tell me why. >> because we have been asked to provide a capability and the mission and we do that. >> what is the association? where's the next up with the associated? >> there is no longer bright line. we are asked to provide a capability, provide a function and a mission, and we do it. >> i would say, my opinion here, i think it has to do with exercise of sovereign power in a foreign nation. and the circumstances under which you're there. i think the bright line between a peacetime environment, providing embassy security in peru for tokyo or wherever, and providing embassies' security in a combat zone, offensive and defensive, that is where i would

pull back to be peacetime places and wartime places. let's not worry about what province is what in iraq and whether 2003 versus 2007. but say it is wartime places and peacetime places. >> i want to put it this way. if we is the commission were to recommend that this kind of activity, where are you moving, not where you're standing stock still, in a high threat area was a closely associated activity, how would you react to that? would you say, you're wrong, commission? or would you say, that is cool. let me put that question to each of you. it is a better question than mine. >> my response would be the same as it was in my opening oral

statement. i said that there would be a policy decision, and if a contractor is going to move forward with that policy decision, then we stand ready to do that. you said you would be good with it. ms. rogers. >> which is why clarity is so important in this issue. we will abide by what the government decides. >> good. mr. balderas. >> absolutely. >> excellent. none did you contract directly with usaid because they do not contract directly. do any of you contract with the emblem mentors? >> we do not. >> we have one contract for security risk assessment. >> commissioner, a few months ago, we bought a company that does work as a subcontractor for one of the implement ares for usaid in afghanistan.

>> this was a security company. >> yes, sir. >> you worked indirectly for usaid. how do you feel about that? you think it makes more sense to work directly for a ided -- for usaid? >> of wanted to take a look at that situation and one of the things that i saw there was the implement your -- implementer. it would be nice to have a direct line, because they need subcontractors, anyone that has a weapon,. >> by now you do not have a sense that you have a direct line to usaid at all. >> it sounds to me let you are

not thrilled about that. >> thank you very much. miss rogers, you're not in that way and bald, but in your professional opinion, does it make sense and isn't the best set -- is it the best thing that you could be working for the implementer and usaid at arm's length? >> the government needs to have better visibility, and we have two instances where we work with the contractor through a prime. but in that situation, it would be very helpful if we could actually have visibility and communication with the u.s. government. >> does dod provide anything like that right now for you? are you in the same situation, mr. balderas, were you do not have that line? >> on one of them, yes. on others, we work in close proximity.

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step beyond, they are very loyal, they are very dedicated and very professional. they are an outstanding security guard for us. >> and you are not comfortable with going with the lowest common denominator and hiring anyone from any country. >> correct. >> and you are the same? >> no, we don't. >> and you, mr. balderas. >> no. >> thank you mr. chairman. i want to start with the issue that we started talking about a second ago. and i want to ask one question, that was not asked of you, each of you gave what

sounds like convincing explanations why you bid on it. my question is that the legal option of protesting is available to you, do either country plan to do that? sir, we will have a debrief and why we were not selected. >> ok, but it's an option? >> yes, sir. >> mr. balderas. >> the same answer, we have not received the debriefing yet. >> to turn to your testimony, mr. ryder, and what you had on with mr. henke on this critical issue. i was struck in reading your testimony that you touted the witness model, embedding ds agents in moving convoys.

you liked the blended system of governmental professionals. and you went so far on page 9 to be supportive of having the notion of government personnel present at shift changes regarding static security is that right? >> i believe it should say shift changes, and not on a specific entry control point. but if you have government provision on a shift. you had a government person that was there that provided oversight. i am in favor of that. >> the main point is that you like the notion of government direct oversight of private security contractors. of being there. >> yes, we like the blended approaches, yes, sir. >> i believe that has appeal, if you take that notion to its

logical conclusion. that suggests to me that the government can -- it's this trust but verified notion. is the logical suggestion of that in an optimal world that we wouldn't have private security contractors and that they would be doing what they should be? >> i stated that transparency and oversight is paramount. we favor that. i would not make the leap of having oversight of a government employee with a contractor on a shift. that the next leap is that the government should do that function. but i do feel, it's not only important for the oversight but that you develop this contact

between the customer and contractor. that's important. if you have someone there for 24/7, it's a benefit. >> mrs. roger, what is your view of this blended concept, is that optimal? >> yes. >> mr. balderas. >> yes, we are doing that with the department of state. >> ok, let me ask you a few questions, mrs. rogers. in your statement you go to length to talk about corporate transparency and you quite rightly apologized at the beginning for not showing up in april. and i appreciated that. i was struck by you not showing up for the april hearing. because it was my understanding that beforehand that you had supported that support. i am glad that you are here today that you pledge in the future of some irreconcilable

issue. and it was my understanding that it wasn't an irreconcilable issue, that you were directed by your board of directors to not attend, is ta right? >> i will say that we pledge to be here. >> do you pledge in the future or have a deputy of the hearings that we hold? >> yes, to expound on that a bit. it was a perfect storm, i had just come off my honeymoon. that wasn't the perfect storm. >> come on, excuses, excuses. >> no, that was enjoyable and we had a board meeting thereafter. and we felt we were not able to adequately prepare. >> right, but in the future you will be here, you will send a

representative? >> yes, commissioner. >> you talked about the importance in your view of having local naturals. would you speak about the article in the "washington times," that in afghanistan that local nationals may be playing a double game. obviously i am concerned about that in iraq as well. what do you do to be sure that's not an issue? >> we share your concern. it's a thorough process. when we were first awarded the contract in '04, we deployed that the department of defense use local nationals. we pledged and vetted our vetting process with the department of defense. there weren't records at the

department of ministry at that point in time. we embarked and implemented a seven-step process. that now includes bio metric testing. and we ensure this before the nationals every 28 days. we have a good relationship with them. of the screening of the tribal leeders and past employment. we do face-to-face interview s andbio metrics. we haae just over 300 from the beginning. we have an 85% retention rate. very helpful. >> one other thing, one thing that you touted was your successful efforts at the company to negotiate a truce between the tribes. since the pipeline was moved and no longer attacked. obviously that's a good news

story, since the pipeline is not being attacked. but one could look at it a different way and it could be troubling and surprising to learn that private security contractors are engaging in that function. talking with tribes on behalf the united states government. what is your comment on that? >> the u.s. military, the corp of engineers that the time were not able to get in and meet with the tribes. they were too high profile. and we were requested by the department of engineers to go where they did not go. because they had a low profile. we didn't negotiate, we gathered the information and they moved the pipeline. >> thank you. if you will indulge me mr. chairman. there is that old expression, it's not bragging if it's true.

and obviously the converse of that is the case as well. in your statement you touted a number of things. you swept away a number of urban myths of private contractors and the notion that private security contractors are more expensive than the government. and you cited a geo study for that proposition. right? >> correct. >> and so i asked our staff over the weekend to look at that. what they reported back after talking to gae, it's not an apples to apples comparison. the report was to be a comparison of dod costs, and dod re -- refused to participate.

and saying that if we had to do it, we would use gs agents opposed to third country nationals. and the reason we don't want to hire third country nationals is because they are mercenary. yet you are hiring local nationals and charging the u.s. government to do it. my only point is that this is not apples-to-apples. you have a comment? >> it's a g.o. report and the department of state asks. >> but my point is that the u.s. government could hire the third party nationals and the local

nationals you hire. the state department does that, so the government could have done that without paying triple canopy. isn't that right? >> they could have hired anyone they want. again the mechanism itself. >> right, but if the government were to hire them directly as opposed to pay you. it would be cheaper for the government to hire; right? >> it depends on the nation itself, and whether they allow the government to hire local nationals. when we work with different nations there are different rules and laws. >> the nations we are talking about is iraq and afghanistan. aren't there iraqis hired by those two? >> that's correct. >> aren't there third country nationals in iraq and afghanistan?

>> i could not speak to that. >> you are not sure? >> no. >> do you know, mrs. rogers isn't it the case that the u.s. governments hires third party nationals? >> the government hires? >> the united states government. >> the brits and south africans are, so yes. >> mr. barneras. >> i don't have direct knowledge but it's my understanding. >> thank you. >> this has been an interesting friday for us and an interesting monday. and i thank all of you and i wish mr. torres is here. i understand he's got complaints about our opinions. he should have come directly. but you had the willingness to

answer our questions and that's how the system should work. and i thank you for being here. no -- i won't go there. and in continuum you have the u.s. government providing security. and it is not subtle. as you, mrs. rogers point out. contractors can have a much lower profile. and the people they bring in have a lower profile. that sometimes means they are safer and the indigenous folks don't have direct relationship. there is so much government to have private contractors. and you have the u.s. government come in and sometimes that logic to do it. and you have u.s. government come in this continuum manage the government. they manage it but don't oversee

it. but they are the ones in charge when a diplomat goes out. and you have private contractor with management. and the fourth is a private contractor is hired and paid by the united states and hires a security contractor. and we have practically no interaction at all. we have to work through the prime that strikes me simplistic in its implications. i was unclear when you talked about tte u.s. government participation with private

security and u.s. management. versus the u.s. government hiring a contractor and having oversight. when you described about the previous question, which were you talking about as being a good model. >> as i understood the question, my preference is to work straight for the department of defense and state, and not through another. >> so you weren't getting into this issue. mr. balderas, you looked at me as i might not have stated correctly. but my sense is that when i am with state department and i am taken around and the person in the shot-gun on seat is a state department employee who is in charge of and directs the contractors who are his or her manpower pool. is that correct? >> yes, commissioner that is correct. >> do you believe that system works well? >> i do believe that it works

well. >> were you suggesting that, that works better than having the contractor on the own versus the indirect over sight? >> it's possible, i would like to see more direct oversight. >> ok. in that way does it shield you from liabilities and criticisms? or more of a comfortable level? >> it doesn't shield anyone. but having government oversight would prevent any kind of incident. >> mrs. rogers, would you weigh in on that model? >> i can't comment on the state department because we have dod contracts. >> but they don't manage and direct your operations. >> correct, we have transcenders on the vehicles and when they

are on, there is visibility in the operation center. >> but no sense of an opinion? >> that has worked well for us. >> mr. ryder. >> we are very in favor of this blended approach that we talked about with the state department official. >> yeah, you used the word blended. and that's why i wanted. >> yes, sir, very in favor of that. >> what keeps you up at night in terms of a potential screw-up? is it more likely to have an incident in a static facility, a convoy or some personnel? what would be the one that you feel you have to make sure to have the best and brightest? let's assume that everyone is good working for your organization. but some are better than others. would they need to be in the personnel side of the equation?

or the guarding of the base equation? or convoy side of the equation? why not with you, mr. ryder. >> i apologize. what keeps me up every night is having to go to calhoun, georgia and speak to a wife and children that lost their dad. >> i understand that. but let me say for the record, even when blackwater was taking wear oo me and other diplomats. they lost 30 people, and they didn't lose any of the people they were in charge of. so that has to be part of the record. wherever they screwed up, or some of their people didd let's take that off the chart. now answer the question. >> i just drove to that because you asked what keeps me up at night. >> ok. >> when you talk about the

inherent danger of more danger on static or the road? i don't think you can make the qualifier. the instant that i gave you was in a static facility and three bombers came in the facility and we lost someone. >> bear with me. i am asking where is a possibility for your people to screw-up. that's the answer. this is not a trick question. i don't have a sense how i come down with this. i am asking you because you deal with it. i cannot believe if i was in charge of a company that i wouldn't be concerned about some more than others. that's what i asking. >> details are more common than static security. >> that's the question i was asking. >> commissioner, i think you can

answer his question. but you can also in my way of thinking, what is the highest risk where something can go wrong and you are the most vulnerable for a mistake. that's really to me. what situation can happen, you stay sitting up at night worrying about either because you don't have enough staff or the right people. it's one of those things where high-risk can occur. >> my answer remains the same, i think it's the high-risk of moving in protected detail than static security site. >> i have to take a different attack, i would have to say that our operations of that screen and higher. right at the beginning where we are at the biggest risk. we need to make certain that we hire and vet the individuals

that are possible. and to have what is available on the individuals. >> that's another element to it. i was asking in terms of those three operations. and mr. ryder was asking the question i asked. you are telling me something that is valuable but now tell me. >> personal security detail. >> mr. balderas. >> with over 30 years in a lot of bad places, one of the most dangerous things you can do is operate a moving vehicle in these countries. bad roads and bad weather and have nationals on the road that are not familiar with operating a vehicle. but this carries security and risk. and traffic accidents, unfortunately people lose their lives. >> and i will assume that the other two, like mrs. rogers said, vetting is a high

important element. >> i would agree. >> sir, i added another step, trying to screen the personnel. hiring the wrong person, everyone in the country carries a reputation with them. >> thank you. >> ok, i will bite, what is that step? >> looking at it. we have five different steps. of course we meet contract. but we have a company called converty, that has a step for the managers to identify the right person that we will promote. again that was another issue that we took on. again no system is 100%. i look at other systems that hire people like at nasa. it's just as important to

prevent an incident just as much as we do to protect the principle. no system is 100%. >> thank you. we need your help on something that won't initially sound like asking for help. but i think it's very important in the direction we are going. and that is we could have thought of putting up these plaquers that we sometimes put up. we need big ones, with your companies and d.c.status reviews. which are acceptable and property and contractor procurement system review. and then the marriott of dcaa system review. and then the status which is very important of incurred cost submissions and the government looking at your cost.

because contract cost and growth is a big deal. but rather than do that, i would ask you to take back and talk to your contract staff. and there is an opportunity for us to learn and maybe get in a dialogue later on and for you to provide inputs. because there is some big debate, raging debate about industry and the security policy people laid out a change in the regulation proposed that there be more timely significant penalties for companies that don't have systems that are effective in the government's eyes. and don't have plans that are effective in the government's . .

there's a difference between companies doing business in the united states and doing international business contingencies, because there are different challenges. i would like your comments on that. many of the comments come from the companies that we all know and are very familiar with, like a lockheed, boeing, general dynamics -- those companies who

have long been in business. not have perfect internal control systems, but they have documentation from many years of working with the government in a constant and our men. they carried a flag for all of industry. my question is, how should the flag be carried for companies like your own that operate in the environment that we're talking about here? if you could do that and then provide that to the commission -- that is not one of the 48- hour challenges. if you feel like -- we have a constant dialogue going. we'll have another hearing with the defense contract management agency. we'll have industry into that. we'll have specific companies and not just associations. where are you have in those processes? is there a middle ground? no oversight is good oversight -- not a thing is not something

i have heard it all. we will try to articulate for you for that. the second item i have -- i just want to ask -- i will start with mr. balderos. i may talk to the other two of you based on what we run into. when we were at prosperity, where you have worked, we were told by a c.o.r. -- and we have done some ball up in this case. the company -- some followup in this case. the company -- they said they were uncomfortable with the completeness of the armed contractor oversight documentation. he asked for follow-up and found

documentation of gaps for 17 iraqi nationals and some third- country nationals as well. there had been posted to static guard positions that were probably not authorized -- they had been posted to static guard positions that were probably not authorized. this was through a number of records. subsequently, the triple cannot be advised -- i work with those from people in all cases -- that the company -- at 11 guards were posted arms positions -- arm positions, six unarmed, and that they were confused by instructions by dcma, and they believed they had followed required procedures, regardless of whether the people were approved. that was a statement. -- the statement. can you tell me about what happened and what your take away is on that?

obviously, posting an iraqi nationals -- charming them and posting them to protect american lives and troops -- arming them and posting them to protect american lives and troops -- this is not a good outcome. >> there is now a new event. we are sorting through the proper process in order to that the individual and country. -- individual in country. we're tasked with these individuals who can stand post. we do background checks. we provide that to the c.o.r. you are working for someone on the ground that may not have a lot of experience. rwarde working with a fo contract agency and an oversight entity after the fact. we have provided that information to the c.o.r. on- site. it is up to them to submit the

package and get the authority. we provide that information to the c.o.r., who then decides to go and authorize and arm. we went in and responded to that. we had 11 people stand post. process was taking longer than it should. this is a new process. they said we could not do that unless we had a fire in -- had a final authority. we were notified and of the weapons away from those individuals. the other six were never armed and were standing pose without weapons. after trying to work with them and to be compliant with the oversight ruling, i have directed -- we sometimes get told that we are difficult or confrontational. when we look of the contract, i tell my personnel that we will

not do this unless we have all of the paper and written permissions in place before we react. again, we tried to respond and work with the government. the oversight said that was incorrect, so we corrected it immediately. >> ok. i know that i have given you a bit of a heads up -- heads-up. you had this instance that does not relate to security, but it involved advancement between employees and your staff. my understanding and my question is going to be -- how are we going to keep this from happening again? when you found out, you immediately fired those employees. we were told by the commander that he immediately sent home the three women that were involved in the partying -- the government-employee types. my note here says that you ask

for your military police -- dod military police to pay particular notice and to do it surprise searches of vehicles -- your vehicles, so there would be no question about independence. they turned up a couple cases of beer. zero tolerance. those employees were later fired. you may say it is a challenge, but it is an unacceptable situation. how does your company assure that these situations do not happen? >> it is unacceptable. i'm aware of that situation. it was lasttjuly. it was an off-duty bar with the u.s. -- party with u.s. and ours. we did fire them immediately. we did ask the military police to conduct spot checks of some of our security as cortines and personnel.

we did it because we wanted to send a message throughout our employees. we have a zero tolerance policy. when we hire individuals, they are made aware of that. they signed a statement that they are aware that if they are caught drinking or using drugs or any unethical or criminal behavior, they will be fired immediately. got my time is up. -- >> my time is up. >> one question. ms. rodgers, have you had any discussions with the state of current about continuation of this or the future of it? >> yes. >> the results are? >> the original conversations were just and briefings. how do they work? how can they work when the state department takes them over? do you think they can be improved? which then went on in a little

bit more detail. the stock because we were bidding on a state department contract -- they were stopped because we were bidding on a state department contract. >> you do not know how long it will extend? >> i do not know. they expressed a desire to continue operating them, based on a third-party saying it was the best practice. >> just one quick general question. what are the implications if the government took over the functions that you are currently performing? >> commissioner, what i would say is it is purely a resource implication to the government. can they recruit, train, and deploy the number of individuals that we have performing these functions in a timely manner to be able to take up the mission? it is a resource issue on the part of the government.

>> the government has identified gaps that require specialized security skills and specialized skills. we can rapidly mobilize and give that to the government in a finite time line. i think it would be a resource implications. >> the same is true. if we get the requirement, we can fill it. >> thank you. that is all i have. >> thank you, commissioner. >> i appreciate and do not in any way want to undermine the useful distinction that was made between mobile and static operations. within that, not challenging it, within that are the distinctions between static operations in places like mozul or kandahar where there are highly lethal incidents and between urban, civilian presence?

are there some more complicated operations? are there some that are less complicated? >> i would not qualify that a static -- that the static security is less or more complicated. the difference in kandahar is the threat in that location. it is not the complexity. >> i am with you. >> up the same answer. the situation depends on the threat. >> thank you. sorry. >> he is not used to short answers given the previous panel. you got him by surprise. -- caught him by surprise. >> one section of the statute would amend a 62 -- 862 says

that accounting regulations, which impose a number of control features on security contract in, including the required incident reporting, raises them to the statute and regulations level. does not intend to put new ones in. -- it does not intend to put new ones in. when there is a failure of a contractor or subcontractor to comply, it takes and past performance, responsibility, suspension, and disbarment. make sure that the normal contract compliance requirements are in place. do you support that? >> yes, sir. >> yes. >> actually, i was in a meeting with senate staffers asking for support for this.

>> that is support. that sounds like support to me. these short answers are getting to me, mr. chairman. we have faced the question -- this is from both dyncorp and triple canopy. in 2008, there was a recommendation that the state department consider whether it was in the best interest of united states to retain the black water -- retain blackwater. the state department did not publicly and to that question in 2008 or create any written answer to that question. -- did not publicly answered that question in 2008 or create any written answer to that question. the iraqis kick them out in january, does a 9, and replace them.

could you -- in january, 2009, and replace tem. -- them. could you have replaced them? >> we could have. >> we did replace them in 2009. >> do you think us up like that would have facilitated our relations with the iraqis -- a step like that would have facilitated our relations with the iraqis? and i cannot answer, but i can speculate -- >> i cannot answer on behalf of the iraqis, but i can speculate that it might have been able to. >> i cannot speak for the iraqi government. >> miss rogers, as much as i recognize you had many things going on in your life, there were questions that i had time to come up with, because you did not testify the first time.

one is that an account which recently appeared in the huffington post called aegis's charm offensive -- are you familiar with that? and adjust the title -- >> just the title. >> it says a corrective action request was considered re garding aegis. do you have knowledge of that? some of the individual -- >> the individual was a u.s. military individual who was part -- who was actually disgruntled, if i may say so. i think it was referring to that. the quote was -- itw as african -- it was at the convenience of the government and had nothing to do with our performance. >> what did it require?

>> it said we would terminate the support contract at the convenience of the government last june. >> can you provide the commission with full documentation about what led up to that notice? >> yes, i believe i have, but i can do so again. >> finally, i have one minute. how generous. there is been a number of -- the head of the aegis group in england and the co-founder of triple canopy. >> i do not think he is the co- founder of triple ghannouchi. -- canopy. >> he has nothing to do with triple canopy. >> aegis groupl -- group. >> is the still head of the

group in london? >> he is. >> he has been characterized in testimony before this commission and the press as a mercenary -- not the often hostile term used in afghanistan and iraq about personal security contractors, but in the technical sense. when -- before founding your company. are you familiar -- i can remember some instances -- there was a title, "iraq's mercenary king." in testimony on friday, one of the professors noted that in -- i think it was dr. stinanger -- she had noted that he was a highly controversial mercenary. are you familiar with the mentions that the head of the

aegis group is a mercenary? >> i am familiar with the accusations in the press. you know as well as we do that it is very easy to sensationalize this business. >> could i ask you a pointed question? did he fight for money, not for his country? >> no, he was requested. it has nothing to do with aegis. he was requested on behalf of the government. >> he only worked for the british government? and that it was a different government -- western-allied government. >> did the work for money, not for his own country? -- did he work for money, not for his own government? >> no. >> what am i wrong on? and he did work for -- >> he did

work for governments that were allied with the west and at the request of them. >> i'm way over my time. >> we will give you a chance to wrap up when we are done. you may have a thought on that. >> i have two quick questions. first concern -- third-party certification. you're in favor of establishing standards for the industry. obviously you have testified to that. you're in favor of reviewing your companies and certifying them to perform security functions. if the third party circuit fired he makes a determination -- if the third-party certifier makes a determination that would require the termination of a contractor on or prevent you from future work, would you still favor that idea? if they could get you terminated or banned from future work, do you still support that? >> the terms and conditions and

the roles -- how they will be set up -- as we have said before, we favor a third-party oversight in standards. we favor a third-party oversight. but even -- >> even -- >> yes. >> ok. >> yes. quite frankly, if some contracts were terminated now, that would send a clear message across the industry. exactly. >> yes, i agree. >> second question is on -- you are familiar with -- you have cited this in your testimony. it is the center for new american security which issued a report a couple of weeks ago. has your company provided any funding or resources to cnas? >> i do not know. i will take it for the record. >> we have been supporters of

cnas through participation. i can check for the record. >> are you aware? financial support, resources, money. >> we contributed to any event a while ago. i can go back and double check anything else for the record. no, we have not. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, bob. >> you went to great lengths to talk about the betting you do of local nationals -- vetting you do of local nationals. what about third-country nationals? >> the only ones that we employ are gurkhas.

the parent company has a relationship with gurkhas that have previously worked for the british military. they have their own stringent vetting process. >> are you familiar with the process? >> we modeled are processed after that process. -- our process after that process. >> they are vetted through the state department. h a number ofg and background checks including credit checks. once those are done, they go to our security department division which assist them in filling out the form that is sent to the state department. i think it is the moderate risk public trust -- that is what they get when they come out of diplomatic security. that is the process we have four

third-country nationals. >> we use the state department's standard. as i said before, the department of state does a good job looking at the countries that we use as a third-country nationals to hire people in those countries. we also look at screening countries that would not allow workers or citizens to work in iraq -- countries such as nepal and the philippines. those citizens go under the country's laws and were told not to work in iraq, because the countries did not favor the war. we did not hire those individuals. i could not tell you what the current laws are. back then, we made the decision not to hire those types of personnel. >> i have a question for you. our staff was told by your staff in iraq that third-country nationals may actually sacrifice quality. do you think so?

this is what your staff told our staff. >> it is a sacrifice of quality relative to americans or local nationals -- you agree with your own staff? >> if we could, if we had the choice, we would hire more americans and put them to work. we have to fill the requirements stated in the contract. >> you do not really disagree with your staff. you're making the best of the situation? >> i would rather have an american. >> fair enough. when you lost out on these latest contracts, you were actually rated blue. >> no, sir. if i said that, i misspoke. when i review the proposal, --

reviewed the proposal, that was mine perception. >> that is pretty important. when that was issued -- you mentioned there was a lot of concern about transition. there is always a question where you can -- question period where you can ask the government to clarify. have you gone to the government to clarify issues about transition? you have testified that you were not entirely comfortable about everything. what questions do you ask? what responses have you received? >> more times than not, when this happens, we go back to the government to ask questions. i do not believe it was me that talked about the transition being a problem. once the department talked earlier, they said transition was a problem. -- when the state department talked earlier, they said transition was a problem. when you try to transition to a large work force in a short time, it is a challenge.

to get back to the question, we always go back for clarification either on something in the statement that is not clear to us. we will go back and ask. it is hard to say exactly what we ask questions on, but we tried to clarify them so that we can make the best proposals. >> are you satisfied with the clarity that you get when you submit the questions? >> by and large, yes. >> how about you, miss rogers? is state giving you the kinds of answers you need? >> we are not working with the state department right now. in terms of clarification, there needs to be further clarification. >> how do you feel about it? >> we work as best we can with the burden of state. >> you are a diplomat, are you not? >> i am trying hard to be diplomatic. we do have some challenges with

state. it let as ask additional questions when we need answers. >> do they give you answers? >> some of the proposals are time-sensitive. sometimes we do not have complete clarity on some of the questions. >> i think i caught your drift. thank you very much. >> i want to ask the same question in a more technical way. sometimes an award is made without discussion. sometimes an award -- the usual way is that after the proposal comes in, there are discussions. do you know whether on this $120 million contract there were discussions or there were not discussions? >> i do not believe there were discussions. i do not believe there were. >> no, sir, i do not. >> we can check on that for the record. >> mr. balderas.

you said that the relationship between the united states government and the contractor is a business relationship that shares a common objective. in must be a partnership with a portrait openness and communication. -- it must be a partnership with openness and communication. we've seen our working relationships with our government customers shift to one where communications and actions are taken with an eye toward what an agency inspector general will think, rather than what is in the best interest of the government and the agency's mission. what do you mean by that? are you suggesting that the inspectors general are politicizing oversight? >> the increased oversight -- there are no down sides to increase oversight. it cuts down communication. contract officers and

contractors have to watch everything they say. it reduces communication and the freedom to speech. -- freedom to speak. you are held accountable. even some of the additional oversight issues that have been brought up as far as simple things -- looking for every penny. we have had payments held up for pennies. we now have to spend time to figure out where that error was and to rectify it. i wish the commission would look at those things. .

>> there is a good reason to look at those. if an officer is trying to look over their shoulder for everything, sometimes communication is restricted. >> are your communications guarded and restricted now as a result of being inspector general? >> it is more of a paper trail. we have to have a written statement. >> my question is, are you being lost and transparent with the government now as a result of your judgment that agency inspector generals have been unduly restrictive? what's actually, -- >> actually, it restricts my ability to do that. we have to have people in the room. >> give me an example of what you are not discussing that you previously would have discussed

with them. >> a lot of things are like tell the contract is going. every business would like to have a 360. some of the things that you ask a client is how we can do things better. some of those discussions are not taking place. we are not getting answers back because they do not want to say that. some of that is restricted. >> ms. rogers, you mentioned in your statement that your company regularly meets with members of congress and staff. how many meetings have you had with congressional members and staffers and key decision makers with regard to reform efforts and initiatives and other things? >> i do not think i can count them all. about two or three weeks ago, i spent an entire day on the hill.

both appropriations subcommittees and foreign affairs. we try to me to engage in dialogue readily because i think there are a lot of areas in which we can agree. >> you gave an example of your having done that a couple of weeks ago. give me a ballpark over the course of the last year. i am not asking for a precise figure. >> for me, personally, i would say that we are up there once every 45 days. we engage in dialogue on the phone. it we actually engage in dialogue on the phone quite often. in terms of when there was a third-party certification, i was talking to staff about whether we support it. i think it happens regularly. i apologize for the vagueness.

>> thank you. >> thank you commissioner, my cochair, mr. hayes? >> of like to know how much time each of you have spent time in iraq or afghanistan. have you done any service in iraq for afghanistan? >> before i retired, i spent probably a couple of weeks every quarter and my responsibility is the end -- i would have to go back. >> would you agree that that experience was in valuable in helping you with your present work? -- is in valuable in helping you with your present work?

-- is invaluable in helping you with your present work? >> without a doubt. >> mr. bill ferris? >> i served in iraq in 2003. it gave me an idea of where the country was back then and where we are right now. >> mr. rogers? what's i served in iraq for little over nine months for the department of defense and a bully but it was invaluable. >> which you agree that if you have not served there that there would be things that you would not be doing now towards the entire mission? in other words, did that mission alert you to a different course of action because you had been there? >> i am asking each of you.

>> clearly, my experience in standing up the iraqi police and understanding how the odepartmet of defense responded clearly helped me. my experience running the protective service detail for the secretary of defense and the deputy secretary of defense certainly helped. >> in valuable -- it was valuable in in pressing upon me on working with the local culture and understanding as a recipient of the services of private security officers what worked and what did not. >> i understood the threat and the cultural differences and how to operate them both. they are both different. >> this is not directly related to security, but it is something

that the commission is having to wrestle with. that is the concept of protest. i will just say it like i feel it. i find it outrageous that our men and women could be risking their lives and even though a contractor has the right and they can exercise it, but we would see the number of protests that we are seeing and delaying the implementation of a new contractor to come in in a timely way. i just need you to tell me, do you ever wrestle with the fact that you may be risking the lives of americans by protesting and making the war effort even more difficult or is that just not a factor in your consideration when you issue protests? >> we take a very hard look at whether or not we will issue a protest. in some instances, we have not, even though we had a right to do so.

i have seen different examples where it made sense. one was in 2005 when we had a contract that was turned over to black water and in that instance, because it was a high threat area, we had a lot of different sites where there. -- sites there. under that, we did not protest because -- >> i get the point. >> the big issue was safety. >> so, you figure this was a safety issue and justify your protests? >> also, the contract was done inappropriately. >> my question is, do you put into the factor that your protest could delay the implementation of a needed effort? >> we take protests and look at

protests very seriously. we have only protested in one instance and that was when we thought that going ahead with that contract would jeopardize lives. it was awarded on the lowest bid. >> mr. ryder? >> there has only been one occasion since i have been with this company when there was a protest. i think we all know what that protest was. to answer your question, i do think about what that protest means to commanders on the ground. >> just one. about this program that your company is in charge of in iraq. it tracks the security folks and it also keeps a record of incidents and it is involved in rapid response if they security detail needs assistance. we do not have that in

afghanistan. what is your opinion of that? >> i think that that program has proven very helpful and has minimized incidents. i do believe that it has been identified as a best practice and i believe it should be considered in all conflict environments. >> thank you. >> thank you all, three of you. -- thank you, all three of you. >> what was the common the was made on lowest price case? what's it was in august of 2008. >> can you provide that? i think that would be very helpful. >> yes. >> i think we have gotten a lot of work done. i think that you have all been -- what is a good way of saying this? i think we did a good job of

selecting you folks and i think you were very candid. thank you. you greatly facilitated our effort in trying to understand what is going on. mr. ryder, any final comments? >> just a few. i appreciate being included in this important work. the policy makers will make the determination as to what is governmental and what is not. dyncorp will be ready to perform those functions. when i talked about standing by what we have always said is the work force as we deploy experts, they will be embedded with our performance, compliance and conduct every day. i have heard the word mercenaries use several times. i take exception to that for our employees.

as i look at that young lady in georgia and when she lost her husband, because he was not a mercenary, he was serving this nation and he felt that way. i wanted to make sure that the commission knew that. dyncorp always stands ready to support this commission as you move forward with this challenging and important work. >> thank you, miss rogers? >> i appreciate the opportunity. as i have stated, we have been very outspoken in the need for a common set of standards in which we can be held. i think we have demonstrated that we are very serious about this. primarily because we are supporting the u.s. government in conflict and a dangerous environment. i am not sure if i included this in my testimony, but we have found it very helpful for

performance measures and within each contract, i think that is very helpful when looking at cost analysis. it helps to do that on a regular basis. i will also echo mr. ryder's comments. we take exception to the use of that word. i do think that it is an insult to the men and women who were supporting the united states government and putting their lives online. >> thank you. mr. balderas? >> of which we would have done this sooner. we stand by working for more oversight and accountability. hopefully, we can get the standards and certification sooner than later. again, if i can be of any help to the commission in looking at

these issues, let us know because we stand ready to help you. thank you very much. >> thank you all. when you're done. -- we are done. >> up next, a former cia official talks about u.s. counter-terrorism efforts and interrogation techniques. after that, we will bring you more on the wartime contract in commission hearing. then, remarks from president

obama on parenting and been the ceo of johns hopkins who talks about the new health-care law. on tomorrow morning's "washington journal," bob to sack, tritucker carlson on the midterm elections ajay chaudry. washington journal, each morning here on c-span. tim geithner will be on capitol hill where in the morning to the morningtarp. a recent report from the treasury shows that it has been repaid over $194 billion. live coverage at 10:00 a.m. eastern. >> supreme court justice clarence thomas on the prospect of a new justice.

>> is bringing in a family member and it changes the whole family. it is different. it is different than what it was when i first got here. i have to admit, you grow very fond of the court. >> with the confirmation hearings starting june 28, learn more about the nation's highest court in c-span's latest book, "the supreme court." providing unique insight into the court. >> now, some perspectives on u.s. counterterrorism strategy from cia and fbi officials. we get an insight on the terrorist threat against the u.s. and ways to use intelligence to combat. this is about one hour 20 minutes.

>> good morning. let me welcome everyone to george washington university on this sunny, hot day. you are in for a 3 today. this is building on a serious we have had on intelligence officers to come to share their inflections upon their career. we had charlie allen last year to come after 50 years in the intelligence community, he certainly has a lot of insight and perspective to share with us. i might note that he is also recently retired and we are fortunate enough to consider him

a senior fellow. and in addition to welcoming the c-span audience, i want to welcome chesley and amanda lafferty, phil's nieces. today we will hear perspectives from phil, his role but that the cia and at the fbi. if we look at the threat landscape that we face today and how it has metastasizeddand how we can continue to see the blurring of both foreign and domestic threats, i could not think of anyone better positioned than phil to share his insights both from what we have seen overseas and some of the implications al qaeda poses and some of our countermeasures and objectives, but also the growing need domestically.

obviously we are all aware of a growing on growing threat. at some point, i think we all have hard questions that we are still just beginning to struggle with in terms of what sorts of intelligence capacities we need, how we can get to a true picture on the foreign and domestic threat, and how they come together. i could not think of anyone better than phil to be able to share his perspective on that. for those of you who do not know, phil joined the central intelligence agency in 1985. and he is a wildcat out of nova as well as a cavalier and out of uva. his degree is in english literature. you can tell you are in a treat by someone who can not only address complex issues that can communicate in a wonderful way. phil was at the counter terrorism center at the central intelligence agency worries

served as deputy director. he served as the first deputy director of the fbi national security division. he is a former national intelligence officer and join them as an analyst working in southeast asia. he has served in the white house in policy-making positions and has served on the national service -- national intelligence council for southeast asia which, at the time, was a primary focus for counter-terrorism issues. we are delighted to have a dear friend, someone i have spent an awful lot of time with in places much less friendly than grappling with these issues. bill will speak for about 40 minutes. -- phil will speak for 40 minutes. we will open that up for questions and answers. we believe in dialogue. we would get a perspective on a

critical set of issues. without further review, thank you for joining us and i look forward to it. [applause] >> let's be clear here. i resigned from the government's three months ago. it is the first time roughly i have been out of the house before 11:00 a.m. it is the second time i have had a cup of coffee. if this is a bit slow, i will decaffeinated by about 2:00 p.m. and i will be down from a nap at 3:00 p.m. it is interesting reflecting now. we have been at this for a long time. i think, in looking back, things have gone quickly but so much has happened. i want to talk about my perspective on what has

happened. want to give you a sense of the ups and downs inside the game, as it were, but also that the adversary looks like. i think we'll have stories to tell at this point, not just professional ones, but this is such a poignant issue. i remember driving home from the cia in winter 2002 and just remembering the faces in "the new york times." i want to tell the story. i am sure that our adversary has a story as well. i respect that story. this is an adversary that is committed, smart, and tough. they have lost people and we have. i hope to reflect as well on what this might look like from our adversary. my story started, when the first and most interesting in my career, was going in november 2001 and to afghanistan with the ambassador who was the head of the u.s. government team

that set uppthe process that led to the karzai government. i worked on the covert action program early in the 1990 proxy for about six months before moving to paris for one year. if anyone wants to ask about that, that would be productive. it was a fun time. i came back and worked on covert action when we were aiding the rebels against the soviet-backed government. i remember sitting at the airfield with the ambassador in november 2001 with windows, no lights, and this is where we need the president of afghanistan who walks in and starched white robes. i will never forget this as long as i live sitting there reflecting on language in the u.s. newspapers about a quagmire.

khond heart was still in the question. -- kandahar was still in question. what are we in for? sitting with that president was just a remarkable moment. i thought they would try to believe us dry and i thought they would maybe succeed. the adversary often reflects on us. they believe we were softer than the soviets. they did not know that we would show up. they thought they would get the same response they got in somalia in the early 1990's. they thought they would make as cut and run. they did not have an exit plan. i am not just speculating. i'm talking about with the al qaeda members told us starting in spring 2002 when we started capturing them early on. they told us they did not have an exit plan. they went left, that is into

iran, which was shut down in 2003. then they went right into pakistan and made a mistake early on spending too much time in the settled areas or cities. eventually they set up their version of a safe haven in the tribal areas. looking back, there are these fabled stories at the 5:00 p.m. meetings with the director. there is some humor, i guess, in counterterrorism. they were for -- they were referred to as [inaudible] i remember hank crumpton, the later ambassador, a brilliant operator and a brilliant man conducting many of the meetings. the fight was still on than in winter 2002 talking about to rain.

-- talking about terrain. we were talking about the threat matrix. you think of how far we have moved since then. we went from paramilitary in late 2001. then we went into al qaeda operations working against them. then we go into 2003, 2004, 2005 which i think are some of the most difficult times of this entire campaign. you see the morphing of a group that was designed to be a revolutionary organization, the morphing of a group whose

mission -- whose message is taken up by revolutionaries who develop cell phones, for example. is that my father? [applause] -- [laughter] in operations that focus but then very quickly and are moving to places like southeast asia where you saw, in my view, the most sophisticated of the al qaeda and affiliate's. the arabian peninsula saw the devastating violence of 2003 and beyond. you saw the growth of groups in the horn of africa. moving on, you saw further movement out towards europe, attacks in london in 2005, and the southern philippines. there was a margin of the organization that when i return to the cia in 2005, there were going global to an organization whose revolution was morphing. i use the word "revolution" and i want to stop and transition for a moment to talk about what it looked like to sit there at the table and talk about the

adversary. we do not face a terrorist group. i think this is misleading. and in this country, when we see an event like times square or an attack on the london subway, we have had the luxury of moving on to other things like health care or the environment. we only see this adversary episodic late in connected tax. -- episodically in connected attacks. the end is over the course of decades or centuries, a period of time that is hard for us to understand, too formant -- to for meant a revolution. we should not ask -- we should ask the questions that they are asking. are they forming a revolution or not? this is not just in conducting attacks. the power is in persuading others to think and act as they

do. and is notable that the attacks of september 11 were focused on not just killing people but focused on the idea of america's par projected overseas. yet a military target, the pentagon, the white house, and a financial target in new york. those people said we have a committed and smart adversary. i suspect people would think they are misguided nuts. they are not at the leadership level. they thought, how do we get america to move out of our turf? had we persuade the americans to do with they did in somalia and get out of saudi arabia, jordan, egypt, algeria, so that these local corrupt regimes are more susceptible to revolution?

what better way than to attack the pillars of american power. we look back at a day of mourning, loss, and pictures in "the new york times," but i have to look at this and say this is a strategic attack by an organization that thought we would cut and run. the intervening years after the initial years of paramilitary operations and chasing al qaeda and watching them move to the affiliate's, we saw a lot of ups and downs. we saw the capture of a lot of individuals like khalid sheik. he was an iceberg for the organization. when that iceberg melted, i think many in the organization thought the loss someone they could never replace. person, after person, after person who are involved in plotting against the united

states. i think, once again, and i want to return repeatedly to this conversation to the theme of how we perceive the target and how they perceive themselves, i think we make a mistake when we focus on these individual take counts. we are not asking the right questions. what is the status of the revolution? i will return to that, but i think an important question about these takedown is not whether any individual goes down but, what is the pace of operations over time? you should not think of this in western terms. this is like fabric. there are a lot of people in the organization. people involved in finance, documents, facilitation, and training westerners to turn and kill other people. instead of thinking about these major individuals, we need to think about how quickly our

threats coming out of the fabric to raise a risk. those threats can be replaced so the question is, over the course of the years, not year but years, are the charts not only coming out quickly enough in terms of operational temple so that the fabric phrase and rips? if the operational tempo slows the fabric can be restored. we had been on this for a few years. three or four years ago, things are tougher. i think again that we make a mistake not only in assessing whether an individual takedown is important. we should assess groups of individuals and the pace of operation. we make the mistake of talking

about time frames. the western time is short. i speak from what they say, our adversary thinks in terms of decades and centuries. now that i am not sending government, i can say when i hear them say there are down this year and up next year. i say, look, i want to know where they will be in 10 years and 50 years. we ought to be looking at this through the eyes of the adversary. a success this year, from their optics and the way they look at the world, might be simply vindication that they are being tested and vindication of they are on the right path. if they were not being tested they would be saying that this is too easy and it cannot be right. losses over six months or a year to me are not necessarily indicative of whether the organization is dying. losses over three, five, 10 years are. i will tell you later on i think the wave has crested and i think the organization is dying from within.

i should not say organization. i see this as a revolutionary movement. we have to think long-term about what they are up to. i mentioned downsize for the organization. they have had a lot of ups. if you think of this group as one that set back 20 years ago and had a vision that they could spark people who never touched and al qaeda member, went to a camp in pakistan or afghanistan, but believe those people to think and act as they want them to think, think about what has happened since then. we have had difficult campaigns in southeast asia, militants in the philippines who have mixed with al qaeda affiliate's, successes for this organization in saudi arabia in 2003 and beyond. there was the evisceration of the saudi and yemeni organizations. seven or eight years ago, the organization is resurging in yemen.

you have the prospect of the, if not affiliated, at least sympathetic people coming into power in the horn of africa. you have a group that raised its flag in algeria in moroccan or tunisian organizations. you have a rest, after a rest, after a rest in western europe. -- you have arrest, after arrest, after arrest. after about -- over the past 18-24 months, we have had arrest after arrest after arrest here. this is a formidable organization, but if you think of it as a revolution in -- revolutionary organization. if i am in their shoes, i am saying we could have done worse. the could have done worse to

have revolutionaries who never met us take up the flag, across from the southern philippines to denver, colorado. think about how this revolution has moved as you try to imagine what the future will look like. i would argue it has moved through three threads of people who have observed the revolution. the first is a core group that al qaeda is still formidable. i cannot remember a time where i would sit and watch the threat matrix and doing briefings with the directors, the attorney general's coming year after year, i could not remember a time where there was not some kind of serious allocate a problem that had implications for the united states. -- some kind of serious al qaeda

problem that had implications. they were all serious. meanwhile, while the american public when watch the american region watch the occasional peek, a tax in britain, the underlying, when you would not see the piques was constant. that is one reason i am happy to be out. i did not have to sit at 7:00 a.m. and watch a kid who is 17- year-old wanted to blow himself up. there may be immigration fraud, marriage fraud. when i am saying is people who look at these threats by reading the newspaper are misled. you only see the peaks, but the values are not that low. i think the three threads are still prominent. the second which has been more prominent overseas are the affiliated organizations. by those, i mean organizations

that as a whole have taken on the call qaeda mantle. the arabian peninsula, the many -- the yemenis. after seeing affiliated operations around the world and knowing it was coming to our shores, the question should not be are we a million? the question should be why did it take so long to get here. we are the head of the snake. and was inevitable. in the internet age, the of the integration means nothing. your currency is it be heading videos, those that show a dead kid in gaza. finally, after having had al qaeda problems, we also have david hedley in chicago. we have had the core of al qaeda, the kid in denver and new york, the like-minded who will carry the revolution forward.

it is a global revolution. like-minded people in places like dallas. at their people who want to pick up weapons to attack. new jersey. i mentioned a global because to my mind that are not much different than the like-minded from syria who walked into iraq. i talk to my friends in the middle east and i view the kids in this country, which we view as the bastion as democracy, why would anyone adopt this ideology in this country? there are not any different than the kids i see from remarkably different cultural -- cultures. they were ideologically motivated, very focused people. the kids are seeing today similar to what we have seen kids see overseas. there are talking among themselves. they call these clusters of

kids, i have never seen the show "24" the kids who are talking. they start showing videos from an attack in iraq. they show videos from people killed after eight you a the attack in pakistan. -- killed after a uav attack in pakistan. these kids start to talk and they say, "let's do something about this." this is not much different than a kid in yemen, saudi arabia, syria, jordan, lebanon who in 2004, 2005 was saying they did not know the way to get involved but they knew if they showed up in baghdad maybe they could do something about the emotional sense we are being wronged. i use the word emotional. i went to contrast it to the

people in the core al qaeda who are so deeply and ideologically motivated. these kids we are seeing believe the ideology, many i have seen do not. they are emotionally driven by conversations, photos, sermons. there is in the vantage there, by the way. and emotionally driven people are easier to turn, not just for sources, but easier to turn away from the movement and revolution because they do not always understand what they are joining up for. hold on just a minute here. hold on. the floor is mine. last i checked, i am not getting paid for this. 30 minutes, 40 minutes, 2.5 hours. this could turn into fidel castro. we are here at 9:00 p.m. that is right. i am 20 minutes in and i have given you a picture.

i and the world's leading optimist. my nieces are here. we will go hang out and georgetown today. this is going to be ugly. anyone who wants to join me, you are paying. this is a dark picture. it is sunny outside. that is the stifel world -- that is not the full world. we see reminders that this campaign is in the fall. we see arrests in our country, the potential for attacks in europe, but i am not done yet. i do not think you get your money's worth unless we talk

about the problems in this revolution. they are substantial and i think the problems are growing. i think the adversary is in trouble. the first responsibility we have and the first reason, i think, we should be assured we are on the right path is the business i came from and that is i think security is better than it was nine years ago. i think we have learned a lot. i think in some ways we have got a lot more professional about how we handle frats from those days we were looking at the threat colors when it was on the newspapers every day and we were dealing with the daily threat briefings around town and still trying to determine lanes in the road and make it as mechanical as we could. people often ask why we have not had another attack in this country. let's go through why. it is nuanced. the answer is not easy, but i think there is one. i want to do this on why you should not walk out of your being repressed -- being depressed, unless you want to. if you want to foot the bill for lunch, you can really be depressed. the affiliate's are struggling.

they're struggling in iraq. they're calling -- they made errors in algeria. he killed too many. after all qaeda told him not to, he still killed too many locals. to my mind, maybe because i come from a terrorist plans, but we have seen these same mistakes in the same reasons that the affiliate's are diverting. they killed too many locals. the messages that are not publicized, go after the head of the snake. you go too big and the local said, we are tired of this.

you can kill the foreigners, you can -- they killed too many of the locals then they have the coalition. affiliate's are struggling in places like north africa. i do not think of the past couple of years that is a grab has gone anywhere close -- that zagreb has got as close. the have adopted some of the thinking. less tax on locals, more attacks on the head of the snake. as governments leave, the local government is more susceptible to the revolutionary movement. local government in algeria was not susceptible 20 years ago. the message of al qaeda was you were not successful in the overthrowing the government because they had the support of the head of the snake. that is the transition in thinking for terrorists. raise the bar, raise the level of your targeting. raise it from the locals to the foreigners so that when the foreigners leave the locals

will go down more easily. i do not think there are doing that well. i think they took a huge hit that really decimated the organization. they have a structure, as i mentioned earlier, was the most remarkably organized and disciplined than any group. once they made the mistake of attacking too many people, security services got serious and they went down. i think there are other pieces

to this patchwork of that is, if you miss them overseas, and we make fun of the a chest. it is blood sport to go after vhs. -- dhs. there was more questioning at airports. it is a very inefficient way to do business. look at who they are sending in here. you get the inefficiency of making sure the people you do not know about go into these borders. i can tell you that the adversary is worried about the difficulty of getting into this country. we can take shots at the infrastructure in this country, but our adversary feels much more uncomfortable trying to get into this country than they did nine years ago. they are not decimated overseas, but they try to look at how to resuscitate and they see a country whose borders are much tougher. remember that a lot of people

that had years of operational experience and there, whether they are document forgers or facilitators, they are gone. of the ones that are coming up behind them as a result of all this are not going to be as comfortable devising means to get into a country that have never been to. the last thing i would tell you in terms of looking at the operational perspective on optimism is that state locals in this country and the fbi chase ever leave that there is. there are the least that you see and therefore the 100 behind and that you do not. poison pen letters which is a lot of what we used to deal with. there are a lot of passat boyfriends in this country who think that if the right and nasty letter about their old boyfriends new -- the old girlfriends new boyfriend, do not do that.

not only the amount of resources are dedicated against3 the maturity with which we look at a target is fundamentally different. if you miss them overseas, if our hardened mortars and hardened cop tips make it heat here, someone will look at them. part of that transformation is formative and i think that is one of the reasons that we stay safe. that is the transition of saying that someone is the target of an investigation and as american citizen, i knew about investigations. if you ever got behind the doors that i got behind when i transition from the cia and fbi in 2005, it was stunning.

what we talked about with the director was that when we see a target, the questions we have or not one of that target is prosecutable, but it transitions from the starfish to the spider web. we do not want to just caught of -- just cut off one part of the plot. we want to destroy the entire network. we can be over the bar and prosecuting someone to i sat in a thousand briefings with the director. what we said more and more is that we understand who we are looking at, but the questions that we have on not starfish questions. that person will tell us who got

him into the movement. has he traveled? who did he see overseas? word of the ideology come from? is there someone who was involved in radicalizing him? we sat on plots time after time where we certainly have plenty to come down on somebody, but the questions we had were not if we could take them down, the question we had was if we knew the network will enough so that we are not learning any more which is the definition of a really great take down to it is never that easy. -- take down. it is never that easy. we also had an adversary who helped. this is maybe the most significant thing i can say befooe i close.

this ideology was developed as an organization that started arguing that attacking outside of algeria and iraq was legitimate. they built a theological basis for this. this basis is thin ice. the eyes got thinner over the past years as more and more local people died. again, i am a trained analyst. tell me what you know, tell me what you don't know until me what you think. i know this. look at the muslim attitude studies and look at countries that are surveyed that, after 2001, been seldom suffered an attack.

in 2003, there were too many locals that died. there were attacks and pakistan. going back, as i have said repeatedly, i think this is an ill understood concept, going back to the early '90s and watching 100,000 plus people dying in algeria and when al qaeda is considering whether to affiliate with the algerians, the wonder if they will be sullied by affiliating with people who were not only known as murderers from the 1990's, but who will raise more questions about the appropriateness of this ideology.

what i am telling you is that these countries that have had a tax do not show remarkable declines in support for the united states through the that is not the message. the recruiting pool is still huge. they show remarkable decline and i think increasingly irrelevant for the al qaeda. these guys are eating themselves. i love washington d.c.. there are questions about how we participate in this world of ideas and my answer would be to save some money and let these guys eat themselves up. clerics from saudi arabia and egypt have come out against al qaeda's at lg. the organization -- al qaeda's

ideology. the organization as individuals involved of the talk about this on things like blocks. i notice a difference in the statements after fort hood and then after the december 25 attempt. they were different statements. he does not have a problem justified for hood. and there's a lot of shucking and jiving after the december 25 attack. this ideology is killing itself. the most recent example to my mind is an organization that slowly establishes some version that takes the brilliant step of doing the same thing again. they killed so many pakistan is that the pakistan the

parliament has now said that they better go after these boys. you have the most sustained operations in the tribal areas and outside the tribal areas since we have had since 911. -- a sense 9/11. -- since 9/11. the headings overseas and body parts in bali, these are not winning propositions. i can tell you, going back to when we first sat at those tables that i went back to in january of 2002, the world seemed extremely turbulent because she could not see where we were going. you had no sense that we were on solid ground. do they have anthrax?

are they in the united states? do they have a cell level attack next month? it was an interesting point. a lot of that was because we were trying to capture uncertainty. i think we're in a steadier world, now. as i said, i am out of government and i will not be subtle. i think a lot of my colleagues are slowly coming to believe that the way this cresting to rid i think of the movement is dying. i think that one of the challenges that we have is to understand that even as a, dies, the tale of that, is lethal. we will lose lives in this country. i will bet -- i don't make a pay check anymore.

i was or to get a paycheck. -- i was formed to get a paycheck. -- i was going to bet a paycheck. we have the presence of affiliate's in this country and we have like-minded people who are intent on coming apterous. they are not intent on attacking, they want to carry out this revolutionary ideology. the half-life of an ideology should be measured in a decade or two decades or three decades. it is an idea, it is not an attack. the attack is a manifestation that someone has absorbed the idea. his ideas have a long half-life , maybe we have another 10 or 20 years to go. as this adversary eats its young, these bits of the tale of

the comet will hit us and the question that we will have as we brief -- as we grieve for people who were murdered that more not jobless for terrorists. there are murderers. as we grieve for people who were murdered, we have to ask ourselves how we are going to react against an organization that is already declining. they won a victory. my message is that they should never get one. gang members murdered many people in this country every year. we go after them and take them down. there are filthy murderers. he is not a terrorist, he is not as hot as, he is a filthy murderer.

his newspaper would have copies of the birthdays of the people he has killed. when something happens in this country, the question is whether we deal with it with the same forbearance that we deal with other challenges that this society has. i look at my nieces that are sitting here with me. i worry about drugs and gangs. and they are all murderers and we should not miss that. it is how we stand up and face up and chin up and move forward and for them in jail and let them rot. . .

we succeeded in slowly stemming the tide of our revolution. but as we go down this road, a long way, keep your chin up. this adversary is not in yemen. they are human hiding behind the facades of jihad, who have decided that the murder of an innocent soul is acceptable. this is an ideology that can never win.

unless we let it. this is not a threat to this country. this is not an existential threat. it's a threat to the lives of the innocents who will die in future years, but is a threat -- it is a threat that we can handle. they are not jihadists and they are not terrorists. they are murderers whose movement is dying. and i would love to take your questions, as long as they're not tough. >> thank you, phil, for a very -- [applause] 4 very provocative -- in terms of the landscape that they covered. i'll take the prerogative of asking the first question. part of that is, obviously, to be no. 3 and al qaeda is obviously a dangerous job.

and your comments respond in terms of the individuals and institutions, and not to pay too much attention to the peaks and valleys over six months cycles, but i am increasingly concerned to the bridge makers, and and others who are propagating their narratives on the internet and facilitating radicalization had never quicker pace. -- at an ever quicker pace. there is a role for the government to help facilitate the adversary narrative, the ideology -- is the narrative, stupid. until we address that, they are going to have a lot of tactics

and that creates a strategy. i would be curious what your thoughts are on the growth of these bridge figures, and what role the united states government and the others all to play -- ought to pay in pushing back on the narrative, especially on the internet. >> a couple of quick thoughts. i think this is critically important going back to the theme of ideology. these are people who have spread the ideology behind the core of the organization. they are a definition of what al qaeda might want to become 20 years ago. in the 21st century, how we contract people in the difficult -- and the difficulty in moving like, you want to have someone in yemen to do it for you. for my mind, and i should have mentioned this in the

presentation, when the measures of success in dealing with the organization with a day or the at the l.a. get enough safe haven and ideological traction to independence -- to independently run an al qaeda- like organization. i think the december 25 attempt it is the first time that i can think of where an affiliate showed both intent and capability to reach inside the united states. that is not just a connecticut or operational at, but they just got enough traction in yemen where people are not saying how do you take out the president, but how you go after detroit? on your questions on the internet, i think that we should play. show beheading videos, and there

are operational consideration, how much you gain in terms of destroying ideology? in difficult decision making time, the question is too complicated. the easy question is, if this is of revolutionary organization, i would say take out anything that we were legally allowed to take out on the internet to stop the spread of revolution. i think our messaging should be pretty straight forward. we do not mess around. we do not mess around with your hide. we never used the word terrorism. do not call them jihadists or terrorists. they are pock murderers. the most interesting thing i have seen in the past four years in terms of ideology, look at

the spring of 2008, look at the first question out of the box in the internet interview. it is an almost rude question, who last about the killing of innocents. why don't you go after people like the jews? why did he take this question? i think he takes it on because he knows -- this is not a paid advertisement. i think he knows that they're losing ground in terms of popular opinion when they kill innocents. we should not talk about terrorism or the war on terror. we should talk about what they do not want. every act that they take, some innocent man, woman, or child is dead. a child has to live without a

war of the family. that is not jihad. that is murder. >> i do referred to them a jihadists. -- i do refer to them as jihadists. >> you talk a lot about al qaeda. i want to follow up on iran. let me ask you about that. what is the connection amongst them? are they competing? are they cooperating? for the independent of each other? >> that is a good question. from a western off date, i'll give you an answer that may be hard to understand. at different levels, the message that you get are contradictory. but the broadest level, you still have a broad cine hatred

of the shi'a regime in tehran. before 9/11, i don't think he would seek any kind of activity between al qaeda and taliban. he had the iranians closer to the northern ally as before 9/11. sometimes the enemy of your enemy becomes your friend. i do not think that there is any operational cooperation between them. i think sometimes that the iranians might look at afghanistan and say, the americans can get bled by them because we want the americans to be out of here. it where iran and mexico and canada, i think we would be done. but looking at the way to think about al qaeda, i don't think they like them. i don't think they're that interested in dealing with them. i think they look a lower level

activity and say, they are bleeding our enemy. we do not like them, they did arrest the leadership council in the spring of 2003, but i think the story is fuzzy when you go further down and when you have are ron saying, they are still bleeding the enemy. >> please identify yourself. >> that was really outstanding. i want ask more about the domestic front. when you see the smaller scale attempts as some of the tale of the comment -- tail of the comet, in britain, they have a

more homegrown threat and that is the pillar of their prevention efforts. that outraged the muslim communities as compared to enhanced electronic surveillance as a way of addressing potential on growing concerns. >> i think that the operational implications of the metastasized threat are significant to the united states. if you have three kids in a basement and out when the or los angeles, the prospect that you're going to find every one of those and a free society is zero. if that is the bark, and sometimes it felt like that was the bar, so get over it. we cannot leap over the bar. i think in terms of strategic threat, damage to rockeye that means the prospect of 19 hijackers -- damage to al qaeda

means that the prospect of 19 hijackers on airplanes declines. i do not remember -- and it has been so long, so many vodka tonics, it disappears out of my mind -- that is a joke. turn off the camera. [laughter] i met diet coke. i don't remember the conversations at this level about the home grown, i turned that i hate. it is a step forward. these kids are not going to hit 19 hijackers, but i think your questioo about our reach, do not look to the british for anything. they are a bunch of losers. no, just kidding. [laughter] the lessons we learn from dealing with security partners are profound.

in many ways they have a better system than we are. they have been at it longer. i would argue as well that our national dialogue -- their national dialogue is much more mature than ours. look at the british home office and not only the outlying path of action but the directness that they address the problem and talk about the role of government in stemming this language -- they use the word language. very direct, very tight partnerships. i think the cultures are so difference in terms of concentration of the community in britain, because our country as much more diffuse and terms of the population -- but there is a way to mature in talking about ideology, but also how we iraq -- react to events. my conversations around the

world with security services, i have often found they are much more mature in responding to events, and frankly surprised at how we respond. how we deal with, for example, creating new infrastructure after this event, however organization says they must've done something wrong, instead of saying that sometimes bad things happen. don't get in trouble here. >> i would be curious on that question and specifically looking at the role of domestic intelligence and whether or not we need such an enterprise in the united states. you and i have been fitted together from the counterterrorism units, and i am not suggesting we need something along those lines in the united states, but what i am suggesting

is that we have to start asking the hard questions on what sort of a capacity, whether or not we need heat mapping -- where should the united states to go in this set of challenges? is the bureau of to the task? >> i think the bureau gets the job done. the aleutian i saw was pretty remarkable. the boss with hate me for this, but i think a lot depended on the directors pressing hard to make this happen, and the transition in a year insisting on continuing evolution, there will be slippage, but i think the organizational question has been answered. i think there is a bigger question to be had. the american people expect a lot out of the federal security service. you realize, the american people do not expect any more from the

federal bureau of investigation. they expect the bad things will not happen in this country. they expect security. that is pre-emptive. no one ever asked how good the 9/11 investigation was. they ask, why did you not know? that is in the background, which is good, you can deal with other things in life, but the balance is to make sure that nothing happens, and then it is very frustrating to work this process. i think the question is, do we have a continued dialogue on what our expectations are of the security service? you have to expect that people are going to be saying, have we talk to them about the ship? ahoy i'm not sure that we have sources in the community but we want to talk to them, we want have those committee talked to was, we want to be in those

communities so that they feel comfortable -- a lot of people expected communities to talk, but that does not happen -- but after a plot breaks, you want to talk to them about what it means to them. you need to tell the parent of a kid, don't worry, you got to be out there in the kit -- in a community and thinking preemptively because that is what the american people expect. and in need help from the hill and the white house and elsewhere when you make a mistake and you of our collective people say, how did you do that? you asked us to do things, you ask the nothing that happens, and when we over colette, people say what you do that. -- i think that is important. and now one of put in a plug for state and local intelligence. there are some mechanisms and

capacities that can be spread elsewhere. >> i want to follow up on this discussion that suzanne got started on, the long-term perspective. as someone who has worked with senior executive-branch officials, some of them appointed, others career folk, it is a huge challenge and our perspective is very short term. you mentioned how our adversaries take a decade. if you talk us through some of the approaches to shift that american view to better deal with its adversaries? >> no. i am not sure i have an answer. and guess what i'm saying is -- for example, if you are red team in another event, how quickly do you answer the question of what you need a presidential or

congressional inquiry to find out what went wrong and who's head should roll? if we'd done that nine years a low -- nine years ago, there is an informal global security network that helped the does the state this adversary. we've not had an attack in this country. i would take that bet in a heartbeat, it going back to my experience at bagram airfield. i want to see the odds on that in vegas. that has to be 100-1. no one would've taken a bed. keep cool, practice it, and say, we would not have taken this that nine years ago. let's not give this adversary another victory. create another acronym, roles a moorhead's, i don't care anymore. i am not getting an answer.

my response would be, if you have to be mature in this face of adversity and that is what they pay people for. stand up, realize that sometimes when you're playing defense for nine years, something is going to slip through. man up and move on. these are not victims of terrorism. they are victims of murder. this is the saddest thing to me -- not only victims of murder, but the families of a kid destroyed like the one in atlanta, georgia his life is destroyed now. he was misguided. >> we had a question here. and it could turn the microphone. there you go. >> thank you for the fascinating discussion.

, pickup on a point that suzanne talked about. >> why is everyone quoting suzanne? [laughter] >> she got the ball rolling. you talk about increasing the relevance of the narrative within muslim communities across the world. but at the same time, with a rise in domestic plots of the last 12 to 80 months, is almost as if the narrative has taken on more salience among most americans living in west virginia or in london. what do we make of this, and how could on the one hand the narrative become less popular in the arab muslim world, and on the other, become more popular in some of our own communities? >> some of this is a measure time. -- a measure of time. the narrative reach the shores

of bit late. this is a 30-year proposition and we are 10 years in. it took awhile to get here. 320 million americans and i wondered about going to the university of maryland and asking a statistician, if you saw going from 3-12 plots, or whatever we had over the past year, and i country of 320 millions, how statistically significant effect? i still do not see this as an epidemic threat in the united states. and talking to my european colleagues across what they to sit on. i would say easily, 10/1, in terms of -- so we shall -- still should consider ourselves lucky, considering that we are the head of the snake.

and the places that we face in our network, from l.a. to new york, that does not mean that you could pick up a plot in denver or houston. i don't necessarily view the plots thht we've seen over the past year as indications that a radical infusion of ideology is here. i think we will continue to see ups and downs in the coming years. i think the questions we have our weather al qaeda central can regroup and whether we have strategic threats, and whether some of these affiliate's like al qaeda in the arabian peninsula get comfortable not because they can organize have you plotting against this country, because if you have said havens and combine that with capability and intent, eventually we will get hit. i am talking about sides of my mouth. i do agree that there has been an increase in plotting that we've seen over the past year- and-a-half. i don't think it is a statistical aberration but it is not reached the level in my mind

where we're sitting on a hotbed of revolution. i am surprised it came this late. i would have thought we would see this in 2004 or 2005. it is almost inevitable and i think that we ought to take it in stride and keep up the plots and don't overreact. what's his name in new york, shahzad, he is an amateur and chile gets the bomb just right, and in his approach. >> these are people who americans see glimmers of themselves in. is not the jihadi sites but the chat rooms that we should be focusing on. they are largely in english. >> one quick comment i should have made.

i think there is fertile recruiting to be had in this country. if you look at two enter late numbers -- the first of the number of people picked up in plots of the last couple of years who are not foreign-born. many of them are converts. and did you look at the few research study -- and then you look at the pew research study a remarkable degree of dissatisfaction -- the numbers are right there, quite striking. not only do you see an undercurrent of people who believe in disenfranchised, if you see it in the numbers of people arrested. there are a fair number of people who may be susceptible to recruitment, not necessarily

related to al qaeda. but american society has not treated as right and we're going to do something. >> looking back on my deployment to guantanamo bay in 2006 and 2007, i am often asking myself if the benefits of guantanamo bay in gathering intelligence are worth the trade-offs and international perception, and if you could comment on that? >> i guess that challenges i will put in my contest. in detainees generally, the experience i have related to the ci, where what you have was guantanamo. i don't think you can

underestimate the value of information we had from an al qaeda member. i know there are questions about this, people dispute what we received from al qaeda members who were taught to buy cia, but as a trained analyst with 25 years, the value -- the value of any intelligence operation is sources and wires. there was a third was detainees. invaluable information. that is only half of your question. was it worth it? i think we did not have a lot of time back in 2002 and 2003 and 2004. the level of threat was high and people made the safe choices. it may be quite angry in this town that the cannot learn from the past. we simply have to attack the past.

my point would be that we learned a lot from detainees and now we have the luxury of no tax and a public debate on what the american people want. if that is not what the american people want, and that seems clear to me, then let's take whatever path they want. i'm not here to judge what we did take years ago was right or wrong. it was very valuable, but there are questions among a lot of people. as long as you're willing to take the hit, not receiving intelligence that was invaluable, i understand people represent the will of the people and american values want to go on a different direction. i think that is ok. any security service and a democratic society service for the people >>-- any security service in a democratic society serves the people.

there's a lot of judgment because on about whether we made a perfect choice is eight years ago. they surpassed and we tried our best. i'm an american citizen. i think about it every day and i tried to do the right thing. people think maybe we should try something else. that's ok. >> what is the risk of a when day attack? >> i think you would be absolutely devastating. after so many years of this, as you move through management ranks, one of your responsibilities is to keep cool. i think it be absolutely devastating. i think the likelihood is extremely low, because the ability to acquire these things depends on safe havens, expertise -- all the kinds of things that al qaeda has lost. they can train people to get in

and attacked an airplane or a train. putting together an anthrax program or program to explode a significant nuclear device, i think, especially now the likelihood of that is declining. not because of lack of intent, but it takes time and expertise, money, safe haven. and this organization is having a lot of problems in all of those areas. the second half of that is significant. if you take what this organization seeks, to continue to stabilize the head of the snake, not to make them afraid but convince others to come to our side -- i think that panic attacks, which we think less about and catastrophic attack, the panic attacks are fairly likely and i think need to revolutionary goal of the organization, not as much as a nuclear weapon. but radioactive isotopes or chemical the fis -- we have seen

try to -- seen them try to turn to these things in the past. i go back to my original vision of the organization, and they are easier to do, less safe haven, less training, not as much training to do it, better access to the material, and you still have the benefit of people saying, ready allies -- radioactive isotopes in new york. i lifted this empirically. weapons, grenades, backpack explosives, what ever you do with a backpack stuff we saw. >> thanks for the great hall. i agree mostly with your views.

what i wanted to his reply on your 25 years. what was the most surprising thing that you experienced in 25 years? >> did i do something wrong? are you all right? [laughter] >> if you could paint mark for not siding suzanne. the surprising thing? that is the first time i ever got that question. i guess my answer is personal. i had a graduate degree in english literature, and i will not make this long, but i'll give you an answer that has nothing to do with the business.

i sent out about 37 letters to high schools after it got a master's degree in english literature with a specialty in the victorian novel, if anyone wants to know. and i wish they had not answered the letter but i got 37 responses back, all of which said no. i thought they would get lost in the mail. no, all 37. my father called me and said, the cia is hiring. i drove up to the front gate of the cia. there was no internet id. and i expected to say two years. who are these guys? i like to read and i like english literature. and 24 years later, i met kings and presidents, went to the oval office, and i was a ds-nine analysts. i had a really great honor last year.

secretary powell, president bush, tony blair, tom ridge -- i got a brief that congress in the well of the congress of the united states. i remember the first party we had when i was a new analyst and i forgot to wear my belt to work that day. gs-9, i kept my jacket on all day and rolled over in a chair from my cubicle because i was so embarrassed to stand. and after 24 years, i got demint -p-- meet presidents and prime ministers and hang around the oval office. i look back and it just seems -- i do not know how it happened. i do not know and i feel blessed. >> any other questions? phil, on behalf of all of us, thank you for a very thoughtful

said remarks. thank you for your public service for this country and thank you for joining us today. >> thank you to ninth nieces ninthmy -- my nieces. if you want to pick up the bill, come along. [applause] >> a token of our appreciation, figure to bid and literally. -- figuratively and literally. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> a hearing on wartime contract in on afghanistan. then remarks by president obama on parroting. later, the ceo of john hopkins medicine, dr. miller, talked about the new health-care law. on tomorrow morning's "washington journal" we will get an update on the senate. tucker calls and after that on the obama administration in the midterm elections. later, ajay chaudrey on the changing demographics of united states. treasury secretary tim geithner will be on capitol hill later in the morning to testify about the troubled asset relief program known as tarp. a recent report from treasury shows that it has been repaid over $194 billion from loans issued to financial institutions. live coverage it 10:00 eastern.

next, the wartime contract in commission looks at the role of private security contractors in iraq and afghanistan. the commission examines which security task are better performed by the u.s. military in which it could be delegated to the private sector. witnesses include representatives from the state department and the pentagon. this portion of the hearing is one hour 50 minutes. >> good morning. i am mike thibault, and thank you for attending this hearing which will explore timely and important issues regarding americans use of private security contractors, or pscs, in iraq. this opening statement is based on behalf of christopher shays, fellow commissioners, and myself.

the other commissioners are clark kent ervin, grant green, bernanke, katherine schinasi, and others. the commission met in this room on private security contractors in iraq, and we may talk about afghanistan but this is in iraq, whether they might be performing inherently governmental -- or the office of management and budget is presently preparing new diagrams on the finding of an apparently government, closely associated, and critical functions which need close oversight of private contractors. we're looking into that as part of our overall mandate. besides that mandate, this hearing has special silence. they're about 19,000 contractors

in iraq, 14,000 under department of defense contracts, and roughly -- precise numbers are a challenge -- 5000 work for the department of state and the u.s. agency for international development, for usaid. the massive drawdown of u.s. forces in iraq aims at cutting our military presence to less than 50,000 by the end of august this year, and the zero by the end of 2011, obviously next year most of the security duties currently executed by the u.s. military and dod contractors are being handed off to the department of state. state will need more security contractors, many of them with special skills, and we will explore that today. the drawdown in the security function hand off will put increased rain on our systems for planning, acquiring, overseeing contracts, and

program management. and evaluating performance -- we're going to talk about a fair amount -- related to psc work. let me give you some specifics to clarify the foundations and implications of these facts. commissioner green and i accompanied by his staff experts were in iraq last month to prepare for this hearing. we met with defense, state, and usaid people involved in security issues. and we got out into the country. we visited four court operating bases, or as we all refer to them fobs. that confirms what are hearing has already determined. there are already weaknesses and america's use of pscs, especially with respect to effective internal controls to ensure full and proper vetting of security -- private security contractors. problems may get bigger and more costly with the challenges in

the months ahead. we saw significant problems at three of the four fobs we visited. at one fob, we found 17 iraqis and 53rd country nationals still on guard duty, protecting the u.s. base without proper+ vetting. another in-country contractor intervened to put people on guard pause before they were properly authorized. fortunately he was turned down. cu

the state department lacks the personnel, equipment, experience, and training to take care of some of the security functions that have been provided to dod. or by dod previously. these include quick reaction combat teams, dod is going to be gone, clearance capabilities, recovery of wounded personnel, and damaged vehicles, the counter-battery teams, a critical safety factor and deterrent to additional hostile indirect fire, and the experts and vehicles that detect and dispose of improvised explosive devices, what we all refer to as ied's. the iraqi government currently lacks many of these capabilities and we are trying to develop those. we currently like many of these robust and consistent system for monitoring psc operations in the country.

i was personally impressed by the furnace and the execution. we found plans for contractor management during and after the drawdown. we've made that concern known to the executive branch. the dramatic expansion of state security responsibilities in iraq could lead to weakly managed contractors performing inherently governmental functions in a combat zone. a scenario with large downside risks with concerns for the safety of the remaining military, government, and contract employees. these challenges are driven by the scale of peculiarity of our engagement -- excuse me -- in iraq. the united states has used pscs in other areas such as the balkans, but never on such a

scale -- i will get there -- as in iraq and afghanistan. the defense to state and off of responsibilities aggravate the problems already created by the scale of private security contractor used. including blues private security contractor oversight practiced and we will be discussing more today. we will talk about the current issues with psc management and oversight. we will probe the many challenges ahead as it transitions to state department control. at this time, the bottom line appears to be that a lack of timely and effective coordination between defense and state could undermine the progress achieved by the u.s. military -- and there has been progress. embolden insurgents and jeopardize the safety of americans left in iraq -- this is a troubling prospect.

with a drawdown under way, we simply cannot afford to return to the pre-search of an "wild, wild west" day is in iraq. today's hearing has two panels of witnesses. there are four government witnesses have been t2 -- speak to planning and program management. the first is gary motsek, charlene lamb from the bureau of diplomatic security, david blackshaw, chief oversees security division of united states agency for international development, and edward harrington, deputy assistant secretary of the army for procurement. our second panel brings together four industry witnesses who will testify on government program

management of pscs in iraq. there john ryder, from dyncorp international, a ignacio balderas -- if i made a mistake on that, i apologize, director and chief executive of triple cannot be and written on here is mr. torres, chief executive officer of tories advanced enterprise solutions, or torres aps -- aes. i must now insert a late breaking addendum to my opening statement. in preparation for hearing, commission staff offered to meet with all witnesses and/or their key staff. that is a routine function. mr. torres, ceo of torres advanced enterprise solutions confirmed on june 7 that he would be testifying today.

our staff meeting with him was scheduled for last tuesday. of late last monday, mr. torres assistant cancelled that pre hearing meeting. last wednesday, mr. torres told commission staff that torres aes was a small company was probably not needed on the panel. he also stated that he had army reserve duty this week, and not -- and might not be of a reschedule or get out of it. that is the last the commission has heard from mr. torres. last friday, mr. torres lawyer informed us that mr. torres had reserve duty, had key staff out of the country, and i do not know in that light moment what that resulted in, and the words by the lawyer was "nervous about appearing." in front of this commission. mr. torres ought to be nervous. this commission was one asked him under oath by his firm agreed in january to assume private security

responsibilities at fort operating base shield with several hundred guards that that -- that had not been properly vetted and approved. a diligent u.s. army contract in officer representative, "weaver 42 as the c. or, correctly prohibited these torres guards from assuming their duties. the incumbent contractor who have lost the contract up from a poor performance viewpoint was very well rated, was quickly rehired. there would not be a loss of transition -- for $1.5 million to remain on the post for 16 additional days, and hundreds of torres employees were placed in stand down status. there were not approved, it even though they won the post. this commission was also born ask mr. torres why he personally flew to iraq, to fob shield, and strongly suggested to the co are -- cor pectoris be allowed

to approve -- oppose the unapproved guards, guards that would protect american troops, and then to catch up the aaproval process. i personally asked the cor if he had tried to intimidate him into allowing unauthorized employees to post to guard duty. the cor told me that intimidate was too strong a word, but mr. torres essentially so that this was all about paperwork and was not a big deal. i've heard that from recent responses, what is the big deal? why we need controls? the commission can now report that this same company -- good news for them -- was awarded the next four lowest price, technically is acceptable -- we

call them lpta -- contracts to protect american troops at four additional bases. this raises an interesting question. what is technically a susceptible? we raised that question and the issue of past performance during and meeting with the commander, joint contractor in command-iraq and afghanistan. specifically, we ask, how did torres aes arriving and attempting to post several hundred unauthorized guards impact the awards of four additional security contracts? we were told, and i was there along with another commissioner in staff, that these were competitive lpta task orders, and torres had the lowest price, and that past performance was not considered in this case by jcc-i/a during new competitive task orders.

we're told that was only this contract. but that is what is competitively bid and awarded. since we only do past performance on the contracts and not the past orders, we did not consider it. these are competitively awarded. it is the wrong answer. after an extended discussion, the commander had knowledge that past performance should likely have been considered and be considered on competitive task orders, and that she would look into this. in my view, sitting there and listening, this is a major miss on the part of jcc-i/a. now we have a major issue that needs to be addressed and our primary witness had hunkered down into the rocks.

what does it take for government contracting leaders to say that they lpta contractor or any contractor -- what does it take to demonstrate that they are not performing adequately, and that their past performance dictates that a contractor is not technically acceptable? we do know that trying to post hundreds of unapproved guards to protect american lives had no consequence in this case. so i guess we're going to have to explore what does. today we will further explore where contractual accountability and performance have consequences. again, what does it take for poor contractual four months to result in contract termination or non-award of future contracts? i'm going to start off with a observation before my time starts. i think it represents is all. mr. blackshaw, i'm sure that you are a valued government employee. i've never seen my role -- so

many qualifiers about what you can and cannot talk about. i realize that senior officials that can talk about it, having worked the government side all my life and participated in testimony for a couple of decades, that each word is crafted to be consistent with the agency's intent. but when you say your testimony clarifies middle management roles and answers questions and a limited role and things like that, i realize that when we coordinated with usaid, we said we wanted mrs. lamb's counterpart. she is a senior policy official that can speak for the state department. we didn't get that with usaid. is going to impact the kind of questions we will as, because ultimately, you will take back

-- very early on in my career, i went to a couple of hearings and to say just like it was, they said, do not mess up, and i was at all levels. i am not looking for comment. what i am looking for is for you to take back our disappointment that state department put you in this position. i don't want you to take the hit that they contacted me and i thought it would work to pay, because we had an expectation that senior leadership is more engaged and would have there right person or persons in attendance. so what we have questions, we would give them. you would get an opportunity to wrap up some comments at the end. if you like to put some comments on that at the end, please do, but we will continue on with the question. mr. zakheim? >> i share the co-chairman of views. i will point something out for the record.

when i was undersecretary of defense and i was asked to testify, and i normally show up, as i was overseas. i'm not shooting you. you're just the messenger. but that is the problem -- you are the messenger. and if i could not testify, or did not want to testify, which was rare because i believe that the congress wants you, you come -- i would kick it down to my deputy. and it might deputy did not want to testify, he would take it further down the chain -- everybody knew what was going on. and so this is not you. you are just down on the food chain. but it is reasonably outrageous that an agency that is so involved in the work that we're trying to look out, did not see fit to send a deputy assistant to administrator with these other people who are just as busy as to our bosses are. and that is all i'm going to

say. >> well, go ahead. i hope you won't try to match our dissertation but go ahead. >> of like to clarify -- u.s. for security representative and i am the appropriate person. you have to understand, we are under public law which based diplomatic security responsible for overseas security. the pscs are all provided by diplomatic security and i work closely with them. i helped to engage them, i work under section 862. they are implementing patter -- partner. they're basically private citizens that could be institutional contractors, ngos and subcontractors. >> i appreciate that.

if the other commissioners want to explore this with you, we will give them time for their questions. the way we're going to do this is i'm going to lead off and staff always comes up with this missed the final quarter of commission -- and i'm going to follow a staff recommendation because that is what i do. i want to start off, mr. harrington, to the addendum that we just added with our disappointment related to torres aes. what does it take to terminate as security contractors contract? what does it take from a policy viewpoint, mr. motsek, but i'll start with you, mr. harrington, from an execution viewpoint? you are formally the commander

of defense management contract agency, and in your position present and past, what does it take to terminate a contractor -- because it obviously did not take posting on approved foreign cards? can you talk to me a little bit about what is the policy and the execution guidance that you give your field representatives? gilad yes, chairman thibault. what does it take? it takes a clear specific evaluation of a contractor that presents capability that is not adequate. it takes the judgment of the contracting officer on the ground observing that. it takes the contract and all the sadder -- the contract officer to confirm that that contractors actions or lack thereof are appropriate to not so like that contractor for that

function. i will tell you that i will research that further to ensure that the guidance we have right now, it very much specifically focuses on document contractor performance, good or not good. >> let me ask you to build on that, mr. harrington. do you agree that if you have a contract a torres contract, that the multi-award, each task for competitively awarded, that past performance might be a consideration? >> yes, sir, i do. >> because it was not. i was there and the commander turn to the contract after an almost a testy discussion, she turned and said, while it is something that we will consider in the future. and that is not good enough. mr. motsek, can