>> i think the major banks of the company -- country now old a cap of the larger risks. and that goes to each of the things that you pointed out, each of the potential sources of lost still ahead. again, this is still an unknown. we want to be conservative in making these assessments, as we were a year ago. our supervisors will continue on a regular basis -- one of you said in your opening remarks that rew do not contemplate stress tests along this -- that we do not contemplate stress test along this basis. i hope we do. aggregator lee, quarterly, difficult challenges and

assessments -- regularly, quarterly, and difficult challenges and assessments. carta are you saying that will be ongoing or quarterly? >> -- >> are you saying that will be ongoing or quarterly? >> both. >> you have said that there will not be a new taye are p program. -- t.a.r.p. program. that no money going to gmac. but we do not anttcipate at this stage putting more money into those existing programs or to the institutions. >> in the same way that would appll to chrysler and gm. >> on the underside of your question, we are now on a path

to exit those companies much more quickly at a much lower estimate of losses than we anticipated. at gm, we are drink -- bringing down the risk dramatically. we will continue as aggressively as bbgan to get the government out of those investments -- as we can to get the government out of those investments. those are commitments that we inherited. we are trying to reduce them as quuckly as we can. and fdot low a risk as we can. >> -- and at as low a risk to the taxpayers as began. >> if one of these institutions came to your office and said, we are experiencing liquidity crisis, would you advance the money -- a them money?

>> i do not ever has to as questions because that this kind of impossible. if financial reform is in place, then we have a very well- designed process. and instead of emergency measures than we have in place in the fall of 2008, we would -- i would assume we would make better choices. you're talking about the 12 weeks remaining in this program? >> yes. >> our job and my responsibility is to be sure tte we are safeguarding the basic strength %- the american financial's system. again, our system because of the actions of we took is still in a much larger -- noa much better position than wee were. >> if financial reform is in

place, the same people come to you and say, ttere is a systemic and regulator. the systemic regulator is supposed to look into a crystal ball and see stuff. >> i will say it again. we are not designed a financial reform program and -- we are not designing a financial reform program that looks into this and -- we are born to force the system to run with less leverage, less risk of finding, less exposure to cash risk, and that is the best protection we have against systemic financial crisis. >> the problem with that is that aig was not a mystery to people. most people under -- on wall

street understood that aig was writing trillions of dollars in credit and billions of dollars in mortgage-backed securities. the problem was that even though people recognized it, they did not recognize that as risky behavior. >> i do not agree with that. i think this crisis is litteredd with people feeling o see risks that cause catastrophic damage. aig is a more simple failure. there was nobody responsibll with the authority and capacity to restrain risk taking by that institution. as you said, there were tens of billions across the country, but none of them were responsible for onsidering the risk that aig took on and i was ahead mistake easy to avoid. -- and that was a mistake easy

to avoid. >> you are saying there is one mooe. >> we're not adding regulators. we are reducing the number in our system. all we're oing, quite frankly, is making sure that the people whose job it is to manage financial stability for the country have the authority to constrain risk thinking -- risk taking when it could cause damage. that is what caused the crisis. aig is the perfect example, but not the only example. you could look of bear stearns or merrill lynch or a whole raft of companies that were taking on systemic risk. nobody have the tools or respond slowly to constrain those risks ahead of time. and when they mess up, we did not have the choice to let those failures happen without

catastrophic damage. the great virtue of capital constrained leverage is to recognize the fact that we live in an inherently uncertain world. no one will know with ccnfidence what the response is or the probability is. neilon thing you can do is to force these institutions -- the only thing you can do is to force these institutions to run with less risk. that is an effective tool of concerning risks. -- restrrining risks. >> if you define risk appropriately and you enffrce the rules appropriately. >> again, we think te basic lesson of this crisis is

possible, objectively measurable set constraints on leverage. banks should fund more conservatively. they should not be exposed to the possibility that overnight, people will withdraw tens of billions dollars and put huge pressure on the system. i do not know any credible argument that there is a more effective basic tool then capital constraints on the equityyfunding as a safeguard. it will not prevent firms from failing. we will create a system where firms can still fail. that is an important part of the system. but i do not know of any other alternative. i do not know any other feature that does noo begin with well- designed, measurable risk

taking. they will not keep companies from taking risks, but they will protect the system. " i'm not sure that with -- >> on not sure that with more regulators -- i am not sure that with more regulators that problems will not come from the investment and banking community. they will derive new types of instruments that 10 r 15 years ago we did not see. p+>> maybe we agree more than yu think. but again, the future of our system was not that aig was crawling with the supervisors with the authority to restrain and control risk taking. are right.s present, then you %hanging the deck chairs -- it

is important is it institutions take risks that play this fundamental role in our system need to be subject to conservative restraints on the system. aig was not. we will make sure it is. >> thank you, mr. secretary. mr. silver's? >> i cannot resist continuing this line of discussion. mr. secretary, i think that your fundamental of observations about this set of questions are all absolutely correct. our report on aig showed a two fundamental things. one was that the lines of business that we lead -- had led to aig. the unregulated numbers is just an in-depth vacation of the

impact of aig was just a global -- was an indication of the fact that aig was just a global firm. as a panel, we may disagree with where you did with the choices you had. but it is very clear that the choices that you diddnot have -- in your current role of the bank of n.y., of the treasury. you did not have the ability to pick and choose with the systemic crisis. i would take it a little further from there, though. and we leaaned as a panel, and it is reflected in our report on the day -- on aig, what a

powerful force they exerted on the torrez is available during the crisis. in particular -- on theechoices available during the crisis. in particular, those tied to the regulated guaranteed %-bsidiaries of aig. that is, the insurance companies pupport were tied together by credit rating agencies and the firm. that seems to me a powerful argument that making sure in the future that those that have guarantees behind them are also tied up with risky lines of business. derivatives, proprietary funds, hedge funds and the like. does, -- the irst is the vocal

world. the notion that we ought to say banking companies can outdo proprietary trading, cannot invest in hedge funds, -- cannot do proprietary trading, can on invest in hedge funds because there is a problem. it essentially requires that derivatives dealers not be within a bank holding companies, barack and leased -- but at least there be somebody at the banking lobby -- bank holding companies. could you explain the position today? >> members of the committee, including chairman lincoln and chairman daud, or carefully going through these provvsions to be sure we come to an appropriate balance perido.

we want to follow our key objectives. one is, as you said, the banks are unable to take risks like proprietary trading. or if they use derivatives for proprietary trading, they could imperil the stability of the bank, or allow them to benefit from the access to the safety net that the bank enjoys and extend the benefit of those activities that we do not believe are essential for baking. the other thing to point out -- for banking. the the thing to point out is that an essential part of banking is helping customers hedge their risks, whether those are. we want to make sure that the

bankssare able to hedge their risks. i think it will come to a very good balance.%- this bill will do an excellent -- an exceptionally important thing, bring restraint to the derivatives market. we would still present enormous risks if we were unable to enacc these reforms. >> there are reports being made with respect to both measures i indicated. to essentially weaken them. you spoke a moment about the area in section 17 of derivatives. can you speak to the question of whether banks will be allowed to put meaningful amounts of capital into these

and defense experts are not goinn to comment on the etails -- into these hedge funds? >> i'm not going to comment on the details. i am very confident that this bill will do the necessary >> i would just observe, and my time has expired, but i would just observe that when you're talking about hedged investments under a bank logo, that a diminutive exception could easily blow up the capital structure. it would seem to me that the lesson of our aig report would be to not allow that. >> we are not going to create

risk. we also do not want to support the basic balance of risk taking that we saw in the system. there was no capacity to restrain those risks and abbas not a good outcome foo the system. >>zuj] -- and a that was not a d outcome for the system. >> i would like to hear your rationale for why liquidity was invested innthis part of the banking system, what the goals were from this program. >> i'm sorry, for the -- ? >> the use of the small funds for the non-banks. >> excellent question. the first just dreaded everything that we did in the crisis. -- guided everything that we did in the crisis.

we made sure that credits that did not exist at that time would be open again to american businesses and families. without that, there would be no recovery. for that reason, small banks, as you know, get about half their credit -- small businesses get about half their credit from small banks. for that reason, it seemed fair to make sure that they have the same access to the poor -- to the capital programs. for the reason of fairness and the pragmatic reason that they play a role in these businesses, we thought it was important that they have access as the major institutions did. >> staying with the smaller banking sector, -- and i did not

read the panel's report. it eems like many of these banks -- and small banks also made decisions with these programs leading them to scrammle to get out of the program. this is something to be -- that is important to be able to do in a financial crisis. looking forward, if we ever have another ffnancial crisis, have these programs impaired our ability to inject liquidity into the system given no reluctance -- given the reluctance of the banks to participate in this current program? >> i hope so. the central challenge that you face in designing reforms or the financial system -- the

government will be there to protect your future. that is where these bills are so important, because they give us the tools to definitively aal of those expectations. that is very important because of the things we had to do in the crisis. >> i guess, the difference between injecting liquidity into the system and sort of provvding for failing institttions, i think it is he to inject liquidity into the system. >> i completely agree that the necessary part of the tools in the financial crisis are those that the system can find. without that, the the system

will crash, and our system almost did. and that gambert 2008, we work on the verge of a crash -- in september 2008, we were on the verge of a crash that the banking system had not seen since the great depression. we need to make sure that the government has the funding needs -- meets the funding needs of all solvent into -iistitutio. but in doing that, you have to make sure that people do not make judgments on how much risk they take on the assumption that the government will be there again if they are in prudent in their judgments. that is the classic, vital challenge of getting reform. >> let me turn to the housing market, which was mentioned before. almost 30 years between 1965 and 1995 tte housing is tree was stable. starting in 1995, it grew

dramattcally for a variety of reasons. my own view on the how to market is that we return to a rate of 65% of houses are people who own their own homes. honassuming we get back to a rae that is sustainable, we wouldn't a better program the one in which you design people into and a corporate housing program? >> i think you are describing the objectives that exactly shaped this program, which is why it got so much criticism. our program was designed exactty as you said, to make sure for those americans who can afford

to stay in their home, but they have the option to do that. but this program is not designed to be sustained at a level that would be imprudent. >> i would like to come out to your recent remarks about communnty and regional banks as a key source for credit or small businesses. much of the public focus and our prior reports have been focused on the largest t.a.r.p. recipients that were part of the stress test. ouu july reports that we're working on at the moment are a unique window into the performance and health spof

hundreds and tooassess the bank's program. to help in assessing we have to have clear goals. one thing you just said about accessing capital to large banks, do you want to expand oo that? opposed to too large to fail? >> one of our basic strategy is is to make sure that we are safeguarding the bases security of many americans and we have a financial system that is able to meet those objectives.%- as you said, we have 9000 banks,

not 12,000 and, not 24,000 banks. most small businesses get most of their credit from small banks. the drugs we have bout 2700 community banks -- >> we have about 2700 community banks participating in the program. >> exactly. we have assets remaining in bank's federal $10 million or below in assets, we did that for the simple reason of fairness because they showed the same access that we gave the major institutions. we thought it would be important to make sure there was access to credit on affordable terms. it is a simple process. as you said, it is still a challenge for many of those banks and, therefore, many of

their customers. >> woull be the -- what would be the goals involved in the, how they utilize the capitol? >> if you compare small banks that to occur t.a.r.p. capitol as opposed to those who did not, the spaull bank is lending at about twice the rate as those that -- the small bank is running at about twice the rate as those that would not take capital. and of course, for many banks, access to t.a.r.p. capital meant that they did ot need to do any lending. having said that, fundamentally,

this program did not meet our objectives because as many of you have pointed out, because of concern about the conditions that might come with the future. we have banks that did not want to be subjected to either to the sigma or the fear of conditions, which is why we have legislation pending before the congress that has been pending for six months. it has very carefully funded programs to help banks get through this. when compared to the whole range of alternatives, this seemed like the best process for a set of ccnstraints.

>> we have a program in new york days at the fed.member from your it is comprised of member banks that not only provide equity, acts as an lending consortium to small businesses. it makks loans that the individual funding banks may not have made. we are for it to you as a suggestion. maybe consider it at the national level. because we're nottonly looking at loans passed up by a particular banks, but also the lending. i do not think it is clear under blf that the banks are lending %%under the consortium. >> if you look at the state+

option provided to the small business facility, that option is provided to executive programs. again, the vvrtue in the will we designed this is that if you increase lending, the dividends and go down. that is a great incentive, but also, roviding assistance to states across the country that have those programs. we are n a sense, enhancing a greater diversity of programs as well. >> thank you. >> i was surprised by your answer about the metric for success on the home mortgage foreclosure gramm. -- foreclosure program. but i want to comm back to this.

over the 15 months that the program has been in effect there have been 330,000 so-called modifications. about two-thirds of those are goig to fail. aad that means over 15 months -- and correct me if you have a better estimate -- but over 15 months, that means the hemp program is permanent modifications. that is about 186,000 every month that arr newly possed the faults and foreclosures. i'm caught in the question of what is your metric for success here? >> let's step back and look at the basic strategy that the president put in place alongside

the fed. first, we put down a floor on mortgage prices. we made it more possible that millions of americans would be able to refinance the world to take advantage of lower interest rates. the courts are unfamiliar with -- >> i am familiar with what you have done overall. the problem is that what -- more than 1 million families this year will lose their homes to foreclosure. hampstead is it. >>. -phamp -- what's hamp hamp doesy to make sure that a set of

foreclosure have the chance to do that. and again, the members are -- the numbers are 1.1 million will try for modifications and 1.1 million will see modifications. >> as superintendent neeman said, we will find out what the consequences are of that. one of the early modification programs acttally got people in more trouble. it raised overall payments and got them in more trouble than they started out with. what do you have to show for it? >> we have 1.2 million americans that have a reduction in their payments, had a chance,

therefore, to keep their homes.+ >> and passed up other argentines that they might have had to deal with their foreclosures. -- past of other opportuuities that they might have had to deal with their foreclosures. and the point is that they've lost their homes. what is it to say that a family -- how do we decide when the program is working? >> you look at its results family by family, foreclosure by foreclosure, a change in monthly payments by change in monthly payments. in looking at that, these programs could not have been designed esponsibly to try to prevent a set of foreclosures

that were probably unavoidable. >> help me with the metric. arr you saying preventiig one foreclosure would have been enough for $60 billion? >> zeyno. did you have an estimate when you start of this? >> the virtue of the program that we have laid out is that we have given everyone detailed numbers they can look at. >> yoo say we designed the program from the beginning and in effect you are saying, not to save everyone. i understand that. you have designed around servicers. servicers have done a terrible job. you have designed it around3

we economy of hundreds left to prevent thousands of foreclosures. -- we only have hundreds left to prevent thousands of foreclosures. >> these proggams will outlast the expiry of charge. as you have seen, we have added to this basic framework of loan modifications games a series of programs. we will keep working on that. i will never stand before this body or any other body and over going to do. -- and over-claim for what this program is going to do. >> we must stop.

i am running over and it is not fair to my colleagues. mr. make walters. >> mr. secretary, if you could turn back the last quarter of 2008, what changes would you make to the t.a.r.p. and be said? what did you learn from your experience? >> the best i can tell you is that the forms we proposed for managing the future, we're doing is giving that enaated in past -- and passed so that we can again tell the american people thht we have a reasooable chance of preventing this from happening again.

that is what i am working on at the mommnt. the basic framework in the reform bill for rescue programs is much better. >> y unanimous vote of the battlpanel, it was a four-vote . the government's failed to exhaust all options before committing $787 billion in t.a.r.p. funds to help aig. throughout its rescue of aig, the government failed to address perceived conflicts of

interest. even at this late stage, it remains unclear whether taxpayers will be repaid in full. i think it is only fair that you be permitted to respond. >> i do not agree with those conclusions, except perhaps the fourth. which says, and i say all the time that the carrot is still exposed to risk with aig. -- the government is still exposed to risk with aig. this hamp in the peak -- this mess in the hamp in the peak of the crisis, this has come darnell a tiny fish -- come

down now a tiny bit because we have been so careful in managing the risks we're going to be continually selling off the risk to minimize lost and we are working hard to make sure that there are a set of financial reforms to make that happen. the basic package of these protections will be in a position to both prevent and better manage mistakes like that. >> on a slightly different, but i think related note, when does the administration returned fannie and freddie toothh private sector? >> i'm not sure when it is framed quite that way, but let

me answer it this way. we are deep into a process of examining what set of reforms should replace the current system that we have in the housing and finance market. those required -- those would require somethiig well beyond the basic problems then prevented the gst's. -- the gse's. i have said publicly that we expect to recommend senate broad reforms sometimes -- sometime next month. a and i would point out that thh losses that we still face in these institutions are losses that we inherited.

at our assistance, they have put in place much more conservative uuderwriiing standards. they're bringing down riss and restitution quite significantly. institutions today are being run much more conservatively, as you might expect. i think we're going to find -- i hope we will find broad support in the congress. this is the kind of reform that these institutions and the housing market needs. >> thank you. my time is up. >> i want to take you back to a fellow panelist who cited home ownership levels from 1965 to 1995 as something that we ought to be aspiring to.

and your response is that is exactly where reward -- where we are trying to get to. i will give you a chance to modify your answer. from 1965 to 1995, the flight number give assistance to economies of color. but cannot be we go back to. -- that cannot be what we go back to. i want to talk about the shift in foreclosures, which i think is evident iran the question of people's ability to pay. it cannot be -- is evident around the question of people's ability to pay. it cannot be that of people cannot find employment that they should be thrown out of their rooms.

>> our policies are not designed to sustain home ownership ates at a level that we think is not sustainable. it caanot be our objective. i think it is true that we need to not just need the needs, but play keep huge role in -- play huge role in the financing in the system. as you have pointed out, there or big gains in access -- those big gains in access to credit that our system generated also came with fraud and abuse. that happened on because of the present regulation, but because

a system that did not provide protections. we do know that we have a whole range of incentives across the american financial system that were designed to encourage home ownership. it is important to recognize in our broad housing policies, and this would be true for the housing and gse arket, we will try to make sure that americans have access to affordable housing programs, but not sustain an investment level in housing that was part of this basic question. having said thht, i have from your second question.

>> unemployment. >> thank you for oing that. we have done a continuous series of innovations from the beginning of this program. we're going to design programs that will directly help the unemployed reduce the payments on their homes, but also we will also work to encourage much less in the program. we will announce a range of programs to help the unemployed in their states 3 range of other types of innovative programs at the state level -- through a range of other types of

innovative programs at the state level. as you said, unlike the early stages of the foreclosure crisis, the principal driver that we see is unemployment. >> two responses. one is, i think there is an issue of relationship of scale to the problem. the scale is simply inadequate. i think we have models in pennsylvania. you have three months. i hope your thinking about that. i did so of the data is contrary to what some of my colleagues would say -- i think some of the data is contrary to what some of my colleagues would say. starting in iran in 2002, 2003, we saw an -- starting in 2002, 2003, we saw a set of unsustainable practices begin to take control.

>> that is one good way to think about it, but you also left you think about -- you also have to think about the credii crisis. roughly 8 million haveelost their jobs in this credit crisis. >> i would like to clarify the miserly do not believe that we should have a process -- that i certainly do not believe that we should process in which people find as the rooms when they lose their income. should be homeless. i think it is important to recognize that not everyone needs to own a home. by think renting is a perfectly viable option.

people need to pick what best fits their financial situation. maybe programs that help move people out of a situation that may be is not a cooporate into one that is a of corporate, even if it is not -- that maybe is not appropriate into one that is inappropriate, even if it is not owning their own home, especially as it is designed in the way that they did to keep people in their homes is not that effective. maybe you could comment on that. . .

>> a fund all mental responsibility of washington is to make sure we are repairing those mistakes. we want to make sure that people damaged by those mistakes have a that is a responsible and good news. recognizing that we cannot reach everyone and different solutions will be a program for different people and we get a lot of challenges, but those two mistakes are the ones we need to fix in financial reform and i am

confident we can do that. >> to build on the comments made previously -- do you think the government's should be playing a role significantly in the future in financing in the mortgage market? does the federal government have any particular advantage over the private-sector which would suggest that they needed to play a role in that sector? >> i want to alter the basic framework i have laid out on this. i think there will be a good policy case for the government promoted the objectives of access to reasonable housing options for low income americans. cess to reasonable housingg options for low-income americans. that's an important objective. i believe in that objective. we need to make sure e do it as carefully going forward. i also believe it's likely that we'll determine t will be n appropriate role for the

government providing some form of guarantee to help make sure that there are broader housing finance market are able to provide credit in recessions and downturns. that's a very important basic debate. we are going to have that debate when we talk about reforms. but having looked at a variety of different models, there will be a reasonable case for petaining a limited role for government and providing that kind of basic guarantee. how to do that is a challenge. i want to make sure that where you do that -- have to pay for that guarantee and the terms will have added capital against risk. these are the kinds of questions we're will bing at in the context of reform. you are -- what do you know %- that the american public isnnt

aware where and why hasn't that been conveyed to the american public? >> i think the american public was left with thh impression that the government of the united states came in and wrote checks for $700 billion to our nation's largest financial institutions and they will never see that money again. pnd that initial perception that was created by the critics of this program hardened and % has been a challenge. as you on this committee have found. particularly of those that have been here since the beginning. the reality, of course, is different. we've only put out about half of that authority. we have more than half back. this administration that came into office didn't write a single check to our nation's largest banks. we wrote $700 billion to small community banks across the country. as i said, this program is generating a very substantial positive return to the american people and we are going to

ppreturn hundreds of billions o dollars of authority. how often does that happen in washington to meet our long-term needs? those are the facts and realities of this practice. if you compare that record, not just against the expectations of the critics, not just against the expectations of the architects but the experience of any major country in a crisis, it is a remarkably effective program. highest return on the use of a dollar of taxpayers' money than i think almost anything the government has done in this crisis. now -- >> mr. secretary, this is your time and we are over the time. i still want to give superintendent neiman a last round of questions. we are past the time. >> but acknowledging thatt this cost a huge amount damage. we are going to be living with the aftershocks of that for a long time. we are still in the beginning of repairing that basic damage and it's going to take more

time. >> thank you, mr. secretary. superintendent neiman. >> in my opening statement, you know, congress' finalizing financial reform that will have implications for decades, both nationally and internationally. many are glad to see the u.s. acting on regulatory reform. i've heard from foreign government fficials that they are very much pleased that we're moving ahead. they are probably not saying it asspublicly as they should. i'm particularly very proud of the sick -- significant areas of the world, things like the %- volcker rule, executive pay and risk. however, we all know that these also -- these issues acting as a first mover do raise issues around global competitiveness, regulatory arbitrage and regulatory gaps around the

world. would you mind sharing with us the standard you would apply when determining the u.s. must leaddand when the u.s. mustt lead in global concert? >> weeare trying to do so together. we are trying to fix the things we got wrong but at the same time we laid out our basic objectives of reform. we negotiated internationally a broad consensus on the set of broad objectives internationally that would parallel the basic strategy we adopted here. you will see when the g-20 leaderssmeet in toronto on saturday and sunday they -- a remarkable commitment across the major economies through that set of basic principles for providing better oversight, better transparency and disclosure, better protections against risk takkng on a more even standard and across the major markets. we could have decided to move place high standards here and pull the world to these standards over time.

we decided to move together. now, we have a very difficult challenge ahead in negotiating a new set of capital standards for the globally active banks and that will be the critical test of our capacity. again, to pull the world to a higher standard. but we come to that with a remarkably strong position because we were able to move so quickly in the united states to recapitalize our system with private capital, replace the government's investments early and, therefore, our firms on most measures have less leverage, more capital, more the kind of capital you need against future losses. and that gives us a very strong position in those discussions. again, the best way for us to shape that consensus, to make sure we come to the table having acted to fix the things we got wrong in the united states, and we are, i believe that the reforms congress will enact will be a good model for the world and will give us

enormous credibility in trying to pull the world to those higher standards. >> are there other examples like capital where thh u.s. has to act to be a first mover if there's not a global concert on that particular area? >> again, we are going to try to make sure we're moving in pair less. derivatives is anothee example. anything where they can move quickly to evade the weakest pegulation. derivatives is a great compamplet again, we want to make sure that all these firms and all these markets are operating under much more rigorous standards for disclosure anddtranspareecy. otherwise, again, the risk will move to the dark and will leave us more risk in the future. we will try to make sure that, you know, we are going to dramatically strengthen the competitiveness of the u.s. financial system. as we have done well in the past, make sure we put in high

standards for protection for investors nd in the u.s. %%rketplace and we are going to do everything we can to make sure the world joins us in that cause. >> thank you. >> thank you. we now bring to a conclusion our 21st hearing of the congressional oversight panel. we want to thank you, mr. secretary, for being here with us today. the record will be held open for any [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> search the congressional chronicle at the cspan video

library. for a snapssot of all the members of the 111th congress, the cspanncongressional directory available at." c-span.org/store. >> the house is in session at 10:00 eastern. it will have a bill to grant subpoena power to the commission looking at the causes of the gulf oil spill. and we will look at the future of afghanistan commander general stemming the crystal. he is meeting today with president obama about his criticism of the president and his staff. more about the gulf oil spill and the future of drilling at 8:30 eastern from a member of the energy and commerce