where we spoke to james kent, the asset manager, and paul johnson, the performance manager. after that, at approximately 8: 30 we always have our supervisors meeting and all the supervisors are required to attend. after that, i went back to my office and was working on the upcoming removed, the second upcoming rate move, and also preparing budgetary items and such for the bp officials and transition officials that were arriving later that day. i went to lunch at approximately 11:30, went back to my office and continue working on these documents. at approximately 3:30, we had a meeting with the bp officials and trans ocean and it was deemed we would go on a tour of the rig.

we toured several different spaces, made our way up to the rig floor, and when we got to the record, we went into the drill shack. that point, i was the last one into the drill shack. it was standing room only. at that point, i knew there was something going on, but i have no knowledge of what it was. i was asked by either jimmy or randy that was on that tour with us to please continue the tour without them, that they needed to stay up there. we went down and show them a few more items, went down into the pump rooms, show them the thrusters, and then went to dinner at approximately 6:30. after dinner, we had a pre scheduled meeting of all supervisors in the conference room, along with bp and trans ocean officials.

that lasted until approximately 9:15. after that, i went and had a cigarette and went to my state room, took a shower, and got into bed. >> and after that, after the time -- >> i had just opened up my book and started reading the first sentence of a paragraph and i heard what sounded like the attention errors being bled off. i thought that was strange because i had just spoken with chris pleasant and he had said they were finished bleeding off the tensioners. it got progressively louder and sounded like a freight train coming through my bedroom. there's a thumping sound that consecutively got faster. with each the, i felt the rig actually shake. there was an initial boom, the lights went out, i jumped out of bed, ran to my door, because i knew there was emergency lights

out there so i would be able to see to get dressed. when i open up the door, i actually smelled some sort of fuel as well as tasted it. when i turn to go grab my clothing, the second explosion occurred, which threw me across my room. i jumped up, grabbed my clothes, slipped my work boots on, grabbed my life vest and my hard hat. i ran out into the hallway to the center stairwell. that point, i observed about four or five people just standing there frozen, looking up at the stairwell. when i looked at the stair well itself, i don't know if the stairs where there are not, because there was so much debris, it was completely impassable. i hollered out port forward or starboard forward and go to your stations. i went to the port spiral

staircase and made my way to the bridge. once i arrived on the bridge, i went to my station, which is the port side back computer station system. that point, i observe that we had no injuns gunnoe thrusters, no power whatsoever. -- no engines, no thrusters, no power whatsoever. there is no dialtone whatsoever. i hung the receiver up several times, thinking maybe someone had left it off the hook. i picked it back up, there was no phones. i hollered out, we have no phones. at this point i ran over to the starboard window of the bridge and looked back to the derrick. prior to this, for whatever reason, the second explosion and everything had not registered

with me. i initially thought that the wire had parted and that thumping sound was the block coming down the derrick. i was fully expecting to see steel and pipe and everything on the record. when i looked out the window, i saw fire from derek laid to deregulate and as high as i could see. i realize we had just had a blowout. i ran back to my station thinking that the engine should be started up. there was still no power of any kind. no engine starting, no indications of the starting, i heard the water tank bore bank directly on my left behind me. i heard somebody say that engine room and pump room are gone, they are all gone. i turned around, i did not

recognize who was at the time because he was covered in blood. i asked him, what do you mean, gone? he said they have blown up, they are all gone, blown up. >> i looked at him and recognized his voice, it was mike williams, the chief e.t. at that point, i ran over to him and he had a laceration across his forehead. i hollered out where the medical supplies were. they said it was in the restroom at the back of the bridge. i ran to there, try to find some calls are something. the only thing i could find was a roll of toilet paper. i ran back, stuck it to his head and said hold is there. i went back to my station, still not truly believing that these engines were gone. i just could not fathom that. upon looking at the screen, there was still nothing, no engine starting, no thruster's running, nothing. we were still lay dead ship.

i heard the watertight doors slam again. i noticed an individual holding a rag on the back of his left head. he hollered out to me, i am hurt, bad, cheap. i am hurt real bad. at that point recognized his voice, because he was covered in blood as well. i ran back and looked, pulled the rag away from his head and looked at his wounds. i immediately put the rag back to his head and hollered out for a medic. i ran over just in case there was a medic on the bridge, which there was not at the time. i ran over to the starboard water tank door and hollered down to the lifeboats, we need emetic up here now. i ran back to my station, still hoping that engines would start. there was nothing. when i turned and looked when ibrent notice standing behind him, chris pleasant was standing

at the bop panel. i hollered out to him, have you eds'ed? i asked if we could, and he said yes. i turned to look back at chris pleasant, and someone hollered out that hollered outeds without approval. i hollered out for jimmy, can we eds? he said yes. when i turn back to chris, he was in the panel, pushing a button. i hollered to chris, i need confirmation that we have eds'ed. i told them we needed confirmation again. he said yes. i said we have to be certain, have we eds'ed?

he said yes and pointed to a light on the panel. i turned and hollered out to kirk for permission to go to the stand by generator room and manually start it. i thinking at that point was the bop had unlatched, what remaining fuel would be in the rice or were burned away, and we are going to the power as well as fire pumps. kurds said yes, go. the cheap they came running over with the radio. he looked at the radios, turn them on, tried to get coms and could not get them through the radios. we were standing 5 feet from each other. we verified we were on the proper channel. again, we had no coms. i said don't worry about it, and i laid the radio down. i left the bridge and when to close the watertight door, and mike williams pushed the door back, and he said you are not going along, cheap. i said come on.

the motorman also fell in line and we ran forces than by a generator. as i was running to the stand by generator, i looked up at the derrick where the crown should approximately be, and i could see nothing but flames way past the crown. i remember looking down at the deck because it was very slick. i saw a substance that had the consistency of snot. i remember thinking to myself, why is all this snot on the deck? it was approximately an inch to an inch and a half thick. we had to pass right to passbop house, which has a huge door, approximately 90 feet tall at 50 feet wide. you can actually look down into the moon pool. when i have looked into that space, i could see nothing but flames. i could see no equipment whatsoever, it was solid claims.

when we walked into the standby generator room, myself and mike williams ran to the starting panel. i flipped the switch from automatic imanuel, hit the reset button, and the start button. there was absolutely no turning over of the engine. i tried it again, the reset button and the start. again, nothing happened. mike williams had hollered out because there was a voltage meter on the panel itself. he said we have 24 votes. i stood there for a second. paul was standing over by the watertight door. i looked at him and told him to shut the door, because he was standing there with the door open, looking at the flames. at that point, i thought maybe if the engines are completely gone, all the switchboards, maybe there is some kind of electrical interference or something not allowing the generator to start, so i turned, and right behind a panel i was at is the 480 switchgear for the

standby generator room. i ran to it, close the breaker, the main feeder breaker from the generator and then reopen it. i also turned the switch for the automatic synch on the standby generators to manual. i ran back to that panel and again tried to reset and start. there was no turning over of the engine whatsoever. i believe it was mike that hollered out, try the second battery bank, just in case. i want to say it was paul that actually flipped the switch. i cannot be sure, though. but we did, after the second battery bank was turned on, we tried again and there was absolutely nothing. the engine did not turn over whatsoever. at that point, i said that's it, let's go back to the bridge. it's not going to crank. when we open up the watertight door to go back out to the bridge, that is the first time actually felt the heat, and it

was very, very intense. we ran to the bridge. we came in through the port side door, watertight door. i observed yancey and andrea were still at the radios. i ran across the bridge to the other watertight door on the starboard side. kirk was standing with the door open outside the bridge and he was looking down at the lifeboat station. when i ran over there i looked down and saw the light of #one driving away, pulling away from the rig. lifeboat to was already gone. that point, i turned to mike and paul and hollered out, that's it, abandon ship, let's go. they ran across the bridge and passed by me. i turned and looked. and see an entry were still at the radios pig i hollered to them, that's it, abandon ship, let's go now. i saw them take off running to where we work. i turned and ran out the watertight door.

captain kirk was in front of me. as we were coming down the stairs, i observed a man on a gurney at the bottom of the stairs with three people trying to get his life vest on him. the three people were stan come up chad murray, and randy ezell. that point, i did not know who was in that journey. as related to the bottom of the stairs, we went to the life raft. we hooked it up and proceeded to crank it up out of its lift, rotate it around to the side of the rig, and then drop it out so that you could inflate the raft and get clear of the rig. there was a rope attached to the shackling the vice that went from the shackles of bias to the boom. it had to metal hooks that the rope was wrapped around and unshackled to the front of it. i do not know what this rope was for, but it hindered the life

raft from clearing the rig. that point we hollered out for a knife. nobody had one. mike williams found the shackle and tried to unscrew it by hand. he could not. he pulled out a pair of nail clippers on steroids, basically. he proceeded to unscrew it, the shackle. and that popped off, the life raft moved out over the side of the rig. we started pulling the painter line. at that point, i looked over the man on the gurney was. there was one gentleman standing there. i do not know who that was. i jumped up and ran over there, grab the gurney and said let's him to the life raft. when i got back to life route, i was on my knees right at the opening. there were two people in the life raft. one of them was a bit young. i do not know who the other person was.

we're going to die. we're going to die. at that point i honestly felt that we were going to cook right there. the rife raft, from the hurdness of jumping in there and so forth, it actually felt -- fell. at that point, the life raft actually get forward and started rocking back and forth. there was smoke in the life raft, and the next thing i knew, the life raft was descending. as we got closer to the water, the smoke cleared out. as we touched the water, i heard someone ask where the panel's work. i was by the exit door. i jumped into the life raft and

grab the rope on the side of the life raft and started swimming, tried to pull the life raft away. chad murray was right behind me. someone else was right in front of me. i was swimming on my side, looking up at the rig. it was 25 or 30 feet above me. it was a tremendous amount of smoke billowing out. at that point, i sought a person's boots and his clothing come out shooting through the smoke. just before he landed, i noticed it was curt. he landed approximately 5 feet from me. another pair of boots and a person came flying out of the smoke. he was approximately 10 feet from me. before he hit the water, i noticed it will yancey.

i got to the point where i could see the helodeck. i noticed an individual running at full-speed. enzi dropped off, he was still running. just before he splashed into the water, he was looking at us. that was mike williams. i noticed shortly after that we were not going any further from the rig. about that time, someone yelled. i looked over my shoulder past the life raft and noticed the painter line going into the smoke. at that point, i heard chad murray scream for help. i would have to say that probably 60 yards away was the rescue craft.

i saw two flashing lights in the water. one of those was getting hold into the boat. seconds later, the second person was called into the boat. i started driving towards us. we feel that we needed a knife. when we got about 15 feet from them, an individual came to the bow of the boat with a large pocket knife. curt swam out, grabbed the knife, and swam to the back of the life raft. i followed him to the back of the life raft. he cut the rope. i swam back to the front of the life raft and immediately began to swim. chad and paul were tying up the rescue craft to the life raft. the life raft that does away from the rate at that point. when we got to the actual boat,

we were all still in the water. the ones that got out in the life raft. the only people to my knowledge to were still in the life raft were an injured person on the gurney and two others. i stayed on the rescue craft and assisted in getting the rescue -- in getting people out of the lifeboat. once on deck, once all of the lifeboats and life rafts were empty, we had the first monster that i had witnessed. at that point, it was determined that 11 individuals did not make it. from there, i started checking to make sure that all of my people were accounted for. i did not find the whine b

-- i did not fight the windone, brent mansfeld. he was laying on the floor. he had bandages all over his head. he had oxygen on his mouth. he also had a neck brace. his head and was facing a man who was on a bed. i stepped in between them and the man on the bunk and was trying to keep them from going to sleep. he kept trying to go to sleep. i kept waking him up and adjusting his oxygen mask. the man on the actual bed was buddy trahan. i tried to keep him awake.

when the coast guard arrived, the rescue swimmer came in and asked who was critical. at that point, troy hadaway, who was the magic on the rate at one point in time -- who was the medic on the rig at one point in time. i stepped to the backside of the bed to assist with getting them on the gurney. i placed my hands on his hip and his shoulder to get the gurney under him. as i told him, he was screaming that his leg was hurt real bad. he had a severe lacerations on his leg. he also had a twisted and nine gold lower calf on his left leg. -- twisted and mangled lower cap

on his left leg. he had lacerations all over. i told him and went to get a second position to roll him a little further. bill was standing on the other side abouof the bunk. buddies back was bart. b -- buddy's back was burned. we -- i stayed with them until they came to get brent. when i left, -- again, i checked on all my guys to see how they were doing -- i made my way to the upper level and watched the rig burn.

>> thank you for the detailed report. in the statement you just gave us, you said that there was standing room only in the drill shed? what time was that? is it, to have standing room only at any time -- is it common to have standing room only at that time? were there additional people in the drill-dead at that time -- drill-shed at that time? >> there were additional people in there. >> during your conversation that you were just discussing, you said "yes we have" multiple

times. at any time, did he mention to you that there were no hydraulics? >> no, sir. >> at any time did he point to the camera and indicate any problems? >> no, sir. in your written statement, you said the captain was screaming for someone pushing the distress button. >> i believe you are referring to the statement that was given after he was detained for 26 hours. i object. we will not be the cross- examined on the statement. we decline to answer that question. >> what we are asking him to do is to set the record straight.

>> the statement is what the statement is. we are not going to sit here and stayed that that is or is not the statement. >> the statement was taken not under oath. he is under oath now. he can confirm or deny the accuracy of that statement. >> if i say good morning, then i am subject to prosecution. we are not doing that. >> your counsel and advice is you [inaudible] >> i am advise my clients that he did take an oath. >> ok. i understand.

does adriana had the authority to activate the edf or to call out in distress? >> i do not know. >> mike williams is a subordinate of yours, correct? >> correct. >> how you communicate with the dpo? >> can you clarify that question? >> earlier you tell me that the people that monitor the alarms that would be aware of any alarms that were bypassed with officer.dp >> generally the dynamic position officer would call either the electrical

supervisor are the chief at the tower directly. >> when you are in your room reading your book, was there any notification to you to evacuate? >> not to evacuate, no. >> to muster? >> i did hear yancey announcing that there was a fire. he started naming off the engine rooms and multiple locations. after the initial explosion, i did not hear any more announcements. >> that was audio through the whole rig? >> yes sir. >> if there were a gas alarm that detected too high gas in one song, which ripped a general alarm? >> yes, sir. >> did you hear a general alarm? >> i do not recall.

>> with your the general alarm from where you're located on the rig? at any time during the evacuation we told to leave anyone behind it? >> objection. [inaudible] >> which engines were running at the time of the incidents are? >> i am not certain. i know there were two operational. >> are you familiar with the engines? >> yes, sir. >> were there any safety devices on the edges? >> yes, sir.

your over speed device. >> mechanical? electronic? the net whenever last tested or inspected? >> the week prior. >> did you witness that inspection? >> no, sir. not personally. >> who would have witnessed back. >> the first engineer. it would have either been the engineer on the town or orbrenbt mansfield. >> what is the frequency of inspecting those devices? >> i do not recall. >> were you responsible for the inspection of the devices? to was responsible for the safety devices and the over speed devices? >> the second and third engineer.

>> due date report to you? >> date report -- day report. -- they report. >> there is a difference between i do not know and i do not recall. do you realize that? >> yes, sir. >> did you ever see inspectors inspecting those devices outside of the auditors? >> yes. >> who are they? >> the coast guard as well as bp auditors and such. >> do you know if there is an emergency shutdown system in the control room? >> yes. >> was there any notification in the engine room to shut down the engines? >> i do not know.

>> do you know if there is a policy in place for the people in the engine room to shut down if they are given any kind of warning? >> no, sir. i do not. >> earlier you mentioned that you heard a discussion in the drilling-shack. do you recall any of that conversation? >> no, sir. >> who is leading that conversation. >> i do not know. >> in -- are you familiar with the air-intake system by in the engine room? >> yes, sir. >> i have a map over there, but i think there is one in front of you. is that the intrinsic area

around the rig for detail on that image? >> this is the problem that i envisioned. >> bp-00131951 >> that is the document? >> yes. >> i will give you one. >> thank you. >> is the grade-out area the

intrinsic area of the fork? >> yes. it is the hazardous area. >> help or away from that area or the air-intake systems -- how 40 way from that or the air- intake systems from the -- how far away from that area or the air-intake systems? >> i do not know the actual distance. >> could you show us if i give you a highlighter? >> yes. there are multiple intake sites. >> he is going to put it on

there. >> can you tell him what you just told me? >> i do not know the location for engine number three. >> do you have a different document? >> no, i had this one. -- i have this one. we are all looking at the same one. do you know how often they tested or inspected the air- intake system that prevented the flow of gas or anything into the engine room? >> i do not recall.

>> to be responsible for that? >> the engineers. >> were you aware of this bp audit? it is and"title -- it is entitled "deepwater horizon." it was introduced -- i was introducing it and was going to follow up with a question. >> i would rather have the legal representative for mr. bertone asked the question. -- legal representative for mr.

bertone ask the question. >> i may have an objection. i need to understand the question. i am not asking the question, i am asking to understand the question. >> is this the latest or is this prior to the answer that? >> it was prior to the incident. >> you want to question him about this document? >> i was going to ask him if he participated in that audit. >> yes. >> ok. who is the deepwater horizon's maintenance supervisor. >> that is technically classified. >> are you responsible for responding to that audit? >> yes. >> how do you reference that

audit and complete the recommendations? >> when we received that the actual audit, we convert it to a spreadsheet and certain items are set to a certain department heads. the department heads report to me. i update it and awarded to the manager. >> that audit -- i have it if you want to open it up -- it references that repairs had either deteriorated or not been suitably addressed. work the repairs you were making on the deepwater horizon -- >> we did not receive any of these documents prior to today. i would not object if you ask him what he knows. >> that is fair enough.

they are big documents. i am sure he is not read all of them. what was presented to you about that audit? whether any problems that bp had with deterioration of the equipment on the deepwater horizon? >> from the initial assessment? >> yes. >> yes. >> the problems they had addressed were not being properly prepared or were not addressed when there returned in september 2009. is that accurate? >> i do not know. >> i think you mentioned rmf. could you elaborate on that program? >> it is the rig maintenance system. it is where all the work orders and ordering of parts or carried out. >> was there any excessive jobs that were overdue for

maintenance on the deepwater horizon? >> i would object to the term "obsessive -- object to the term "excessive." >> can you answer that? >> the thing with the rms system, that was implemented in 2009 at the time of that marine-assurance audit. thate were a lot of pm's were not appropriate to the rig equipment.

there were many duplicates. we have been going through and eliminating those. if you look back at the history on it, you would see that there were a lot of pm's that were not done in the allotted time. the were also a lot of those that did not apply to this vessel. >> most of those, as i recall, they were no major pm's past due. they were more moderate or a minor. >> were there a lot of personnel

changes in the past few years that you are aware of on the deepwater horizon? were there personnel changes under direct supervision? >> if yes. >> how many? >> i do not know the exact number. >> 15-20? >> i do not know. >> did this have they affect on your maintenance on the deepwater horizon? >> object. >> i think he would be well aware of the fact that if he had maintenance problems that they would be because of people he lost? >> i do not new.

-- i do not know. >> is there a competency- assurance program all the deepwater horizon? >> are you talking about roles responsibilities? >> i am talking about a program that assures competency for the job be performed. >> if yes. -- yes. >> was everyone qualified to do their jobs? >> yes. >> the report that i referred to earlier, it decided that the maintenance supervisor had told the auditors that a lack of manpower as a result of no power on the engines because of injuries number one and and is

no. 6 knitting maintenance. is that a correct statement? the net to be true? -- do you know that to be true? >> i do not know. >> de no the auditors? >> i do not recall their names -- do you know the auditors? >> i do not recall their names. >> i was there during the modu specs. >> did you participate at the engine room level? >> no, sir. >> the report indicated that the tests were successful on the oversee devices in the engine room. did you know what they meant by successful? >> objection. we have not read the report. >> do you know how the engines were tested?

how did they perform the audits in the engine rooms? >> they were manually overspent. >> did they shut down? >> to my knowledge, yes. >> was that information relayed to you? to relate that to you? >> that would be from my engineers. >> was the deepwater horizon schedule to get to the shipyard? >> yes. >> when was that? >> it was supposed to be the early part of 2011. >> do you know how long it was going to be in the shipyard? >> i do not recall the exact amount of days. >> was there any information passed to you along the lines of maintenance issue being the reason to go into the shipyard? >> objection. >> were you ever in any meeting

with transocean or vp personnel who scheduled maintenance and said they were going to the shipyard? >> again, i object. >> i did not hear them talking about it. >> what was the plan for the shipyard is it? -- shipyard visit? >> there were many items that were planned, but i do not have all of the specifics as to what

they were. >> review -- obviously you were aware of the visit by transocean and b p personnel. at any time did they talk to you or your staff about maintenance? >> to you just want to know his personal knowledge? -- do you just want to know his personal knowledge? >> what is most important to get done as far as maintenance when it goes into the shipyard? >> that would be your thrusters, your engines, you're drilling systems. >> based on your knowledge, what work needed to be done in the shipyard? >> i do not know. i do not want to speculate. >> you are the chief engineer.

i am tried to make sure i understand. did you have a list of items that you had prepared for when it went into the shipyard? >> yes. >> what was on the list, if you remember? >> thrusters, engines, drilling equipment, and sea-water systems. >> thank you. >> did you discuss with any deep the our transocean management -- > >> we discussed the out-of- service. between wells -- out-of- service period between wells. >> what was said to be fixed

during that time? >> there were multiple items. >> or any high-priority? >> objection. >> what was the most critical to be maintained or prepared -- maintained or repaired? one last question -- you have been on the deepwater horizon since 2003, correct? >> correct. >> was it a practice to have able-bodied seamen on the bridge to go into areas with gas detectors in lieu of a general alarm? >> you are asking if it had ever happened or is it a practice? >> was a practice. >> a practice would be a continual ongoing thing? >> could you rephrase your question? i am not following what you are trying to ask? >> earlier, i ask you some

questions about the electrical alarms -- the high-gas alarms. they would initiate a general alarm that would have lights go off. is that true? >> that is correct. >> in your seven years on the deepwater horizon, did you ever see or talk about having an able-bodied seaman monitor high- gas alarms that have multiple alarms going off in one zone in lieu of having one alarm go off that trips an audio or visual alarm? >> can you please clarify that and break it down? >> you have able-bodied seamen in the bridge monitoring multiple gas alarms? is that true?

>> yes. >> you have a gas-detection system that monitors the high- gas? >> yes. >> if the high-gas -- if two high-gas alarms go off, does it trip an audio or visual alarm? >> yes. >> is it a transocean practice on the deepwater horizon to bypass that alarm and have be able-bodied seamen go down with a gas detection system? >> i do not think he can answer what the practice was. i think he can answer to the direct knowledge as to whether this ever happened. >> did you ever see any seaman monitoring high gas alarms from the bridge and go back to the area with gas-detection systems? >> are you referring to two items in one zone? >> yes, sir.

>> no, i am not. >> the note if an alarm was actually bypassed? >> i do not know. >> thank you. i have no further questions. >> just a couple of quick follow-up questions. do you meet with them when they come on board? >> yes, sir. >> was the last time they came on board? >> i do not recall. >> within the last year? >> yes. >> do you recall any list they may have given you as to items that needed to be repaired? >> yes. >> did any of those items and all the engines? >> yes. >> did any of those items involve the engine over speed? >> no. >> did they check the engine over speed when they came on board? >> i do not recall.

>> are you aware that they do an annual inspection? >> yes. >> do you know what to check on the annual inspection? >> i know basically, yes. >> can you give us specific details? >> no -- i know that they go through and inspect the injectors, the air boxes, the ventilation, and multiple other items, but i do not recall what they all are. >> do they meet with you at the

end of the inspection? do they give you a detailed list of what they check? >> yes, sir. >> do you recall anything specific that was related to the engine over-speed that was not working? >> no, sir. i do not recall. >> thank you. >> good morning. i had a few questions for you. you took over as the chief engineer in september of 2008. is that correct? >> yes. >> were you required to read the deepwater horizon operations manual? >> if yes, sir. >> did you read the section which prescribe -- which describe the duties of the chief engineer? >> yes. >> are you familiar with those duties? >> for the most part, yes. >> are you familiar -- in your

testimony, you indicated that the deepwater horizon was in the process of implementing a new system -- a maintenance management system. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> when was that implemented? >> i do not know the exact date of its. i can give you a year. >> to your best recollection, how long had the process been going on? >> i do not want to speculate on that. >> have you received any formal training of the system? >> yes. >> to provide that training? >> transocean. >> was the one session or multiple sessions? >> it was a single session in town and we also had people come out to assist us when we went

live. >> did they assist you in implementing the system? >> they worked out there approximately three weeks. i do not know. >> more than once? >> i do not know. >> based upon your familiarity with the rmf system, you indicated there were some discrepancies between the previous maintenance on that system. at the time of the casualty, how accurate -- how accurate do you believe the information was? you aware of discrepancies in the system at the time of the accident? >> [inaudible] >> were you aware of any reported maintenance contained in the rmf system at the time of the casualty that were incorrect?

were you aware of any discrepancies specifically concerning overdue maintenance contained in the system at the time of the casualty? [inaudible] reported maintenance our scheduled maintenance that was not completed? >> the question is do we know of any maintenance that was not completed prior to the casualty? >> let's be real specific. the air-dampener to the engine room -- what is the frequency that they were required to be inspected? >> i do not recall. >> would it surprise you to know that it was required every 14 days? >> [inaudible] >> you are the chief engineer and you do not know the frequency -- >> yes the question and he gave

you an answer. you are badgering. >> chief, how all the did you review the system for maintenance issues? >> daily. >> excuse me? >> daily. >> your be them daily. so you'd be aware of any discrepancies as they occur. >> correct. >> if you noted a particular maintenance item that was overdue, what actions would you take? >> we had periodic meetings with different department heads to go over any overdue maintenance and see when they could be accomplished. >> do you recall any overdue maintenance relative to the air- intake dampen nurse in the engine room? >> no, i do not recall. >> let's move on to a different

topic. i am not going to ask about statements. i am going to talk about testimony. if i recall your -- if i recall, you went to the bridge after the first explosion. you and two individuals but to the stand by generator room to find out why it did not start. is that correct? >> we went there to start it, not to find out why it did not start. >> you testified he flipped the switch to manual when you got there. why did you do that? >> because it was in automatic mode. >> why would it be in automatic- mode? >> that is the standard position of it. it is always in automatic. >> what does it mean to be in automatic? >> the generator would start on and its own without any -- the generator would start on its own. >> you said that this was a

standby generators and that it was not automatic. i am tried to clarify the issue. >> the question was -- >> i am try to understand what it was from the person on the rig. that is my purpose. was it your understanding that this was designed to be an automatic start for the main generators? >> after a certain period of time, yes. >> if i heard your testimony correctly, that did not happen in this assistance. >> i have no recollection of time-frames during that event. >> you indicated that you have

been on the rate since 2003. do you recall an instance in august 20008 when he lost all power? >> i do not recall. >> while you were on board, do you recall if there were any chance ocean -- recall at the

rear any transocean issues? did you have any guidance on that? >> i do not understand the question. >> as you are going through your various maintenance items, one may be more significant than another, did you have any guidance as to when you should have advised someone others might and its issues? -- ed buys some wind of those maintenance -- advise someone of those maintenance issues? >> i do not know. >> can you get the basis of what you do not want to answer any questions? >> provided a statement 26 hours

after this interview. we are not going to be cross- examined on something that was done at that time. >> are you advising him to take his fifth amendment rights and not answer questions about that document? >> i am advising him not to answer this question because his statement speaks for itself. >> if i ask a question for the record -- we cannot introduce anything in our report that is not public record. this is not a public document. >> this is an official document. this is a document that was filed while under oath. we are not going to be cross- examined on it. i instruct my client not to answer any questions in regard to specific things.

>> so you are telling him to take his fifth amendment right? >> i am telling you that we are not going to answer questions or be cross examined on statements reflected in this statement. >> can i ask a question? did anyone tell you to leave anybody behind? >> he already answered that question. any information about that is contained in the statement. the statement speaks for itself. you have the statement. there is no purpose. it is not relevant. that is not the purpose of these proceedings. if there were any other purpose that i do not understand, we can discuss it. >> it is a fact-finding mission. we cannot put anything into a public document because it is not public record. >> this was given under oath. you had it.

you know what is in debt. he is not answering -- you know what is in it. he is not answering any questions about it. >> you said you knew there was something going on when you were in the drilling shed. how did you know something was going on? >> objection. when did he say he knew something was going on? >> he said when there was standing-room only that there was something going on. >> when you say the word that i know something is going on, you are taking that out of context. can you had the court reporter read back what he said in that testimony? >> we had that ability? i do not know. >> earlier, did you not

testified to the fact that there were standing-room only in the drilling-yet? >> yes, there was standing-room only. >> did you mention anything to the fact that there was something going on? >> object to "something going on." >> it was standing-room only. there were a lot of people in that drilling-shed. i do not know what was going on. >> thank you. >> i just want to caution you on one thing. this is a fact gathering investigation. as part of that gathering, we are evaluating your knowledge, skills, and performance. i understand that you have legal

counsel and he advises you on what to answer and what not to answer, but i wanted you to be aware that when you have basic knowledge that requires your duty and you indicate that you either do not know or do not recall, that brings into question your performance and to your knowledge and skills. i just want to make sure you understand that. >> yes, sir. >> that has no part in this. you are trying to intimidate the witness. >> i am just try to make them understand. do you feel intimidated mr. bertone? [laughter] >> this is an employee of hours. >> you are not representing mr.

bertone. >> i thought that was wrong when you challenge them. if that was my witness, i would have stopped you. you are trying to challenge this witness, to intimidate him because he said at various times, "i cannot recall." >> i understand. mr. bertone, i -- it is my duty to make sure you are well and born of the policies and procedures of this hearing. i just want to make sure you understand that. >> i am want to make a statement regarding that. i believe when you started this, you gave him an oath. it does not have anything to do with whether he is intimidated. it does not have anything to do with whether he can remember something. if the truthfully cannot remember something, i do not see why we would threaten him about something that he may remember.

this committee was the truth. he gave truthful answers. if he did not give truthful answers, we would have to address that. i do not appreciate the admonition. we are here and we are answering questions truthfully. >> we certainly do understand this committee. >> i just want to make sure mr. bertone understands that part of that gathering is -- that they didn't -- that gathering is to look at his performance. white do we not take a five minute break -- why do we not take a five minute break? thank you. >> mr. sabol the debt, please raise your right hand.

-- mr. mr. > mr. sepuvado, please raise your right hand. before we start, if kelso and the witness will make sure that you speak into the microphone. thank you very much. >> good morning. for the record, who is your attorney. >> i am ralph whalen. >> thank you, very much. >> could you please state your full name and spell your last? >> sepulvado. >> by whom are you employed?

>> bp. i am i am, the well-site leader. i have worked for them for 12 years. i was with arco for 20 years. i have been a well-site leader for 23 years. >> could you describe your job is possibilities on the deepwater horizon? >> we supervise the drilling of oil and gas wells at the rig at site. >> about how many people are you responsible for on the deepwater horizon? >> approximately 140. > to you have any other dbp representatives with you? >> there is one other well-site leader on the rig. >> how long have you been

assigned to the deepwater horizon prior to this? >> i have been on the deepwater horizon eight years in october -- october of this year. >> thank you. >> do you recall sending an e- mail about a visit to the deepwater horizon? >> yes i do. >> i had it in front of you to refresh your memory. bp-mbi00127131 is the e-mail. it appears that you were approached to find out why the to the rig. coming >> that is correct. >> de know why they were coming to the rig? >> we only had the names of the individuals who were coming to

the raid. there were coming to make a routine visit. they wanted to commend the crews for having seven years with no accidents or days away from work. >> how did you personally feel about that visit? was there anything you had concerns about? >> it was pretty much routine. somebody normally comes out every three months or so. >> was there any reason why they came to you to find out what they were coming to the break? >> he got the mail before i did. >> if you know who scheduled the date of the 20th? >> no, i do not. >> was that proposed by the rig? >> i do not know. normally they just send us an e- mail to let us know when they are coming. that is usually the only type

of e-mail's that we see. >> was there any coordination with someone on the deepwater horizon for what would take place when they arrived? >> i do not know. i left on a friday. i was gone when they came. >> was there any communication with you about what was actually taking place on the deepwater horizon? >> no, there was not. >> are you familiar with the acronym pob? personnel on board? >> yes. >> were you at capacity before you left the rate? -- before you left the rig? . .

>> where review on april 20, sir? >> i was then dop school in lafayette. >> was this for a scheduled training could mark >> yes, it was. >> were there specific issues with the weld you had encountered? >> we had some loss returns. the only problems we have always

out there was loss returns. they took kicks further up the whole, but i was not on the rate at that time. i cannot remember exactly what function it was, but it was one of the bop functions that was leaking hydraulic fluid. an rov guy spotted it and came up and told us about it. it was not a critical function of the bop stack. you had the yellow and blue pots which was backed up systems to each other. they had a leak, not during the operations, but in other words, when you close something more open something, it would vent fluid, and you would have to put the pod in neutral or block it,

and then it would not vent. had problems off and on with the shuttle valves that make fluid it go from one place to another. sometimes they get trash in them. >> if a pod is put in new.com what is it able to function gregoire >> it will function, but you have to put it back in neutral to keep the fluid from venting to correct were you aware of any the production changes leading up to april 20 before >> when i left the rate, there were discussions -- the original plan called for [unintelligible] there were discussions about running the liner. as a matter of fact we had the equipment out on the rig to go either way. >> you had the equipment to run

the lighter and that paper? >> yes, we did. that was before i let. bob came out and took my place what was going to the of bop school. >> it was a temporary leave? >> yes, it was. >> was there any form of reading or any kind of exchange with him prior to your departure? >> i sent him an e-mail and i talked to him before i got on the helicopter, went over with him what we were going to do for the next day or two on the rig. some of the equipment that we had on the rig to run the casing, and that is about it. i did send him an e-mail telling him about some of the things we were going to have in the next day or two. >> have you worked with him before on any wells or had he replaced to par to this incident was marked no, i haven't. >> were you confident with

leaving the rig with his knowledge of the well and what was going on with the deepwater horizon? >> i had never worked with him, so i don't know what his qualifications were. all i was told, he was coming out to relieve me, and just the exchange we had there at the helicopter, while waiting for the helicopter and the email, that's it. >> was the oh, well site leader at another deepwater facility? >> yes he was. >> which one was that? >> i think it was the under wars. -- thunder horse. i know he had been on the mad dog project before the under wars. >> you know if there was any other a typical type of scheduling going on the deepwater horizon outside of yourself being scheduled for well control training, such as billing engineers from the beach that i normally at the rick sent to the rig in lieu of brian merrell?

was he the normal in jr that would come to the rig, or was that mark? >> both of them. mark was the lead engineer and ryan was the back of engineer. both of them had came out to the rig. >> in your past experience, the beat the send out a specific person? >> i don't have a lot of experience running a lot down sleeves. i have been in the exploration program for the last seven years. we don't run that many lockdown sleeves. bp did send somebody out to run the lockdown sleeves. bp said represented out to run it. >> to knowledge, did they have a specific person that they sent out whenever they did run a lockdown sleeve on the excretory side --, exploratory side? >> yes.

it was ross skidmore, as far as i know. >> as far as management on the rig, who has final say in all operations? >> it is a joint effort. usually if we decide to do something, we talked to the oym, tool pushers, drillers. any plan we send out, we try to discuss with them what is coming up, what were going to do. they have input if they don't like something we are doing, we have a discussion about it. >> are you familiar with the term "management of change" circus or >> yes. it is somebody else like a

drilling contractor, the oym does that. >> if you have reproduction change it goes through -- are you the manager of the facility? >> someone else will domoc, probably some of the engineers in houston. >> but there is a process, and one process is called authorization of start up. the manager of the effective platform has to authorize the process. >> i cannot remember signing any moc's if we were going to change its a plan for running casings. >> he said they were running a tapered string. at any time when you were -- purge your departure, were you consulted about the upcoming segment job? >> the only thing i saw on the cement job was e-mail's, and normally that is the way it comes to us. that is done in town by the engineers, and they usually have

halliburton, they run models and make recommendations to the engineers, and they determine what kind of see meant we are going to run. from the rig, we normally get the additives that go into this a man. whatever we need to go whichever -- that go into thec ement through >> was there any time in your history on the deepwater horizon that they had run -- >> the only time we ever run production casing on verizon was maybe two or three under wells in the seven years. like i say, we were in exploration, so most of the wells we did not use. >> earlier we were talking about

personnel being at its maximum quality if you have to make room for certain people. we do consider someone as performing a cement block to be non critical? >> not for going to use them, no regrets ever in your career, even if you had a contingency -- if any progress that the rick, did you ever not use them if they were already at the rig with the equipment? >> we normally did not run c bl's in exploration. on this well we had them out at the location. i had lined up to come out to the location, and the only reason we are going to use them is if we lost returns. if they lost returns, did not

see what we call lived pressure, if you did not see that left pressure and you lost returns, we are going to run them. >> as well sought later, are you ever involved in the scheduling of manifest for people on the rig? >> 3 clark did that. >> do you sign off on that? >> no, i did not. what is went and told them who we had coming, and they took care of the rest of it. >> hypothetically, if a person was scheduled to be on a flight on april 20 at 10:00 in the morning, would that have to be preapproved on the day before the 19th? >> yes, it would. >> so if schlumberger on the reed to run a cement bond law of the 20th because the job was being performed at midnight of the 19th for the 20th, how

exactly would that be a contingent on blog, and i know you were not on the rate so i am not trying to put words in your mouth. how would the court notes to put the personnel on the helicopter go to hit the beach before the job was even required if you had lived pressure? >> a lot of times, since we have to give notice the evening before, we will put people on the helicopter in case they have to go in or are supposed to go and. we can take them all. it is easier to take them off than to schedule them. we can take them off that morning, but we cannot schedule them that early. >> earlier we were talking about up bop, our records indicated that you were the well site leader, and i have some records in front of you. indicated that when you were on board, you with the last well site leader to perform above

bop pressure test. that should be it right there. this should be the mbi. is this what you are looking at? >> it started on april 9. >> it is bp-acn-mbi 00002499. >> that is in it. >> it looks like 2504. there are to test if you pull it out in that one pamphlet, sir. >> i am not really familiar with these type of tests. can you please tell me what we are looking at? i am not familiar with the digital bop test. >> we worked 89 years trying to

develop this is the eight or nine years, and it was approved to use some time last year. that were used on the horizon. you have to do your first test using synthetic mud. the reason this came up is because that synthetic blood compressibility. -- synthetic mud. your line has to be a flat line, and the digital test the use as a baseline. then it uses red lights and green lights after that. in other words, it follows the same slow as the original test. it will get a green light, if something is wrong with the test, you will get a red light if it does not fall on the same slope of the line.

they are assuming the slope of the line is the compressibility of the fluid. gibber cheer affects -- temperature affects the compressibility of the mud. sometimes we wait as long as two hours for one test, for that line to get level. >> that test on april 9, was there any indication that the bop did not pass the pressure test with our >> no, there was not. >> there is no signature on this. how does that normally handled by the well site leader? there is no signatures on here. do you normally sign that at the request for >> yes, we normally sign them. >> this was submitted to us, but we do not have assigned one. but it is signed. >> yes.

>> earlier we talked about the leaking -- i have some other documents right in front. is bidet operations report, 13765. i believe i highlighted a section. it indicates there was a pilot leak on the bop on the yellow pawed at 1 gallon per minute. switch to blue pod leak slowed. is that accurate, sir christopher >> yes it is. >> do know why this was not carried over into the reports on the rig? >> no, i do not.

>> are these made available to the mms, the bidet operations report script or >> we have them on location if they want to see them. it should have been documented ion the report. >> would you be surprised that it is not in the report? >> yes, i would. >> i want to move on to modifications. to your knowledge, were there any modifications made to the bop stack without payment review? >> none that i was told about. >> do you know if they changed out the valve package on the stat? >> i don't know. >> if there was any modifications, would have brought your attention? >> sometimes it may be and sometimes it may not be. >> use lee when they work on this? is out of critical path and they

sent what they call a swat team to the rig. the subsea engineer does all the repairs to the stack. a lot of times that is done out of critical path. a lot of time some of the step that they do does not get passed onto us. sometimes we will ask them for some kind of breakdown of what kind of work they are going to do on the stack between the wells. usually it is stuff just like replacing rubber goods and stuff like that. a lot of times they find something not on that list and the repair it, we don't know about it. >> the transaction is what team, is that just transition personnel, or do they bring the manufacturer's people in as well? >> the swat team is usually only transition. if they think they want to look

at something else on the stacks, sometimes they bring a camera guy out, and sometimes bp were present a third party, usually from west houston or somebody familiar with the stacks. registered a was brought to our attention that it is a common are typical industry practice to displace the riser and offload to the vote simultaneously. is that accurate? >> yes, it is. you can still keep up with what you have coming back out on the well. they have what you call pvt monitors which monitors the volume in the pits. each got just the pits going into the well, you can keep up with what is coming out of the well predicts a you have no concerns if you were on the writ with the accuracy of what you recording and what is being displaced and offloaded? >> no, i don't. i would make them check the pits

that we were pumping into and take the pits of that work pumping to the boat. take them off line, which would be out of the pvt sensors. they would not total them. >> who would you make do that? >> usually would have to get the driller to do it because it is a transmission system. you might want to tell the mud loggers, too, because they also monitor volume. >> about that pod that we discussed earlier with the leaks on it. the know if mms was never notified about the leak? >> if that have a problem, they usually send rov down. is he sees anything on the stack, he tells the subsea engineer. he goes to the oym that will come to us. i will call houston and let my team leader know. >> the know if anyone reported

that to the mms in the new orleans district is more >> i reported it to the team leader at the time. i don't know if he reported to the mms, but that is usually the way it was done. he would reported to our regulatory lady and she would report it to the mms. >> are you familiar with the mms regulations caused more >> yes, i am. >> i have one regulation in front of you. is that in front of you, sir? >> yes, it is. >> what is the requirement if they pod is not fully functional? >> to suspend the operation until it is operable. >> was that done at the deepwater horizon? >> no, it was not. the reason it was not, i guess we assume that everything was ok. i reported to the team leader and he should have reported to the mms.

that was john? >> yes. >> i am going to want to audit. are you familiar with the deepwater horizon is a follow up that was conducted in 2009? >> i saw the audit, but i was not involved in it. i was working nights, the first week of the each of you work nights, the second party were days. they came and made that audit. usually they talk to whatever co. man was working day like. -- daylight. usually they would have the audit and come back and have a debriefing before they left. they would get the company men together and give us a rundown of what they found on the object, and we would turn list over to the oym and leave it up to him to get those things fixed.

every so often, they would call us on the phone and revisit some of these things. they would want to know how much of it was done, how much was left to do, and gives some dates when they would finish the rest of it. >> who were the people requesting those states? was that john, even locaian lit? >> i think john was in on some of the telephone calls. some of the guys doing the audit were in on that. and >> do you know kevin davies or norman long? are they bp employees? >> yes, they are. let me back up. i think davies is a contract high. i am not sure, but he works for bp. >> what was your relationship

with trans ocean in addressing those recommendations? did you work with someone on the rig to ensure that those were created to your satisfaction customer >> a lot of those were things we did not know anything about, and normally we left it up to the guy that came out and did the audit to follow up on it. they would contact trans ocean every so often and we would have this phone conversation to check up on what had been done on the audit. like a said, what was going to continue to be done on it, what the status was and what had not been done. that was done from a houston office. >> did you know if there was any problem in trends notions of addressing those recommendations in a timely fashion? >> none that i knew of. we had some of the supervisors

in the office on some of these audits, two mechanical supervisors and some of the marine people to check out anything or the status on some of the things on the audit on their end. as far as i know, they did not have any problems, other than some of them were longer than others and some were waiting on parts. >> were you present at the audit from april 1 thru april 14? >> that was of this year? >> yes, sir. >> yes, i think i was there, because i left the 16th. >> in those audits, it indicated that the bop was well past its inspection dates of every three to five years. is that accurate? >> yes, sir.

>> are you familiar with the regulation 250-446a? >> no, i am not. >> are you familiar that you are supposed to have the inspection on that every five or six years? >> no, i did not. >> most of the turnover was core group people responsible for the minutes of engines and components in the engine room. is that an accurate statement? >> they had some turnover, but i don't know who in the mechanical department, what kind of turn over the head, because we hardly ever dealt with them. the only ones we dealt wit or knew of would be the ones in the drilling in the of the business. >> was there turner were in the drilling portion of it? >> yes, we did have some turnovers, but it was not really

unusual. >> there was a note in the audit for the deepwater horizon that bt had completed. i'll read to you. says the automated number of findings based on the nature of these findings, the potential adverse effect on the read emergency preparedness and watertight integrity regarded marine related issues, our recommendation was made to the weld team to suspend operations until many had been satisfactorily addressed. did the welty's at any time shutdown the deepwater horizon for that recommendation? >> they had a flooding incident on the horizon. i don't know exactly what day that was on. i was not on the ribbon that happen. another rig was shut down for some time until they did their investigation, but any other time it was shut down for anything like that, i don't know. not while i was out there.

>> were you on the rig when they had a stake the stand down in late 2009? -- a safety stand down? >> we had several safety stand- downs'. >> in 2009, there was one report it was due to 15 near misses. do you recall that one? >> no, i don't. >> have you been back to work with bp since the incident? >> yes, i have. >> are you wearing a trainer safety notices be he has put out with relation to this incident to is well site leaders? >> no precooks were there any safety notices? >> there have been safety notices. >> is there anything you do differently than you did do in the past we look at the -- then you get in the past? >> we do everything with the rov on service and we also do

the dead man test on the surface. other than that, pretty much everything else is pretty much routine. we just make sure everything gets tested on the stack. >> the node id be he has senior greek -- do you know if the he has senior drill inspectors, ray? >> no, i don't. >> the know if bp has a drilling superintendent accountable for their regular discussions with contractors caused more greg's no, i don't. that is usually done in houston. >> do you know that in 2002 that the he had two incidents in -- for shallow gas wells? but there was a letter that indicated they would have both drilling superintendent accountable for regular discussions with contractors and

senior drilling advisers that provide on site assurance to be personnel. and you don't know if any of those individuals were on the rise and -- on the horizon press mark >> no, i don't. >> thank you, i have no further questions. >> i did have a couple of follow-up questions. when you are normally on the rig, do you work days or nights? >> the first part of the hit show you work nights, and the second, you were days. >> who normally works opposite you? >> on the horizon? don vidrine, and i have worked with murray sepulvado a week bit >> how long has don been on the red? >> i would say least six months or longer. >> gassiyev prior experience that you would become to be it -- does he have prior experience

that you would be comfortable on the rig with him? >> i think don came over on the rig to relieve somebody one hitch, and that is the only time i ever worked with him before he came to the horizon the second time. >> a you have no knowledge of his experience level? >> no, other than just working with him since he has been on the horizon. before that, none. >> thank you. >> mr. skidmore, please read your right han>> raise your rigt hand. >> do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you god? >> yes, i do. >> thank you, sir. please be seated.

>> mr. skidmore, for the record, could you please state your full name and spell your last name? >> ross randy skidmore. >> but who are you employed crest or >> swift. >> is swift contract it out by b e? >> i am. i cannot answer for all of swift. there are various technology groups that they go after. >> what position you hold with lived with for >> i am de subsea oil supervisor. >> how long have you held that position at the deepwater horizon? >> this was the first time i have ever set foot on the deepwater horizon. >> when did you first set foot on it, what date? >> i believe it was on april 16. >> how much subsidy will

experience had you had prior to this incident? >> i initially started subsea work with penrod. i broke out in september of 1983, if i am not mistaken. i have been employed in this industry since 1977, but i began my subsea work in 1983. >> i know you only arrived on the 16th, but can you please inform me of what you are actually doing out there and what your responsibilities were going to be? >> myself as a contractor, i assist and what we were looking at was taking possession of the deepwater horizon upon completion of the macondo and taking it to the nile project.

>> what are you going to do when you say taking possession? >> moving to read to the next job. i was going to ride the rig to the next shop and perform the assist with the nile well. >> were you going to be involved at all with the main is that was going to be done on the stack wants it was pulled? >> the only involvement would have asked for maintenance would be -- i would be directed on what to do. i don't take anything on my own to go out and do it in bp's name. >> what are you going to be doing when you took possession of it and i'll, going to the nile well? i truly don't understand much responsibility was. >> we have not started receiving any of the equipment yet that would be required for the job. so i would be on board the

vessel as the equipment arrived. i would call again and report project called in and report that these particular tools have arrived, we have received them. right down the list of the equipment that would be required to perform the job on the nile. >> inouye please take me through what happened on the day of april 20, from when you woke up to when you departed the rig? >> you are asking me from when the incident began on the 20th? the morning of april 20, when you woke up. >> the morning of april 20, myself, shane, and braque were the same three on the team that were going to take this read to the nile. what we were doing it that time was just going over the word that we will be doing, as far as

the of nile project is concerned, as well as going over the pipe tallies on when they are going to run the rundown sleeve on the macondo well. >> after that happened? >> we drug it on through the day, doing just exactly that. around 9:30 that evening, that night, is when i went ahead and went to bed. i went to bed at 9:30 l was laying there in my bulk reading. i close my book, laid it down and laid back on the bed. i believed that i was well enough along to be able to go to sleep at that point, and that is when the incident took place there, about 10:00, if i

remember correctly. >> prior to arriving at the deepwater horizon, where you given any documents from bp concerning the well or any of the procedures that you would be running? >> did i carry any out with me? >> were you given any prior to you going to the deepwater horizon? you may not have taken and we do, but did beat the ever give you any procedures of what you would be doing? >> like what was saying, when we were coming out to the job, the way it came about was, shane and myself arrived on the rig on the 60. the lead on the job did not come out until monday because of bed space. there's not any rush to get all of us out there. so we went out to the rig as soon as we could to get settled in, get things laid out. brad, the lead for the job, he

wants to bring everything out that was needed. if i had something with me -- i know when i got there are requested some information. i received it when i was there, as far as pertaining to the well, where they are at proper when can i expect to get started with the lot downslide. >> who do report to. >> i report to merkt kelly -- merit caylee. he is the team leader of the subsea. >> how many lot down sleeves had you been involved with running before? >> this would have been my first one to set. i have been involved as far as taking the measurements and inspecting it through an open well. >> did you talk to brag about his experience in running lockdowns lease customer >> no,

i have not. >> did the issue in the concern about running the lockdown sleep? >> only to be successful with it. all we had was positive conversations as far as stepping into this job and going through it. we had drill quip on board. it would have been carrying out the job and we would have been alongside with it. >> was there everyone else from swift that had been on the deepwater horizon that did subsea operation were prior to -- >> not that i know of. >> do you know he would know that? like if we contacted some, if

there was any other swift employees on the deepwater horizon, who should we contact? >> the reason i was saying that, i believe that myself and gary ellis are the only too swift contract employees that work in the subsea wells group. i am sure of that. >> a lot of my questions we had prepared for you were developed with the understanding that you were the subsea wells supervisor for the deepwater horizon. seems as though you were actually down there during the transition from going to the macondo to the nile well. for my understanding, you were only going out there to work on a lot down sleep, and you had never worked on one before. >> i was out there to assist and support -- to work on a block dowlockdown sleeve.

>> i would be working alongside and with the drill quip as well as our own -- as well as the bp employees through it. >> had you had any prior knowledge of the timing that a lot downslides should be run? >> as in the sequence of events that it would fall into place in relation to the well? >> yes, sir. >> i knew that the timing that we were going to be setting again. >> did you have any document to reference it against and said that it might not have been an industry standard to run the lockdowns leave at that time? >> the document are requested and received from brian on the vessel was the sequence that it was going to be done in. that is the way i knew it to be.

>> was there an issue with the timing of what time the lockdown sleeve was set? >> as far as a lockdown sleeve would go, the only concerns that would have been raised would have been to ensure that we have enough distance between the stinger and the balance plug. as long as you have that distance in there, you can have a sufficient amount of weight for setting this tool. and also have a clean well bore. the timing was not really a concern of ours. >> was there ever any discussions about a negative test and the timing of running the lockdowns leave? >> not from us.

>> from anyone else? >> not to my knowledge. >> i have no further questions. >> we were not sitting in a shared space. let me add that in there. as far as our sophist -- our office space, where we were sitting, we were by ourselves. we were not sitting in the group as far as the well's teams go on that job. we were in a separate office so we were not involved in the conversations that were taking place on deciding what was going on. >> thank you, i have no for the question. >> when the incident occurred, i think -- was on the floor bucking up the tool for running the lot down sleep. is that correct? >> i believe they were ensuring that they had the crossovers,

and that might have been getting this phase out and everything correct. i don't know exactly what he was doing. >> the drill quip guy was at the rear of the vessel using a bucking machine to prepare for the lot downslide. >> this is correct. i held him getting crossovers and altogether. >> during the day? >> yes, sir, during the day. >> when did you start that? >> i don't recall the times, but it was on and off all for the day. there would be several activities going on. the drill quip hands also took care of all of the casing run, the hangars, and all that is well-prepared he handled all of his communications back and forth to town. we were in and out as he could and as we had grain availability and assistance there. >> did you start bucking the

tools together right after lunch, or was it after breakfast? >> i cannot tell you exactly. >> do you know what tools he had to but together? >> it would be some crossovers, because drill quip had the tools assembled in the shop and they were sent out as an assembly. but he still has to be able to get the crossover in to make it up to whatever that redtop would be for the stinger. the crossover for the top -- we will looking into separate tools, one of them being the impression tool to be run first and the second one being the lockdowns leave. >> did you assist him bucking of tools, are you just were observing him? >> just pretty much observing and looking through the area.

we were having trouble finding some of the crossovers. we actually borrowed some of them. one of them i have come from halliburton, off one of their tools or something. >> was the drill guy familiar with the rig? >> yes, he was a regular on the rig. >> so he pretty much knew the routine and you were following his routines? >> yes, he knew everybody on a first name basis. he was like one of the crew members there. >> you are watching and to run the pressure blot first? that was based upon what? >> once you run into debt and landed out in the profile, the pressure of an energized the lead blocks. they will protrude out into the side of the well head, where the

lockdowns leave would be energizing into into the profile. when you recovered the lead impression to, you can get your measurement from that. the indication that you get from the profile that tells where it is sitting at in the well head. you take that measurement in relation to your lot down sleeve, and that will tell you when you land its at this point, it will be locking in either just right or else we will have to make an adjustment to stroke it out longer or shorter so you will have a true mesh in the profile. >> so the reason you had to run the lead impression blot is because the tool does not always phase out the same? all the well head itself? >> it is just to make sure that the work was done correctly in the shop, and everything is the way it is supposed to be. it will also let you know that

the casing was set all the way down and exactly where it needs to be. >> that is what i was trying to get too big the casing would necessarily be set all the way down? >> that is just one point that would raise a flag if you run a let impression and you are high or low. then you are going to get on the phone and have a set down and figure out why is it not the way it should be. >> does this deal assembly really is just a locking mechanism that does not sealed? it is not do anything to seal, it just is a lot of the casing in place? >> the lockdown sleeve would be assisting in the production side. it would give you straight into your production casing. >> can you explain that in a little more detail?

>> a lot of down sleeve is going to land out on top of the casing hangar. it is going to lock in place. this will assist in holding, ensuring that casing will be held in place. when you run your tree any leger tree on top of the well head, it would step in to the top of this lot down sleeve area. it seals between the tree and the lockdown sleeve. >> it adds lee provides it that sealing mechanism. does it still on the other end where you have the case in hangar? or is it just a locking device? >> i would have to say there will primarily be a locking device where comes into the top

of the casing. >> and the locking devices simply engaging some hydraulic movement there to lock id, or how does that actually lot christine >> is going to be weighed and hydraulics. >> say you have weight hanging below you, or you just have pressure on the top? >> are you asking me in reference to the lock down sleeve? you will be running 100,000 pounds below the stinger. that is the way that will be hanging underneath the lock down sleeve. this will assist in getting it through, setting it in their good and true, and when you slap of a sufficient amount of weight to land this out, you will not be putting anything in excess. if it calls for 60,000 pounds to slack off, the new head of 100,000 pounds thinner underneath it.

>> so you runway above the setting wait? >> i believe that is what procedure called for. >> it only takes 62 said it? >> i believe is 60 to 72, not to exceed a certain amount in there. >> what is a hydraulic are the mechanism? >> that would assist you with a lot rain coming down on the uppermost part of it. >> is that the pressure from the top that activates the hydraulic mechanism? >> you are going to be in putting the pressure from the cement unit, coming three choker kill line. >> it is that pressure exposed to the entire well bore? >> it is in that area right there, from wherever you come in and that centered -- >> it is not contained in the running tool, is between the

bop's and the running tool? >> if you come down for the drill stem and put pressure on the, you have a sure sub inside that will allow you to pump pressure down the inside. it will allow the column of fluid to vent to the annulus, and then you can pull your pipe dry and not have to be pulling wet string. >> did you have some share in georgia sheering out of? >> i believe they are brass types crews. >> is just a doll blocking mechanism that your engaging? like you just gotta profile you are going to push something

hydraulically. >> that is correct. you are just walking into a profile. >> ever do get through setting the throughsleeve, is there anything else you do particularly to the well head? >> when we get to that point, after the stack would have been unlatched and off to the side, then the rov as a measuring tool that will land on top of the well head, and it extends down to the lockdown sleeve. it would give us an exact number of inches from the top that allied to the top of the lock down sleeve. >> that is so you will make sure the tree would fit on their properly when you come back with the tree? and so they would know it is in their word is supposed to be. i cannot say the exact number. we were told a number that it should be set at in there. that would be another indicator that this is properly done and a

good job. >> but it does not seal the well bore. just seals regius locks in the casing, does not seal the well bore. >> yes, they are locked in the casing, and the production zeal is inside of that. >> thank you. >> what exactly is your title? argue the subsea supervisor? >> my title is the subsea well supervisor. >> i supervise every shore operations, when all is happening, and if i had problem with anything i am seeing, i bring it to their attention at the time. the cannot work through it, i pass it on freetown to my immediate supervisors. >> who is your immediate supervisor? >> merritt kelly would be my

immediate supervisor. as far as on the job goes, the lead at hand on the job would be my supervisor at that time. >> what is your experience running in the drill quip, casing hang on, and the lot down sleeve? >> in my past have been required of you casing jobs, but i have never ran the casing in hangars, as far as my responsibility goes. >> but you have run the clock down sleeves? >> i have been around them. i have never had the job that was saying you are the lead on this, this is your responsibility, and been involved from day one, as far as procedures and all that. i follow a procedure i have not

written. >> thank you. >> no questions, thank you. >> no questions, thank you. >> douglas brown. >> my name is steve gordon and i represent douglas brown. having spoken before you came here to trans ocean's lawyers? >> no, i have not, unless i had

any conversation with any of them on the boat after the incident. but i had no face-to-face business talk with anyone. >> we use a boat, what boat you refer to? >> the code that we evacuated to, the work boat. i don't recall the name of it. >> is that we are pretty much everybody went to? >> yes, it is. >> can you tell me, i know it is hard to recall that night and that morning, but how many lawyers came out there? [laughter] as best you can recall. >> can you explain your line of question there? i don't know how that is said to related.

>> i thought the first day's testimony is that there were no lawyers that came out there. >> i don't remember why i cut that line of questioning of, either, but i don't get anything relevant to the safety issue we are discussing here. >> did swift tried to get you off of the banks and, if you know? >> no, i am not going to say that anybody tried to get me off or separate me in any way. i was well taken care of. >> and you came in the morning of thursday? >> yes, i did. >> in you tell me, sir, if your work, when they pick up the bop from the macondo well, if your work would have had anything to do with the bop? >> i hope it does. i have not been told that i will

get, but i would like to follow this whole thing through. >> for instance, if this event had not happened and the bop would have been picked up, with your work on board the deepwater horizon have had to do with tobop? >> no, but if i would have been asked or directed, it would have. >> so whether or not there were new and dealers on the deepwater horizon is completely outside of your scope. >> i would not have a clue. >> now your right, you said, on the 16th. >> i believe it was. that would be a friday. i believe it was on friday that i made my way out there. >> can you tell me why you were on board the deepwater horizon before 2200 hours on april 20, if you attended any safety meetings?

>> we have so many. we have preached our meetings that i will stand in and listen to listenpre-tower meetings. we have our drills. always impressed by the way -- i was impressed by the way that the marine department, transition employees did take their positions in this safety seriously. and i was led around the rig and it was explained to me, because i have never been on that rig before, and i was shown all of my evacuation stations, plans.

i was given the time to just wonder about from my room and learn my way around, more than one way. . . >> i couldn't just pick one out, but i'm going to tell you, yes,

because if there's a safety meeting, i'm standing in the background. >> ok. >> is that -- >> let me try it this way. did you attend any abandon ship drills specifically? >> let's see. that would be on sundays. >> that's what i heard. did you attend that? >> then i attended one then. >> you did. where was your life jacket? >> in my room. >> ok. and did you board the life capsule? >> no, not during the drill. >> all right. the muster, do you feel that the muster went calmly and effectively? >> there, there is not a way that you're going to be able to effectively take a muster onboard during the incident.

it was attempted, and then once the lifeboats were all manned, doors closed, we attempted to take another muster, but it's pitch black at that time and it's still so loud you can't hear yourself think let alone communicate with the man next to you. so what they did in -- to resolve that problem, as soon as we were offloaded, onto this work boat, they separated us out, all standing on one end of the vessel right there in that work area, and as the name was called, we left that area to a separate area. so they did, they did get a good muster. >> all right. and which life capsule did you depart in? >> i departed on the one when you come out the door directly to your left. >> ok. >> so that would be number one, i believe it was. >> and do you know if during the time -- how long it took

from the time you arrived at that area before you departed? >> it was greater than ten minutes. it was, it was greater than ten minutes, because the way the situation was, the way the fuel source was, we were, we were in a, in as good a safe a place as you could be as far as mustering at a lifeboat would go, so we didn't take any chances of leaving too soon, if that's -- if you understand what i'm saying, we stayed until we knew there was nothing else coming, nobody in sight, and everybody was pretty much deemed that it was time to go then. >> and you might have said this.

had the other life capsule already departed? >> well, the other life capsule had already loaded and closed the door. i don't know if it had started down before we got in it at final loading. >> and were you in the life capsule that had a tough time starting the engine? knowdon't, i don't really if we had any trouble starting the engine. i think we were just really wanting to make sure everybody was there. >> all right. >> if i'm not mistaken, if i wasn't the last one in the boat, i was probably the second to last one getting in. >> before you got on the life capsule, did you ever hear anybody say "abandon ship," or call out for an abandon ship? >> i don't recall those exact words being spoken, but the alarms for abandon ship were

going. >> ok. and did you ever see the captain 238 at any time from the explosion till the time you left? >> i did see the members of his crew. i can't say i saw the captain, but we did have some of the marine department coming by, checking at the boats, and i couldn't tell you what communication was done. he was just looking and then back to his other duty. so whatever he saw was what he was looking for. >> ok. while you were onboard the bankston, did you hear either mr. ezell or mr. harrell make a phone call? >> mr. ezell or mister who? >> harrell. >> harrell. i, i don't, i don't believe paid any attention to if anyone was on the computer or the satellite phone.

i know we had one, but i don't recall anybody using it. >> last area. did you interact at all with the schlumberger people that were out there? >> not in any business way. you mean on the vessel itself? >> on the deepwater horizon. >> no, i don't believe i did. i don't believe i had any business with them. >> do you know that they were there? >> didn't pay them any attention if they were. >> do you know any -- >> but i'm sure they would have been, because if their services would have been needed, but i didn't have any, any interest in looking them up. >> do you know anything about a cement bond log that should have been run, or was requested

to have been run? >> no, i wasn't privy to any of that. i know what you're talking about, and i know -- i understand what a cement bond log is and the reasoning for it if there's any questions as far as the cement job would be, if there would have been any flags, that would have not involved in any decision-making. >> ok, thank you so much. >> thank you, sir. curt kuchta. >> yes, sir. >> thank you. >> good afternoon, mr. skidmore. my name is kyle schonekas. i represent captain kuchta. sir, was this perhaps the most harrowing experience you've ever had in your life? >> hopefully the only one.

>> had you ever endured an explosion like this before? >> no, not that i can think of. >> when you reported to the life capsule and you waited -- were waiting to leave, were you anxious to go, sir? >> i believe everyone was anxious to go, but, no, we weren't trying to rush the process. >> was there any concern that every moment you stayed on that rig -- let me ask this: do you recall successive explosions? do you recall that? >> well, i also recall some other explosions, but i believe i could have recognized them for the, the apv's, pressure-- stored vessels, things of that nature that were well above and aft of where we were at the time, and maybe some drums, but there was nothing in our area

where the lifeboats are located. there was nothing in our area that would have been -- that made me feel like we need to get out of here right now. i was not uncomfortable in that respect. >> you didn't have any concern that the longer you stayed on the rig, the more likely it was that you were going to be injured? >> yes, sir, i did. >> and would you agree that that was probably a common feeling among everyone there waiting? >> i'm sure it was. it was probably more noticeable in some than it was others. >> and the sense was, we need to get out of here as quickly as we can with as many people as we can; is that right, sir? >> we need to get out of here as quickly as we can with everybody. >> and not endanger the rest of the people? >> that's correct. >> thank you, sir. >> thank you, sir.

jimmy harrell. >> oh, no, thank you. >> thank you, sir. mike williams. >> no questions, captain. >> thank you, sir. steven bertone. >> no, thank you, captain. >> thank you. bp. >> no questions. >> thank you. transocean. >> thank you, sir. >> sure. >> good afternoon, mr. skidmore. >> good afternoon. >> i'm a transocean lawyer. >> yes, sir. >> and for the record, we've never met, have we? >> no, sir, we have not. >> ok. i'm happy to do so now. you had said something that i wanted to follow-up on. you said that when you were heading out on the 16th, or shortly before the 16th that you had requested and received documents from brian morel. do you recall when you said that?

>> yes, sir. i did that. >> ok. did you know brian morel before making the request to him? >> i knew who brian was. and actually, where our office where we sat was here and brian was across the hall, so it was real convenient. he was, looked like he was in there by himself, looked like a good time to try to get a little information, you know. so shane stepped across the hall and asked him to send us a procedure, or what's going on with the rig right now so we can plan our timeframe, see where we're at, how much time we have and -- >> and the hall that you're referring to was where? >> let's see. i believe that would be forward, upper, on the lifeboat level and forward, because the well site leader's office was across the hall from myself and

brian was just down from the well site leader's office. >> and brian is a bp engineer, petroleum engineer -- is that your understanding? >> yes, sir. >> ok. and in addition to brian morel, there were some well site leaders who were out there that -- whose identity you knew of. is that correct? >> that's correct. >> and did you understand that -- was it your understanding, at least, that brian morel was the senior bp person out there during this time that you're referring to? >> no, i didn't. i didn't, i didn't look at brian as being the senior bp personnel out there. i just knew brian was easily approachable and he's always willing to help. >> now, do you know when brian morel left the deepwater horizon? >> no, sir, i don't. >> ok. do you know if he was on the rig at the time of the explosion?

>> i do not believe he was. >> ok. now the documents that you said you requested and received, it was scheduling documents, is that right, or was there anything beyond that? >> oh, it was pretty much a reader's digest-type version of a procedure sequence of events -- we're doing this, we're going to be doing that. it had the casing, the casing run in there, it had the lead impression tool, the lockdown sleeve, and then it fell off into riser cleaning, i believe. >> and did it give you -- did he, brian morel, give you in this document an order in which to do these various tasks including the lockdown sleeve? >> well, this is, this appeared to me to be the sequence of events, the order that it would be in. >> ok. so did you ever -- well, first of all, let me ask you. i know you've described this as being the first lockdown sleeve

that you were personally going to be responsible for setting, but you added that you had been around this sort of an operation before? >> yes. and i didn't, i didn't want to mislead anybody by saying, by me saying that "i'm responsible." i'm not trying to stand up and take some kind of credit that's not, that's not coming to me. we're just working as a team out there, and i feel like i'm just as responsible for what goes on as the man next to me. >> and i understand that. i think we all do. in the order of the sequence of events that were set forth in that reader's digest-type document, there was something called "displacement" to take place -- is that correct? >> yes. you're referring to displacing the riser, and that would have been after the balance plug -- correct? >> correct. >> ok. >> and after displacement was

completed, at some later -- after that fact, after that event, then the lockdown sleeve was going to be set -- is that correct? >> that's, that's correct. >> now have you seen it done differently on other rigs, and that is, that you set the lockdown sleeve first? >> in the mud, in the drilling mud. it would have been just another way of doing the same thing, is, is when you, when you get your casing set and you're cemented and everything's good, go ahead and sweep that area, circulate and clean that seed area out, and then come on down and land your lead impression tool, recover it, read it, and run your lockdown sleeve, and then go ahead with your -- finish whatever is required for the rest of the well. >> including displacement? >> yes, sir.

>> ok. now, you indicated something and i, you know, i have to tell you that i didn't understand everything you said. in fact, i only understood a part of it, so let me come back to those things that i need to understand. i thought you said that you had, you were going to establish a certain distance between the stinger and the plug in order to have enough weight. now, can you explain for me exactly what you were talking about there? >> yes, sir. when you have, when you have your, your running tool like so, the stinger that i'm referring to would be the crossover that mr. mccarroll and i were discussing to go under the tool, whether it be six and three-quarter drill collars or a long string of heavyweight, if you want a hundred thousand pounds hanging under your tool, so when you come down and land

out you don't have to put anything in the compression from the top, so you can have the weight hanging from underneath landed out. and i believe the comment that i made, that the only concern that i would have had if they choose to set the balance plug first is, i would just like to have enough distance between where the tool lands out for the stinger, so i don't tag cement when we come down and land out. we just want enough room under there of open annulus. >> and the balance plug you're referring to, that was going to be set at eighty-three hundred and sixty-seven feet -- is that right? >> if i remember correctly. from eighty- three to eight thousand, or somewhere in that area. >> and the purpose for setting the plug at that depth was to give you the needed weight to set the lockdown sleeve? >> well, with it being set at that, at that depth, i wasn't concerned with the stinger

under the tool then, we had room. >> you had enough? >> yes, sir. >> now in other wells, have you seen the -- and i just call it "cement plug." maybe there's a better name. you've called it "balance plug." but is that plug typically set at between three and five hundred feet? and in other words, a much shallower depth, much closer to the surface. >> well, sir, i'm not being rude. i just don't have anything to do with the well planning. when the well is planned out, presented and approved, it's handed over and we do it as instructed. >> mr. skidmore, you're not being rude. no one thinks you're being rude at all. but i'm just trying to understand what your experience has been. could you tell me, at least in your past experience -- i'm not asking you to make judgments about whether you would agree or disagree, but in your past experience have you commonly

seen that plug, that cement plug to be set at a much shallower depth? >> yes, i can say i've seen it set at a more shallow depth, and i've also seen it where there's no lockdown sleeve, so. >> all right. now, can you run a lockdown sleeve first before setting that plug? >> as far as my concerns and interest would be, i would say of course i can. >> ok. could it have been run first in this instance if the plug had been set at a shallower depth? >> you know, i'm just not going to second guess on their decision. >> i understand. you said you reported to merrit kelly. was merrit kelly an employee of swift or bp? >> no, sir. merrit kelly is a bp employee. >> ok. and he was on the rig, or was he on the bank? >> he's the team lead of our complete group. i'm a member of the group.

merrit is the team lead for the subsea wells group. brad tippetts would have been the team lead for the horizon job, for the lockdown sleeve, and moving on to the nile. and i believe we would have had a new team lead assigned when we got to that job. >> all right. now in the course and scope of your duties out on that rig, do you normally see, receive the final abandonment procedures from bp? is that something you get? >> no, sir, i don't, i don't get the full breakdown procedure. i'm not saying that i'm denied access to it, i just haven't received it. when i got -- when i come onboard the rig, if i was to go to the well site leader's office and request it, i'm sure one would be provided for me. >> ok.

do you know who at bp writes those procedures, or wrote it at least for this rig? >> i don't know who wrote the drilling procedure and all for that rig, but it's all signed off. who signed off on it would have been involved in the -- >> what i'm really referring to more than the drilling, because there is a drill plan, i'm really referring to the temporary abandonment procedures. that is a term that we've heard -- and i wanted to ask you about that -- whether you, a, received it, and b, if you know who wrote it? >> no, sir, i do not know. >> ok. ok. now there's a difference between an outer lock ring and a lockdown sleeve, as i appreciate it. do you appreciate there is a difference between those two things? >> between the outer lock ring and the lockdown sleeve? >> yes, sir. >> yes. >> can you describe for me what those differences are, what

does one do, what does the other do? >> well, the lockdown sleeve -- now i'm referring to the actuator ring on the top of the lockdown sleeve. are you referring to the locking assembly for the casing hanger? >> you lost me. let's go -- >> i believe we're -- >> well, let's go with what you're referring to. i'm going to go with what you're referring to. >> ok. now, what i, what i was referring to was the lockdown sleeve when it's landed, it has a locking mechanism at the top. and this actuator ring actually assists in protruding into that profile of the upper part of the wellhead housing, and that's the sole purpose for running the lead impression tool to let you know just how you're meshing up. >> and were either of these two things run before this well was displaced? >> no. we had not gotten to that point yet. >> did that cause you any

concerns, with displacing the well before either one of these two safety factors were put into play? >> not concern. not safety, not concerns as far as safety. it might have, it might have aggravated me a little bit, because we weren't going to do it with the mud and we knew we had everything cleaned and swept out, but it was not a safety concern. it was just the possibility of maybe having to make an additional trip, to go in and jet and wash. >> and that, that additional trip that you're referring to takes time. how much time would you say that takes? >> well, probably -- let's see. >> at these steps. >> oh, it wouldn't be a good guess for me.

>> ok. >> it wouldn't, it wouldn't be a good guess for me. that's -- >> would you, would you -- you've heard the expression "time is money," i assume, you've heard that before? >> we all have. >> and that is particularly true on a rig where bp's paying close to a million dollars a day -- isn't that right? >> yes, sir. >> and so additional time to make an additional trip is a factor to consider, do we want to expend the time or not? that's one of those factors that businessmen look at when they make business decisions? >> and that's all that was in my mind, because if we have a bad reading, then i would have to stand up and fight that battle, or my group would, you know, to have an additional trip ran. >> you mentioned cbl's and you indicated in response to someone's questions you were familiar with what that was. and i'm not going to get into the details, but running a cbl takes hours, does it not? >> well, the cement bond log, it would be all wireline, and it would -- you know, you would

have to rig everything up, everything would have to be rigged up and ran, and then after it's ran, it would -- you would need someone qualified to interpret. >> would that take most of half a day, in your experience? >> well, i'm not familiar with the crews on the horizon on how efficient, you know, everybody is in it, but, yes, it would take more than one or two hours. >> and waiting on centralizers if they're going to be run into a string, centralizers is another thing to rig up, is that not correct, when you've seen them used? >> well, centralizers would, you know, the purpose on them would be to give a sufficient standoff to have a good cement job to come up around the outside of the casing. >> does it take time to run the centralizers into the string? i may be using the wrong terms, but to essentially install them? >> well, anything you add to a job would add time. the amount of time, i couldn't

tell you. >> mr. skidmore, thank you very much. >> yes, sir. >> thank you, sir. anadarko/moex? >> mr. skidmore, my name is ky kirby, and i represent anadarko and moex offshore. i hear you say that you have not been responsible or the lead in setting lockdown sleeves, but you've seen many of them done; right? >> i've been around, i've been around the work areas. >> all right. how many have you been around for? >> well, i couldn't tell you. >> rough guess? >> no, ma'am. i'm not going to guess with it, because i haven't been

responsible as it being my job to see that this is done until this time right here, where i only had one thing to do when i went out there with them. >> i understand. have you been around to see others take responsibility for more than ten? >> i've been, i've been around job operations where this was being done, but i would not be directly involved in it. >> ok. so you've been around? >> yes, ma'am. >> others have been responsible, right? >> yes. >> so how many times do you think you've been around for that when it was somebody else's job? >> well, you want me to just grab a number out of my hat and pull it out -- >> well, i don't want you to make up a number. [laughter] more than five? >> i would say probably, probably more than five, yes. >> all right. >> because how long have we had lockdown sleeves in this industry? and i've been in this industry since 1977. so i have been exposed to it, but i've never been having that

one purpose there to do. >> i understand. >> yes, ma'am. >> now you've seen them done in -- you've seen them lockdown sleeves set in mud, you said; correct? >> i'm using the term "mud," where i should -- probably should have used drilling fluids. >> drilling fluids. >> the existing drilling fluids that's in the well at the time. >> and of those that you have been around for but not -- it wasn't your job -- >> ok. >> what percentage of them do you think were -- do you understand were set down in drilling fluid? >> well, i -- all right, here's you a number. this is the first time where i had any thoughts over changing displacing out.

and maybe what you're asking is, why would i prefer it to have been in the drilling fluids rather than displacing out. >> is it the case -- before we go there, because that will be my next question. >> ok. >> before we go there, is it the case that all the other times you observed others doing it, they were doing it in drilling fluid? >> well, it's just, the only way i've ever been exposed to it. it's just finishing up as it is, and then you're displacing every -- once you get everything displaced out, that's when you unlatch, pull your bop, clean your riser and move on. >> ok. so all the others that you've observed were all in drilling fluid and this time around you got a procedure. was it from brian morel? >> the one that i was reading through was the one i got from brian, yes. >> all right. and did that procedure tell you that there was going to be a displacement with seawater down to roughly, something over eighty-three hundred feet? >> or under, under eight --

around 8,000 feet, wasn't it? >> well, my documents say -- >> 8,397 feet. >> i don't have them. you know, i don't have any documents, and i haven't had any since i was on the rig, so i'm going off of memory here with you. >> sure. but it was somewhere around 8,300, right? >> yes, yes. >> a lot deeper than you've probably seen before, right? >> yeah. >> all right. and also, this is the first time that you've seen a procedure that calls for displacement before setting down the lockdown sleeve, right? >> it stood out with me, but i have a little more interest in this one than i have before, and my concerns is, i don't want any possibly cause some sort of a problem with the setting of a

lockdown sleeve. >> and what was it that you were thinking of was going or possibly could cause the problem? >> well, one of the main purposes for drilling fluid is to carry solids, sediment, cuttings, whatever's in that column out, and it had been cleaned. and when you displace out with seawater, you lose that viscosity. so as the riser gets rattled and shook, you can have flakes and different debris fall down, and in so doing, it would be landing possibly in that landing profile of where the lead impression tool would land. and if that was the case, it would give you a bad reading on the lead impression tool. if you have some rust settlement in this profile, it's going to cause you to have an impression of latching higher. and if you do that -- and they

call this a good reading, 'cause underneath the lead impression tool you have some indicators that show whether you're down all the way or not. well, if you're landing on something that would dent those indicators, that would give you a false high reading up there, but you would still look like you landed out all the way. and in doing that, that would cause you to adjust the lockdown sleeve, to where it would lock in the proper distance that the lead impression tool told you it needed to be in. >> i see. now the purpose of the lockdown sleeve is to hold the casing in place, right? >> yes. >> and the casing can essentially stretch under high temperatures, right? is that true? >> evidently it would, it would

help hold it in place if anything was to, it would be like another barrier, another thing to help hold it down. >> so if there was a strong buoyant force caused by the displacement, then you could see the casing rise as a result of that, correct? >> well, i'm not an engineer, you know. >> but did you -- i'm sorry. >> but anything that's buoyant will lift. >> did you have any concerns about that possibly occurring? >> you know, we've seen so many casing jobs over the years, when you get to that point, everybody goes to the mind set that -- that we are through, that this job is done. >> well, what do you mean by that, we're so close, that let's

just get it over with, or -- >> no, ma'am. what i mean by that is, when you run that last string of casing, and you've got it cemented, it's landed out, and a test was done on it, then you say, "this job, we're at the end of it, everything's going to be ok." now i'm telling you this not from a supervisor, not from the well site leader's office, but from the working men, that are out there -- we finished this well, you're thinking ahead to your next job, you're moving on. >> i see. so what you're telling me is that once you get that last bit of casing down, you think, "eureka, i'm on the homestretch" -- right? >> you are. >> "and i don't really have anything to worry about anymore, because i'm pretty much there?" >> no, i didn't say you didn't have anything to worry about. that would be, that's a good supervisor right there, that wouldn't let his, let his guns down. >> ok. now, did you, or did you hear anyone else express concern

about the potential of buoyant forces pushing up the casing during the displacement because there was no lockdown sleeve? >> no, i was not privy to any of that. >> did you -- >> i did not hear any discussion in that respect. >> did you have any concerns? >> no, i did not. >> all right. do you have an understanding of why a procedure that called for displacement first and locking down after that was created? >> i didn't see a procedure in that way. the procedure that i was looking at when i arrived to the rig was the one that i got from brian, and i believe it was the sequence that we were in. >> and the sequence you were in was displacement -- there had been cementing, correct? >> after the flow. after the balance plug, start displacing out, at that point.

>> and then you were going to do the lockdown sleeve? >> and then we would do the lead impression tool and then the lockdown sleeve. >> and did you have any discussions with anyone about why that sequence of events was chosen? >> i asked, "why couldn't we go ahead and do this in mud," and i can't even, i can't tell you who i was having the discussion with, but it wasn't going to happen, we were going to go through in the sequence that we were given. >> so whoever you were talking to just said, this is the way it's going to be done, period? >> pretty much. >> did they say to you, "well, why are you asking us that, ross, what difference does it make?" >> no, i haven't, i haven't been challenged on some of the questions that i might come up with, but i am selective on some of the questions. i might give a little more

study before i ask them. >> who's the person, who was the person on the deepwater horizon that you were most likely to bring that question to? was it brian? >> well, i -- brian was approachable. we discussed things; we would talk. you don't want to just -- when the well site leaders are having discussion, handovers or with their logistics, you don't want to just interrupt in another man's chain of thought, so you'll go to the next one. >> so was it likely brian? >> it was likely brian that i would have been having this discussion with. >> you said brian was pretty approachable and seemed to always want to be helpful, right? >> i found him that way, as little as i know him, but that's the way my impression of him is. >> did you find mr. kaluza the same way? >> who? >> mr. kaluza. >> bob, right? >> right.

>> yeah, i found bob and don vidrine both to be approachable and you could discuss things, but finding the time because they were pretty busy this part of it, with the cement job and the casing and the boats coming and going, they were pretty, pretty busy men all through that time of the well, so that's why i did more of my discussions with brian there, just offline. >> you didn't want to interrupt them? >> pretty much. >> did you attend the pretour meeting around 11:30, 12:00, where the day's tasks were going to be discussed? >> i don't recall. >> we're heard tell of perhaps some little argument or disagreement, if you will, between the company man and the oim that appeared perhaps to do

with the negative test procedure. do you recall anything like that? >> no, i don't recall any, any argument going on between the oim and the company man out there. >> do you recall hearing -- >> if they had one, it wasn't in the hallway where i would have been able to hear anything. >> do you recall any, any time when the company man said, "well, my way is the way it's going to be done?" >> no, i have not. >> ok. since you apparently were asking why wasn't the lockdown sleeve going to be set in mud, it's fair to say that you could have gotten enough weight per your requirements if you had set it down in mud, correct? >> no. the weight that i was referring to was the string that we run underneath the tool.

the only, the only concern that i had, drilling fluid versus seawater, was the viscosity in keeping the landing profile clean. that was the only concern i had. there was nothing related to the well or the safety end of it at all. >> all right. have you had occasion, given that you've been on many jobs i know, to observe negative testing before? >> no, ma'am. >> did you see this negative testing? >> no, ma'am, i didn't witness it. >> all right. so the procedure that mr. morel gave you -- and i'm sorry if i'm making you repeat yourself -- it was a reader's digest version of procedures; is that the way i heard it described by you or mr. kohnke? >> that was a comment i made. >> ok. was it multiple pages?

>> yes, it was several pages, but it covered a large area. >> so was it for the test on the rig for that day, or was it just for the lockdown sleeve procedures? >> if i'm remembering correctly, it was, it took in the, the whole casing job all the way through the riser cleaning. >> all right. based on what you read, did you see any deviation from what occurred in what occurred during that day? >> well, when it comes to the drilling end of it, that's not my line, that's not my reason for being there. i'm an old subsea hand, that's my expertise, and the well preparation, the sequence of events, those are not my

decisions to make. i might be able to -- i could have discussion concerning it, but i don't make any decisions in that. >> i understand. i was just wondering if in the reader's digest version of what you were given about what the procedures would be and the sequence in which they would occur would be if you noticed throughout the day that things weren't exactly going as had been set forth in that document? >> oh, no, i didn't see any flags raised or any, any -- i didn't notice any, any stress between the drill crews and the bp side. everything seemed to be moving, and i didn't hear any verbal challenges at any point during that, but i was not in the drilling office either. >> did you hear during the day at any point -- and i'm not talking about arguments between

bp and transocean personnel, i'm really just talking about people expressing concern about, for instance, readings that they're seeing, you know, and they could be doing it jointly, did you see anything like that, any hubbub going on? >> i wasn't involved in it. if there was any, i wasn't involved, and it must not have been going on active enough to even catch my attention, not from where i was sitting. >> you were asked if you had interactions with any schlumberger folks while on the rig? >> i was asked that. >> now, you did know they were on there, right? >> i hadn't, had not paid them any attention, because they usually are on there, so. >> do you know them personally? do you know any -- ok. >> i haven't, i didn't know any of the personnel on there. i'd never set foot on that rig until that 16th, so probably 99 percent of the people out there

i was meeting for the first time. >> since the incident, have you had anybody share with you what they understood occurred and caused the incident? >> asked me that again. >> since the incident, has anyone shared with you what they believed was the cause of the incident? >> no. and i wouldn't have anything to share in respect to that either, because any time you make an accusation, you're accusing someone and it puts a lot of personal blame and burden on that person's shoulders until the investigation's complete. >> all right. i have no further questions. thank you, mr. skidmore. >> yes, ma'am. >> thank you, ma'am. cameron. >> no questions. >> thank you. halliburton. >> thank you, captain. >> sure.

>> good afternoon, mr. skidmore. >> good afternoon. >> how are you, sir? >> fine. >> my name is don godwin, and i represent halliburton. we have not spoken before, have we, sir? >> no, sir, we have not. >> thank you. a little tool or some tools while there on the deepwater horizon. do you recall that, sir? >> i said that i had borrowed some tools? >> yes, sir. >> oh, no. the crossovers you're referring to. >> ok. >> crossovers with, with dril- quip. >> ok. i wrote down where you said that you thought you might have

borrowed those tools, or the tool from halliburton or another company. my question is: were you guessing when you said you thought you might have borrowed them from halliburton? >> no. we definitely salvaged a crossover. i couldn't tell you exactly if it came from halliburton or if it came from another basket out there, because charles, the dril-quip hand, was orchestrating it and he was having discussions with the people. >> ok. >> so it was a known that it had been borrowed. >> right. and what i'm asking you, though, sir, is, when you say possibly halliburton, you're guessing that they're halliburton tools? >> yes, that would have been a guess, because it was gray basket, gray tools that came out. >> thank you very much. >> yes, sir. i see what you were asking. >> thank you. >> thank you, sir.

>> captain, one follow-up. >> well, let me check my list. please. >> thank you. >> mr. skidmore, did you ever mention to someone on the back deck of the bankston, the boat that evacuated you, that at some time prior to the blowout, that you had sent an e- mail to the bp office asking for a snake bite kit? you were overheard saying that. and i want to ask you about that, what that means. >> well, i hate it, but i did. [laughter] >> well, i apologize to have to

ask you, but i knew you had and i wanted to get your explanation. >> yes. and i'm afraid just, just my personality might be causing some conflict with some of it. but this was, this would just be in reference to just oh sorry luck you might be having at the time. >> i understand. >> there was nothing that i would have been referring to that, that i am seeing that's wrong, because if i would have seen something and recognized it as being unsafe or a threat, i would have taken it all the way to town. >> so -- i understand your explanation, but just to be clear for my understanding. you did not actually send an e- mail saying that, this is something you felt and spoke about on the boat? >> yeah. this is, this is just, just more two men talking back there, that it never should have gone

any farther than that. >> i understand. >> but i cannot, to tell you the truth, i cannot remember just, just at what time i might have said that, you know, to someone or what, what we were thinking at the time, because i know that it's, it's probably hard to, hard to believe or understand, but myself and my team, our group, we found it, we found it better to be more talkative instead of finding yourself drifting away to a corner to sit over there and look at your feet. after an experience like that, it's just, keep everybody up, everybody keep talking, 'cause we were isolated, we couldn't call up the house or have any communications for a twenty- four period and, so we were talking.

>> i understand. thank you again. >> yes, sir. >> thank you, sir. mr. skidmore, thank you for your testimony today. are there any question that we didn't ask you, or any information that you would like to provide to us? >> no, sir, i don't have any more information. i just hope i was able to help with some of this. >> yes, sir. thank you. if we need for you to come back in the future, will you make yourself available? >> i believe i would need to, wouldn't i? [laughter] >> thank you, sir. you're dismissed. we'll take a break. thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

>> the senate is back in this morning at 10:00 eastern honoring the life of all ted stevens who is killed in a plane crashed this week. they expect to clear a $600 million border security measure. we spoke to a reporter about this legislation. the senate this coming in for an unexpected session. what we will we see? >> we will seek to centers come in to get a unanimous consent. -- senators come in to get a unanimous consent. >> what will the border security bill do? >> it will fund the troops to

go to the border. it will allow for a couple of unmanned drones to go across the border. it is a reflection of how of legal immigration is really -- has really come to the forefront of the political campaign. both parties want to show they are trying to stop illegal immigration. >> you mention charles schumer. what about republicans? will they be there? >> we do not have any confirmation. and none are retired to -- required to. harry reid said they have the unanimous consent of their caucuses to approve the said security bill. there is no requirement for any republicans to show up to mark a duplex ted stevens died in a plane crash on monday. -- to show up. >> ted stevens died in a plane crashed monday. how will the honor of this?

>> we do not know. senator rakowski is working on it. we have not seen the language of that resolution yet. >> how unusual is it to have this somber session? >> it is unusual. it happened in the past. i believe members came back to approve a resolution dealing with -- about five years ago. it is pretty unusual. now we have had two in one week. >> after finishing a short session, when our senators expected back to washington? they will be here for another four weeks. then they will set their eyes on the midterm election bu. >> ian swanson, i appreciate your time.

>> thanks a lot. >> up next, a conference from the education department on a school bullying. topics on "washington journal" include the budget in the future w futureind energy -- and the future of wind energy. >> "time"magazine contributor it said the view of war as adults is shaped by how we can see if -- how we proceed war -- perceive war. for this the programs of nonfiction authors, visit booktv.org. >> the education department is

looking at ways to reduce bullying in school. next but we will hear a panel of researchers talk about the scope of the bullying problem in public schools. later, we will hear from arne duncan. >> we are delighted that you all are here. we look for to sharing this session. some of the foundational questions came up earlier in your discussions with secretary arne duncan. we hope the panel will be able to answer additional questions that you might want to wrestle with their out your workshops and sessions over the next day and a half. my name is valerie maholmes. i am the director of the national institute of child health and human development.

it is my pleasure to introduce our panelists for this morning. we will be talking about the scope of the problem with respect to bullying. i will introduce our speakers. they will give a brief overview of their topic and then we will have a facilitated discussion and we will finally have time for questions and answers. greta massetti and i have had the pleasure to help shape this session. we afford to engage in with you. i would like to introduce dr. phillip rodkin, an associate professor at the university of illinois at urbana-champaign. he is interested in promoting healthy peer relationship with children and educational settings. his goal is to understand the

development of aggressive behavior and to devise intervention that take account of children's existing social relationships. next i like to introduce sameer hinduja, an associate professor at florida atlantic university. he is a co-director of a cyber- bullying research center. he works nationally and internationally with the public and private sector to reduce the incidence asian -- to reduce the victimization online. he has given training in keynote to a range of audiences. his most recent book is entitled "bullying beyond the school yard ." i would like to introduce dr. catherine bradshaw, an associate

professor in the department of mental health at the john hopkins pull of -- john hopkins school of public health'. she is the co-director of the john hopkins center for the prevention and early intervention. she is a busy woman. her research is stumbling in school climates. -- is a bullying in school climates. but also had susan member who is unfortunately -- we also had susan limber here is sick and not able to attend. i like to bring forward dr. phillip rodkin. >> thank you very much.

it is a privilege to be at this meeting. let us see. how do we move the microphone down? cannot get -- i see. here we go pur. part of what is exciting about this summit is that the history of bullying research is one of tragedy and response of some terrible, awful event happening like whistle and the opening video. we actively, we try to do something. it is the tail waggning thing t. around 30 years ago, there was a situation in scandinavia where three boys committed suicide for many of the reasons that we are well aware, bullying, taunting,

and so forth. the professor who is still very active in scandinavia was commissioned by the government of norway to do a bullying intervention. what is interesting is that he had written a paper from three years before that said abortion is with the most stable behavior's there are -- aggression is when the most stable behaviors there are for people. if you are aggressive at one point in time, you will probably be aggressive nature. it is difficult to change. aggression in children is very hard to change. it is not impossible but really tough. knowing that, he thought that he could still change aggressive behavior in schools or bullying,

that he could distinguish indiscriminate aggression from relationship to see occurring in our schools today. with the mandate of the norwegian government, he instituted a bully prevention program and virtually every school in the country. it involved a lot of monitoring. it involved incredible amount of cooperation and time. it was a very intensive kind of project. in the formulation, he came up with the definition to which has already been referred to on what distinguishes bullying from aggression nevada there -- from aggression. there we go. bullying happens repeatedly over time. it is not reactive. it is intentional and meaningful.

it is an equal power. it does not mean physical power. at times, but you do not need physical strength to believe. it means power. it means control. the paradox of aggressive behavior is that aggressive behavior is botdysfunctional. it also serves a purpose. it is a way a change in someone else's behavior. in school, it is about gaining power and control, not just physical power but social power. this is why the police tend to be more popular -- bullies 10 to be more popular.

bullying is a relationship. with a bully, there is a victim. it is an abusive relationship, and relationship of control, dominance, akin to domestic violence. aggression can be a property of the individual. bullying is a read this issue between the least two people. in the relationship, you look for elements that make their relationship adapted, and not a good, not wahorrible. that is what e start to have to look at, their relationship and to is supporting their relationship. you in the school is stating that this is ok, is encouraging

relationships that are in moral? the social networks at school help make aggression adapted for the bully. what we do is ask kids to name -- not as are you able lee or are you being harassed, but to is bullying whom -- are you bullying or are you being harassed, but who is pulling them? -- bullying them? this the kind of measure we do as a research tactic. on the left, cookie monster. he always thought he was a nice guy. he is bullying elmo.

when you aggregate the responses of all the kids in the classroom, you will know who is of bullying whom. in our work, we cannot tell the teachers and the principal who is bullying whom because of confidentiality reasons. there is no reason why they cannot do this on their own. it bullying is supported, you need to talk to the kids not just informally but in a systematic way. ask the children. you added up together. you know. there is always an issue that it

seems so obvious. how come the teachers did not see this? how come the principal did not see this? the answer is usually because they did not ask or what to know. 50 or 60 years ago, as part of education curriculum, teachers were instructed to do so seal metric -- soci-metric tasks, as the children who do like most, who do you like least, and use that information to make it work. teachers do not do that anymore. they are too concerned about standardized tests. they have a dualism between academic learning and the morals their children are learning.

they should do it. it will not take that long. when we use this measure, we find something that is interesting. among elementary school kids, third, fourth, fifth grade, there are a lot of voice warbling girls, almost half. -- there are a lot of boys who are bullying and girls, almost half. we have. boys -- we have many boys who are pulling girls. this also brings up other ideas. if you do not connect to the lines, if you do not see the relationship that is fair. that is so troubling. in it is a relationship of dominance and control, an abusive relationship.

interventions do not as a bit of the aggressive trumpets aggressive -- does not just look at how aggressive child gets aggressive, you look for bullying in the school. you have to track children's relationships. you have to understand what the society of children is like at your very own school in an informal way. what this the dynamic look like? all the testing will not overcome the moral issue of bullying and that was put so well by the secretary in the opening video. when it comes down to it, schools that to be a place that is welcoming for all children. parents have to support that

norm even if some of them do not. you do not put yourself up by putting someone else down. when that message gets across to kids and adults and we watch it in the schools, bullying will diminish. thanks. [applause] >> good morning. it is an honor to be here.

we define it cyber bullying as willful and repeated harm inflicted their cell phones and other electronic devices. repetition is also involved. children have embraced computers and the internet. we see cyber bullying dictated through children's iphones. approximately 30% have been victims. it depends if you are asking them over the last 30 days or over the lifetime. there are a number of nuances that affect that percentage.

in our most recent data collection, we found that about 215 of youth have been victims -- 21% of you have been victims. -- youth have been victims. one out of every five the youth that you know is being a jerk to someone on-line. this is being played out with continuous days. the girls are more likely to be involved in cyber bullying as victims or offenders. it makes sense to us. cyber bullying is more verbal. we are seeing an involvement tends to peak during middle school. that is not without exception. we think about elementary school

being about aptitude testing. we think about high school where you are getting more self- confidence and extracurricular activities. for me, middle school was the worst. i was concerned about what everyone thought about me. it devastated me when individuals were starting rumors and making fun of me. it tended to internalize the harm at that age. most victims think they know who the cyber belleek -- bully is. we think about stranger danger, but that is not the case woman talk about cyber bullying. there is a number of competent researchers who are focusing on this problem. there is definite physical

consequences. research has pointed out headaches and of donald payne, psychosomatic consequences -- and abdominal pain, psychosomatic consequences. we are also seeing emotional consequences like frustration, sadness, and fear. youth have not developed a positive coping skills as well as adults. they have not developed resiliency mechanisms. moving on to psychological consequence. we identified a big between cyber bullying and self-esteem. we went to see which came first, lower self-esteem or a fiber bullying. -- cyber bullying.

victims of cyber blink contemplate suicide more often and engage in suicide more often. it is the ability to succeed in social reactions many of us have gotten to where we are because we have developed the ability to succeed over time. then there are behavioral consequences. those who had been victimized in cyberspace tend to be victimized in the real world. the liquid to in violence have been tied into this. -- >> links to violence have been tied into this. the department of education is huge on formal assessments on

educators and students. we have created an online research structure. there are encouraged online methodologies for this. there is a lame way to get a printed kids. there is also an acceptable and relevant way to get the message across about acceptable peer relationships. i know the real focus in on climate for a good portion of the specific couple of days. it is very big. students think that teachers are in their corner. it is all tied into a positive school climates. we talked about getting older youth into younger youth.

they can create psa's on youtube or have an awareness or pledge campaign. it is important to focus in on special populations. i am interested of youth on the autism spectrum. they gravitate online because of their social means. it is important to note the influence of peers. if your peers aside verbally -- cyber bully, you have more of a chance, too. this is not something we can

relate to cyber space. it is connecting them to the real world. i will be chatting with you and brainstorming with you and figuring out an action plan. [applause] >> it is quite an honor to be here today. thank you very much. i will start off my top and then move on to susan limber's top. research factors often drawn the frameworks. we have applied it to bullying.

the context includes social as less physical aspects of the environment which influenced those involved and the impact of bullying on outcomes. there is increased interest in the link between bullying and school climates. the students involved in bullying have less able opinions of the school. bystanders are also negatively affected by bullying. researchers have identified social factors that it treated to a culture of -- that contribute to a culture of bullying. the aggression becomes the norm.

classrooms have higher rates of bullying and aggressive behavior. the risk for retaliation is very great within this context. when it comes to assessing the school climates, there are often discrepant views between students, staff, and parents, making it difficult to get a clear picture. a recent american this debate on the staff members under estimated the prevalence of bullying. they are concerned about the impact. students thought staff were unaware of bullying and did not intervene effectively. when we asked staff, 97% said they had effective strategies and that they rarely made situations worse when they intervened. this highlights the discordance between the way students and staff are viewing the situation.

there is little work that is focused on the parents' perception of bullying. they generally under estimate the emotional and physical harm. they share concerns regarding fiscal climate especially the high school level -- the school climates, especially the high school level. about five% parents when the truck reported it to them did not do anything. we want parents to help them cope and support their children. we need to be careful not to model aggressive responses or encourage retaliatory behavior to the students. some of our study showed that

parents are even coaching their children's to fight back. we have a man who is been really instrumental in violence and attitudes toward retaliation and how some are formed in the home and carried out into the school. that is a really important target. it could send mixed messages about the aggressive retaliation. there are important developmental differences and halston and to respond to your bullying. younger children are more likely to contact their children or parents. teenager's turn to their peers are handle it themselves. this highlights the importance of apparent focus for younger children. a common approach is the tiered

public health model. the public health approach to prevention includes a universal system that affect all students within a defined community or setting. that is depicted here in the green zone of the triangle. it targets a subgroup of actress students. a third level support indicated involvement of students for thei. they applied this type of model. these efforts can be implemented at multiple levels within the child psychology, including individual students. they use lessons to foster

social and emotional skills. a recent analysis of social learning programs conducted highlight the significant impact of social learning programs and student academic and behavior outcomes. effective classroom management is a critical piece of the equation. there is a research documenting school efforts that set a common set of expectations and involves all prevention activities. effective supervision is an essential element. families play a critical role in this process by promoting a context that promotes child disclosure.

the three tiered public health from work connects bullying prevention with other programs to prevent behavioral and academic problems. it sometimes seem like more is better. that is not always the case. schools are doing about 14 violence prevention or other types of programs to promote a safe and supportive environment. this can be overwhelming for staff, and thereby leaving support. there is a seamless system of support that is coordinated with high fidelity and implemented across fiscal context. although it is tempting to latch onto a new program, we recommended developing a comprehensive and long-term prevention plan which addresses multiples to the concerns through a set of integrated programs and services.

the triangle helped up the help us -- the trial helps us implement programs that foster multiple competencies. in to help the news it appropriately. she has been sick over the past few days. she did send her slide and some notes that i working from in terms of today's presentation. is important here is the role of policy. the state of georgia it was the first to codify requirements for schools to redress bullying -- to address bullying.

43 states have addressed bullying in schools. some provide no definition of bullying at all. the typically require state or local officials to enforce policies against bullying, but there is considerable variability. most recommend procedures for recording bullying incidents. most policies highlight the importance of discipline for students in training for school staff. quite a few requires state department to develop proposed model policies that can be emulated on the local level. relatively few states require implementation for programs. limber and her colleagues have

developed a series of practices that are based on existing prevention programs from educators. one focuses on misdirection. they may do more harm than good and are important to take note of. they mandate suspicion for children who knebully. such policies also discourages students or staff from reporting policbullies. bullies have a problem too. children who bully are in need of an intervention to stop their

inappropriate behavior. conflict resolution is also used to prevent bullying. it may do more harm than good. conflict assumes there is a disagreement to be resolved. bullying it abuse. it is to be stopped rather than treated as a disagreement. research highlights the importance and potential roles fort deviant training. the contagion practice occurs. the bullies learn from each other. short-term solutions are not sufficient. changing sure shall -- social norms is a time intensive activity.

they would not be able to produce sustainable changes. they have identified a set of 10 principles for best practices. the first one bill on the social and ecological framework. the second one emphasizes the role of data. i feel strongly about the role of data from parents as well as staff to get a full perspective on the set to ration. they can be helpful to help them own the problem. another is based on a teenage base for the nation. -- based integration. the often include students at

the high school level and parents and a diverse set of teachers. training is critical, especially about how the policies in the building and how to increase supervision in the hot spot. they should receive training about how to intervene consistently and be rewarded and reinforced when they do intervene. challenges include finding class time to actually do some of this stuff. that is always a challenge. it suggests that spending 20 or 30 minutes on a weekly basis reviewing some of the issues is a very important thing. when you are looking at curriculum based activities, it might be two or three times a week your needing to spend the time. we need to ask teachers to spend a three or five-year commitment to implement the program.

having the leadership say they would give a program a try for a number of years is very important. sometimes these programs take a while to take effect. change will not occur overnight aboard a -- overnight. a series of analysis have been conducted of the past six years examining the extent to which particular mottoes have an impact on bullying. the findings of the studies have been mixed. some suggest certain models are affected. others conclude that the effects are very limited. one examines the impact of 14 bullying programs. it concluded the programs produce a reasonable rate of return on investment. that is not good enough. we need to have a stronger commitment to producing sound

research in this area. another rigorous study was conducted more recently. it reviewed over 30 programs. they concluded that programs can be successful. if they expect a very by the actual activities and implementation. further rigorous research is needed on bowling prevention programs to determine their effectiveness and thfirst -- effectiveness. they need to determine which programs are critical for success and factors that are important in predicting program implementation. thank you.

>> my name is greta massetti. we will move to audience questions. what is the next step for research? if you had it your disposal research funding, what would you invest it in? >> the next step is to talk to kids about bullying and to is bullying in their classroom. that is the next step. and to develop technologies that are already existing to have it explained in a simple way.

if you are talking about bullying in a school based setting. the next up is to ask is what is going on in their school. the second step is to see it there are really talk bullying prevention programs that are effective. it is less than meets the eye unfortunately in terms of programs that work. that does not mean there are not programs that are working. it means that we do not know about them. we are not formulized them in a way we can understand if they work and why they work. i think bullying prevention,

people want to say that their products are affected. there is a great joke among all of this that they are affect ive. talk to kids. try to find out what works. >> of like to echo what he said. >> i think there are a number of programs that have been developed. some have been thoroughly developed and we do not have the resources to test them in the wake of the need to be tested with large enough sample citing. the assignment is that the school level. the need to have trials of 50 or more schools. one topic is not only relying on students reports but also during

observational data collection, peer nominations, or staff reports. having a more comprehensive assessment system with in the trials. >> if there is a third thing, it is teacher and cluster management ability. -- classroom management ability. anyone who is involved with kids. let's just say teachers. we all know that some teachers teaching a class, it is about establishing a dynamic. it is about to establishing a

social atmosphere and letting it get out of control. when you have second grade teachers to bring down in tears in their classroom because kids are shouting at them, that is not a teacher who can manage her classroom. a classroom is a society. it is a small society of 20 or 30 kids. how do you manage this the first group of children? the kids are not just 20 kids is sitting in a row in desks. they are kids who are connected, networked, half relationships, positive relationships,negative relationships. does the teacher knows that? what we are working on now is watching teachers in the classroom and outside the

classroom. which teachers are doing what that tells promote a positive social atmosphere in the classroom the get go so they do not lose control? focusing on the adults in the school would be a third important thing. >> are there questions from the audience? >> [inaudible] i and the author of a book. it is on the first books to expose psychological aggression among girls. i do a lot of public work on this issue. dr. rodkin, i found remarkable that your slides said girls were

bullying boys 8% of the time. how are you defining bullying? i wrote my book because they bullying -- because the definition of bullying or not including psychological aggression. >> you make an excellent point about blatant aggression and hoehling -- bullying among girls. intentional, chronic, and in balance of power. -- imbalance of power. the kids ignore that. they figure it out themselves. when asked kids who bullying who

whois bullying whom, they tend o pick out the boys. >> they will name said they have already been told. it is important that our kids make sure they understand. i am sorry to interrupt. if you ask them to name what bullying, they will reflect back what the kolter is telling them bullying -- what the culture is telling them bullying is. >> i agree with the substance of your point. the measure that we can and what kid in to report is the bullying among girls. what i agree with less is that

in asking the question we are reinforcing the rolls for bullying. what we are asking, who seems to be a bully? when we ask the question, we have four pages. our boys who bully other boys? girl boy? girl-girl? >> who is giving the silent treatment? my point is that kids defined bullying in a very narrow way. it is part of our task to teach

everyone that the word "bully" is not attuned to the range of how kids relate to each other. there are all kinds of cyber cruelties that kids themselves cannot understand. that is all i am saying. the behavior is really need to be part of the research. i do not believe that e8% of girls are baleebullying. >> we have perhaps a comment. >> we talk about aggressions that do not give a definition. we can talk for years about this kind of stuff. there are many of us that a look

at these social aggression that are really focused on what are the dynamics across gender. there was a recent analysis conducted at the university of arizona that showed very clearly that boys and girls do not differ across this notion of relational and social aggression. the process is different. the outcomes are more severe for girls. we need to focus on the fact that there are many very aggressive growth. i work in the chicago public schools. the girls are scarier than the boys. begin not the fifth these girls are just spreading rumors and excluding each other -- we cannot just think that these girls are spreading rumors and excluding each other. we need to consider this and our provincial -- prevention program. it plays