course and the corrective measures taken by house bote. >> we provided update. but more importantly, the baker panels themselves reblingded we apointer an independent exercise that at least two ways. we've done that. dwayne wilson, a -- to the non-executive committee of the main opening board. and he does independent 234gs in those u.s. refineries and gives an annual report, which we made public as we did with the bakeer panel report. and it says what's go good and where we need to try hard e. >> is he looking into what happened at the deepwater horizon? >> his mitt is specifically the baker panel report and five u.s. refineries. so that's his scope. there isn't an investigation going on into deepwater

horizon, which is quite sprat. >> are any of the recommendations from this report failed to be implemented since the report was issued? >> the report was in a sense, it wasn't about tens of city and the things we needed to do to comply. the challenge the baker panel gave us was to become an industry leader. . .

which the independent expert views and our nonexecutive directors would look into. so we recognize this is a lot, this is a journey. >> would those have been recommendations that should not have happened if the baker report recommendation had been followed? >> the citations that oshea gave after the audit was a big disappointment for us because we believe we were meeting the requirements of the setment. so, we were disappointed and we're working with them to resolve that difference. the violations, the 700 of them osha has chosen to give them on a different basis so it's a large number.

it's not an apples and apples with the way they have pipcli done that. but at the end of the day, we're committed to working with them, closing out, working out all of the requirements of the settlement and working cooperatively because at the end of the day we want a safe work place, make sure we're putting things right. >> thank you very much. >> senator? >> thank you very much senator for conducting this hearing and i apologize. i was in an intel hearing and had to come up. last week i held a hearing as my responsibility for noah. my question to you sir is number

one, the are you working at -- in response they're approved. out there in the response we have -- multiple agencies. >> i know there are. for groups, but what they said was that any oil clean up worker under contract with bp, if they any way show sign of of medical problems must go to a care

center overwhelm run by bp. according to them, that when workers presented themselves with bp clean-up contractor they were not allowed to go to the west jefferson medical sent e but we're told they had to go -- they called it the bp e.m.f. tent. anyone trying to get information. we're not talking about individual patient information, but information that was not forthcoming. is it true that bp clean-up contractors must have been shown respiratory things or in blisters on their feet, on their hands. things that seem to be appearing. are they mandated to only come to the bp, or can they go to anywhere to get treatment? >> we provided medical support

but as i understand it, we couldn't limit where people are perfectly welcome to see their own physicians. but what we've done is try to put in place medical provisions so that people can get early treatment and stop things getting worse. >> i just want to clarify dr. finland. i know bp has an emergency medical service na sillity or tent, or whatever. but there's also the jefferson medical center and some others. when they come in off the beach, or having respiratory problems, which we're interested in, blisters on their hands from picking this stuff up, which is not only impact of oil, but what has been -- are you saying that they can go to any medical facility, whatever is closest

and whatever and they're not mandated to come there? >> what you described gives me concern. i have not heard of that. >> we want the best treatment. the highest priority is the safety and health in the workers and the response. so i think what we would want to do is make sure they got the best treatment they could. we have also committed to having independent health monitoring done. >> what is the independent way of doing it? >> we're working so that they agree of protocol and a way of caring it out. >> do you have that protocol established now? >> i don't think that's for bp to propose? >> is that protocol in economist

tans and you're complying with it? >> i don't think it's in existence bah we are monitoring the health of people through the sort of things we've described and we're committing to long-term studies. i could get information when more is available. >> it determines both care and also the consequences of what's being used. now, i don't know that, there are a lot of rumors out there. a lot of information. i believe you as a man of science, we as members of congress must be data driven.

so, number one, i want to be sure that people can go to where ever they need for health care. that number two, whatever your treatment is, that you're participating in work. and it seems hasn't set up a bio surveillance. and i don't mean it in a -- a set of protocals so we know the consequences of what's going on out there. it's not only the heat, but it's oil and these dispersements. and very little is known about these. the consequence, the consequence of human life. the consequence on our seafood. we were shocked at our hearing last week at how little our government knows. i'll put it on our government. knew about the impact of the dispersements on both marine and human life. so i'm looking for care for the

people, information, and more resolve i'd like to share that i raise again with what i raise. thank you. >> thank you very much. dr. flynn, quite frankly i found your introduction to your testimony safety as our top priority as rather offensive. 4 you're in charge of safety, you have a long history. yet all the documentation we have in front of us is about systemic bypassing of an emphasis on safety, as well as emphasis on profit. you really believe with all your

heart you can tell your the families of those who died that you have set aside safety as your top priority? >> you heard what i say or said is our number one priority and profit doesn't come before safety in bp. >> well, let's take a look at the material then. according to the center for public integrity, bp in ohio and texas have accounted for 97% of the handed out by oceana. how can one company account for that if safety is their top concern? >> the situation with those, they chose to take a different

approach in handing down those citations. instead of in the other cases where a system failing would be noted, these were on a per instance basis. what i mean by that, if for example, you found an electrical fault that maybe one finding in one case, in this case, they chose to give an analogy to offer a citation for every single outlet in the house. there is a different approach. we're not comparing apples with apples. we don't believe the number of citations reflect the level of risk or the progress that we've made. so we are working with them. we're working with them to resolve our differences. we're committed to dealing with the issues that they've brought up. so, i did want to point that

out. >> don't you think it's strange that you're blaming it on a process. that same process was used throughout the industry. yet, while bp ran up 750 of the safety violations that were designated, others had eight, exxon had one. yet they all had the same process. yet you're blaming it on a process rather than a culture of ignoring safety. >> a different approach was taken, so we're not comparing apples with apples there. they chose to issue citations in a different way. but at the end of the day, we are closing out those issues that we've identified and we're working on our differences in the way that that was done.

at the end of the day, we have the same goal. we want to complete a safe work plose. >> robert malone did not blame it on the process. he said, what i saw, were break downs in a culture of safety. do you disagree with bp america's robert malone's assessment? >> i think what bob malone was talking about were what we saw after if incidents of 2005 and 2007. these were terrible incidents. there were break downs and we've accepted that. but since then i believe we have changed. we have invested. >> there was a survey of workers on the deep water horizon in the weeks before the oil rig exploded and it showed that many of them were concerned about safety practices, and they feared reprizals from upper management if they reported

mistakes or problems. have you taken to heart the type of feedback from that type of study and are you concerned about the fact that your own workers are afraid to report safety problems because the company doesn't want to hear bad news and doesn't want to report it? >> the reports that you talk about trouble me deeply. we expected workers to raise concerns and we expect people to respond to them. so what you describe does trouble me. what we have to do is to look into what was happening there. we have to look into the multiple factors of what was happening with the trans ocean operation to find out what were the things that led up to the incident.

>> well, my time is expired. but, the list continues almost without end of short cuts that were taken to increase profits at the expense of safety. and i must say if you're testifying that we are determined to change our culture, we are determined to have a situation where we don't encourage work ers to not report problems. and they won't be afraid of those reports, we are going to make sure that we aren't in a rush to produce and we're going to make sure that x, y and z will happen that will prevent the blow outs. everything from the failing battery on the blow out preventer, the problems with the hydrolics, the fact that you chose to have only one valve that wasn't tested, the fact that you replaced mud with white watering, the list goes on and on and on of shortcuts.

few you to come here today and say we really are at the top of the world in terms of safety, and it comes before everything else. there is nothing, nothing in the testimony of any sort that backs up that position and i just -- i feel on behalf of those who have been injured in your company you would be in a far better position to say i am going to change this culture. whether to come and tell us all is well. >> thank you. >> dr. flynn, on may 5 of this year, a couple months ago, washington state department of labor and industry reported that the refinery in my home state for 13 serious safety violations during an inspection that started last november. 12 of those violations included failure to routinely inspect or

maintain safety control devices such as pressure safety values. i'm obviously very concerned about the safety practice of refineries in my own state. can you assure me today that fundamental changes are being made at cherry point to address those violations? these are regulations that are being violated, that have been there for a long time. they're regulations that your employees should be well aware of in following. they are too often ignored clearly and i want to hear from you today what fundamental changes are being made as a result of that at cherry point today. >> a requirement is that our operations do comply with all aspects of legal requirements, including those process safety management rules. for each of those findings, we will agree a great abatement with the regulator and we will close them out. we have also put in place our

very own independent auditting function that will go around and will check each of those refineries independently so we get to it. because we don't want to -- we are committed to both having the standards in place and to having the auditting in place to check we're not off course. >> you're vice president of safety, one of the hats you wear. have you picked up the phone and conveyed that to the management and bp? >> the -- >> that you want those changes to be made and that for those fundamental changes to be made at cherry point? >> the managers who i work with, the executives in the company, we work together to -- on a shared goal -- >> but you haven't talked to anyone on cherry point to follow up? >> on those particular ones, i

haven't talked directly to cherry point, but i have spoken to the regulatory person who covers that at the refining level to ask about those particular citations, and -- >> because one of the things we know is that if no one is calling up and saying we have a culture of safety, you need to follow it, we are very concerned these violations have taken place, fix it. how do you convey that you have a culture of safety? >> that's very clear. we measure -- we actually do measure the number of citations that are occurring so the executives can see when things are occurring. and we also set very clear expectations. and we audit. so cherry point will be auditted independently by our process safety independent audit team and we will put in place actions to prevent something from

happening again. >> i'm also very concerned about the company's ability to address mechanical issues. it seems to be identified as a contributor to many of bp's failures, not only in the gulf, but the alaska refineries. in fact i heard you state in your opening statement that the first layer of protection is plant and equipment. i'm told by my state's department that they see disturbing evidence that bp has a pattern of delayed evidence at the cherry point refinery. they see maintenance that should be conducted that's been put off for multiple years and testimony offered this week in the investigation of deep water horizon indicates there are over 300 deferred maintenance jobs that would have requires over 3,500 hours of work to fix. so i have to ask you again, how

does that represent the culture of safety that we keep hearing about? >> following the incidents that we talked about earlier we put in place standards for mechanical integrity. and as part of that, not only are their audits, but if there are overdue actions they get reported up through the lines. we've been driving that down, so that they're not hidden. so that is happening inside of bp operations, and tremendous progress and changes have been made. because there's visibility to the executive level. on the deep water horizon there would have been a contractal requirement between bp and trans ocean that safety requirements were met and that that rig was fit for purpose. and that there weren't maintenance issues. i believe we would have expected that it would also be auditted and if those issues were found, then the team thowled have taken it out and sort resolution.

>> ok. >> we've got workers experiencing a different reality and either management isn't being truthful or bp's culture of safety is nonexistent. which one is it? >> also they put in place processes and systems that will make sure that the requirements of the corporation are transmitted down to the front line. so for example, the management system that's been put in place puts mandatory requirements down into the front line. the second thing are those independent checks and balances, the fact that we have measurement on the delivery of process on leaving and lagging

indicators but also independent audit to make sure what the top of the house is saying needs to be done is happening down there in the front line. >> for peer of being fired, there was an article in the june 8 edition of "washington post" worker raised some safety concerns, was criticized by a survivor and was eventually removed. i would hope that you agree unless they feel 100% that they can come, then culture won't change. i would like to ask you today if i can get a commitment for you as vice president of safety that any worker reporting safety concerns at any of bp's facilities will be taken seriously and that those workers will not be retaliated against?

>> that's both my personal commitment and that is company policy. >> so we have your commitment that that is the case? >> yes, that's both my personal commitment and that is company policy. >> thank you dr. flynn. >> i apologize because i've got to leave in a little bit. on the gulf of mexico, but it's 35 miles per hour from the panhandle of the gulf, so we own most of the condo's in panama city. >> are you a medical doctor? >> no. >> do you know stewedies of past oil spills and sea water and the effect it might have long-term on human beings? >> there have been past studies

of the affects of oil in water. in this particular case what we've done is clinted $500 million to make sure there is going forward also a long-term study of the effects of the gulf of mexico oil spill. and that will be done independently. there will be a guiding body, bp won't be directing that. that will be done through independent channels but we'll look into that. >> in what you've been using, does that cause oil to some properties, oil to dissolve or just break it up? which does it do? >> well, they work in the same way as a washing up liquid, would clean a greasy plate. in fact they contain many of the same components.

and so, the unified command each day has a difficult decision as to is it better to disperse oil or is it better to have floating oil? what we know about the long-term affect, studies have been done that when it breaks it up into small droplets the way it would with washing up, and that makes it more bio degradeable the microorganisms can effectively render them harmless. >> the impact of the spill has been devastating throughout the southeast. it's going to be tremendously important to people who have

invested a lot. so i hope you'll remain committed to that $500 million commitment to the study and to react, the facts would come from that study to invest those on behalf of us and the senate. >> thank you very much for the testimony and i apologize. >> how do you think this is going? >> i'm happy to answer questions. >> would you say there were processes and systems in place to make sure this didn't happen? do you suspect that would have been your testimony? >> that's our intent is that we operate safely. we put in place processes and systems. to do that among other things.

>> you said we're not comparing apples with apples, i guess we'll have to take your word for it. they they treated your willful and egriege your violations differently than others. issued for each instance of a willful and flagrant violation. willful. willful. 760 for bp. other refineries, one. willful citations issued for violations with intentional disregard for employee safety

and health. 69 for bp. would you say that having intentional disregard for safety and health is a sign of a culture of safety? >> we were really disappointed with the outcome -- >> you said that a number of times. you said that every time. you're very disappointed. were you alarmed? >> we're working with them to resolve -- >> were you alarmed? >> as you described, and as i described earlier, it's a large number. and so naturally it apractices attention and attracted our

attention which is why we've looked into it to understand what's happening and working to reresolve our differences. >> so i take it you weren't alarmed. were you embarrassed? >> i mean, we take feedback from the regulator very, very seriously. we're absolutely committed to resolving the issues. >> well, i'll take that as a no. serious citations of which you have 30 issued for violations with the substantial probablity of death or serious injury. ok, again, we have the father of one of the men who's killed at

the trans ocean explosion testify here and he said that no one from bp had come and talked to him. that's chris er the jones. actually, the brother testified. his brother gordon jones died on the deep water horizon. would you commit to this committee to reaching out to each of the families of the men who died and personally apologizing? because he said no one had ever from bp had apologized. he felt really awful about that. would you personally commit to the committee that you'll do that? >> let me take that request back

. because bp will want to reach out. >> no, i'm asking you a different question. i'm not asking you to commit to go back to bp and discussing it. i'm asking you, dr. flynn, if you will commit to us that you will personally get in touch with each of the families of the 11 men who died and reach out personally to them? >> and if any of those families want to talk to me, then i would be happy to do that. it's a devastating, it's a devastating tragedy and i can only begin to imagine who those folks are going through. >> they have to reach out to you. >> if there's anything i can do to help then i would be glad to do that. >> ok. would you then reach out to

these families in a way where they, where they have the opportunity to talk to you? and where you can express your condolences and express your sorrow? >> of course, i have already done so here. >> i meant to each of those families. >> i'm happy to do whatever will happy. if that will help, then i'll do it. >> ok, thank you. >> senator berkeley? >> ok, thank you. the "new york times" ran an article on july 12, and it has a

number of statements in it based on the review of bp's record. the theme is they start with this thunder horse. are you familiar with thunder horse? >> yes. >> the thunder horse is a large platform that listed badly and nearly sunk because of a series of mistakes that were made. it could have been catastrophic, said the senior consulting engineer. you would have lost a lot of oil a mile down before you even knew it. it could have been a hell of a spill, much like the deep water horizon, end of quote. when someone looks at the incidents before the deep water horizon and ones that occur after this. do you see a pattern of short

cuts related to safety. because if the engineering short cuts are taken, the drilling operation is in per real. do you see a pattern that is of any concern to you? >> you refer to the thunder horse incident. and that happened around the same time as texas city, alaska. we took a lack at all after our operations. it was a global response from what we heard from the baker panel, from our own investigation. to put in place management systems and processes, and then

mshment to detect when things were going wrong. so, we did respond, we have changed things. in the case of the deep water horizon, there was a particular drilling operation, a particular set of circumstances that were going on and we don't know what happened yet. so we'll need to look into the causes of the accident and put in place actions to prevent recurrence. >> if i can ask my question again, it's pretty simple yes, no answer. did what with thunder horse and other incidents in which a number of people died in many of them, create a pattern that caused concern for you? i don't want a long explanation. i want a yes it caused concerned -- >> of course we're concerned when -- >> thank you. let me go ahead then. i'm glad to hear that because it appears from much of the review

it didn't translate into changes, it translated into retaliation against workers who reported safety problems. that's a very different type of way to respond to safety than to actually improve safety. the authors of this say that the problems at thunder horse were not an anomaly but the warning that bp were taking too many risks in pursuit of growth and profits. do you disagree with that characterization? >> i disagree with that. >> it goes onto say despite near misses, bp has been unwilling to learn from its mistakes. do you agree or disagree? >> i think we have learned from our mistakes and we've put in place things that have made real changes on the ground and to our processes going forward.

>> that's a disagree? >> i believe we have learned from accidents made in the past -- >> you disagree with that statement then? >>ic we have learned from mistakes of the past. after the deadly explosion at texas city texas facility said they were arrogant and proud and in denial. it is possible they were fooled by their success. is that an ongoing challenge for the company? >> we place safety as the number one priority in bp and we put in place actions to learn from the past and to manage risks in the

future. so ear always going to be looking to see if there's more to be done. i think we're looking for improvements but i think we have learned from lessons in the past. >> bp is not the only company that has taken on different projects with a difficult safety net. it stands in contrast to its competitors, most notably exxon mobile whose experience in 1989 spurred a whole sale change to its approach in safety. so the exxon valdez had a whole sale change in its approach to safety. not a change in terms of surround pressing workers supports of problems but actually tackling safety issues. is it possible that we will see

from bp a whole sale change in its approach to safety? you're in charge. will you lead that change? or are we going to see more of the same? >> there's been a significant change that started in 2005 and there's been dramatic change over the last 500 years and i've been very much part of that as the safety professional. that's what i do every year. i've spent the last 20 years dedicated to making those improvements. so we have made progress and our commitment is to carry on with that. that if things do go wrong, we will investigate them. we'll look at the causes and put in place actions that prevent recurrence. >> as you're aware, following the explosion that resulted in the death of 176.

the united kingdom renounce its offshore safety regulations and as part of that reform. risk control measures and health and safety management systems are in place in place. the safety case is required for all inspirations operating in british waters and it's an offense to operate without a current safety case that has been accepted. it was always thought that it always developed safety cases on each of its oils in the world whether required by its laws or not. can you tell us if bp cements safety cases for all of its in british waters or the

continental shelf? >> it's a legal requirement. regards will less of requirements, does bp develop safety cases for all of its worldwide? >> safety cases, one particular mess for assessing risks and putting in place management systems and arrangements to manage those risks. so we use them in many jurisdictions. they're not usedexpialidocious tense ziffly. >> so your answer is no that you don't use them? >> we would use them for new developments. but in existing cases we have essentially a management system that that would cover the same

ground. >> but, you do not develop these same safety cases? >> the safety cases are a particular way of putting together that information. it's a particular format. but what it does is it identifies risk for a bp requirement. then puts in places their roles and accountability for managing that you know they're on track. and we require that of every operation. >> bp admitted that it did not use the condo well that blew out on april 20? >> the right things would need to be in place from the activities.

so the requirements that are in their management system are essentially the same for safety cases. it's a for matt away of doing it. >> is there a particular advantage to not completing the safety case for each role? >> it's up to others. the format that they choose to present their management systems. what we have is a management system that we believe is adequate for controlling risks, and putting in place. and the requirements for managing those risks. a safety case is one way of doing it. there are other ways after achieving it. the most important thing is achieving the outcome. >> ok, let me turn to another question. we talked about trailers and tents, especially at refineries.

a number of disturbing facts of refineries, at the time of the bp texas city explosion, the american institute recommended practice 752 was in use. that recommended practice did not specify any minimum safe distance from having this area of trailers that would use. 15 fatalities at bp texas city all occurred in a trailer that was located less than 125 feet from the explosion and following the explosion, the chemical safety board asked the american patroleum institution to advise or recommend a new practice. a.p.i. did that, however the recommended practice specifically excluded tents and temporary structures.

so my question to you is does bp or the industry really think that tents are safer in blast zones than trailers are? >> these are shelters from the elements to protect our workers from sun or rain. they're not there to provide protection from explosions. so, they're really just there to protect them from the elements. i was actually very impressed. they are engineered. >> do you think they're safer than a trailer? the regulation says that trailers -- so instead of using

trailers you're not using tents. >> let's be very clear, the shelter that are used to protect workers are not used in hazardous zones. that's not what they're for. >> are tents currently used in my blast zones at any bp facility in the united states? >> they're not used in hazardous zones that i'm aware as they're for protecting workers. if for example, a unit is shutdown and maintenance is needed, or is some maintenance is carried out and they're there to protect workers from the elements. >> ok, well i do want to follow up on that so it was my understanding that tents are being used in blast zones. so, i will have more questions on that. i have a couple of other questions here. dr. flynn, as you know under requirements, companies have to report occupational numbers and i've become very concerned that these reports, while they're

important, are inadequate at best and often misleading. at worst allow us to disevere weather our attention from more serious indicators of safety and protection, both for workers and for broader communities and environments. do you believe reports of injuries and illnesses truly and represent safety in your facilities? >> leading lagging metrics for process safety. so while injuries are important, we do monitor them and they are important and they certainly are reported. we use a range of leading and lagging indicators inside of the company to give a broader picture of process safety. >> ok. can you -- i wanteded to ask about your company's current state of readiness. how is your planning and preparedness for a possible

worst case scenario of a massive leak at one of your u.s. refineries similar to or different from your planning and preparedness for the deepwater horizon disaster? >> the first step is prevention. where something, with a material like that you describe is used, then there are multiple defenses to make sure that that material doesn't get out. >> can you assure me that bp is ready to respond to an accident of similar proportions at a refinery like in washington state? >> so there will plans -- >> there there will, so there aren't today? >> no, there are. i'm sorry. so there are plans in place for responding to an emergency at the refinery. >> ok, i just have one more

question. senator franken, if you have any additional questions? >> you want to go -- >> no. >> ok. dr. flynn, i really believe that worker participation, in proving work place safety is essential. workers are really in the best position to identify on the ground safety risks. the original baker report notes that bp had not established a "positive, trusting and open environment." do you remember that from the report? >> i remember the comments. >> yeah, i think it was a written report, right? in which workers could approach management, bp had not established a positive trusting and open environment in which workers could approach management about their concerns at all their facilities.

that was a talk about the -- as i mention in my opening statement, the new york sometimes reported this morning that workers trans ocean were afraid of reporting safety concerns. they're afraid of "corporate level reprizal." one of the workers complained of fear tactics. an open environment. when can we expect such environment to become a reality for people who work for bp? >> so inside of bp, i would have

to agree that a cooperative relationship with the work force, so they can bring forward concerns is really important. the backer panel pointed it out so we're very committed. we put in place actions to promote that. so we're already in action about it. when i hear those reports for what happened on board the trans ocean enterprise rig, then that gives me cause for concern. we wouldn't expect that sort of thing to be happening, so therefore it's something that will need to be looked into. >> ok. you took this job when, in 2007? >> yes, 2007. >> ok. and when we went over these statistic on willful citations,

serious citations, these are from 2007-2010, from june of 2007-february 2010. i have to agree with the chair. there seems to be a disconnect between your testimony and what i'm peers to be the reality here. now, you are the vice president of health safety and security environment, is that correct? >> yes. >> so you're in charge of all this, you're responsible? >> my role is to set standards, to advise executive management and those that are implementing those standards. and then to monitor trends and give advice to the executives if intervention is needed. but in bp, we're clear that the business line is accountable for delivering safety along with

business and safety is the first priority. >> ok, i'm not sure what that answer meant. do you feel responsible? do you feel you have a responsibility? the safety of people working for bp? >> sir, i have a part to play. and my role is to establish standards that extend company wide and programs. i'm also responsible for advising executive managers and those that implement those standards and for monitoring progress through things like audit. that's what i'm responsible for. >> i think part of the disconnect isn't just between your testimony and reality. it's sort of between the human catastrophe and tragedy that we saw and if affect that we get

from you. and i think that it is disturbing to other members of the committee. i know it was to senator -- well, i don't want to speak for snert -- for senator merckly, but that's what i felt. i just think that it was very disturbing to me that no one from bp had made any attempt to get in touch with the families. maybe you're right, maybe they don't want to hear from you at this point. maybe it's just been too long. but, just speaking to you, man to man, i just don't get it. i don't get your -- i don't get pbp. e don't get its lack of remorse

or the way it expresses it. thank you. >> dr. flynn, thank you for coming today. i was not happy when previously bp refused to participate in a committee hearing so i know that the last two hours have not been a fun experience for you. i did want to ask you, you've heard from our committee members, people are very concerned about what happened and the reaction and want to know that the company truly understands the deep impact of this. i just have to ask you, when you go back to your corporate headquarters and end of the offices, are you going to say whew i made it through the hearing, or are you going to say there are serious concerns that this company needs to address in the future? >> we've heard those very serious concerns. we've heard those concerns coming from those affected, those in the gulf coast. we're very committed to

investigating the incident, and putting right whatever we discover and to continue to improve safety in bp. >> well, would you give me your commitment today to work with me and senators the committee in this administration in leading fundamental and really lasting change in bp's own general approach to safety and protection standards and regulations in this country? >> i would be happy to work with you. >> ok, i appreciate that. thank you very much and thank you for coming. and being a witness today. i want all of our members to know they can submit additional questions to you and you may do that. we ask for your response and for members who do want to submit. this hearing record will remain open for seven days. with that, this hearing is adjourned. thank you very much.

>> coming up -- .