you are quoted as saying that as us and uk forces were preparing to invade iraq, you were asking "why now?" "she said it 'as explicitly as i could. i said something like, "the threat to us would increase because of iraq."'" going back to 2006, in 2006, if this date is correct, on 9 november, you gave a speech at queen mary college, london, in which you, in a slightly more round-about way, more or less made the same point about iraq. you said specifically that the interpretation by british moslems of uk foreign policy as anti-muslim in particular related to the uk's involvement in iraq and afghanistan. the foreign affairs committee of the house of commons in 2004

concluded that war in iraq had possibly made terrorist attacks against british nationals and british interests more likely in the short-term. now, how significant in your view a factor was iraq compared with other situations that were used by extremists, terrorists, to justify their actions? >> i think it is highly significant and the jic assessments that i have reminded myself of say that. by 2003/2004 we were receiving an increasing number of leads to terrorist activity from within the uk and the -- our

involvement in iraq radicalized, for want of a better word, a whole generation of young people, some british citizens -- not a whole generation, a few among a generation -- who were -- saw our involvement in iraq, on top of our involvement in afghanistan, as being an attack on islam. so although the media has suggested that in july 2005, the attacks on 7/7, that we were surprised these were british citizens, that is not the case because really there had been an increasing number of

british-born individuals living and brought up in this country, some of them third generation, who were attracted to the ideology of osama bin laden and saw the west's activities in iraq and afghanistan as threatening their fellow religionists and the muslim world. so it undoubtedly increased the threat and by 2004 we were pretty well swamped -- that's possibly an exaggeration -- but we were very overburdened by intelligence on a broad scale that was pretty well more than we could cope with in terms of threats to plot -- leads to threat plots and thing that we needed to pursue. of course, also we were dealing at that time with a number of young british citizens who went to iraq to fight not with her majesty's forces but against

them, and i can't now recall the numbers but it was quite a few. i think we thought about 70/80, something like that. i could check that. i can't remember exactly. but we became aware of this. obviously these individuals were not travelling to iraq directly but we became aware in iraq, where people were being taken into custody who were british citizens who had travelled there. so it became a strong motivation and in my speech in queen mary college i said this publicly. i think it is worth saying that i needed the approval of the home secretary to make any public speeches and he cleared the text with me, and john reid and i discussed that part of it and he agreed that i should say that in public.

>> so you're saying you had evidence that the iraq conflict, our involvement in the iraq conflict was a motivation, involved in the attacks in london in july 2005, who were going to afghanistan to fight. were there other attacks or planned attacks in which you had evidence that iraq was a motivating factor? >> yes. i mean, if you take the video wills that were retrieved on various occasions after various plots, where terrorists who had expected to be dead explained why they had done what they did, it features. it is part of what we call the single narrative, which is the view of some that everything the west was doing was part of a fundamental hostility to the

muslim world and to islam, of which manifestations were iraq and afghanistan, but which pre- dated those because it pre- dated 9/11, but it was enhanced by those events. >> so was support for an iraqi jihad, expressed like that, part of this single narrative spanning different extremist islamic groups? >> in some quarters, yes, and arguably we gave osama bin laden his iraqi jihad, so that he was able to move into iraq in a way that he wasn't before. >> the madrid bombing of march 11, 2004 appears to have been

related to iraq, a consequence of iraq -- perhaps an attempt to put pressure on the spanish government to withdraw its forces from iraq. were there other attacks that specific political effect, particularly to put pressure on governments to withdraw from iraq? >> so many plots, i wrote them down to remind myself because it is three years since i retired. i think we felt that madrid was significant because of its timing. i think that there are a number of other plots which may have had that political motive ultimately but i can't immediately recall one that we were as confident as that about.

>> could i just ask you, you said the timing of the madrid plot. is that because there was a new spanish government recently elected? >> no, it was during the elections. >> it was on the eve of the election. >> it was related to that political situation? >> well, it looked likely to be. and of course the spanish government, if you recall, rushed to attribute it to eta. i have some sympathy with my spanish colleagues because whenever an attack happened or was about to happen, we were pressed very quickly to say who had done it and we don't often know. evidenceu didn't have of an attack of that very specific kind being planned in britain to put pressure on the british government relating to an election or political events here, if you can recall? >> no. i mean, we were always concerned about terrorism in the run-up to elections but, no, not

directly. >> now, some witnesses that we have heard have argued that it was necessary or right to remove saddam's regime in order to forestall a fusion of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism which was, in their view, expected to come from iraq at some point after the war, beyond 2003. in your view did the toppling of saddam hussein eliminate a threat of terrorism from his regime? >> it eliminated the threat of terrorism from his direct regime. it didn't eliminate the threat of terrorism using unconventional methods of

chemical, bacteriological or indeed radioactive. so using weapons of mass destruction as a terrorist weapon is still a potential threat. after all osama bin laden said it was the duty of members of his organization or those in sympathy with it to acquire and use these weapons. it is interesting that we have -- such efforts as we have seen to get access to these sort of materials have been low-grade and not very professional, but it must be a cause of concern to my former colleagues that at some stage terrorist groups will resort to these methods. in that respect i don't think toppling saddam hussein is germane to the long-term ambitions of some terrorist groups to use them. >> from what you said earlier about the relatively small amount of resource that your service was required to give before 2003 to monitoring iraqi intelligence and potentially

terrorist activities in this country, and your very large focus on al-qaeda, there is an indication that you did not at that time see saddam hussein's regime as an important sponsor of terrorism directed at least against this country. >> that is correct. >> does it therefore follow from that that you don't subscribe to the theory that at some point in the future he would probably have brought together international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in a threat to western interests? >> it is a hypothetical theory. concerninly wasn't of in either the short term or the medium term to my colleagues and myself. >> overall, looking at the sort

of two, three, four years after the conflict began in 2003 -- and you have referred to the consistency of jic reports on this -- to what extent did the conflict in iraq exacerbate the overall threat that your service and your fellow services were having to deal with from international terrorism? >> substantially. >> and is this an impact that has continued beyond the time that you were director general, which was up to, i think, 2007? was it a long-term impact? >> i can't answer that because when i signed the official secrets act in april 2007 i had seen no secret intelligence until i reminded myself in preparation for appearing in front of you today. so you would have to ask my successor that. but it looks to me as though -- from reading the press, on which we now have to rely, with all the drawbacks of that -- that there is a continuing

problem, the threat is still severe, as i read it, and it has mutated and developed in different ways. but i cannot speak with authority on the threat today. >> you speak with the authority of a member of the upper house of the legislature -- >> which has no access to intelligence. >> and i'm sure you are well informed on current affairs. the final question from me -- once the decision had been taken to invade and the campaign had happened, were there actions that the coalition, in your view at the time, could have taken to mitigate the way in which the conflict was becoming a motivator for islamic extremists around the world? were there things that it could have done or should have done to mitigate that effect?

>> this is speculative but i think that planning for the peace, there is plenty of evidence that that wasn't done sufficiently or certainly not done by the americans. and i think that after the military success it was critically important to try and ensure that the lives of ordinary iraqis improved in substantial ways with the toppling of this dictator. the insistence, for example, of the americans on sacking, you know, much of the civil service and the army, the ba'athists, was an error. others much better informed than me will have given you evidence on that. i was asked on a visit to the united states on other matters to talk to paul wolfowitz about this issue and to seek to persuade him that it was not

sensible to do this. but if it had been possible to resolve things in a more constructive and better way than it turned out to be, it is possible the degree to which threats arose might have faded. but this again is hypothetical. the fact is that the threat increased, was exacerbated by iraq, and caused not only my service but many other services round the world to have to have a major increase in resources to deal with it. in 2003, having had an upgrade in resources after 9/11, which my predecessor agreed, and another small one in -- another one, not small actually, in 2002, by 2003 i found it necessary to ask the prime minister for a doubling of our budget.

this is unheard of, it's certainly unheard of today, but he and the treasury and the chancellor accepted that because i was able to demonstrate the scale of the problem that we were confronted by. >> a doubling of your budget because of iraq? >> well, the two are connected. the upsurge in leads in the uk was beginning -- was happening during the summer of 2002, getting increased during 2003 and really took off in 2004, and we got the money agreed in the autumn of 2003. so we were faced with the difficulty of doing a major expansion of the service, recruiting many more people, moving into new offices round the united kingdom, opening eight new offices, overhauling much of what we did, rethinking the way we did things, because

there wasn't any point in becoming twice as big and doing twice as much. we wanted to do five times as much. that was necessary because the amount of material and leads we had which we did not have the resources, even with extensive police help, to pursue. so alongside the creation of jtac, the development by david omand of the counter-terrorist strategy, we were going through a major change and expansion and dealing with the most over -- almost overwhelming amount of terrorist leads and terrorist plots that we had had for many years. >> can you recall who asked you to see paul wolfowitz and when approximately? >> no, i am afraid i haven't. >> what year are we talking about? >> oh dear. i think -- no, i would have to check that. i don't know. >> and you don't remember who

asked you to see him? >> it may have been the foreign office. you know, when people -- as director general, when i went to the united states, i sometimes was asked to do things for other departments. i think, if i recollect, at whatever stage it was, sort of almost any visitors to the united states were being asked to press on this particular issue and i think i was just one of many. and i was seeing him anyway. >> but you didn't convert him? >> not a hope. >> i think sir lawrence would like a follow-up question. >> yes, i would like just to go back to before the war. you were giving evidence, assessments of an increased risk of al-qaeda and other jihadist reactions to a potential war in iraq. could you give us a sense of the difference between the sort of things you were anticipating and what you actually experienced?

>> i think it is fair to say that we didn't foresee the degree to which the british citizens would become involved. our focus in the 1990s and earlier on these issues involved, for example, members of algerian extremist groups, members of libyan extremist groups and others. we had had an operation to which david omand referred in his evidence, which was a case in birmingham in 2000, where we retrieved and prevented the detonation of a large bomb. david omand said he thought that was related to al-qaeda.

that was the case at the time i thought i retired. we now think, i gather from my colleagues, it probably wasn't. but those were british citizens of bangladeshi origin planning an attack, target unknown, disrupted, convicted -- one convicted. but certainly i think during 2003/2004 we realized that this was not, as it were, the focus -- the focus was not foreigners. the rising and increasing threat was a threat from british citizens. that was a very different scenario to, as it were, stopping people coming in. it was what has now become called home grown. >> but prior to the war you were still anticipating a severe threat, but more likely from algerian or libyan persons? >> more likely also from al- qaeda abroad. i mean, al-qaeda had not focused

on the uk. it attacked us abroad in 2003 but it became clear that its ambition was to attack us in the united kingdom. so we had the heathrow plot, we had the canary wharf plot and so on. we had the shoe bomber, richard reid, we had the second shoe bomber, saajid badat, and we had a string of plots leading to convictions. it is not something i would have normally said in open session but when jacqui smith said it publicly, i think in 2008, that between 2001 and when she spoke there had been, i think she said, 16 substantial plots of which roughly 12 were stopped. 7/7 occurred, tragically. 21/7 would have occurred if they had been competent.

it was not detected in advance. richard reid was not detected in advance. there were -- obviously there is a judgment here about what constitutes a substantial plot -- roughly a dozen which were stopped and of those, many did involve other countries and people in other countries, but in most of them british citizens predominated. >> as part of the war, your view was that a war in iraq would aggravate the threat from whatever source to the united kingdom? >> yes. >> how did you communicate this view to the prime minister? >> it was communicated through the jic assessments, to which i fed in. >> there were jic assessments that warned of this threat. did you have any direct conversations yourself with the prime minister or other senior

members of the government, particularly about this issue? >> i don't recall with the prime minister -- i did talk about it with the home secretary. >> did you feel that this particular aspect of the overall assessment about the pros and cons of going into iraq was taken sufficiently account of? >> i think this is a difficult question because -- i mean, at some stage you are going to ask me about lessons learned. the imperative of the government was to do this and the view was, i think, implicit that if there was resulting terrorism, that would be dealt with in the medium term. so in a way it is a question of balancing the short and the medium term.

additionally, you could say that even if terrorism increases, that shouldn't stop you doing what you believe, as the government believed, to be right. i saw it as my job to continue to say, as objectively as i could, what our judgment of the terrorist threat was. that judgment was the service's at the beginning of this period and then became the jtac judgment. and that's, looking back through the papers, pretty consistent, as i think you agree. >> there wasn't any particular controversy amongst the intelligence agencies about that judgment? >> not that i recall, no. >> so are you confident then that there was no doubt in the government's mind that, as you say, weighing up all these different factors, which may not have been a determinant factor of whether to go to war or not, but the issue was there? >> i can't tell you to what extent senior ministers read the jic assessments. i don't know the answer to that.

i believe they did read them. but if they read them, they can have had no doubt. >> just a final question -- were there other issues unrelated to iraq in which you were able to talk directly to the prime minister? >> yes, i mean, i have -- the director general of the security service has the right in law to have direct access to the prime minister if he or she asks for it and i did see the prime minister regularly, usually in broad meetings with others, and more later on in the period than at the beginning of the period you are considering. >> but there was not a one-to- one on this particular issue. >> no. >> thank you. >> you said a little while back, in answer to a question from sir roderic lyne, that in your judgment the effect of the invasion of iraq was to substantially increase the terrorist threat to the united kingdom.

two questions really on that. how far is that really the hard- evidence-based judgment and how far is it a broad assessment? and the other is -- so many other forces are at work, particularly in overseas theaters -- there is the middle east issue in the round, there is pakistan, there is afghanistan, there is somalia, there is yemen -- where does iraq fit into that picture as a driver for an increase in terrorist threat to the uk and so on? >> i think we can produce evidence because of numerical evidence of the number of plots, the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the correlation of that to iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved, the discussions between them as to what they were doing. so i think the answer to your first question -- yes. the answer to your second -- it would be wrong to suggest that this is uk-centric. we were anxious -- i mean, again, people believe that

yemen has just come on to the radar. yemen was a real concern back in -- somalia, all these other places -- back at the millennium and iraq is not the only issue which has motivated terrorists in this area. it pre-dates iraq. if we get -- it post-dates iraq. but what iraq did was produce a fresh impetus of people prepared to engage in terrorism and i think that, if you asked me to produce evidence, i could produce that. >> given the interaction between terrorism and the counter-terrorism policies of the government on the one hand and the iraq situation both before, during and after the invasion itself, how were the two high-level policy areas brought together in government

in your time? >> well, they weren't at the beginning. i mean, david omand wrote contest with input from all of us, i think it was sort of 2002/2003. it wasn't actually published of course until 2006 and i would suggest it didn't really begin to have a substantial effect until probably 2005. so therefore at the stage that the government was deciding to take military action we had a pretty embryonic counter- terrorist policy and there wasn't a correlation between that and the iraq decisions. later on, the counter-terrorist policy encouraged in policy- making the thinking of the implications of actions more formally than had previously been the case. >> you spoke about jtac in the

beginning of your evidence this morning. jtac essentially are the tactical event level but did that drive a greater address to higher-level policy because of the stream of reporting from jtac? >> i think i dispute that it was all tactical. quite a lot of it was -- the reports are of different levels for different audiences. the point about jtac is it serves people from military commanders in the field to investigators in the police and the security service to policy development in the foreign office. so it has a range of different levels at which it reports and i think, as it has established itself and gained stature and credibility, that it is a substantial contribution to policy-making, again partly through the jic but also in its own right. >> thank you. this committee is fortunate in having two historians amongst its members and i would like to ask you a little bit about the

pre-history, if you like, of the security service insofar as it might relate to iraq later. i suppose, is it right, the formative modern history of your service was the cold war and then irish terrorism? were there lessons/experience from either, but particularly perhaps from northern ireland, that came to be relevant in addressing the iraq issue and counter-terrorism and -- >> yes, very much so. i think the experience of northern ireland, the mistakes made there, the length of time it took for the agencies to work constructively together, the police, the ruc in those days, the army, ourselves, the

but it helps inform the we approached this of experience i think it is the relationship with the police. the assistance that we have for moving the operation from intelligence investigative phase 2 and evidential arrest and prosecution stage. a mass of other useful experiences are approached and this counter terrorism threat. of course, it was not complete

because of threats that were different with irish republican terrorists. the threat was from the rest of us. it was not global. it did not come from anywhere in the world. irish terrorists were not interested in mass casualty some of those do not prevail. another issue that is different is that it had a recognizable structure. the good intelligence, you could draw. you cannot do that in al qaeda. it is a much looser structure. i found that our american colleagues certainly open to

discussing with us the lessons learned. and thinking about how to approach these new threats. it was not precise at all. i think it gave us an advantage. a lot of these tricky issues have been resolved. >> thank you parikh i would like to ask about lessons in the iraq years.

first. >> just one little point of freedman. did i understand you to say that you did not have a practice of blair? >> at all? any time, as i said earlier. cabinet room on a range of>> you didn't have the sort of meeting at which you could sit down with him once a quarter or whatever and run through the half-dozen things that might be on your mind and make sure that these were directly inputted to him and have a conversation about them? >> the main conversation was at least once a week with the home secretary. >> with the home secretary? >> yes, and that was a frequency again much more than some of my predecessors. i saw ministers -- a lot of ministers actually. i regularly saw the foreign secretary and defense secretary. i saw them in meetings, i saw them to brief them, much more extensively than my predecessors had done. so i was the main political -- the person in the government who answers for the security

service in parliament is the home secretary. i worked for three home secretaries, i saw all of them very regularly and discussed a range of issues, and you have seen some of those papers. >> so if messages were to get through to the prime minister about the expected impact of the iraq war on terrorism, it would have come through your participation in joint meetings, through the home secretary having talked to you and through jic papers? >> yes. >> those would be the channels. now, going back over the previous sort of 10 or 15 years, to the extent you can, had it been the practice at least for some of your predecessors for them to have scheduled bilateral meetings with the prime minister? >> pretty irregularly.

>> irregularly? >> hm-mm. i think some of my predecessors saw the home secretary very irregularly. i think that the sort of broad answer to your question is that as -- in the last decade the director generals of the security service have seen ministers at all levels much more extensively and much more frequently and have participated much more broadly in whitehall meetings than was once the case. that's quite understandable because, you know, in the days of the cold war -- i simplify -- but ministers tended only to be interested if there was a spy scandal. it was when terrorism from al- qaeda and its associates and sympathizers became a major political issue, then the role of director general of the

security service in participating in meetings became much more extensive. >> would you have any means of your direct access to the prime minister with that of the heads of the other agencies? >> i believe the head of sis saw him much more frequently than i did, for understandable reasons. >> thank you. >> i would like to ask two or three specific questions on lessons learned from the iraq experience from the standpoint of the security service and its director general and then to offer you the opportunity to give us any general reflections

you have. so the specific ones -- first, i suppose, as a member of -- and you have accepted, as it were, collective responsibility for the workings of the jic -- hindsight, the pre-conflict wmd assessments which have proved to be wrong, is there anything in the jic process that might be improved? we have had the butler committee. we now have this one. >> of course the butler committee said some very important things on this and i have thought about this. i wasn't really part of the jic at the stage where that dossier was being put together but obviously i was aware of it and my recollection -- i have two points, i think. the first is that we were asked to put in some low-grade, small intelligence to it and we refused because we didn't think it was reliable. but because of the nature of what we do, we had very little anyway. the second one really is the degree to which, if you are not an expert in the jic, you need -- your options for challenge

are, to a degree, limited. the people who knew about iraq and wmd were foreign office, ministry of defense, sis, dis, not my service. i have obviously thought whether my predecessor or i should have challenged more and i know that a degree of that intelligence on which too much reliance was put has been withdrawn as anyway unreliable. i think that -- and i think that in his evidence david omand talked about this interestingly -- i think the jic is essential in order to assess, analyze, calibrate raw intelligence into a report that can go to ministers. it is not a good thing for raw, unassessed intelligence to be

widely distributed because the wrong decisions can be made. so it has a very important role. at the same time i think that the jic has about it an aura which is undeserved. people talk in hushed tones about the joint intelligence committee. it is another whitehall committee. it is fallible. it produces some excellent things. it produces some less good things. reflecting back, with the wisdom of hindsight, there was an inadequate challenge. butler and david omand talked about it in terms of group- think and the psychology of everybody feeling it was going one way. i think the important thing about it is it should never --

its judgments -- it is always recognized and others must recognize that its judgments may be fallible. looking back through the jic reports, i think it was pretty good on the terrorist threat actually -- much less good on iraq. i think that the jic did try to go back and look at its past judgments and be self-critical and you will have seen papers on that. you will have also seen papers on the extent to which some of us thought it needed to be more self-critical. i don't know what it is like today.

it is always going to be an imperfect way of doing things but it is right that we try and do it like that because the alternative is anarchy. >> thank you. there is one general question arising out of that, which was looked at by the butler committee and we have now had evidence of it ourselves from a number of witnesses, and that is the extent to which ministers, who sometimes may be newly in office or newly in a relevant office, can be expected, simply by a kind of osmotic process, to understand the nature and use of intelligence, its fallibility, its bittiness, how to use it. do you think there is scope for a more systematic or ordered induction process for ministers when we need to rely on intelligence? >> certainly. this is not a new issue. throughout my career, even when quite junior, i have been involved in helping ministers to understand the inadequacies of intelligence. i spoke about this in my speech in the house of lords, the degree to which intelligence can be seductive, and dangerously seductive. but i think that for many years the intelligence and security agencies have sought to help incoming ministers -- i'm sure it is happening even now --

understand the nature of intelligence, the fact it is a source of information, it is rarely complete, it needs to be assessed, it is fragmentary. all those issues are very well documented, both before this inquiry and well known. my recollection is there used to be some formal induction for ministers, not just about, you know, not leaving their papers on a train and looking after their laptop, but some more formal discussion on how to understand and approach intelligence. i think that that is a valuable point, if it can be achieved. >> if it has fallen away, it should be restored, you say? >> yes. >> thank you. one last question on direct lessons from the iraq experience. given the limited nature of the security service's direct involvement in iraq but looking to the terrorist threat during

and afterwards, are there any lessons from the iraq experience that the security service has learned or has taken up? >> i think that -- i suppose what the lesson for the security -- and there are some broad lessons, but the lessons for the security service is the need to be pretty quick and responsive to changing circumstances. i think we were pretty quick to persuade the government that we needed to expand to meet this anticipate the degree to which, as i said, british citizens would become involved. i wrote to david blunkett -- or to john gieve, the permanent secretary at the home office, in 2004 to say -- i hope you have this letter. if not, i'm sure my colleagues can give it to you -- in the wake of operation crevice, to say that this operation

represented some issues of very real concern and that the government needed to be thinking about engagement with the muslim community, presenting these facts, the effect of foreign policy on domestic policy, a broad range of things -- this is march 2004 -- and i suppose i regret that we didn't anticipate some of that but it wasn't necessarily foreseeable. >> thank you. i wonder, are there some more general reflections you would like to offer at the end of this session? >> i think, chairman, you have really touched on them. the main one would seem to me to be the danger of over- reliance on fragmentary intelligence in deciding whether or not to go to war. if you are going to go to war, you need a pretty high threshold, it seems to me, to

decide on that, and i think there is very few who would argue that the intelligence was not substantial enough upon which to make that decision. i think the second point would be really the point you picked up on of making sure that the immediate imperative, as the government saw it, to forestall saddam hussein was connected with the medium-term increases in the threat and the two were seen together in a way that they, i suggest, were not entirely. the third one should be, of course, by focusing on iraq, we ceased to focus on the al-qaeda threat or we reduced the focus on the al-qaeda threat in afghanistan. i think that was a long-term,

major strategic problem. there were issues about structure, the cabinet office, which i think you have covered. i think those are my main ones. >> with that then, i'll close this session. our thanks to our witness. we will resume at 11.30 am, when we will take evidence from major general andy salmon. so that ends this session. thank you very much. >> this is about 40 minutes. >> "washington journal" continues. host: we want to welcome sonal verma, the d.c. chapter chair of american immigration lawyers assocation. we want to go to the process of

how those a become american citizens. what are the requirements for nationalization? guest: you have to be 18 years or older. you had to offend a legal resident for three years or far years.-- or five years. you have to provide continuous physical presence. you have to have continuous of physical presence. you have to have permanent residence for the five years preceding the time you file for citizenship. you cannot have committed crimes or done certain things against laws of the united states. host: as you look at the process, how has it changed in the last 50 or 100 years? is it more complicated or easier to become a u.s. citizen? guest: it is more complicated.

it is more complicated to become of legal permanent resident of the united states. people travel worn out. the world has become global. so when people travel and they are a legal permanent resident, they are spending more time outside the united states and it is difficult to show the permanent residence prior for applying for the naturalization process. host: these questions are available from the web site of the department of homeland security. what is the rule of law? what does the judicial branch do it? why do some states have more representatives than other states? what is freedom of religion? what is one right or freedom and the first amendment? some of those born in this country could not answer those questions. guest: the immigration and

naturalization service has a terrific website. anyone planning on filing their application can go to the united states citizenship and immigration service website, www.uscis.gov, and there are study guides. there is a list of 100 questions asked on the civics exams. there is a lot of preparatory material available so they can prepare and be confident going into their citizenship interview and taking their civics and english exam, which is another part of what is required in order to become a citizen of the united states. host: we have on line for those of you going to the process of applying for citizenship. that is 202-628-0184. otherwise, we have a dedicated phone lines for democrats, republicans, and independents.

in talking about this segment, we discussed about what happened when folks came through ellis island from europe a century ago. what did happen to those immigrants here? how long was the process? guest: the process to travel here was several months on a vote. when they came to ellis island, they were herded into a large room, basically, a large area, and individually they would have to show where they were from, who were, what their profession was, and provide health screening. they would get screening there on the premises. now that is not part of the naturalization process. the four met at that time was a very primitive compared to what is now -- the four met at that time was very primitive compared to what is now.

as we have now, it is a more organized process. we have the law available to allow for naturalization. back then, you were a chinese citizen. you are from china. you were not allowed to be a citizen. there were other rules at play that now are not available. host: i want to go back to one requirement, the ability to read, write, and speak english. we are a bilingual country. many people speak spanish. if you go to an atm, it is in english or spanish. in a recording, it is english or spanish, and many are critical of that. guest: i think the criticism is unfounded. to allow people to participate in united states, to make certain concessions to allow them to bank oor to move

forward is fine, but i think, also, to have the english requirements in the civic requirements are necessary to show that they do want to become progressive members of our society, to participate. one of the the freedoms you get when becoming a citizen is to vote. to understand what the issues are, to vote, it is necessary to know english. host: sonal verma is with the american immigration lawyers assocation. harris arkansas, pennsylvania, good morning. caller: i do not have a problem with people who want to come here legally. it is people who come here illegally to jump over the fence and create a burden for our society. if they do the necessary progress to become a citizen, i do not have a problem with that. it is the people who come over here illegally, take the jobs,

use up our health care, cause all the financial crises that california is experiencing right now. you know, we can be realistic about the problem, but government wants to get too involved in it and they do not want to do the right thing. that is my comment. host: thank you. guest: in order to become a citizen, you have to be a legal permanent resident and have a green card. that is not an issue that would affect the citizenship process, because you have to go through a number of steps in order to become of legal permanent resident prior to applying for citizenship. host: next is marked from miami, someone going to the process right now. mark, good morning to you. caller: yes, i am going to the process now. host: where are you from? caller: canada.

i have been a resident alien for several decades. i love the united states and i want to star participating in the political process. my question is, when you are applying as a resident alien, you have to relinquish your resident alien card and its status. is it true that if you do not pass your naturalization test, that you have it then therefore lost your resident alien status, too? guest: no, that is not correct. you can only lose your resident alien status by appearing some of -- by committing some crime or fraud. you will not lose it by relinquishing your car. by not passing the sixth exam or retaining u.s. citizenship, you will not lose your legal permanent residents -- by not passing the civic exam.

host: bonnie joins us from oklahoma on the democrats' line. are you with us? good morning. caller: i am 61 years old, and after googling the best place in the world, i find united states is not the best any more. host: were is the best? caller: norway. host: to you want to move? caller: yes. after living in 10 different states and the things i've seen in the people i've met, i am sad for our country know. guest: let me use your call to ask you about the reverse. if you have u.s. citizens who want to move to our land or norway, what is your process? guest: it depends on each individual country, just as the

united states has a set parameter of laws to apply for citizenship. each, individual country outside the united states will have their own at method by which to determine who can be a citizen. in europe, the vast majority of countries have a points system which allows you to become a legal resident. then they have a certain period of time within which you have to file for citizenship of that country. but each country has its own laws and they are very different from the united states laws appeare. host: sonal verma is from the american immigration lawyers assocation. nina joins us from villanova, pennsylvania, on the republican line. caller: good morning. if one is applying and their parents are citizens of -- from india or pakistan -- what is the

weight once -- the wait once the child, the citizen, has applied for their parents to come? immigrant lawyers that are not charging hundreds of thousands of dollars, do you know of any? i heard in some cases where the poor people are trying to get their elderly parents legally into the united states and they are having trouble with the process because these lawyers are extending these cases on and on it just to get hundreds of thousands of dollars sometimes. i would appreciate that. one more question. there is a business be said that is offered to individuals wanting to invest in the united states and then they are offered a green card, i believe. i wish the obama administration would look into this policy,

because they are asking for $1 million or more for some of these investors. if they could lower the borrower, invest in real a state, $100,000 investment, that would increase our economic situation and bring these immigrants, who are going through missouri. some of these developing countries, they want to come in legally, yet they cannot because of these economic issues. if they lower the borrower, and say you can invest in r, country you will get a green card. that will make it easier on everyone. host: thank you. guest: let me address your first question with respect to how long it takes a u.s. citizen to bring their parents from abroad. it takes less than a year to bring your parents from abroad. they come in as legal permanent residents and once they established their residency with

physical presence, they can file for their citizenship within four years and nine months of having entered the united states. it is a quick and easy process, actually. your second question, with respect to the list of good attorneys available, you can contact the american immigration lawyers association and to do research. you want to look online for attorneys and see if they are members of the american immigration lawyers assocation. i would like to encourage everyone to steer clear of people holding themselves out to offer immigration advice or legal advice. they are not licensed attorneys. we have seen significant issues with respect to these individuals providing erroneous advice to people and causing more problems than they are helping with. so you do want to seek a good, licensed attorney. it should not cost hundreds of

thousands of dollars to bring apparent from abroad. it is a very reasonable thing that most immigration attorneys do. with respect to the investor visa, there is a tiered structure. it is a very complex situation. there is information available on line with respect to the base amount of investments needed and the requirements and which countries can participate in the process. there is actually some conversation happening right now as to whether or not they are going to try to introduce changes or introduce bills that will enable investment in the united states to be a better avenue by which people can enter and become legal permanent residents of the united states of america, and that is something i am looking forward to seeing more of. host: for more information, log on to alia.org.

we also have all linked available through our web site at c-span.org. our producer is from trinidad. can he have dual citizenship? guest: the united states does not have dual citizenship, but if trinidad recognizes it, he can maintain his citizenship and all the rights and privileges that go along with trinidadian citizenship. whenever he enters the united states, he has to use a u.s. passport in order to maintain it citizenship here. host: as part of the process, you get fingerprinted. once that is completed, how long do you wait for the exam? guest: that is a million-dollar question right there. sometimes you can wait two months. sometimes you may be waiting six months after you did your fingerprints taken. it depends on where you are in the united states.

each district office has its own processing time, but you are looking at a general period of 10-12 months from the time of filing for application to the time you are sitting for your oath ceremony. in the grand scheme of things, for everything else you apply for immigration, he is not as lengthy process. host: brian has this question -- true or false? our legal residents required to carry their green cards at all time? guest: the law states they are required to carry evidence of their legal permanent status. host: augusta, georgia. tell us your story. caller: yes, i just filed. i was going to the oath ceremony, but between the test i took, they told me i had a citation, a citation for

disorderly conduct, and they told me i could not go through the oath ceremony unless is show good moral character. they dropped my citation and probation. and i am still waiting for that. host: where are you from? caller: i am from tunisia, north africa. i lived here since 1998 with a green card. i got a wife. i went through this process, and i was there until they told me i cannot go through because of that citation. guest: you have to establish a good moral character for five years. if the citation occurred during that five-year period of time, you have to start the clock over again from the time the citation occurred until the time you filed your application.

it is not going to permanently bar you. and depending on what the citation is 4, it will not permanently bar you, but you may have to wait a little longer. host: our people from friendly nations given more priority? if you are from somalia versus someone from canada or great britain, are friendly nations given preference? guest: in the citizenship process, no. everyone is treated the same way in filing their application. caller: hi. i keep having to remind people that ronald reagan gave a huge amnesty when he was in there and i think it is too hypocritical for conservative folks to forget that and to act like the liberals today are being so soft on immigration and wanting to be so soft.

if we are going to move forward, and reagan did not put down any more effort at the border, we will have to do that. we will have to crack down at the border and have to have a good idea requirement. but we will also have the re-do what he did with immigration. i write about that on my blog. paul brown, my congressman, things the civil war should not .have been fought have now in thewe united states is due to several factors. we have seen an increase in the number of people coming to the united states, but we have also seen an increase of the number of people staying here. in 1996, there was a law that was passed that said if you are in the united states for six months or longer, you are ba

rred from returning for three years if you leave. if you are out of status for over 12 months and you leave, you are barred for 10 years from returning. what this law created was a hostage situation, where people who spend time out of status in the united states, and do not feel they can return to their home country because then it will not be allowed to return to the united states. you have to go through a waiver process and it is a very complex situation to qualify. so we have a lot of people here right now who without the 3 and 10 year bars, would be able to return to their home countries. we have not addressed that as a country. we just see the increase in number is compiling simply because we are keeping these people here. we are keeping people from

returning to their home countries. no one wants to stay here and not be welcome, but we are not allowing them to return. host: dana joins us -- dan joins us from tulsa. caller: good morning. my fiancee is from mexico. it has spent 13 years. since then, she has been a model citizen, a single mother that has raised her child care. the child was not born here, a homeowner. owned her home for eight years as a single mother. and she had filed for citizenship. i am afraid she has lost in the system. you know, her english, she may not have worked on it like she should have come up -- it seems money is the key to everything,

as in being able to acquire an attorney to represent her. i know you talked about it, but it seems, if you have money, you can get things taken care of. but just being a good citizen and working at all low-wage, the attorney fees are too much. guest: ok. i don't know if she has already filed for naturalization or she was a legal permanent resident. it sounds like she is going to the process and perhaps has not heard back. i do not know how long it has been since the time of filing. you can call the customer service line. you can call it. if you have received, you can ask them for the status of your case -- with a receipt. you can go to the website and

plugged in at the receipt number and see where it is in the process. host: let me bring up the 14th amendment. some republicans call for repealing the amendment set in place after the civil war to make sure that slaves could be u.s. citizens. is that the right alternative? guest: i do not think it is the right alternative. amending the 14th amendment to appease a certain political goal is not what we do in the united states. the 14th amendment achieves citizenship for everyone in the united states who was born in united states. it did not discriminate against who you work. there is a small line of supreme court cases that upheld the 14th amendment in various situations. it provides equal protection to people within our borders.

and to use the 14th amendment as a pawn for political purposes is, frankly, disturbing. host: sonal verma is with the american immigration lawyers assocation. yusef joins us. good morning. caller: i think we should let all the mexicans, all the haitians, all the jamaicans, we should let all of them into the country because this is god's land. this land belongs to god. if we allow them to come in, we can fight with these jews, who divide people with immigration. host: wait. why do you say that? caller: man, look at the history of the jews? anytime you thought anything jewish, you cut people off. you do not hear people.

host: i would say the same for any ethnic or religious group. caller: if you look at the history of them, they have always divided people by race, by color, by finances. it is the jews behind all of this stuff. there is no such thing as immigration which should allow everybody into this country. this is back to the original land. we're with the jews be at? host: did you want to respond? guest: no. host: where are you from, dom? caller: i am originally from mauritania. host: how long have you been in the united states? caller: june, 2002. host: why did you come here? caller: political problems in my country. i feared for my life.

after so many prosecutions in mauritania, i felled my country and applied for asylum. . .

host. host. blah blah blah. caller: bra blah blah (202)737-0002 (202)737-0001 (202)628-0205 (202)628-0184 sonal verma.org cspan.org.org julia angwin (202)737-0002 (202)737-0001 (202)628-0205 (202)628-0184 (202)737-0002 (202)737-0001 (202)628-0205. (2. guest: anyone says anything from 12 to 18 million. host: host: it's red herring. it's not the economic or political issue that people make

it. i think that's very true to a certain degree. i think the arguments that are made for the economic problems that are created by people who are here without documentation have been blown out of proportion. you have a lot of people in the united states who are hard working, paying taxes, who will never get tax refunds, never obtain any money back in social security, they are paying into the system. when people come here, whether they're undocumented or here on proper visa, or whether they're legal permanent residents, they send money. they go to the grocery stores, restaurants and malls. the sales taxes, revenue generated for small businesses by people in the united states are helping our economy, rather than hindering our economy. it goes back to why do we have

these undocumented people in the united states? they are here, that increase in numbers has been seen in the past 14, 15 years simply because of the situation i'm going back to. people are not discusses it that often. without it, you would see more back and forth migration, what was happening pre1996 where people returned back and had more opportunity to go through borders, rather than staying here. without the preentenure bars, we had fewer undocumented people, and more people who could in some capacity file for a visa, or to obtain some sort of normal status in the united states in some way. that was a whole line of method

that people do not have anymore. host: you are encouraged to join this conversation on line. how about the parents can be legal residents, but never citizens after having children here. guest: i don't know that that's a very good suggestion. i think that would cause a lot more, you know, with all the argument about the fourteenth amendment right now, i don't think that's something that's going to go very far. the conversation, the reason that the fourteenth amendment has been brought up, we're talking about people who would come here, have their children in the united states, automatically by their birth in the united states become citizens. the conflict has arisen by saying that they're somehow

affording their undocumented parents a path to citizenship. the background is these babies have to grow up, attain 21 years of age, and they have to petition for their parents to become legal permanent residents, after which time, five years later, their parents can attain citizenship. in order to be petitioned for legal residents, those bars are going to kick in, and those warrants are going to have a 10 year, wait the process and come back. the problem that everyone is raising with respect to people being born in the united states, and that horrible term anchor babies is really what's really happening out there, what can happen, because you're talking about waiting at least 31 years before a foreign national can become a legal resident in the united states. host: a few more of your phone

calls, sonal verma, welcome to the washington journal. are you with us? host: no. host: where are you with us from. caller: nigeria. caller: host: how long? caller: 40 years. i'm a two-time veteran of the armed forces, navy and army, and i have tried to get my citizenship when i was in the military, and they told me i have to pay $500, and i was wondering after serving in the military for about 10 years, why do i have to pay to become a u.s. citizen? guest: that's a good question. currently, there are certain

expedited procedures by which people serving in the military can attain u.s. citizenship, but you've, of course, he should already, and it seems are not currently serving, so you would have to go through the application process, and that's a fee that's paid to the u.s. immigration and citizenship service, a fee based agency, that's how they operate. the current fee for filing is $595 plus a biometrics fee. that's how they look at your background to determine whether you have any criminal acts in your past. host: bennett is joining us from danville, kentucky from the republican line. caller: good morning. i'd like to ask your guest there, given that back in 2000,

there were reports that the gore-lieberman folks were registering voters in florida that were non-citizens, other penalties whether legal or illegal aliens, if they were to register or vote in an election, are there penalties for those who encourage this or if a as i will taillight any illegal vote for a non-citizen. guest: that's a terrific question. yes, there are penalties for fraudulently carrying yourself as a u.s. citizen when you are not, and there are penalties for having someone sign up to become for assisting and aiding in such fraud. the distinction that you made that i want to make clear is sometimes people don't know that they can or whether they can or cannot register to vote.

in those circumstances, it is very important to insure that you're rights are represented by a very competent professional to help you sift through the morass, because if you have a fraud, someone believes you have committed fraud, you will be barred permanently from achieving citizenship, and if you're a resident, may have it taken away from you depending on the level of fraud. you really would want to seek counsel to try to assist you to get out of that. like i said, there's people out there that are going to do things like the notarios, do things that are going to cause more harm than good. host: jason cooper says thank you. it's wonderful to see someone express concern over the term "anchor babies. guest: that's a terrible term.

i'm a farmized u.s. citizen born in the united states and been able to attain e.u. citizenship. while a person coming from the united states must announce citizenship, how is it i'm able to hold dual citizenship. guest: the united states does not recognize dual citizenship, but the country you're going to may. depending on where you are in the european union, they may recognize dual citizenship. when you return to the united states, you won't be able to return using the european passport, your entry would have to take place with your u.s. passport. host: the debate continues,

30 million illegals are in this country. guest: it's difficult to pin down the number of people in the united states. the census is not taking into account who is here illegally and legally. not everyone is raising their hand to be counted like that. it is difficult to assess the number of people in the united states and who are undocumented. host: steve says please ask if expatriation is growing. guest: i think it is by degrees. it's some people going back to their home countries. many people are in line waiting for their status. legal aliens working here have been just waiting and waiting and waiting before they can get

permanent residence, and now they are tired of it and are going back home. host: next we have a caller from the republican line. good morning. caller: good morning. host: please go ahead, rick. caller: i brought my wife here on a fiancee visa. we have been married for 3.5 years. she got her temporary residency card in january. guest: ok. caller: now we have to go, there's some kind of interview. if we don't go to it, they said they'd revoke her status. host: where is she from, rick? from ukraine. guest: she attained her green card. you said that she attained a 10 year green card or two year green card. caller: right now she has her 10 year green card. guest: had she been married to you for two years or longer when

she attained it? caller: our anniversary was april 27, so three years. guest: who told you that you needed to have another interview? caller: the uscis. guest: generally speaking, when a citizen marries a foreign national and they attain permanent legal residence, they get a conditional green card, a two-year conditional green card. at the two year anniversary of attaining that, you file to remove the conditions of the green card, and then ultimately attain the 10 year green card. in your situation, i'm a little confused in that you've been married for over two years, she has a 10 year green card. i would suggest that you seek counsel to try to get that sorted out, because that doesn't sound like a normal situation. host: caller joins us from

philadelphia, also in the process of becoming a u.s. citizen. go ahead, please. caller: i am in the united states fourth time as family-based green card. i returned to my home country after six months, because i wanted to finish off my education there. i filed my return permit, where i can return to the united states within two years, so i returned to united states after 1.5 years in 2006, july. now, according to the uscs, i can file my citizenship after four years and one day, because i applied for my return permit, and i, so that counts towards my

five years, is that correct? guest: i think you would need to sit down with the dates, sit down with someone and count out each and every day. generally speaking, you have four years and nine months from the time of obtaining your permanent legal residence before filing for your application for citizenship. at the five year mark, you are eligible for that citizenship. the reentry permit gives you that one year towards meeting the permanent residency requirements if filed correctly. you also have to look into the continuous physical presence requirements and make sure you have had 30 months in the preceding five year period of physical presence in the united states. host: if ultimately, you are denied, what is the process. guest: it depends on the reason for the denial. if it's an eligibility factor, meaning you applied at three

years and not five years, you apply when you are eligible. if it is for a mistake, somehow, you are confused with someone else, which occurs occasionally, or because they have determined that your eligibility factors, that you don't warrant the eligibility, or if there's-it depends on the reason for the denial. you can appeal the denial of the n400 directly to the district office. ask for a motion to reopen or reconsider and present evidence as to why you believe that you are eligible. if for some reason it is an eligibility factor, you are allowed to reapply for citizenship. you >> coming up on "