somewhat threats that you see in the world. what are the key thing to put the money into? >> the services get to keep the savings they find. my intention is to take the other savings and provide those also to the services. in other words, the defense agencies, osb and so on--the savings we find there, they will get to keep. our intent to -- is to take that money in provided to the services. i used an example earlier. i think everybody realizes that we probably need more money in shipbuilding. that would be an area that i would certainly look to when it comes to the navy, in terms of not only letting them keep the

money they identify for the purpose, but, perhaps, if i could provide additional resources. >> is this for preparing for the next wars? >> what i am trying -- we have had this conversation before. i confess that i get a little impatient that everything is about providing for today's wars. out of the overall procurement budget, about half goes for modernization programs -- the joint strike fighter, the new ballistic missile submarine, new ships, the tanker, the next- generation -- ranged strike -- the newnge strike, ground vehicle combat program for the army. half of the procurement program

goes for those modernization programs. about 40% goes to things that are used in the spectrum of conflict. about 10% is for the wars that we are in. the cost of the wars we are in is fundamentally paid by the overseas contingency operating fund and by supplementals. this is not about finding money for the wars we are in today. we have that money. it is about protecting money for the future. >> can you -- when you talk about producing intelligent contracts -- are you concerned about the redundancy implications on military and civilian sides? >> it is hard for me to believe that, in these different elements -- the services, the defense agencies, the combat and command in theater, that there

are not redundancies and duplications. it has grown by leaps and bounds over the past decade. i read about that in the "washington post." i think the thing that people have not focused on -- it was just not about terrorism and the war and terror. a lot of it was the intelligence requirement to fight these wars that we're in in iraq and afghanistan. i think -- i do not think anybody has stepped back and looked at all of this in a very long time, if ever. i cannot remember it being done. jim clapper does it on the national side. if we do is side-by-side, there are almost certainly savings to be found. what i'm really after our people -- not to fire people, but rather the reverse -- to put people who may be doing or redundant jobs here in the u.s.

or at combat and command -- if we're short intelligence specialists in afghanistan, to cover those short comings or shortfalls in staffing in afghanistan with some of the savings we find in people who are not in theater. leaving aside the money and the people, it is just hard for me to imagine that come in these big organizations, there is not a lot of duplication. >> you mentioned the joint forces command. what will happen to general odierno? >> i talked to general odierno about this. he supports the decision to eliminate jfcom. as i indicated in my remarks, i expect it will take about a year to carry out this change. and i have told ray that is --

his assigment in jfcom -- his assignment in jfcom was the same as his assignment in iraq -- to work himself out of the job. >> he did not mention medical costs. how much longer can we see these growing costs before those costs have to be passed on in terms of increased premiums for coverage? >> yesterday. health care reform is on my agenda, as are -- some of these efforts are part of the third track i was talking about that grew out of the qdr and the other reviews. we have studies going on now, as i said, that will help shape our fy 2012 submissions. they involve logistics, health care and personnel policy, more

restructuring and organizational changes, continued acquisition reform. i think it is safe to say that, as far as i'm concerned in this effort, there are no sacred cows. health care cannot be e xcepted. everybody knows we're being eaten alive by health care. i believe there is a growing understanding on the hill about this. it cost us $19 million in -- billion dollars in 2000 and 2001. it will process about $65 billion in fiscal year 2010. -- 2015. when the top-line is growing at 15%, it is not sustainable. it has to be part of our effort. >> you are not exactly working yourself out of a job by coming up with all these initiatives.

can you make a decision about how long you're going to stay? publicly, you are still committed to the end of this year. >> first of all, it is important to stress that i believe this is not just about me. i believe the service secretaries, the chiefs, the comptroller, the director -- i believe the senior leadership of this department, in this administration, is committed to all of these activities. admiral mullen, general cartwright -- very supportive. they're doing some things in the joint staff that are even more far-reaching and some of the things i have talked about. so i think that there is broad support in the leadership -- and, of course, the deputy who

will end up manages been -- managing this thing on a day-to- day basis. all of the the art and, from the deputy chairman and down, it is supportive of this -- all of the department, from the deputy chairman and down, it is supportive of this. the president and congress are committed to it. i drink a lot of this will continue. as far as i am concerned -- i think a lot of this will continue. as far as i am concerned, i will be here longer than either i or others thought. >> mr. secretary, these are major changes you are discussing. to what extent are they just the tip of the iceberg of what you have planned? do you see what you are -- do you see a further need for tightening between the osb and the -- osd and the joint

staff and eliminating other commands? >> this is a dynamic process and i expected to continue. this is not the work of one year or one budget cycle. i would not necessarily describe it as the tip of the iceberg. if 90% of the iceberg is under water, then that is a pretty good percentage of it, but not all. we have four tracks under way. the services are thinking about some pretty dramatic things. the are not ready to talk about it. they have not made decisions yet, but the kind of options they are looking at is impressive. i think that there is -- this will be an ongoing process. we will learn as we go along. as we get into these things, do these things with short

deadlines, we will learn some things that will give us future opportunities or targets -- whatever you want to call them. i think we have to keep after it. last question. >> you mentioned reports and the qdr. there was our recent report which sparked discussion about the value of it. it sounds like, even though it is congressionally mandated, it is the kind of thing that may be a place to look for cost- cutting. >> i actually think that the qdr has a value. i think that the outside -- and what i told them is that i think the outside review of the qdr, if you will, actually would be better before the qdr is written -- to have them to

assess the world and the kind of agenda that the qdr looks at. then it can actually in form the preparation -- inform the preparation of the qdr with an outside qdr -- with an outside perspective. having it come afterward is of limited value because the qdr is done, printed, and people are doing all kinds of things with it. i think the qdr is one of those that does have value, but i think the outside review would better be done at the front-end of the process. thank you, all. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> hear you are, senator. not a bad desk, either. daniel webster used to use it. >> daniel webster sat here? >> harry truman he did this movie. he just really despised it.

at the time, harry truman was seen as the senator from the prendergast machine in kansas city. i always wonder if he did not think, at that point, that the movie was looking at him and his relationship with the political machine back home. >> senate historian donald ritchie tonight on c-span's "q&a." monday, secretary of state hillary clinton delivers a speech on the global health initiative -- the centerpiece of the obama administration's foreign policy and an expression of u.s. lawyers and leadership in the world. secretary clinton will be inscribed -- will describe core principles and calls on borman's -- governments, organizations, and individuals in delivering sustainable services to more people in more places. live coverage is monday at 11:30

a.m. eastern on c-span. >> the american red cross hosted a daylong conference on thursday on the use of the internet and social media in emergency communications. speakers included the fema administrator of craig fugate. this portion of the conference is about one hour, 10 minutes. >> it i can get everybody back in their seats, we will get started with the next portion of the program.

as we have seen from this morning's panel, which were all fantastic -- the buzz on twitter has made us a trending topic in the area. good conversation is going on out there. the challenge of capturing and organizing social data during emergencies is felt in a lot of different places in the online community. if the government -- at the government level, there are a lot of people in organizations who are looking for solutions. one of those taking the lead is the federal emergency management agency. at the tip of the spear, you will find fema administrator fugate. he began serving as a minister in 2009. prior to that, he served as the director of the florida division of emergency management, where he coordinated disaster response, recovery, mitigation, and prepared this efforts with

each of the state's 67 counties and local governments. he's a prolific tweeter. you can find him @craigatfema. please welcome administrator craig fugate. [applause] >> i'm going to take a different tact. i can tell you this is not the demographic and i am trying to reach -- demographic i am trying to reach. [laughter] sometimes we become so in love with our tools and process we forget why we are talking about them in the first place -- that is changing outcomes. it is always felt good to have a common lexicon. if you, administrator fugate, i feel like i am raising my hand. i go by craig. victims are the ones we lost. the rest of them are survivors.

there is a reason why i make that distinction. the public's of resources, not a liability. -- the public is a resource, not a liability. if you look at what we do in disaster response -- i can see from the patches and the logo wear a variety of organizations that provide direct services to survivors -- there is a tendency, from my profession, to look at the public as somebody we must take care of, we must guide, we must direct, we must help. it is like this or redoing of everything. in never starts with the assumption that perhaps the public has a greater role in this, not so much that they can take care of themselves, but they are actually every source. i realize that i am now age- challenged. in one of our famous -- when i held up my phone and said this is now a tri-quarter and he did

not know what i was talking about because he never saw "star trek" back in the 1960's -- and this is a data center. the proliferation of this data center and these throughout the world means that, when disaster strikes, oftentimes the first information coming out could be attacked, phone call, video, picture -- a text, phone call, video, picture. it is going to come from someone who is not a car-terrifying, certified, blessed person -- card-carrying, certified, blessed person, approved to take care of people. information may be seen as suspect, they may be seen as someone trying to spook the system. if you are shooting a video of your house burned down in an area where there are fires, that is good enough for me. especially if you have three

people shooting it from different angles. that is a pretty big hoax to pull on the system. 15 minutes or less -- what am i going to talk about? do not focus on the technology, the tools, or all of the gizmos. focus on what the outcome we are trying to achieve is. understand, these are merely tools. there is a danger that we lose sight, in trying to perfect the use of technology, we forget why we were trying to use it in the first place. social media's biggest power, as i see it, is to empower the public as a resource, as part of the team, not as victims that must be taken care of. [applause] so, when i looked out across the room, and you guys that are tweeting and typing as fast as you can -- in an air-conditioned

room with light and connectivity. how do we translate that into how to best deploy these tools to empower the public? in most disasters and most emergencies, when you going through all the reports and the data, you actually got to those survivors -- who actually got to those survivors first? other survivors, neighbors, bystanders, family members. we often talk about the response and responders -- we call it the government-centered approach to problem-solving and we forget that disasters do not get government, they hit communities. it took us awhile to get people to understand that the government-centered approach is not going to be really successful if we do not embrace the volunteer and community groups as part of the team. then we got smart and realized, you know, last time i checked, we hear not really good at doing food distribution or

setting up bowater systems or other things. there are other folks who do it every day, called the private sector. in many cases, they have a better, more elegant solution. we have to change the conversation to what can we do to get you open, instead of setting up a parallel systems. it is getting people understanding this dynamic of disasters is one that government has an important role, but so does the volunteer, faith-based community, who often times may not have disasters as the core mission, but they have the capabilities to plug in, but have not been socialized to do this. how'd we plug them in? the private sector -- i love this term "public-private partnership." let's talk about team. we ought to figure out how we leverage both the government and

the private sector resources to change outcomes, effectively working as a team, not merely something that is a contractual relationship where we are buying services or we have some high- level we are talking with nothing happening. we're not figuring out how to get things done. fourth part of this team -- we're using social media. ok, everybody loves their buzzwords. a lot of that is data. what is data? think about it. think of all the data out there. what do they have to do with data to make it useful? they have to put it in context, right? they have to personalize. it has become actionable. data, by itself, is not changing anything. we're talking about the social data summit. what are we trying to do? i come back to this term -- public information, data, let's talk instead about knowledge.

if people don't understand what it means, they cannot take and personalize that to make the best decision and the best outcomes -- we cannot possibly tell everybody everything they need to do with the precision that will give them the best outcome. we can tell them and give them that information that we have in such a way that is not translated into knowledge to be able to act -- that is now translated into the knowledge to be able to act. with all of the variety and variables, we cannot have a visibility of them all. i look at these tools as just that. the goal here, to me, does not really change. how do we minimize the impact of those things that we know a lot about -- severe weather, floods, hurricanes. we know a little bit about those -- like h1n1.

there are those that we do not have any warning of before it happens, such as a terrorist attack or other type of threat that we may not be familiar with. i could give you some fun ones -- a near-orbiting objects. name your poison and i probably have somebody working on the scenario for it. here is my challenge. don't look at the glitz, glamour, and the flashiest of the technology as -- flashiness of the technology. it is another way to empower the public to have greater ownership and understand the roles and responsibilities they have, and to provide the knowledge so they can make the best possible decision for them and their families and a time of crisis, and empower them to help each other and their neighbors while we focus on the things we

do best -- helping make a community safe, rescuing the injured and trapped, and beginning the process of moving towards recovery. this is not appalled bought -- this is not an acknowledgement that the public are abandoned to themselves. far too many people should have been prepared or not. that forces people to compete for scarce resources in the aftermath of the disaster. we have a responsibility and role to being prepared. we can play a greater role in the response in our communities. technology is a tool to empower the public. we need to look at from the standpoint of, are we really changing that all come, or are we -- that outcome, or we just introducing more noise into the system? thank you. [applause]

that i think you are finished. -- >> i think you are finished. ok. do you have time for a couple of questions? i do not want to put you on the spot. ok. let's go ahead and take a couple of questions from the audience. >> yes, ma'am. >> i was working in close a vote kosovo in- in co 1999. sometimes, we need to have historical memory -- institutional and historical memory. in macedonia -- they had taken in the refugees during the crisis. i was doing a project, looking at what international ngos were doing in macedonia after the

crisis. the issue comes up again and again about organizations and everybody wants their piece of pie, even if there is duplication. you sound like a very down-to- earth guy. since this is an issue of human nature, how do we deal with this thing of trying to get organizations to cooperate? i think the technology can help, but what do we do to get groups to not duplicate services and efforts? thank you. >> there is an old saying from someone who worked -- the department of secretary -- suburban the transportation secretary of florida said this. the first thing you do is check your egos and the logo at the door. the second thing is, all organizations have strengths and weaknesses. the tendency is that we try to be all things to all people, because we do not want to appear weak or that we do not have capabilities. that is a disservice to the

people that depend upon us. in the situations i have found myself in -- i will give you an example. in the aftermath of hurricane wilma, we were dealing with the tremendous power outage. one mission we had was to feed 100,000 hot meals per day. no organization had that capability. we had been working and building a safe place or we could bring people the other so that it focused on their strengths -- where we could bring people together so they could focus on their strengths and be successful in what they were good at. if i leave anybody out -- we had the southern baptists, the methodist men, the red cross, the submission army -- salvation army -- we had about 10 trailers cooking. we had make -- we have the red cross making deliveries to

community centers and salvation army's vehicles. the red cross is not meant to be the permanent press is -- presence. the salvation army could keep the coffee and cold drinks going. the red cross -- the salvation army was not trying to figure out how to resupply. what was great is that nobody had total ownership of the process, but everybody was successful. we were turning out 100,000 hot meals per day about two good days after the storm hit. most people could not figure out how we were doing it. the organizations said what they were good at and what they could bring to the table. that is and we have seen in haiti and other places. -- that is something we have seen in haiti and other places. if we can start bringing in core competencies and utilize our

talents and techniques to get to an outcome, working as a team, you can leverage very quickly. it means you have to give up some autonomy. this is inherently, for some organizations, difficult -- to except that they may have to depend on other organizations for their success. -- to accept that they may have to depend on other organizations for their success. it means that you have to be willing to say, i cannot do this alone. i have to park their -- partner. what am i really good at? then you look at who can address the other areas. it will not happen overnight. in this town, it is a huge challenge, even within the federal family. we have a president who says, when our neighbor is hit, we are all in. he means all-in. we're finding a way to work as a

cohesive, federal team, versus a collection of agencies. again, as we build that team on the federal side, we need to continue to build the other parts of the team. >> we have one more, maybe two. >> my name is molly. so much of what we do with our clients is trying to broker in strengthen public-private partnerships. many are in the area of this rut -- a disaster response. you mentioned the impact these could have. what is the biggest opportunity for the business community to partner with you, and where you think the greatest need is? >> do not treated as a social obligation. it is a bottom-line issue. any corporation that has shareholders who says we're going to do this because it is the right thing to do is crazy. it is not sustainable.

it may buy some good media picked it is not sustainable. until you demonstrate that a communities resiliency and the ability to recover is a bottom- line issue for business, i do not care how good your pr is, if you do not have customers utilizing your services, products, or shopping or stores -- i do not care how much you did to help, you failed. it is not about it feels good, it is the right thing to do. it is the bottom line thing to the corporations did ask the businesses that spent a fortune in katrina to get stores open -- it is the bottom line. asked the businesses that spent a fortune in katrina to get stores open. they have a stake in this as well. they expect government to solve these problems and set the stage for their successful recovery. we are going, no, you have a big

stake in this as well. when did you go to the city and county commission and advocate why they need stronger mitigation methods? where were you when we talked about temporary strategies for housing for the customers and work force you're going to need? you just cannot plan in one small piece of this and then think a couple of goodwill gestures will buy what you need to be successful. if the committee fails and does not recover, your bottom line is affected. >> one more. >> hello, sir. i joined citizen corps right after 9/11. there was a wonderful program given by fema called search. i'm requesting from every person i know that we get it moved back into fema. we need to get our country back out there and to training that. it is 99-to-one -- professional

responders are 1%. we know it is going to be citizens working together. we have a great program. we have to get it back into the lead. it needs to happen under fema. >> you want that to be back under fema? done. [laughter] it was done and to the post- katrina reform act. -- under the post-katrina reform act. when we do sert training, we immediately get the question, what is next? we're looking at increasing the relevancy of this for young adults and high school students, looking at some of the youth programs. are there ways we can take the train and breakdown? a lot of groups have said this is really great, but the attention span of our audience will not get you there. if we could give you two or four hours, what could you give us in that time that would help empower and train people, not

necessarily to the level of a sert team, but we could use some of the tools, techniques, and information? finally, not necessarily looking at sert, but looking at the concept. there are great tools that the red cross and others have built for children in public schools and private schools to begin the process early. but it is not consistent across the country. there are areas of excellence and areas where it has not happened. we know that, if you're not talking to different groups, particularly focusing on children when they are willing and impressible on these issues, it is hard to come and afterward as adults and talk about these things. we're looking at a variety of things. it was actually move back in before i got there. we're reenergize in some of that. we're going to put more emphasis on the sert programs

themselves, and also address youth, children. we're trying to ask the question that we run into -- after you have taken the train, what is next? that builds the demand for more training. the program was not built for that. we're trying to figure out what is the best strategy there. we do that and then -- here is the problem. you take the training, you do not have a disaster. people say, i took this training. we do not have a disaster. that is actually good. [laughter] red cross runs into the same thing. there is a limited audience that will train contained provisions these and skills -- train and maintain proficiencies and skills in the absence of a disaster threat. when there is a threat or something has happened, but

short-term things that need to be taught -- the only time they may pay attention is when the events are occurring. we talk about communication, all that stuff. we can teach people how to stay alive. how many people have been breaking down key steps in the characters? think about it. if you have a post-disaster environment where you have broken infrastructure, contaminated water, a lot of things going on, and you can get communications out, but you are limited. people are trying to figure out what they need to do to stay alive. have we looked at the social media piece of this where we have the connectivity to get it out to them in manageable chunks? are we going to send them to web page to download the pds -- a pdf file on their phone, which is the only thing that is

working? my first cup of coffee this morning. now, i shall depart. they are dragging me off. i have to go. have fun. [applause] >> thank you, administrator. as we heard in our earlier presentations, more people than ever are reaching out for help through social media. a public executions of our response community are very high -- the public expectations of our response community are very high. it is often the government that answers those calls. we have a group of people from all levels of government who will talk about the solutions they are bringing to this issue in their own communities and on the national level, and the international level, too. i would like to introduce the moderator, in morris from federal news radio. jeremy heidt from the tennessee

emergency management agency. merni fitzgerald, public affairs director for fairfax county, virginia. jack holt. noel dickover with the state department and a co-founder of a crisis agency. >> at federal news radio, we have been falling how departments and agencies are trying to meet and overcome these challenges -- talking

about how departments and agencies are trying to meet and overcome these challenges. one recurring theme is that it is not easy. it is the wild west out there. very briefly, this morning, there was a thunderstorm. perhaps you heard. it was horrible -- anarchy. it was awful. seriously, it was like to 0.5 inches of rain in a half an hour -- like 2.5 inches of rain in a half an hour. we're learning about power lines, metro lines, flooded roads. still, gridlock this morning. the problem is, as a journalist, when i see this come up on twitter, i cannot use it because i have to trained elite that information. i am just a little news monkey. that is my job.

i cannot tell you the red line is single-tracking at silver spring. that will not impact anybody's life, but their commute. i cannot imagine what it is like for you when lives are in the balance and you have to triangulate this information. it is the wild west out there. i'm going to shut up. we have a row, state, and local government represented here -- we have the federal, state, and local government represented here. i'm going to turn it over to noel dickover. >> the question of validation is a great one. i recently experienced haiti. in a crisis, one big problem is that you do not have a valid data. you do not really have great data with which to act. you have these assessment team that an in and work that.

-- that come in and work that. sometimes, other means are necessary. what you saw from the state department response -- the state department is really a conveniener. they bring people together. one organization works with stelco companies -- with telco companies and works to build the social networks to start figuring out how to capture people on the ground with cell phones and to be able to feed the system with some level of data. that did not tie the whole loop. later, you have folks who said, maybe we could use this. you literally had marine battalions that could not deploy without that data.

there is a process of starting with nothing, then getting a body of data to work with, then validating it over time. during that crisis, i was working crisis camps. i spent the entire second week setting up about 13 of these. i got three calls -- one of them at 1:30 in the morning. it was from the folks at apm who were looking for ways to connect and figure out what was there. they had a great system with a lot of stuff that could tie back in, but they did not have data. we took a team of seven open source crisis responders down there to work with them on a hospice -- on the hospital situational awareness data. we went through the open street best map you can use. we took the data sets to make a valid data set. it was a month-long process.

how'd you start with nothing and then get to something valid? -- how do you start with nothing and then get to something valid? but federal government was relying on crowd-source data -. patients who were trapped in buildings. the coast guard would then send in helicopters to rescue them. somebody sends a text. they pick it up. it gets put on line. -- online. it appears to be valid and the first responders react. that is an amazing chain of events. the real question is what that will look like in a few years. >> let's pull it back and go to fairfax county emergency management with the public affairs director there, merni fitzgerald.

the bios are available for everybody. but we have a limited amount of time. take what he said and extrapolate that to the local level. >> fairfax county response worldwide. you have heard of our urban search and rescue group. they were in haiti. we lived in local communities. local government is closest to us. it is true that disaster response is a shared responsibility. i will go over a couple of challenges. fairfax county -- we have a facebook page. we're treating -- tweeting. during snow again -- snowmaggedon -- you do not want to be duplicative. we all have to work together. we want to work with you. i read one tweet that said, in this way, we can work around the government.

i thought, no, let's not work around the government. let's work together. the local government is the people. your local government representatives represent you. let's talk about a couple things. we use the same tools you do, but it is a challenge. one challenge is -- and you can help with this -- the 91 call centers are staffed 24/7. -- 911 call centers are staffed 24/7. those of us who are actively monitoring both traditional and social media -- we do not for get traditional media. -- we do not forget the traditional media. if something happens in the middle of the night, the nine -- 911 center is open for business. how do we get the information to them if we are not monitoring social media? i didn't -- i know you do not want to hear anyone about lack of staff or budget.

the real question is, how do we connect with each other? h1n1 -- you have made extensive use of social media. the vaccine -- there was a shortage. there were huge lines of people trying to get vaccinated. we were live tweeting the vaccination clinics. you can go to this one now. we have a few more doses over here. we tweeted and said, the line is now gone. from our point of view, the line was gone because it was not outside the government center anymore. immediately, we were sent a photograph from the cell phone saying, what do you call this? it was a photo of the absolutely huge line inside the government center building. where you stand depends on where you sit. that is why we have to work together on this. we were putting out one message and it was not quite accurate,

because we all were only looking at part of it. that is why we can use all of your input. we have always had it, but you are using different tools. we have this set of hot lines -- hotlines. we have always actively been looking for input. look at arlington and alexandria counties and the photos of the huge trees that were uprooted. we're using the same tools, whether it is a worldwide disaster or a local event. it is a local first responders -- the police and firefighters -- who are responding to take care of things. >> jeremy heidt is from tennessee myrrh -- tennessee emergency management. you said the local folks deal with the people. tell me about the relationships. relate it to what merni was just telling us about that communication and how it has to work, even if the feedback is not stellar.

>> it is a challenge at the state level, because we're sandwiched between the locals who deal with the people on the ground and the federal government which has a lot of resources. the state has tremendous resources, but is limited in its ability to interface with the public, unless it goes through the local government. i am looking at this slide. i hope i can walk of -- stand and walk around. this picture looks like a parking lot, but that is interstate 24. i was having flashbacks of a flood this morning. we got 22 inches in less than 36 hours. those people were on interstate, driving along, and the water just came up and got them. the people on interstate foregoing, hey, this is flooded -- almost before we knew it was going on. they were sharing that information, getting that information to their folks and families, trying to figure out

where the water was and was not. we developed a social media strategy last year. this was the first test of it, during that flood. we had the opportunity to use twitter and blogs and get some feedback, which was very different from past disasters where we relied on phones. we're using a lot of the tools out there. one challenge is that there is no money for this stuff at the state or local level. you have to leverage funds you get -- but there is nothing dedicated toward this. you have to convince your superiors and your upper-level folks that this is valuable. you have to prove it as a business case. that is very difficult. from this disaster, i think i have a good case for why we need to do this. we experienced a lot of new challenges, but we have a lot of new successes. our website had 42,000 visitors

in just that one month -- way above where we normally are. we were trying to get information about boil water notifications, which roads were to be avoided, where food and water should be shipped. we did a tremendous amount of pushing that stuff out with tweet. we got feedback. we had chosen not to do facebook. we did not know how to manage it or what we were going to do with it. fema said, let's do a joint collaboration. we put together a facebook page. i'm skipping through some pictures. we put in information. every time i go into a room, i said, how many of you searched for or found something about the disaster for someone who was affected? almost everybody raised their

hand. i said, how many of you shared it? everybody raised their hand. i put it on twitter. i put it on facebook. we know we have to challenge ourselves to adopt this, take it, bring it in and spread it with the partnership that we talked about. i know we put out a lot of information. if you do not make it actionable, is it any good? we put out 140 press releases in the last three months since that flood. it does not seem like a lot, at least to me. we had 60,000 people who registered for federal assistance. when you look at how people spread that information, it has a tremendous reach for us. i hope we can learn a couple of different ways to do things. we have adopted things like school -- google voice to help us manage the intake of calls. we're slowly adopting those

kinds of free things. we are trying to work different relationships together. i hope we are succeeding at some levels. some things will not work. we are finding ways that do work. i hope can adopt them and spread them to other states. that is my last slide. >> jack holt with the department of defense. he mentioned managing the intake of information. i would think that the department of defense finds that challenging. it is. -- >> it it is. we got a memorandum from the deputy director of the department. it was about how we saw our place on the internet. was it a fortress to be defended or a field to maneuver? we have chosen the latter. our adversaries and our children are using it as such. there is a lot of efficiency to be gained. we needed to redesign our

systems to give vintage of this. haiti was the first iteration of how to apply some of these things and why it is important. we have been talking about some of the tools and technologies. get to the strategies behind this stuff. the reality is, as in politics, all crises are local. it does not matter where you are. if it is happening on your block, then that is your crisis. you own that. that is one of the issues with the instant command system, one of the things we need to understand how it works and why. from the federal standpoint, that instant command system is not for us to be in charge of, but is to give us the information we need to get resources on the ground to but

that action, to be able to be used -- to put that action, to be able to be used. i do not know if you saw the project in excellence in journalism report in early january on the study they did in the city of baltimore. it was called "how news happens." one of the interesting takeaways -- in the city of baltimore, at that time, they determined that 62% of the news in baltimore for that week or two, was triggered by the government through social media. then it was added to by the local media in the area. that is an important trend that is happening out there and something to be aware of. also, we talk about crisis. i want to take a step back. i have been doing this for about 15-20 years.

i have a lot of experience with the national guard, both in oklahoma, virginia, on deployments, local, the national guard bureau, as well as at the federal level with d.o.d. i want to talk about crisis, but also risk. we leave that part out. what we're doing here is a risk mitigation -- crisis mitigation. this is risk communication. what comes from here will help us in the distribution of resources and a gathering of information, and in the relationships. this will help us in the response to the next crisis. there will be one. the thing about social media it is that, wherever that crisis happens, it is not local for us, but we are all neighbors. how would it -- how do we build the systems? how'd we build the system that we're going to need to actually

-- how do we build the systems that were going to need to actually act in that crisis? we are not the biggest part of this. most of this happens amongst you. it happens with the people who are out there looking at this and deciding how this needs to happen. how do we facilitate communication and relationship to get help on the ground to people who need it when they neede it? it should be very simple. i was in oklahoma city in 1995 when the building was bombed. i noticed an interesting thing about what was happening in that city and the response as to what was happening in that city. within 15 minutes -- the bombing happened at 9:00. at 9:00 in oklahoma city, the helicopters were already out giving reports on traffic. they suddenly turn their cameras toward downtown, the plume of

smoke. it happened in real time on tv. within 15 minutes, the fire chief was down there and had decided where he was going to do is media reports. everybody knew he was want to be there. that was set up. he had been -- done that throughout his risk communication efforts. people knew who to contact and where he was going to be. the cameras were there. everybody was in place. he started giving out information. it remained very simple throughout the crisis. here is what we know. here is what we're doing. here is what we need you to do. he engaged the community from the very first communication -- the very first statement. it was simple things. there has been an explosion downtown. we have all of our rescue units in place. if you do not work downtown -- if you are not a rescue worker

or a medical worker, please do not come downtown. a simple request. don't care who you are -- if you are not medical or rescue, please don't come downtown. the interesting thing was, people pulled over to the side of the road immediately. there responded immediately when he asked them to. each interaction and communication after that, he asked people to engage. a few years later, there was a research done between the community aspect of what happened during the oklahoma city bombing and what happened during the columbine bombings. when take away was that the oklahoma city community started killing immediately because they were helping. everybody had a piece of -- started healing immediately because they were helping.

everybody had a piece of it. the people of columbine will never heal. they never got a piece of it. in the risk communication prior to the crisis, the one thing people want and are desirous of -- they need leadership and a presence there. you may not have the information, but if you are there, that is step one. the other thing they want is direction. what do you want me to do? they want to help. you build that into the risk communication, so that at the point of crisis, you are now managing expectations and your reputation in those expectations. people already know you and they know what to expect. you're now going to work those issues. this is what you are there for. all of that stuff takes place prior to. from a strategic standpoint, those are things to be looking at. i think i said this at the first

crisis camp that i was at. this begins right here, right now. >> that>> that is a good point. we had a lot of folks showing up. use of major organizations looking at engaging with the public in these ways. -- we had major organizations looking at engaging the public in these ways. it was an incredible step forward. >> we have research that says someone in uniform is highly trusted. nowadays, your own community of friends is more trusted because you know who they are. that speaks to the world we're in now as opposed to the world we were in before. we would have the top elected officials like police chief and fire chief out there. people may or may not listen. the same information telling you what to do, managing expectations is going out

through communities of france f -- friends through social networking and media. if your friend tells you to stay off the street -- we know that is true. we had a very cold day. we had to manage expectations and tell people that unless you are willing to be out in the below zero weather for hours at a time, stay away. it was through networks. it was not just because the official people's said it. it was a common message but there were many voices. that is what we like to have. >> living in oklahoma city of the time, that was one of the things i realized about fire chief jon hansen. everyone knew him. he was everywhere. he was a every open house could get to. he was on tv. he was the guy you see on the news at 6:00 in the evening giving you fire tips.

he was well known in the community and trusted. in this environment today, that is why government needs to be in these spaces to help, engage, and become that leadership to help give direction at that point. it all happens right now. >> if you do not fill the credible information gap, it becomes filled by the backing of people who think they might know what they should do. >> exactly. >> in my work with the national guard bureau, donahue is one of the key people working on the study of the time on weapons of mass destruction. a lot of things came from that. one thing he realized and what we tried to teach people is that you have to fill the information gap. if you fill that, it gives you the opportunity to manage. rather than allowing panic to happen. -- if you fill the committee

gives you the opportunity to manage the fear rather than allowing panic to happen. andoes using tortwitter other social media help or does it magnify? does it put people on a level playing field? tell me about it ego issue. >> if you are hearing from fairfax county government, you are hearing from fairfax county. you do not know the people behind the screen. that is important. there does need to be a certain amount of transparency. you are going to hear from fairfax county. we're live tweeting various things and putting them on facebook. it does not matter who is on vacation. you will get information from us. that is very important. everything is local. we know how to play with

everybody else. incident command system is alive and well. despite articles i have read about the elephant in the mix that you cannot use social media at the same time you were working with in the incident command system, that is not true. in some instances, there may be worth it -- work that needs to be done on processes. when it is approved, we will put it out in a million different ways. in 2010, one of the ways we're using is social media. >> egos are the hardest thing to check in the room. at the state level, we try to bring the agencies together to bring the boys to a single point and have all of the information from different agencies coming out of the one final or voice fu -- funnel or voice so that it

has been vetted before we say anything. there is a network of relationships you have to have in place before a disaster. >> it is more complicated than just egos. the people in charge of the disaster are controlling for risk. they are trying to make sure they are not putting out that information. there is a set of concerns. you are overwhelmed. he does get into that. with social media, it is up. mechanism. people can build up mack -- massive reparations from that. one of my favorite pieces of information on haiti is from fairfax county. there must have been people out there saying you have to use map.st. rtereet and they did. ego has a negative connotation,

but it is a far more complex set of issues about whether you applied social media at a command center. >> we have to get over what we typically think of as social media. social media is about relationships and building these relationships. each relationship is a negotiation. you cannot lead if no one will follow. on these platforms, the information you put there and how you communicate is how you will reabe received. it does not matter what your rank is. is your information useful and reliable? that trust builds among people. thatout,ets vented abou is what matters. it does not matter who is there if that is where they're getting the information.

that is the trust placed for the communication. that is where they will go. if they are not trusted, you will never give them. they will let you know. you have to listen as well as speed. >> that is one of the great things about the social networking sites. feedback and self moderation from the public. when someone else pipes up and throws out something that does not mesh with the community understanding, they are quick to say that i know where i got this information from. he came from a credible source. what you are saying does not apply. very self-correcting. i know that was one concern that the chatter would overwhelm the information. it does not. it is very self-correcting. there is a question over there. >> i have a process question for all of you. the example of 9/1 one was mentioned -- 9/11 was mentioned.

are you using facebook in particular as an additional case management or constituent record system in real time? are you responding to a constituent issues immediately? or are you pointing them to other systems and keeping that channel funneled only to one system? >> in a way, it is all of the above. information comes into local government in many ways. we have all kinds of phone numbers. every government employee has an e-mail address. on a regular day, information is coming in many places. to be actionable, it needs to end up someplace. if it is something the 911 call takers need, we pass it on. if it needs to go in the queue because it is a neighbor of the issue in someone's grass is too high, it needs to go in the queue there.

just because we hear from somebody does not mean it is actionable within an hour. it has to line up against what is already there. it might not be the most important thing. we have to triage it. we're getting information from all sorts of sources and getting it where it needs to go. it is not just the public aggregating information and making us aware of it or assuming we will find it. now the media is doing it as well. c click fix is not an emergency. we already have systems to do things in the government. instead of encouraging people to use our system, if you go there, that is how people are now doing it. "the washington post" has used that as their local grape area.

if the information is not coming in ways we are used to, how do we suggest. a lot of this is a challenge about how to adjust and get the information where it can be acted upon. it is just information unless something happens with it. >> we have used it in a couple of ways. during a snow event, we had people stranded on the internet. they were using that information -- that relationship to give the information provided. we were able to provide sandwiches to people stranded on the snow. we did not have snowplows. it was kind of weird. and case management, we run into that with the process we're going through now with recovery. because of privacy concerns, if you cannot do a lot when people say that they have an issue we want to come back to them

privately or offline. it is difficult to have a discussion about a particular situation or medical issue. there are a lot of regulations that prevent us from doing that in a public forum. >> i would submit that is your role. there's never going to be a time that local, federal, state folks will have a room of 300 twitter.andincanning we need to focus on getting situational information quicker. the question is how the crowd can help. how can thises and help the government with that role? the answer is to self organize and figure out what is good. -- how can citizens help the government of that world. the answers to self organize and figure out what is good.

if the public takes on that role and figures out what is essential and does the initial validation, that is where it will come from. there is no way you can levy that on the government. >> it is interesting to hear how people are just putting things out there. i convened standing in the middle of the street saying help, and someone is almost supposed to find me. someone to be working on a different type of network. of timeent a lot teaching our kids about 911 and safety. is the onus all on the government to find this information? are we helping people navigate where the onus is not on the government to provide the assistance?

>> i would hope that if someone street is saying something, it will get around and someone will contact the local government so the person on the street can be helped. part of it is not working. you have to get the word out. the government and others are counting on the network, the community to get the information so that we can find it by either going directly to the first responders or others. if you are standing on the street in fairfax county but do not mention fairfax county, it is possible we might miss it. >> does it change your role with the different tools being used on the immediacy? you have to figure out how to triage it. >> that is what the marine corps found with their intel folks

during haiti. they were scanning local networks looking for information. at the beginning, they did not have access to it. they were looking for whatever they could find. they started finding this information. over theresomebody and see. we have nothing else to work with. through trial and error, they started to say that these are verified and we can trust these. they were all over that. through trial and error, they started working with what they had been started vetting for trusted sources. the short code and things piled on top of that added to the ability to move and get to people on the ground. part of this is also about the systems we need now and how to work differently. that is the interesting thing

about this and who has what role. every crisis is local. in your local area, what are the risks out there? it does not have to be nuclear disaster. where the risks of hurricanes, storms, floods? how will you deal with that. where will you go for the information? build the information now while you can and let it float up. at some point, it will come from the mayor's office to the county office to the state office and possibly for the red cross to federal assets like fema but it is a lot faster now. when you take a strategic look of the networks and how they work, find where you need to be

right now. >> this is a huge sociology lesson. >> it is. >> we spend a lot of time training people on how government works. i think they missed a lot in basic civics. >> the state department role in crowd, i think the government overall can beat the crowd in these situations. the state department set up and worked with the red cross and other folks. they did not have the dollars but everybody else did. it was like $41 million overall. that was amazing. the role of government can do a lot of convening. the role of the public is critical in making things . think we're out of time. one more question. >> i am with emergency management agency on the coast. this is directed towards marni and jeremy.

we have limited staffing. we cover eight counties. we have extremely limited staffing with 500 jurisdictions. how do we get this operational? not the tools or technology, but the process. we're trying to do it regionally so that one organization does it for all 500 jurisdictions. what do you see your states or counties doing? >> power agency in our state has tried to audit and use the technology to put one message together in one place, have it replicate and propagate thin as many places as possible. that is one solution to limited staffing. you can multiplier voice tremendously using social networks. >> we have organize all of the communicators for the local

state governments and dhhs and fema. they were all part of regional support system 15. that sounds so technical but it is important because we're all talking together. fairfax county is taking the lead for the region. it is using the tools. we're making sure we bring everyone to a certain level using the tools. it is not a twitter philosophy. it is the tools. it is about how to get things done and help people in an emergency. there are new ways to do it we did not have before. by working together as a region, we are trying to make sure that everybody has capabilities. we can pass information among all of us. it has been pretty helpful. region hasal capital wi most of the local governments using various social networking

opportunities. that is something you could not say years ago. part of that is also the private sector, ngo's, the red cross. we're working with everyone. it is not just a government function. local government touches the people. the ways. >> i would like to touch on that a second. they're looking at ways to get information out. you also have to figure out how you will listen and where he will point people in case of an emergency. what happens if your local place is swamped? that canve out wirliers pick up the slack? if you are down, who is picking it up? those are things you have to think about in risk communication and strategy as to how this will work. you can spend your live try to figure out how to get into more places. how do you get people to

realize that you can bring them into one? >> you have to leverage not just your resources but your neighbors, friends, partners, and other governments or counties. become my word. if societies are resilience when a disaster hits, he will find a response is much better. we're not just talking about disaster response. we're talking about women's issues in developing countries. we're talking about environmental issues and a host of things. the state department is not just focusing on disaster response. there's an initiative called civil society 2.0. it is convening the tech community where you can get people interested in social good to help out with social and environmental issues across the board.

we will have a meeting on november 4. other groups may participate. i look forward -- i encourage you to look forward to that. we will have a conference on the world bank that evening. we will have something on chile on the 20th. >> thank you all for your insight and time. thank you. c-sp c-span3 [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> discussions include managing and administering funds in war and times of economic stress. our live coverage begins on monday.

>> now, testimony by a deep water horizon survivor and chief rig engineer stephen bertone before the bureau of energy management commission. he testified that the rig experienced blackouts, computer problems, and maintenance issues months before the explosion. alarms and other crucial systems were not functioning of the time of the explosion. the commission is investigating because of the explosion that left 11 workers dead on april 20. >> please state your name for the record. >> stephen bertone. i was the electrical supervisor.

>> please speaking to the microphone. >> it is the red light on? >> how long were you the electrical supervisor? >> seven years. >> was it all on board the deepwater horizon? >> what other ones to be worked on? >> i was on the f100 and be merry honest -- marianas. reeding and bates was purchased by transocean. assigned to the deep water since 2003. i have been the chief engineer since november of 2008. >> prior to april 20, how long have you been on the hitch? >> i was there 18 days.

>> were there any safety problems of interest on the deepwater horizon considering your job responsibilities prior to the incident? i was going to try to have an open question to see if he had anything on his mind before i went for detail. [inaudible] we can do that. were there any problems with the a, b, c chairs? >> i do not know. was there a loss of power on the a chair? >> can you define that? >> that is where the driller sits. >> what is the monitoring? >> he is monitoring the placement, drop, depth of the well, paul, and so forth. >> were there ever any incidents

associated with a chair associated with the loss of power? >> prior to the incident, yes. quits when was the latest? parts and do not recall. >> were there any problems with the no. 4? >> yes. >> how long was that going on? >> i would say roughly eight months. >> were any alarms bypassed for any high gas situation? >> i do not know the answer to that. >> i did not hear you. >> i do not know. >> or any alarms bypassed on the deepwater horizon? >> i do not know. >> you are the chief engineer

and do not know if the alarms are bypassed? >> i am not in control of those. >> who is? >> the dp operators. >> what are their names? >> yancy keplinger and andrea fuentez. >> if an alarm was bypassed, would it have to be under your approval? >> no, sir. >> let go to april 20. i have your witness statement in front of you if you want to refer to it. please give us the detail of that day up to the incident. >> from the time i woke up? >> yes. >> we had a 6:30 meeting between oim, capt., tool pusher, and myself. there was a phone call where we

spoke to the asset manager and , the project manager. at 8:30, we always have our supervisors meeting. all supervisors are required to attend. after that, i went back to my office. i was working on the upcoming big move rig -- rig move and preparing budgetary items for the officials are writing later that day. i went to lunch approximately 11:30. i went back to my office and continued working on the documents. at approximately 3: 30 or 4:00, we had a meeting with the bp officials and transocean. it was deemed that we would go on a tour of the rig in. we toured several different

spaces. we made our way up to the floor. when we got to the floor and the drive shaft, i was the last one into the drills shack. it was standing room only. at that point, i knew there was something going on. i had no knowledge of what it was. i was asked by either jimmy or randy on the tour with us to please continue the tour without them. they needed to stay up there. we went down and show them a few more items. we went into the pump rooms. we showed them the thrusters. we went to dinner at approximately 6:30. after dinner, we have a scheduled meeting of all supervisors in the conference room death along with bp and transocean officials. -- we had a scheduled meeting with all of the supervisors in the conference room along with

bp and transocean officials. after that, i had this cigarette. i went to my statement, took a shower, and went to bed. >> [unintelligible] >> i had just opened up my book and started reading the first paragraph when i heard what nsionerslike the attentite being bled off. i thought that was strange because chris said they had just finished. it got louder and sounded like a free term -- freight train coming through my bedroom. with each one, my room shook. there was an initial boom and the lights went out. i jumped out of bed and ran to the door. i knew that there were emergency lights out there so i could see to get dressed.

when i opened the door, i smelled some sort of fuel as well as tasted it. when i turned to grab my clothing, the second explosion occurred. that threw me across my room. i jumped up and grabbed my clothes, slipped my boots on, grabbed my life vest and my hard hat. i ran out into the hallway to the center stairwell. i observed four or five people standing there frozen looking up the stairwell. when i look at the stairwell itself, i do not know if the stairs were there or not because there was so much debris was completely impossible. ollered for people to go to other staircases. i took the spiral staircase and made my way to the bridge.

have been [inaudible] when i arrived at the bridge, i went to my station system. i observed that we had no engines, thrusters, or power whatsoever. i picked up the telephone. i tried calling 2268 for the engine control room. there was no dial tone. i hung the receiver up several times thinking someone had left it off the hook. it did not work. i hollered out that we have no telephones. i headed over to the star report of the bridge. i looked over the deck. prior to this, the second explosion had not registered with me. i initially thought the thumping

sound was the block coming down the derrick. and is expecting to see pipe on the floor. when i looked out the window, i saw fire. at that moment, i realized we had had a blowout. i ran back to my station thinking the engines should be starting up. in approximately 30 seconds, two engines start up, come on line, and start closing beefeater breakers -- the feeder breakers and start the thrusters. there was no indication of injuns starting. i heard the watertight door bang directly to the left behind me. i heard someone say that the engine rooms were gone. i did not realize who it was. he was covered in blood.

i asked him what he meant by gone. he said there were blown up and were all gone. i recognized his voice. it was mike williams, the chief. i ran over to him. he had a laceration across his forehead. i hollered out where the medical supplies were. they were in the restroom on the back of the bridge. iran to try to find some c gauze. all it could find with toilet paper. i took it back to him and told him to hold on his head. i could not believe the engines were gone. i could not fathom that. while i was looking at the screen, there was nothing. no engines, no thrusters, nothing. we were still a dead ship. when i turned back around, i noticed an individual holding a

rag on the back of his left head. he hollered out to me that he was hurt bad. at that point, i recognized his voice. he was covered in blood as well. i ran back and looked at his wound. i immediately put the rag back to his head and hollered out for in case there was one on the bridge. there was not at the time. i ran over to be watertight door and hollered down to the lifeboats that we needed a n medic. i ran back to my station hoping the engines would start. there was nothing. i turned to look back at brent. chris pleasant was standing behind him.

asked if he had eds'd. he said he needed permission to do that. the performance management operator for transocean was standing next to me. i asked him if we could eds. he said yes. when i turned back to look at chris pleasant, someone hollered out he could not do that without approval. thew jimmy caharrell, oim, he said we could eds. chris was in the panel pushing a button. i hollered to chris that i needed confirmation the week ha -- that we had eds. i said i had to be certain that we had eds'd. he said yes and pointed to a light on the panel.

i hollered out for permission to go to the stand by generator room to manually started. my thinking at that point was that the bop at unlatched. the remaining fuel would burn away. we would need fuel and power as well as pumps. curt said to go. the chief mate came running over to me with a radio. we tried to get coms through the vhs radius but could not standing 5 feet from each other. we verified we were on the same channel. we had no coms. i said not to worry about it and put the radio down. i went to close the watertight door. mike williams pushed the door back. he said was not going alone. i told him to come on. paul also fell in line. we ran towards the standby

generators. as i was running to the standby generators, and looked up at the derrick where the crown should be and could see nothing but flames. i remember looking down of the debt. it was very slick with a substance that had the consistency of snot. it was approximately an inch and a half thick. as we made our way to the stand by generator room, we had to door.the bop it is very tall and wide. you can look down into the pool. when i looked into the space, i saw nothing but flames. i could see no equipment whatsoever. it was solid flames. when we walked into the stand by generator room, myself and mike

williams ran to the starting panel. i switched from automatic to manual, hit the restart button. there was no turning over of the engine. i hit reset and start again. nothing happened. mike williams pollard out because there was a voltage meter. we have 24 votes. i stood there for the second. paul was standing by the door. i told him to shut the door. he was standing with the door open looking at the flames. at that point, i thought maybe there was some kind of electrical interference not allowing the generator to start. i turned. right behind a panel where i was switch gear.80

i closed the main breaker from the generator and reopened it. i also turned the switch for the automatic sink from automatic to manual. i ran back to the panel and again tried to reset and start. there was no turning over of the engine whatsoever. i believe mike hollered out to try the second battery bank just in case. i want to say it was paul that looked the switch. i cannot be sure. after the second battery bank was turned on, we tried it again. there was absolutely nothing. the engine did not turn over whatsoever. at that point, i said that was it. let's go back to the bridge. it will not crank. when we opened up the watertight door to go back to the bridge, that was the first time i felt the heat. it was very intense. we ran to the bridge.

we came in through the port side watertight door. i observed yancy and andrea were still at the radios. i ran across to the starboard side. someone was looking at the lifeboat station. i looked over there and saw that lifeboat no. 1 was pulling away from the rig. lifeboat no. two was already gone. i turned to mike and paul and hollered out to abandon ship and go. they ran past the bridge by me. yancy and andrea were still at the radios. i hollered for them to abandon ship. i went out the watertight door.

the captain was in front of me. i observed a man on a gurney at the bottom of the stairs with three people trying to get a life vest on him. the three people were people i knew. i did not know who was in the gurney. as we made it to the bottom of the stairs, we went for the life raft. we got that up and proceeded to crank it up out of the lift. we rotated it to the side of the rig and then dropped it out to inflate the raft and be clear of the rig. there was a rope attached to the shackling the vice -- device that went to the boom. it had two metal hooks with the rope around it. i do not know what the rope was for, but it hindered the round draft -- the raft from clearing

the rig. mike could not clear it by hand. we pulled out a pair of clippers on steroids. he proceeded to unscrew the shackled. that popped off. the life raft moved over the side of the rig. we started pulling the painter line. i looked over to the man on the gurney. there was one gentleman standing there. i do not know who it was. i jumped up and ran over and grabbed the gurney and said to get him to the life raft. when i got back to the raft, and was on my knees at the opening. there were two people in the raft. one of them was david young. i do not know who the other person was. i made eye contact with david. the raft was slightly turned from the opening.

it was slowly rotating around. once it rotated around, i shoved another man into the life raft and directly followed afterwards. --i entered the life raft prior to that, there were a lot of explosions still going on, smaller explosions. there was immense heat. all of the flames and keep from the floor were coming down the fourth part of the debt as well as all the flames and heat from under the rig. they were meeting in some kind of cortex at the life raft. i had my leather work gloves on. i do not recall when i put them on, but i can remember feeling the intense heat through the gloves and on my knees. i went to the far side of the life raft. i heard the injured person on the gurney start hollering about

his leg. i heard andrea screaming that we were going to die. i honestly thought we were going to cook right there. the life raft [no audio] [inaudible] at that point, though life raft dipped forward and started rocking back and forth. there was smoke in the raft. the next thing i knew, it was descending. as we get closer to the water, the smoke cleared. when we touched the water, are heard someone hollered out for the paddles. i was right by the exit door. i jumped out of the raft and grabbed the rope on the side and

started swimming trying to pull the rest away. chad murray jumped out and was right behind me. paul jumped out and was right in front of me. i was on my side looking up at the rig. 30 feet above me there was a tremendous amount of smoke coming out from under the rig. at that point, i saw a person's boots and clothing come shooting through the smoke. just before he landed, noticed it was curt. he landed about 5 feet from me. a few seconds later, another person came flying out of the smoke. he was approximately 10 feet from me. before he hit the water, i noticed it was yancy keplinger. as we were swimming trying to pull the raft away from the rig,

i could see the heller that -- helideck. i saw an individual running. before he splashed into the water, he was looking at us. that was mike williams. shortly after that, i noticed we were not going any further from the rig. about that time, someone hollered out that the painter line was still on the rig. i noticed the white painter line going up into the smoke. i heard it chad murray behind me start screaming for help. looked to see. about 60 yards away, there was a rescue craft. i saw two flashing lights and the water. one of those was getting hauled

into the boat. seconds later, the second person was hauled into the boat. the rescue craft started driving towards us. we were hollering that we needed a knife. when they got about 10 15 feet from us, and individual came up to the ballot the boat -- to the boat with a large pocket knife. curt swam to get the knife and cut the rope. i immediately started swimming and pulling the rest again. chad and paul were tying up the fast rescue craft to the life raft. the life raft backed away from the rig at that point. when we got to the actual boat, we were all still in the water.

the ones who got out of the zero life raft. the only ones in the life raft to my knowledge were randy, stand, and the injured person on the gurney. when we exited the water, i stayed on the rescue craft and assisted getting the injured person out of the life raft. at that time, i learned that it was wyman wheeler. once on deck, we have the first muster i had witnessed. it was determined that 11 individuals did not make it. from there, i started checking to make sure that all of my people were accounted for. i did not find brent mansfeld.

i have learned that there was a makeshift hospital on the main deck itself. i made my way in there and found brent laying on the floor. he had bandages on his head. he had oxygen on his mouth. he also had a neck brace. his head was kind of facing a man on a bed. i stepped in between brent and the man on the bunk. i was trying to keep brent from going to sleep. he kept wanting to go to sleep. i kept waking him up and adjusted his oxygen mask. the man on the bed was buddy trahan. i tried talking to him to keep him awake. when the coast guard arrived, the rescue swimmer came in and

asked who was critical. at that point, troy hattaway and bill -- i do not remember his last name -- stated that buddy trahan was the worst. they brought in a gurney. i went to assist getting him on the gurney. i placed my hands on his hip and shoulder to roll him to get the gurney under him. as i rolled him, he was screaming and hollering that his leg was hurt real bad. he had a severe lacerations on his leg. he also had a twisted and mingled lower calf on his left leg. his finger nails were gone. he had a hole in his neck. he had multiple lacerations all over him.

i rolled him and went to get a second position to roll him. bill was standing on the other side of the bunk. he said, "oh, my god. and looked and his back was burned from built to head. when we got him on the gurney, they took him out. i continue to help brent as best i could. i cannot remember who else was there, but i stayed with him until they came to get brent. i checked on all of my guys to see how they were doing. i made my way to one of the upper levels. i sat there and watched the rig burnen. >> thank you for the detailed

summary. >> you said that there was standing room only in the drilling shed. what time was that? >> approximately 5:30. >> was a common to have standing room only? >> generally during our change or something of that nature, around 11:30 or 12:00. >> were there additional billing in the shed at that time because of the people on board from bp and transocean? >> yes, there were several additional people. >> was there any activity on the rig floor. to mark >> i do not recall. >> during your conversation with chris pleasant, you said he said yes multiple times when you

asked about the eds. did he say anything about hydraulics? the point to the camera -- panel and indicate any problems? >> no, sir. >> you wrote down that the captain was screaming at adriana for pushing the eject button. >> i would like to lodge an objection. this statement you are referring to was given after he had been detained for 26 hours without the ability to contact anyone, including his family or counsel. i object to that and advise him not to answer the question. >> we're asking him to confirm what is on the statement to set the record straight. >> we're not going to sit here

and say that is not his statement or what is in a statement. the statement speaks to itself. >> the statement was taken under oath. he is under oath now. he can define the accuracy of the statement. that is a fair call. >> there is a federal lawsuit. if i say good morning to you and is this afternoon, i can be prosecuted under that. we're not going to do that. >> council advises you [no audio] >> i am advised that my -- by my client that they did take an oath on the vessel. >> ok, i understand. >> does adriana have the

authority to activate the eds or call out a distress? >> i do not know. >> mike williams is a subordinate of years. >> correct. >> on the chain of command, how do you communicate with the dpo? >> can you clarify the question? >> earlier he told me people who monitored the alarms would be aware of any alarms that had been bypassed with be the dp officer. if he had concerns, would he address that to you or the dynamic position officer? >> generally the dynamic position officer would call either the supervisors were chief et on tower directly.

>> when you were in your room reading your book, was there any notification to evacuate? >> not to evacuate, no. as i opened up the door, i did hear yancey keplinger announced that we had fire. he started naming of an engine rooms and multiple locations. after the second explosion, i did not hear any more croupier announcements -- anymore p.a. announcements. >> if there were a gas alarm that had detected two hi gases in one's own, with its general alarm? >> yes. >> did you hear a general alarm? >> i do not recall. >> could you hear the general alarm from where you were

located on the rig? >> yes. >> at any time during the evacuation, were you told to leave anyone behind? >> objection. [no audio] [inaudible] >> which engines were running at the time of the incident? >> i am not certain. i know that there were two in operation. >> are you familiar with the engines? were there any safety devices? >> yes. the over speed device.

it is mechanical and electronic. >> de know when they were last tested or inspected? -- do you know when they were last tested a respected? >> the week prior. >> did you witness the inspection? >> no, not personally. >> who would have a witness that? >> the first engineer, brent mansfeld or the engineer on tower. >> what was the frequency of inspecting those devices? >> i do not recall. >> were you responsible for that? for the inspection of those devices? who was responsible for the inspection of the devices? >> the engineers. the second and third engineer. >> do they report to you? the report through the system if there are any problems they

notify me. >> you do not know the inspection frequency. >> i do not recall. >> there is a difference between i do not know and do not recall. you understand that, correct? >> have you ever seen any inspectors on the rig inspecting those overspeed devices? that is outside of the auditors? >> yes, the coast guard and bp auditors and such. >> and do you know if there is an emergency shutdown system in the control room? >> yes. >> was there any notification to the engine room to shut down? >> i do not know. >> do you know if there is a policy in place for the people

in the engine room to shut down if they are given any type of warning? >> no, sir, i do not. >> earlier use of something about the discussion. how familiar are you with well operations? >> who was leading that conversation, do you know? >> i do not know. >> are you familiar with the air intake systems for the engine rooms? >> yes, sir. >> i have a blown up map, and i also have one right in front of you. the base number -- >> that is it. >> to you have the details on

that image? >> this is the problem i envisioned. i would like to give -- >> could you give us the number again? >> yes -- >> [inaudible] >> i will give you one. >> is the grade out area the intrinsic area? >> yes, it is the hazardous

area. >> how far away are the air intake systems for the engine room? >> i do not know the actual distance. >> would you like to show was on the board where the air intake system is for the engine room? >> there are multiple intake sites.

>> could you say what you just told me. >> i don't know the exact location for engine number three. >> [inaudible] >> we could not make a visual that would stand up on paper. but we're all looking at the same one. do you know how often they tested or inspected the air intake systems that prevented the flow of gas into the engine rooms? >> i do not recall. >> who would be responsible for that? >> engineers.

>> the engineer that you named earlier? >> yes. >> i'm going to introduce something else. it is a dp audit -- a bp audits. it is entitled deepwater horizon marine service audit from september 2009. it was introduced -- and was going to follow up with questions. >> i would rather have the legal representative ask the questions from you. >> [inaudible]

is he aware or does he have personal knowledge. if he is asking if he is aware, i might have an objection because i need to understand the questions. i'm not asking the question to see if he understands. >> he does have the legal representative. >> is this the latest or prior to the incident? >> this was prior to the incident. >> you want to question him about this document? >> i was going -- who is the deepwater horizon maintenance supervisor? >> i am technically classified as bad as well. >> are you responsible for responding to that audit? >> yes. >> how do you manage to imagine

and maintaining the recommendations from bp? >> when we receive the audit, we converted to an xl spreadsheet and certain items were assigned to different department heads. those department heads report back to me as to the status of them and i updated it and forward it to the asset manager and performance manager. >> that audit actually preferences when you were doing the audit said what was being performed by transocean personnel that repairs had either deteriorated in or had not been suitably dressed in the final incident. were the repairs you were making on the deepwater horizon -- >> we did not receive any of these documents prior to today and did not prepare by looking through them. i would not object if you ask him what he knows, but as far as referring to them -- >> i'm sure he has not read the whole thing.

>> were there any problems bp had with the deterioration of equipment on the deepwater horizon? >> from the initial assessment? >> yes. >> yes. >> from the initial assessment, the problems they have addressed were not been properly repaired or if they were even addressed when they returned in september 2009, is that accurate? >> i do not know. >> i think you mentioned rms, can you elaborate on that question >> it is the rig maintenance system. it is where all of the ordering of parts are carried out. it is a transocean maintenance system. >> was there any excessive jobs that were overdue for maintenance on the deepwater horizon? >> i would object to the term

excessive. >> were there problems on the deepwater horizon that were not being addressed because of the amount of manpower available to transocean personnel? >> can you answer that? >> the thing with the rms system, it was implemented in 2009 at the time of the insurance audit. ande were a lot of pm's craft that were not appropriate to the rig. many, many duplicates and we have been in the process of eliminating those.

if you look back on history of it, you would see there are a not done in the allotted time, but there were also ones that did not apply to this vessel. most of those, as i recall, paste were no major pm's due. >> were there any problems with being behind planned for scheduled maintenance? >> i don't know. >> were there a lot of personnel changes on the deepwater horizon that occurred?

>> i would object to the term of lot. you need to be more specific. >> were there personnel changes under your supervision? >> yes. >> from many? >> i don't -- how many? >> i don't know. >> did the turnover of personnel have an effect on the maintenance on the deepwater horizon? >> objection. that's an opinion. [inaudible] >> i think he would be well aware of the fact that if he had maintenance problems and it was related -- related to the personal loss. >> if you ask him if there is -- you asked if he thinks there is a problem. >> was there a maintenance problem with the number of personnel turnover you had on the deepwater horizon? >> i don't know.

>> is there a competency it assurance program on the deepwater horizon? >> are you referring to rules and responsibility? >> i'm talking about ensuring the confidence of the performance. >> yes. >> did transocean have a pool of personal or not permit employees on the deepwater horizon that would perform jobs what was behind scheduled maintenance? >> yes. >> with a qualified to do the jobs per year review of their work? >> yes. -- per your review of their work. >> the report i referred to earlier cited the marine supervisor who was your self told the auditors a lack of manpower was the reason for no progress on these engines, talking about engines no. 1 and no. 6 having delayed maintenance. is at an accurate statement? >> would you rephrase that and ask him.

>> do you know that to be true? >> i don't recall. >> do you know who the auditors were? >> i don't recall their names. >> did you participate in the motor speck of it? >> i was there during the motor spec. >> who did you purchase -- did you participate at the engine room level? >> no, sir. >> the report indicated tests were successful on the engines in the engine room. do you know what that meant, that they were successful? >> objection. we don't know what they're talking about. yet a specific question of whether he knows the test was successful or not. >> do you know how the engines were tested when they perform their audit on the engine room?

>> they were manually overspent. >> it did day shutdown? >> to my knowledge, yes. >> was up from some relay of information? >> that was from my engineers who relayed that back to me. >> was the deepwater horizon scheduled to go to the shipyard? >> yes. >> when was that? >> it was supposed to be the early part of 2011. >> do you know how long it would be in the shipyard for? >> i don't recall the exact amount of days. >> was there any information passed to you along the lines of maintenance issues being the reason to go into the shipyard? >> i would object. >> were you ever in any meetings with management from bp

personnel or transmission personnel who said they're going to the shipyard because we -- transocean personnel is there going to the shipyard -- >> again, i object. >> post motor-spec audit. >> i did not hear them talking about it. >> what was the plan for the shipyard visit? >> there were many items that were planned, but i do not have all these pacifica's as to what it was. -- all the specifics as to what

it was. >> were you aware of the visit by transocean or dp personnel with you or anyone on your staff? >> that's a compound question. do you just want to note his personal knowledge? let's back up to the first question. as chief engineer, what is most important to the shipyard is it from your standpoint? what's most important to get done as far as maintenance at the shipyard? >> that would be your thrusters, your engines, your see water systems, your ballast systems and your drilling systems. >> based on your knowledge of the rig, what work needed to be performed when it went to the art? -- when it went to the yard? >> i don't know. i want to speculate. >> you are the chief engineer.

i'm trying to make sure i understand this. did you have a punch list of items you had prepared for when it went to the shipyard? >> yes. >> what was on the punch list? >> if he remembers. >> thrusters, sea water systems, drilling equipment. >> thank you. >> on april 20th, did you discuss with the bp or transocean management that showed up on the rig, rig maintenance? >> yes. >> what did you discuss? >> we discussed the out of service. between welles. -- we discussed the out of service period between wealth. >> what was scheduled to be fixed or repaired during the out of service time? >> multiple items. i don't recall all of them. >> any of any relevance those high priority? >> of any relevance to what?

>> [inaudible] >> you had been on the deepwater horizon since 2003, correct? >> yes. >> was the practice to have able-bodied seamen on the bridge to go into areas with high gas with gas detectors in lieu of an electric alarm that sense of a general alarm? >> are you asking if it is a practice or if it ever happens? >> a practice. >> he knows the terms -- practice would bst continuing ongoing thing. >> yes. >> could you rephrase your question. i am not following what you are trying to ask. >> i asked some questions about the electrical alarms, a high

gas alarms -- if one went off on the deepwater horizon, it would generate a visual alarm that have lights go off, is that true? >> yes. >> in your seven years on the deepwater horizon, did you ever see in your meetings or did you discuss having an able-bodied seaman on the bridge monitor high gas alarms that have multiple alarms going off in one zone in lieu of having an alarm going off that automatically trips and audio or visual alarm? >> can you please clarify that or break it down? >> yes. >> you have able-bodied seamen monitoring multiple gas alarms, is that true? >> yes. you have a gas detection system

that monitors were high gas? >> yes. if a high gas alarm goes off in one's own, does it trip and audio or visual alarm? >> yes. >> is it a transocean practice on the deepwater rising to bypass the alarm and have able- bodied seaman go down once they see the gas alarms from the bridge with the gas detection system? >> i do not think he can answer what the practice is. i don't think he can testify as to what particular practice. >> did you ever see any able- bodied men monitoring high gas alarms from the bridge and go back to where they landed with gas detection systems? >> are you referring to two items in one sum? >> yes, sir. >> i have not. >> did to the alarms go off in

one's own -- that alarm was actually bypassed to have a visual and or audio alarm bell of? >> i do not know. >> thank you. i have no further questions. >> a couple of quick follow-up questions. when abs personnel, and board did she meet with that? >> yes. >> when was the last time they came on board? >> i do not remember. >> within the last year? >> yes. >> to begin the a punch list of items that needed to be repaired? >> yes. >> did any of those items involve the engine? >> yes. >> did it involve the engine over speed? >> no. >> did the abs check the engine speed when they came on board? >> i don't know. >> are you aware they do and [unintelligible]

-- are you aware they do an annual inspection? >> yes. >> do you know is checked on the annual inspection? >> vaguely, yes. specifically to the engine room. -- >> specifically to the engine room. >> they go through and inspect injectors, the air boxes, the ventilation and multiple other items, but i do not recall what they are. >> when they meet with you at the end of the inspection, do they have a detailed list of what they check that they

present to you? >> yes. >> do you recall anything specific related to the engine over speed not working? >> no, i do not recall. >> thank you. >> i have a few questions. you took over as the chief engineer in to does make? >> correct. >> as part of your assumption of his duties, were you required to read the deepwater horizon operations manual? >> yes, sir. >> did you read the section which describes the duties of the chief engineer? >> yes. >> are you familiar with those duties as described in the manual? >> for the most part, yes. >> isn't part of that responsibility for the maintenance on board that vessel? >> yes. >> in your testimony, you

indicated the deepwater horizon was in the process of employment in a new maintenance management system, correct? >> that's correct. >> do you know when that first target to be implemented? >> i don't know the exact date. i can give you a year. >> we don't know the day. >> to your best recollection, how long had the process been going on? >> i don't want to speculate if he does not know. >> had you received any formal training in the implementation of the system? >> yes. >> who provided the training? >> transocean. >> whether a single section for multiple sections? >> it was a single section in town and we had people who came out when the system went live to assist us. >> how often did they come out and assist in implementing the system? >> they were out for

approximately three weeks. i don't know. >> more than once? >> i don't know. >> based upon your familiarity with the system, you indicated discrepancies between the system. how accurate do you believe the information in the system was? >> [inaudible] >> were you aware of discrepancies in the system at the time of the accident? >> discrepancies as to what? >> were you aware of any reported an ancient -- any reported maintenance overdue systems at the time of the casualty which weren't correct? >> would you please repeat that? >> were you aware of any

discrepancies specifically concerning overdue maintenance in the rms system at the time of the casualty. >> discrepancies in what? >> reported maintenance for scheduled maintenance that was not completed. >> does he know of any maintenance not completed prior to the casualty? >> let's be real specific. the air dampers to the engine -- what's the frequency there are required to be inspected under the system? >> i don't recall. >> would it surprise you if it was every 14 days? >> objection. >> you do not know the frequency -- >> i object to that. you ask a question and he gives you an answer. i don't want you to badger.

>> how often did you review the rms system for maintenance issues? >> daily. >> he repeated daily? you became aware of discrepancies as they occurred? >> -- he reviewed it daily? >> if you noted a particular item that was overdue, what actions would you take? >> we had periodic meetings with different department had going over any overdue maintenance and when they could accomplish that. >> do you recall any maintenance to the air intake engine room dampers? >> i do not recall.

>> if i recall your testimony concerning the events, you had gone to the bridge after the first explosion and you and to other individuals once to the stand by generator room to find out why it did not start, correct? >> we went there to start it, not to find out why it did not. >> you testified that she flipped the switch to manual when you got there. why did you do that? >> because it was in automatic mode. >> why would it be in automatic mode? >> that the standard position. it's always in automatic. >> what does it mean to be in automatic? >> that the generator will start on its own without any intervention. >> would you refer to that as an automatic emergency generator? this -- >> i'm trying to clarify the issue. >> is the issue that is a

standby generators? >> that's the issue -- on trying to understand what was it from the person on the rig. was it your understanding this was designed to be an automatic start in the case of the failure of the main generators? >> after a certain time, yes. >> if i heard your testimony correctly, that did not happen in this instance? >> i have no recollection of time frames during that event. >> view that indicated he have been on the rigs since 2003.

do you recall an instance in august of to the estimate where the vessel lost all power and went black and shipped? >> i did not recall. -- i do not recall. >> while you were on board, do you recall if there weren't any transitions -- and transocean guidance regarding me and tissues regarding -- any

significant ones -- did you have any guidance on that? >> i don't understand the question. >> as you are going through seeing various maintenance items, along, maybe one is more significant than the other, was there any type of guidance as to what point you should advise maintenance or the coast guard of those issues? >> i don't know. >> i have no further questions. >> back to the written statement we were discussing earlier, could you give me the basis of why you don't want to answer any questions before that? >> the basis of the statement was obtained about how we was held 26 hours immediately after this incident which was extremely traumatic to say the least. is what it is.

we're not going to be cross- examined on something that occurred. >> are you going to take your fifth democrat ever questioning on that document quest for >> i am advising him not to answer this question because the statement speaks for itself. >> can i ask the client -- for the record -- to bring you up to speed on the procedures we have. we cannot introduce anything into our port that is not made available on the public record. this is not a public document. >> this is an official document. the document he compiled while under oath and immediately after the disaster -- we're not a point of cross-examine on it here. i would instruct my client not to answer any questions concerning the specific things with in this statement. >> you are telling him to take his fifth amendment right? >> i am telling you we're not

going to answer questions or be cross-examined based on that statement and if he is asked specific questions about this statement, i will restrict him not to answer the questions. >> can i ask the question? >> did anyone tell you to leave anyone behind? >> do not answer that question. any information is contained in the statement and the statement speaks for itself. you have the statement, there is no purpose, it is not relevant. it is not relevant to go into that right now into these proceedings as i understand it. we are not prepared to discuss. >> we cannot put anything into a public document because this is not -- >> this was given under oath to a coast guard official and of this is not a public document -- you have it, you know what is in it, he is not -- he is not

answering any questions. >> [unintelligible] >> you said you knew something was going on in the driller shed. >> objection. he said he knew something was going on? >> when there was standing-room- only, he said he knew there was something going on. >> he knew there was a meeting? >> when you say he knew something was going on, that has a sinister connotation. can you have the court reporter read back what he said in that testimony? >> do we have that ability? >> did you not testify to the fact there was standing room only in the dollar shed? >> yes, there was standing-room-

only. >> did you mention anything on the fact that you knew something was going on? >> objection to that something going on. >> it was standing-room-only. there were a lot of people in the driller shaq, but i do not know what was going on. >> thank you. >> i want to caution you on one thing. this is a fact gathering investigation hearing. as part of fact gathering, we are evaluating your knowledge, skill and performance. i understand you have legal counsel and he advises you on what to answer and what not to

answer. but i want you to be aware that when the basic knowledge that requires you your duty and you either do not know or do not recall, bring to question your performance and your knowledge and skills, i want you to understand that. >> [inaudible] you are trying to intimidate this witness. >> i just want to understand -- do you feel intimidated? >> i do. >> i'm not talking to you. [laughter] this is an employee of ours. >> when you had the guy on the record a new challenge in because he wanted to read a

rule, i thought that was wrong. if that had been my witness, i would have stopped you. i think what you are doing now is wrong. you are trying to intimidate this witness because he said of various times i cannot recall. >> via understand what you are saying. i just want to make sure it is my duty -- i just want to make sure you understand that. >> i'm going to make a statement regarding that. when we began as, you gave him the votes and the it was to tell the truth, the truth about what occurred out there. does it have anything to do over whether he feels intimidated, anything whether he can remember something if he truthfully cannot remember something. i don't see why you'd be threatening him by not being able to remember something that he may face potential jeopardy over that. if this committee wants the truth, he gave truthful answers.

if he did not give truthful answers, we may have to address that, but i do not appreciated admonition. he appeared at we are answering questions truthfully. >> i understand. >> i want him to understand part of fax gathering is to collect data concerning his knowledge. that's all i'm trying to say. why do we take a five minute break. >> the wife of a deepwater horizon will read worker who died in the explosion also testified before the commission. she said her husband was concerned about dangerous work conditions before his death. we will also hear from the well teed -- well team john guide leader, this portion is one hour

10 minutes. >> the board will call on this natalie roshto. -- ms. natalie roshto. will you please rise and raise your right hand. a false statement given to the united states government is punishable by [unintelligible] -- do you solemnly swell -- desalt lease for the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help

you god? thank you. be seated. before we began asking you questions, the board wants to express your -- want to express our deepest sympathy for a lot of your -- wants to express our deepest sympathy to the loss of your husband. we're fully committed to do all we can to obtain information that will prevent occurrence of a similar incidents. is it ok for the board members to refer to your husband [unintelligible] quest -- [inaudible] >> could you state your full name and spell your last? >> natalie roshto.

>> thank you para >> when did he start working at transocean? >> september, 2006, i think. >> at time of the incident of what was shane's position? >> you as a roughneck forehand. >> did he hold any other positions prior quest for >> yes. he started out as an ordinary seaman and wood from an ordinary seaman to a roustabout and from roustabout to roughneck. >> do you know when he became a roughneck? >> about a year-and-a-half prior to the accident. >> the node his schedule was for the deepwater horizon question mark >> do you know what he was scheduled to come back? >> if he would not have worked over, he would have came, wednesday, the 21st. april 21st street >> if he had not stayed over. >> you was supposed to start working over wednesday.

his overtime would have started wednesday. >> do you know if he received any rewards while working at transocean? >> he received an award in 2008 for spotting a dropped object. he stopped the job and they awarded him for stopping the job and -- >> how often did you speak to shame about his job? >> on a daily basis. >> when he was offshore as well? >> yes. >> did you speak to numb once or twice or how many times a day? >> mostly once a day. >> provided the testimony you gave to the committee in congress, i would like be -- if you want to refer back, not going to ask detailed questions, but there were notes present to congress that we may want to ask additional questions on. it is indicated there that you had talked to shame on the day of the incident.

is that correct? >> yes. what do you recall what you talked about? >> the matters on the rig. but was there anything unusual? >> the extensive loss of but they had been losing and kickbacks they add had and the atmosphere he was working in. >> this phone call took place on the 20th? >> yes. >> did he talk about the work environment on the rich get time? >> it was a little more high pressure that had been in times before. >> high-pressure? >> yes. >> to ease a why? was there something specific -- did he say why? >> he felt the pressure because he knew they were behind. >> do you know who may have been applying the pressure west mark >> he never specifically said. >> was he having proper sleep?

>> he was having adequate sleep, i think. >> during your phone call with him, was there anything unusual in this town or anything that would have indicated -- was the told any thing when he was talking to you? >> when we talked on the morning of the 20th, he said coming down the hallway, he had been told by somebody they had a kick back that night. specifically, he did not explain what that meant. that's all he said. >> was that the only bone call? >> witten he was getting off his hitch that night -- when he was getting off his hitch that night. >> the mud they were losing. that's all he kept stressing.

>> had he voiced any concerns on the deepwater horizon, and the phone calls you had previously? >> the previous shift he was tom connally had many conversations about the pressure on the rig and the mud they were losing. when he was home his last pitch, he found out they had lost the well. i think he knew then he was going back for problems, but he never stated that. i just gathered from our conversations he felt that way. >> i know you are not a drilling expert, but did shayne ever mention anything about if the well was different than any other wells? >> yes. >> did he say anything to anybody at transocean or to you?

in the testimony you gave before congress, you indicate he did a lot of training. >> yes. next he comment on how effective the trading was? >> yes. he just attended a leadership safety school. the six hour drive we had home, we talked intensively about how good he felt about it and how he was going to take back what he learned to the rig and the morale at the men of the safety school. they felt they were going to take it back to the rig and apply it. he thought was very well orchestrated. >> this was the transocean school? >> yes, sir. >> did he go to well-control training? >> i believe he went to 11 the first fired on. i cannot tell you when. >> 2006? >> yes. >> do you know if a majority of his trading was in the classroom

setting or was it on the drop trading? >> he did a great deal of on- the-job training. >> did he have some co-workers he would talk about that he was confident in? >> he never specifically would name names. he would just talk about the positions they are in the signed off on different things and there were men there pushing him to do better and move up. >> he was satisfied with the training he was getting on the job? >> yes. >> did he discuss safety concerns on the deepwater horizon? >> no. >> when he was with you all in his off time? >> never expressed any concern of safety. until this well, he never expressed any concern. >> that he'd been involved in any type of near miss or incident or injury?

>> he was involved when the rig started taking on water last year. i did not speak to him for four days. he was in the compartment that was taking on water at the time. they all got on the boat safely. >> did he have concerns after that? >> never. nothing more than we just talked about life insurance and things like that because he knew his job was dangerous. >> did he ever mention anything about a safety stand down in 2009 aboard the deepwater horizon? >> he mentioned it. he said the walls were too thin and could not say too much. when he got home, he did not really want to talk about it. that was all that he ever said. >> does that indicate he had concern about saying things on the rig? >> he said he did not feel like talking about it that it had been a long day.

>> in your testimony, you indicated you would like to see better enforcement of existing laws. did shayne ever mention anything about government enforcement? >> i had no idea it existed before this? >> any additional information you can share with the board i am not familiar with? we only have access to the testimony you gave congress. is there anything you would like to share with the board that could probably prevents a bit like this from happening again? -- probably prevent something like this from happening again? >> i would like to stress the last time he was numb, he told me -- from day one, he deemed

the whole well from hell. he said mother nature does not want to be drilled here. i want to stress the fact that this industry is vital to our country and for our men to be out there drilling and their lives put under business agenda, that is what i was stressed. i think we have enough safety rules. he was satisfied with his job and loved his job had planned on being out there for the rest of his life. but i do not think we need to be getting more safety rules. the ones their need to be ample that harder for our men to provide us with necessary commodities. >> thank you. i have no further questions. >> i have no questions. thank you.

>> transocean. >> we have no questions. >> anadarko offshore. >> no questions. >> no questions. >> weatherford? >> no questions.

>> is there any additional information you like to provide? >> i would like to thank you for letting me speak on behalf of shane and it has been a long road. i just want to thank you. >> thank you for being here, you are dismissed. >> thank you. >> it just to remind you, you are under oath. we have some follow-up questions for you. >> i have one follow-up question regarding the

circulating bottoms up on the casing run. when they landed the long string of casing, the decision was made not to circulate complete bottoms up. what was the reasoning for that? >> we were actually drilling the well and got to a depth of 18,000 to a record 60 feet. -- we got to add depth of 18,260 feet. we circulated up, getting all of the cuttings up and what we routinely do is once we get the cuttings out, the ecd is a lord and we add a little bit of mud to replace that so when the static weight is equal -- when we did that, we just lost complete returns.

the biggest risk associated with this cement jobless losing circulation. that was the number one risk. based the fact we have lost circulation just like that out of the clear blue, we decided to go ahead and get circulation established. because of the actual volumes, we would actually have volumes above the well head once the cement was in place. then we would be able to circulate that and see if there were seats -- see if there was any gas. >> thank you. >> i have a few questions. you indicated your last certificate was 2007 -- >> 2008.

>> how many will control schools do you go to? was it just the one time? >> every two years. >> do you remember how many total you went to? >> i don't remember exactly. i've been certified for a long time. . just don't remember how many >> what is your best estimate? >> 20 or 15. >> you have been with bp since 2000, is that right? >> yes. >> you are familiar with the bp safety management system? , -- >> yes, sir. >> how did you insure safety was well designed in the safety of operation. >> could you please repeat that was mark >> how do you insure safety was properly addressed

and of the well design plan and construction -- how do you ensure safety? >> can i -- are you talking about the actual design of the well or at the ringside? >> in terms of the design and construction -- in terms of the responsibility of the well team leader. >> the well design is actually done by the engineering group. it is passed on to the operations group, which is what i'm in. we implemented job. the actual safety on the rig is run by transocean. we follow their safety management system. they have procedures in place for actually doing the job.

they actually pull the pipe out of the whole. we operate under transocean's safety management system. >> the testimony we received before -- by a understanding is there is documents between transocean and pp -- under bp. -- you operate under transocean -- >> we operate under transocean's management system. >> transocean works for bp, right? >> yes. >> third-party contractors work for bp. >> yes. >> how do you ensure third-party contractors comply to the

management system? >> the people who work out there know before they go and when they get their they are responsible to operate under transocean's safety management system. >> can you describe what the safety management system was on the deepwater horizon? >> there are several factors to it. there is to start program which is similar to stop. different people call them different things. you have observations and we look at the data to see if we see any trending in the issues. you have a prompt card. a prompt card is something to keep in your pocket when you walk around and you are getting ready to do a job. you can take the card out and you have the various list of

things to go through to remind you of hazards and or things you need to have in place. all jobs have a job safety analysis or it is also called a fink plan. these have to be filled out by the individuals who perform the work. if you are not part of the fink plan, you have to stop and take a timeout -- part of the think plan. the major tasks are called task- specific think plants where there is a much more extensive analysis done which includes a safety risk assessment and it has to be signed off by all parties involved. that is the basic fundamental safety management system on a day-by-day basis. >> there are safety conditions

identified when operations can be stopped? >> everybody on the rig has a right to stop a job at any time. >> having the right is one thing. what are the safety conditions under which they can exercise that right? >> bases something they are not comfortable with or -- they see something they are not comfortable with or they see somebody doing something they consider unsafe, they have the right to stop. >> that is pretty general guidelines for an expensive and complex operation, isn't it? >> transocean's guidelines and bp's are very specific. anyone has the right to stop the job if they don't understand what's going on, they can stop it. >> has anybody ever stopped an

operation that they don't understand what is going on? >> yes, sir. wheat we even keep track -- we get a morning report called timeout for safety. they will have during the drilling of the well, did anybody exercise their right? >> yes, there were. they were mainly in lifting-type operations, where somebody might not be in the right place, and they wanted to make sure of that prior to the starting. things of that nature. >> but today, about the drilling operation?

>> i do not recall actually about the construction operation, sir. did you have a separate contractor? was he serving as the safety officer? >> we had the transocean person boat, -- person, and every couple of weeks, we would send a b.p. bowed out also, lifting,

safety, things like that. >> but a transocean person, is that not set up as a conflict of interest? in terms of the fox guarding the henhouse? the safety officer, since he worked for b.p., he would not stop an operation? >> i think he is really not a safety officer. he is not a policeman, so to speak. p gets involved in the operations to make sure that the necessary risks are being identified and that any safety issues are addressed. is thatture on the ruig

everyone's to be safe. >> culture is one thing, but safety is another thing, right? now, who decided that the deepwater horizon was a suitable platform for this type of thing? >> it was just, like i said, i do not know how to answer that. i am sorry. >> who approved the deepwater horizon? who was it? b.p.? which departments in b.p. that the vessel -- >> that was done through the upper drilling management, and more of, you know, the upper- level people. >> and you do not know who? >> we signed a contract, sir. >> who went through the horizon to determine that it was

suitable for the operation? >> i do not know that. that was done in 2000. >> would it have been the gulf of maritime -- gulf of mexico maritime authority? >> i am not sure if they were the individuals in place in 2000. >> ok. would it be that position, that space that would do the vetting and approval? >> the new rigs that have come in have been vetted by 2 groups. >> they would determine suitability of the vessel? >> and the rig audit. >> do you know if these others

participated? >> i do not know. >> in terms of the b.p., a 2009 audit, who was responsible to monitor whether those items were that discrepancy was corrected at b.p.? >> the marine group would have sent out an individual, and then they would have reported back. >> ok. report back. who would determine whether the progress was sufficient for the deep water horizon to continue operation? >> that was the actual marine group. >> so if the gulf of mexico korea authority, that would be his decision whether the vessel -- marine authority, that would be his decision whether the vessel could operate, correct?

>> yes, sir, it would have been people in his group. >> ok. no, i think part of the audit pointed out that there was some discrepancy, in september 2009, wrote and i do not have been in here specifically, but it was pointed out -- in september 2009, and i do not have in here specifically, but it was pointed out. the deep water horizon -- >> correct. >> and maya understanding is that it was not corrected by the time the deeparise -- and my understanding is that it was not corrected by the time the deepwater horizon was used.

why was this discrepancy -- why in who made that decision? -- and hugh? -- and who made that decision? >> why are we referencing? >> i believe he is referencing what was required every three to five years, and there is the 2009 b.p. audit and the mode of -- the only time that had been done was in 2000. i think what the captain is trying to ask is why, if you had a chance to go from one location to another, why did you not perform a major inspection? >> we did report, i am sorry -- transocean inspected it fairly

every time it was pol pot -- pulled. it would usually takes anywhere from 7 to 9 days to the actual inspection, and it was gone through from top to bottom. i am not an expert. i know that we, as in b.p., a lot of them the time to inspect and do any maintenance on the stacked, allotted them -- a lot of them -- alloted them the time to inspect and demands on the stack -- and do maintenance on this debt -- the stack. i believe it was born to be a minimum of 60 days.

>> i know you said that transocean inspected it every time they -- i believe it was going to be a minimum of 60 days. >> i know you said that transocean inspected every time they pulled it, and do you think that was adequate? >> i cannot say, sir. >> responsible for determining the qualification of the suitability of the vessel and the qualification of the marine personnel. is that correct? >> they were the people from b.p. that were involved at transocean. >> yes, sir. personnel. who determines the qualification of the drilling crew and third- party contractors, and how was it determined -- who determined that?

>> they were responsible for supply qualified people, so it was up to transocean to supply qualified people, and it was the same with our other third-party contractors, which would be halliburton, etc. whenever we got a new person from a third-party contractor, we would review the resumes, talk to the management of the company, the service company, before the people went out. >> ok. so they are responsible, but b.p. vetted them. >> the third party. >> the third party, not the transocean personnel. >> we saw what training they have, but it was up to transocean to supply qualified people.

>> can we put that up? he received direction from you as the welke team leader. is that correct? >> yes. -- as the we4ll team leader. is that correct? >> yes.

>> on the bottom of the exhibit about the gas flow problem, did you see that? >> i did not see that on the 18th. i did see it after the incident. >> is this report something that you would reveal in terms of your daily interaction, involvement with this operation? >> this particular report is part of the simulation that is run. there are normally numerous other attachments. the leader and i would discuss the actual cementing procedure itself, which is a completely different document, which would have the strengths, etc. this is just part of the simulation, which we did not discuss simulations. >> ok.

another person was saying during his testimony on tuesday that he did not see this particular information. do you know if the others were aware of this piece of information? >> i am not aware if they were. >> so it was never brought up in your discussion with them prior to the casualty? >> no, sir. >> you were shown three moc's, management of change.

one was on april 15. i believe the third one was on april 7. three documents. now, other individuals listed on these documents, are they b.p. personnel? in the level won approval, can you look get the names and identify any non-b.p. personnel? >> ok. -- in the level-one approval. >> ok. >> looking at the exhibit. >> yes, all of the it level one

are b.p. employees. >> ok, they are all b.p. personnel? >> yes, they are b.p.. yes, sir. >> how about these others? >> yes, sir, these are b.p. employees. >> this other one?

>> yes, capt., these are b.p. employees. >> so based on your testimony, while third-party contractors and partners provide input to the process, and of the day, it is b.p. that were fieldin the change and approved the change, based on what i see -- it was b.p. that revealed the change. >> yes, sir. >> ok, for this other document, the date is april 14. on the second page, i see mr.

patrick o'brien. what was his position within b.p.? >> mr. o'brien is the vice president for completion in the gulf of mexico. >> of these documents, there is only one which has his name on it. is it normal for the v.p. of drilling and completion to be part of this process, and why is his name only appearing on one of the three changes that are before me? >> i do not know why mr. o'brien is on this particular document. as a level-one approver. kit -- i was not under the impression that he had to be. >> but i do not see an

indication here that he has approved it. he was involved in the construction of this well. is that correct? >> he was aware of the day-to- day operations. i do not believe he had the intimate details of the actual engineering design. >> ok, but he has knowledge, and general knowledge of the well design and operation. is that correct? >> yes. >> now, also using these documents, there are two management of change on the 14 th and 15th. if i can go back to the documents that mr. matthews got

from the b.p. web site, this is the people in drilling and operation policy -- the b.p. drilling an operation policy. -- and operation policy. >> yes, sir. >> on page of for you what, the second paragraph -- page four, the second paragraph, it is about the business leader. can you read that again for me, please, sir? >> the business leader is accountable to ensure that any deviation from policy and establish procedures and all non routine operations of undergone a formal risk assessment and that appropriate measures are taken to manage the risks prior to performing the operation. >> yes, sir, and if you have two

does thatne day, qualify best non routine? -- as non routine? at this stage of the project? >> it was not out of the ordinary to have to change the depth. and they also consider that the tapered storing, and the other end, i did not consider it non routine. >> ok, so based on that, the other person should not have been notified as the business unit leader? >> i do not know if he was notified or not, but i would not

consider either one of those routine note -- non routine. >> my9 expert opinion, problems -- my non expert opinion. .> one kicke >> ok. one kick. it occurred to me that during a critical period of operation here, the decision was made to allow one person to vote attain a routine training, -- to attain

a routine training, which was to be taken every two years, and he was replaced with another who has less experience, and my understanding, had never served on the deep water horizon. who made this decision? >> we have some folks that keep track of all of the placements of we well site leaders. in this case, he was assigned to the pd2q. -- pdq. that rig was shut down for a period of time, so he was available to step in for four days. a lot qualified. some have less experience than others, -- a lot are qualified. >> so the other had been there

for how many weeks? >> he had just been there for one week. i am trying to think now. i am sorry. i am trying to think of how many days he had actually been there. >> right, but what i am looking at is here you have an experienced well site leader who had been there for quite awhile, during a critical stage of the operation, in your replaced him with somebody who was available -- and you replace him with somebody who was available and you had more experience go to a routine training opportunity. were you aware if anybody bothered to contact mms to ask? >> .no, we did not contact mms

to get an extension. >> was there any risk assessment between sending him to a routine training versus keeping him on the vessel? did anyone assess that? somebody available, put him in the slot. how was this decision made? >> there was no risk assessment done. we feel but all of viet well site leaders working for us are qualified -- we feel that all of the well site leaders are qualified. is a part of every well that we is part ofis everyone. >> were you a part of that

decision? >> i was informed that he needed to go to note well sc -- he needed to go to well school? >> i had no concern for that. >> what is the b.p. procedure sitehe relief votof a well leader? is there? >> not and i am aware of. there may be, but i am not aware of it. not that i am aware of. i misunderstood your question. i am sorry about that. everyone is different, you know, the individuals. what happens is, there are relief notes. in the old days, they would be handwritten.

now, they are just emailed to each other, usually a day or two before. we also talk on the phone. we have a system in place where there is always a well site leader that is bare. that is the reason the schedule is staggered the way it is, to make sure that someone knows. there is a conversation. he would be working with another website leader who had been there. well site l -- another well site leader who has been there. >> they check off and sign and turn it into somebody? >> not that i am aware of. >> what is the b.p. policy for a leader to maintain communication with a leader?

he testified that he went to go to the school and turned off his cell phone for four days, so he had no communication for what was going on on the rig. is that standard procedure? >> yes, that is standard procedure. it began as he is not on the rig, he is not in line of sight -- because he is not on the ratig. there others that are their daughter in the line of sight. so it is standard. -- there are others that are there that are in the line of sight. >> not to be in contact for that long period of time when he is off of the station. now, was there a report to you

after he was released? saying, "we are good to go," or something like that? >> i talked to him before he left, and said, "be careful. have a safe trip." and he was going to school. he needed to go to training. >> now, my understanding is that there was a vip from b.p. on the horizon. is that your understanding, also could >> yes. >> what is their relationship? which also? >> yes. >> what is their relationship -- also proofal -- also? >> what is their relationship? >> he reports to mr. o'brien.

all of the people in the b.p. organization ultimately report to mr. o'brien. >> ok, so mr. o'brien is with drilling and completion. as you indicated, he is the senior guy. he had knowledge of the well- designed and the daily operation -- the well design, and when he ended up on the deepwater horizon, became the senior official, is that right? >> -- he became the senior official. is that right? >> i would not see it that way. >> ok, so the w4lell site leader, he can do whatever

-- they can do anything without "?ying, "hey, mr. o'brien >> he can follow the procedure that we have in place. i am sure that if there was an issue that he wanted to discuss, he could discuss it with mr. -- could have discussed it with them. we have a procedure. >> that is fine. but if there are anticipated situations, and it is not in the plan, would he ask mr. o'brien for his direction, because mr. o'brien was on board the vessel? >> .i believe that probably the

leader would call me first, and there are issues that need to be pushed up at times, and then the discussion would be with mr. simms. mr. simms is my boss. if it was by coincidence that mr. o'brien was there, i'm sure he would have been more than happy and willing to participate in the conversations. >> is it customary or standard procedure that when the b.p. " drilling and well completion come out to the raid, r -- rig that he has a briefing from the well site leader? transocean personnel? >> i am sorry crede you are going to have to repeat that one.

-- you are going to have to repeat that one. -- i am sorry. >> they get a briefing from the leader? >> he once it in on a meeting. that would be the first thing to happen since he had not been there before -- he would sit in on a meeting. i know that he would not bother the well site leader if he was in the middle of something. >> are you aware of whether there was a briefing brought -- provided by mr. calusa? >> i am not aware of any specific briefing.

>> you are not? >> no, sir. >> i just have one question. you said that she thought that the well site leewood call you if they thought they had a problem on the rig. is that right, sir? >> yes. >> i have one follow-up, capt. so you do not believe the w theell site leader -- you do not believe that the well site leader would meet and greet him when he came? >> yes, he would. >> i agree. >> you stated earlier you did not get an opportunity to see the halliburton report from april 18. have you read that model?

have you looked at that model? >> i saw it after the incident, yes, sir. >> if you had looked at that model prior to the incident, would that have sent up any red flags for you? here a what we're seeing with a gas flow potential? -- based on what you are seeing here? >> like i mentioned before, i did not even know that that particular piece was in there because it was never brought up in any meetings. it was never brought to my attention the whole time i have been involved at the horizon. >> do you know if this report, this model, is shared with anyone with in transocean? >> i do not know if it is

distributed to anyone on the rig. i know that the actual cementing report would go with this. that would be shared, because that is the actual job. it is not a simulation. it is not a model. it is the actual job, which is are the people at the borig actually doing. >> is shared with people on the -- is it shared with people on the rig? >> i do not know if it is or not. >> you stated earlier that you had one management change begins you were not able to reach the anticipated depth of the well. i understand that the well was 20,000 feet korea is that correct? >> yes, sir. -- 20,000 feet. is that correct? >> yes, sir.

>> did you change the depth because you had found your anticipated target, or you were not able to reach your anticipated target? half mainad a pi objective and a secondary objective. there was a secondary exploratory talil. that is what this nomenclature is. when the pressures came in different than we anticipated, at that time, the subsurface staff was informed this was the way forward. do you guys want to stop but this particular level and continue, or is the successful and you want to stop and because rent.com -- or is it successful

and you want to stop? >> thank you. >> good morning, sir. i just have a few questions about the maintenance for the rig, and i understand you are not responsible for it, but i am more concerned about some things clarifying that. you indicated that you had seen the b.p. audit from september 2009? >> yes. >> one of the items that was included in there is that there were two engines that were well beyond their scheduled maintenance. i think they were to be recalled at 24 hours. is that correct? >> i do not remember that directly. >> contained in there, those engines were scheduled for overhaul in may of 2009 and june of 2009. the fact that they still showed up in the audit in september,

would that concern you? >> i remember discussing the complete audit with transocean, and giving them the audit, because they are also given that audit on the rig, and they are to come up with a plan on how they are to abide by the audit. >> were you aware of the plane to carry out the scheduled maintenance cycles? >> pimm -- aware of the plan? >> i do not remember the plan concerning the engines. >> in 2008, when the deepwater verizon suffered a total blood of, were you aware of that? >> i do remember that, yes -- the deepwater horizon. >> do you remember what the cause of that was? >> i do not remember the exact cause, no, sir. -- suffered a total blackout

but. i am sorry. i do not remember the cause. >> you participate in receive the daily reports from the deepwater horizon. is that correct? >> yes. >> now, you were previously shown to double the reports right before you, and one is from said yuri 24. if you could just take a look at that for me -- one is from february 24. >> ok. i have got the 24th. >> it says "remarks," and do you see those items, sir? >> yes. >> and there is a list of eight of those. ok, number four says that the

number two thruster is out. >> yes. >> number five says number four engine down and gives no further explanation. >> yes, sir. >> if you can look at the other daily report for march 13, and if you can look at the same remarks section at the center of the page, are those the same eight items also on that report, as well? >> yes, sir. >> the fact that these show up almost three weeks later with essentially the same for bridge and language, does that raise and a concern with you as a team leader about the drilling process? -- the same verbiage and language? >> the other items were on there for a long time, mainly waiting on either parts or, the number

two thruster -- i am sorry. it also had parts. the number two riser attention art monk -- t riserensio -- riser tensioner, that was coined to be repaired when we pulled orlistat -- that was going to be repaired when we pulled the stack. >> if you saw the same items appearing time and again in these daily reports, you might pursue additional support from your level or otherwise above. do you have a threshold? is there some number of times with this would appear on a daily report to raise some concerns were you would go to an additional authority? >> yes, sir, and that is why i know the status of these, because we discussed this with

the transocean people, and they gave us the responses on the different time frames on when they were going to have these pieces replaced. >> ok, if you were unsatisfied with the progress being made by transocean, who would you go to to try to get compliance? >> paul johnson, the rig manager. that is the person i would contact first. >> ok, during your daily meetings, does a member of the marine group participate? >> occasionally, not every day. >> how frequently do they participate? >> closer to once a month. >> so a member of their group would be aware of the various maintenance and related issues that were ongoing? >> yes. >> so they would have some level of awareness. >> yes. >> do you know if ever based upon your conversations in your meetings, did anyone ever report

any of these minute items to be the fico scores note -- to the coast guard, or to the deep water horizon? >> i do not know of transocean reported any items or not. >> but as far is you know, no 1 within b.p. did? >> not that i am aware of -- no one within b.p. did? >> not that i am aware of. >> sir, are you familiar with the maritime classification society as relates to the offshore drilling platforms? >> not really, sir, no. >> so you do not really understand what their wall are and the inspections of vacation a classification of the vessel? . what their role are? >> no, sir. >> did you ever visit the deepwater horizon? >> yes, sir. >> and what was the nature of

your visit? >> i would go to see the crew, see well site leaders. ory're generally was no plan a major agenda, just to go out and see how everyone is doing, how in the operation running, and do a safe to walk around to see the overall condition of the -- to a safe to walk around to see the overall condition of the note -- into a safety -- do a safety walkaround. >> one was the last time? >> february. we do what was the last time? >> february. -- what was the last time? >> february.

>> do you recall if any of the safety things were related to -- >> we did go through it with the transocean people on board about any progress being made on the maintenance issues and any issues in any way we could help. >> were you satisfied with their explanations concerning progress on these eight items? >> yes, sir, i was. >> thank you, sir. i have no further questions at this point. >> you indicated that all personnel, b.p., third parties, transocean, they were in compliance with the transition safety systems, is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> based on the testimony, a senior personnel -- testimony, a

senior personnel could not recall some of the specifics regarding the vessel's safety management system. the surveyor did not recall very much. did b.p. receive the results of the system audit? is it the marine authority group, or is it your group, what group received it? >> i did not receive it. i am not sure. >> so what i am looking at is

that there are a lot of things based on the safety. there is a lack of knowledge of the system. there is, you know, a lot of overdue maintenance issues here, so are you comfortable with the vessel's safety management system? i knew you use it and try to comply to it, but are you comfortable with the affected safety management system on board the deepwater horizon? >> we trust transocean to run an effective, safe operation using their safety management system. they are the owners of the rig.

they maintain the rig, and we choose to operate under their safety management system because they are the experts. they have the marine group and the other groups. so i guess to answer your question, we had faith that transocean was attempting to maintain a safe shippings -- hip. -- ship. >> it seems that faith is not a very good business decision here, but anyway, that is my point of view. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] >> they also heard about shutdown systems that could have warned the crew of impending

disaster. there is testimony of the transocean chief electronics transmission. this is about 90 minutes. >> mr. williams, please raise your hand. do you swear that the testimony you're about to give is the truth and nothing but the truth? thank you, sir.

>> i am representing him today. >> could you spell that? >> first name scott. >> think you, sir. -- thank you, sir. >> mr. williams, could you please state your name. >> my name is michael williams, w-i-l-l-i-a-m-a. -- s. >> who are you employed by? >> transocean. >> which are of the position with them? >> electronics transmission prior to that for a period of one year. and prior to that, i was a roustabout. >> how long were you a roustabout? >> two years. >> where you and roustabout with another company as well, sir?

>> no. >> do you have any oil and gas experience outside of transocean? >> finan. >> can you please briefly describe your responsibility is -- none. >> can you please repeat the scrubbie responsibilities? >> any and all electronic devices throat -- throat -- throughout the rig. >> can give me some background of your education or if you had any other jobs involved with electronics? >> i was in the united states marine corps, and i was a certified avionics technician., and that was the education level that i used to achieve this job. >> thank you. >> can you please let us know where you were? >> i was in the a.t. shop.

>> ok, can you please give us your best recollection of the event up until the event? >> starting at the time i woke up? >> yes, sir. please. >> monday was a short change game for me -- day for me. i got about five hours of sleep the night before, where we rotate from days tonight's or actually from nights to days, the reverse. -- note from days to ninth. nothing unusual occurred maintenance wise. -- from days to vonights. as far as we knew, we were running tests, which normally means is lower maintenance day for us.

during testing, there is usually no maintenance that is going to be conducted the case you have got pressure everywhere, so they kind of make it a knows zone. -- no zone. the star burned crane had just been changed out. -- start crane -- starbord crane had just been changed out. i was working on the boom. i stayed approximately one hour. i took the chief mechanic with may, who was new to the position, to familiarize him with the operation and to try to kind of give him an idea of what i do versus his responsibilities in the same job would be. then i went up and visited with dale, the crane operator. we went through the limits and state for approximately one hour, conducting some tests, making sure, double checking and

it could go all the way down and bring it back up -- stage for approximately one hour. i then proceeded back to my note shop -- stayed for approximately one hour. i then proceeded back to my shop. i took care of some of those issues. >> ok, and could you please tell me that when you were in the shop, was there anything that indicated that there was a problem that was going on? >> it just so happens that i was on the telephone around 9:30 with my wife, and i have two racks for the pa system, and there are two cingular of redundancy, and the rack just happens to be in my shop -- there are two for redundancy.

announcing whatever levels of gas were indy -- in the mud. my wife for heard what was going over the speaker and asked if i needed to get off of the telephone -- my wife heard. we had gotten them so frequently that i had become somewhat immune to them. i got to the point where i did not even hear them anymore, especially with this well. we were getting gas back frequently. it was a constant fight. when the levels reached 200, that was the cut off for all of the grounding and hot work, that is what i concern myself with gas levels. i know that they are hot enough that i do not need to be cutting wiring or making sparks anywhere. so at that point is when i really started paying attention to the gas levels. until then, that was the only

indication i had that something was not necessarily out of the ordinary but something to get your attention. >> after that occurred, did you hear anything or any type of problems electronically when you were in the shop, sir? >> could you rephrase that? >> was there anything out of the ordinary after you heard the alarm? was there any sound to indicate there was engine over speed, or any type of hissing or where it was coming from? >> what i heard next was that i heard a hissing noise and a thump. where my shop was located was directly below vthe riser. it was not uncommon for the operators to run that in reverse to retract it at hauteo atut, -- out, and i can hear it bang in there.

i heard the thump, and i heard this, and i thought was the hydraulically note -- hydraulic leak, may be too hard, so i heard a hissing noise. at that point, i did tell my wife i needed to get off of the telephone to say i needed to check it out to make sure we did not hydraulic -- did not have hydraulic -- and then i heard beeping. there is a crossover between my shop and an adjoining space. there is a cross ventilation system in there, and i can hear the panel beep, which are alarms, and i am hearing it continuous. and i am thinking, what is going on? why have a process station acted up? i am trying to put all this together in my head with a

hissing and of the beeps. and now i know i need to get up and find that exactly what is happening. as i pushed back from the table, i hear the engines start to rev. now, my shop is located directly center of the rig. engine 3 is on my portside, engine number four is on the starboard. i know which engines are on line in any given time. i could hear number three starting to rev up, from normal anything i hadve heard before, and it was steadily rising, and i knew we were having a problem. as they started to push back from my desk, my computer monitor exploded before me. the light bulbs and themselves physically popped.

now i know we are in trouble. i reached down to grab my door, and simultaneously with grabbing the ham boat -- handle, the engine goes to a level that is higher than i can describe it. it is in so fast that it stops spinning and there was a huge explosion. >> and after that initial explosion, was there an additional explosion? >> there was. that explosion blew the fire door that was between me off of its hinges. >> the first explosion? >> the first explosion. >> it blew the fire door and myself across the shop. and within seconds, the co2

system started discharging. the co2 controller was inside my shop, as well. i could not see anything. i could not breathe. there was no oxygen. i crawled across the floor, and found a mile away out. i made it next door by feel, stayed on my hands and knees because i could feel the heat. if there was one to be in the oxygen at all, it would be at the bottom. as i reached the next door, i grabbed the handle for the door and it exploded. that was explosion number to. >> wood was the time frame? >> potano recollection -- what was the time frame? >> i have no recollection.

as a clear that door, i remember getting really angry. i do not know why. i was mad at the doors. the doors were beating me to death. two doors in a row, it hit me right in the forehead. it planted me against the wall somewhere. my arm would not work. my left leg would not work. i cannot read. i could not see. i knew i had to get outside to get some fresh air. the co2 was overwhelming. as i am crawling, i crawled across the bodies of at least two men. i do not know their conditions. i am trying to get them to respond. i assume that they're dead and i keep going. i can only help myself at this

point. ecr, it was elevated. all the panels for the floor and were missing. there was nothing but great work. i was tripping and falling through this great work, trying to make my way through the outside door. i got halfway across and i could see light. i assume that i am headed in the right direction and i keep going toward the light. eventually, i made my way of side. i turned to the right. the reason i did that, i knew that whatever little breeze we had was coming from the start of bird bowel -- the starboard bow. so i turned to the right. as i did, i got my bearings, got

my eyes cleaned out enough so that i could see. there were no handrails and there was no stairwell left. one more step and i would have gone into the water. at that point, i looked up at all and the exhaust packs for engine number three, the wall, the handrail, the walkway, all those things were missing. there were completely blown off the back of the rig. the only course of action from there was to turn around and go the opposite way, go to the port side. i needed to go back to the left and head toward the start side of the rig. there are two lifeboats on the deck there. from what i saw, from what i heard, and what i felt, i seriously considered launching a

lifeboat by myself. i knew that something really bad had happened and it was not going to get any better anytime soon. i had an inclination that this was way worse than anyone could expect. i thought about it for a second and i remembered that i have responsibilities. i have an emergency station to go to. the problem was that my emergency station no longer existed. i made a decision to put my life jacket on right there and try to make my way to the bridge, which would be my secondary muster station. i determined that, i could not make it there, i would come back and try to launch the lifeboat by myself. i got up to the main deck. when i got there, the hissing noise had now turned into a full-blown waroar.

the dog house was on fire and half of the garrett was on fire. i realize that we had a blowout. i made my way to the port side of the rig, upwind, walked across the main deck, all the way ford to the bridge. -- all the way forward to the bridge. then there reported immediately to the captain that we have no propulsion, we have no power, we have no ecr. he looked at me dazed and confused, with a deer in the headlights look you have to understand that we have noecr. it has blown up. engine no. 3 has for sure blown up. we need to abandon ship now. i just kept saying it over and over and over. at one point, i was finally told

to call down, to sit down, that we were working on it. at that point, my supervisor or one level above me, mr. burr looked over my injuries. he looked for medical supplies and could not find it. the nearest thing he could finalist for the paper and tried to stop the bleeding. i got enough of it out of my eyes where i could actually start to see. i got enough for the paper on my head to stop the flow of blood into my eyes. i remember him asking me about the standby generators. mr. bertoni asked. the captain asked if it would give us fire pumps.

no, it would give a sliding and it would give us the ability to get back on line later. knowing that you have to have a standby generators to power the air compressors that struck the main engine -- no one volunteered to go but br. bw -- mr. bertoni to start the generator. it dawned on me that no one had volunteered to go with him. they were sending a man alone, by himself, to try to start this generator. if ever there was going to be any success in that, we needed more than one man. i grabbed him by the shirt tail and told them he was not going by himself. i am going with you. he objected several times. i told him, if i do not go, you

do not go. you are not going by yourself. at that point, another man, paul, i believe his name was, grabbed hold of my shirt tail and we went in a line, the three of us, back to the fire. we crossed the moon pool area on the main deck, proceeded in to the stand by a generator room, made several attempts to start this generator. i do not know how long we were in there, five minutes, 10 minutes, 15 minutes -- i do not know. we made several attempts. with all the procedures located at the generator, several times, we tried. some of the things that's the thought of -- as the electrical supervisor, he was familiar with the stem by generator and we connected to respond. the signals came on and told me

that the berries were available, but the engine did not come on. at that time, steve and i decided to make their way back to the bridge and report findings to the captain. on their way back to the bridge, that is when i noticed that lifeboat no. 1 had descended and was moving away. it had descended and disconnected from the rig. as we got back to the bridge, the captain announced that he had given the order to abandon ship. it was a lost cause and we would not be able to fight this fire, that it was time to leave. as we were making our way down the ladders to get to collect those, like the no. 2 descended. so now there are the to lifeboats. they are gone. once they go down, there is no coming back up. because we had no power. there was they thought and

someone made mention about making it to the law -- the have lifeboats. they were in good conditions. i did not see any physical damage and idedidn't -- and i dd not see any fire. but it was going to be difficult to make it to the main deck again. there were several explosions occurring. you could hear stuff popping. we did not know which way the rig was going to fall when a default. i guess is general knowledge that if you cook a derrick long enough, it will fall. we did not want to walk through there and have it fall on us. so the decision was made to launch a life raft. there were three life rafts are available to us. after what seemed like forever, we finally got one life raft deployed.

we had an injured man with us in a stretcher. our first concern was to get him loaded. we were having difficulties with the raft, the handle with which it is deployed. there was a terrible angle between the reagan and the life raft. the life raft was not sitting level. we could get him poorly in the door, there is the danger he could fall in the water. eventually, we got him loaded. there was a crowd of folks trying to get into the small opening. i remember grabbing two people and backing them up against the wall. we had a 20-foot boat head behind us that would shield us from led derrick. the fire at this point is completely out of the top of the parent. things are popping and falling

and starting to fly. there were projected as coming from everywhere. the smoke and the heat are intense, even at the bulkhead. i guess there was some type of backdraft occurring underneath the vessel and it was starting to wraparound and feed itself. at that point, i was not sure that the life raft was going to survive. there was so much heat coming up that i thought for sure the knife -- the life raft with pop or melt and the people inside would cook. as we were waiting for an opening to develop for us to go into the life raft, when the whole finally developed and everybody had gotten in, the life raft deployed. so there were three of us with no rights staff -- with no life raft and boat. there were two more life rafts to our disposal. as a part -- as long as it took the first one to deploy, and did

not feel we could deploy -- and i did not feel we could deploy a second one. with the decondition of myself and the other two people, i did not know that we could deploy another life raft. i informed the other individuals that we could stand here and die or we could jump. then i remembered that, in our training, they teach you to reach your hand around your life jacket, grab here, take one step of, take one step ahead, and fall. the problem is that there is no life raft at the bottom. -- there was a life raft at the bottom. so we could have injured ourselves landing on their life raft -- on the life raft. i remember telling a yamani behind me that we had to run and jump. -- a young woman behind me that we had to run and jump.

she said she could not jump. we saw the other individual go. i told her, he just did it. you have to do it. she kept saying this she could not do it. i said, watch me then. i cleared the life raft by a pretty good ways. once i hit the water, when i came back up, i could not see anything again. now we have a new set of problems. i have oil, hydraulic fluid, gasoline, diesel, whenever is floating on the water, it is burning my entire body and i uncovered in the sludge. i do not know what it is. it is burning. i could hardly breathe. at that point, i started backstroking with one arm and one leg that still worked until i remember feeling no pain. i remembered feeling no heat. and i thought that was it, i had

died. sometime later, something apparently will be back up, a pop or an explosion or something and remember feeling the heat again and felt the pain come back. i thought, i have to swim, i have to swim, and i started swimming again. then i heard something in the distance. i heard, "over here, over here!" what in the world could that be? i started swimming as hard as i could to get to it. at one point, i did not hear the noise anymore and i did not feel the pain anymore. then i felt something starts lifting me out of the water. a small orange rescue craft, a small boat, had grabbed me and flipped me over into the boat. i remember telling him that we

need to get away from this fire. it is bad. i didn't know if he even knew what was going on. but i wanted to let him know that the situation we were in was terrible. he said, i cannot leave. there are more people in the water. i see more lives. so we went to the next like we saw in the water and retrieved that person. it was andrea. we retrieved her into the small rescue boat. at that point, i said, look, can we leave now. he said no, there's a raft in the water and there are more lives in the water. we proceeded to go back toward the raid began. -- the reagarig again. i'm starting to feel the heat. the life raft is still under the reagarig.

there are people outside of it. i could see the lights. i could see the people outside of the life raft. one was the chief electrician. he kept asking me for a knife. i did not have a knife. is nocean's ocean policy pocket knives. according to our training that we had every sunday for my entire oil-field career, there is a cutting device inside the life raft. in the panic and darkness, they could not find the cutting device. as we return to pull the life raft away from the rig, it was not moving. we were simplistic. finally, one of the gentleman in the life raft or in the rescue

boat had some kind of cutting device. they got the line lose and we pull ourselves over to the diamondbacks. >> earlier, you had mentioned that there were several [unintelligible] that indicated that there was a high level of gas. that is when you were on the telephone with your wife, is that right? >> there was an alarm that came over the intercom system. >> you said there were 200 parts per million? >> add two hundred units of gas, that this when all were cast to seize. >> then you started hearing some local panel alarms. what panel were you referring to? >> the necr and the ccr. those are the local panels that to theh hmi machine interface,

that is where they get their data. >> did you hear any alarm that would indicate a general monster? >> never. >> are you familiar with the alarm, sir? >> yes. >> can you please explain to me how that is set up? >> the general alarm is set up to inform the entire reagarig oy number of conditions, fire, combustible gas, toxic gas. each one of those conditions has a distinct tone and a distinct visual light. we have let columns throughout the reagarig. there is a red, yellow, and a

blue. you get an audio tone with every visual alarm. one of you get either wrot those alarms on the evening of april 20? >> no. >> do you know why? >> yes, they were bypassed. >> i do know that? >> because i physically sought on the screen. it is with their considered inhibited, not bypassed. >> can you please explain what that means. -- what that means? >> you have four states of alarms. you have the normal operating condition, the inhibited condition -- which simply means that the sensor is active, it is sensing, and it will alarm, it will give the information to the computer, but the computer will not trigger on alarm for it.

it will give you the indication, but it, trigger the actual alarm. if there is an override condition, which means the computer will not consider that sensor for any purpose. >> were there any alarms in the override position? >> none that i am aware of. >> i am not familiar with the deep water horizon's alarm system. if you get two high gas alarms in one area, say, the engine room, hypothetically, with that shot in the engines or would it show up in the air intake? -- shut in the air intake? >> how the system works is that there are several toxic and combustible gas sensors located

in key areas, mainly around the drilling package. the drilling package is the key. secondary is all the air intakes. they can be anything from the accommodations to the engine rooms to missionary spaces, anywhere fresh air flows. all spaces are controlled with a positive or a fan, forced air in, and an exhaust. when you get two detectors to go into a high stake in one's own, -- in one zone, which is supposed to happen is that the est should trip, the emergency shutdown, and you should also sound the general alarm. >> be a know what this was

inhabited? >> -- do you know why this was inhibited? >> when i discovered it when you're go and i inquired why, the explanation i got was that, they did not down, want people waking up due to false alarms. >> did you discuss with anyone the possible safety issues? >> yes. >> 2? >> the senior dpo on my watch the day and the supervisor. >> who was that? >> .com field was the supervisor, who is no longer employed -- tom fields was the supervisor, who is no longer employed by transocean. the other person was also not -- is also no longer employed by transocean. >> was a mr. bertoni

familiar with this? >> no. >> who was in charge of that system? >> the operators, the bp operators are the first operators. the third would be the chief made. the next level would have been the captain. ultimately, it would have been the oim. >> were they all aware that the systems were inhibited? >> yes, sir. >> if these systems were not inhibited, would it have prevented the initial explosions? if the systems were in place and

actively running, would it have a lab personnel to get into an area that was safe and would it have caused an explosion on the engines? >> objection. i do know that this witness has the capability to make that determination. >> let him state what he knows of how the system is configured. >> when you get to detectors to go high in one zone, the isd for that affected zone should be tripped. that controls your dampers and airpower. those things should trip. air supplies, all those things for that affected his own should trip. -- affected zone should trip. it should also trip to the general alarm. that is how that system is on

doesn't -- is designed. >> [unintelligible] >> i do not know. >> i am going to move onto another subject. yesterday, we had miss natalie rockdown. -- rockstone. she had mentioned that it was the oil well from hell. have you heard that? >> yes. >> why? >> another well expect something similar to this. wheat ended up severing the line by -- we ended up seven the line by putting a shot in the pipe and we lost the will completely.

now we're back in another quadra or another zone -- another quadrant or another zone and we saw a lot of the same things. we got stuck. we had to sever the pipe. it was deja vu. "the oil wealth from hell" was coined because of the location -- the oil wealth from hell -- the oil well from hell was gone because of the location. >> how many -- how long were you at 252?

were you there -- were you on the deep water horizon the whole time? >> yes. >> he was talking about the rate of penetration. >> were there any pending results from those comments? did anything occur after that? >> within days, we lost circulation. we blew the bottom out of the well. >> so it picked up the rate of penetration? >> yes. >> in the same interview, you indicated that use of "chung' ks?" please discuss that. >> yes. the hitch prior to the accident,

which would have put a backup of five weeks, i was in the drill scheck dealing with -- drilled shal shack. their representative walked into the back of the doghouse and he had a -- handful of what appeared to me to be granular rubber. the only thing rubber down there is the annular. everything else down there is still. as he delivers these chunks of channeler rubber, a look at the senior subsidies supervisor and i literally ask him, "what the hell is that?" he said, "no big deal.

that is normal." >> who was that? >> that would have been marked hey. >> was there any work done on that after that? >> to my knowledge, no. it took me a few days to understand or to formulate why we were getting chunks of rubber back. there was an incident prior to that where we were in testing mode and the annular was closed around the drill pipe. i got a call from the nighttime tool pusher to come investigate whether or not there was an input to the stick to hoist the block while the annular was closed. i inquired as to why he needed to know that. he said that the block moved 15

feet to 20 feet. we need to know why. we need to know if it was an inadvertent stick movement board went up by itself. myself, the electrical supervisor, we conducted an investigation. it was an informal investigation. we got into the end chair log data and dissected the data. what we determined was that one of the styx was moved in the positive direction. what we could not definitively determine was which stick. the tax system with inside the law was not accurate enough. it simply said the joystick eight and a joystick be. we could not find a reference as to which the joystick that was. but we did confirm that there was joy stick input. we relay that information back

to the tool pusher, of that, yes, indeed, a stick was pushed, but we cannot confirm which one. one had been given an input command. the joystick moved 15 feet with the n. miller closed prior to the chunks -- with the annular) to the chunks of rubber coming up. >> who's tommy daniels? >> he is the technical supervisor. crux of late -- >> on the topics of beale bop, [unintelligible] there ever >> yes. >> elaborate on that, sir. >> around the same time of the

inadvertent stick movement, there was an issue with the bop control panel purge system. how the system works is that the dog house itself is purged so that it is positive pressure and the panel inside the dog shaq is also purged, you have two moving simultaneously. another tool pusher had held the back door open to the dog house for an extended time and in the lost purge.ck but during this time, with the door open, someone had opened both of the glass access doors to the bop control panel and it

lost purge. when it lost purge, i got a phone call saying the ad thebop -- saying that the bop panel was gone. before i got up there, mark hay had already switched the panel to bypass mode. i informed him that i had worked on that system on the last rig moved and discovered what the issue was with it. i had parts ordered and it was actually running in automatic. if he would give me two minutes to three minutes, i could get the panel back started in

automatic so it would work properly. the repair that i made was not really a repair. it was to trick the system to start in automatic mode. once it would start, it would stay running unless it lose purge. at that point, did would power down. when it loses purged, you want to power it off because it thinks that gas may be in their or something is combustible. i tricked into going into automatic. it was running in automatic mode for a period of weeks. it was on until it lost purge that it turned itself off. i asked mark, hey, do you want me to started back in automatic. his exact words were up, of a " no, the thing has been on

bypass for five years. why did you even mess with it?" >> earlier you said about the chunks coming up in the annular, you made reference to another problem called the h air. >> yes. >> what was going wrong with that? >> that is the main operating 0.4 the driller to control all the drilling functions. it controls everything from mud pumps to talk drive -- two top drive -- to top drive to

hydraulics. it controls everything. for three months to four months, we have had problems with this computer simply locking up. we've been calling it "the blue screen of death" because you would have no data coming through. inside the dog house, there's ab b chair. we had ordered replacement hard drives from the manufacturer. we had actually ordered an entire new system, new computers, new servers, new everything, to upgrade it from the very obsolete operating system it was using. those computers were using windows nt, which is an unstable

platform to begin with. between the manufacturer and the the they could not get bugs worked out of the new operating system. they could not get the old software to work correctly on the new operating system. our sister rig, the nautilus, was going through those growing pains force. we were waiting for them to figure it all out so we could copy are learning said make it work on our rig. in the meantime, we were living along with what we had. they came in. we replaced the images on the hard drive for the software imaging. we got them back running. the chair would run for two days or three days and then it would crash began. tommy daniels was instrumental.

i can tell you how many hours or days he spent focused -- i cannot tell you how many hours or days he spent focused on getting these shares results. being new to his position, he took it upon himself to resolve this issue. he was still working toward that up until the time of the explosion. it had not been resolved. >> to your recollection, while you were at the deepwater horizon, roughly three months, was there ever an incident or kickoff when the "a" share was down? >> not during my time there. on other wells, the was. >> how long ago was that? >> not exactly. >> but in the "a" share was down

during an incident? >> it was internally discussed that it caused the kick. they lost all communication to the drilling package. the had no way of monitoring anything for several seconds. before they could get the b chair up, they had taken a kick. >> i want to go back to something. you said -- while talking about the pressure regulator, you said it was policy that they had those in bypass on the entire fleet. >> yes. it was not necessary policy. i was told that the entire fleet runs on bypass. >> do you know anything about the inhibited alarm on the other fleet? is that something you are aware of? >> all i can speak to is backed, when i was on the deep water millennium, which is a drill ship, i was ruled out of bed at 2:00 a.m. for a general alarm

that went off. i would have to say that theirs were not bypassed because i express to gegetting a better bd because of them. >> thank you. -- getting up out of bed because of them. >> thank you. >> can you touch upon the pipe racking system on the deepwater horizon? >> yes. >> what condition was it in? >> jokunk. >> please elaborate on how long it was meant it -- it was malfunctioning. >> from the time i started to the accident. >> did anyone say that it had to stop and fix a piece of equipment? >> continuously. >> in some of the testimony, we

had been informed that the rig was scheduled to go to the shipyard for repairs. were you aware of that? >> yes. >> what were you scheduled to do during that timeframe? >> my part of it would have been the complete rewiring of both pipe tracking systems. >> complete rewiring? >> yes, from top to bottom. >> who would have a sign that to you? >> it would have come down from the electrical supervisor. >> were you available -- were you aware of modu spec? >> yes. >> did anyone tell you about the findings? >> no.

>> one thing the audit also mentioned was that there was a personnel retaining issue. is that accurate? >> yes. >> did you have any issues with in your main is responsibilities because of that? >> no. >> was there a transocean group that was temporary work staff? >> yes. >> were they as qualified and competent as those normally on the rig? >> to my knowledge, yes. >> where did they come from? rigs andaced from other league new hires. >> with a familiar with the

system you were working on? >> the last two were not. there were familiar with electronics, but not our specific electronics. >> do you know who had any control of the personal issues on the deep water horizon? >> no, i do not. >> thank you, sir. i have no further questions. >> mr. williams, were you on the reagan on -- the rig during 2008? >> yes. >> were you aware of the brownout? >> yes. >> can you discuss it? >> i cannot. i was on the deck when it went out. the only thing we knew was that the crane shot down. >> do you or b on theop -- do you work on the bop system?

no.theknow >> you indicated you were familiar with the gas warning system and the sensors. >> yes. >> would you be familiar with the location of those sensors? >> yes. >> you indicated you were familiar with the ventilation system and the automatic shutdowns. would you be familiar with the locations of those intakes and the automatic shutdowns aboard the vessel? >> i could find everyone of them. >> you also indicated you being familiar with the shutdown system and the ed system as well. we have a couple of schematics that i would like to put up and ask you if you could indicate

the location where the gas forms are. [no audio] >> i am going to give you a blue pen. the exhibit is described as the deep water horizon.

>> mr. williams, use that microphone when you speak. >> ok. >> the diagram way have up here is described as the deep water horizon safety and fire control plan for the second deck. i would like you to go to the diagram. draw a blue circle around the gas sensors that you knew were located her on that level or in the engine room.

nly. >> that's better. >> the engine rooms themselves do not have gas detectors in them. >> are there some located on that level of the deepwater horizon? >> yes. >> can you circle where those locations are? . .

>> there was a set here and a set here and there was the pump room and the exact ventilation. the main vent up here, on both sides of the rig, and the toxic and combustible would be up on the main level. -- the main deck vents up here on both sides of we're not seeing the shall shakers on this level. >> when those alarms activated, where were you see the indication that they had activated? >> you would see the indication at that ccr and the ecr.

>> could you take that blue pen and also draw locate -- -- >> circle around those locations as well? >> thank you, sir. he may sit down. -- you may sit down. i am going to ask a little more information about the gas detection system which you previously described as you experience it on the evening of the 20th. can you take is in a step-by- step fashion and describe how the gas detection system is set up. what happens when an alarm activates, and then the sequence of events that is set in motion by that alarm. >> any detector that is in a normal state can go to a high

stake are eight high-high stake, depending on the level of gas or toxins that are present in the atmosphere. when you get to those detectors to go high-tide in one designated zone, or if you get one detector in two adjoining zones, the system esd's at that point should trip, shutting down the air and electricity to that space. at the same time, the general alarm should sound and individual alarm panel said in the ecr and ccr should also sound. >> or the engine rooms in a single zone or are there separate zones for each individual engine room? >> in regards to the fire and gas system, the engines only had a thermal detectors in them.

they did not have a gas detector actually in the engine space. the only thing -- the only gas detection had for those is for the air intakes. the index had the gas sensors mounted to them. >> of each individual air intake has a gas sensor? >> not exactly. >> please explain. >> the two circles that i drew on the port and starboard side of the rig, those were " consider the main air intakes for the injuns basis. one side -- for the engine spaces. >> i believe we have been told that each one of the engine turbos has a separate air intake. is that correct? >> yes. >> does each one of those have a separate center? >> no sir, they do not, not to my knowledge. >> when you describe that you basically have to have to alarms activated the hi-fi state within

the same zone, what would set that in motion in this series of events that you described on the 20th? >> what would set the alarms in motion? >> you explain that you started to hear the engine over speed and you had heard the gas alarms triggered. >> what i heard were local alarms on the panel. i had no idea what type of alarms they were. i could just to the beep, beep, beep on the panel. i did not know what alarms they were. i did not assume anything. i just knew i had a bunch of alarms coming in one on top of the other. as fast as i could acknowledge them, another one was going off behind it. >> you are not aware of for those alarms were going off as far as location? >> no idea. >> i believe you indicated that the gas detection system is also tied into the ventilation

system automatic shutdown process. is that correct restore >> yes, sir pickett could you describe in more detail how that happens? >> we have 30 esd panels located throughout the rig. they are stand-alone, manually operated panels. there is i want to say between 12 and 14 buttons on that panel. each button corresponds to a set of functions that are going to occur if you press it. emergency shutdown for say the drilling package was esd no. 4. i am familiar with that because we just recently tested it. it would have shut down the power to the rich lore, basically, shut down the air- conditioning, hydraulics, the block, it shut it all down. and it shut down the air intakes. so it functioned in manual mode.

we never tested the automatic feature, to my knowledge. i never tested the automatic function of it. we did not go introduce gas somewhere to see what it would do. it was just understood that it would work. >> you indicated that when this series of alarms would go off, if you had to in the same zone, it would trigger that esd system. with respect to shutting down a main engine, can you describe the sequence of events that would happen if those alarms triggered? >> if the fire dampers close, you lose your air intake to the engine and the engine would suffocate for lack of oxygen. i can say that thomas daniels explain to me one time that an esd got rid of him accidentally

and shut down an engine ventilation intake, and it's up to the fire doors off the hinges in the engine kept running. it was looking for air, and it just literally sucked the doors off the hinges. so those esd's were never tested because of that risk. so the function of them was to snuff out the engines. if it cannot get air, it cannot run. >> are you familiar with the term read saver? kent -- rig saver? >> i honestly do not know. >> we had some testimony from the trechief engineer.

is it your understanding, and i refer to that -- i believe is termed a standby generators. what is the difference between a stand by an emergency generator? >> an emergency generator would give you entire read power, where a standby generators is available to do very little, honestly. is there to assist you to get your main generators back on line. >> are you familiar with what happens if you have an engine running and a generator running, and for some reason it trips off the line, is there a standby ready to pick up the load all the time? in this case here, if the no. 3 engine tripped off the line and exploded for whatever reason, there was a designated secondary engine that should have started and picked up the load. >> correct. >> if in fact that secondary

engine does not start, what happens? >> within 10 minutes, the standby generators should have cranked. >> he said within 10 minutes. i believe that is also what [unintelligible] explain to us. is it your impression that that restart within 10 minutes is basically automatic, that no one needs to push additional bonds or switches are turnabouts or anything else to make that happen? >> that's how i was b.g.e. that is how i was explained that the system worked. the only testing of the standby generator, to my knowledge, was a manual start, just make sure it would crank and run. >> when the chief engineer was here, he explained to us that when you all went down to the backup generators location to try to start, that he switched it from automatic imanuel. do you recall that happening? >> yes, sir. >> would that be the normal

process as far as you understand it to start that generator? >> yes, sir. >> would that be because 10 minutes had not elapsed since the main shutdown -- since the shutdown of maine power plant gregoire >> we did not care about that. we wanted the generator on line. >> thank you. >> harry truman hated this movie. at the time, he was seen as the senator from the pending gas machine from kansas city. always wondered if he did not always wondered if he did not th