i misled you a little bit when i said the money is based on revenue. not all of those criminals are equally a problem, some are warlords, some are actually taliban. what we are concerned is what fraction of revenue goes into phe worst of the criminal elements. . .

they're going to be hurt the least and may even benefit if the less powerful organizations are effectively the target of the enforcement. overall, aggressive enforcement successfully targeted may end up in powering the organization's most capable of intimidating or corrupting the sources of information that are driving the targeting. i not like to be sour grades but it is my job. mark will give you something that is more uplifting. >> i am the brenner of the good news. the bad news as you just heard is that our current policy in

afghanistaa consists mostly of banging our heads against a brick wall. the good news is that it report -- it reportedly feels very good when we stop. we have some street for things to do. less of the things that are hurting us. there's a story told about president coolidge coming out of church. a reporter came up and asked about the sermon, what did agree to talk about. coolidge said, sin. he was against it. it is widely agreed that we should be against drugs. -pheroin growing in afghanistan is bad for heroin addicts, that for their families, bad for their neighbors, that for the afghan government, good for the taliban, and therefore it is

said since drugs are bad, counter narcotics efforts are good, and if some is good, more is better. there is a widely shared piety in the international drug control regime is that we should be doing more to fight them. you will get a lot of head nods about that. in particular, it is claimed that sinne the taliban and makes money off of the government -- and the government is weakened, counternarcotics is counterinsurgency. but as the doctor pointed out, it is not necessarily so. the natural result of counter narcotics efforts is to increase the flow of funds to dealers an+ to increase the shareeof those funds going to insurgents, warlords, and drug officials. every enforcement action creates

a loser. someone gets arrested. everybody else innthe trade is a winner. they just lost a competitor. if you bombed all the ford plants, chrysler would be happy. as john caulkins just pointed out, the winners are likely to be the people with the muscle. the winners in the drug enforcement game are going to be this project to resist enforcement. increase in enforcement intensity increases the competitive advantage of the worst organizations. and has been pointed out, counternarcotics tends to concentrate drug activity where the government is weakest.

you will see a lot of people boasting -- 27 of the 34 provinces are substantially poppy 3. that is an accomplishment to be proud of until you realize that what that means is that the other seven provinces of afghanistan now produce the entire supply of illicit opium throughout the entire world, virtually. we have given them authority over the entire heroin production of the world. it does not sound at great state like that. mike in the garden told me -- my kindergarten teacher told me to always offer constructive criticism. we do have some ideas. we can target enforcement. we do not have given to the

natural tendency. take the u.s. for example. the fbi's concentration on the mafia means that the effort. -- the mafia never had a piece of that production. we have a large group of organized crrminal groups that never got a piece of that. the fbi waa all over them, no self respecting cocaine dealer would have anything to do with the mafia. but we can imagine doing that in afghanistan. we can go to heroin traffickers in afghanistan and saying, there is opium that comes from the talent and and and does not come from the taliban. if you are selling the wrong stuff, you're going to be the focus of our attention. the sad fact in afghanistan is that many of the groups that help the taliban and out in 2001, the no. alliance was in a trade association of heroin dealers. and yet those same warlords are

perfectly happy to sell helmont- derived heroin into north and central asia. you can imagine going to one of those groups and saying, we're paying attention to your sources. which ever exporter is selling the most caliban-backed heroin will get our undivided attention. that would require knowing where the stuff came from, which would require more detailed chemical signature analysis than we are currently doing. not stated the art, but beyond what we're currently doing. and the capacity to actually target the enforcement, which under afghan conditions may be complicated. the problem but targeting enforcement is that it opens up the door to influence and corruption. how you distinguish targeted enforcement to corrupt enforcement is not an easy problem.

corruption is unambiguously that. if we could displace the corrupt government officials and replace them with our government officials, that would be wonderful. it is not clear how much capacity u.s. government has for that or how much tolars the afghan government would have for that. it is also possible to reduce the level of corruption by reorganizing the enforcement machinery. concentrated enforcement is an inducement to corruption. there is only one agency to in the enforcement. if you can corrupt agency, you are golden. think about drug enforcement in the u.s. -- multiple agencies all working the same account. a tracker who buys protection from the local police chief is not buying all that much. the fbi is looking. if there were many enforcement

efforts in afghanistan rather than one, each one might be less corruptible. change in the afghan government and we do not have any direct capacity to bring that about, and might have other consequences since multiple enforcement agencies, as we discovered, and up interruptingg each other.. that is how the dea was born. we get to world development, -- rural development. not alternative development. not writing people not to go poppy. we're not when it change the amount of poppy growing. we can only move it around the country. if we went to the farmers and helped make them rich, rather than help them stop growing poppy, we could do development the right way. we're not paying the caliban --

taliban attacks. if you want help growing pomegranate, you better be sure that there is some poppy growing, because that is what brings in the development money. if you uncouple the development from opium production, you can make friends. and finally demand destruction is unambiguously good. a drug program that wooks even a little bit, that is better to nothing. those are all productive suggestions, and i hope we're clear on how limited the capacity is. i am worried that if we focus

entirely on a constructive suggestion, we will relabel all our current efforts under a new set of labels and keep doing what we're doing, which is mostly mistakes. even if there's not much that we can do that does more good than harm, that is still not a reaaon to keep doing a lot of stuff that does mooe harm than good. if you are beating your head against the brick wall, the fact that there is no stone wall available as an alternative is not a reason to keep doing it. the point is to stop. the overwhelming recommendation is to do these things if we can learn to do them, do less of what hurts us. that will lead to complaints from iran and russia. that has already led to substantial push back from

russia and ron saying today the united states what the united states has been saying to mexico and colombia, which is, why are you not solving our drug problem? well, why don't we stop using drugs? if that was the case, if the price fell, consumption would grow, not very much. a 15% increase in price might lead to something like a 10% increase of consumption. it is not trivial. help the drug prevention and treatment efforts in russia.

russia has been much less so, still in a primitive drug war phase. we might help them out of that. but we have to expect that any cutbacks will lead to criticism. it is not clear to me that we ought to take the advice about our policy in afghanistan from two governments that would desperately love to see us fail in afghanistan. our current counter narcotics policy in afghanistan provides material support and resources to the taliban. that is our basic conclusion. the basic advice is to stop as much as we can, do less of what we're doing that is harmful. if we want to break the momentum of the taliban, a good place to start would be to not fill their coffers.

that is our story and we're sticking to it. and now the actual truth. >> as professor hyman comes up, if you can see from this presentation of this study, that was supposed to be the good news. this is also why we have another person here to present the view from the administration as well as others. they will have their opportunity here very shortly to give their thoughts on this. before that, professor heymann. >> i'm about 10% a good economist as any of that 3. and that worries me about giving my thoughts. on the othee hand, economists led to the economy that we now have. sometimes they are wrong.

indeed, often they are wrong. the question that i want to put to you and to them -- how sure are we of their conclusion? john caulkins said that the drug world is very complicated. afghanistan is very complicated. when you put into effect, if you get an extremely complicated situation. in fairness to the authors, they have noted that they have to be modest about their conclusions because of the complications of the situation. but they have fairly simple, straightforward, general principles to apply to a very complicated situation. their argument goes -- there is

an extremely simple minded answer which they are rejecting, and that is drugs are bad, so counter drugs are good. they have moved us to an intermediate level where they are applying microeconomics intelligently to the problem. but there is a ground level where they admit to a good bit of uncertainty, and that is the area i will explore with you a little bit. ok, it gives me pause to think that if we ask the taliban to vote on whether there should be reduce drug production that they are taxing, and we're being told intelligently they would answer yes -- reducing the drug

production would increase their tax revenues. their position would be exactly the same as our present position. that is powerfully counterintuitive. let's see why they might really want to object to an increase of law enforcement against their taxation of drug production. let me step back first and say what i think a strong and what i think this week. the argument of the analysts is that there are only two pure reasons why we might go after drugs in afghanistan. one, to reduce the drug problem. two, to reduce the insurgency problem. they make a case that the arguments that either of those

would take place to a significant extent -- extent is very weak. they have convinced me of that. the result of that is to say, we should not be paying much attention to drug enforcement in afghanistan. i think they take the argument further and say, indeed, we are harming ourselves in the drug war and in the war against the television if we engage in drug enforcement. that takes a little bit further than i am comfortable. let me just say why i find a more modest version of their on drugs, i find a modest

version convincing because there are so many alternative locations to grow the drugs inside and outside of afghanistan. and because demand is very inelastic, even at the retail level, and the effect on demand on anything that takes place at the growing level, a tiny part of the price, is not likely to a don't think we can have much effect on the drug problem, even if it was our problem rather than europe's problem and russia's problem and ron's problem. i don't think we could have much effect on it. much for the reasons that they say, drug enforcement in afghanistan. on the other hand, as they pointed out, in those areas where -- the 17 provinces that

are largely free of poppy growth, it would not make touch, as mark kleiman teaches in his book the bill refers to, to keep them poppy-free -- and i would certainly keep them poppy-free. the question is, how much attention should we pay to stopping the poppy growth and sailed from the seven remaining provinces. i think they make the case that as the drug issue it does not make of all lot of difference. -- an awful lot of difference. they are all over that part of the world, throughout all the - stans, you coulddgrow poppies in very large quantities and move them easily.

i find a modest ffrm of argument that this is pat counterinsurgency law a little weaker. that is the part that i wonder about. at one point, they argued that drugs account for a small part of the taliban's overall revenues. dependence on other countries, more moderate countries, who make -- who might make demands in exchange -- that is not a3 billion could be replaced doesn't establish that it is not a good form of counterinsurgency to make them rely on saudi bankers. the second part of the argument

-- this is the part that troubles me, they make me nervous because they are better economists than i am. the second part of their argument is that if you increase the costs of production by law enforcement in the seven provinces, by $100 a kilo, let's say. that will result in an increase in price at retail of least $100 per kilo -- i will buy that. and reducing quantity that is less than proportional to that increase in price. the decrease in quantity lesser

proportion to that, and the result is that total revenues will increase. all of that, by the way, tends to ignore -- i am sure that they thought about it but they did not tell us about it -- the very large stockpiles of opium waiting there to be released. but increase in total revenues does not necessarily increase the take of the taliban. if the taliban has to provide protection at a cost, which passes through increasing revenue, they will get richer -- greater revenues but not necessarily greater cost. that is a place that i am troubled. i like to hear from you about that.

are you with me? in other words, there will be greater revenues but there may not be greater profits. ok. if they are right about that, and now i feel like i am stepping off into deep water, john caulkins is right and mark kleiman and the other gentleman, about the desirability of having a bad crop, why don't wheat farmers demand an increase in taxation of wheat to raise the price? i am asking the question -- jonathan caulkins said that afghanistan is different. what makes afghanistan different in that regard? why isn't there a strong argument against law enforcement

in every case? because in every case, law enforcement will raise the price of something that sells on and inelastic marquette -- on an elastic -- inelastic market? they may have a very good answer to that and it may be going through your mind, too. i wanted to ask it. their whole argument is based safely on the advantage to the taliban getting increased revenues. i will raise the question

whether they will increase the profits when they get increased revenues. but less assume that they did get increase profits. when you think about what to do with an organization like the taliban or al qaeda, a good starting point is to think about all the things that they need to operate. aside resources, they need hagens, weapons, popular support, and absence of informants, knowledge of the opposing plans, leadership, intimidation capacity, corruption capacity, communications, outside alliances -- i just went to a lot but you would not be a but think of too many more things that they need. the argument oes as far to say

that the revenues increase with law enforcement. law enforcement may decrease th3 it may be that the planters of opium or the families of planters are a great source of recruits. that may turn out to be a complicated story. but you have asked a question -- i am 90% but you have to ask the question, besides revenues, what this law enforcement helps or harms in terms of all the other things that the taliban and needs. and then finally, i am left wondering how much of the

difference in actual plans on the ground their argument will make. i am interested in hearing their reaction to this. they do not want to stop whatever law enforcement is necessary to keep 17 provinces relatively opium-3. -- opium-free. that was not changed. we have a low capacity to fight the drug trade on the ground in these seven provinces. we will have to pursue counter insurgency in other ways first. what is it exactly that they would change, except this. -- the american spirit of hopefulness, which in this case may be somewhat ridiculous to

think that we'll have a major affect on the insurgency by fighting the drug war in the place where it is hardest to fight, with a surplus drugs already immense, and from which the drug production can easily moved elsewhere. ok. [applause] ba >> you will have an opportunity to answer questions. but first, let me invite the head of the white house office that deals with these issues to make a couple of comments. obvious questions that have been raised by this study, and, well, here. it is great to have you here.

how would pass it to you if you like to say something. >> thanks very much. i very much appreciate the instituteehosting this. and putting this together and the work of john and jonathan and mark. and also fills remarks about this. for people who do not live and breathe the drug policy issue every day, and particularly in afghanistan, you have been very helpful in explaining just how incredibly complex this is. the other part that i appreciate is that you have been able to distinguish among the various countries and what perhaps might have been more effective in mexico doesn't necessarily mean that that same strategy is the active in colombia, and that it is strategy -- that it is affected in afghanistan.

i think that there are some other things that are not quite in this dynamic and fast-moving environment. especially the change of command in afghanistan, and the fact that the policy would remain the same. we have the opportunity to work closely with ambassador holbrooke and with a number of people to write the counternarcotics strategy. there is government-led eradication within afghanistan. there is also the good performers initiative that rewards those provinces that produce considerably less. the other part is that i think it is not just the united states that has a new look for a new format for our drug policy,

which puts far more emphasis in the areas of prevention and treatment than merely a law enforcement and criminal justice. it is also a number of institutions -- a number of nations around theeworld also approaching their drug problem in a balanced way. after the two presidents obama and the dead -- meddvedev met, it was also about how could you deal with the very enlarged population. you bringing this to the attention of the world community about the problems and the complexity, it is one that is appreciated by many of us that

live and breed drug policy every day. and thank you so much. >> would you like to comment? >> thanks. i wanted to mention first of all that before i came to work at the state department, i was working at the center on international cooperation at new york university, which is the sponsor of the study, and my colleague from cic is with me here. and we started this project which you now see before i started with a government. it was an extension of work that we had previously carried out on counterinsurgency and counternarcotics in afghanistan because we were worried and concerned that -- at that simple equation that mark mentioned earlier. and i want to bring up one. that jonathan caulkins made very

clearly, in the political context, it is the money rather than the drugs, per ce, that does harm. we decided to go further than our previous work by trying to find some real experts on policy analysis, in particular that of law enforcement, drug markets, and we were very fortunate in doing that. however, that said, we have no control over the outcome of the studyy now that i'm in the government, we welcome the findings and we hope to learn from them. i hope that my presence here does not mean an endorsement. but the president has said that our operations in afghanistan and pakistan and the region are most important national security priorities.3 more material money, people, and resources to it, but we have to

keep thinking constantly about what we're doing in this comppex situation. this analysis will be a great help in doing that, but the real test will be the results on the ground. this analysis will help us to analyze that, but it will not substitute for them. i do think the panelists for provocative analysis and a look for to further discussion. i wanted to larify two points that i should mention. and i want to thank professor heymann for useful comments. and it's a reference to saudi assistance to the taliban. the government of saudi arabia is a very important partner of the united states in combating terrorism in afghanistan, including financing for the taliban. this has been increasing over time. it is one of the best partnerships that we have had. there are true that private individuals there and in other regions in the country who do make such connributions. and the administration in addition to moving away from

eradication has moved toward a rural development policies such as mark recommended, that is not tied strictly to alternative development -- alternative livelihoods. we have a huge agricultural program for afghanistan which it nationwide. -- which is nationwide. it is no longer the case that we afghanistan program -- are agricultural program is targeted at the entire sector. >> we will invite you in a moment to ask your questions. but there are a couple of good question. with the taliban object to what profits go up? why don't wheat farmers asked for this help?

revenues to increase with law enforcement. and then the interestinggone as well, what on the ground which recommendations be? >> the first thing i should say is that it is true that economists have messed up the economy. none of these people have a deeree in economics so none of us are to be blamed for the meltdown. why do we farmers ask for production and the weak prices? they do. the new deal agricultural policy was to cut back on production to increase prices. sugar farmers want tariffs on

sugar imports. milk producers want to say. reduced production is something that our farmers are abouu a lot. with the taliban want less -- with the taliban and what less production? it is complicated. there's one place where we do not see perfectly i'd like. my view is that the government- led eradication efforts is paying people to not grow poppies said that it can be taliban. i am not sure that that is a good idea. taliban would pay that theyy started growing poppies in the north. there are governance issues about that out so i'm not sure how that comes out. but with resppct to enforcement within the taliban's on area, --

own area, i'll leave my colleagues as to the hard question. i learned a long time a gun -- i'd go that professor heymann's easy questions are hard for me. >> why at -- why does law enforcement have perverse effects there? you only really like the contraction of supply if you are effectively the monopolist.3 lots of other producers, you don't want someone to come in shrink your supply. fundamentally -- the fundamental premise of the and the critique of the analysis is that afghanistan is 95%, and p hil made a good point.

it is not literally a tax. there's not a statute in afghanistan did his finds this tax rate. let's use the metaphor for a minute. if the character of the tax or an excise tax, so they got $500 per kg, been shrinkinggkilograms would shrink their revenues. it the character of the tax is more like a sales tax, a percentage of the value of the goods, that shrinking the product -- it dries up the total value of the market and that is what they can tax. thank you for forcing estimate implicit -- explicit the implicit assumptions that one way or the other they will capture a share of the total dollar flow, not like an excise tax.

i am glad that he asked about illogic, and it does not apply everywhere. here are the crucial differences. there's a technical economic terms about the inelastic cities of demand depending on how much prices go up when quantity goes down a little bit. i tried not successfully to explain that that keep parameter for the exports from afghanistan is only 20% as large assit is inside a market like united states. that is a crucial difference and it has to do with that inflation and the value per kg as the drug moves down the distribution chain. it is much less favorable to law enforcement back in afghanistan and it would be here. the second reason why law

enforcement looks different in this context is that when you squeeze on supply, you will do great things for the quantity consumed. and not as good things or even perverse things to the total dollars. most of the time when we're thinking about law enforcement in the united states, we're willing to not make progress on reducing the dollar's if we')e making good progress on the quantity being consumed. but when the united states is thinking about afghanistan, and kilograms produced does not verily directly affect the it is more hemispheric beenuse global. most of it stays in the hemisphere. we get most of our drugs from the western hemisphere. and we do not really like regular criminals in the united

states making extra money, but the expense to which we dislike extra money going to the taliban insurgency may be even more. >> it is not to say that the majority of uus. law enforcement is well spent. if we only had 250,000 drug dealers in prison and set a 500,000 people in prison, we would still have drug dealers on the streets. >> this is a question, not an3 it is not the quannity produced that goes down, it would be some above, but the costs of producing that going up by having a higher -- having to pay

more in the way of corruption, and does your logic continue to apply them? >> i am really glld that you brought thht up. he said that before and it is a good point. it is easiest to think through for eradication reducing the amount of opium. by now -- right now, the people producing the heroin are spending $80 a kg for the opium they buy from the farmers. they're selling it at $2,000 a+ kilogram. what happens that they have to pay the farmers more, $150 a kilogram instead of $80? it did not change their export price and they just ate it, then that increasing cost took away from their net revenues and their profit, then the analysis

-- that changes everything, you are absolutely right. another implicit assumption is that this distribution chain, like most distribution chains, will pass on price increases. what you can come back and say to me is, do you have direct empirical evidence of that? can you point to the data? and the answer is no. our information about distribution chains inside afghanistan are inadequate. we are importing the belief based on just how distribution chains work in general, both in the legal economy and other illegal drug distribution chain. >> one more question falling on that question, which is the illustration he made earlier. what difference on the ground to your conclusions drive you to?

>> focus on corruption. rather than living in the background problem. figure out how to do that targeting. there is a lot of bargaining going on, but the non-targeted is worse than useless. it is helping the bad guys. let's not do any enforcement activity that we do not rigid against anyone that we do not have reasonable expectation that there bad. we don't completely agree on this. i am not -- the analysis raises the question of the government- led eradication.

and the implication about prevention and treatment. one operational thing you have to do is respond to russian and iranian complaints, and i think that gives us something to say back, which is partly, work on your drug treatment. [unintelligible] >> inasmuch that weird powerron the consequences of the drug policy, -- that we are dour on the consequences of drug policy, we may be getting permission to folks making policy to think about symbolism. and this relates to phil's comment, is it only the money? sentimentally it is about hearts

and minds. and in some dimension of drug policy, it can be pursued in a way that captures hearts and minds, and you're not going to -- you are free to meet -- think more and weigh more heavily those considerations. if the treatment centers have a modest impact on the drug market but had a big impact on how people in afghanistan perceive the concerns of the american taxpayers to their problems, then that may be more salient than if they thought it was having a larger effect. >> very good. this go to the question. >> and from the national defense council foundation. i like to thank you very much. my question -- we talked about russia and afghanistan a little beth, but what about pakistan, pacifically the isi --

specifically the isi? do they have right counternarcotics role to play? or they may have a seat onnthe >> anyone want to take a shot that? >> unfortunately we're going to duck because it is not the direct focus. but there are people in pakistan making money from this drug trade. some of the action goes through pakistan and the pakistan its profit from that. the second thing is, we talk about the fact that we might be able to move the trade more easily than you can eliminated. moving in and out of

afghanistan may been that if you focus only in afghanistan. depending on where it moves, it3 moving to pakistan could not be ruled out. >> i run the drug policy project. this is washington and no one likes to hear bad news. it means a lot did you come here and address this. thank you very much for coming. my question has to do with the purity of afghan heroin in the region. many attics in afghanistan and surrounding countries are3 fairly pure. if we could dramatically reduce the supply of heroin, either through aerial spraying or that is trafficking the region, or to high-level interdiction, as we've seen in other places traffickers tend to buy their drugs to the point where it is no longer smokable. intravenous drug use becomes the

most efficient means of delivery. have you thought about the consequences to afghanistan and the surrounding countries, especially pakistan, and are these countries in any shape to begin to handle a massive spy and intravenous drug use? -- spike in intravenous drug users? which would mean hiv in drug usage. >> i'm going to have to pass. it is a serious point. even call it eve -- even if we cull it, it is not necessarily good. i'll accept that. the prospect for a large increase are there. >> year raised hiv which is

tremendously important. let me raise a story -- laid out a store. is this about arts and minds? and hiv is a serious problems. if it seems that someone wants to think about whether or not we wanted to discuss in the context of our drug policy efforts to of prevent the spread of hiv, which it been a terrible problem. there are pros and cons. you can imagine a horrible backlash if we are perceived as distributing needles. they are conservative and it is way beyond my pay grade to think through the implications of that. hiv will be an important problem and someone might want to think about whether or not there are actions there that would further the interests.

>> i am.. the institute. i was just wondering how to recommendations might change, if at all, given the current efforts at reconciliation and reintegration under waa. if the bad guys are no longer identifiable? >> the first thing to say about that is thank you for setting that up. you're not respond enough credit for it. -- not gotten enough credit for. my basic take on the reconciliation process is that it will certainly be true that it somehow some of the current insurgent efforts get reconciled in to the government, and attacking them is no longer the objective. i am assuming hey will not be everybody.

i presume that the taliban will not be coming in. place, there still. be out there and there will be other warlords. it still makes sense to shape your drug enforcement in the interests of restoring governance in the country, which is not identical to the other. >> i don't think we have it any more details to add to that. >> i'm wiih afghan american service. i wanted asked about the problem with alternative development, at taliban is taxing the legitimate crops that are being exported. alternative development in the poppy-free regions where they had considerable success with legitimate afghan --

agriculturrl sectors? if you elaborate on that a bit. >> is a great question. i would preface my answer that i am not an expert on afghanistan. i am a counternarcotics expert. what would like is that my answer be one of the talks that table with a lot of other factors also being listened to. yes, if you just focus on the dollars to the taliban, it is an argument for addressing alternative development in the more secure parts of the country. rewarding the parts of the country that have succeeded in getting away from poppy cultivation and succeeded in achieving a measure of normalcy , rather than thinking of

alternative development and the combined tactics, which makes sense if you think as soon as the marines are done shootiig, then all the insurgents and the warlord influence and power has disappeared. they mapped -- that may not be there may be places where we have won the shooting, but you still have to worry about the protection. that would be an argument for that. shifting more to the safer parts of the country. >> let me follow that or you can follow up. >> go ahead. >> your thoughts on the incentives of a government-led

eradication, if you have had the opportunity. >> and then mark can tell you why i am wrong. i think that there areetwo very different strategies and you haveeto make a hard choice which direction you are going to go. one approach is to say, let the poppies blum a lot places, because then the market share of the portions heavily influenced by the taliban shrinks. that turns a blind eye to potential competitors. i just cannot imagines that we would embrace that wholeheartedly, so i'm sitting on the opposite side of the camp, which is to say, we should try this afghanistan be as normal as possible, to be able to jane newman is say to

afghanistan and to the russians and to the world, we worked hard in this world. we have a couple of successes in this area. we're not opposed to eradication across the board, but opposed to eradication in those places where angry farmers could be quickly recruited. >> i think we've heard both sides. >> from the criminal justice policy foundation. if we are spending about $100 billion a year right now on the afghanistan problem, and the farmer's income is about $500 million, what if we bought from the farmers? how does that play out? the extent to what we're doing now conditions that we are

targeting certain farmers, or we have some kind of intelligence. would there be a way that we get more effectively control the markets and affect the monopoly in using our own economic power directly? >> two different issues. the food on the table, i forget what they call themselves, to buy all the poppy in afghanistan and use it for medicine for the third world that does not have money. there are regulations, not because morphine is expensive. 4% is for poppy funding. as jonathan said, there are a couple of years production already inventory. we just puss up the rice, making the people holding those inventories richer.

what would happen if we just airdropped $100 bills all over afghanistan? we can make every farmer in afghanistan rich for a tiny fraction of what we're spending blowing the place up, and there are all sorts of corruption issues. but if they were in charge, i would think very hard about effectively doing that. i would not buy the poppy crop, i would buy all of the crops. it is our problem whether we can get to market or not. i think bind the poppy crop prolongs the endemic problems. p,-

thank you very much for your work. thank you, mark, and joining may end thanking -- in thanking how panel area of -- the panel.

>> before the senate judiciary committee votes up or down, watch the entire confirmation hearing for elena kagan, including her testimony, senators' questions and comments, and all the witnesses to purchase of part of the hearing, just click the "buy >> we are here to talk about a new plan to tackle homelessness. what did you find? what have you found? guest: what we did find is that we have a motivated and excited body in the administration who believe that no one should experience homelessness. we also found that the sense of urgency in innia and preventing homelessness is critical. over six -- the sense of urgency in ending and provide homeless

this is critical. -- preventing homelessness is critical. many communities are around the country are innovating solutions and are seeing reductions in the number of those homeless in their communities. it would behoove the federal government to adopt the best practices and promote those in communities across the country. host: what is the economic impact adopting the best practices? why should taxpayers pay to shelter the homeless? guest: that is a very good question. taxpayers are right now paying unnntentionally, through the use of emergency rooms, jails, hospitals, and so forth. for example, in states like oregon, what they saw was that they were spending roughly $40,000 per annum on individuals while they were homeless. the same person move into a prominent support housing, for example, reducing the cost by

about $17,000. there is -- it is economically beneficial to those communities to adopt the best practices. solving the problem is much more cost-effective. host: there are six under 40,000 men, women, and children -- all but six water for -- 640,000 men, women, and children homeless in this country. how many of them are children? guest: the number is really a difficult one to grasp, especially among on accompanied youth. -- unaccompanied youth. host: let's lay out the bullet points of this plan. prevent an end homelessness among veterans in five years. set a path to ending all types of homelessness. let me ask about the money you

need. what kind budget are you talking about? guest: right now, the president come in fiscal year 2011, ass requested and 11.5% increase over what was requested last year. you're talking roughly $4 billion to begin this process. as you may or may not know, the federal government annual budget expects the projections to go out word. we do not make the projections right now. host: $4 billion per year right now. how you spend that? guest: use spent the $4 billion on the evidence-based practices, on things that work. focus on committees that are getting results, instead of just finding f not per diem basis and terms of how long a person stays in a shelter. you fund the programs that are actually getting people into housing and keeping them house, so that you are more efficient and strategic and targeted with resources that you have.

in a nutshell, that is how you spend it. then you spend it on stable housing mixed in with seevices like health care, education, and job support and training. host: the type of shelter were you not only good bets, but health care as well -- not only include beds, but health care as well. guest: the emergency type of scenario where people go in and they are worked with accordingly. what we're talking about is permitted support with the housing, will -- prominent support with housing, where a person has a place to live, and they have support, whether it is 24-hour care for those who are most chronic and disabled, or, in scattered site, mixed in with the community, and there are services delivered to those individuals.

host: of the 4 billion, are you using part of the money to build these types of infrastructures? guest: there are dollars for construction and rehabilitation within the department of housing and urban development budget. by and large, in light of the housing will go into subsidies -- a lot of the housing will go into subsidies to utilize existing units within the community for families to go into so that they can integrate ,reintegrate into the community, just like everybody else. hostt you are giving the -- money guest: you are giving a subsidy. the family of the individual would pay 30% of their income, whether it is from the job or some type of benefits they receive, anddthe subsidy would bridge the gap between the fair market rent and the 30% that day. hos -- the 30% that they pay.

host: why is there a significant problem with the veterans being homeless? guest: good question. by and large, same reason as other people, lack of income to afford housing they currently live in, area of conditions, problems that plague people, that forced them to spend all of their income, lack of being able to find a job, etc. veterans also suffer from issues, especially combat veterans, of a posttraumatic stress and brain injury, that causes the veteran to not be able to, without proper treatment and care, much as well as someone who does not suffer from the same conditions. host: first phone call comes from sue on the democratic line in wisconsin. caller: good morning. thanks for having me. i had a solution for this gentleman on how to finance the

whole thing. stop the war in afghanistan and spending $9 billion and bring it home to the homeless. then he would not have a problem with posttraumatic stress syndrome and all the other problems that the troops have. that is my comment. host: anthony love, you want to respond? guest: sure. thank you so much for your call. that is one solution. we are dealing with the issue right now and taking care of those soldiers who are coming+ home and the veterans who had served in previous wars at previous tours of duty in the military and trying to care for them now. host: david, independent line. caller: 94 c-span. -- thank you for c-span. we have homeless people who are down on their luck, and our government build a $2 million

island in the miidle of the illinois river, so i guess the homeless and hungry can watch it during tte winter while they are almost freezing to death. i don't know why they based this money when they could be helping out everybody else -- yesterday waste money when they could be helping out of a body else. iihave a comment -- the government seems to be going anti-religion a little bit. without these religious-type, fifth base to help organizations, without their help, -- faith-bassd health organizations, without their help, there would be a lot moree destitute and hungry in the united states. guest: thank you for your comment. as it relates to the government going anti-religion, quite the contrary. we know that faith based organizations and people of faith have been instrumental in topphelping those who have been down on the block and downtrodden. we are focusing on programs,

religious or not, that getting results and helping men and women and children to exit homelessness as quickly as possible. host: cleveland, ohio, you are on the line. caller: hello, anthony. my name is a gerald loeb. -- gerald love. taking care of everybody else in every other country but why don't we just take care of people here, please? guest: that is exactly what his plans to proposes to do. it not only proposes that we take care of individuals, but we give them the hand that they need to take control of their own lives and live at sufficiently. host: another objective of this plan is meaningful and sustainable employment for people. you talk about jobs training, but what types of jobs? what kind of training are you doing? guest: right now we have

mainstream programs that help individuals find jobs. the individuals who have the most barriers to employment, those programs do not necessarily work for hem. you bring that the scope of those programs to reach out to those individuals that have the highest barriers to employment to help them get the training that they need to find decent- paying job to afford rent in communities that they live. host: atlanta, georgia, republican line, willie. caller: i would like to ask one question. how you get out when they say that subsidies for rent -- they are not taking applications? guest: that is a good question. in many communities, there are subsidies and long waiting lines, waiting lists, for people to acquire this subsidies. one of the things that this

plan it aims to do is to look at those waiting lists and units that turned over at how quickly they are turning%% over and how readily available to our individual -- howard obli -- how readily avvilable they are for individuals. and so, you know, with additional funding and additional studies but fourth -- additional strategies put forth, communities can target those were strategically and get them to people who need them the most. host: kansas, independent line. caller: i am one of the new homeless. i am college-educated and never had trouble finding work, but in the past few years, it doeshas been a possible to find work where you live. my solution is simple -- we need

to get rid of illegal aliens. i am a meeting people in laundromats, and i could have had a three jobs out there if i were not competing with illegal, mostly mexican men come up for wor -- mostly mexican men, for work. they walked in the $11 to $12 now,%plus taxes. when our congress and president obama -- until our congress and president obama decides to do something about it, which will consistently have this problem, exporting the mexican citizenry to the united states. guest: our focus is to deal with individuals who are homeless and try to exit on business. in the obama administration has called for congress to -- i know the obama administration has called for congress to adopt comprehensive immigration reform policies and that is where we are at this time. host: next call is john, and i

understand you are homeless? caller: yes, ma'am. i'm a vietnam veteran, and i have a job. and i am being treated, don't get me wrong. but my problem is, i can afford rent, but they want a deposit. but the time he paid a deposit -- by the time you pay the deposit, you just don't have the money. host: 10 i asked you how you are listening today? -- can i ask you how you are listening today? caller: i borrowed the phone from somebody. i'm staying at the salvation army shelter. guest: first of all, thank you for your service. we definitely appreciate that. last year, the obama

administration provided $1.5 billion to communities for the homeless prevention and rapid rehousing program, and in communities across the country, some of those resources were used to go to individuals like yourself who have the means to pay rent, but the barrier is the deposit that is needed. i would get with your case manager at the salvation army to identify where those resources go in the community that can help you get the apartment that you desperately need and deserve. host: part of the plan as the federal strategic plan is to look at best practices. what are some of the best practices with health care and the homeless? guest: 0, that is a very good question. communities like seattle and connecticut are utilizing health care in terms of making sure that people are well taken care of by getting the health care needs taken care of.

states like massachusetts, who tend to be on occurred in terms of -- who tend to be had occurred under terms of medicaid in helping the imppverished and most -- who tend to be ahead of the curve in terms of medicaid and helping the apartment and most desperate -- places like massachusetts and seattle and parts of ccnnecticut are demonstrating best practices for people who are homeless. host: and enol from one of our viewers, who says that as the -- an email from one of our viewers, whh says that their work tax credit -- there were tax credits available to wealthy investors for investing and subsidized housing during the 1990's. guest: those are practices that

we will adopt and promote. we are required to review this plan annually and look at progress that is being made. if ideas like that are beneficial and working in communities, those are ideas that we want to embrace and prommte. host: here is an e-mail from a vietnam vet, was wondering how many of the%% hhmelees are vietm -- was wondering how many of the %%meless are veterans. guest: on any given night, there are 107,000 men and women who served in our nation's military that are without a home. host: democratic line, brian, good morning. caller: i think i have a couple of reasons why we have so many homeless. number one, during the wall street, banking industry took homes from everybody and then they bail out wall street to make up for all the lost

wages on the homes. they got paid off on the homes and they got the back for foreclosure and sood them for profit. the other reason we have a lot of homeless is laws regarding people's drivers' licenses but last year alone we had 1.5 million people lost their drivers licenses. in america, you need a car to do anything. most people almost live in their cars. i, for instance, used to own in $120,000 home and i work full time and at night i wws going to college full-time. on december 27, 2000, after i got my report card with all a's, i'd stop for a couple bottles of beer a local tavern and i got pulled over for going over a 35 mi. per hour to double blocks

from my house and i have not had -- a license two blocks from my house -- i got pulled over two blocks from my house and i have not had a license but i had to drop out of college, and i lost my house in foreclosure. i am walking the streets, and pretty soon i will be homeless. bachelet, by this weekend, i will be homeless. -- actually, by this weekend, i will be homeless. host: why this weekend? caller: my landlord here -- i pust cannot gee a job. if you look at all the jobs and it that i qualify for, you must have a driver's license. guest: if i am not mistaken, he %-id he was a veteran. host: the previous one, john. this one is brian. guest: there are organizations

and agencies out there that good help you in this situation and could intervene for you, as well as talking to your lender about some type of payment plan for staying in wrong --, talking to your landlord about some type of payment plan so you can stay in your home. the reason for the one-stop centers are to be as a resource for individuals who may struggle to find jobs on their own. i would recommend that if you could get to a one-stop center, get their and get them to help you with unemployment issues, as well as to work with some of the local homeless providers in your community and talk to them about how you maybe able to stay in your home or be able to get into another home that may be more affordable for you. host: maryland, republican line. the wake said. call -- go ahead.

caller: i have one question. i noticed that mr. love is with the united states interagency council on homelessness. does that fall under any federal agency, or is he part of our group that president obama has called in as a czar group to help him? another questionn+ -- does this work duplicate some of the things that other agencies inn% existence are giving aid to? guest: that is a very good question. actually, the u.s. interagency council on homelessness is an indepeedent agency, comprised of 19 other federal agencies. the specific job the council is to coordinate the work of those agennies. as opposed to duplicating the efforts, our role is to make sure that every stick on the other federal agencies are coordinated, -- is to make sure

that those efforts by the other federal agencies are coordinated. host: that may sound like a cz ar agency to some. guest: it may, but it came about in 1987 as part of the official response to homelessness. host: what is the operating budget? guest: a little over $2 million, for one year. host: how much stuff you have? -- how much staff do you have? guest: 10 professionals out -- 10 professional staff. host: next call. caller: i would like to tell you this, that was the first part w -- the first at 4-profit

but that ran a service for the new york city homeless services. they canceled the contract, but i would like to show one thing to you, sir, that the homeless homeless, although they account how good a place homeless -- tout how good they place the homeless, it is a thing where you go into a system and you find your help. it is not the truth. the fact of the matter is that homelessness in new york city has steadily increased, steadily increased. now, i am not saying the obama administration has anything to do with this, but what i do know is that there should be some federal oversight by the obama ppadministration, by the federal government, into the the new york city department of homeless

services. how do i know that, sir? because i have been there. i have seen the people that work in the new york city dhs and i know those people. to be honest with you, sir, they don't care one bit about the homeless. guest: well, the people that i actually know from new york seemed to be very caring folks. no doubt you have had some experiences that caused you to have those feelings. as it relates to federal oversight, our goal is to provide leadership as opposed to oversight. and to ensure that communities have the tools and resources needed to work with individuals and families who are homeless. communities are not fulfilling that role, that our job is to go in and identify with the gaps%- and problems -- then our job is to go in and identified the gaps and problems without try to tell local communities what their

priorities should be and how best to address the issue. host: one of our viewers says -- is that something that you question when you are thinking about jobs training for the homeless? guest: not at this particular time. the department of labor may have that information available. one of the strategies we use is to develop a research agenda to track those things that may have an impact on a person who is homeless and what may prevent them from finding a home. host: mary on the republican line in florida. caller: hello? host: you are on the air. caller: i just wanted -- i was just wondering why the vets --

hello? host: you need to turn your television down, that is the problem. caller: hello? host: we will go to utah, independent line. steven, you are on the air with anthony love. caller: i have a long-term solution for solving the homeless, and it deals with education. it costs $24,600 a year in washington, d.c. per student, and $30,000 per year for college on average. if you took the money when the kit is about 1 years old and put it in a trust fund, monthly putting it in a trust fund, at 7000 he could later have a $35,000 and -- at 18, he could%% later had a $35,000 income, and they could take money out of the trust fund to pay cash for the

-phouse and still have a $60,00- a-year income. it is a comparison to the money we are spending on schools, what could be done with that. you could eliminate a whole list, he would not need social security and unemployment -- enter you could eliminate a whole list, you would not need social security and unemployment insurance. guest: thank you for your comment and thoughtful solution. we agree that agitation is a key component -- that education is a key component and conserve as a factor in preventing people from becoming homeless. the department of education is a major member of the u.s. interagency council. that is something that is definitell being taken into consideration as we deploy strategies to committees around the country. host: where can people read about your plan? guest: www.usich.gov, or

www.hud.gov. host: one of the parts of the plans to develop a stability it coming out of the juvenile justice system. guest: you worked to devise effective ddscharge planning strategies for the young people who are "aging out of the system," to ensure that as they are, they are liquid appropriate housing services of -- and droppe -- to ensure that as they are, they aren't lin -- they are linked with the appropriate housing services. host: savannah, georgia, sodbuster on the democratic line. -- sylvester on the democratic line.

,aller: i'm a veteran approaching 62 years old. it is good to help people who are homeless, but when they come back, and when they are on the verge of homelessness, why should a person have to be on the verge of homelessness in a country -- [unintelligible] there are lots of things, and then decided to -- host: i apologize. i have to let you go. very difficult to hear you there. i do not know if mr. love -- guest: thank you, again, for your service to your country but celeste trichet note is that the core of this plan -- that you, again, for your service to country. what syllester should know is

that at the core of this plan, the est way to end homeeessness is to prevent it from happening in thh first place. host: next call. caller: good morning, mr. love. the question i have, and i don't know how much this would go into your home, but in cases where i have a home and we make it month by month, it is a wonderful day, but the problem we have is that the insurance has gone through the roof. we are paying $600 a year on insurance, and now we pay $3,800 a year in insurance.%% you at your monthly mortgage payments, -- add that to your monthly mortgage payments, and it goes through the roof. it does not seem to be any relief. we had three several years ago.

several years ago but it seems that insurance companies seem to raise the rates at a lot of people lost their homes due to that. and the subprime, of course, that we have had. what can be done with that situation? guest: as it stands now, the one thing that can be done is to look at insurance for homes and so forth regulated by the states, to work with those state entities to look%at what effect those policies are having on individuals in helping to stay in their homes, and working with those states to make sure that they implement policies were buying insurance for your home does not become a risk factor of you losing the home. host: and e-mail from viewer --

why not build new homes and apartments which will create millions of jobs? guest: development of housing, as well as utilizing existing housing for people try to exit on business. -- for people trying to exit homelessness. host: the know how much stimulus money meant to that? guest: i do not. host: next call. caller: the real-estate boom started in the 1970's, and it has just quadrupled, the price of real estate. the housing bubble has burst, but the price of rice has ot dropped a bid -- price oo rent has not dropped a bit. if you can reduce the rent, so people on minimum wage and paid on a quarter of the income, you could end homelessness

overnight. host: mr. love, what about the historical comparison? guest: that s a good comparison. over the last several years, we have seen a great reduction in the number of affordable housing units that been built, while at the same time we have seen the number of high-rent a per income units have increased. part of a strategy is that we put more affordable units on line and so forth, and then in the, as you said,,w 1960's, we had a few homeless compared to now and there are a number of factors that%% contribute to that. to likely to get -- too lengthy to get into any one show. but one of the things that the plan institute is strengthened -- that the plan aims to do is

make sure that people can find jobs that pay wages where they can live in their own homes. host: christopher, independent linn. caller: good morning, and thank you for bringing the information of homelessness to the american public eye and formerly homeless, and survived three years on the streets of los angeles and was put out of my apartment recently and took advantage offthe services that new york city provides. mr. love, i did read your one before report on homelessness that was recently issued -- your wonderful report on hold since that was recently issued, but i have to question the actress and -- question the accuracy of the numbers but in los angeles alone, you have over 140,000 homeless. i would like to volunteer as an ombudsman, having been a

previous federal employee. i made some bad decisions. i am lucky to be retired from the major university and the federal government, many years of service, and in the last several months, a new apartment in new york. i want to thank those people in new york, contrary to me being -- contraay to the other caller, the new york city agencies have been patient. there is a process, and the process is a risk. -- process is rigorous. they screen you very well for your mental and physical and financial conditions and they do provide services that you all are trying to do in other cities. guest: thank you so much, and congratulations on being able to exit homelessness. i thiik that the best way that you conserve it is, based on your experience with homelessness, is to work with

your local community. we firmly believe that the issue is local, but the federal government as a role in can play -- has a role as a template to help families and individuals exit homelessness -- has a role it can play to help families and individuals exit homelessness. host: st. louis, missouri, republican line. caller: hi, mr. love. thank you so much for the information that you have been given. it is plain and simple and we know it is based on fact. my question is the link that your company or agency provides for childrrn in foster care at that are getting out of foster care. we're in ms. iraq and i have information on that -- where in missouri can i have the information on that? they get into junior college, or

get into junior college and then into jobs. where can people like myself locate an agency where we can offer our homes for a period of time to these children? thank you. guest: thank you. you are in st. louis, and dependinggon whht county you are in, you can get with child protective services in that county and begin to work with them to let them know that you would like to provide some form of home for the children that are in foster care, and potentially become a foster parent yourself, to work with the county in st. louis. call the state of misery and the health and human services department, -- state of missouri health and human services department, and they can direct you to the right places. host: oakland, mmry. caller: when you drive through

little towns and cities, you see so many abandoned buildings that, with a%little bit of work, even for the homeless people, to make apartments and places that they could live in and give them at hand%up. the don't want just to be living on the streets. they need a hand up and then they can help themselves. i knew one that waso on heroin and within a couple of years i had him off of heroin and going to college in a different state. he was a wonderful miracle from god. if we are a nation of religion, then we should help out brother and do as much for each other as

we want for ourselves. host: we will go to one last phone call here. annapolis, a republican line. caller: canapolis, north %%rolina. host: sorry about that. caller: i have never called in on your line. i had a couple of comments. i see all this rhetoric about helping the homeless and one thing or another. i am about to be homeless. i'm a vietnam-era of better written. i am about to be homeless here. i have reached out to every agency i know. it seems that i cannot seem to find the help that i am looking for, because no one even knows of any programs out here that seem to work for the people that are possibly going to be homeless. i would like to comment from this gentleman as to where we find these agencies and how we can stay in a home and not

become homeless. guest: as a vietnam-era veteran, again, thank you for your service -- you should be able t% link up with the va hospital within your community. if there's not one near canapolis, there shoulddbe a veterans' organization. i also encourage you to reach out to vietnam veterans of america, if there is a chapter in your community that can direct you to services that are close by good to our national websites that will go on and give you information -- if there to that can direct you services that are close by. there are national sites that will go on and give you information. you can link up with organizations and agencies. as a vietnam-era veteran, i would say that the first step would be to reach out to the va medical center in your area that is caused by or with he

veterans services organization that has an operation close by. host: there is a twitter comment -- one keeps bringing up that many homeless don'''t want to pt in a shelter . guest: absolutely. for those that are most chronic, there is housing where someone can have a place of their own, their own space and own bathroom and own key, saying that this is their home to the idea behind a shelter, and emergency stop-gap -- what we aim for is a more permanent and targeted solution. permanent housing is not only more to maine, it is more cost- effective. -- not only more humane, it is more cost-effective. host: this congress need to approve this plan?

guest: it was authorized by an act a >> britney you a direct link to -- bringing you a direct link to public affairs, presented by america's cable companies. >> now a local perspective on the homeland security from the former head of the los angeles and new york city police departments. good they spoke recently at this event hosted by the aspen institute.

>> i want to get us started as close to 2:15 as possible. as you see, the title of this session is "local law enforcement perspective: view from the front." we often hear about a potential terror attack on america, and i would argue that is a misnomer. there is no such thing as an attack on the homeland. any terror attack would take place in the city, and i would argue there are three places it is most likely to happen -- new york city, washington, d.c., and los angeles, and are featured guest has been to two -- been the chief of two of those cities.

us. four states -- how many data points, and you could not get that information? >> i think they are in excess of 60 stations. comments were made that they are not generic in the center not all alike, and that is an issue. what they all attempts to do is gather information, analyze it, and movv it up the food chain to the counter terrorism task force in washington d.c.

we have an initiative working with several other states. the idea being that within our fusion center and several others, we would make an effort to share information. pusion centers are intended to capture not chose terrorism related activity, but all crime centers. additional crime information we would get -- all that information would be sent to the fusion center to be looked at alongside information that might be coming into this, very specifically, terrorist-related. the beliee being that as the threat of homeland security became much more of an internal threat rather than external, the

access to crime data would possibly give us early-warning straighten -- early warning. we were able to gittins crime information and terrorism information, the idea being it would improve our capabilities. the issue raised was one of those frustrating issues that comes up for in this area. you have information about if information is used inappropriately, who will bear the penalty if the government is to be sued. it is unfortunate.3

the issue of indemnification. >> can you give us an example of information that did not get passed up the chain? >> no, i did not spend a lot of my time worrying about what was going on in the fusion center. good it reached a point of concern. hundreds of thousands of pieces of information going through the place every day or eeery week or every month. those are noo things that have been brought up to my level of attention. >> you mentioned they are standardized, that you had a model fusion center, but some are less functional.

should there be a natiinal standard? >> i think there should be a generic structure to them one, that all of them the crime centers. the idea is if they had the ability to take the critical information from all of the police stations, to be able to match it against the much smaller, specific information. secondly, there is some debate about centers being emergency operation centers. it is an emergency operation center use of times of natural raging national disaster. there is no generic pattern across the country. congress looked at it several years ago, but at this particular point, there is not a consensus about the standardization. some of that has to do with the way they are funded. some of them are funded by

federal resources, some by state resources, some by agency resources. there is not a standardized way by which they find it. >> is that problematic? >> budgets are the source of all problems. the number of personnel the los angeles police department might be in a position to resign is impacted by the budget difficulties they are facing. to get our fusions under oath and running, -- up and running, we had a joint information center. it was largely funded by the fbi. again, there's no standardization of who pays for

it, and in these times of tight budgets, the concern i would have is that this area is an area that could be significantly weakened. there is the county board of supervisors. the work they do often goes on heralded, because you do not see the results of it. >> the federal government reorganized its to certain degree to try to deal with information no coat reaching more coherently. >> it still seems there is a great deal of tension and frustration.

as i understtnd it, it was created to try to change some -- to try to put them under an umbrella and put them in a coordinated system, and i think the idea under the leadership creation was that this would be a person that would be able to coordinate those activities, once information was being shared and the various boundaries are often created artificially between agencies and can be broken down. it is a suicide mission, from my

perspective. out of a sheer act of patriotism pnd the belief they could get something done, the most recent -- if i understand it correctly, in the most recent, ahead of its recently lost a battle against the president of the united states and the cia, so it looks like to insubordinate basically got rid of the boss, so that does not bode well for the idea of the sharing of information in a professional fashion triggered >> as a big city chief, how does that impact you? when you saw is being fought,

what were the ramifications? >> that was the reality of what my -- what i and my colleagues -- there are 63 major cities that belong to the organization. for a time, i was privileged to be part of that, and one of the frustrations i had after 9-11 was trying to convince the federal government of the importance of local policing at the urban level. the importance of sharing information for the use of information we could gather, for theemanpower we could bring to the issue, local law enforcement personnel, usually better working relationships with a private security officers that work in our cities and towns,

that we literally had to argue for several years to get a place of the table, and then we had to argue to get close to where the particularly during the last year of his tenure, he really recognize the value and capacity increase that could be gained by using the resources. the problem with local police is who do you interact with? i was fortunate in terms of coming out offlos angeles. because of the uniqueness of those cities and the likelihood

that those cities would be top priorities for terrorist attacks, we have probably more access than others would have, but as the turr battles went on, who do you align yourself with? who do you feel has the clout to get things done, the clout to make things happen at local level? >> do you think there has been improvement? >> i think there was, but it reinforces we have come a long way, but we have a long way to go in the sense that we are on an attorney. the destination is not quite clear. -- we are on a journey. the destination is not quite clear. there were very significant improvements.

>> you mentioned local police got a better place at the table. do they have the place they shoull have yet? >> i think it is a beginning during his last couple years and secretary and impala connor. in speech after speech -- secretary napolitano.3 pushed the fact that homeland security is really home town security. that has become the increasing reality as the field of terrorism has shifted from the international external thheat,

whereas al qaeda has been kept underground and has lost its ability to put together an attack of that significance. the home grown threat has become much more important, as evidence over the last several years, and acceleration has become more significant. that is why there is a growing appreciation that at the local level, it is quite likely that a potential threat might be detected by local security or local personnel before the fbi or any other federal agencces would get into it. >> i want to explore that net more langs, but we get bulletin's periodically from the department -- i want to explore that in more detail, but we get bulletins periodically from the department. are they so generic?

>> we do not get them as often. often common -- the problem that existed, and my sense would be that is still continues to this day -- is the time it takes to get cleared is often critical, that we were advocating we need information much more quickly. the federal government might not want to be calling wolfe ime after time, and at local level, eventually we say, the information is no use to us. there is still attention that a exists, and there is an

understandable tension. >> on the home grown threat, how do local departments have to adapt and change what they do to focus more on the potential but something is going to happen? >> it takes a lot of effort, and let me give you several examples. . 2e!j#p#m

the idea of educating police generically, and then encouraging, within their policies and procedures, weighs four officers to easily -- ways for officers to ut forth a information easily aboot a potential threat. in the case of the los angeles police department, we focused a large amount of resources on these sorts of things. that is oftentimes not available to smaller departments. but in doing it in a city like los angeles, you can basically do it, prove it, but tested out. we have checked off blocks thatt

if an officer came across someone they believe might have a terrorist connection, they checked off a block with a couple of works. we would have officers who would catch that check, do the initial review, and very quickly move that information to our counter-terrorism entity which would move very quickly to our fusion center. the fusion center within or collaboratively with all of the various agencies -- the fusion center would then work ely with all of the various agencies. the idea was to take this model nationally. homeland security was looking

for national pilot programs. beginning with secretary chertoff and expanded under secretary napolitano, we were advocating the training of forces, officer teams that are similar to the teams that go into a disaster areas with rescue dogs, so that in a which after katrina needed,%- police services desperately, and we brought together officers from all over the country. sometimes when people have not all work together, it breeds confusion.

what we tried to create was a contingency of officers used to working in these platoon-like unit. secretary napolitano has just given the green light to the pilot program. the similarity between the fighting crime successfully and fighting a new type of crime, terrorism -- most of the ideas that came about in the 1990's when we finally got a handle on fighting traditional crime in the united states, came from local police. they did not come from federal government or federal agencies. they helped to promulgated nationally, but most of the ideas came from local police stations dealing with local issues. similarly, if we are going to

put an emphasis on home town and security concerns, we have to give the people in those home towns away to percolate their ideas up the ladder. that is a function of homeland security to look at these things, pilot them, test them out, and then if they think it will work, puts them ahead. >> one thing you did when you angeles was to beat up your intelligent unit considerably -- beef up your intelligence unit considerably. tell me about that. -p>> when i returned to policing in los angeles, it was 2002, post-9/11.

i do not think that during my two years in new york when we were focusing very heavily on traditional crime that i spent 1% of my time on terrorism. the idea was, they tried to blow up the world trade center. we got them. it is over. coming back in 2002, within a year of 9/11, i easily spend 40% or 50% of my timeeas chief of %+lice in los angeles on terror related activities. this involved growing in the department with officers focus on the terrorism. we grew it to 300 officers. that is roughly equivalent to the number of officers in new york city.3 as chief of police, believed,

and still believe, that los angeles, new york and washington would remain the most significant targets. to maximize that investment was not just a matter of improving internal capabilities, but also to improve the external coordination capabilittes. to that end, we were very aggressive in seeking out partners. for years, the lapd and the sheriff's department bumped up against each other. fbi spent more time investigating has been working with us. -- investigating us began working with us. -- than working with us. we began to form new partnerships because of a willingness on the part of those

partners. the heads of the office in los angeles were more responsive to me than they might have been. our believes are usually echoed by those in washington. there is something special going on in los angeles. we do seem to have developed a seamless relationship as far as working with each other, sharing information. that is not to say that we sometimes do not bump into eaah other's laaes, but we do not cause a catastrophic collision. >> did you send members of your unit's overseas when there was a terrorist acts overseas. ? >> i would have liked to have done that. ray kelly ii new york, with

private funding, has had police officers from new york based overseas. the new york situation is a special one in that there was a real belief there, at a time when the partnership was not a good one with the federal agencies, and nypd did not believe that information was being collected and shared appropriately, that it was incumbent on them to develop their own sources. there was also tension about what immigration should be shared. as a police chief, i want the information that will enable me to know if i should respond to it. the national level has one perspective. at the local level, you might %+ve another. kelly on his own has developed a very formidable counter- terrorism entity that includes people overseas.

the sharing of intelligence is oftentimes based on relationships. i know you. you know me. we trust each other, rather than just some bureaucrat calling up to say what can you tell me? i would have liked that capability. i did not have the resources to do it. i did have the resources to send people overseas in response to a major event. in the case of mumbai, we sought permission to send people overseas to take a look at the circumstance, but we were not able to get the appropriate visas and authorizations to travel. kelly already had people in the area and he got a lot of firsthand information very quickly. it took awhile longer in los angeles to get the specifics about what had happened in that event. in that particular event, which

you will all have the opportunity to hear more about tonighh, i was fortunate that as chief in los angeles, that within a relatively short time, still several weeks to a month after the mumbai initiative, that we began to get actionable intelligence about what had happened in mumbai that caused me as police chief to totally, totally reorganized my whole department to respond to what we perceived to be a new form of terrorism threat. >> was there any other terrorist event that changed your trainin+ and deployment? >> as much as that? no. there were things that we would learn that would refine some of the training and equipment, bbt mumbai was -- >> more fundamental? >> it was a very significant event.

the nature of the attack. the idea that you could have 10 of these characters, fully educated who became radicalized very quickly, who were willing to go into this city with minimalist training,,minimal equipment and hold the city hostage for three days, take a attention of the world.the%- how they used basic cellular telephone technology to monitor both how it was being reported in the news and to stay in touch with their handlers. one thing that was of great concern to us was the idea that -- normally, in a situation where hostages are taken, a traditional policing has always been, by and large, to try to rescue the hostages. it contained. yoo negotiate. you try to buy ttme. but what mumbai showed us was

that in dealing with terrorists, they were not going to let those people live. they were going to kill them. they were on cnn for 48-72 hours. they were able to spread fear and panic for an extended period of time. they were going to die and they were going to kill those people. >> how did that change what you did in los angeles? >> we had a 60 person swat team that we relied on to respond to something like a columbine situation or a hostage it should tuition -- hostage situation. there were very well-trained and well-equipped. we had officers in the department who had high-powered weaponry that they were trained to use as the result of a bank holdup in northridge in the 1990's involving two characters armed to the teeth to literally held the city of los ngeles hostage for two hours.

we thought we had sufficient firepower and sufficient personnel to deal with what we thought the threat might be, until mumbai. mumbai clearly showed that terrorists can very easily pommand and 27, 8, 10 things at the same time. not just the city of los angeles, but the region, the county. we would not have been prepared to deal with that threat. we literally spent 60 days totally reorganizing the los angeles pplice department with tabletop exercises. we began to acquire many more significant assault weapons. -pthe thrust of how we approacho that situation was not to basically contain, but to get in as quickly as possible, killed them before they killed the

hostages. the idea was that for these people the negotiation was only for buying time. you would never negotiate them out of killing the hostages. in a country like ours, each police chief, each organization, in terms of their training, makes their own decisions relevant to that. terrorism was one of our top three priorities. we have the capability to deal with but traditional hostage situation, but also, a mumbai- style event. you will see tonight how easy it was to pull that event off. we need the capacity to deal with the shifting terrorist threat. that is as important as the

timely sharing of information. the threat is constantly evolving. al-qaeda does not have the same ccpacity they did, but they do have the capacity to influence and inspire. the most recent experiences in the united states have both been inspired by al-qaeda. >> did you have any shift in dealing with, for example, cellphone jamming? >> there is a wide range of technology. some of our solutions were learned after the mumbai initiative. that was probably the most significant learning experience

since columbine. mumbai as one of the most significant times for me in my seven years in los angeles. we had the capacity -- i had 300 officers and highly trained people -- to literally, turn on that is what you want. what the capacity to, as the threat changes, and the threat is conntantly evolving and accelerating -- if you look at the timing of the attacks that we have been able to fend off, it is not that theyyare coming from a different place, coming from within, but they're coming with much more frequency. and now the russians are coming again. [laughter] >> exactly.

i asked you earlier about the issue of playing in the fbi sandbox. did that create more friction? did it make it more difficult in some respects to get information when you needed it from the fbi? >> los angeles had a couple of issues. the fbi would have preferred that the extra resources that i was able to prioritize and apply to terrorism, that they should terrorism task force. the idea of the total sharing of information within this exclusive entity. the problem i had with that however was the sheer amount of information. you have to prioritize.

as get as the systems are -- as the computer systems are at analyzing the dots, eight human beings ultimatelyyhave to make decisions. they say if this is something that has to be put off to the side. in los angeles, we have the capacity, with the number of personnel assigned to this function, to deal with those investigations which the joint terrorism task force did not feel met their threshold, but our people at the ground level felt they wanted to pursue further. i had the luxury of having the resources to continne those investigations. the understanding was that the information would keep flowing back to the infusion center.

-- fusion center. the bureau would have preferred the we stayed more within their guard rails. we had some tension over that, but it was not butting heads. we had conversations about it. it was the same with kelly. he devoted so many resources to it because he has a lot of people he can use. what was discussed this morning was the idea of sometimes inadvertently stepping on someone else's investigation. >> how often does that happen? >> i do not think it happens with tremendous a frequency. back when we were battling the good old mafia, i can remember, i am a product of boston in the 1980's. if any of you saw the movie "the

departed," that movie was so accurate. the state police, the boston police, the fbi, none of us a trusted each other and we were all trying to do each other in. it was horrendous, horrendous. several fbi agents spent many well-deserved years in federal prison because of their support of organized crime. you did not trust anybody. now, you might have differences of opinion, but you're not purposely steppinn on anybody's investigation. it is a sin of omission not commission. the case you mentioned this

morning seemed to be a sin of omission, not trying to step on the fbi's case. >> do we need and semi-5? -- an mi-5? >> that is a good question. i think what we have is very good. we are trying to find ways to refinance, to make it more inclusive. we talked about timeliness and attention. i would add prioritization. we need timely investigations. we need to pay attention to the greatest exttnt possible to the widest range of issues, but we also need to have prioritization. he who tries to do everything is doomed to do nothing, ultimately. we have to have prioritization.

a fellow that i worked with at reallyd in the 1990's reenergize american policing. he had an expression that -- he had a high school education, but he was probably the smartest person in america on crime and what to do about it.. he had an expression that you can expect what you expect. effectively, whether you're dealing with crime or terrorism, what you're paying attention to it will give you information that allows you to pake informed decisions. he ultimately transformed the nypd in the 1990's when it came to crime in new york city.

he was the internal combustion engine for changing police i. the american police were not good at gathering information and then using it to tell us where to put our people and develop strategies. he did all of that. when you think about how those four principles relate to terrorism, the good news is the same things that work for local crime can work for it terrorism. timeliness, accuracy, rapid

response -- beforeethere are 15 or 20 robberies and murders or rapes, you want to use effective tactics to stop them. the tactics we have developed before mumbai were not going to work for that incident. lastly, follow-up. crime is never going to go away. we can reduce it dramatically. similar for terrorism. terrorism is going to be here for all time. as the admiral talked about last night, we would like to kill them all, but we cannot, and there are always going to be more, so we need to find other ways to deal with them. for police, we cannot arrest our way out of the crime problem. we have to find more thoughtful

ways to deal with the prevention of crime. similarly, the main thrust of terrorism is to prevent it in the first place rather than just to take action in response to it. if you think about 9/11, we had the intelligence, but the cia was not talking to the fbi, the fbi was not talking to local police, so they had this is information, but they did not share it, so they cculd not rapidly respond. when they didn't respond -- in other words, when they went out to check on the guys who did not want instructions on how to land a plane, they did not follow up early enough. we did not have this follow-up. human beings prioritize

information. they decided this information was not relevant. why? because they did not have the big picture. same thing with the christmas day bombing. a lot of people had a lot of information, but it did not get passed along the way. >> there was one thing that you wanned to do in los angeles that you could not do. that was mapping. talk to us about that project. >> the term mapping is a term we use all the time. as a young sergeant in boston in when we would talk about a crime situation, we would put a map up. we would put dots on the map, red dots for homicide, green dots for robberies. very quickly, you start seeing

hot spots and trends. the idea was that you could then assign your police resources and educate your policemen. this is where the robberies are going on. when you're not on patrol, look at the intermission on this issue. police have been using mapping for years to identify problems. one of the things we map is at the jewish community, for example. they have worked with us for years because of the threats against them for years. various synagogues, schools and sensitive applications. at a time of heightened threat, the police can provide extra security to identified locations. or, if we get calls that an

incident is occurring at an address, we can know immediately that address is a synagogue. you want to have additional reformation. the effort in this new world we are living in is to deal with a -ppopulation that unlike other countries has merged into the mainstream of our communities. there are very few communities where they take up a whole neighborhood. muslims are scattered throughout los angeles. many of their applications -- locations are not as clearly identifiable as they might be in other religions. it could be a store front.

it oftentimes is. as we were developing relationships with them, we thought it would be a good idea, four times of heightened threat, we need to know, where are you? so that we can identify in a call comes in and that there is a disturbance, we see that that is a mosque. we know that it is a significant location. well intended, but in that community, with its sensitivity to being singled out and targeted, with concerns about what the federal government was doing, the term mapping was like waving a red flag in front of the ball. the damage from the use of that term was tremendous. it almost unraveled everything we had done. they thought this was just a covert way that we were trying to gather intelligence for

counter-terrorism purposes rather than for traditional police response purposes. >> but in fact, do police departments not want to know where those populations are also for investigative purposes? >> intelligence is provided to you relative to an individual or maybe an organization. having ways to identify or locate that person -- are there certain entities, maybe a mosque, or the jewish defense league -- which in boston was believed to be committing attacks against minorities -- you may want to focus attention

on organizations whose activity was to commit a crime. we want to know that a moscow or a group or an organization might be -- mosque or a group or an organization might be involved in criminal activities. i did that with gangs. i knew exactly who was in a gang. we had 40,000. when we have a criminal threat, we gathered information on who was engaged. >> i want to take questions in just a second,,but i would like to pursue this idea. let's take somalis. you want to talk to them. you want to get a sense of what is happening because you are worried that people may be getting flight training or whatever. how difficult is it to build those bridges? >> incredibly difficult.

police forceles please pa has a 9800 officers, six of whom are muslim. >> 6? >> 6. finding people who could speak different languages -- your desire to interact with those communities is multiple. one, you want to protect them %+ainst crime. if we are basing the assignment of our resources on reported crimes, if they are not resources to it. tickets, we went use police to help people to set -- two, we want to use police to help people assimilate into society.

most of the events that have led to civil disturbances have involved a police action and an african american. i have spent most of my time trying to improve those relationships. if i could get more informatioo and connections to various communities, i know who i can turn to speak as a witness to a crime or give me information about a crime. it is the same thing with the+ immigrant populations. societiesming from where police are not respected or trusted. here andoming discovering the crime is a way of serving them better. to them it lloks like we're

trying to develop relationships to use them in a negative way. we had a situation with the governor of arizona -- i do not know what she has been smoking lately. she has basically said that all of the illegal immigrants coming into arizona are smuggling drugs. what the latino community of that state must feel like when the leader of that state is making that allegation. it is that type of demagoguery that perpetuates fear among these communities, and then we the police haveeto deal with the fallout of these political forces. >> do you think that sort of relationship the building is an absolutely critical tool? >> absolutely.

when i went to los angeles in 2002, a purposely chose to go to that city. i am very mindful of its negative role in perpetuating a lot of racial divides in this country, not just with african- americans, but potentially with the latino population and all of our growing immigrant populations. let's learn from the past.. repeaa thoseceive th mistakes. america has been around for four hundred years, and for 380 of those years, police have been the ones keeping these populations segregated and suppressed.

the lapd seems to have turned a corner with the african-american community. we now need tt do that with the latino community, the asian community, and the muslim community. if you do not have trust, you will repeat the mistakes of the past yea. police work will be so much more important in the era of terrorism. pthat is another reason for advocating a local police being allowed under the tent of federal terrorism work. we can contribute to the discussion and the priorities and the approaches that they are engaging in. >> let us open it up for questions. i see a hand up back there.

>> based on some of our reporting, the younger generation is typically avoiding mosquee and popular community locations at large because they believe that police and law enforcement are targeting them. how do you address that? >> basically, by a building relationships. we would go to services on fridays where in moms would communities -- where imams would invite us to go to talk to their communities. we also have many jobs in policing that are open to them,

both on the force and not. hopefully the second generation will not risk the mistakes of the past. that is nother big aspect of this. the average american police officer, prior to 9/11, really did not have an understanding of this issue, the muslim faith, the various factions, and the various elements within that faith. we understand presbyterian and baptist. well with the muslim community, as we as seen in iraq with the bloody battles between the groups, it is a very complicated world. it is not just one community. we need to know about that and appreciate that so that we can interact in a way that is

mindful of these sensitivities. >> there is another handout back there. -- hand up back there. >> york first tour of duty in new york was as chief of the new york city transit police. if you were in that role today, how concerned would you be about the threat of terrorism in the new york city transit system? how would you approach mitigating that threat? >> 5 miilion people per day get on and off of that system. fortunately, the city of new york does prioritize that, because we have had clear evidence of planned assault against the subway system that have been afforded.

the subjectt-- have been thwarted. the subway system does remain a high priority target. that is one of the difficulties that the nypd has to face. fortunately, they have a very those threats.nt focused on%- i cannot think of anything i would be doing differently from what they are doing in new york at the moment. they're getting the camera3 a big thing. we know the importance of those systems to be coordinated to be activated, and to be in place. >> do you feel they are getting the attention and money needed

to transmmt? >> in terms of the limitations, once again, there is only so that is where prioritization comes in. transportation is one of those areas where there needs to be a focus. it is the lifeblood of new york city. it is not the same in a city like los angeles. millions and millions of people moving around in our country. at the breakfast i had this morning, there was a discussion of the resources that have been committed to the airline industry. public transit could say the same thing. the squeaky wheel gets the grease.

in terrorist expenditures, you must examine what is the likelihood of an attack in terms of prioritization? >> i would like to talk about the information sharing. could you talk about strategies that you employ? [inaudible] >> that system was very similar to what new york had put in place. it is similar to what many cities around the country have done.

the argument i made to the there are only about 40,000- 50,000 federal agents compared to 700,000--00,000 officers. you need uss , 1980's ands 1990's, there was an explosion in the private security business. why? policing was contracting. we were raised bunning to crime after the fact. -- we were responding to crime after the fact. security was focused on preventing crime in at the first place. they invested in alarms, cameras, the prevention of theft

and lost. that community, because they're much further along in the use of technology and sharing information. talk about getting a place at the table. it is a very big table. a lot of people have to be at that table, and the table has to be round. it cannot be rectangular. it cannot be a triangle. it has to be around, because everybody needs an equal voice in the discussion. somebody, as the designated head of the table, will take all of that information and make a decision. we have to find ways to include and disseminate information. homeland security, get it to us, even in its rawest form, as long as it does not compromise where

the information is coming from, so that we can make a local decision. if the threat is against the subway system, we can target the resources for a couple of days. similarly, if there is a threat against a shopping center and homeland security cannot corroborate it, given to us and let us ensure it with our security personnel.that is whatt in the sharing, the idea of inclusion rather than exclusion. exclusion is what brought about 9/11. it brought about the crime statistics in america n the 1970's and 1980's. inclusion is what began to solve the crime problem in the 1990's, and it is what will ultimately help us mitigates the terrorist

issues we are facing. we are all in this together. >> we have to do at this table. go one after the other. >> the los angeles police department has an unrivaled expertise in the study of gangs. you mentioned gangs. i wonder if you see any relationship between that and the study of terrorist groups, and if so, how that expertise could be shared nationally or internationally. >> in los angeles city there are documented 40,000 gang members in approximately 400 gangs. in the county, about 100,000 gang members. as closely as we watch them -- and we watch them very closely, because they are a significant accelerant on our major crime problems -- we, in my seven years, no interaction that we could detect between those gangs

and the terrorism entities that we are so concerned with. in los angeles, we had great capabilities because of the history of gangs and the growing expertise we have been acquiring, to share the information, to watch for that, to see if there was the beginning of a morphing of drug cartels, since they are involved in so much of the human trafficking. would they be willing to start smuggling in conjunction with a terrorist and actively, knowingly assisted terrorism in the united states? we wanted to watch for that. the case makes itself.

we want to watch to see if thatt involves. we have not seen it yet, which is not to say it might not occur. we might be able to detect it if it does begin to form. so far, at least during my seven years, we did not see thht. >> i was struck by what you said about the number of identified muslim officers in the lapd, only nine. did that make it harder to do this bridge building work, and why do you think that is? why do think there was such an underrepresentation? >> the growth of the muslim population in the united states is a relatively recent phenomenon over the last generation. a change in immigration laws in the 1960's totally changed the complexion of who was coming into this country.

as those people were coming into this country, they were also coming in from countries that did not have good relations with their police. police were not seen as a profession that they would want their kids going into. in america, police are a strong middle-class profession. by and large, even when we are not good, the public has strong support of the police. immigrant communities, asian communities, indian communities, because of the parents' experiences with policing in their countries, there is not a great deal of respect for the profession. so, they strongly discourage their childrrn from joining police department, because it is not an esteemed profession.

our problem in recruiting is not unique. it is a problem throughout the united states. my asian population in the los angeles police department is about 6%-7%, which is not equal to the overall population in the city. it is aa issue that we are addressing with exposure. we had trouble at one time including african-americans in the police department, and a survey showed that one disincentive was the attitude of african american women towards the police department who, for generations, had seen their men abused, their sons, their husbands, their brothers, accused by the lapd, so that he strong influence that women would have been at that committee was to discourage

their young men and women from going into the los angeles police department, because within the african-american community, that was not seen as a job of great esteem. >> are there other questions up there? in the blue shirt. >> i am from the staff of the senate homelaad security criminal affairs committee. how would you take what you develop in los angeles or what ray kelly has developed in new york and scale that down to small and medium-sized communities? the recent terrorist attacks were planned in colorado and connecticut. >> there are a lot of people who are a lot smarter than me who

have come up with great ideas. the archangel program, which was the national model for how to identify a critical site, was developed in los angeles and supported by homeland security. but homeland security attempts to do, one of the reasons they were very generous in their support of us, and why they are of new york, everything we did was with the idea of not only improving the security of los angeles city, but understanding the importance of relationships with our colleagues in other cities and communities. we spread the intermission to them as quickly as possible. i will beg, borrow and steal from anybody, always with attribution. if you have a better idea than

me, i am not going to waste my idea -- waste my time on an idea that you have already perfected. an idea developed in new york is 50,000 person police departments, but can be used in a 10 person police department. anybody can put a map on the wall and put dots on it. here is something that you can train their officers very quickly on. here are these behavior detection model that people can very quickly be traiied to watch for. the next manifestation of thht is the american public. we need the public to be aware,

but we do not want them afraid. we do not want them living in fear. but we do want them to be aware of the importance of information, and to be trained to make intelligence out of it. it is quite clear in america, the farther you get from new york city, the less prioritization there is on this issue. new yorkers talk about it every in los angeles i had to work very hard against the political mind-set in that city that did not want to spend resources on this, because it just was not a priority any longer. we are very fortunate that for nine years we have not had an attack. we have the fort hood incident, but i would argue that was similar to the 20 or 30 mass murders we have had in the last several years third >> but the program the bill has been cut back. >> one of the things my

successor has had to deal with is that even though the size of his forces remains the same, there is no more overtime. instead, officerssget compensatory time. on an average day, he loses the equivalent of 1000 officers the were hired during my time as police chief. as a result, the 300 officers, of the one belsen that we hired for counter-terrorism, he had to -- of the 1000 that we hired for counter-terrorism, he had to reduce. that is the terrible ssueeze that we're finding ourselves in at the moment. it goes back to the old adage, you can expect when you expect. if we are drawing back, the

pottntial for an incident or incident to occur greatly increases. what we have time for one more. -- >> we have time for one more. or is that it? >> chief, i am wondering if you see comstat being applicable to fighting the cyber-crime moving forward, and where you think the profession is going in the next 10 years? >> the great about that system is that is applicable to everything in life. walmart calls in their managers intelligence.ut timely, accurate what we sell this week? what are tactics we could use to increased sales? they do this follow-up every saturday morning.

mcdonald's wants to know how many hamburgers they sold every day so that they can be supplied appropriately the next day. we joke about the use of it in personal lives. i was having breakfast at a hotel in new york city. she was at a different table, %+n tt say hello.ing over with - timely and accurate intelligence. she was looking quite beautiful. we did flirting. we exchanged business cards. her boss says he is going to call you. the boss was right. effective tactics, it took us a couple of months because our crazy work schedules kept us apart. we finally had lunch and dinner. relentless follow-up, a few months later we were married.

so, you can basically bring comstat into anything, including cyber-terrorism. it is basically the gathering information, turning it into intelligence, doing it all the time, constantly improving on it, and the constant education and improvement of the individuals who are going to have to make decisions based on that intelligence. you can have all of the best information in the world, but if you have people they are so parochial who do not want to share, or are not trained enough to recognize what the in termstion is of intelligence, then it is all going to fail. that is the importance of keeping high caliber people in government constantly working, from the president on down, to have inclusion of federal, state and local. it is how we began to win the war on crime in the 1990's. since the 1990's, crime is down 40%, continuing to go down, even 40%, continuing to go down, even in