of that day, our foreign policy in are racked gives us the future for building the capacity of iraq. we would prefer to look -- not to look like the military. we would like to have a lower key appearance to us. that is what we're striving for without reducing are creating security vulnerabilities. >> my time is up. the only observation within your statement, and i will make the observation -- i do not think the united states army -- and i am not being critical. united states army does not work to a standard of "as best as possible ""when removing things from the battlefield. combat medics, instead of flying in to take out the wounded, it will be, name a company.

we are now the combat medics. it just does not make sense. my time is up and i may export a little letter with you. and i appreciate the position that you're in your candor. commissioner green. >> thank you. thank you all for being here. i know you are excited about it, as are we. mrs. lamb, i was on the trip with commissioner thibault in iraq, and i spent all my time at the embassy with embassy and usaid personnel. i do not have to tell you -- you have got a huge mission, one which i do not know whether state is ever -- state has ever in its history been taken on -- been asked to take and on. and none of us want to see the department failed.

but the clock is ticking. you're taking over from an organization, dod and much of it the army, which has a significant planning capability and significant resources. and i know from my experience with both organizations that states cannot or has not been able to compete with those kind of resources. so you have got a real uphill climb. i was very happy when i was in country, and we were briefed a number of times by ambassador things being done there -- but i would like it a focus on one thing, the psfd part of the

personal security contractors. this is number one and emotional and very sensitive issue with many. as you know, we have a hearing on friday that dealt with inherently governmental, and there are many people out there, despite the position of those at the table, that believe that the pfd part of the psc mission is inherently governmental. i am not going to take a position one way or the other. but i would like to know based on your projections, and i think they are probably optimistic, about the number of people that it will require a in a rock alone, how you're going to oversee that mission? my understanding is that iml will require something light 50 or more pscs just to do police

training. we don't know what the officer- military cooperation will work. we do not know what usaid will require. and i do not think that until we put in those five enduring presence folds, we know what the requirement is going to be there. how are you going to not take over this mission and how are you goong to monitor it, considering today you have only got 1800 total officers, 800 of which are overseas worldwide? >> again, a very good question and thank you for asking. we are creating an additional skill code. i just lost my train of thought. >> security special.

>> my security specialists special security personnel. these are limited appointment positions right now. they will be serving to augment diplomatic security officers within the pfd movement. we're currently recruiting and hiring -- >> how many have you hired? >> we have 25 on the ground in pakistan and afghanistan. and when we started hiring and training, we had enough agents to fill iraq. we will now start transitioning into iraq. >> do you consider that program successful? >> all the feedback that have gone from our security person now has been highly successful. and that they have matched incredibly well with our agents.

to the point that we are looking to perhaps create a permanent skill code and move away from the limited appointment with them. >> and what would you do with these folks when we get out of iraq and afghanistan? >> the country will be and -- because we have small numbers, we can use them at the training center. they will have an incredible amounn of skill and high for it capabilities. we can use them for training and local guard force management at some of our largest -- larger high threat posed around the world. >> well, i wish you luck. one of the things that i am somewhat concerned about -- well i think coordination in-country appears to be going very well, i am not sure the level of coordination here, between --

both within the department and with dod -- and i will make a comment. i think an issue came up, and this is probably not the most important one, but it cannot be solved in the field. it has to be solved here. who is going to run the state department's air force pressure mark i do not know what -- and not want you to answer that because i know what your answer would be. but those kinds of issues have to be dealt with here. i would encourage you to become as active as possible in that coordination process. so you do not have to respond, because i know you want another to run the air force. mr. motsek, i would normally not

ask this question at this hearing, because we're talking security, but since you raised it in your opening statement, i could not resist. you made this statement that the quadrennial defense review has a knowledge contractors as a part of the total force, etc., etc., severaetc. there is virtually no planning process within the work within the department of defense to integrate contractors in the planning, other than a cursory mention of them. not even as much mentioned as was in the to keep -- 2006 qdr 3 of like your comment. >> how was very happy with what i got in the qdr. from my perspective, we got the acknowledgment of the total force, our main goal. we have other recommended

language that did not make it. for good or for bad, we have elevated the idea of opera rational contract in support to the level that there is a belief in the process going on, and especially the policy folks, who feel that we are addressing those needs in due course as we go through what we're doing. a year ago, we would not have been able to sit here and in knowledge that the chairman has a three phase assessment on the use of contractors. and do we have the appropriate mix? and he is leading that effort right now. that did not exist. >> why do we have so much difficulty in getting an ex -- annex w's?

>> that is only a handful of specifics. the real issue is what are the supporting service plans?? once you make that decision and, when, if it falls to be supporting contract -- in the comlink, it also supporting contract. a year ago, we hired contractors who would go to each of the commands, we had 15 of them out in the field, and we're trying to inculcate this into the planning process. today, eight of those are not government officials. we're weaning ourselves off of that and inculcating the fact that we had joint planners now who are focused solely on contractor operations inside the co-coms, and soon they will

all be government officials. that is a step in the right direction. we have finally published a concept of operations for ocs now. that was a painful process to get all services to buy into. >> why is planning for contractors -- why should it be painful? these folks are providing the lion's share of the support? a commander should care as much about this as he does about movement plans, signaled plans -- my time is way over. >> nothing is perfect. i do not want to overstate the case. but what -- but when the chairman got the phase 2 approach of his assessment, which i would urge the commission to look at, and i

would be happy to brief it to you -- when he saw that, his initial response was get this as part of the normal rotations. of the joint staff, the people have taken a lead in this effort or part of that process and we have put that in there. >> they are not very happy with what was included. >> i understand. >> that is enough. thank you. >> thank you, commissioner green. commissioner tiefer, you're next. >> back in the winter of 2008, when i was still trying to find my way around here, co-chair thibault went out there and came back with our first that.

much of your analysis of what might go wrong with pscs depends on a system of serious incident reports filled out and provided by the pscs. self reporting by pscs on things like -- supposedly anything, white civilian casualties and weapon discharges. i have a question for you, and i want to get the usaid perspective on this. i am going to ask you if we can rely fully on contractors to self report the incident? three different studies have been conducted of this. one by human-rights first,

which reviewed 610 incident reports, and of them, just one even suggests on wanted weapons discharged. remarkable. then there is a study which i am sure you're familiar with, by the usaid inspector general. they found that contractors can sensor or mid incident reports that might reflect on them poorly. -- censor or omit incident reports that might reflect on them early. you may say that you have made reform since then, but we're finding about the attitudes of their ability to self report. from 2006-2009, of 207 incident

reports, the numbers about civilians or other persons killed or injured were probably destroyed -- below 0% in that category. we're seeing a certain pattern on the self reporting incidents. finally, the special reporter -- special inspector general for a rack at a recent study in which all 109 incidents, they found documents, no iraqi civilians were injured, let alone killed. mr. blackshaw, can we count upon pscs to self report? >> that is a difficult question to answer. >> cannot start with the answer know before we get into the explanation? can we count on this? >> in many securities scenarios,

we almost have no choice. >> i did not ask on whether it was a choice. can we count on them to reliably self report civilian casualties and weapons discharges? this is my second time to get this is our no answer. >> i am not sure. >> you think is quite possible that we can reliable -- when the report 0, 0, 0 and hundreds and hundreds of their reports? >> it is a question i cannot answer. >> i'll take my time. ms. lamb, you are professional in this field. i know you are doing diplomatic service and you have made remarkable reforms. and in some of your areas, if you have df agents were you

have a radical -- credible reforms. a lot of the pscs do not have this kind of scrutiny. can we count on private security contractors to reliable report all their civilian casualties and all of their weapons discharges? >> if you categorize that with all, i would say no. but i would clarify that sense we have created a position for a contract coordinator, and we have drastically increased our relationship with iraqi authorities -- >> i have very few minutes and i appreciate that they cannot be counted on. i wish usaid had sent someone who could answer questions with your clarity even though they have not done as far as you have done with reform.

the usaid ig did a study that suggests that for reporting, subcontractors are not even as reliable, and of "the report, -- and that quote from the report, 140 pscs themselves were killed or injured. i am honored that and i respect them. they are reporting can be very full in one category and it is zero in the other category. of 29 subcontractors 17 lacked documentation of the most basic point, which at the government had consented to their hiring. can we count on subs as much as

primes, mr. blackshaw? >> it's a much different position than most other government agencies. we are implementing partners and working way outside the wire. we're working in areas where ww do not cdo d or other type of force protection. are implementing partners of our unique and different. some of them work in a much different thought process that a traditional -- >> if i may remind you of my question, and you may want to answer your question than mine, but please answer my question. can subcontractors can be counted on as much for self reporting as prime? yes and no?3 question by laying the groundwork for you understand -- >> i only have 40 seconds. you have a lot of foundation. can you give me a yes or no? >> i will say no with a caveat.

>> they cannot be counted on. thank you. >> can i clarify for the record? >> i will give you additional time. but you could wrap it up at the end. it is probably a good time now but could you succinctly take a stab at it? >> usaid works in areas where there is not a lot of force protection. how are implementing partners work in very different working environments. a lot of them balance force protection with maintaining neutrality. most of our pscs are indigenous, local contractors are cards, so that we can bland and work within the environment. the difficulties of reporting are going to be higher based on the type of cards and protective security details.

>> thank you and i appreciate the clarification. and do you have another question? >> just one. the slam -- ms. lamb, there was a recent award to a blackwater company. i want to ask you. the state count the incident were 17 incidents were killed by blackwater and extreme of past performance that is bad when it considers bids by blackwater? >> a complex question. it is based on past performance of the contract. >> i don't have any more time. wouldn't that incident count as

past performance? >> is an ongoing contract so i do not want to comment on that at this time, please. >> thank you. commissioner hanke, please, sir. >> i am sure our witness -- our witnesses are familiar with section 22. the section deals with very comprehensive training, alleging, and equipping of private security functions. in an area of combat operation. with each of the witnesses tell me if you believe -- with each of the witnesses tell me if you think that section 22 is the most complete lot for private securities -- private contractors? >> yes. >> sir, likewise. >> likewise. >> yes, but i also think that

because we use a lot of different protective security details that follow other governments rules, we need a different prototype. >> ok, mr. motsek. said sinn e of the law requires that the secretary of defense shall designate the areas constituting an area of combat for the sections. iraq and afghanistan are included in the areas designated as an area of combat designation. has the secretary of defense designated an area of combat operations? >> the answer to my knowledge is no. the reason is because the executive authority of even the secretary presides -- roadsides

in the executive branch, and the president has done this. it is redundant and a requirement. >> so the secretary has not designated an area of combat operations, that is simply correct? >> i have never seen a document in response to section 22. >> the rule that was published in the federal register says among other things that the secretary of defense may designate such areas of combat operations for the limited purposes of this part. maybe that was just an oversight or a type of typo -- or a typo.

state and usaid, are they bound to follow the requirements of section 22? in an area, in a designated area of combat operations, the chief of mission will be responsible for doping -- developing and implementing instructions for pscs. i think a lot was trying to come up with one playbook, and operate under the same guidelines for selection, training, and oversight of pscs. my question for ms. lamb and mr. blackshaw -- it is stayed down by the parameters of this aw? -- it is state -- is state bound by the parameters of this lot? >> our civilian contracts and

civilian personnel that we deal with do not understand the military language that they are written and. we work very closely together, where appropriate in compliance with the specific mission for our personnel, and that they parallel each other. we have gone to great pains to make sure that that happens in these areas. >> my understanding and my reading of the regulation, i believe that it is final, right? jim is interim period >> is an interim-final. the final should be out this year. >> section 862 applies in iraq and afghanistan when the development of chief mission says it will apply. is that a fair understanding?

>> we have applied if the military has applied consistently. >> that is not a question. it allows some discretionary authority as the chief of mission in iraq or afghanistan determined that section 862 applies in iraq or afghanistan? >> i would have to consult with our legal personnel. i'm not sure that there is anything in writing that says that. our office is a responsible for publishing the directives that are signed by the ambassador, so inherently, yes, they have endorsed this. >> but not formally. state has not put them under the rubric of section 862 formally. >> again, i can take that question for the record. i think that is starting to cross into a legal around -- a legal ground.

>> before the end of the hearing, that would be helpful. i think you have states -- staff here that are able to talk to your lawyers in your counsel. the negotiation to get the roll out the door was leave it open, leave the chief of mission with flexibility to apply section 862 or not. you're saying that the chief of mission, even though he has not made a designation that they are operating as if he did, following all the intense? is that your position? >> that is my position. .

>> the only personnel that i have with me today or the experts on diplomatic security and it is and all of our contracts. >> is a need bound by perimeter 862? >> the answer would be yes. relation with the language in the contracts and grants. that should be applied for those contracts and grants. i believe we made all the corrections. >> would you like to comment on the issue? >> the reason that the language

and the rule is slightly different is because they hundred 62 was up primarily applied to iraq and afghanistan. we work trying -- we were trying to create the rule. >> as long as it was designated? >> exactly right. we are where we are with iraq and afghanistan because the dod is still in place and that goes back -- it still requires -- that is what brought the department under a common set of standards that would be published in the future and you are now talking about those standards that were published in the future. it is still in existence and it

is still a valuable document between us and the department of state. >> but it is not related to the department of state? >> yes. >> i would like to follow-up with an addendum. i think i heard you say that the state department has adopted this for consistency staae -- consistency's sake. is the state department down by a 62? if this is what you are talking about, what happens when the consistency issue is not necessary any more to drive that? >> that is the key question. when we go from title tend to title 22, we are no longer in a combat operation.

you hit the nail right on the head. >> thank you for appearing today. mr. harrington, i think that i will give you a pass. you have been here a couple of times before. you are a substitute witness for us. a little bit of my frustration is the fact that this entire issue of private security contractors is seen as one that resigns in the acquisition community and it is all about management. management is important, but there are also a number of questions that fall outside of the acquisition area. something you said reinforces my frustration, which is that you were happy to get anything into the that is not how we would like the department to handle that.

with that said, let me turn to you mr. blackshaw. how many employees carry weapons? >> none. >> so, none of the usaid funded employees? >> none of our u.s. direct hires carry weapons. >> i asked how many usaid funded employees. >> from what i understand, our implementing partners to not carry weapons. when there is a need for that type of force protection, they subcontract out that responsibility to a firm that is licensed for the host government. >> how many of those are the carry weapons? >> it varies. >> in iraq. i am focused on iraq. >> we have about 12 implementing

partners that have protective security detail from companies such as [unintelligible] >> how many of those carry weapons? >> by all do, generally. >> you have -- you act so detached. these are funded by u.s. dollars, correct? >> yes sir. >> who owns those weapons? what's it would be the company that owns them. >> who has responsibility for inventory and monitoring their use? >> to the best of my knowledge, it would be the protective security detail companies. >> i think that you mentioned mostly u.s. companies when you were reading off of your list to

the extent that they are u.s. companies, do they fall under section 862? >> yes ma'am. >> one of the reports that my colleague referred to is the oig report. even though we are talking about iraq, one of the recommendations that they made seems to be relevant across a number of different areas. regulate private subcontractors , the have a position on whether that would be a good idea? >> i think that there needs to be regulations. there needs to be a code of conduct. rules of the use of weapons and things of that nature. i do not think that we can

regulate it completely because each of the implementing partners are working in very unique operating environments and they have to blend in with the cultural -- >> i understand that. what we have learned in our trips to the field, locally based aid employees do not spend much time getting out into the field. would regulating the private subcontractors for the private security services -- it seems to me you would have to change your operating process and get out and actually see what is going on in the field. >> it is a very difficult such a way some. a lot of times, usaid can-do program monitoring, but with the type of force protection that we bring along with us, we could actually put the implementing

partners and the recipients of theeaid in jeopardy. usaid has a working group looking at how to do program monitoring more effectively in a combat environment. >> usaid works in a high combat environment. i would hope that you have figured out a lot of this already and could be bringing those lessons and to the iraqi theater. -- into the iraqi theater. i would like to give the state department some credit for creating this position. too often, this debate resolve's -- revolves around the fact that we can't do it because we can't do it. in your budget request, particularly with respect to the mission that you will be taking on, have you requested -- has

your request been approved? >> yes, these numbers have been approved. >> so you have gotten everything you have asked for? >> is in the budget. we have not gotten anything yet. until the fiscal year 2010 supplemental comes in, i cannot answer that. >> is a fully funded?

-- is it fully funded? >> i apologize, i am -- i was off last week. prior to leaving last week, everything was in there. >> as you know, the senate armed services committee has buill issues and that they arr focused on things that deserve our focus. my time has expired. >> mr. commissioner? >> thank you mr. co-chairman. you guys deserve credit. if you midday statement -- you made a statement that is on page 4.

you would agree that you get what you pay for, correct? >> that is correct. >> then why do you continue with contracts that are lowest priced technical is acceptable? >> thanks to the city commission today, -- of the sitting commission today, we will be awarding a new contract. it will combine our existing static guard contract. >> let me ask you point blank. can you guarantee this commission that the next one will be the best value? i would want a guarantee. you have kids getting killed out there. can i get that guarantee? >> i can guarantee that the

process is on track -- >> no, i want a guarantee that the next contract will not be the lowest priced technically available. why do you want to protect people on the cheap? if it was your kids or it was my cards, you would not want that. >> of course not. >> can i give that guarantee? >> yes. >> mr. blackshaw, i do not envy you. who is your boss? >> the director of security. >> ok, is he here? your his boss? what are you at the table? >> first of all, -- >> could you come to the papal

-- to the table, sir? >> we will have to pause for a moment because i have a responsibility to swear him in. >> will you put a timeout on my time? >> i will time out your time. >> do you swear that everything you say is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. >> i do. >> let the record show that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. >> can you give me your full name and tell me what your responsibility is and can you tell me the birth of your responsibility relative to that of mr. blackshaw? >> i am the director of security of usaid. mr. black shark is one of the division chiefs under my control. >> supposedly, you have a

broader mandate. the kinds of hemming and hawing that mr. blackshaw had to do, you do not have to do, correct? >> i would hope not. >> ok, then do not him and hall. because mr. blackshaw was forced here and there, do you folks at aid contract security personnel? >> no. >> you do not contract at all? >> overseas, no. >> when usaid people go into the field, who protect them? >> either diplomatic security or contractors funded by security. >> so, your people are essentially protected by contractors and nobody else.

>> there may be occasions when eight people travel within the country -- when a id people travel to the country. our partners may have the contract for the security force. >> could you identify partners? >> [unintelligible] >> and they provide security for your personnel. >> on occasion, that may occur. >> how do you overseeing the performance of those people that are providing protection for your people on occasion? >> the requirements for their performance would be under the contract. >> and how do you overseeing the review of those contracts given that it is your people's lives

at stake? >> the contract in officer at the mission would be irresponsible for oversight of what is required in the contract. >> is an aid staff member? >> yes. >> what kind of visibility do you have into the performance of these private security contracts personnel that are working for the contractors that you hire? you say that it is up to the personnel out there, but what kind of evidence comes back into headquarters? how do you check for incidents? county check for mishaps? i am curious. tell me. >> the reporting is done by the aig. >> of the inspector general is

not reporting for you, they're reporting for the people. how do you manage it? when i was in dod, the last people i relied on was the aig. >> what we have done -- one of the issues that we recognized a year and a half ago was that we needed better coordination and oversight of the partners when they chose to employ contractors for security. we have assisted the aid mission. it is a key interface between the partners and the aid mission and the security officer. >> when your people you contract

with hire out or contract with contracts, are those the lowest priced contracts? >> could you repeat the question? >> you say that the partners would contract out the security. correct? >> that is correct. >> sometimes, those security folks will protect your folks? >> yes. >> those contracts, are those the lowest priced contracts? >> i do not know about that. i can get back to you. >> absolutely, i would like to hear about it in 24 hours because people's lives are at stake. >>i share my colleagues' concern

about the cutie are. -- about the qdr. you are really good at what you do. why do people push back? you say that you have so much trouble. i do not understand why people pushed back. i used to run the equivalent of qdr many years ago and it was something important and people pushed back, then osd would just say, "too bad." what happened here? >> it is processed differently than when you were in the building. after the fact, as we did the after action review as to what made it and what did not make

it, the response that i got was that we had in place and were making progress, this was not a red flag to the extent that it had to be raised as a specific issue. the broader issue was raised. i am thankful that it acknowledged the fact -- when you and i grew up, there were three pieces. the other piece that i think that we have made progress on is that here to fore, to be blunt about it, our commanders frankly did not plan beyond phase three. they did not plan beyond that. the secretary has put out some specific guidelines that you are aware of that make it extremely important and they must plan for all phases of the operation. when you go to phase three,

phase four and phase five, that is when this huge contractor package comes into play. i do not want to look at the qdr in isolation. i think if you look at the totality, you see that we may reasonable progress. you bring up a good point. and i personally satisfied? certainly not. from a broad perspective, i think that we made progress. >> another question, this process, ipoa is the organization that tries to monitor these contracts. are you aware of a single case where a contractor has been censured by ipoa? >> that hits the nail on the head. we have associations out there.

but this goes back to the discussion that we were having >> in that case, why do you think that this document that is essentially going to be run by the same people who have not censured a single one of their colleagues, what will make a difference? >> that is the key issue. there are two components. we are waiting for the legal version because we have the aspirational version floating around for a couple of months. the second pieces to half a certifying authority independent of what you and i consider to be the trade associations and independent of the government proper. we can always enforce our own rules. an independent agency, quite frankly, without going into specifics, because i cannot talk

about specific organizations, but some of the international organizations have stood up and said that we are ready and prepared to perform this mission as the independent assessor of what goes on. what is so key to this is that the iraqi government has signed up for this. it goes back to everyone's question, what do you do for compliance? the simple answer is, if the companies grew up, he can no longer operate -- if the company screws up, he can no longer operate. we have to respond and react. >> thank you, my time is up. >> thank you, i am one to work on this a little bit and take privilege. you said company in the future. when this first concept of an independent party came up, i was

not in favor. the reason i was not in favor was because i felt that we should give industry and dod and state and opportunity. i am now convinced, because it has not worked. we are still concerned that in the present, there are mechanisms to pull their ticket. it is called contract termination. yet, it doesn't seem to ever occur. i just share that with you. mr. sherbert, is that your name? >> yes. >> and do not start the time until the fall questions are asked.

>> i would just ask for the opportunity to ask a number of follow-up questions. he was nicer to you than i would be. our staff asked for a representative from a id who was most knowledgeable about security contracts in the war theater and you said that you have a broader authority. you are mr. blackshaw's boss. we may agree or disagree with your responses, but you have given responses. you are obviously available to be here today. who made the decision for you not to testify? >> mr. blackshaw's name was on the invitation and mine was not. >> as i understand it, the reason his name was on the invitation was because after

consulting with his office, we were told that he was the appropriate person to speak to about these matters. is that your understanding? >> i will take your word for that. i do not know. >> the request that was made of you about whether the contracts that aid have are low-priced, i would like for somebody to provide that information during the coorse of this hearing. can somebody e-mail that. i do not see why we would have to wait for 24 hours. >> it looks like i am just a softie. >> the contracts would be their contracts. >> of the question is, your office is presumably able to and -- offer the answer to that question because you said that you would.

i do not understand why it would take 24 hours to supply the answer to that question. will you give us that answer during the course of this hearing? >> can you do that and will you do that? >> we will contact someone to see if we can get that answer for you. >> can you do that right now? >> yes, we will do that. >> i wanted to talk about something else. i wanted to link the subject of friday's hearing to the subject of today's hearing. we're talking about the same thing. this whole issue is inherently governmental. as i reflected on friday's meeting and talk about today's meeting, it occurred to me that we are wrestling with the wrong issue. this is not a definition problem. we have an adequate definition of what is inherently

governmental, an activity that is in the public interest as command a performance by federal employees. private security contractors are authorized to use deadly force to protect american lives in a war zone. governmental, it is that.%- we do not have a definition problem, we have an acknowledgement of reality problem. given the rest -- the risk of the use of force, under mounting -- undermining a time when we a knowledge that it is important to win friends. given the fact that we have so little visibility as to the contractors and subcontractors, given that we have legal

ambiguity as to whether or contractors and subcontractors can be accountable for their misdeeds and given the potential for national subcontractors to shoot at our own personnel, this should be performed by federal employees. we do not a knowledge that we all the -- acknowledge that reality. we do not have, in the short- term and medium-term, an in- house capability to provide the security for ourselves. i am not asking for a response, but given the predicate, i was confused by a number of comments. it seems to me, the behavior of

personnel could affect the national security goals of the united states. that is not true of security forces. secondly, and i would give you an opportunity to comment after this. you said that contractors are part of the total force and then a few pages later, you said that they do not operate as part of a larger integrated and cohesive military force where their actions could adversely affect the success of the mission or could provide alternative courses of action. i would argue that the misuse of force of bonds at the united states to a course of action.

this use of force binds the united states to a course of action. >> first of all, thank you for not making any response to the larger question because we clearly have a disagreement there. >> let me stop you there. i do not know where the disagreement is. we should develop an in-house capability. you said that on page 8. what is the disagreement? >> if the broad context of your statement says that the application of deadly force is inherently a government, a doctor could say that a contract dr. could do this. >> let me stop you there.

we are not talking -- you know perfectly well the distinction i am making. you go on to say that the dod recognizes that there are security functions that are inherently governmental. what are those? >> there are operations such as the protection of the united states. it cannot be done by someone other than the secret service. federal law says that the secret service is primarr. >> are you saying that the only reason we do not have private guards for the president of united states is because the law permits it? >> in the past, we did. the president of the united states during the civil war was protected by private security. >> are there any specific

security functions in the war theater? the context of the statement where you make this claim, we are talking about wartime contingency plans. we are not talking about the president of the united states. you said in your statement that the dod knows there are functions that are inherently governmental and cannot be contracted. >> a security functions that would result in an offensive operation is one that would be inherently governmental. >> you do not make a qualification when you say that. >> that would be one example. private security contractors specifically do not operate in a context of a cohesive force. static guard capability.

the vast majority of incidents that occur around installations are criminal in nature. >> let me stop you there. on page eight, you talk about the fact that dod is developing government slashed civilian groups. that is an in-house capacity for dod. why are you moving towards that? >> because it goes back to what was brought up as part of the qdr. here to fore, there have been to options. we had a military option and a contract option. essentially, we defaulted on the pfc side of the house because we

had no force structure. >> if you have the organic capability to provide security in the war zone, either american military personnel or civilian personnel, would that be the preferred method, given that pfcs -- i was scoring to commend you. if you were -- you are not being candid with me. i began my rather long statement by saying that we do not have the organic in-house capability to provide security. >> correct. >> i am not talking about right now. my question is, down the road, is your preference to provide security?

>> my candid answer is no. the weakness that we have in the system today is that you're giving me the other option that i do not want which is an all or nothing option. >> mr. chairman, can i take a half second to get a response from mr. harrington? >> you can take more than half a second. >> what about you, general? >> i am unable to comment on a strategic level. >> let me ask you a specific question. as i understand it, the government is required to in source security functions here

in the united states. isn't that an anomaly that it is required here in the united states, but not in a war zone? >> i would just say -- >> is an anomaly? >> i do not think so. >> what is the difference? why do we insist on enforcing here in the united states? >> i cannot comment on the numbers. >> i was not asking about the numbers. i was asking about the russian now. >> my comment on the numbers is that i am not sure that all of those are being in sourced-in- sourced -- in dallas -- in dallas torched -- in-sourced? >> i do not know the answer to that. >> thank you very much. >> mr. harrington, i would like

to ask you this. after -- would you be comfortable with the fact that in the united states, where we have incidents on occasion that are few and far between where we have americans protecting our government facilities, but in iraq and afghanistan, where it is a very different such a wage and, would you be comfortable knowing that in the united states, we have americans, but overseas where things are not okay, we rely on locals that might turn on us at anytime. i would like your personal and professional opinion. >> as long as the rules of engagement was appropriate for the level of performanne, within the rules of engagement, as well

as within the magnitude of the function, i would be comfortable as long as the rules were in place to oversight for those contracts. >> the state department is going to take care of personnel recovery. you have a wounded american government employee. are you comfortable to have a contractor be in charge of the medevac? what i would answer the same way. -- >> i would answer the same way. if it was formed to perform a live critical function, yes. if we were unable to define those terms and conditions, no.

>> commissioner? >> i appreciate my colleagues and the effort on the part of the panel to answer questions. i appreciate having the director of security from usaid here. thank you for being here. this commission was established because of extraordinary waste and theft of u.s. dollars and abuses in security. there is an expectation on the part of the senators who saw this as a form of the truman commission. i would preface my question by saying that i have three

incredible constituents in one family that became very successful in the business world. they were running two fortune 500 companies. why were they so successful? they said that the biggest reason was that they dealt with reality, not with what they wanted. part of what we are dealing with is what would make sense in terms of capacity. the law requires us to do one thing and we pushed it aside a little bit.

congress defines this as so intimately related to the public interest to reqqire a government employee. this is intimately related to the public interest as to demand a performance by the federal government personnel. the panel that we had on friday said that this was not all that helpful. it should not guidance. either dod needs to do this as the law is changed, or we really are on the edge. we have security guards in static positions in convoy and personnel. i would like each of you to tell me what would arise as a

question to be dealt with. is this guarding facilities, is it guarding convoys, is it guarding personnel? i would start with you. >> in my mind, it is key personnel. i would have the -- >> that is where the issue becomes more. >> that is when it becomes the interest of the u.s. government operators performing the functions. the other two examples are situational based and riskk based. this could be reversed the day after. >> general? >> it would be personnel. from my perspective, where any

type of a threat that will overcome that private security contract turning into a combat operation, but i would be the key focal point. cash i>> man? >> i would think that this is a trick question. whether it is a static guard on the facility or protecting a vip, we have given these folks weapons and armor to them -- and armed them. i do not think that you can measure or delineate between which attack is more critical than the other and which becomes inherently governmental. >> is not a trick question.

but you think they are equal? >> yes. >> who is going to answer this question and? >> i think it is inherently a tough question. any time you could use deadly force, there should be an inherently government function, but the difference that we see is when we play offense and defense. >> would you add anything to that? >> we have embassies that are protected by host country personnel because that is their responsibility. >> what i did not like and why i appreciate you coming forward, we do not hire contractors. we give out grants and we hire folks and they do it.

i think you are well aware of this report. u.s. aid's partners use subcontractors and you use the word sub-recipients. my question to you is, does usaid oversee any thing that these pfcs do? >> i do not know that they do it directly. >> so you doing indirectly? >> only for the contracting officer. >> that raises the next question. don't you have a responsibility to oversee them? >> i think i would have to have an attorney to give you that answer. >> i would just like your intuition as someone who deals with security.

you think that it is wind that the u.s. government has no responsibility -- you think that is fine that the u.s. government has no responsibility? >> they are hired -- >> paid by united states of america. >> yes sir, to perform a function for the implementing partners. >> right, now, let me just say that the answer i got from you is extraordinary. this report makes it very clear that there are consequences. one of them is that your not getting accurate information of the number of incidents with the security folks because you do not have oversight over them. that was a major criticism and the implications in afghanistan

and iraq is impacted by that. i would just end by going on record to say that the thing that is coming through here is that dod is leaving iraq, state takes over, isn't this going to be handled -- the answer is then that the army is out. the security folks that inherit in -- that is inherently governmental is going out and the state is coming in and what i fear is that the personnel folks are going to be contractors even if it is inherently governmental. is an alarming thing that in this commission will have to

deal with. you are leading. the state will have to take it over. you do not have the expertise. you do not have the experience. in my judgment, you do not have the ability to make sure that the government does this one is inherently governmental. -- when is -- when his inherently governmental -- when it is inherently governmental. >> the required vetting, screening and training is critical. whether it be a specialty or for our protective security personnel. we have this ready for legal review. it is thoroughly scrubbed. you need to make sure that we fall within the spirit >> the

bottom line is that this is inherently governmental, but there is the next level that says that it may not technically be governmental, but you would be foolish not to use government security in those instances. >> ok. >> all right, if we might go ahead and get started, we will go down the statements, but before i do the statements, i have to be sure that i say this word for word or my cochair gets

after me. might i ask the three of you to stand, please? raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you will give in this hearing is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? >> accomplishes be seated. let the record show that all of the witness's answer to the affirmative. i can never make the promise that we will make up time because then i may make a false statement. i very much appreciate you coming in and representing your company is. we can take the statements starting with you mr. ryder. give me one moment. i owe it to you and your company.

donald ryder, program manager for dyncorp international. dyncorp international's almost the world. i am especially opportunity to describe and discuss our experiences providing security for the department of state in iraq. in past testimony, we detailed many of the defense, development, and diplomacy solutions that dyncorp international provides through our major programs in training and mentoring, logistics, platform support, and contingency operations. the lessons we have learned in those locations have helped us to

shape and solidify our approach to security. the keys to success and security, as well as in everything that we do, our strong corporate ethics, leadership that enforces standards of performance, compliance and conduct, vetting of employees, rigorous training and paying attention to the needs of our customers. i will keep my remarks brief, but i want to highlight a few points. first, at the hearing last friday, a good portion of the conversation focused on security details. the protection of principles the man's the highest levels of professionalism and competence. we feel that the model currently incorporated is successful and should be replicated across all

mobile security operations. the model blintz experienced contractor personnel with supervising agents that are closely coordinated with their counterparts, using vehicles that are monitored and 360 degree visually and tracking systems. the model can direction -- can be replicated for the service being provided. for example, while i do not believe it is necessary or cost- effective to place a government agent with each entry control point team at an embassy. assigning an agent would reduce their risk related to performance, compliance and inappropriate employee conduct. this added degree would increase accountability for both the government and the contractor. a final point, our employees that support the war zone show

the dangers that our military and civilian personnel face. funeral in georgia and at the same time, company representatives were paying their respects for another guard. both men were working a contract to train the afghan national police and killed in a suicide attack. to support those seriously injured i, and dyncorp has cread a program to support the family. we believe that the program represents the gold standard of support for other companies to emulate and we emulate that the government mandate and fund similar programs for all contractors supporting foreign policy objectives. we made this recommendation sit -- consistently.

having lost 68 of our own, we have the obligation to their families and we will continue to make these recommendations at every opportunity that we get. in conclusion, as the u.s. military prepares to leave iraq, the security needs of those that continue to work with those in iraq are important. the policy and decision makers on the government side will determine where we are going. whether contractors will be part of that direction and whether -- if the u.s. asks us to meet those needs, we will support the government, holding ourselves to the highest standards. i will be happy to answer any questions that you may have. >> thank you, mr. ryder.

the next speaker is miss rogers. >> get afternoon commissioner thibault. i am the president of my company. please let me begin by apologizing on behalf of my company for not being able to accept your invitation at the previous hearing. we do recognize that our testimony to you is an opportunity to assist you in your critical mission to identify reforms. i have prepared written testimony and submitted it and i ask that it be submitted to the record. it goes into greater detail. as a brief introduction, our

company is a subsidiary of a worldwide group. we are threat driven and intelligence lead. we are a company that offers comprehensive security solutions in a variety of spaces. we provide humanitarian assistance, commercial risk analysis and more. our focus is to provide the appropriate support that enabled our clients to focus on their mission, the mission for which they were trained. all worked undertaken by our company is done with integrity. our track record is extensive and our men and women are dedicated to supporting the mission at hand. we hire seasoned and professional employees with exceptional skills. my experience in iraq comes from the civilian side. when i work for the department of defense, i was often the

consumer of services by security services. our mission was to work with the iraqi people. we opened health clinics, organized soccer games and worked to reopen a dance school and held a dance recital in a local village. the iraqi people just one of their lives back, a sense of normalcy, and we could not have done this with soldiers in full combat gear and a standard security perimeter and a high profile as court. it was only possible with the low-profile security provided by the contractors. . .

this comes with the imperative need to have the robust recruiting in screening process. our vetting process is a been used by the united states government. to illustrate our approach with one of our contracts, we had 18 free construction liaison teams in each of the provinces. they consist of 11-14 individuals, have iraqi nationals. they are in that field providing valuable updates on the status projects. and they often identified potential product -- problems. one night the u.s. corps of engineers was attempting to build a pipeline.

there was a problem, and with our local employees, we found out that the pipeline inadvertently crossed a territory. the pipeline has not been blown up sense. iraq is a very different battlefield and conflict environment as you well know. during the conflict in iraq and afghanistan, working with the local populace is happening at the same time as local military operation. soldiers need to be doing what soldiers are trained to do. you do not wwnt the full soldier all of a critical mission to escort civilian so that we can meet with local farmers and build wells. but this mission needs to happen as well. in iraq, our mission to support the united states government is where they have identified a

place where they need our support. since aegis was founded, we have been a staunch supporter of the private industry. our standards let us to be a signing member of the security organization. we're one of the first companies to continue to work with this initiative, all what the intent to develop standards for accountability and transparency. the private security industry is one of the most highly scrutinized areas in the united states government. we support the united states military in their changing our side -- j.t. environments. there should be stringent oversight. but the u.s. contract in process

has not changed. the same oversight for guarding a nuclear facility and an embassy in paris are being applied to our industry in iraq. it is not adequate. we would like to see reform. it is necessary because the united states needs to be successful and current and future hostile environments. reform is crucial. it seems a cost-efficient way to spend u.s. dollars is to support the u.s. mission with a blend of government officials and specialized contractors. during our six years of operation in iraq, we demonstrated that we have added value, something for the government to determine. thank you for this opportunity. i hope that we identify some critical reforms and away ahead. i look for to continuing the dialogue with the commission as you recommend much-needed reform for greater clarity, transport

-- transparency, and oversight. i would be happy answer your question. >> thank you, miss rogers. i have asked you, is that ignacio? >> please provide your statement. >> members of the commission, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. as ceo of triple canopy, i can assist the commission understanding the role my company plays in helping advance the mission of the united states government in iraq, and how oversight of our industry may be improved. with the use of private security contractors, and allows soldiers

to be taken off routine security missions. this enables the estate's embassy staff to safely conduct a greater scope of activities and further our mission in iraq. this year we've seen unsupported arguments made against security contractors and we've seen these arguments either be false or exaggerated. it's been demonstrated that private security contractors are not paid exorbitant sums, and they do not cost more than underutilized -- are utilize military personnel. our work for the department of state protecting u.s. embassies in baghdad was estimated by the gao the saved $4 bbllion over the life of the contract. they provide the flexibility and additional capacity the united

states government needs to better meet its military and diplomatic goals. what we cannot do and should not do is to replace the function of our military. this should not be classified as inherently governmental. the department of state has for many decades used firms to provide security at every embassy around the world, regardless of where the embassy is located. there will be legal frameworks where people may be authorized to use limited force within national laws. the company provided security services in the united states must be legally licensed to provide those services. the same licensing requirement exists in the vast majority of nations around world, including iraq and afghanistan. in addition, other nations will not permit on government or military personnel to be present presence of military personnel

in a foreign nation is typically governed by status of forces agreement or similar treaty. as in the case of iraq. often their limits put on the numbers of diplomatic staff that may be present in a foreign country. private security firms is a necessity in order to comply with the agreements the united states government has in place with foreign governments. are rigid determination that security is an inherently governmental function would likely limit the ability of united states government to carry out its diplomatic and military effectiveness. a more effective approach is to identify best methods for contracting security forces and the best tools for maintaining adequate oversight, control, and accountability. i believe that there have been improvements in oversight within iraq. but in my opinion, not enough has been done to manage the

future and to establish a framework for success. all are for a few suggestions. the first suggestion is to emphasize -- emphasize the need for following the federal acquisition regulations and to provide better guidance on how private security procurements should be conducted and how contracts should be administered. a second suggestion is to recognize the private to develop the run standards. the standards can work in conjunction with federal regulation and oversight. for that reason, i welcome the recent inclusion of the third- party certification requirement in the 2011 national defense authorization act. my third suggestion for improving oversight is to consider the following fact -- the u.s. government has more of authority and ability to exercise oversight over u.s.- based and u.s.-owned firms.

the support u.s. objectives. a foreign firm could avoid paying u.s. taxes, avoid u.s. criminal jurisdiction, and avoid having to appear before congress. use of u.s.-owned firms significantly increases oversight. my final comment is the best value contract. he continues to be a challenge in the regina right. the race to the bottom continues. the government -- the companies must find more ways to reduce their cost. this causes degradation in the quality of services being provided to the u.s. government. the better practice is to make this according to the best value method. it says that on the award may be better -- made to a higher price if it benefits the government. this does not mean that an award

will be based to a lowest price bidder if it avoids the pass- fail cheapest approach. i like to conclude my remarks and thank the commission for their work and addressing the hard work that we must work together to resolve. this concludes my testimony to the commission and thank you again for this invitation to appear today. >> thank you, mr. balderas. we will use the same format that we use previously, but regardless, there is relief 5 minutes on there. that is ok. unless you want to reschedule it for 5 minutes for this round? we used to go 8 and 5. oh, my goodness. excuse me. yes, we're doing eight on the first round. you're looking at me. i apologize. i had my hat on from the last

time. don't start my time until i provide some insight. we obviously are not trying to be cute by putting mr. torres name tags appear. but he was invited and we did not hear until very recently he was not coming. the point we're trying to make consciously is that it would have been good to have him appear. the process that we will work with will be unfortunate. already his attorney has said that he would not come, and he certainly has every right to do on the testimony, and it would have been better to fact find at the hearing and to follow up at the hearing and to get into this -- there will it was a solid path performance provided, and we have to go back to have them look into the eye and say that there was not.

will be in the one of those unfortunate situation. but we can deal with it. we would have had tt have dealt with it. i thank the three of you because you did meet with us before. i've quickly met with all three companies at different points in the last 20 months, and found you accessible. i did not always agree with everything that you did, but i've found you timely and very good at follow-up and forthright. i know that is going to occur here. and that is what we look for again with regard -- regardless. let's go ahead and get started. i think it was you, mr. balderas, that said you support certification. i like to spend that out with you a little bit, and mr. mott said -- mr. motsek took the

initiative on that. it is an international process. there are international companies and there are american companies. they have an international standard that you expressed before -- that he express support for and for the certification process. i like to hear from each one of you, your comments relative to the value of an independent international acted -- initiative like the swiss initiative, or whether you have an issue with that question. and and credibility for everyone. mr. balderas, can you go first and we will work our way right to left? >> how would be glad to start this off. i feel that since i became ceo of triple cannot be an april

2004, one of the first things that we did was draw up and create our own code of conduct. we use that as a baseline for other companies that agree on and look for standard contract. we as a company have been pushing for a third-party certification, and is sad that we do not have that already. but i came in 2004 asking for guudance and try and find regulation for this industry, i wish that we had done this in 2004. i cannot support third-party -- third-party certification in now. we have been a leader in this effort -- i cannot support third-party certification enough. there many foreign companies out there working as well. again, looking recently, it was a look at a third-party certification, international code of conduct, which would

hold everyone accountable for their actions. i could not agree more and supported more. >> thank you. miss rogers? >> as the commission knows, aegis has been very proactive on this issue. we have met with the senate and house and the relative staff. we're looking at all in the stems and pursuing a higher code of conduct. and a third-party certification process -- process, and we have been for some time. we're not only working with the swiss initiative, which you mentioned is the international effort, but we're also working to set up a new american security and we're and end -- involved in the study on contractors and conflict. we view any opportunity and work with all parties discussing this, because we of the reform does take place. whichever one has the most momentum, we hope that we are

involved in it. i am adding accountability mechanisms. i think that they're critical. operating in a conflict environment, we do require high, stringent oversight. i think for additional regulations, a code of conduct which with mr. balderas, one thing that we did when aegis was founded was created code of conduct. i hope to take a -- help the commission in this effort. >> mr. ryder? >> as you heard me say before this commission will hold the highest standard and condos within our organization. we already have a code of conduct. our employees are trained to that code of conduct. and we've always said and continue to say we support third-party oversights and standards, and standards for the

work that we do. you've heard me probably say in my opening comments the other times when we talk about performance, compliance, and conduct. we feel very strongly about that. we think we have the ethics that we currently executed day, and local word to the standards on an international level for third party standard that we then can look to. >> i am looking for quick answer hear from anyone. you believe that clear standards -- do you believe that clear standards will reduce the marketplace from businesses that may have difficulty with the standards? or they should not belong in the height of file -- high-profile business? is some of the delay in the standard because some not wanting standard? mr. ryder? >> i cannot say whether those

that do this type of work are resisting because of standard. from the dyncorp perspective, i think that's what sets us apart from other companies, the ethics that we currently have. >> miss rogers? >> 3 men's guns in a hostile environment are not helpful to anybody. i think a higher level of standard would minimize that. companies that are well structured, that operate with integrity, transparency, and oversight would definitely help the situation and minimize these incidents. >> mr. balderas? >> sir, standards within the industry are a barrier to entry. we have to set a minimum level of standards and then raise them

to a bar that we all agree upon. and then we should exceed that bar. as far as a company not being able to meet that, it should not be in this business and that includes my business. set the bar and we will make it. >> we spent a fair amount time discussing the role past performance and what was referred to as a rush to the bottom. i think i am right, dyncorp is the most heavily the -- heavily involved in the state department. >> insecurity work right now, we do not have a contract with dod. we're just finishing a contract, but that it ends. didn't you are presently state. aegis does dod work? >> primarily. >> and trouble can be, i know

you're heavy in-state. do you do quite a bit of dod work? >> to book cannot be is one of the few companies, if not the only, both what they are rack theater-wide contract and state contracts. >> what i like to get to, and i mentioned it earlier -- you call it a rush to the bottom. i don't know whether i never did from you or your nap it from someone else collectively. i took it from someone. it was not an original thought on my part. but we go from 1200 to 1000 to 800, and one of the company's that it was a $250 a month rate. and they make a case that they

are as good or better than everyone from those countries i mentioned to the united states military. my question is -- is that tte type of work that you should be bidding on, this rush to the bottom and maybe find another country? what you think about this lowest price technically acceptable? >> how will go ahead and start. as you've heard myself and ceo before you talk to this commission, we at dyncorp think that it has to be best value. you should not be going to the lowest price. you tend to get what you pay for. we are best value, and that is how we view it. >> that is what you primarily been on for those reasons? >> we did best value. we may not get the lowest price but we did best value.

-- we did the best value. >> we view security conflict, cutting corners, and the rest of the bottom, corners have to be cut. and that is not good for anybody. we view best value contracts and best value of words as providing the government with the best services. that is the way the government should look at it. >> in the race to the bottom, what we do as a company we take a look at safety versus cost. it is below, it's not safe for the client and our workers. we do not bid. they're not enough requirements for standards to ensure that the level of performance meets the contract. when i say that, i speak from defense and state experience.

we have to provide all the management plans for all subcontractors. based on that, we have a staffing requirement to present to them. they approve the country and the contract and standards. once that is done in the gives approval, we can work the host nation. that is how we check our workers and train our workers with the public trust security background check, not only foreign nationals. as far as defense, they do not do that. we can source the nation, then that company can recruit from that. all that is done in-country. there two traditional ways to do this. i am not saying one is better than the other, but to be able to pre qualify a country that you are working on make sense to me. we want to make sure that we of

the right personnel and that we have them from a country that the government approves from. >> thank you. my time is up. i'll try to make up for this in the next bit of time, but i'm having difficulty making up for. commissioner green? >> third-party certification -- would you advocate mandatory standards are voluntary standards? >> how was a mandatory. >> mandatory. >> absolutely mandatory. >> thank you. miss rogers, you talked a lot about standards. what happened and cobble -- in kabul?

>> i believe that management might not have been aware of what was cool it on. i believe there might have been loose standards. from our experience, with our management controls and oversight that we put in place, that would not have happened. >> ok. you mentioned in your opening statement the advantage of low profile that is often associated with private security contractors. how would you respond to the often repeated statement that in iraq and afghanistan, the populist does not differentiate between private security contractors and military? they are american. i don't care what kind of a suit

you are wearing, they are americans. how the rationalize and respond to that question marjorie we do not operate and move about in a high-profile military escort. when i say low-profile, i mean we provide security and we have different uniforms, we plan then when we are on duty. we do have weapons, but we work very carefully to make certain that we work with the local culture and that we're careful in how we drive and operate an with u.s. signs on our car. where spent several years honing our experience and expertise to make sure that we of integrated with the local culture, that we are aware of the cultural environment, and our profile is just as such. >> maybe it is an education of the local populace that you are in fact different because that

is not how it is generally been reported -- not your agents specifically, but private security contractors. and you all work for different folks. mr. balderas, if you do both. who does at usaid work? >> we have done previous usaid work. >> how you get guidance from the u.s. government or the appropriate department and agency regarding psc operations? mr. ryder? >> what did they tell you to do, if anything? >> when we have been on the contrary, there is a statement of work and then at tactics, techniques, and procedures were outlined very specifically with wpps work. those standards and those

procedures are very clear for diplomatic security standards on how you train, how you operate, the vehicle's use, the weapons used, the communication system that you use. that guidance is very clear from the department of state and the diplomatic security side. from the same side, because i do have a detective service requirements in my civpol contract, we use wpps-like standards, and the only difference is that we haven't taken all those protective service individuals back to the united states to train. we train them in-country. as we replace them, they go back to training here in the united states, which is wpps- certified, and you have certified instructors and the certified training environment that you do, but their tactics, techniques, and procedures on how we conduct procedures which

come from the state department. >> the clear guidelines are in a statement of work, as you well know. in addition, it is imperative to have close cooperation with clients which would go to another reformer would recommend. from our experience, it would be helpful to see the contract in officers in the same theater as the contract that they are managing. we think that would be very helpful and actually the both -- the who -- behoove the contracting process. >> what is the difference in standards -- and you touched on it earlier -- what are the differences in the standards between the state department and the defense department in the guidance and the oversight

particularly that you received? >> it is pretty much been document. -- it has pretty much been documented. their officers that ride with the individuals on the contrary. the difference between that and the department of defense, they do not have that same level of oversight. we work directly for the military. but having actual people with those of the department of defense is different. >> i ask that question to the earlier panel. would you support that similar system that state is using, and having the government employee, whether a uniformed person or a civilian, in the movement? >> i believe in what you're

saying. one of the things that to the extent as far as additional cameras and having more personnel on oversight, i would agree with that. >> ok, last question in my time will be of. any of you -- what are the biggest challenges to your operations once dod leaves at the end of 2011? mr. ryder? >> has a look at the transition -- because i do not know all the requirements, that is a challenge because i do not know all the requirements. in the first panel there was a discussion of doing certain missions. we talked about the medical evaluation. we could talk about providing combat security. it may not be enough. until i know who is going to

have the requirement and do that mission, i see those challenges. i don't think that they are challenges that cannot be overcome. there contractors that can perform some of those missions. because i don't know all the requirements that will be out there -- >> of are there any missions that you note to david dod is performing that you do not believe a contractor could perform? i am not talking about a two- year or three-year run up to get the capability. but calling in on that mission in the year, are there any the contractor could not perform? >> not knowing the breadth and depth of the contractors out there and their capabiliiies, but those that are attracting indirect fire coming in, can they perform that? i would think that there are

systems and technology that someone could do that. that is the one that comes to mind. >> miss rogers was a marketing i don't think contractors should be performing offensive operation. but as the military leaves, the drawdown, i would echo mr. ryder. the greatest challenge to the lack of communications -- is the lack of communication and potential act of communication -- coordination. going back when information is being passed to the contractors operating within the iraqi theater, that is a best practice identified by the inspector as well as the government accountability office. i think that lack of coordination and visibility of the contractors, even during the drawdown, will be a challenge. >> mr. balderas?

>> not knowing all the requirements, the coronation right now to study if we can do those requirements, one of the things is the background checks. the security clearance we have to me for every worker, in order to get ahead of that and get prepared, that that be a challenge. we want to get in front of it to begin the process because it is a very long and challenging process to meet those requirements today. >> thank you. time is lower. >> thank you, commissioner. mr. tiefer, please. >> you answer this with your full-length statement. so i want to get one word. you said you were in favor of a third-party certification. the word i'm looking for is independent. when the department of defense but its report about the issue of a third-party certification

under the subject of, he can merely be the third party creates the standard, and simply flip it into the next which. the the issue is the defense department supports independence means -- independent means to verify and monitor, external validation, and oversight body that is independent. let's put it more bluntly. should the trade organization not be involved with the verification? >> yes. >> yes. >> yes. >> i commend you for going way above the previous panel.

mr. ryder of dyncorp. we just heard from the previous panel about the fact that a contract has been awarded to blackwater, even though as the defense department says, will live under the spillover of the blackwater operation. i know that you're one of the bidders on that. blackwater? >> commissioner, i cannot

answer live blackwater was selected. i can tell you that i know the proposal that we in in in my view, the proposal that when end, the technical portion of the proposal was a new technical proposal. i can tell you also that we feel and i feel today that we could not meet the timeline of getting folks on that contract in the 60 days that were required. and one more -- >> i am running short of my time but i do want to comment that i saw you and you gave excellent testimony at the december 20 hearing on the police training contract. the gao agreed with you. it looks to me that it was being set up for blackwater, again, because the have existing

facilities and country. having been kicked out of iraq by the iraqis, blackwater is creating a new empire for itself based on the fact that it has existing facilities in afghanistan. >> if i could give you another minute, can i expand the discussion with mr. ryder? talk a little bit about it, mr. ryder, about the challenges you would have to have met the 60 days and the kind of action she would have taken so that you could have met the 60 days. >> i think we were prepared -- as we put the proposal together, we understood that timeline. we understood the requirement for living conditions and mission supportt we have worked our way through that. we provided an additional solution to the government of how to do instead of building dams, not knowing the way that

they would have the contracts, so i think that we were there. as the commissioner knows, there are always challenges in standing up a contract and getting the required number of anyone that does you there are not such challenges is being less than honest. but we were prepared -- we understood the requirements and we were prepared to do that. and i might add, that dyncorp international, and i could be off by a few numbers, maybe the largest contractor in iraq today. >> and you're the third piece of this group. could triple canopy have met that? >> it would of been a challenge for any company based on factors. but we looked at it. and where we look at safety, we also look at our aaility to execute.

we cannot confuse enthusiasm for capability. we do not bid and less we think that we can perform -- unless we think we can perform. it would've been a challenge for any company. >> chairman, if i may. i apologize. we currently have on the ground dyncorp employees, we have folks on the ground that understand those locations. >> thank you. >> mr. balderas how was reading a book by pulitzer prize when mr. -- winner called "big boy roleules." it covers a technical point that we did this morning. "triple canapes said its only obligation in the incident to

report was to report the incident to its contract holder, qdr, which was supposed to report to its contract holder, the construction co., which was supposed to report to this contractor, the u.s. military." that makes you at least four- tier, the way that you're counting. i am not at all challenging you, but from my reading, and i think that the difficulties to understand the testimony this morning, it may be the duty of a subcontractor is to report to its prime, and to the primes prime, and then dod. if you want argue for that or not, what -- what do you think would be a better system is some direct relationship was

established? >> thank you for that question. i appreciate that very much. anyone in the security business, either a subcontractor or primal, should have a clearer chain of reporting incidents. if i could speak to the earlier statement you made about the issue of this incident were talking about, triple can update did find out about the incident. we solve reported that to the area command, the military. >> i was interested in that. from what i read, and this is about the issue of. then-employee, you fired him later on, who said, "i want to kill somebody de." and then he went out and had several incidents with the iraqis for project manager filed a seven-page report, but it was

given to the government and the weight that did not show the government that there had been shot fired. he did not show the depth of the incident. i can read to you from the washington post article filed at the time that the government guide, former director for the green zone, said that triple canopy officials mentioned to him and his office but did not specify the allegations -- approached him in his office but did not talk to the allegations. that is the "washington post" allocation. they mentioned they had a couple of guidance and things that were questionable on the road and i was pretty much it. would you be willing to supply the commission with all your documentation about this

particular incident, apart from the piles of court room stuff about the that nation? >> let me check that. we may afforded the report to the commission to the commission already. >> but that does not cover what you say to the government. that discovers the report of the incident. no evidence was found by the reporter that you forwarded the report mentioning remarks is what was said, not that you handed the report when making this conversation. >> when we found out about the incident a few days later, we self reported. we were told. >> it's not just the the director. there were many different places and can you give documentation about who was given to?

did it again, all the things you point out shows the confusion there and we did self report. >> i think it shows more than the confusion. >> i would be happy to for that to you. >> if i can ask aegis a question, your personnel currently operates in iraq. >> we support that effort. >> you also used to have a senior position which we considered tantamount to running the group and afghanistan until you left it, whether you're taurus or theirs. and i'm told by the state department officials testifying before us this morning, the what you transition to the state department, that will have been under direct fire employees.

why do you think these coordinating bodies can and should be under pscs and not with the state department under u.s. government to retires? >> i think that ms. lamb and nine would be on the same. we support the contract operations center in iraq. report directly to the j-three. we sit side-by-side with them and we're in bed with them at the operation command center. the intent as you well know for the contractor operations center is to coordinate, collect information to coordinate and collate the incident reports that are required now of all contractors, which is a very good thing. for us to support it, we bring the expertise from private security companies, and i think that is critical. we have been there, and i quote

from one of our supervisors, the support that aegis has provided has given not only expertise on private security contractors, standard operating procedures, but also allow their staff to focus on investigating the incidents. >> my time is expired. and like it. commissioners henke. >> we had an issue about inherently government or not. it was very interesting because we found that there were really few lines and considerable disagreements on the implication on what sounds like a cut and dried term. are you familiar with the new: b policy letter definitions of inherently governmental or

mission critical? but the record indicate yes. >> i am not. >> you are not. i want to ask each of you, mr. ryder, you're familiar with that concept in the application of it. are you familiar with the current rules? >> yes, sir. >> the court rules that. all the taken example of security -- moving security. -- i want to take the example of moving security. it means convoys security and anything other than securing a fixed post. in an active wartime situation, you can have endless discussions about whether its constituency or non-permissive for counterinsurgency, civil war,

but in an active battle space, if you have moving security. very briefly, just a quick yes or no, providing that function in that scenario, is it inherently governmental? mr. ryder? >> in that scenario that you just described, i don't think that function is inherently governmental. >> no. >> no. >> the same scenario, but now the function is closely associated with inherently governmental, the the own -- providing that service, is that closely associated with inherently governmental? mr. ryder? >> commissioner, we struggle and everyone has with the definitions of inherently

governmental, and we continue to struggle with it. my answer to your question is i do not think so. >> that's fair. >> in node. >> no. >> a final quick question. has that function been critical -- mission critical or to the agency's operation, is it critical? >> yes, i think it is. >> yes. >> yes. >> if this critical and critical has the most latitude for discerning judgment, and it is difficult to apply a standard term to a range of scenarios, if there are as critical functions and there's a lot of latitude to determining what a critical function is, and it can change over time -- we found ourselves in a situation in 2004 different

in late 2006 in iraq. the situation had degraded. my question to you, if that is a critical function, how do you determine where the bright line sark? to determine whether it should be provided by the government or eligible to be contracted out. >> commissioner, i think that is a policy decision. i think the policy makers struggle with that decision. if you are asking my personal opinion has a provider of services in a large corporation. >> how would you think that decision should be made? how does someone exercise on the government side discretion for determining what is closely -- mission critical? >> you just they did it, sir. i think it's a decision based on the government side, it was critical and they needed a

capability to be performed and they came to it by the security company to provide the capability, and i think we provide it very well. >> that does not tell me much, sir. what are the criteria used to make that decision for sure if it is critical, you can either in source in or out source it for you have less ability. or the criteria? >> you are asking me to make a policy decision. >> of policy decision would be a three-tiered system of inherently government, closely associated, and critical. how does the executive branch make that determination? >> i could not say. >> everything else can be or is eligible for the contract. i am not asking you to make apologetic decision, but apply a policy determination to a specific circumstance. how do you do that? >> i do not do that. the government does that. >> how would the government do

that? >> i am not a government official. >> you were, right? your military officer for 30 years. >> now you're asking me to go back five years since i retired. >> i'm hearing it did not want answer the question. >> i would love to be able to answer that question except i do not make those decisions even after the policy decisions have been made, and then there is a decision that we can contract the service out. i am the recipient of the statement of the work and the recipient of the proposal that we've been put in to provide those services. >> miss rogers? >> flexibility needs to be given to the government to be identified as critical.

this is why quite frankly we believe that there should be an pffice of contingency operation contract in. contractors need to be accountable as well as the contracting officers. it is not -- if that is not offensive and the government deems it critical, the contractors will then with their specialized skills respond to a statement of work. i think if the government is giving the flexibility and identified it is critical, and if we have the appropriate oversight, i think that will suffice going forward. >> whether it is in a fiction action to a contract this task, it should not be contacted. >> correct. >> any of you in close proximity of front-line, where there insurgents to change uniforms?

justi>> iraq and afghanistan ary different. you have reconstruction stabilization operations happening. the current military force has the military to force. >> the current military force because of the size, because we made mr. wright -- mr. writer's point, a policy decision. that is what we're going to want. and maybe the foreign-policy is larger than that. so we are where we are is what you're saying. >> yes, sir. >> mr. balderas, how would you make the decision, if you determine a critical function, you're sitting there was something to do, how do you decide whether the contract it or not? >> i would have to agree with the position of offensive versus defense. we tried to avoid to evacuate in the incident.

>> your bright line would be what. >> offensive action. moving from point a to point b is not an offensive action. but where you had to evacuate, if you can avoid it, we train people to leave not a fire weapons at people. the first thing to do is get out of there. as a defensive reaction. >> my time is expired. >> thank you, commissioner henke. commissioner sock time -- za khaim. >> i think one could say that you would argue offensive is inherently governmental. what about that level in between critical an inherently governmental -- closely

aasociated? you've told me that offensive is inherently governmental. why isn't the kind of thing my colleague just talk about, or stone, a friend area, moving -- why is it that closely associated? you have not explained to me at least what you would not call these activities closely associated. he explained very well why it is not inherently governmental. just go down the road here. why isn't that closely associated? >> my position on this is the decision has been made. what we're talking about is whether it is inherently governmental or not, a decision is made. we have been asked to provide a capability and we provide the capability.

>> you say you're downstream of the decision. >> and we execute. >> that is fine. i do not question that. but you people are professionals. you are experts. and you very flatly said that this is not inherently governmental. obviously, you have an opinion, because you are experts. so i am asking you as an expert , why is this not closely associated? you explain why it is not inherently government. you're an expert and i can understand that. as an expert, as three experts, as people to do the job quite well according to the government, why is this not closely associated? >> are we still may, sir? >> yes, sir, and i will move on down the road. >> i'm not understand your question. i do not think it is closely associ.