lobbying they might have done is an issue for bp and an issue that they should explain themselves. i mean, the decision to release megrahi, though, was a decision made by the scottish government, and i haven't seen anything to suggest that the scottish government were in any way swayed by bp. they were swayed by their considerations about the need to release him on compassionate grounds -- grounds that i think were completely wrong. i don't think it's right to show compassion to a mass murderer like that. i think it was wrong. but it's a matter for bp to answer what activities they undertook. but the scottish government made its decision and has explained its decision on many occasions and i'm sure will explain it again. i'm very keen that we are clear here that bp should, rightly, be blamed for what has happened in the gulf, and have real responsibilities to cap the well, to clean up the spill, to pay compensation -- all of which they are getting on with, including putting aside the 20 billion pounds in the escrow

account -- $20 billion -- sorry. i think they've made good progress on that and further progress needs to be made. i think it's important to separate that from the decision to release al-megrahi, which, as i say, was a decision made by the scottish government and, as so far has been shown in investigations by the scottish parliament, was a decision which i wholly disagree with but, nonetheless, was taken in an appropriate way. i think we have a question from tom bradby. >> mr. president, tom bradby, itv news. >> quite a lot of people in the u.k. feel that your determination as a country to continue to push for the extradition of computer hacker and asperger's sufferer, gary mckinnon is disproportionate and somewhat harsh. do you think it is time now to consider some leniency in this case? and, prime minister, you've expressed very strong views on this matter, suggesting that mr. mckinnon shouldn't be extradited. your deputy prime minister has expressed even stronger views. did you discuss that with the president today?

and if not, would now be a good moment to share your views with us once again? >> shall i go? >> please, go ahead. >> it is something that we discussed in our meeting. i mean, clearly there's a discussion going on between the british and the americans about this, and i don't want to prejudice those discussions. we completely understand that gary mckinnon stands accused of a very important and significant crime in terms of hacking into vital databases. and nobody denies that that is an important crime that has to be considered. but i have had conversations with the u.s. ambassador, as well as raising it today with the president, about this issue, and i hope a way through can be found. >> well, one of the things that david and i discussed was the increasing challenge that we're going to face as a consequence

of the internet and the need for us to cooperate extensively on issues of cybersecurity. we had a brief discussion about the fact that although there may still be efforts to send in spies and try to obtain state secrets through traditional cold war methods, the truth of the matter is these days, where we're going to see enormous vulnerability when it comes to information is going to be through these kind of breaches in our information systems. so we take this very seriously. and i know that the british government does, as well. beyond that, one of the traditions we have is the president doesn't get involved in decisions around prosecutions, extradition matters. so what i expect is that my team will follow the law, but they will also coordinate

closely with what we've just stated is an ally that is unparalleled in terms of our cooperative relationship. and i trust that this will get resolved in a way that underscores the seriousness of the issue, but also underscores the fact that we work together and we can find an appropriate solution. all right? thank you very much, everybody. >> thank you very much. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> live coverage begins at 7:00

a.m. eastern on c-span2. a immediately following the prime minister's question, british foreign secretary will make a statement about afghanistan and take questions from members of parliament. coming up next, the nominee for the director of national intelligence appears before the senate intelligence committee. securities and exchange commission chair mary shapiro testifies on capitol hill about wall street regulation. president obama hold a press conference at the white house with british prime minister david cameron. you're watching c-span, a public service offered by cable. >> as the senate prepares to debate the energy bill next week, find out what the debate is about with our video library. look up the bill with our new bill search feature, and what congressional hearings and previous debate on the house and

senate floor. it is all online been freed. the c-span video library -- is washington your way. >> c-span is now available on over 100 million homes, bringing you washington your way. a public service created by america's cable companies. >> president obama is nominee for director of national intelligence appeared before -- told a senate panel that promise better cooperation by intelligence agencies with congress. james clapper retired from the air force is a general in the mid-1990s, and has held a high -- a couple of high-level intelligence jobs. he would fill the post vacated by a dennis blair. this is three hours.

>> this position is the single most intelligence position in the government. the dni is by statute the head of the 16 different intelligence offices and agencies that make up the intelligence community. the principal advisor to the president on intelligence matters and the official in charge of developing the intelligence budget. as has been made clear over the first five years of the existence of the position, the true extent of the directors of authority and the exact nature of the job he is supposed to are still a matter of some debate. as the articles yesterday and today in the "washington post" have made clear, the dni faces

major management challenges caused by the enormous growth throughout those intelligence agencies and other parts of the government's national security complex since 9/11. these articles raised several issues. the high infrastructure in suspension of building and data systems. yesterday's article specifically names, and i will not read them out, but seven huge new buildings, all of which will obviously have to accommodate individuals and all kinds of support services and positions. the article also describes a contractor number that now reaches approximately 30% of the entire intelligence work force. it carries out inherently government functions, contrary to policies of the office of

management and budget. manyuthor's account government agencies and 1931 private companies that work on programs related to counter terrorism, homeland security, and intelligence. under the past two dni a's and cia directors, the number of contractors have been coming down slightly. i am pleased that they are no longer being used to conduct interrogations'. nonetheless, the use of contractors needs to continue to decrease substantially. i intend to keep pushing on this. until contractors are not used for any inherently governmental purpose. our original fiscal year 2010 intelligence authorization bill contains a requirement that would reduce the number of

contractors across the community by 10% from 2009 to 2010. but because of the delay in passing the bill, this is not gone into effect. but "post" articles, this committee has found that intelligence growth has not always lead to improved import -- improved performance. growth in the size and number of agencies, offices, task forces, and centers has also challenged the ability of former directors of national intelligence to truly manage the community. as a sponsor of the first legislation calling for the creation of the position, i have long believed that the dni needs to be a strong leader and have real authority.

clearly there is need for a strong central figure for the balkans -- for the balkanization of the 16 agencies will continue. but this cannot be another layer of bureaucracy. the dni must be a leader as well as the coordinator of this increasingly sprawling intelligence community. but the dni must also be at times more than that. he must be able to carry out presidential direction and shift priorities based on national security concerns and emerging needs. in actual practice, the dni is constrained from directing 15 of the 16 elements of the community because they reside in various federal departments. and the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of 2004 states that in carrying out his

responsibilities -- and this is the rub -- the dni may not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the secretaries. this is often interpreted in real life to prevent centralized direction. the 16th agency, the cia, is not housed within the department. but it too has demonstrated its ability to support the dni's directed it that likes by importuning the white house. we understand from former officials from the dni office that both problems have greatly ability topast dni's lead. every day of every week, month by month, the dni must assure coordination between intelligence agencies to eliminate bifurcation in improve

information sharing. he must put in and to programs that are not working and avoid redundancy and overlap. i increasingly believe that this is becoming a major issue. the 2010 intelligence authorization bill reported out again unanimously in revised form last week, which the white house has approved, and the house intelligence committee supports, containing 10 provisions that would strengthen or add management flexibility for the dni. eight of those 10 or requested by this or prior administrations. i urge the house to pass this bill. the primary mission of the dni is to make sure that the intelligence community produces information that enables policymakers to make informed

decisions. this mission includes insuring that the department of defense and military commanders have the information they need to carry out military operations and force protection. yet it also covers the full range of national security, foreign policy, and homeland security information needs. i want to make sure that general clapper, if confirmed, will weld the mantle -- will wear the mantle of the national of the national intelligence, not just by hat he wears today as director of defense intelligence, and that he will have the necessary broad strategic focus and support that this position requires. so i will be interested in continuing to discuss with our nominee the proper role of the dni, but the mission should be, and how strong the authority should be to carry out that

mission. not in question is general clapper's the vast experience or dedication to public service. he has served his country for more than 40 years in a variety of capacities. 32 of those 40 years in active duty in the united states air force, retiring in 1995 as a lieutenant general. he has led two of the larger intelligence agencies, the defense intelligence agency and the national imagery and mapping agency, since renamed the national geospatial intelligence agency, or nga. he is currently undersecretary of defense for intelligence, a position he has held since 2007. he is one of the few national security officials to serve under both the bush and obama administration. in short, this nominee has as

much experience in intelligence as any serving or retired official. general clapper, i want to be cleared that we do not question your service, your knowledge, for your capability. we only ask that you clearly indicate your vision and commitment to head the intelligence community this afternoon and work to give it direction and prevent sprawl, overlap, and duplication. before i turn to our distinguished by its chairman, i understand, general, that you have family and friends with you today. if you like to introduce them at this time -- i think i will change this and as the ranking member to go ahead, if that is agreeable. then ask you to introduce her family and then senator mikulski would like to say a few things, i suspect, on your behalf. i call on the vice-chairman. >> thank you, madam chair. as usual i agree with your opening statement and i join you

in welcoming general clapper to the committee for consideration of his nomination to serve as director of national intelligence. the outgoing director, and rolled dennis blair, deserves our thanks for as many years of service including his work as the previous dni. admiral blair faced a number of unfortunate challenges during his tenure, as other administration officials assume greater control over intelligence community activities. the next dni must have the political clout, will power, to ensure that our intelligence agencies are able to get there by the word time without being micromanaged by the department of justice or the national security council. it is my hope that the next dni will insert this needed leadership.

something that george do you bush got right is placing key people in the job who are responsible to congress. for example, if there was no question that john negroponte and admiral mike mcconnell what the president's principal intelligence advisers, as they should be under united states law. at that time the public did not even know the names of intelligence staffers on the national security council. today the paradigm has been reversed. we have a staffer on the national securities council, who most people believe act as the dni. he calls the shots and even goes on national television to the floor of the administration's viewpoint. one article was bought on in describing his role in today's intelligence. this is not good for the country and is contrary to congress's intent. if the president well lights for him to act as his principal

intelligence adviser and head of the intelligence community, then i will be happy to cohoes this confirmation hearing with the chair. if not, in this template needs to change. general clapper, as the chair is already mentioned, you have served our nation well. you have a long background in the military and intelligence community, and i think we all thank you for an impressive 46 years of service to our nation in the field of primarily intelligence. you know that i have concerns but you will be allowed to do what dr. blair could not. you talked about leaving federal service for some time that you are now seeking one of the hardest jobs in washington, one fraught with maximum tension. today i ask you to tell us why frankly. our nation is at a critical point. we're six years into this experience of intelligence

reform and i am afraid we have a long way to go. the recent "washington series" topps series some -- top-secret series says what we have been saying for a long time, the intelligence committee lacks effective oversight. i hope we can focus on whether you will have the horsepower needed in the white house to use the dni as the position for reform and management it needs to be. the dni in the next round will need to be someone who is willing to break paradigms' and trend against business as usual. not someone reluctantly accepting the job, but willing to take on the old card. we do not need our top spy chief to be a figurehead who seed's authority to the justice the bargain. we need someone who could

oversee the policy, a dni who will push the envelope on his authority and advance the institution's ability to lead our intelligence agencies. just as important, we need someone who can throw some elbows and take back control of our intelligence agencies from the justice department, white house bureaucrats, and the dod. you must establish a clear chain of command between the cn -- the cia and the dni. while the 2004 intelligence reform bill was a step forward, in our efforts to reform the intelligence community, it fell short of what i hoped congress would achieve -- namely, and i have shared many times before, the dni was given a lower responsibility without the authority or the tools needed truly to lead our intelligence agencies. the arm wrestling that took place between dni blair and the

cia director over who would report oversees was a clear sign that we do not have to keep the right balance. but we have to get a ride if we hope to meet the national security challenges ahead. -- have to get it right if we hope to meet the national security challenges ahead. some of rationalized this as an example of the old adage, where you sit is where you stand -- in other words, you protect the stir of whatever institution you lead, i do not take much comfort in that explanation. that is not of hallmark of the sort of labor -- leader that we needed to head of the intelligence community. a number raised concerns about your affiliation with the department of defense. i think that is a valid concern. when the president called me to inform you of your project us of

your nomination, i have to tell you, that is not the best way to put you afford to this committee at the next leader of the intelligence community. we're happy the defense department and arms services committee love you, but frankly that is not what we are looking for. excuse me, i had to get my throat cleared and i have a few more. excuse me. let me be clear -- i am a big supporter of the defense department and my son is done if nine - -- with the senator like a cough truck that has not been previously tested by republican?

[laughter] >> if you will attest to that. >> i think that this is a queue. >> it's it's you. chew. it's a whether i am clear not, i am a big supporter of the defense department. my son was in iraq and three of my staff took leaves of absence to serve in iraq and afghanistan and we appreciate their service like all of the members of the armed services. but at the strategic level, and over emphasis on dod within the intelligence community can be counterproductive. we've seen this as the state department recovered to -- tried to recover the lead from the defense department. a letter of yours criticize 15

specific provisions in their reauthorization bill. you said you felt obligated to afford the armed services committee the opportunity to hear your criticism of the bill. we would have appreciated that same courtesy being extended to this committee first and foremost, since you are dual , under our structure. you're the dni of national intelligence, in your memo is something that you should address to us up front, and in your opening statement today, i would hope you might reference it. we have to get the relationship but ic 20 and its overseers right. through such oversight we can ensure not only that the dni

understand the expectations of his position but that other agencies recognize the dni's leadership. general, too much of your previous contact with committee has been reluctant and reactive. we have to have the dni who works proactively to meet its obligations under the law, to keep the senate intelligence committee currently in fully informed, and that requires a good unopened route -- working relationship. today is your opportunity to instill in this committee that confidence that you're up to the task of leading the intelligence committee of complying with your statutory obligation to work with this committee. and i wish you the very best. madam chair, but had far too many dni confirmation hearings in our time together, and i believe this high turnover rate is a symptom of the inadequate our do you invested in the dni. if we are unable to address those legislative shortcomings in a timely manner, i hope this is something that you in the

next ranking republican will begin to address next year in the new congress. and i thank you, madam chair. >> thank you very much, mr. vice chairman. senator mikulski, you have a few comments you would like offer. >> thank you, madam chair. i will be very brief because we're going to get quickly to the hearing. i want to work hands-on with mr. clapper, and i would like to thank the committee first of all -- like you, we have been through four dni confirmation, dni's and -- four that there is a question of the functionality of the dni, then it is incumbent on us to work the legislation but not all the dni nominees. let me say this about mr.

clapper. one of the things -- you know me a straight talking and playing talking, no nonsense. one of the things in working with mr. clapper as head the nga -- his candor, his st. paul ordinance, his willingness to tell it like it is not the way the top brass wanted to hear it, i thought that was refreshing and enabled us to work very well. in his job, i think he will be able to speak truth to power, which god knows we need, and he will speak truth about power, which we also need. and i would hope that it has -- we don't know if we won a military guy hitting the dni, mr. clapper, he left the military service in 1995. he does not come with an

extensive military staff, and i think he is going to -- he is probably the best qualified to do this job because he is not only been a nighthawk standing sentry over the united states of america, but he has run in intelligence agency and he had their run -- had to run with dramatic leadership at the top. i think we ought to give him a chance and i think we ought to hear what he has to say today. i acknowledge the validity of the questions the chair and the ranking member has raised, but i think we would do well to approve general clapper. >> madam chair, if i may thank my friend from maryland for helping me get my voice back, and wish her a very happy birthday. >> happy birthday, senator.

we could sing a rousing verse. i think that should be a state secret. [laughter] >> we will not turn, the general clapper, if you like to introduce her family. we like to welcome >> could you see that the mike is on? can you turn it up? pull it closer to you if you can. it should resonate. if somebody could see if we can get a mic to general clapper that would work. >> i work for the federal

government and i am here to fix your mic. >> can we try again at full voice? let's see what happens. david, let's do something. >> [inaudible] >> no, we cannot. what i would like to suggest, we will take a brief pause and get the microphone fixed. we want to catch every syllable. we will be in quick recess.

>> we will reconvene. it general, if you like to proceed, please. >> distinguished members of the committee, it is indeed a privilege and honor to appear here as president obama's nominee to serve as the fourth

director of national intelligence. additionally, i want to take -- thank senator mikulski. being nominated was an unexpected turn of events. i am in my third two were back in the government. my plan was to walk out of the pentagon about a millisecond after secretary gates. i had no plan to take on an additional position. i have always been a duty guy at heart. when approached by a secretary gates and the president of the united states of america, i could not say no. i am honored that president obama has expressed confidence in my abilities with this nomination. i submitted a statement for the record subject to your concurrence. if i could deliver one message to you here today, it is this. i have served over 46 years in the intelligence profession in many capacities.

in peace, crisis, combat, uniform, a civilian in and out of government. i have tried hard to serve in each such capacity with great interest to our nation first and foremost. i can assure you that will continue to be my central motivation. we have the largest, most capable intelligence enterprise on the planet. it is a sacred trust to make that enterprise work for the sake of this nation as people. intelligence is a key endeavor in a unique and distinctive position to harness and synchronize the diverse capabilities of the entire community and make it run as a coherent enterprise. i want to repeat something that i said to many of you privately. i believe strongly in the need for congressional oversight. if confirmed, i will continue to form a close partnership with the oversight committee.

particularly in this difficult times throughout the world, this concludes my formal statement. i am prepared to respond to your questions. or, i can respond now to your commentary as well as that of the ranking member. >> that is up to you, general. if you would like to proceed -- or we can take it up and questions. >> we have members waiting. if i will get to the point, it will be at subsequently. >> we will proceed in order sonority and alternate sides. i hope that is acceptable. >> as i mentioned in my opening statement, i believe that they have to be a strong leader as well as a coordinator.

in the handbook from february 2010, you wrote, "i no longer believe as strongly as i once did in greater centralization of intelligence activity or authority. i realize that the individual needs of each department for tailored intelligence outweighs the benefits of more centralized management and control." secondly, in your answers to the initial questionnaire, you wrote that the responsibilities of the dni entails supervision and oversight that seems weaker than direction and control. here is the question. if you were confirmed, in what way specifically will you be the leader of the i.c. as opposed to a coordinator of the 16 agencies that make up its parts?

can you give specific examples of where you see more forceful leadership is necessary? >> i think that with all the discussion about a lack of authority and perceived weaknesses of the office of the director of national intelligence, i believe in already does have considerable authority either explicit in allotted or implicit that can be exerted. it is my belief that the issue in the past has been the art form by which that authority has been asserted. it would be my intent to push the envelope, to use your phrase, on or those authorities can be broadened. i refer specifically to programming and financial management since that is the common denominator in this town, one area where having been a program manager twice as well as

the program executor for military intelligence, i think i know how those systems work and how that can be leveraged. when i speak of centralization, i don't think that everything has to be managed and run from the immediate con finds of the office of the director of national intelligence. i think the authorities can be extended by deputizing or delegating the various parts of the community, things that can be done that did not have to be done within the confines of the staff. i would want to clarify that. i would not have agreed to take this position on if i were going to be a titular figurehead or but ornament. i believe that the position of director of national intelligence is necessary weather is a construct we have now or the old constructs.

there needs to be a clearer, defined, identifiable leader to exert control over the entire community. given its diversity and the heterogeneity, if you will. >> given our present budget problems, this growth of the entire community which has doubled in budget size since 9/11 is unlikely to continue, we have all had occasion to discuss this with recent heads of individual departments. it is my belief that everybody is well aware of that. in fact, the budget may actually end up being decrease in coming years. has growth, in your view, then

managed correctly? are there areas where you believe work remains to be done to consolidate and better manage prior growth? >> i think with of the degree of publication of the articles, it would seem to me that some history might be useful. when i served as the director of dia in the immediate aftermath of the cold war were we were under a congressional mandate to reduce the community on the order of 20%, to put it another way, one out of every five employees had to be removed from those roles. the process started before i left active duty in 1995, and a continued through the '90s. i was away for six years, and

someone took over after 9/11. that downward profile was in progress, and we were constricting facilities, 9/11 occurred. we put the brakes on, and we had to rejuvenate andrea expand the intelligence community. the obvious way to do that quickly was through contractors. that certainly happened in my case, the immediate aftermath of 9/11. i think the questions that are raised in the article that you point out about the growth of contractors and all of this sort of thing, in my view, it is part of a historical pattern, a pendulum that is going to swing back. we're going to be faced with a somewhat analogous situation that we faced after the fall of

the wall when the charge was to reduce the size of our intelligence community. with the gusher, to use secretary gates's very apt term, it has accrued from supplemental or overseas operations, that is one year at a time. it is very difficult to hire government employees one year at a time. if you go back even further in history, you think back to world war two where we had the arsenal of democracy which turned out ships, planes, trucks, jeeps, and unending numbers. it is more of an information driven war.

it now drives intelligence with some of the contractors doing so many things. it is a testimony to the ingenuity, innovation, and capability of our contractor based. there is more work that needs to be done there, what is lacking here, are some standards. should there be limits on the amount of revenue that accrued in contractors? should there be limits on the number of full-time contractors that are embedded in the intelligence community? those are issues that i propose we work together on a plan confirmed as the dni. i would start with the office of

the dni, which i think has a lot of contractors. we need to look at whether or not that is appropriate. most of the buildings, the facility that will go and at springfield va, i was very instrumental in that. that came about because of the consolidation that occured in 2005. so the facility, the consolidation of the central facilities at fort meade, the collocation of the counterintelligence facilities, the support agency at fort meade all came about because of the backgrounds. what the business case was that we got out of these facilities that overtime cost more than a

government owned facility, not to mention the quality of life working conditions that were demonstrably improved. >> one last quick question. it is my understanding that a contractor cost virtually double of what a government employee does. we have set as a mark, 10% reduction a year. i don't know if that is quite achievable. i know the cia has tried to do 5%. what is your view on this as to what would be a practical and achievable number to aim for the reduction of contractors, assuming they are 28% or 30% of the work force today? >> we need to try to come up with some kind of organizing principles about where

contractors are appropriate and where they are not. since there are wide variances in terms of percentages and prevalence of contractors in various parts of the community. in the case of services with the exception of, perhaps, the army which is understandable, in the case of the agencies, the percentage is higher. one agency in particular, they are traditionally heavily reliant on contractors for operations. we would want to come up with some organizing principles, some standards and formulas that would determine where contractors are appropriate and where they are not. rather than just keying on a fixed percentage. it could, in some cases, the damaging or not. i certainly agree with -- and again, it is time for the

pendulum to swing back as it has historically. i would want to see what the impact was on individual cases. >> we will ask you for that assessment as soon as you are confirmed. mr. vice chairman? >> general, let me pose a hypothetical that has some basis in reality. let's say that you have worked for years on the oversight committees to produce a test. he administration's director rights to the committee saying that -- let's pretend that an undersecretary of defense and intelligence would be your successor and sends a discussion draft to the majority staff at the armed services committee alerting them to provisions in the text that need modification because they conflict with longstanding authorities of the secretary of defense. let's also pretend that that is

-- and the under secretary did not clear it with you or the intelligence oversight committees. how would you view this action of the undersecretary, and how would you view his meddling in this operation? had you think you would react to them doing this? >> i probably would have chastised them for not having provided a copy to the staff that was exchanged, the irresponsible request for the house armed services committee staff. in retrospect, it would have been better had i seen to it that a copy of that went to the respective intelligence committees. that happened anyway with the speed of light without me taking

any action, but it probably would have been the more appropriate course. i have been the undersecretary of defense for intelligence. i consider it my responsibility and my obligation to defend and protect the secretary's authorities to the maximum extent i could. if i were confirmed, i would be equally assiduous to ensure that the prerogatives and authorities are in advanced. >> in our discussion, we had a good discussion last week. he said the senate intelligence committee should have jurisdiction over the budget which is currently under the jurisdiction of the armed services committee. could you clarify that for me? do you understand that? >> they apparently like me now.

>> i continue to worry if i were you. >> it would be better, frankly, and i guess i don't want to get into jurisdictional gun battles here among committees, but from my viewpoint, having done this in several incumbencies, it would be better if the oversight were symmetrical. in the house, the house intelligence committee has jurisdiction over the military intelligence program. it is a different situation here in the senate. >> that is very clear. i appreciate that. you have, as anyone around here knows, entered into the most deadly mine field in washington d.c.. step carefully, but we appreciate you taking that step. a very important question about habeus. habeus decisions have resulted

in the release of guantanamo bay detainees, the government conceded in some cases, and in others, the argued it -- they argue against their release. recently, the government won a case on appeal. we know the citizen rate is now above 20%. do you agree with the public statement of the national security staff for a said that 20% recidivism is not that bad? >> he was comparing it to what i believe the recidivism rate is in the united states. a rate of zero would be a lot better. that would be a great concern. it is incumbent on intelligence community institutionally to make the soundest most persuasive authority of an accurate case possible.

when these cases are addressed, when decisions are being made to send people back to those countries. a particular case and point as we discussed in very wary, when we appear before you it is something you have to watch very carefully in yemen because of their ability to monitor and rehabilitate anyone. it is problematic at best. these decisions were made as we also discussed, this is an interagency process in which intelligence is an important, but not the only input to that decision. >> would you agree that the committee should be given intelligence assessments on guantanamo bay detainees that we have not fully received yet? yes, far as i'm concerned,

sir. you should have that information. >> i had concerns about your views like having the dni sit at a policy-making role on guantanamo detainees. is that over the line of intelligence gathering, and getting into a policy area? >> i don't know the exact mechanics of how those meetings were, but i would say as a general rule, i don't believe intelligence should be in a policy-making role. intelligence should support policy-making. it should provide a range of options, but i don't believe intelligence other than for intelligence policy should be involved. >> i assume you would not hesitate if the intelligence

agency's conclusions point to a different direction than the ultimate policy decision, that you would share your honest assessments with the oversight committee in our confidential deliberations. >> yes, sir, i would. >> one of the questions we have is whether there should be a statutory framework for handling terrorist habeus corpus challenges. a new definition under the circumstances under the law of war. we are in a different kind of battle that we have been. do you think we need a new lot on habeas? >> that is what i think i would

need to take under advisement. it is a legal issue a little out of my domain. of the top of my head, i am not sure i can answer that. >> if you are confirmed, we would ask your legal counsel -- you work with your legal counsel and thus to see if something is appropriate. if you would have any recommendations. in your meeting with me last week, you said that the department of justice was meddling in our intelligence agency and was not an acute problem. i respectfully disagree. the doj prevented agencies from complying with statutory responsibility to share intelligence with the committee on the times square attack, and

they did not confirm about whether to mirandize terrorists. what and what do you expect to have over the decision whether or not to mirandize a terror suspect? >> i would hope to be consulted and in the decisionmaking process if such a situation arose. >> have you had an opportunity to discuss these issues with the attorney general? >> i have not. >> what you think should take precedence? making sure that the statements can be used in court or preventing future attacks? >> my interest, the entrance of intelligence is in getting information. how the detainee is treated legally is another decision that

i don't make. but my interest is in procuring information. there is some commonality here between a straight intelligence interrogation say, done by the military reverses interrogations' done by the fbi. in both cases, the interrogator is trying to achieve or develop a report with the detainee or the person being interrogated. that is a major factor for the fbi, for example, when they are interrogating in preparation for aggrandizing somebody. the interest of intelligence is gaining information. >> du believe there are legitimate reasons for the department of justice instructing entities within the doj or intelligence community

not to share intelligence information otherwise under the jurisdiction of this oversight committee? >> i am not sure i understand the question, i am sorry. >> d.c. situations in which the department of justice can or should say the intelligence entity or the fbi -- to not share that intelligence with the intelligence committee? >> i can't think of a situation like that, or certainly i wouldn't be very supportive if that were the case. >> i can't either. >> senator rockefeller. excuse me, senator widen. >> it is well known that the world of counter-terrorism and homeland security is a sprawling

enterprise. yesterday, the washington post made what i believe is a job dropping assertion -- jaw- dropping assertian. -- assertion. they said that no one knows how much money it costs, how many people in employees, how many programs exist within it, or exactly how many agencies do the same work. they made this as an assertion of fact. do you agree with that? >> no, sir, i really don't. the statement implies that this is completely out of control. i believe that it is under control. in the end, the common

denominator is the money that is appropriated, whether it is intelligence or for other purposes. the money is appropriated with fairly specific strings attached. there are allegations of a program by program basis. -- allocations on a program by program basis. it is not one of those things we can do. it does serve, i think, as a means of control over the allegedly profligate intelligence activities. various take the tudjman is made in that assertion. is it clear how many people -- the various judgments made in that assertion. is it clear how many people are employed? >> government workers, absolutely.

contract workers, it is a little bit more difficult. i was a contract worker a few years after duty. depending on what company i was working for, i might charge four or five different contracts. when you have different parts of people, it begins to be a little bit more difficult to count up on a day-by-day basis how many contractors may be doing work all or in part for intelligence. that is what makes the headcount a little bit -- >> it is not clear how many people are employed. is it clear how many agencies do the same work? >> i don't believe that, sir.

. .

let's suppose that the cia disagrees with your judgment. they would say that is not the way to do it. the best way to get the cooperation is to be patient and wait six months before asking for the information. what would you do so that we can get some sense of how you would see your job interacting with the cia? ? >> that i felt for what ever reason that the only way to secure that information, i would do so. i would discuss the with the torture of the cia. >> all two, you believe they you would have the authority to overrule the cia director. >> i do.

>> the third area i want to ask about them false contractor issues. one area i have been most concerned about is that i think that this is a real magnet for conflicts of interest. how often you have got a situation where one of the biggest potential sources of conflict is when you have expertise on a particular topic residing mostly in the contractor base rather than the government work force. you get in a situation where the contractors are being asked to evaluate the merits of programs that they are getting paid to run. i would like your judgment as to whether you think this is a serious problem. if so, what would you do about it? >> you would have to be on guard. when i search for almost five years, half of the labor force at the time was contractors. you do have to safeguard

against an mechanism for watch dogging to prevent this conflict of interest. you have contractors that can gain an unfair advantages in terms of competing for more work. he must be on the lookout for it. i do not think it is a widespread thing. the need to make sure it does not happen. that is the crucial crux here. there is the maintenance of government employees who do have the expertise to assess the performance of the contractor. when you are in a situation with the contractor and you do not have the check and balance on your own government work force, you have a problem. >> i you will think you find a more widespread problem then you

see today. i appreciate the fact the you indicated that he understand there are conflicts there. i want to get into the question of declassification of use. it seems to me that so often the classification process, which is supposed to protect national security, really and of being designed to protect political security. you and i have talked about this on the phone. i would like to pay your -- get your assistance on how you would away the protection of sources and methods with the public's right to know. there really is not a well understood process for dealing with this. in the absence of well understood process, political security chromosomes kick in. everything is classified as out

of reach of the public. how would you try to strike that balance? >> i agree that we do over classified. my observations are that this is more duke to the default. it is the easy thing to do. i think it is more of an is mistreated default with autumn to city to it. there are sources and methods whether to declassify and or not. having been involved in this, my general philosophy is that the

can be a lot more liberal about declassifying. we should be. there is an executive order that we are in the process of gearing up on how to respond to this. this is going to be a more systematized process. it also require resources to pay attention to. >> will you be the person who we can hold accountable? in the past, i think there has been a sense it is the president's responsibility. then you try to run down to in the white house is in charge. i want to know there is someone that will be responsible. i appreciate your assessment. >> it is for intelligence. >> what intelligence issues? what exactly. it is broader than just the

factintelligence. >> thank you. >> thank you. you have an impressive experience in the intelligence world you can draw on to help you in this job but i think there is no question that we are grateful the you are willing to serve again. i appreciate your courtesy call last week. when i asked my question about why you could want this job, you responded with two points. he said it is not the first aspect. you said you were taking a job out of a sense of duty. i personally appreciate it predict.

it'll make you intend to make it work. you told me that if the the night can enhance its ability, and you are right about that. to have our support, and you are going to have to spend a lot of time here sharing with us more problems and proposed solutions. chairman feinstein initiated a serious meetings with your predecessor. alice always grateful for that. one of the reasons we manage to pass the act was because of the long hours.

there are lessons a you have learned from your predecessors. i appreciate it and congress is good and legislating new boxes but it is harder to legislate cultural change. do you believe the organizational culture is important? how you define intelligence culture? do you believe that cultural change is important? how would you address that?

quite a man and made myself clear. i like to clarify something. >> here comes our electrician. >> i probably should clarify

took effect in the make clear that there is no intent to shake up the dni. i do have that intent. what i meant to clarify is that i do not -- i am in the mode in making the model we have a work rather than going through the trauma of yet another reorganization whether it is to some other structure. i believe the model that we have with all its flaws and legal ambiguities can be made to work. that is my intent. i would not have taken this on if i did not think that was the case. >> that they acted it anyway. >> a very important point is that -- and i have said this to the president. we spoke again about it this morning. the fact that the manner in which the dni base to the

oversight committees, the manner in which it relates to the president are very important and the optic and the substance of the relationships into a great deal to compensate for the ambiguities of the law and weaknesses of the position. that is why i am intent on forging a partnership relation with the oversight committee. you pay a huge role. you play a huge role in compensating for those ambiguities. a to be incumbent upon me if i am confirmed. -- to ensure that is the constructive pressure ridge of partnership relationship. i asked him about his support. cultural change has some

experience. was brought on to mandate the changes of the commission that degree work on reorienting and bringing the original founding fathers had in mind the de. i am very proud of the way it has evolved. i think it is moving to the new campus here in another year so and will further brain that cultural change about there is a unique culture in the intelligence committee. there are in fact subcultures built around the trade craft that each of the pipes foster.

that term is often used pejoratively. that is also the source of the trade craft which allows us to conduct those very important endeavors. the trick is to bring them together. that is to mess them and bring to give a complementary out to be a head each of those killed said to bring to bear. there is an important dimension. you are right. it is one thing to enact laws, but the cultural aspects of a car -- aspects are quite important. >> ready ready to live report analyzing the iraq intelligence prior to 2002? >> i am very familiar with that. i am very familiar with the

national intelligence estimate. a fingerprint on it the i am very familiar with the flaws. i believe there have been substantial process improvements to preclude such an event from happening again that was an indelible experience for me. we give the country a great disservice. >> what do you believe explains the the year in expressing the presence expressingwmd in iraq in 2002? you think they have been learned inside? wha>> i think we have learned fm that. the whole process used with the

nie's are quite different. there are improved under george tenet's time. they have continued to this day. one of the first things we did, which we did not do with that nie was the standard practice when you need to approve is to first assess the sources that were used. the use of outside readers with their input included. the use of other options. what if we are wrong? confidence levels, the degree of capability gaps that we have. all of those features are now a standard part of national intelligence assessment, drawn primarily from an egregious experience that we had with that

particular nie. i thought the report laid out exactly what went wrong. i was there. it is not there because of any political pressure. it was because of the ineptness. >> thank you. it mr. shoemaker at efforts to states that the response was not to islam. there are nonviolent. i would underscore that. do you think ideology has a role a motivating violent extremist terrorist? do you believe we have adequately analyzed the component? do you believe that closing down guantanamo would undermine terrorists in reality? if so, why? >> that is a lot of questions. i know. >> theological dimension here --

i think that is a very important one. my experience there most recently was my involvement with the aftermath of the fort hood shootings. the issue was a huge challenge for the department of finance. that was the discernment of self radicalization when people take on and ideologies, eternalizing, and use it for radical purposes. in my view, we have a challenge their on how to discern it, how to explain it to others, particularly 19 or 20 year old soldiers? how you determine whether someone is self-radicalizing? with respect to the second question, i think that will probably help the image of the united states if in fact we are

able to close guantanamo. >> thank you predicts. thank you. >> first of all, i want you to know that i've really enjoyed listing to the questions arranged by you and the other members. we are running from may to other. senator feinstein, i would like to suggest to you with the presence of senator levin that the first area of reform has to be with congress. my concern is that the ninth -- dni appears between so many committees, by my count is 8, we

oversight. that is one thing. another, that we really pressure the reform of the 9/11 commission, that we establish a subcommittee. it does come in appropriations. i have it in the fbi. it is not the subject of this conversation here. i think we need to get together among ourselves and discuss how reform starts with us in the senate and the house. -if i might treat the request of by my response. >> the 3 labette certification bonnet, we have all support -- the centers the serve on it, we have all supported it. it is the couple of dozen members and need to be convinced. >> i think they will be. general clapper, she has done

her series. i believe she has done a great service to the nation. she brought to the public's attention that terrible going on. we dealt with it. and i am not saying there is a scandal within the intelligence community. it has grown. my question to you, if confirmed, will you look at the series for a review of the allegations and flashing yellow lights about the growth and reduplication and make recommendations to the executive and legislative branches? >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you. i think it would give us an important guidepost. i would like to go to the issues of cyber security. you and i have worked on signal

intelligence. cybersecurity is part of a task force. we have a jet for issues, government, technology, development, and maintaining our end. governance has befuddled us. government has folded us. we are making progress. we are seeing turf warfare. what will do you have?

we have a task force on cyber. we have you as the dni. we do not give them any power or authority. there is the answer to who is in charge. >> i will start with commentary about in a state. they are near to your heart. nsa must serve as the nation's center from a technical standpoint on cyber matters. i think he talented enough to

parlay that tremendous technical confidence in serving the broader issue here of support. the response has been to establish cyber commence by joe heading the director of nsa as the commander. in a war fighting context, that is how we organize to do that because we need something to fill the void. i think it ministration is trying to figure out what to be the best combination. the bill that i think they have sponsored --

>> what will your role be in this? it is to ensure that the intelligence support cyber protection is provided. and that is visible to the government structure, whatever that turned out to be. i do not believe it is the dni's problem is to decide what that should be but rather to ensure that it gets sufficient and adequate timely intelligence. >> water advisory role did you play to the president? -- what advisory role do you play to the president. when it gets to the department

of homeland security, what gateways to they have? >> one solution is in the legislation proposed. >> i'm not asking for your comment on a set of recommendations. i'm asking, what is the role of the dni help formulate within the next couple of months? do you think makes that decision? >> is a you? >> i do not believe it is the dni or make the ultimate decision.

>> for the provision a support, what is the threat in the cyber domain to this nation? i think that is the oversight responsibility. we will make sure that is adequate. >> then let's go to the role of the dni civilian agencies, the fbi, and department of homeland security. what authority do you have and those domains? do you see bringing them in more? the fbi would have done a great job. i think it has all been great.

it has not been an attack on the homeland. >> the fbi has done great work. i spent some time with them. i think it has been very impressive. they have a cultural talent of a it is a work camp progress. a knowledge that.

>> the fbi is one of the elephant in the living room. it is a huge responsibility provincia. my time is up. >> thank you very much. welcome to this. this comes at a critical juncture. we talk about the leadership that should be brought. this is what i like to explore with you this afternoon. first and foremost, it is an

issue that i have been advocating since before we pass the legislation that created the position one of the issues that has evolved from all of this is being able to look across the spectrum. when they think it has developed tennis -- one of the things that has developed in this is what happened on the christmas day attempt did attack and a systemic breakdown, and information sharing, and technology. clearly, it is something that i think something that shows the

problems though we have. in addition, this week i think it is also a manifestation of a man in the problems that continue to exist. whether it is an integrator or coordinator and whether or not wish to have a reason that oversees all of these agencies. they are willing to exert that leadership. i like to show whether or not you would support unity wide inspector general's. it is pending in the current legislation between the house and senate. i have fought tooth and nail for

it in the past. i think it could initiate investigations and produced the ties of reports that corporate forward by the washington post this week. it could produce the type of an formation that is lacking. we cannot reach across the spectrum and across all agencies. that is where the inspector general could come in and play a role. i believe it is a breakdown they barriers that have evolved. i think that is indisputable. i believe that you would find is a tremendous assets and having someone that can conduct an overkill.

it gives you the vantage point is in the forest through the tree. there are problems that have been identified in the christmas day bomb plot that was identified by this community. it could have been averted if we had someone at cantos looking across the spectrum i would like to have you respond to that. i noticed in your questions you said the ease support a strong and independent inspector general proposed.

>> first of all, and having served as a commander in the used ig's , i think they are a crucial management tool for a commander or director. the two times i have served as a director, i considered an ig crucial. i feel so early above the community wide ig. but claudia with the to insure you use the ig read my only copy that would be to insure use the ig with issues that apply across more than one agency.

i think there is great merit in having a community-wide inspector general. >> he say it to overlay the authority. there is certain how do supportsd agencies. you are still testing it would duplicate those efforts. >> what i am saying is that i do think there is merit in having a community wide ig go look across as an institution for systemic weaknesses and problems and identify those i would try

to foster a complementary relationship with either agency igs' are the dod ig that has in intelligence component. white said he could anticipate a lot of the problems before they occur. is anything that surprised you this week? ? o -- --no. >> i do not agree with some of

that. i think there was some shrewdness to it that i do not subscribe to prad. i think she is extrapolated your anecdotal experiences. i am concerned about the security implications of having a dig for making it easy for adversaries to point out the vocations of contractors who were working for the government of the and not be surprised if that engenders more security and part of the government. pies are you going to a fine way this bill on that basis? >> i think it is disturbing to think in terms of the number of agencies and organizations of more than 1200. nothing contained in that article? >> it depends what does he mean

by an agency. it is like in the army. that is not to say there are not things we can improve. the this is a very important tool the statham -- tool. if i am confirmed, that is one i want to take on with the new director of intelligence. it is my view the treasury should be the lead elements for the threat of finance. that is one area i will take to

heart. this article certainly brings that to bear. cracks i hope you will not dismiss it out of hand. i think it is where they have been other people who are doing this kind of workers. and the bureaucracy, we ought to be looking at it. i hope you are going to give it the kind of consideration. on the april pages, the response he gave between the information, you mentioned these grants of unilateral authority referred to the operation bill that would expand the authority in to the dni and are inappropriate.

he said it could be decentralized. i am concerned that you would subscribe to embrace some of the territorial battles that we are trying to overcome. when you are using words such as "in frenfringe" the other agenc, it concerns me at a time in which i think that your position should be doing more of the centralizing with respect to the authority. i am just concerned about what you will do as in the year if he are suggesting decentralizing other authorities at a time when

you should be moving in a different direction. >> i agree with that. i do not think that everything in the intelligence community has to be room in the confines of the director of national intelligence. i think there are many things that can be delegated to components that can be done on behalf of the dni with the visibility but does not have to be correctly executed. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. senator white house? >> i yield to chairman 11. >> -- senator levin. >> let me ask you about information sharing. your answers to the pre during question the state to the you believe obstacles remained to adequate information sharing. hughes said it was cultural.

-- you said it was cultural. it reveals the cia will not share the data base of operational cables and the dod's intelligent task force for counter-terrorism. the bill they cannot allow non- nsa person to access the data base on the grounds that it cannot be trusted. can you comment on that question and information sharing? >> it continues to be a problem. i think we have gotten a challenge. it is better than it was. it is better than it was before 9/11. any improvement. i think nsa is understandably

currency inches above the production of potential data on u.s. persons. there are very sensitive as they should be. that is one inhibitor to collaborative and sharing that we might like. that is an area i will continue to work. >> the city will -- he said he will -- why do we need instances? -- incentives? why do we need incentives and consequences? >> that is one way of reducing changing culture, to provide rewards for those who cooperate and those who do not.

>> should they be needed? >> and this kind of setting that has been going on so long? >> that is an era i will certainly look at to see if there is a need for further direction 0 what other remedy there might be. >> you also indicated the need for a single repository of terrorism data. in integrated repository of terrorism data capable of ingesting terrorism related information from outside sources remains a necessary to establish a foundation from which a variety of sophisticated technology tools can be applied. i gather that is not exist now?

>> i believe what is needed from a technology standpoint is a robust search engine that can range across a variety of constructs to help connect the dots. i think we are still spending too much manpower to do manual things that can be done easily by machines and the. quite to know the district they have to search different databases separately, that they cannot now from its one question that goes out to all of them simultaneously? is that true? >> i do not know the specifics.

that is my impression. that is why i made this statement in response to your previous question. how what is needed is a very robust search engine that can do that on behalf of analysts said they do not have to do that manually. >> i want to go to some structural issues. the prevention act says that the director of the cia reports to the dni. is that your understanding? >> yes, sir. >> is that clear enough? is that the reason for some complications? >> that language is clear. there is also language in there about, for example, the governance of foreign relationships. they are the province of the director of central intelligence agency. they are to be overseen by the dni.

that is an area of ambiguity. >> section 1018 says the president shot issued guidelines to ensure the effective a implementation and execution with in the executive branch of the authorities granted to the director of national intelligence. it respects and does not abrogate these statutory responsibilities of the head of the department. were the guidelines issued by president bush? but they were essentially in the revision to the second quarter of 12 to 03. -- 123333. in that, a security gate and i worked two attenuate some of the ambiguities created by the famous section 1018.

a specific case is the involvement of the dni they hire and fire process involved with leaders that are imbedded into the department of defense. >> are you satisfied with those guidelines? >> i am assigned, yes, sir. my view may change if i am confirmed. >> do you know it affected your view will change? >> no, i do not know. >> as of this time, you are satisfied with the guidelines? >> yes, i am. >> in answer to the committee's pre-hearing questions revolving the dni's role with respect to the dia, nsa -- you said the dni supervises their performance, said sanders, and formulate policies governing the agencies and ensures they fill their missions. three of the agencies are combat support agencies. that means if they provide critical support to the

combatant commands. to you believe that authority is a shared authority with those agencies? is this is listed in the dni? >> to you believe that they must ensure that they fill their missions, and they supervise their performance? is this a shared responsibility? are you responsible for those functions for supervision? >> i believe that is a shared responsibility. i think the secretary of defense has obligations and responsibilities both in law and executive order to ensure that the war fighting forces are provided adequate support by the

three agencies that were designated as combat support agencies. the dni has a lease a paternal responsibility to insure that works as well. >> is the word fraternal? >> paternal. >> paternal? not fraternal? >> in your current position, had you taken a look at the county network? have you determined whether or not they have engaged in terrorist activities that threaten u.s. security interests? do you support in being added to the state department's list of foreign terrorist organizations? >> i would rather not into that of the top of my head. i will take that under advisement. let's all right. during the previous is a mystery to, we got complected pre-4 intelligence assessments.

do you believe that the importance of congress as a consumer of intelligence products and devices is no less than that of senior officials from the administration? do you go because of the on varnished facts surrounding the issue i? do you believe that congress has an amount to no less than half of the senior officials? >> i believe not only that but it is required in the law. it stipulates that the dni intends to the proper intelligence support. >> on an equal basis? >> sure. >> thank you. >> thank you very much. senator chambliss. >> thank you.

welcome, in general. as i told you, i was not sure why you'd want to come back before this committee again for this job. as you stated in your article, this is probably the toughest job in the intelligence community. your willingness to serve such an awful lot about you. we are fortunate enough to have you. there are some problems out there within the office of the dni within the community itself that will have to be addressed. these issues are not just matters orf the size of the bureaucracy. there are going to have to be

major changes. we cannot afford nanother christmas day situation to occur, because we were fortunate there. it does not necessarily the great work of the intelligence community that prevented a very serious situation occurring within the united states. you do bring a wealth of intelligence background to this job. so did the three predecessors to this job. you probably have more experience than all of them. you have been involved. these are friends of yours. they are individuals that you worked with. you have associated with. somewhere along the lines, there have been some systemic failures such are going to have to be addressed to individuals like to have worked with. it is not plan to be any easier for you then for any of your

predecessors. my question is, knowing that we cannot afford for another situation like christmas day or the new yorker times square situation or the fort hood situation to occur where we had an awful lot of signs and where nobody connected the dot in spite of the statute being very clear as to who is to connect the dots, that will be under your jurisdiction. what this exchanges to you know now that you think need to be made as we go forward to make the community better, to make the office of the dni stronger and to make the calcolleagues me responsive to you as the chief intelligence officer? >> thank you for your

introductory comment. i appreciate that. i would hope i can bring to bear this experience i've had over the last 46-years of having run a couple of the agencies, having spent two years in combat getting shot at. there is an understanding of the intelligence community. i can bring about a better living arrangements. in my book, i think it to be very candid. our most its -- successful dni was admiral mike mcconnell for that reason. he had some experience in the business. he had run an agency and done other things in intelligence. i think that those give an

advantage and understanding of where the problems are and where the skeletons are and where these scenes are and how to work the issues. i think that is one of the value added. i cannot list you chapter and verse. i will want to give back to the committee on specific in that i do have a mind of the -- mind. it confirms come out of one to consult with the committee on what i would have in mind.

>> have you engaged him in the fact that there are some changes that will need to be made that. >> i have done that in writing. whether it was me or someone else. >> he mentioned that letter to a man that you hoped the white house with and the share that with the chairman. do you know what did that has been done? what i do not know. i do not know that the request has been made to the white house. >> general, i've known you for a long time and sing operate.

you are certainly well qualify for this job. i hope you understand this committee is here to help you. we want to make sure from an oversize standpoint that you have got the right kind of policies from this side of pennsylvania avenue. we look forward to working closely with you. >> i appreciate that. that is absolutely crucial. i do not believe oversight necessarily have to be around the relationship. i would need the support of this committee to bring about those changes that you articulate it. >> thank you for your willingness to serve. >> i do not know whether we formally requested that. i think we should. >> we will see if we can make

that request. >> thank you. >> congratulations, again on your nomination to this critically important position. you are clearly well qualified for this. i like to put a statement and the record. i hope we had a chance to review congressional notification requirements in the national security act. had he had a chance to do that? >> i have a burda. . .

>> has as say, that opening burbage has been interpreted to expand that. i'll tell you of my personal attitude is. at the same time, i do not feel it appropriate to preempt what the president want to decide. my attitude is that i would be a zealous advocate for timely and

complete notification. >> i appreciate that and it is an incorrect interpretation for the record. obviously you're not alone in your view that they can be done. i really felt strongly that that is incorrect. while many of the operational details of intelligence activities are justifiably classified, i believe the american people are entitled to know how the intelligence community, the department of justice, and others are interpreting the law. do you agree with that? >> yes, sir, i did. >> and identified a number of areas in which the american people would be surprised to learn how law has been interpreted in secret. as you consider these types of requests for declassification, would you keep this principle that we agreed upon in mind? >> yes, sir, i will. >> the department has the perception that the -- i want to

focus for the reason they're in there in the first place and why it is in the control spending now legislation. it would help save taxpayer dollars. in our meeting last week, you told us that all not all problems or statutory solution. how what dni would you go fixing cost overruns and other problems that this legislation is designed to address? >> you support the management mechanisms that have been established, specifically in agreement on acquisition and oversight, defined by a then- director mcconnell and secretary gates. acquisition is in general a huge challenge, whether intelligence

or elsewhere. i do not have any magic silver bullet here to offer rupp, because if they did, i would not be here. it does require systematic program reviews. it requires integrity on the part of program managers to ensure that they are honestly reporting out their problems and identifying issues early enough so that remedies can be afforded. >> the intelligence authorization bill also establishes an independent commission that would recommend ways to innovate the intelligence -- integrate the intelligence community with others who openly collate information around the world. this reform was first proposed by senator hegel and myself, and i think it's important to help anticipate crises around the world.

would you be willing offer recommendations on this to this commission was a margin i will. >> in yesterday's "washington post" story, but given finance resources and budget constraints, to what extent should we be prioritizing threats from the parts of the world that no one is covering? >> you raise a good point. we did discuss earlier that in some cases one man's duplication is another man's competitive analysis. in certain cases, as during the cold war, when you have an enemy that can damage or mortally wound you, that is merited. i think in many cases, what was labeled as duplication -- a deeper look may turn out not to

be duplication. it just has the appearance of that, but when you look into what is being done, particularly on a command by command bases or intelligence analytic element on a case by case basis, it is not really duplication. the important point that you raise is, what about the areas that are not covered? and that has been a classic play for us. i notice that -- the status of our geospatial databases were 1 9/11 for afghanistan. they were awful, because the prioritize -- the priority that afghanistan enjoyed in our intelligence requirements. we cannot take our eyes off the incipient threats that exist in areas that you're very interested in, for example,

africa, which is growing in concern to me personally. >> bank you, general. what is your view of the gao access to the intelligence committee? >> there been several incumbencies over my time. they have produced very useful studies. i was cited a recent case in point, the isr roadmap that we're required to maintain and gao has critique is on that. i would be involved with security clearance reform. the gao has held our feet to the far in insurance compliance with guidelines on the timeliness of clearances. and they have insisted on the quality metrics for insurance appropriate clearances. i think the gao serves a useful purpose for us.

>> i appreciate your attitude on that as well. meaningful intelligence reform is also going to require some reform of the oversight process. is it time for the senate to grant appropriation authority to this committee has the 9/11 commission recommended for that to work? it has to be in unclassified topline budget request that will allow for a separate appropriation. would you support the declassification of the request for a remark >> i do support that. it has been done. in fact, i also pushed through and got secretary gates to approve the military intelligence budget. i thought that we were being a bit disingenuous by only revealing the national intelligence program, which is only part of the story. secretary gates has agreed that we could also publicize that,

and that if the american people are entitled to know the totality of the investment we make each year in intelligence. i caution members earlier about building in to congressional jurisdiction issues. i would prefer not to touch that with a 10 foot pole. it would be nice if the oversight responsibility for symmetrical -- were symmetrical and both houses. i have been in dialogue with actually taking the national intelligence and program out of the dod budget, since the reason for having an embedded in the department's budget and was for classification purposes. if it is going to be publicly revealed, that imperative goes away. and it's a the added advantage of reducing the top line of the dod budget, which is quite large as you know. and that is a large amount of money that you have no real

jurisdiction over. we have started putting that out of the department of defense budget which would also serve to strengthen the dni's hands in managing the money of the intelligence community. >> thank you for all your answers and good luck. >> thank you, senator feingold. senator burr. >> general, welcome. we're delighted to have you here. i think you will be the next dni, hopefully sooner be a stock later. i say that for the chair in no ranking member, i hope that we will move this as expeditiously as we can. and as i have publicly said, i think you bring to this position a rich experience that many have covered as well as yourself. it benefits once ability to be successful,, and our intelligence community needs that desperately right now. i have to say as it relates to

members references to the "washington post" articles, it pains me. i do not believe that what happens within the intelligence community is something that needs to be as public as it sometimes is. it disturbs me as we promote unmanned aerial vehicles on tv, and we do it with the full knowledge of knowing that we give away something every time that we do it. i think the american people understand that if you have sufficient oversight in place, if you trust the individuals that you have chosen to put into those roles. i see this explosion the publicity about what happens within our intelligence community, really, as a blow to us, the oversight committee, and the inability for us to work effectively with those within

the community. i hope you understand at least for myself that i believe that the committee has to be robust in our oversight. is not a reflection of the leadership of the committee, i might say to the chairman and ranking member. i think it is the overall level of cooperation between the intelligence community and the committee, and i hope that we will work as partners to make sure that the trust of the public in the trust of our colleagues is interested in this committee that we are doing our jobs, and that we had our eye on the right thing. you said earlier that the dni needs to be a leader of the intelligence community and provide direction and control. can you define direction and control for me in this context? [inaudible]

>> general, did that go off? wait just a minute, i think that will get blocked out. >> is it working? ok. i think what is intended in the term direction and control is that the dni is responsible for the performance of the intelligence community. large wr --it -- in intelligence large.tywrit writ i believe under the auspices of the president who intends the hold the dni or somebody else responsible for the performance, and that therefore it empowers the dni to direct the

intelligence chiefs as to what to do, but the focus should be, but the embassy should be, or if they should change. if we need to a tablet -- established at a hot organizations to perform a specific task, we need to have a study done -- whatever it takes, inherent in the dni to this. an hon the intent of the legislation that he or she would correct that. >> de believe that there will be times where the dni has to be a referee? >> i think there could be times, yes, i do. >> this is already been covered, but i have to cover one more time. i believe that this committee is to be notified quickly on any significant attempt to attach,

once an attack is carried out, or there is a significant threat that we have credible evidence of. do i have your commitment today that you will in a timely fashion or a designee by you brief this committee on that information? >> absolutely, senator. it carries with it the potential of it not being exactly accurate, because-. -- my experience has been most critics are wrong. but i believe that what you ask is entirely appropriate and reasonable. >> general, do you have any problems with this committee asks for a level of raw data to look at pertinent threats or attempts at sharing that raw data with this? >> i do not have a problem with that philosophically, sir. i would want as dni if i am

confirmed for that position to ensure to give you the most complete picture i can, and as accurate as possible. oftentimes the so-called raw material is erroneous or incomplete or misleading. with that caveat, i do not have a problem with that, but i want you to understand what you're getting when you get that. >> i accept that and i think most members would. i think that the raw data is absolutely essential for us to do the oversight role that we are charged with. it is certainly not needed on every occasion but on those that it might play a role, i hope you will in fact provided. and you have covered the history of the intelligence community, especially as a related to the 1990's and how that affected our capabilities, post-9/11. would we have been able to meet the intelligence community

needs, had we not had contractors we could turn to post-9/11? >> no, sir. >> do you believe that we will always use some number of contractors within the intelligence community? >> yes, sir, i did. i know this has been a focus of a lot of members about downsizing the contractor footprint. i am fine with that but there's a big difference between downsizing and eliminating. there is a tremendous challenge out there that we were able to tap into. i would hate to see us become so of adverse to the use of contractors that we would sacrifice potential. and i applaud the effort to try to downsize the footprint of them but i hope that we leave the flexibility to use them where it is appropriate -- and absolutely, sir. i could not agree with you more.

i work for conch -- as a contractor for six years myself. i understand the contribution that they have made and will continue to make. i think the issue is, what is the magnitude -- and most importantly, regardless of the numbers, the company, the number of contractor employees, is how the government and specifically intelligence community, how we manage them in ensure that we're getting our money's worth? >> lastly, and it covers crown are discussed, you indicated that not all the intelligence community efforts need to be exclusively managed out of the other dni, that they could be delegated where appropriate. you have any concerns that that might undercut the authority of the dni? >> if no, sir, i do not, and i'll give you a point. when i came into this job early on, in may of 2007, and i prevailed upon both secretary

gates and the dni to designate someone on to the dni staff as a way of facilitating communications and bridging dialogue between the two staffs. i think the record will show that we worked very well together. i would propose to director blair to his great credit he breeds great life into that process, and i would do the same if confirmed. and i would have the same success it -- i'll have the same relationship with my successor if i'm confirmed for dni. and i think that that approach could be used in other relationships, perhaps with the department of homeland security, justice cited example of the top of my head. all i'm saying is that everything does not have to be executed between -- from the confines of the director of the office of the director of national intelligence. there things that can be delegated and done on behalf of

the dni as long as they are visible and with the approval of the dni. >> i think you for your candid answers. in our telephone conversation, i said to you that your tenure as dni would determine whether the structure we set up actually can't work, will work, or whether we need to rethink this. i believe that we've got the best chance of success with your nomination. and i look forward to working with you. they do, madam chair. >> thank you, sir. >> and finally, senator whitehouse. >> welcome, general clapper. here is the bitter end. i like to go back to security. a lot like ask you about five topic areas. the first is the information

that the public has about cyber security. are you comfortable that the public is adequately aware of this scope and severity of the cyber security threat that the country faces? >> candidly, no, sir. i do not think that there is a general appreciation for the potential threat there. i think there is widespread knowledge in the cyber community, meaning the cyber industries, if you will. i think that there is a less acute awareness help their -- out there and what i call the civil infrastructure, but the general public is not aware of the potential threat, no. >> the reason that i ask that is it is difficult in a democracy to legislate in an area where the public is not

adequately aware of the threat. i hope that as we go forward in the pieces of legislation out there that you will help us bring to the attention -- you said that we'd do have classified here, in an area where it does not adversely affect national security, there is a real a bandage to getting the information out to the public and i hope you'll cooperate with us in doing so so that we're dealing with the if knowledgeable public as we face legislative questions. >> i think that is in fact in, but on the intelligence community to have -- to supply that education -- incumbent on the intelligence community to supply that education. >> the basic protective hardware that is out there right now could protect the vast majority of cyber intrusions

that take place. do you agreed that trying to bring -- agreed that establishing and monitoring rules of the road for participation in our information superhighway, that is an area that could stand improvement? >> if you mean -- if i understand your question, sir, the conventions or rules that in order to participate, this is what is required? >> what is expected. >> of minimum level of security? >> getting aware that your laptop is compromised and willing to do something about it, and we put a structure in place so that you cannot do the cyber equivalent of driving down the road with your headlights out and your muffler dangling.

>> i personally agree with that. it would be a sales job, a marketing job required to get people into that. >> and stepping up to america's business community, you feel that the private sector is adequately situated with respect to their own independent self-defense against cyber attack, the networking of private business by the industrial sector and the relationship with government needs to be improved so that our major businesses can protect their critical infrastructure better? >> certification, i am not technically fluent here, but my

general sense is that given the sophistication of some of our major adversaries, nation-state adversaries, i am not sure that, given the rapidity with which new ways of accessing computers -- i am not sure that they are as current on that come up those sectors to which you refer, as they could or should be. >> and to the point where of private business which provides critical infrastructure, a major bank or communications entity, an electric utility, some other form of infrastructure upon which americans lives and property depend, were to be the subject of a sustained and damaging cyber attacks, are you wenfident that at the moment t

have adequate authorities for the government to step in and do what it needs to do in a clear way to protect american lives and property? >> again, i am not an expert on this but my general sense is no, we are not. i think that this is a rigid law hole on the subject is a work in progress -- blocked all on this is a work in progress. on thisthe whole law is a work in progress. i would be concerned about the rapidity of the response which is the key. you speak with general alexander about that, and i consider him an authority, that would be the main concern.

>> and lastly on this subject are you confident that the rules of engagement for our covert agencies in addressing attacks and intrusions that take place on our cyber infrastructure are adequate and fully robust for the challenge that we face? or is that another area of work in progress? cit yes, sir, it is a work in progress. and i think best left for detailed discussion in our close session. >> i will not go further in that discussion but i wanted to get your general perspective on that. i have only been in the senate for three years.

my fourth director of national intelligence already. are you going to stick around? chin yes, sir, i will. i would not take this on without thinking about that. i think my experience has been that it will take time to bring these changes about. when i was asked nim asked nima -- when i was asked to take nima, i was asked to stay five years and i was willing to do that. i did not last quite that long, but i believe that kind of commitment is required. i also would be less than forthright if i sat here in guaranteed that the intelligence community is one the bat.100 -- is a. going to1 batters00 -- it

everyng to thbat .1000 time because it is not. >> i will not hold you to this. it is not a question of that variety to pin you down. it is intended to be a question to eliminate the area that you're must focus on. going into this job now and when would you know now, when it comes time for you to go, and let's hope that it is five years from now, what now which you think would be the most important things that at that later date you like to look back on as having accomplished? >> for starters, kept the nation safe. obviously, this is somewhat of high water act with no safety net. -- high wire act with a safety

net. the thing that will keep me up at night is worrying about that. whatever my tenure is, if the intelligence community has at least contributed to preserving the safety of the nation and its people, i think that would be the main thing i worry about. >> i wish you well. you have got a helluva tough job in front of you if you are confirmed. any support that we can give you, any significant questions about what the role of the dni should be, what its authority should be to complement that role, that is a chicken in a question that you have to resolve one of the other, we would work together with you to get this over with once and for all. >> thank you, senator whitehouse. senator nelson. >> thank-you, general, for your

public service. the congress created this position in order to try to exert some control over the multiple intelligence units that were read times going off in their own directions. and in the compromises that we had to make in enacting this legislation to create the post to say -- that you see, a great deal of control was still left within the department of defense. at the insistence of then- secretary of defense rooms filled r -- rumsfeld. how can you bring the department of defense intelligence operations under your orbit so that you can function

effectively? >> well, sir, i do not see the problem there. i know the department of defense pretty well and that is where roughly 67% of the manpower and the money of the national intelligence program is vetted. i would suggest respectfully that having run through the agencies in the department of defense and served as intel chief, it will help empower me to sustain having -- i will call it a positive relationship with the department of defense components. i been there, done that, don the t-shirt, so i know how to take advantage of that. >> he who pays the piper calls the tune. a lot of that defense intel activity does not have to report

directly to you on the appropriations. how do you get into that when someone wants to go off on the wrong person margin well, i would intend -- go off on their own? >> i would crystallize the relationship established in may 2007 designating the under secretary of defense and the directorate of defense. i have fostered with the to dni's that i have served with a close working relationship on synchronizing the two programs. the national intelligence program and the other. director blair and nine in two rounds testified together on those two programs. we have had an aggressive effort going on for a couple of cycles

now to further synchronize and deconflict the two programs and to coordinated -- coordinate with them. i would certainly want to continue that with my successor if i am confirmed. the director of national intelligence. i do not think, frankly, although there is much made of it sometimes, it is somewhat hyperbole about the strained relationship between the dni and the department of defense. i just do not think -- i have not seen that. i have certainly endeavored to work with secretary gates to actually enhance and strengthen the role of the dni. the dni is one such approach, and certainly secretary gates and i heard during the revision to strengthen the position of the dni.

you share for the record what you shared with me privately about your forthcoming relationship with the director of the cia? >> i will provide that for the record. >> basically saw the relationship was strained. there was a little dustup between the two in the immediate past. intend to smell that out? >> to continue my comments earlier, the intelligence community is composed of 16 components, 15 of which are in someone else's department. the most strained relationship has been with no one component

in the department, the central intelligence agency. that's been true regardless of who the incumbents were, nothing to do with the people involved. all of whom are good people. i've had excellent discussions with director panetta about this, and i think i'm very encouraged and pleased by his support. he has been extremely gracious and supportive and i think he wants to make this arrangement worked as much as you do. >> would you participate in the practice of based bridging in the president's daily morning briefing? >> i plan to participate, yes, sir. i do not plan to give it necessarily but i plan to participate in it. >> will the director of the cia participate as well? >> he could, depending on the subject matter, i suppose. i certainly would not object to

that. >> do you get the sense that that was all a little bit of contention, that suddenly what had been historically the role of the cia director was suddenly not the role, once the dni was established? >> that has obviously been a challenging transition. but it is my belief and my observation from someone outside, that is an arrangement that has evolved with a better -- for the better input findings its waypd to theb from other places. the cia will continue to provide -- continue to provide

the lion's share of the final analysis, but under the auspices of the dni, it is much more broad and involves more of the community. i recently reviewed some statistics that bear that out. >> recently we have had some cases of homegrown terrorists. colorado folks, the times square folks, the fort hood person. do you want to comment for the committee on what you think ought to be done? >> certification, i think we did speak about this earlier period of very serious problem and i was deeply involved in the fort hood aftermath, particularly with respect to e-mails at the

radical cleric hasa majorn -- the radical cleric and major hasan. self radicalization may not lend itself to detection. in the case of the department of defense, it requires some education on how to tell people or instruct people or suggest to people how they discern or identify self radicalization going on right in front them or with an associate. it's almost like detecting a tendency for suicide ahead of time. it is a very daunting challenge and you can not necessarily depend on intelligence mechanisms to detect that self radicalization. >> on page 23 of your testimony, you consider counterintelligence to be under

resourced. you want to share with us why, and also where you would increase the resources? >> given the profound threat posed to this country both by nation-states and others, trying to collect information against us, and there are aggressive foreign countries doing this, and i am not convinced -- and this is more intuitive or judgmental or pessimistic -- that we have devoted enough resources to this. the department of defense is a major supporter of counterintelligence. this is something that i intend to explore to see what we can do to expand resourced investment

in counterintelligence. this is particularly crucial in the problem of cyber intelligence. >> madam chairman, are we going to do a classified session at any point? >> we can't get there is a request. we will not do it today, however. -- we can't if there is a request. we will not -- we can if there is a request. we will not do it today, however. what comes through clearly is your expertise in the specifics of intelligence. i think that that is appreciated and it will make your job allottees year. i do have a couple of questions and i know the vice chairman has a couple questions. i would like to continue this all little bit longer, if i might. have you had a chance to take a

look at the 13 recommendations we made on the of bill mccollum situation? -- on the abdulmutallab situation? >> yes, ma'am. >> their huge expenditures in computer programs, often bought separately by variously -- various departments and they cannot connect in certain critical but very simple areas. i like to suggest that that be high on your portfolio and that you take a very careful look at it, because i would think we're spending billions of dollars on high technology which candidly does not work nearly as well as it should. and particularly in this area,

where an identification could be really critical and one letter or one number should not make a difference. the u.s. the comment? >> i agree with you. as i alluded earlier, despite all the investment in it son that we have made, we're spending too much on the minds of analysts to do things that we ought to be of the honest with our i.t. o >> we have been very concerned about one particular area. this committee is taking that oversight very seriously and has been very active in seeing that this is carefully done, that the intelligence is excellent, and i want to believe that the cia in particular has had remarkable

records with very good intelligence, and in some ways, really, the best of what can be. i just hope that you will have this at a high level for run oversight. >> absolutely. >> thank you. the third is afghanistan. i read a quote by the major general michael flynn earlier in the year that said -- and i am. rising -- and i am paraphrasing, it is largely irrelevant to the world strategy. u.s. intelligence officers and analysts can do little but shrug in response to high level decision makers seeking knowledge. would you take a look at that and perhaps talk with him and see where we are comic if we are in fact lacking? >> i have already had extensive

dialogue with mike flynn when the article first came out. a careful reading of that, think it is a good article. the article really talked to the situation in afghanistan asiaasa was under his control. what occasioned the article was this change in our strategy from a classic counterterrorism mission to a much broader counterinsurgency mission. and it is true. we did not have the intelligence mechanism. to make that shift that quickly. what he is getting to is the cultural, the human terrain if they can use that phrase, perspective and insight required to understand the village dynamics down to the nitty gritty level. that is what his complaint was about. as i told him, if he felt they

had too many intelligence analysis at that lovell and they needed more of the battalion of company level, it was up to him to move them. we're not going to sit back here in the confines of the bill white and -- of the bill why -- of the beltway and manage intelligence and afghanistan. we would certainly support him. >> and finally, contractor analysis. could you put that high on your agenda? i very much appreciate which you said, and that was it all coming outwhat we're the necessity, the types of things, and we need to get that under control. and we do not currently have it under control. we need to know where from an intelligence perspective contractors should serve a vital use and where they do not. as you know, the cost is about

70% more than a government employee. so it is a very expensive enterprise as well. >> yes, it is, and per earlier discussion, the reason why we got to where we are and the sudden expansion of the intelligence community after 9/11, intelligence being a manpower-intensive activity, the easiest way it was contractor which you can hire a year in a time which it cannot do with a government employees. you can get rid of them a lot more quickly. the expansion and contraction. the army has 6000 contractors. i'm not sure we want to keep them honest government employees when the need for the past and language goes down in the future. -- the pashtun language is down

in the future. if i'm confirmed, i'll let down the ground rules and organizing principles that govern down where it is proper to use contractors and where it is not. >> we will schedule a meeting in your ascendancy to come in and brief us on that, so be prepared. but like quickly to tell you what my intention is. i'm going to request that all members submit questions by noon tomorrow and ask you to answer them as quickly as you can, and the senate's we have received the answers, members had a brief opportunity to digest them, we will schedule a markup. if we can do would in a week for 10 days, that is fine. hopefully we can. is that agreeable with you? >> yes, ma'am. i would hope the weather --

whatever action is taken the taken before the senate adjourns in august. >> we will certainly strive to do that. the questions become a vital part first of all of us getting them and your responding. you've been very prompting your responses and i've no reason to believe it would be otherwise. we will try to do our best to accommodate that. let me just end by saying i take you have performed really very well, and once again your expertise in this area -- very much appreciated and very well used. >> thank you. >> madam chair, thank you for making it clear that we will have more questions for the record. i frankly have some questions for the record. allied had your full explanation because they seem to be inconsistent with previous positions and some are not clear.

i do want to have those. madam chair, if it is possible, senator nelson said that he would like have a closed hearing. i think there are some things that you are interested in that might be best covered in a closed hearing and have a couple of areas of overlap between military and civilian that i prefer not to discuss in an open session. so we will do that and i was going to say that the nominee has certainly stayed with it for a long time and we appreciate that. -- don >> he-- ok says that he's is not need one. >> we might be able to have a

classified questions at least that we can submit for response, because just a couple of things that i prefer not to discuss in open session. but let me go back. the general question you'll be asked in writing and in this could have on record -- will you cooperate with both the chair in the vice chair as well as with our staffs in promptly responding to britain and -- ran inquiries, being proactive in sharing it with this question are >> yes, sir. judith that is something that we talked about and i will -- we mention that and i wanted to make sure that the staff knows that on both sides. and we will look for to your

full answers. i was talking when i ran out of time the first time, talking about guantanamo detainees and their release. when i communicated to the national security adviser that members of this committee had been told that the cia and dia did not concur in sending up but titular detainee back to yemen -- a particular detainee back to yemen, the national security adviser told me that those agencies would be reminded of the administration's decision. now as i think we discuss once before, the administration's decision is their decision. but if there is an implication that the intelligence committee

should not be told honestly and frankly of advice that you give to the policymakers, whether is set acceptor not, that troubles me. would you commit to providing the committee the honest and forthright recommendations and assessments that you make, regardless of whether they are accepted optimally by policymakers? >> yes, sir, i would. as we discussed before, this is an interagency process and not an exclusive determinate. it would be in my view that the intelligence should be as thorough and accurate as possible in making such assessments. i do not see any problem with

that once we have spoken are peas, and that that is ignored, that is the process. i certainly have no trouble -- i would not have any trouble conveying that to the committee. >> in case you are advised of a position, we want the intelligence regardless of what the position may come up with. let me go into another interesting area. you get a conference speech in 2008 to geoint with my staff manage to track down which said that that point, the administration would give some thought and the congress as well to maybe another look to the national security act of 1947, but in the answers to your committee, you said you had no plans to recommend manned that

dramatic change. -- to recommend that dramatic change but to look for improvement. the goldwater-nichols recommendation was similar to what came out of the project on national security reform that general jones and others participated in before joining the administration. the administration has not gone along with that apparently. did your recommendation change as a result of the administration position or do you think we need to take another look at the national security act of 1947? >> i think that has been discussed but i don't exactly remember the discussion. i think it had to do with the discussion at the time -- i remember former chairman peter

pace who was a proponent for red goldwater-nichols for the interagency. that might have merit. i do think it is a different proposition and secretary gave points out that goldwater- nichols in its original form only applied to one department. perhaps the principles of goldwater-nichols could be applied in an interagency contest. >> basically that is what the dni is. it is an interagency agency. we will discuss that further. are there any particular aspects of goldwater-nichols you believe should apply to the interagency? >> one of the benefits of

goldwater-nichols, and i was around and was probably part of the legion of people who wrote papers at the pentagon against it in the early 1980's, but now of course that is the accepted norm. what it meant in the department was placing a very high premium. joyousness and joint duty -- on joint this -- one jointness and joint duty. we are experiencing a lot of my ability in the intelligence community. people get out of their own part and move and other parts of the community. and for that matter, it could apply on the interagency. >> you suggested in cancers that the greatest ambiguity -- in answers that the greatest is the

relationship between the dni and the cea. what is ambiguous and the law? >> it does stipulate that the director of central intelligence agency is in charge of foreign intelligence relationships. that is what gave rise to the dispute between the dni blair and director of the cia. and the law says that the dni oversees the relationship -- whatever that means. that is an area of ambiguity. >> all right. three changes that i think might go along way -- i think he's just one of them, milestone si