>> it might have come from resolution 687. i forget actually. i remember that muhammad al- baradei was the one who pushed it very hard when we saw the vice president ramadan and i always thought this is a dictatorship passing a piece of legislation, it should be easy for them, and i thought it was a bit of sloppiness that they didn't go along with it. they did enact something at the end, but i remember that we considered it inadequate and demanded more, but i never thought the issue was big. it was something they should do very easily. .

they had difficulties with that. we also had difficulties, and it took some talks with them to get the resolution.

i wanted to have german drawn, and somehow this diluted their objections they made. this is this element of humiliation that the u.s. was humiliating them, but if they thought it was international, it was difficult, but it took some time. >> when was that? >> i think february. >> 2003? >> yes. the americans would not shy away, but there was persistence in the iraqi side, and i have a feeling they would try.

>> my final thing has to do with interviews. how much importance did you give to interviews? >> interviews were important throughout. that was our experience that if you had direct talk with someone in science, a cautious conversation was helpful, and many things happened on the sides. we also set of separate interviews. they also wanted to be able to show to authorities they had not said anything wrong.

it took place in the hotel. we assumed they would have one somewhere fear a good i remember he felt that was perfectly normal and believed he did get the truth out of them. i was pushed, and eventually i talked with them. it was also included in the solution. first i thought they would kidnap them and take them

abroad. i asked the americans. they have relatives at home. do you think we should put them in jeopardy? they said they can take their families along. i said how many can they take a long? they said up to a dozen. i never thought we would have got much from it, so we would appreciate them saying this is what you need to do. you should order them to come along. i also thought they would get some people who would use the occasion to get out of iraq. >> just to be clear, you said you would have eventually done so if you had been given more

time? >> yes, yes. the pressure from the british it. >> but how many interviews did you manage to complete by the time you left on march 18, 2002? >> well, it depends what youyou know, we had many, many>> in satisfactory conditions. let me put it that way. >> well, there were not so many, but there were a number -- perhaps less than ten which had that there would be no minder present and no tape recorder. the iaea caved in and they accepted i think the presence of a minder. we said, "no. conditions, we don't do it at>> what assessment would you cooperate with you on the basis you conducted the interviews? non-cooperation? >> well, there was a reluctance

certainly but it might also have had to do with the people whom we would call for the interviews. they must also -- they had nothing to hide after all. so that could not have been the reason. if the people said, "well, there are chemical weapons," then they would not have been telling the truth, so they couldn't really have been afraid of that, but they might also have felt, "yes, you are putting these guys in a difficult spot," and try to protect them. i don't i think asked my question -- we suspected, of course that, there were people who knew something that could reveal something, but the iraqis were in a different situation. they knew there were no weapons. >> thank you. >> on a side point, dr. blix, how did you manage for interpreters? did you bring in your own universally or did you accept locally-based interpreters?

>> i am not sure i really remember how that was. we had some, but very few who spoke arabic. we had an american woman of lebanese extraction and she was the one who was --one of those who was active and when we found the stash of nuclear documents, which was quite important, because there were women in the house, and to be searched by male foreign inspectors in the house would have been objectionable to them. she was quite helpful, but i don't -- i can't really tell you whether they were local or not. >> thank you. i will ask sir roderic to pick up the questions. >> we have had the argument made to us that three and a half months was plenty of time for the iraqis to demonstrate whether or not they were genuinely willing to cooperate with the inspections process. by the time you left, by the

time perhaps you finally reported to the security council, had iraq handled the inspections in a way that allowed you to think at any point that they were genuinely cooperating, that they really had nothing to hide? >> well, as i reported in february 2003, i was beginning to feel hopes. this was on february 24, i think. then on -- but very cautiously. then on march 7, i was a bit more upbeat, shall we say. i thought it was, both then and in retrospect, a bit curious that precisely at the time when we were going upward in evidencing cooperation, at that very time the conclusion from the uk side and also from the us side was that no, inspections are useless. they don't lead us anywhere. they don't cooperate.

that was the moment when we presented the cluster document to mr. straw, who had read this document on the plane. i don't know whether he should have had it because he got it through the british member of the college of commissioners and the american -- powell had also got it through an american member of the commission and other members of the security council were not in that situation. anyway straw had read it on the plane and he was -- to him this was an enormous revelation, that here the iraqis had obstructed and they had concealed all the way. now that referred mainly to the 1990s. that was a description of unscom. our starting point was the unscom document 1999-94 which described all these cases. there were also descriptions in the amorim report.

we had refined it and taken a lot of time and lot of work over this document. it was prepared because the resolution 1284 required of us to present a work program. that work program should zero in on key remaining disarmament issues. now in order to identify which were the key remaining disarmament issues, we had to look at all the unresolved disarmament issues and then cull and select from those which ones did we think were key. we had to vet that with the college of commissioners. this is what we did. it took longer time than i would like to, but there was not so much new in it. the unresolved issues from the 1990s remained. they were listed by unscom. there was additional information, yes, in the declaration of the autumn. there was additional information through the inspections already carried out, but not so much. it was not in my view a very revealing document. it was to be the basis for our selection of key issues, but when mr. straw read it on the plane, he felt, "well, this is it.

this is how they behaved all the way through the 90s and this is the way they are behaving now." the only trouble was that at that very moment i was reporting to the security council, "this is not quite the way they are behaving now. they are behaving much better. they are changing, maybe under american military pressure, but certainly to me they are behaving much better." so to me there was something very ironic about the cluster document. we had made it available to the security council because the british were working on the benchmark resolution. they had concluded, as unmovic did, that maybe you cannot solve everything. unmovic said, "we will go for key issues." the benchmark approach was to find six -- six they settled for -- issues, solve these in the limited time and then we can come back and solve another six and that will show cooperation. now which issues were they to select for solution? it then occurred to me, "look here, we are working on a document here which will spell

out the issues in the most update form and we will ourselves use it to select issues." so why should we make it available? we hesitated a bit to make it available, because here was the uk and others working on a resolution and it was not our task to side with anybody in the security council helped by resolution and others. i sounded out the americans and the others. there was no objection to our making this document available a bit in advance of the moment when it was to be an appendix to our work document. so we circulated it. so the intention was to help the uk delegation in selecting, in culling a number of cases which would allow more inspection and possible solution. instead then when it was on the table mr. straw was amazed and puzzled. why hadn't blix presented this earlier? he didn't say we had withheld it but he was amazed it had not

been done earlier. this was sensational. i don't think anyone else took it as sensational. it was reporting of the concealment and obstructions in the 1990s but not much more than that. so it came to be used actually to the meaninglessness of inspections rather than as a means which would have helped to continue inspections. >> i think sir martin may want to come back on the benchmarks document in a minute. in terms of your broad judgments about cooperation resolution 1441 had demanded immediate, unconditional and active cooperation. had iraqi behavior at any point corresponded to that? >> well, the interpretation of what is immediate, what is active and what is unconditional is, of course, up to security

council and was also up to us. i concluded in the security council that they had not been immediate, no. i had discussed it with condoleezza rice and she said, "at least you must concede that point." i said, "yes, that's true. it was not immediate." unconditional? well, one can discuss that. i said to the council -- i asked the question, "have they done that?" i said, "i have described what they have done. you judge for yourself. we can have a preliminary view, our modest, humble view on it, but on immediacy, no, i don't think i would claim it has been immediate." >> even under what was obviously growing, very serious military pressure, threat of military action, after three and a half months they had not opened the doors widely enough to convince you that they really had nothing to hide. they had had time to do so. they had given you some hopes, as you say, that the cooperation was improving after a long time

under this pressure, but could they not have done an awful lot more. unconditional means unconditional, but clearly you had been hemmed in by obstructions of one kind or another which are de facto conditions. >> somewhat obstructed. they had opened the doors. i had said on some occasions it is not enough to open doors. you also have to be proactive. i think that's what they became when they came up with the idea of further excavations, for instance. that was a secondary response to our demands that they give us names of those who took part in the unilateral destruction. so i think they were coming to be proactive, but it was rather late. it was after three and a half months. >> you can see even more clearly i am sure than saddam hussein the build-up, and i am sure you

could sense the shortening of the american timelines towards taking action. now if you felt that the americans had misinterpreted iraqi behavior and that iraq was genuinely cooperating, could you not have said very starkly to the security council that you really believed that iraq was now cooperating in a way that did not allow -- or did not make action appropriate? could you have been clearer in what you said to the council about this? >> well, muhammad al-baradei was a little more forthcoming. he said he thought there should be more inspection and it would be an investment in peace, i think that's the expression he used. i would not go that far. i would have felt a little presumptuous telling the council exactly what to do.

i rather phrased the other way. i said, "people are asking me how much more time will be needed. i said it will not be weeks, it will not be years, but months." i mean, it would have been hard to give a general answer what is immediate, unconditional or active. proactive it was not done till february, and i think they certainly were scared, but would we would not have been able to come to that point even with 250,000 men next door? you see, that was the question -- when was the invasion to take place? there are several people, including some of your witnesses, who said that it could have been in the autumn of 2003. so the decisive time for responsibility going to the war is what they knew in march 2003, but to avoid the war i think it was more the diplomacy in the autumn of 2002 that was decisive. if they had kept this pressure that was so important to get the iraqis moving, if they had

kept the pressure at 100,000 men or whatever it was and kept it up and sounded threatening, maybe we would have had the same cooperation, but once they went up to 250,000 men, and the time march was approaching, i think it was an unstoppable -- or almost unstoppable. the president could have stopped it, but almost unstoppable. after march the heat would go up in iraq and it would be difficult to carry out warfares. condoleezza rice denied the temperature played any role but i think reading other testimony i think it did play a role. the whole military timetable, as was rightly said, was not in sync with the diplomatic timetable. the diplomatic timetable would have allowed more inspections. uk wanted more longer inspections, but the military timetable did not permit that. as i have said, sometimes perhaps a little gruffly, the uk remained a prisoner on that

train. >> you yourself, as you said, thought it would be presumptuous for you to state your own opinion on this more clearly than you did in the council. >> yes. i listed precisely what they had done. it was very fair, balanced reporting on the cooperation we had received and the hitches and the humps that we had met, and the council was perfectly capable of judging that themselves. >> you said a few moments ago that you sensed that the attitude of the british changed at a certain point. did you feel at the beginning of this period that the british were genuinely cooperating, genuinely keen for the inspection process to work so that military action could be avoided? >> yes. >> but at the end of the process did you still have that feeling or not? >> no. i thought that straw was giving up around march 10.

they tried the benchmark approach, which i approved. i mean, i saw it as something hopeful, but said to your prime minister, "look, the benchmark must be doable. if they put something in -- which i realized iraq could not do -- then the conclusion after going through the benchmark will simply be no, they are obstructing and hence there will be an authorization to go to war." so i said they must be doable and i discussed the issue with the prime minister and we handed over this cluster document. but then my suspicion, and this is more speculation, is that the us at the time were not so keen on the benchmark approach. i think straw reports they were in favor of it but i think when you read what greenstock says he was not so sure about it. i think the americans probably

saw the risk maybe they will comply here and succeed and then it is prolonged. whereas others like myself saw a chance that this would be accepted and we would go on to the next benchmark and we would be in april and it would have been too late for an invasion. so when it was seen then that the us will not go along with any prolongation of inspections and there would be an invasion, i think that was the moment when it was discovered that the cluster document indicated that inspections were meaningless. >> you also referred just now to pressure from tony blair, among others, on you to interview

scientists outside iraq. more generally did you feel -- did you experience pressure from the british government while you were acting as an inspector? >> no. i must say we had excellent relations with the british extremely high regard for jeremy greenstock and i think we had very good cooperation with also very good all the way through. i had never any complaint. the americans also did not exert that much pressure i would say. at the beginning they came to us and said they thought we should carry out inspections in such and such a way. we should begin from the top and we should look for documents rather than anything else, and go in in big swarms. we didn't take their advice and they didn't complain. we knew what we wanted to do and they didn't complain. the only real pressure i felt was at the end when an assistant secretary of state came to me and talked about the pilotless, automatic planes and this contraption. this was the only moment. then he thrust some photographs

on my table and i asked where did they come from. they said, "we are not going to tell you." i assumed then that they had some mole in iraq, there was leakage at least to the us, i never thought there was a leakage to the iraqis. i am not so surprised. some people thought we were bugged in new york. my only complaint about that is they could have listened more carefully to what we had to say. >> in an interview you gave in december of last year to the daily mail, the daily mail claimed, but it is not in direct quotes from you -- it is from the mail -- it claimed, "in an interview with the mail hans blix revealed that mr. blair tried to force him to change his mind about the absence of weapons of mass destruction in iraq to placate the americans." is that an accurate encapsulation of your views?

>> no, no. >> it is not? >> i re-read the interview the other day and it's a lengthy one. it was made in my presence, and it was not given to me and i didn't request to have it submitted to me, but there are a number of things in it which i would not have chosen to subscribe today. i take responsibility for things that i have written myself and are on record, but, as you know, in interviews which are not checked, they can well slip in things that you do not feel that you are saying. this is one. i don't think that blair tried to persuade me. >> finally at this stage from me, when we got to the end of the inspection process clearly there was a range of views among members of the security council about the degree of threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in iraq. there was still a pretty widespread perception that iraq

probably had some such weapons, particularly chemical or biological. this had not been dispersed or dispelled, but different countries saw the threat from that in different ways. did you feel these views were sincerely held, or did you feel some people were in one direction or another exaggerating their position for a particular reason, for an ulterior motive? >> well, i certainly think that mr. straw exaggerated what he was reading in the cluster document, because that covered largely things that had been open all through the 1990s, but i don't question the sincerity in the belief that iraq might still remain a threat, and after the war of course, when i saw what prime minister blair said,

that even if blix had continued with his inspections, he would never have got the full truth about the iraqi programs. i think what would have happened is rather that we would, as we went on, more of the allegations that had been made in the dossiers in the uk and us and others, they had fallen apart. so the evidence they had presented would have been undermined by our continued activity. we would never have been able to clear up all the unresolved issues. as i said a while ago, the approach of 1284 was for key issues. the approach of the british benchmark was also to select some, not everything, nor was it reasonable to find this meticulous approach was not a reasonable one. so while there certainly could be a feeling that, no, we will

not get to the truth, it was not -- it would have been difficult for them to base or justify an invasion on the basis of what the situation would have been, say, in april or may 2003. >> but they were not making it up, certainly as far as british decision-makers were concerned. even if it later turned out that what they believed wasn't substantiated on the ground, it was a sincerely held belief in their heads that these weapons were there? >> i have never questioned the good faith of mr. blair or bush or anyone else. i think to question the good

faith, it will -- you need to have very substantial evidence and i do not have that. on some occasions when i talked to blair on the telephone, february 20, i certainly felt that he was absolutely sincere in his belief. what i questioned was the good judgment, particularly with bush, but also in blair's judgment. >> i would like to come back, if i could, briefly to the march assessment of the outstanding issues, which, of course, was entitled, "unresolved disarmament issues -- iraq's proscribed weapons programs." you have told us about jack straw's reaction and your comment on it. in his evidence to us he voiced his surprise that the document had not been available to the ministerial security council meeting in its discussions on march 7, 2003, and obviously given his view of the importance of the document, he felt it would have had a similar effect on other members of the security council as it had on

him. was there any reason why it could not be made available in time for the meeting? >> no, except that it wasn't ready. we had worked on it for a very long time. it took a longer time than i wanted. we were not obliged to submit it until just before the invasion actually. what is it? march 19 or march 20. that was the occasion. it was to be the basis for the work program we were to submit. that was the purpose of it, but i found it could have been of use in the benchmark approach. >> but as he had had sight of it and you had had sight of it -- >> yes, he had sight of it by inadvertency in a way because we were to vet the documents through the college of commissioners. so we gave it to the college of commissioners and he got it, and also powell in washington got it a little earlier than all the other members of the security council. it occurred to me, as i already said, this may well be of interest in a benchmark approach and therefore i took care to feel my way in the council, did anyone object to us presenting this working document? it was a working document, not more.

i found no objection to it. so i said, "yes." we circulated it. >> circulated it after this particular meeting? >> on march 7 in the security council. then powell and straw had it a day or two days in advance. >> thank you. >> i would like to ask another question or two about the more time issue in february/march. you said in your book that you had a discussion with condoleezza rice where she tried to pin you down, i think, and you said it wouldn't be years and it wouldn't be weeks, but it would be months. there is another dimension i suppose to this. is months more time to bring about the conclusive and verified disarmament, or is it enough time to reach a conclusion on whether the inspections process is moving forward in a substantive way? >> well, both actually. you look at the disarmament. i think the investigations we did into the unilateral

destruction would have helped to clear up important issues. how much did they do away with? there would have been evidence of that, but the iraqi participation in this in producing witnesses, people that had taken part in the unilateral destruction, that would pertain more to their cooperation. it could well be that amir al- sa'adi and others, they could only act with the authorization of saddam hussein and saddam hussein was a tougher nut to crack. they might have been wanting to go further. in any case if we had continued i think, and with the remaining american pressure, i think it would have been likely we would have got more results. >> was there a dialogue or indeed a set of discussions between yourself and members of

the security council on the timing question, because there were clearly different views at the security council. at one end you have the americans. >> yes. >> enough time, no more. the british would have liked a bit more time, some of the british. then the whole array of nations who would have liked an infinite amount. >> yes, there was such a discussion. 1284 did not specify any end, as i said. it could have gone on, but we sensed, we knew that the americans had a different timetable, and i asked prime minister blair to help to extend inspections and he did. i also talked to secretary powell about it. in my conversation with him, if i remember rightly, and i have written about it in my book, i

suggested that we should go on until, what is it, middle of april or something like that. the canadians had another view. powell responded to me saying "that's too late." i think blair tried and also failed. he felt it was by the middle or end of march. the military machine had moved up to its goal by that time. so there was discussions about this. >> one separable aspect of that, irrespective perhaps of how much more time, had more time been available or been made available, jack straw's view in his statement to us was that you would have to have -- if you had a deadline, i.e. more time but with a fixed end point, you would have to have an ultimatum. in other words, if there is not sufficient compliance by that deadline, then something else has to happen, almost, what the french among others feared, automaticity of military action. was that a problem with the concept of more time? >> well i think he was right in saying that, yes, if there is an ultimatum it will sort of clarify their thoughts, but there could be difficulties in interpretation.

had they actually fulfilled these targets? jack straw describes the six cases that he had put in. i had simply said they must be doable. i think the french and german objection to the benchmark approach -- they did object -- was based upon the suspicion that this is a gimmick in order to get an authorization. the americans wanted the authorization but they feared that maybe the iraqis will fulfill this. so they were i think lukewarm at best on the resolution. now when you look at the six cases they selected, one was a declaration, a strategy, a strategic decision by saddam i think. that should have been possible. the iraqis would have been able to formulate something even though they might not have liked to, and the second one was about the anthrax.

now they didn't have the anthrax. as i think we have learned now in the duelfer inquiry, the iraqis apparently had destroyed anthrax and buried the remnants in a place near saddam's palaces. this needs to be checked but i read it somewhere. they didn't dare to admit that this had been so close to us. so i doubt very much they would have dared to go along and fulfill that condition. >> because they would not have dared to admit it to saddam himself? >> precisely, because of fear he would say, "what have you been doing?" that would have been hard. the other one was the mobile biology laboratories. they didn't exist. so what they could have done there, and we discussed it with them, can we set up some road controls, we will have helicopters watching, you will have check points at roads, etc. they were quite cooperative in discussing this and i remember amir al-sa'adi saying, "look here, the very idea of having

mobile laboratories on our roads scares me." they had discussed it earlier and had rejected the idea. they didn't have them, so how could they have complied with that? in any case there could have been different interpretations as to whether they lived up to these benchmark cases, but i think what decided it was that the americans were not willing to give enough time for the benchmark approach, and once that was clear, it was dead. i think we are putting the blame now on chirac and saying chirac said he would veto this and that killed it, but i have a feeling it might just as well have been that the us would not have been willing to go along with more time. >> of course all that leads into the attempt to get a second united nations resolution, which would have been necessary for more time with a deadline. i will ask sir roderic lyne to pick up on that one.

>> yes. i think briefly on the end-game in the un, first of all, obviously an awful lot hung throughout the first three months of 2003 on the exact words that you used in the security council, on the tone that you conveyed. did you feel that you yourself were bearing some of the responsibility in your reports for a decision on whether or not to go to war in iraq and did this affect the way in which you presented your evidence to the security council? >> no. i mean, evidently i wanted inspections to continue, and if there was anything today i would have liked to change, perhaps some formulations in the statement on january 26 and 27, 2002, when i said that the

iraqis seem not even today to have come to terms with the idea of disarmament. that was fairly harsh. the only ulterior motive i had was to pressure the iraqis and to warn them that, "look, as un inspectors we are not satisfied. don't expect of us to be helpful." so it was rather the contrary, that we were very harsh and we said that later on, that, "time is ticking. we are close to midnight. you had better shape up and better be cooperative." so the statement in january perhaps was a tiny bit too harsh on a couple of points, but on the whole there are not many words i would have changed. i thought we took enormous care to be nuanced and very factual about it, but that particular phrase i think perhaps was a bit too harsh. >> did you try to rebalance that a bit when you next spoke to the security council in march? >> no, i don't think there was anything too mild there or too upbeat about it. on the contrary, i was rather

restrained. i said, "here are things they have done and they are positive. however we have to judge them in the light of what results do they give, what the actual result is." so i think that was very balanced. i don't think i would have changed a word in that today. >> when the british started putting forward the idea of having a second resolution, did they consult you about that? >> about the benchmark approach? yes. >> but that was at the end of it? >> that was rather late, yes. >> at the beginning did they come to you and discuss it at all? >> no, no, no. >> so the way it was drafted was completely independently of your views? >> yes, except for selection of benchmarks. i also had a hand -- everybody was active at the time. the chileans and the mexicans were together. i also had a draft -- and i saw it also, an ultimatum saying,

yes, this must be done, what a good idea. i shared the paper with the uk, i think, and the us. i did not play secretly with them, but every good hand tried something and i too. >> in your book i think you say that you thought -- this is referring to the text that was on the table on march 7 -- that here was something new. this didn't have benchmarks in it, but you said, "nevertheless i thought here on march 7 there was something new, a theoretical possibility to avoid war." so did you see that as a last effort for peace rather than a resolution that actually, as some have argued, was designed to provide legitimization for war? >> yes. i favored the resolution in the

awareness even that the french and germans were against it. they interpreted it the other way. i thought, well, it's a chance. i saw that, look, you put up these benchmarks. there can be a discussion later on, did they fulfill about anthrax or did they fulfill about biological labs, etc, but i thought, yes, we will start something and once we go on with inspections here, you may be getting into something new. basically i thought it was sound to select something. that's what we were do in unmovic anyway. i thought it was sound. the french and germans did not criticize me for it. we had fairly direct discussions, fairly open with each other. it was rather friendly. they didn't mind i took this view. >> so your position was very different from that of president chirac or indeed the leaders of chile and mexico who declined to support the resolution. you wanted it to pass? >> the chileans and mexicans wanted to prolong inspections

but much longer. it was not only a question of a few weeks but a couple of months, which i would have welcomed. no, no. i think they wanted more. they certainly wanted more inspections. >> but they were not prepared to vote for the resolution? >> no, no. >> yet you say you favored it? >> they might have shared the skepticism of the french that here was an ultimatum. >> but that's not how you saw it? >> well, i saw the risk, but i thought we would get into a new territory. there was a chance in it. i saw the chance, the germans saw the risk. >> lawrence, over to you. >> you mentioned a moment ago that you were concerned that the report you gave on january 27 was a bit harsh on the iraqis. do you think one of the consequences of that might have been to encourage the british government and others possibly to believe that you might indeed report serious non- cooperation, in effect a

material breach, and therefore move the second, sort of the pressure, to bring this issue to a head, make that more intense? >> yes. i think certainly the americans felt, "this is dandy, he is really critical." they had been even more critical, but they thought, "fine, we will get support. this is what the inspectors will say," but of course i promised nothing but further inspections. so they were mistaken about that. we had a mandate from the whole security council, not from the us or from the uk. >> but it may well have created expectations? >> i think so, yes, and later on you can see from media in the usa that when i was more positive they say the us is no longer looking for help from the inspectorate. >> let's suppose that you have been able to report, as was done with the iaea, that effectively iraq did not have weapons of

mass destruction, that things had been destroyed. there would still have been a concern after the crisis was over that there might be a resumption of activity at some point. there was a suggestion that what was needed was a "reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification." could you just explain what that would have entailed and how it would have been implemented? >> well, the 1284 did not envisage the end of supervision of iraq even with the suspension of sanctions. it envisaged and expected a continuation of ban on import on weapons.

so those parts of the sanctions would remain. in addition, as you mentioned, there would remain the reinforced system of monitoring and inspection. so un monitors would remain in iraq and we had an extensive system for monitoring them, but i think both blair -- especially blair has made the assumption that if they had dropped the military pressure and not gone to war, sanctions would have gone and nothing would have stopped iraq. he said, you know, with saddam being who he was and with the sons being there, there was every risk that they would reconstitute, and he was helped -- bush was helped by the isg, the iraq survey group. first kay went in and kay had been a strong protagonist of the war. he came out and said, "no, there are no weapons of mass destruction, but there are laboratories and there are programs, weapons programs."

so that was seized and prime minister blair was delighted when he heard about the mobile trucks that had been seized. well, i'm not so sure happiness would occur to him, but he thought that was evidence. then came duelfer, and both were very professional. duelfer was also appointed by the cia to this job. i think both of them tried to give a straw to their governments to help them. duelfer said "no, sorry, there are no programs, but there are intentions," and the intentions he had gleaned from interviews with some of saddam's lieutenants. the fbi had also had an interview with saddam. i think it has to be looked at very carefully what was said in the isg report. i have not been able to check it lately, but the lieutenants had the impression that saddam would have done this. i think this is a very slim straw, what he would have done. the first reflection that occurs to me is that if the british prime minister or bush

had come to their parliaments and said, "well, we are not sure that there are weapons of mass destruction but we fear they could reconstitute," i can't imagine they would have got an authorization to go to war for that purpose. secondly, i think it was wrong in substance. the monitoring would not have ended. it would have continued. hence there would have been an alarm installed. inspectors are not police dogs that stop. inspectors are watchdogs and they would have been there and there would have been an alarm. it might have been difficult to mount again an offensive, i agree, but nevertheless it would not be -- how long will a disarmament last? iraq has no weapons of mass destruction today, but what about ten years from now? this was too ambitious an approach.

i think in reality they tried to excuse why they went in. i am not surprised, the politicians usually don't get any reward for admitting any errors. >> but just in terms of the practicalities of what was being suggested, this reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, the point of that would have been that it would have been installed. it would have been in place. do you think it would have been difficult to sustain in place say without the prospect of a revival of military pressure? do you think it would have been possible for it to be there even if saddam thought this was a violation of his sovereignty and should be removed? >> yes. there could have been difficulties in sustaining it. saddam would have certainly tried to wriggle out of it and said, "there is no point. why should we even be subjected to this? they have now stopped the sanctions, etc," but still. if he threw out the inspectors, that would have been a sign, a warning sign.

>> can i ask you about another proposal that was made at the time, this time by the french in early 2003, which was supporting inspections with a military capability so it would be possible, if necessary, to force entry into sites. this doesn't seem to have got very far. what was your view of that idea? >> with respect i think this was an idea that came up in discussions with the carnegie endowment, that they would have sort of armed inspections, the inspections would be accompanied by a platoon of soldiers and they would also have representatives of the p5 present there. i was aghast at the idea, because i thought that if you have some resistance --first of all, to appear like an occupying force was very far removed from my idea of conversations with the iraqis and trying to ease out any confessions from them.

secondly, if you would have some little clash between the military protecting inspectors and others, then -- and i said it to wolfowitz, "you will be stuck with this. it is out of your hands." it is not a very wise thing. they withdrew it. this came up. yes, it was also part i think of the preparation for 1441, but it dropped out of it, and i never thought -- you refer to the french. >> i think it was a french proposal in early 2003. there was a proposal, you are right, in 1441. >> that i think was another one. i think the french at one point suggested we should double the number of inspectors. i thought that was not very sensible either. the problem was not the number of inspectors. we carried out about six inspections per day over a long period of time. we carried out all in all about 700 inspections at 500 different sites and in no case did we find any weapons of mass destruction. doubling the number of inspectors would not have helped. better tips, yes. those who were 100 per cent

convinced there were weapons of mass destruction, if they had less than zero per cent knowledge where they were, that would have been helpful. >> i am going to do something which as a historian i suspect is rather dangerous, which is to look at the counterfactual and to ask what would have happened if there had not been armed force starting in the middle of march. there are a number of possible scenarios and you have just given us one, which is you would have completed your work, put in monitoring and verification that would have given continual assurance. perhaps that would have been the most benign outcome, but there are another two possibilities, one of which is the iraqis would never have been able to convince the security council as a whole, having been given more time, that they had fully disarmed, and that could

have led to perhaps a second resolution, or alternatively that things would have just carried on as they were but the start of the military action would have been delayed. do you have any views yourself about the alternative possibilities at this time? >> well, i think it would have been desirable to keep a strong -- keep up a strong military pressure, but 250,000 men was impossible to stop it, and i think that the decisive moments were in the autumn of 2002. they should have said, "yes, we have a military pressure and we have the diplomatic diplomacy that needs to be backed up by force, but not necessarily by a force of 250 thousand." that should have been kept on even if they had gone for the british benchmark approach and they decided that yes, we are making progress.

i don't see why they should have withdrawn altogether. they could have kept a good deal of forces in the area for -- i don't know. they would decide themselves how long the time. eventually they would have lifted or suspended the sanctions and monitoring would have remained. i think it could have been viable. >> from what you were saying before your overall sense was that the combination of the growing activity of the inspectors, the sustained pressure, was opening up new lines of enquiry for you so that you would have been able to move things forward to be able to give the sort of conclusion that dr. al-baradei was able to give? >> yes. we would have been able to clear up some things, but i think mr. blair is entirely right. we have never got the whole truth, nor do i think it was necessary to get the whole truth. the interesting thing -- was iraq a danger in 2003? they were not a danger. they were practically prostrate and could not -- it would have

taken a lot of time to reconstitute in selling oil. what they got instead was a long period of anarchy. i think one conclusion i am inclined to draw is that anarchy can be worse than tyranny. it was, at one time. >> thank you. >> i too would like to take both a retrospective and perhaps a counterfactual look at what -- it goes back to something you said very early in this session, about what iraq might have been able to do following the passage of resolution 1441 to comply fully. you had believed i think you said iraq had a highly developed bureaucratic set of structures, certainly in the 1980s and perhaps into the 1990s, but you had come to the view perhaps during your

inspections that really the whole thing had crumbled as a governing structure and was perhaps no longer capable, perhaps even since the gulf war, of responding with detailed accounts, data, statistics, whatever. if that were so, how much convincing evidence could iraq have provided after 1441? >> well, i think they could have done more than they did in their declaration. that's what they eventually did in february and march. i mean, they were not proactive. they were more holding the doors open. >> but the stuff was there. they could have produced and did eventually produce a mass of documentary material. >> some, not an enormous amount.

when i say that they were not as accomplished a bureaucracy as we tended to believe, nevertheless it was not an incompetent bureaucracy. they had a lot of documents and i think they produced a good deal more for the isg. >> turning to an interesting set of observations you make in your book about disarmament cases internationally, and you report an argument made from the us side in the context of iraq that you recognize disarmament when you see it. that's the us being quoted. then they draw the contrast with south africa, eliminating nuclear arms under your leadership. >> yes. >> ukraine, kazakhstan when they gave up nuclear capability. there is also the later example of libya i suppose. basically were all these countries in a completely different place from iraq in 2003 or could iraq have been

part of that if they had wanted to? >> you are right. i did refer and had some sympathy and understanding for the demand for a strategic decision, and i think i alluded to it in january and said that, "look, south africa took a strategic decision, they said, 'come, this is what we will show you if you want to go somewhere else, just tell us. here are the documents. if you want something more. just tell us.'" so that was a strategic decision. the ukraine and the others also came to the same conclusion. "we want to give confidence." iraq came to this in a different way. they extracted a commitment from iraq to declare what they had and to disarm. they did it unwillingly, and then perhaps i should not be so surprised that they are trying to go slowly or even to obstruct, to do as little as they can. so it was a fundamentally different situation, and perhaps only strong foreign pressure would achieve.

>> they could have made -- saddam's regime could have made that strategic decision. i am still not entirely clear whether in your judgment by, say, february 2003 they had actually begun to make it. can you half make it? >> no, i am not convinced that saddam had come to that decision that they would do their utmost to cooperate. he took the strategic decision in 1991 to do away with the weapons of mass destruction, the biological, chemical and the nuclear. so there was a strategic decision but he wouldn't admit it publicly. one reason, again, the guess is he didn't mind looking dangerous to the iranians. >> that was exactly the question i was coming to and you

have i think begun to answer it. can you with the benefit of hindsight make sense of saddam's behavior in terms of his own motivation, his own perception of his regime, his country within the region and in the wider world? was there a rationality about it or not? >> i never met him. muhammad al-baradei was very eager we should meet him. i was skeptical about it. i thought we will come away with some half promises and then the world will say, "the inspectors have been fooled again." muhammad i think with some justification felt that this guy gets truth so rarely. amr moussa had been there and had a conversation with him. muhammad was very outspoken with vice president ramadan and

i am quoting prime minister blair, "what that report shows is actually the extent to which saddam retained his nuclear and indeed chemical warfare intent and intellectual know-how. it is absolutely clear from the iraq survey group that he was concealing material he should have delivered up to the united nations, that he retained the intent not merely in theory but was taking action on, for example, dual use facilities that were specifically in breach of the united nations' resolutions." now that's tony blair suggesting what you might have said in different circumstances. do you want to comment on that? >> well, as i said a while ago, i think both kay and duelfer tried to help the government. they were appointed by the cia in the first place. they wanted to hand them straws. kay said they were programs and they had to go away from that. duelfer was concentrating more on finding what was the intent in the future, but i think one

needs to see how strong was the evidence, first of all, about the intentions. this had come from his lieutenants i think, less from any direct questioning of saddam, and what saddam might have been dreaming of when he sat there as a prisoner is not terribly relevant. >> it is i think drawing heavily on the interrogation record, isn't it, of saddam in captivity? >> yes, probably, but what was the real danger even if he had even intentions? would he have had a chance to reconstitute his weapons? if we had continued with inspections and they had lifted the sanctions, as i said, you still have the monitoring that went on and they would not have lifted the ban on import of weapons. so i think this is really a straw that both in washington and london they tried to grab in order to get an absolution from law. >> thank you. i will ask sir roderic to ask what he has, coming to the end

of our questions. rod. >> just really a couple of points of detail from earlier evidence we heard. one witness told us that it had taken unmovic quite some time to build up their capabilities and particularly with regard to the use of ground-penetrating radar. was that an important tool that you had or should have had, and were there occasions when unmovic inspectors arrived at sites where, if they had had ground-penetrating radar, they might have been able to prove the accuracy or inaccuracy of

the intelligence that had sent you there in the first place? >> i don't really know whether there were any occasions where we would have needed. i remember and i have read that we got ground-penetrating radar from the uk, and it was used on occasions as well, and i think even with some success. we found something that was hidden, but it was not weapons of mass destruction. so it was a useful thing. iraq had buried various things. they had buried an airplane at some time. so it was not anything implausible, but it was not -- it was a useful tool, but not a vital part of it. >> we also had a criticism that there were occasions when the british had provided information to help guide an inspection and then the inspectors had botched the event. one occasion was quoted to us

where british information had pointed to what we thought was a buried missile, and an iraqi crowd had turned up and chased the inspectors away so that they couldn't then go ahead with the investigation. this was cited to us as one of allegation that we hadch an inspectio could be true. i don't know, but i was never told about it at the time. i was aware that there were demonstrations and there was some obstruction at a hospital i think where we were trying to dig up something, but this was not a major part. after all we carried out some thirty inspections, as i said, on the basis of site information, and in no case did we find any weapons of mass destruction. i think that the testimony that you had in early phase that what did we meet? we only met with resistance and

"mobs" i think was the word used. well, maybe on one occasion or so, but it certainly was not a major thing. i did complain. if there had been significant things, i would have complained more in the security council, because this was our weapon, to report to the security council, "this is what they are doing." they had some complaints, but they were not over a very large number of cases. >> did you essentially feel that you had all that you needed for unmovic to operate as a credible and authoritative body or is there more that ideally you would like to have had to have really done the job? you have already said you didn't want a doubling of the numbers, for example. >> i think we had the tools. we had -- one headache that we did not have that unscom had and that was finance. we had 0.8% of the revenues from the oil for food program. that gave us all the possibilities. we did not squander money. we were very careful. we were subjected to the u.n. accountancy system, but that was not a problem. we could hire helicopters. we could hire airplanes, etc.

this was a major reason for the independence. one reason why unscom was not independent was that they had to turn to government to get the inspectors and to get equipment and with the inspectors came also intelligence. so it helped us to remain independent. we did get help from government like the u.k. we got medical people, communications people from new zealand. we got the russians for the airplane, the french, etc. so there was some help, but it was nothing that impinged upon our independence, and no, i think we were reasonably well equipped. some people have said that our staff was not as high quality as unscom. well, unscom had very qualified staff, including david kelly, who tragically committed suicide here and whom i knew rather well, but, of course, they had links to the intelligence, which eventually discredit the whole operation. so i think we got fairly well good people.

we trained them. we had selected them. we had interviewed them. all of them had more than one month of training while unscom came in and got on-the-job training. some of them had never carried out an inspection. they had flown into iraq to carry out an inspection. they learned a lot. they did an excellent job. i am not saying anything about that. but i think we had the tools, sir, yes. >> i think we are coming pretty much to the end, but sir lawrence has a question or two before we do. >> just with lessons learned, you have had enormous experience on both the nuclear and non-nuclear side of weapons of mass destruction. i would just like to ask a few questions looking forward to what lessons we might learn from this experience. we have had quite a bit of discussion with a variety of witnesses about this term "weapons of mass destruction." it includes a wide variety of capabilities. i wonder just to start with if you would like to say something

about the distinction about the different types of capabilities that come under this heading. >> well, it's been a convenient term, w.m.d., weapons of mass destruction. of course, after the iraq war we talked about weapons of mass disappearance or other things, but it is not a very good term, because the core of it are three -- nuclear, biological and chemical, and missiles to deliver them. there is a vast difference between nuclear, on the one hand, and the biological and the chemical. so for iraq i think this has importance. there was no doubt in the u.k., i think not even to the end, that the nuclear was not a problem. that dossier was closed, whereas the u.s. kept it open. that was the most important thing. if one says that iraq remained a tremendous danger, we have to remember nuclear was not one of them. it was biological, chemical and missiles. they were certainly unpleasant and risky, but not of that

category. i think the expression perhaps originally came also from a wish to play up weapons of mass destruction. you can say that twenty or thirty states have weapons of mass destruction, but you can only say that ten have nuclear weapons. so it is not a term that i think is very likeable, but it is a convenient one. >> i mean, one of the differences also is if you are going to have a nuclear capability, you need pretty extensive infrastructure. there are quite -- known forms of inspection. you know these very well, but with chemical and biological it is harder. are there particular lessons that you might draw for the problems of inspecting chemical and biological restrictions to see whether or not they are being upheld? >> well, we have an organization that is administering the inspection on the chemical weapons convention. i think they were even more advanced than the iaea, because

they drafted their inspection system after the iaea and they learned from some of it. for instance, inspectors for the chemicals, they don't need any visa to go to the country. iaea inspectors still need visa with the possibility for obstruction there. so that is settled. biological is even harder. i was the chairman of a weapons of mass destruction commission, international commission. we examined the question of the biological weapons, and the american sunk the inspection and verification scheme that had been worked up to for a long time. i think it was 2002 that john bolton came and said, "no, no, we won't have any of that." there are real difficulties in doing it. there is a very big industry. there is big research going on. so maybe a different approach is needed to the biological. i did attend a seminar in the u.k. and there was some u.k. expert who said that he still thought the most dangerous biological,

they were the most natural ones that would come. synthetic weapons were perhaps dangerous, but not quite as dangerous. i am not sure that -- the inspection techniques in general improved very much with iraq and the u.s. has given a lot of credit for this. above all, the environmental sampling, which means you take samples of bio-tar, or water, or air and you analyze it and very, very tiny amounts will tell you how they are dealing with enrichment or reprocessing. the u.s. discovered that early in the iraqi affair when american hostages who had been placed in baghdad, they came out and their clothes were analyzed and they found tiny particles that indicated there had been enrichment. so that advanced very much. the overhead imagery has also advanced very much. another element i think is the cooperation between intelligence and

inspection. when we were working on the additional protocol in the iaea, muhammad al-barabei and i, we concluded, as i said, that it must be a one-way traffic, because otherwise we are there and we need their cooperation. if they see us as a prolonged arm of foreign intelligence, you will not get the cooperation that you need. i think the british accepted that. we never heard any complaints about it from the u.k. side. i still think that the cooperation is desirable, and already early in the 1990's we hired a guy, a brit actually, who worked us for in the secretariat to be a link to intelligence and to get tips from intelligence. he didn't get very much. in 2002 or 2003, yes, we did get intelligence. it was desirable to have, and i think it was desirable for us, because we got tips of where to go and what to look for, even though the dossiers were not

very helpful, they were just assertions, but it should also have been of use to the governments. after all they are paying -- well, the iraqis paid for the inspections here, but normally it is the governments who pay for the inspection, and here are people who are on the ground. they are there. they can go in and see anything. if they give us tips, they can go to them legally. they have a right to go there. so inspectors can give something that the intelligence cannot, and intelligence can also give to the inspector something. it is a quality control for those who have intelligence to say, "what do the inspectors say? does this tally?" if it doesn't tally, i think they should be alerted and they say, "hey, there may be something wrong." there may vice versa also be quality control on the inspectors. "have you missed this?" in a way that was the message of colin powell when he came before the security council and said -- he was very courteous about us, but said, "listen,

this is what we have found now." implicitly he said thereby, "these guys, the inspectors, they never found this." so their intelligence was superior. it was not. we were more critical. we also had the fortune of not being taken in by defectors and people who came with their stories. so that is the important -- yes, there is important lessons in this. >> that is very interesting. this is the last question. one of the arguments, perhaps very relevant to the idea of interviews and why the interviews were seen to be so important, is in the end the key capability is know-how. it is the knowledge that the scientists have developed, engineers have developed, and until you have got a sense of what is there, how much they know, how much they understand, there is always the possibility of the reconstitution in some sort of way, particularly i guess with chemical and biological.

is there any way of getting at that other than by actually sitting down with these people and talking to them? >> no. i think that was a good method of doing it, but although it is a crucial element, as you say, they cannot have the weapons of mass destruction unless they have the know-how, there are other ways of stopping it. if you ask me, "what is the value of inspection?," i would not say that this is the most important means of combating weapons of mass destruction. i think foreign policy is the most fundamental. that is what the european union foreign ministers also came to. you create detente so that there is not a need, not a perceived security need to acquire these weapons in most cases, but i don't see in the case of saddam. saddam's weapons of mass destruction was not for perceived security reasons. even though he could talk about the israelis, i think they were more for conquering reasons for iran and kuwait in that

particular case, but in most other cases i think it has to do with perceived security, and the best way of combating weapons of mass destruction is detente, globally and regionally. that's where i feel a little more optimistic today than i did a couple of years ago when the bush administration was still working hard to create a new cold war in my view. then after that i would perhaps put export controls. if you have some customers who would like to develop weapons of mass destruction, try to make it as difficult as possible and export controls is part of that. it is not waterproof, but it is part of it. thereafter maybe you get down to inspection, which essentially is creating confidence, useful confidence, but it is also meant to be a deterrence from violations by

risk of detection. so it has some value. states don't like to be caught violating. so it has some value there. it is also a basis, of course, for action for government. that's the greater problem. get the action. the iaea has signaled smoke coming up of north korea or iran. then what action do you get? so the inspections certainly have a vital function, but it is not a cure-all. >> thank you. that's very helpful. >> i should like to ask you, dr. blix, in a moment if you have further reflections on lessons out of the iraq experience and your inspections, but just to touch on one point, you said much earlier this afternoon, talking about a telephone conversation you had with former prime minister blair, where you said, "at that time i still thought there were prohibited items in iraq."

was that because of the material balance analysis derived from the unscom era essentially? >> well, anthrax played a big role to me all the way through. of course, we could not exclude -- sometimes we get too much credit and say, "you were right. you said there were no weapons of mass destruction." we did not say so. we said, "we have not found any." after 700 inspections and going to sites given to us, we did not find any, which is not the same thing. we did not exclude, but we didn't -- i mean, mr. blair said that we didn't find the truth, but we found the untruth of some of the allegations, and that was important enough. we would have uncovered some of the truth, but not the whole truth. as i said, it was not necessary. you could have ended this affair without the whole truth. you asked me for a reflection. i think i have spent much time on my reflections. i gave one a moment ago. that was the value of the inspections. now here is a multi-lateral system set up by governments and enabling inspectors to go on to the sites. it is a very valuable institution. it must be independent. it must not be prolonged arms of intelligence.

this is one experience that is useful for the future. the other reflection i have is a broader one about the going to war. i am delighted that i think your intention is to draw lessons from the iraq war rather than anything else, and i think that when can states go to war still remains a vitally important issue, and the un charter in 1945 took a giant leap forward in this and said, "no, it is prohibited to do except in the case of self defense and armed attack or authorization by the security council." well, here in the case of iraq you can see how the uk in the summer 2002 or the spring 2002 said, "yes, we might, but it has to be through the un power." self-defense against an armed attack was out.

regime change was out. straw was adamantly opposed to a regime change. authorization by the un, yes, that's the path. so they insist upon 1441 and they get it, but it is a gamble. 1441 is if they had shown or if the iraqis had continued to obstruct, as it was expected, then they could have asked the security council for a second resolution and said, "look, they are obstructing and we now ask for authorization." they never knew whether they would get that. eventually they had to come with i think very constrained legal explanations. we see how mr. goldsmith, lord goldsmith now, wriggled about and how he himself very much doubted that it was adequate, but eventually said, "well, if you accumulate all these things, then that gives a plausible --" he was not quite sure that it would have stood up in an international tribunal.

most of your legal advisers not think so either. nevertheless he gave the green light to it. i think it shows the uk was wedded to the un rules and tried to go by them, eventually failed and was a prisoner on the american train, but it is true at the same time that this rule against going to war is under strain. when you have missiles and you have discussions about preeveryonetive action, it is under strain. if you don't -- if you see a missile coming, that's one thing, but if you simply suspect that a missile site is activated, do you then have an all-out war against them? this is a difficult -- we have had also a practice in the un, as i touched on earlier, in which you have some trespassing of this rule, some

erosion of it in tanzania or in kosovo or in sierra leone. >> could i just intervene a moment on sierra leone? is this in the same category? our understanding had been this was a legitimate sovereign government inviting help rather than an intrusion. >> yes. no, i am not critical of sierra leone. i myself am critical of kosovo. i am more skeptical about that. still to me the security council is there, and even if you go back to blair's speech in chicago, he talked about the duty to protect. that was something novel in the un charter. he outlines a number of things that would be necessary to go to war. it should be doable and should be the right case and so forth. i don't think he mentioned the approval of the security council, but i think that's actually what came out, that, yes, you must have in all these cases also the approval of the security council and authorization. people say, "what is the security council? the russians and chinese will obstruct." not after 1999 necessarily. they are there.

if they had not been willing to go along with the use of force against iraq and they were not willing to go along with it in the case of iraq, i think that was probably their wisdom, and therefore it is legitimate to look at it. if we discover a terrorist movement someone is preparing, i would not be surprised if the russians and chinese would go along with some pre-emptive action, but in the case that some people maintain iraq was legal i am of the firm view that it was an illegal war. i think the vast majority of international lawyers feel that way. this can be discussed, but i don't think -- there can be cases where it is doubtful. maybe it was permissible to go to war. iraq in my view was not one of those. >> dr. blix, thank you very much for your evidence this afternoon. we appreciate it. this marks the end of today's hearings.

we shall open at 10:00 tomorrow morning when our witnesses are general sir mike jackson and general sir richard dannatt, who were successive chiefs of the general staff for the two heads of the british army whilst united kingdom forces were in iraq between 2002 and 2009. general dannatt will be the first witness at 10.00 in the morning. with that i will close this session. thank you. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> president obama is campaigning for a democratic house, senate and gubernatorial house this week. we spoke to a reporter for an update. >> the president hits the campaign trail today for three straight days of campaigning. joining us from the washington post news room this morning is nia. henderson from "the washington post." >> he is going to wisconsin today. of course there's a competitor's governor's race there. so he'll go there and then he'll end the day in california. of course there there are competitive governor's races and senate races. governor's

races. he will be focusing near los angeles and on the house democrats. nancy pelosi has been putting out message saying, have a chance to meet barack obama. they are hoping he will be able to raise millions and millions of dollars for the party. host: this fundraiser is for candidates across the country? guest: there was a little dustup between house democrat leader nancy pelosi and robert gibbs. they said the democrats might lose the house. policy will be on stage with barack obama saying -- pelosi will be on stage with barack obama. this was scheduled a long time ago. the dustup happened the two

about weeks ago. -- happened about two weeks ago. there are 37 seats that are up. whoever controls these governors sees will control congressional districting and will be in a real power position. tuesday is primary day in washington state. guest: the presides not popular there. his ratings are about 40%. you will not see any big time rallies there. the real intimate setting their and he will have speeches talking about the economy. he can defray the cost of these and make the taxpayers pay for them. host: how is she doing in this

race? guest: she is doing ok money- wise. the big problem for her is that 18-year incumbent. governors will be able to distance themselves fm the president. they may not have a voting record that ties them to some of the more controversial aspects of the president's agenda so far. but look at the language. how he will frame the democratic agenda and his tenure so far and how does he framed the republicans and how we ties them to president bush. host: she is having him come out

to her state. guest: that is because he is not that unpopular in washington. barack obama is still the candidate who tracks voters -- who attracts surrogate voters. they are pivotal -- they were pivotal in electing him in 2008. money is the motivator. mojo.will be gagt he will try to give the candidates a boost. host: where will they be on wednesday? guest: heill be in florida. there is another competitive race for governor. you have some senate races, a primary there involving jeff green. one of the things that will be

interesting with these races is how much he campaigns for kendrick meek. the real focus is alex sink. host: heat will go to columbus, ohio. guest: all of these governors races are hyper local races. whether it is health care, double digit unemployment. the unemployment rate in ohio is something like1.6%. the stimulus package is being debated there. whether or not strickland has been good. these are pivotal states on 2012 as you saw them in the previous campaign. that is why obama is devoting so much time in these next days. he will be in five states over

the next three days. host: you have written about whether or not michelle obama will be hitting the campaign trail. a lot of candidates want her to come to her state. guest: she is the most popular democrat in the country. her numbers stand at about 66%. there is some concern about her recent spain trip. thin they can roll her out in close races. she can be a counter on to sarah palin, focusing -- we know that sarah palin is focusing on our mama grizzlies. her issues kind of dovetailed nicely with health care. she will talk about her pet issue which is childhood

obesity. she can be comfortable talking about that and also campaigning for democratic candidates. in the way we have seen her so far. host: what is theownside of michelle obama getting out in campaign 2010? guest: the downside is that being out on the stump will liticize the first lady. this 66% approval rating, her being seen could eat into that. in 2012, she may not have the same kind of popularity among independents and she may not be able to boost her husband's reelection campaign. they are also afraid she might say or do something that republicans or opponents will ceasseize on.

host: how much in dollars could she bring in? guest: michelle obama could bring in 20 million dollars for the party. that is roughly half. the dnc wants those voters back out there. that is roughly half of what michelle obama could do. she retains that of the 2012 campaign. she will be able to bring out the surge in voter, independence, and she will be able to connect with >> house majority whip talks

about the house democrat's legislative agenda and the proposed islamic community center in lower manhattan. close to ground zero. after that secretary of state hillary clinton on the u.s. global health care initiative. and later, former u.n. weapons inspector hans blix testifies before the british iraq war inquiry commission. >> on tomorrow morning's "washington journal," the economist will discuss china's growing economy. after that, the washington examiner's national security extraordinary on the tal ban in afghanistan. and we continue our look at the new financial regulations law. james chessen will talk about the impact on banks. "washington journal" each morning at 7:00 eastern here on c-span. and later in the day, the

heritage foundation releases policy positions on a number of issues, including the federal budget, the u.s. economy and foreign policy. live coverage begins at noon eastern. house majority whip james clyburn weighed in earlier on the proposed cite of an -- site of an islamic community center near ground zero. he also talked about legislation passed already by the democratic majority. this is about 25 minutes. >> thank you so much for joining us today. over the summer district work period house democrats are talking about the ways that we are fighting for the middle class. this week as students head back to school, families prepare for back to school, we're highlighting the strong

consumer protections enacted in the areas of student lending, health care, credit cards and finance. the recently enacted daud-frank wall street reform created the first ever agency to look out for consumers in our financial system. and gives them more protection. the act establishes a new independent watchdog agency. it creates a national consumer complaint hotline so consumers will have for the first time a single toll-free number to report problems with financial products and services. it allows consumers free access to their credit card score. if their score negatively affects them in the financial

transaction or a hiring decision. it reforms mortgage lending, eliminating many of the hidden fees and abusive practices that trap so many families because they couldn't afford to repay. much of which resulted in record foreclosures. for those of us who pay attention to the news this morning, you know for 13 counties around atlanta, georgia, the foreclosure crisis has hit astronomical numbers. we in this bill require lenders to disclose the maximum ma that -- that a consumer could pay on a variable rate mortgage.

that i have seen take a tremendous toll in my congressional district. it prohibits unfair lending practices such as free payment penalties. one. things i always -- one of the things i always thought was tremendously unfair, i don't talk about it a lot, but for the 14 years immediately before becoming a candidate for congress i spent one of the bank boards that was a predecessor to bank of america, i was on the board of c.n.s. and c.n.s. sovereign and i was always amazed at some of what was considered to be just regular banking practices that could have such a tremendous adverse impact on consumers.

now, while we were doing all of this our republican colleagues strongly oppose us establishing the consumer financial protection bureau. as well as ending the provisions -- as well as provisions ending bail jourts for wall street in this new law. they prefer to stand with wall street and with the big banks and it was kind of interesting to see some of the arguments that were used to stop us from doing this. in 2009 congress passed and president obama signed into law the credit cardholder's bill of rights. that is a piece of legislation that expect -- protects consumers and crack downs on excessive fees. the card act contains three

separate implementation dates. the final implementation date, 15 months after enactment, takes place on august 22. next week the last of these credit card protections will take effect. including the banning of unfair rate increases, abusive fees and penalties that require credit card companies to reconsider the interest rate hikes they jam in place before the new law took effect. many of you may recall we got complaints earlier that many credit card companies started doing things in anticipation of what would be prevented in 15 months. when it came time to stand for the middle class, once again house republicans, leaders,

voted no. these new credit card restrictions along with overdraft limits recently instituted by the federal reserve will save united states consumers at least $5 billion this year alone. i mentioned earlier about my bapping experience. well, i remember one day we were all sitting around the board room talking about what we could do to improve the standing of the bank and i raised the issue of overdrafts. i found out that day what it meant to be a skunk at a party. overdrafts were one of if not the biggest money maker we had in the bank.

now today with this new act we are going to prevent things like a $35 penalty every time you swipe a debit card if there's no money there to cover it. just imagine having an overdraft, you may not even realize it, it may have been limited at a $5 purchase you made or a $15 purchase two, or three of these purchases at a department store in one day, all could add up to less than $50, but when you look at the cost of the penalty could you incur a $200 penalty very, very easily. so these are the kinds of things that we are bringing to a close today. but i have with me two young

people who are headed back to school. one, emily, i've been practicing this name, from nebraska. emily has an auto immune disease that require her to see several specialists. her pre-existing condition and health care costs were limiting her career decisions but thanks to this new health care law and the patients' bill of rights, she will be able to stay on her parents' plan when she graduates. and with that i would like to ask emily to come before us now in her own way. >> good morning, everyone. my name is emily. and i would just like to share with you a little bit today how health care reform has seriously impacted my life. i'll start kind of at the beginning. when i was 17 i started

experiencing a lot of really odd symptoms and none of my doctors could figure out what was causing them. so after about two years of a lot of specialists, m.r.i.'s, catscans and a week-long stay in the hospital when i was a freshman in college, i was financially diagnosed with a disease which is a really, really rare auto immune condition. that only about 15,000 americans have. and as you can imagine, kind of a lot to deal with as a young 19-year-old. but i was one of the lucky ones in that my parents have wonderful health care. in my condition, because of that health care was completely covered. i didn't have to care where my coverage was coming from. it was pretty much changing everything about my life. but after i had started to recover and things got better, i slowly realized that just because i had good health insurance under my parents didn't mean that being chronically ill from a young age was not going to impact my

life. when your health care is tied directly to the job that you hold, your career opportunities become a lot more limited than you might imagine. all of a sudden i couldn't take a couple years off before i went to law school because i was going to drop off my parents' insurance plan. i had to be really careful not to ever drop off an insurance plan because i am diagnosed with a disease and that would mean i would be paying for my own health care because of pre-existing conditions. but, thankfully, with the passage of the patients' coverage and affordable care act last spring, none of that is an issue for me anymore. the dependent coverage clause has been a god send for me. it allows me to stay on my parents' insurance until i'm 26. it gives me that buffer time to figure out what career i want to pursue, take a couple years and wait to go to law school or wait to go to grad school and that's something that is invaluable to me and has really impacted my life and the decisions that i'm making now about my future two or three

years down the road. but even more important than that, the patients' bill of rights has made it so that i can't be denied health insurance at any point simply because i have a disease that i can't control. and that's -- it's changed my life in so many ways. and i just am here today to share with you how much it has positively impacted me but i'm not the only young american who has been positively impacted by this legislation. i am one example of millions and millions of young americans who have been helped by this legislation whether through the dependent care clause or through the patients' bill of rights or a combination of the two, like me. and that's why we need to pull young people into this conversation about health care. because young people are the most affected. we're the generation that's the most uninsured. so, i want you today to think about all the different ways that young americans are affected by this reform. it's really, really important and i just would like to take

this opportunity to say thank you to congress for taking this issue and doing something about it. and significantly improving not only my life but the lives of a lot of other young americans, too. health care is something that it's easy not to care about when you're young and you're healthy, but someday all of us are not going to be young and in my case a lot sooner not so healthy. and when that happens health care becomes something that matters almost more than anything else. and for those reasons this is one of the best consumer protections i think congress has enacted in a really long time. and i'm extremely grateful for it. thank you. >> thank you very much, emily. costs have sored in recent years, increasing by 40% in the last five years. students graduating from college with more debt than ever before and many would-be students are holding off on

going to college or skipping it altogether because they cannot afford it. with the college cost reduction act, we cut interest rates in half on subsidized student loans over the next four years. with the student aid reform bill, we converted all new federal student lending to the stable, effective and cost-efficient direct loan program. a more reliable lender for students and more cost effective for taxpayers. we invested $750 million to bolster college access and completion support for students. it will increase funding for the college access challenge grant program and will also fund innovative programs at states and institutions that

folks on increasing financial literacy will be able to graduate students. we made federal laws more affordable for borrowers to repay by investing $1.5 billion to strengthen the income base repayment program. we invested $2.55 billion in historical bladge colleges and universities -- black colleges and universities and minority-serving institutions to provide students with the support they need to stay in school and graduate. we invested $36 billion over 10 years to increase the maximum annual pell grants to $5,500 in 2010 and $5,975 by 2017. starting in 2013, the

scholarship will be linked to match the rising cost of living by indexing to the consumer price index. i'm also pleased today to be joined by sara, a pell grant recipient at chapman university in orange county, california. the increase in the pell grant under the student aid reform bill is helping her pay for college. and this event today provides her with her first opportunity to come to our nation's capitol. sara. >> thank you marks jort clyburn, for having me today. my name is sara and i'm with the u.s. public interest research group. and i'm here today to talk about why this reform is going to help me pay for school and share a little bit of my personal experience with the pell grant. on march 20, it 2009, the end

of my freshman year in college, my father unexpectedly passed away due to a stroke. on top of losing one of the most important people in my life, this tragedy has led to a financial crisis for my family. and i got a call a week after my father's death from my mother telling me that she could no longer afford to keep me in school. unable to pay my flight back home, i missed my father's funeral, worked multiple jobs so i could continue to go to school. but thankfully the pell grant has given me that financial peace of mind to refocus on my education and stay in school instead of dropping out. because of this reform, now i will able to continue school and achieve my dreams to receive a bachelor's degree in english literature, become a teacher and i'm so happy to be here today because the college cost reduction act is going to help millions of other students be able to afford school and

stay in college during a financially difficult time for them. this legislation will help half a million students, will prevent half a million students from losing their pell grants and will also prevent an additional eight million students from getting their pell grant cut by 60% and on top of that it will also help students make it easier for them to pay back their student loans after they graduate. today is actually my father's birthday and i'm incredibly happy to be standing here to talk about how this stronger pell grant program is going to keep helping me support my educational career and help many million other students in america. because of this legislation, thanks to congress, i will be able to stand with my head held high on the day that i

graduate, look up into the sky and tell my dad that his little girl made it through. thank you so much. >> thank you so much, sara. and thanks to you all for being here today with that we'll answer any questions you may have. >> how should president obama handle the new york mosque controversy? >> well, i think the president made statements, i guess it was yesterday, clarifying that he was talking in a micro sense of religious freedoms in this country. i grew up a pents could tal -- pentacostal. i recall as a child, because we were not considered mainstream in religion, the larger or mainstream, baptists and methodists, did not view us in

a very wholesome way. my father was a minister. i learned a lot in that par sonnage and one thing i learned was religious tolerance. today pents could tals are considered a lot more mainstream and i think that over time and what have you we'll be able to view the broad array of religious freedoms in this country in the way that we ought to. now, when it comes to where and how any structure, any sanctuary should be built, we have what we call in this country community standards. and community standards ought

to be left up to the community. so the decision on permitting for any building, be it a mosque or a church or whatever, maybe a place of worship, or be it a grocery store or a liquor store, those things are -- things are left up to community standards and i think in this instance that's what the president's made clear. >> -- [inaudible] could cause more trouble. >> i wouldn't say it's caused more trouble. i think as president of the united states, articulating the constitutional principles from which this country were founded and calling for tolerance on the part of all of its people is a presidential exercise. >> "wall street journal" had a

report that found that 1/3 of stimulus funds that were supposed to be spent on shelf-ready infrastructure projects has been spent -- shovel-ready infrastructure projects has been spent. do you think that money should go elsewhere? >> well, we had a lot of debate when we were putting together the recovery act as to what was the meaning of shovel-ready. now, for a project to be shovel-ready and still meet all of the various tasks that have to be met at state levels for granting permits and etc., are two different things. for a profit to be shipping on a shelf for, say, the transportation department, you don't go out and do bids and other kind of purchasing

right-of-way and that sort of thing. do you that when you have the money to do the project. so i think that what we're suffering from here is the fact that there is a big difference in what we do here in washington and how it gets where the rubber meets the road out in these communities. and so, sure, i'm frustrated with that. but if you keep up with the local newspapers down in south carolina, you know, i'm frustrated at a lot of the inergsa that's taking place at the state levels when it comes to this bill especially. >> is it worth diverting that money somewhere where it can be spent more quickly? >> what's to say that it's diverted to another project that will have to go through permitting and that sort of thing as well. so, no, i don't think we ought to do. that i think we ought to recognize the fact that the permitting process,ed bien,

that you must do in order to award these programs, will be there no matter where you are and maybe next time we'll be a little less energetic in how we define shovel-ready. >> on the stimulus, there's been some more talk that the economy appears to be going back into a slowdown, that the concerns of those at the beginning of the stimulus debate, there are those who wanted it to have a lot more money directed to spending, infrastructure and less on tax breaks. some of those people are now saying that, well, we see that the economic effect has been limited, the jobless rate is still high and so that's vindicated their concerns that the stimulus was not big enough and was not directed enough toward spending. do you agree with that? .

we got much more tax credits and direct investments out of the senate. and that is what we are living with. so, yes, i wanted a much more direct and much bigger bill. a lot of made of the clyburn amendment, an amendment i put forward in order to limit governors around the country from getting in between this directive and the communities where they would go.

i think we are seeing that in some states right now, that even we just passed a bill to help teachers. we came back here last week to do that. now we are taking a look at the clause in that bill that a lot of states have rented themselves in eligible for this money -- rendered themselves in eligible for this money. these of the kinds of things we are all thinking about. >> do you think the slowdown now is partially reflected in the fact that the stimulus was not big enough? >> what i am saying is that i thought that much more, a much larger percentage should have gone into direct projects rather than as a tax credits. it would be of value judgment i do not feel equipped to make as

to whether it should have been bigger. but i do believe it would have put more people back to work much more quickly. >> would you like to see more jobs legislation? >> i have in mind the transportation bill. i really believe that we should find a way to get the transportation bill done. it has always been a big, big job-creator. not only are you creating big numbers of jobs, but you also are providing a tremendous amount of service.

i represent a state that has been determined to have more than 6000 bridges in disrepair. and i would love to see us find a way to get the transportation bill done so that we can fix those things. that would be of tremendous benefit to various communities and also create a lot of jobs all over this country. thank you so much. >> tomorrow morning, a conversation on the future of federal housing finance with tim geithner, the housing secretary and other administration officials. live coverage from the treasury department begins at 9:00 a.m. eastern on c-span2. >> now, secretary of state hillary clinton on the health initiative. she will discuss the investment that focuses on women, children and the boards around the world. this is about one hour 10 minutes.

>> welcome, but secretary an honored guest. i and the dean of science and i guess this is the school of advanced international studies that is known to us as sais my division of johns hopkins university. students are just starting their orientation next week. the students come from more than 70 countries, and even with u.s. cabinet officials of national standing, it is our custom to highlight the stepping stones in the careers of every speaker at the school. secretary clinton needs no such introduction. her fame extends around the world and across generations. let me offer, instead, two brief

comments. first, i would boast that i could think of no university in the united states which offers a more distinguished an appropriate value than the secretary's speech. johns hopkins medicine, the bloomberg school of public health is from the same state and the school of person is all preeminent not only in education and research, but involving people and nationalities who come to baltimore to study their and institutions with partners all over the world established the global health and foreign policy initiative. and the professor has been

chosen as the white house fellow and will be joining the director of u.s.a.i.d. to go and work in aid in the health field during the coming year. sais is especially happy to host you, madam secretary, and to welcome the director of u.s. aid, because of our lifelong affiliation with the state department. as we prepared for your visit, my colleagues compiled a long list of the many senior officials who were graduates of sais. we presently have about 300 alumns working in the state department and another 100 working and a.i.d. our graduates work in more than 100 countries. my second comment h to do with our speaker today. students come to sais because they have chosen an education to

prepare themselves as leaders in global affairs, whether in the profit, nonprofit, or public sectors. they are on the lookout for role models. what a privilege as a dean at to welcome the secretary of state to our school. you could imagine how manyf our american students would consider that position, as demanding as it is, to be the pinnacle of their career ambitions. but our young men and women, i would stress, that the lessons from any career required looking through the famous to the ingredients of success. secretary clinton at seemingly on ending a curiosity about the world around her, a passion that she has shown throughout her life to improve the lives of others, and the discipline of hard work she brings to every task -- those traits, curiosity, passion, and diligence are the recipe for building a worthwhile care at any age. when they are enriched by the

wisdom of vast experience, the public is especially well- served. madam secretary, the podium is yours. [applause] >> thank you. well, it is such a pleasure to be here again at sais, and i want to thank dean einhorn for that very warm and thoughtful introduction. but this is such an exceptional educational institution, and i had no idea we had 300 of your alumni, but i see in action every day the results of the work, the research, the study, and preparation that goes on here at sais. we are the very proud employer of many sais alumni, and i hope that there are more of you who

are going to be joining our ranks in the years to come. in addition to the contributions that johns hopkins has made in the fields of diplomacy and international law, i want to add to what dean einhorn said about the contributions in health. hopkins is, of course, home to excellent medical and nursi schools, and home to the bloomberg school of public health. that school's motto, "protecting health, saving lives, millions at a time," captures both the possibility and the responsibility inherent in the pursuit of better health, whether here in our own country or in communities around the world. new breakthroughs and new knowledge about how to fight disease and save lives only add to our responsibility as researchers, teachers, students, government officials, and as a nation.

each of us, i believe, is called to find ways to bring those solutions to the people who need them, wherever they are. and many contributors to global health are here with us, including representatives from several partner and donor countries, ngo's, therivate sector, multilateral institutions, and public- private eerprises. and i want to acknowledge your and their outstanding contributions to saving lives around the globe, often millions at a time. and that is the mission i'd like to discuss with you today -- how the obama administration is building upon our country's long-standing commitment to global health by bringing life- saving prevention, treatment, and care to more people in more places. this is a signature of american

leadership in the world today. it's also an issue very close to my own heart. have been privileged to visit many parts of the world on behalf of our country over the last 20 years. and iny travels, i've come to know countless people who are living proof of whatuccessful global health programs can do. i've met hiv-positive farmers in kenya who now have the strength to spend their day in the fields earning a living thanks to antiretroviral drugs, children in angola who wake up every morning under bed nets and then head off to school eager to learn, unafflicted by malaria, new mothers in indonesia who proudly show off healthy babies brought into the world with the help of trained midwives, men and women who have grown into adulthood resisting diseases because they had childhood immunizations against polio or measles now, these are but a few of the faces of global health that i

have seen, people who are not only alive, but also contributing as parents, workers, and citizens, thanks to the governments, organizations, foundations, and universities like johns hopkins who collaborate to bring medical care and education about healthy behavior to more parts of the world. these are also the faces of america's commitment. no nation in history has done more to improve global health. we have led the way on some of the greatest health achievements of our time. smallpox plagued humankind for thousands of years until we helped end it through the world health organization's eradication campaign in the 1960's and 1970's. the expanded program on immunization has brought life- saving vaccines to nearly 80% of the world's children, up from less than 5% when the

program began 36 years ago, and it has done so in large part thanks to u.s. dollars and support. the global distribution of micronutrients, which we helped pioneer, has protected the health of many millions of young children and pregnant women. and we are the global leader in the fight against neglected tropical diseases, treating 59 million people in the past four years alone. we help prevent and treat malaria for more than 50 million people every year and we provide nearly 60% -- 60% of the world's donor funding for hiv and aids. all told, 40% of the total global funding for development assistance for health comes from the united states. this is clearly not a democratic or republican issue, this is a nonpartisan issue that

really comes from the heart of america. and our leadership in this field has been possible because of strong support on both sides of the aisle. i commend the bush administration for its ground- breaking work in global health, and in particular in two of our country's flagship programs -- the president's emergency plan for aids relief, or pepfar, and the president's malaria initiative. i'd like to acknowledge two people who helped make these programs possible -- mark dybul, the former global aids coordinator, and admiral tim ziemer, the current head of pmi. now, beyond government, american organizations are making extraordinary contributions. from the bill and melinda gates foundation, which has given billions to revive immunization campaigns and discover new vaccines and other tools to prevent and treat disease, to

the carter center, which has led the global campaign to eradicate the debilitating guinea worm parasite, to the clinton foundation, which has worked wh pharmaceutical companies to make aids drugs more affordable for millions, and to hundreds of other orgazations across america that are finding innovative ways to deliver life-saving and life- improving care to people worldwide. churches and faith communities have also led the fight to bring treatment to those in need, including by deployi health volunteers, who sometimes face dangerous circumstances to serve people in places where little or no care exists. just two weeks ago, medical volunteers from several countries, including the united states, were murdered in afghanistan as they traveled from village to village to treat eye conditions and run a dental clini

that was a terrible loss for the families, a terrible loss for the wor, and it was a terrible loss for those people who had been and would have benefited from their help. so stories like these remind us that strengthening global health is not only a deeply held priority for our government, but for many american citizens and our nation as a whole. and it is an important part of our national story, one that isn't told as often or as thoroughly as it should be. today, on behalf of the obama administration, i'd like to share with you the next chapter in america's work in health worldwide. it's called the global health initiative, ghi for short, and it represents a new approach, informed by new thinking and aimed at a new goal -- to save the greatest possible number of lives, both by increasing our existing health programs andy

building upon them to help countries develop their own capacity to improve the health of their own people. now, before i discuss the specifics of the initiative, let me just take a step back. some may ask why is a secretary of state giving a speechbout global health, there are a lot of oth crises in the world, as i am well aware. some might accuse me of taking a little break from those crises to -- [laughter] -- come sais to talk aboutlobal health. what exactly does maternal health, or immunizations, or the fight against hiv and aids have to do with foreign policy? well, my answer is everything. we invest in global health to strengthen fragile or faili states. we have seen the devastating impact of aids on countries stripped of their farmers, teachers, soldiers, health workers, and other professionals, as we as the millions of orphaned and

vulnerable children left behind, whose needs far exceed what any government agency can provide. the destabilizing impact of aids led the clinton administration to categorize it not just as a health threat but a national security threat, a position later echoed by then secretary of state colin powell. and the center for strategic and international studies, a think tank focused on national security, launched a commission on smart global health policy co-chaired by helene gayle of care and retired admiral william j. fallon, to find new strategies for global health, because weelieve that will help us build a safer, more secure world. we invest in global health to promote social and economic progress, and to support the rise of capable partners who can help us solve regional and global problems.

we have seen places where people who suffer from poor health struggle on many levels. poverty is usually widespread. infrastructure is usually incomplete. food production and school enrollments are usually low. people who would otherwise take the lead in driving progress for theiramilies and nations are instead dragged down by disease, deprivation, and lost opportunity. we invest in global health to protect our nation's security. to cite one example, the threat posed by the spread of disse in our interconnected world in which thousands of people every day step on a plane in one continent and step off in another. we need a comprehensive, effective global system for tracking health data, monitoring threats, and coordinating responses. the need for such a system was

driven home in recent years with the spread of sars and the h1n1 virus. it is cheaper and more effective to stop an outbreak when it emerges, before it becomes a global threat. but that is very hard to do in places where health and public health services are scant or nonexistent. we invest in global health as a tool of public diplomacy. for millions of people worldwide, the prevention, treatment or care that the united states makes possible is their main experience of us as a country and a people. and it can be a very powerful on giving people a chance at a long and healthy life or helping protect their children from disease conveys as much about our values as any state visit or strategic dialogue ever could. and we invest in global health as a clear and direct expression of our compassion.

millions die every year simply because they lack access to very simple interventions, like bed nets, or vitamin-fortified food, or oral rehydration therapy. as a nation and a people, we cannot, we must not, accept those senseless deaths. it's just not in our dna. that's why americans frequently report that they support their tax dollars going to global health programs -- not because of what the money can do for us, but because of what it can and does do for others. few investments are more consistent with all of our values and few are more sound. global health is a prime example of how investing our resources strategically can have an immediate and lasting impact on people, communities, and countries. the list of diseases and deficiencies that threaten lives and livelihoods across the world is nearly limitless, but

our resources are not. so therefore, we must be strategic and make evidence- based decisions in targeting the most dangerous threats, to ensure that our investments that, after all, come from the american taxpayer, deliver results. and we must also must stay focused on the long-term picture -- not only addressing the urgent needs that people have today but building the foundation for better health tomorrow and for the next generation. this thinking informs every asct of the global health initiative, which president obama addressed last year. the united states is investing $63 billion -- first, to sustain and strengthen our isting health programs, and second, to build upon those programs and take their work to the next level by collaborating with governments, organizations, civil society groups, and individuals to help

broaden the improvements in public health that we can expect. we're shifting our focus from solving problems, one at a time, to serving people, by considering more fully the circumstances of their lives and ensuring they can get the care they need most over the course of their lifemes. consider the life of a woman in one of our partner countries. she lives in a remote village that has been home to her family for generations. her parents went their whole lives without ever seeing a doctor, but now, thanks to the hard work of the international community, some quality health care is available to her. within walking distance, there is a clinic supported by pepfar, where she first found out that she has hiv and now receives the antiretroviral drugs that keep her healthy.

if she makes a longer journey by bicycle or bus, there is another clinic where she can receive prenatal care and where her children can receive immunizations. sometimes health services come right to her door, in the form of health volunteers bringing bed nets to protect her family from malaria. but while she can receive care for some health problems, for others she is on her own. her local clinic is well- stocked with antiretrovirals, but is empty of antibiotics or contraceptives. if she has trouble giving birth, the nearest facility equipped to perform emergency surgery is hundreds of miles away, so she faces the very real risk of becoming that 1 in 22 women in sub-saharan africa who die in childbirth.

and while her home has been sprayed for mosquitoes, she has no access to clean water, so her children may escape malaria only to die from diarrheal disease. there is no queson that this health landscape is much improved from just a few years ago. but its short-comings are significant. there is too little coordination among all the countries and organizations, including in our own government, that deliver health services, so critical gaps in care are left unaddressed. there is too little integration. diseases are often treated in isolation rather than bundled together, forcing people like this woman to travel to multiple clinics to meet their and their children's basic health needs. there is too little innovation focused on designing technologies and strategies that can work in resource-poor places and help the people who

are hardest to reach. step back even further and another problem comes into view -- a lack of in-country capacity. in many places, donor countries and outside ngo's have stepped in to deliver critical services that countries didn't have the money or the expertise to deliver themselves. but while that is absolutely the right response to an emergency, it is a temporary fix, not a long-term solution. yet in too many places, it h come to serve as a long-term solution. as a result, this woman's current access to care is erratic, and her future access to care is uncertain she is vulnerable to the vicissitudes of funding cycles and development trends in places far from where she lives. she has little control over the

quality of care provided to her and her family, while if her elected leaders were more directly and more heavily invested, she and her fellow citizens would have more of a voice in the system. the fundamental purpose of the global health initiative iso address these problems by tying individual health programs together in an integrated, coordinated, sustainable system of care, with the countries themselves in the lead. we are taking the investments our country has made in pepfar, the president's malaria initiative, maternal a child health, family planning, neglected tropical diseases, and other critical health areas -- building on the work of agencies across the federal government, such as the centers for disease control -- and expanding their reach by improving the overall environment in which health services are delivered. by doing so, our investments

can have a bigger impact and patients can gain access to more and better care, and as a result, lead healthier lives. to illustrate how the global health initiative will work, consider how it will impact one of our most successful global health programs -- pepfar. in the past seven years, pepfar has provided millions of people with prevention services across africa, asia, and the caribbean. it has also chged the conventional wisdom about treatmen before pepfar, many believed that treating people with hiv in poor countries was impossible, because the drugs were effective only if they were taken according to a precise daily schedule and with sufficient food. for people living in places with food shortages and without health clinics, pharmacies, or health professionals, it seemed like treatment would forever be

out of reach. but the united states could not accept the injustice of allowing millions to die when we did have the drugs to save them. and through pepfar, we set up clinics, trained health professionals, and improved shipping and storage. so the experiment worked. seven years ago,he number of people in sub-saharan africa on antiretrovirals was fewer than 50,000. today, more than 5 million people in the developing world are safely and effectively using these drugs, and pepfar is supporting about half of those people. under the global health initiative, we will continue pepfar's success by increasing its funding. in 2008, funding for pepfar was $5 billion. for 2011, president obama has quested more than $5.7 billion, the largest amount any country has ever invested in the fight against global aids.

and we are raising our goal for treatment. through the global health initiative, we seek to directly support treatment for more than 4 million people worldwidemore than double the number of people who received treatment during the first five years of pepfar. we are raising our goal for care, to more than 12 million people, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children. and we are raising our goal for prevention. through the global health inittive, we aim to prevt 12 million new hiv infections. to do that, we are embracing a more comprehensive approach and expanding on what we know works. we are moving beyond a-b-c -- abstinence, be faithful, and consistent and corct use of condomsto an a to z approach to prevention. because we nd to use every tool we havethe full combination of medical, behavioral, and structural intervention.

that includes male circumcision, the prevention of mother-to-child transmission, improvements and the investments of making detection more available and affordable, education, and when needed, legal, policy, or regulatory changes that wil make it easier to protect populations. despite all the investments the united states has already made and that the world has already made, to stop this epidemic, we know we confront 2.7 million new infections every year. so if we are going to win this war, we need to get better results in prevention. and our strategy under the global health initiative will enable us to do so. so the immediate impact for pepfar is clear. its funding will increase, its impact will increase, and its prevention strategies will become more comprehensive.

similarly, we are strengthening our support for the other health programs we fund ound the world. we are increasing our support for the president's malaria initiative, with the goal of reducing the malaria burden by 50% for 450 million people. against tuberculosis, we intend to save 1.3 million lives by increasing access to treatment. and we are scaling up our work in family planning and maternal and child healthareas in whic -n which the united states can and must lead. every year, hundreds of thousands of women die from complications related to pregnancy or childbirth, nearly all of them in the developing world, and for every one woman who dies, 20 more suffer debilitating injuries or infections. and every year, millions of children in the developing world die from wholly preventable causes. saving the lives of women and children requires a range of

care, from improving nutrition to training birth attendants who can help women give birth safely. it also requires increased access to family planning. family planning represents one of the most cost-effective public health interventions available in the world today. it prevents both maternal and child deaths by helping women space their births and bear children during their healthiest years. and it reduces the deaths of women from unsafe abortions. thunited states waonce at the forefront of developing and delivering successful family planng programs. but in recent years, we have fallen behind. with the global health initiative, were making up for lost time. all told, we will save millions of additional lives through our increased support to existing u.s. health programs around the world through this initiative.

but what about all the systemic challenges that surround pepfar and usaid progra and other u.s.-funded health programs in the field? the constellation of logistical, structural, legal, and political problems that decrease health and make life tenuous for the woman that i described a few minutes ago. as long as they persist, that will limit our or any donor's impact. women we save from aids will die in childbih. children we save from polio will die from rotavirus. and on a broader levelin ter --n terms of the scope and quality of medical and public health services available in communities and countriesthe future will not look much different than the present. we need to lay the groundwork now for more progress down the road by tackling some of those systemic problems, and working with our partner countries to

uproot the most deep-seated obstacles that impede their own people's health. that is how we can make our investments yield the most significant returns and save the greatest numbers of lives, today and tomorrow. so let me explain a few key ways in which we are pursuing this goal. first, we are working with countries to create and implement strategies for health that they take the lead in designing based on their distinct needs and existing strengths, and we are helping them build their capacity to manage, oversee, coordinate, and operate health programs over the long term. now, in practice, this will mean different things in different places. in some countries, our development experts are training community health workers to deliver basic care and answer basic health questions. others, we are setting up supply chains and establishing drug protocols to ensure that medicine will reach patients efficiently.

in still others, we are helping set up health information systems, so health workers can collect and analyze more data -- from the number of births and deaths to more complex information, like the number of women who receive prenatal care at a clinic and return later to deliver their babies. countries need a sustainable system for capturing and understanding data, to continuously monitor and improve their own performance. second, we are focusing on the needs and contributions of women and girls, who are still frequently overlooked and underserved by health professionals who don't notice their suffering or hear their concerns. our commitment to promoting the health of women and girls is, of course, for their sake, but also for the sake of their families and communities. because when a woman's health suffers, her family suffers and then there is a ripple effect throughout a village as well. but when women are healthy, the

benefits are similarly broad. too often, the social, economic, and cultural factors that restrict their access to health services -- such as gender-based violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation, lack of education, lack of access to economi opportunity, and other forms of discrimination -- remain unacknowledged and unaddressed. we are linking our health programs to our broader development efforts to address those underlying political, economic, social, and gender problems. and we're working with governments, civil society groups, and individuals to make sure that the needs of women and girls are recognized as critical not only by us, but by the health ministers, the people at the grassroots who administer care every day, that th are taken into account in the budgets and the planning of finance ministries, prime ministers, and presidents. third, we are improving how we

measure and evaluate our own impact. this includes shifting our focus from "inputs" to "outcomes and impacts" -- that is, determining our success not simply by how many bed nets we distribute, but by how many people actually avoid malaria by using them correctly -- a fuller picture that demands that we invest in improving how we ourselves colct, analyze, and share data. fourth, we are invting in innovation, with a focus on developing tools that will help diagnose, prevent, and cure disease the communities where we work, which are often remote and poor in resources. many of the tools and techniques we use to keep people healthy here in the united states are unsuited to the realities of life in other places. so we need to be innovative about how to reach people effectively. one example is by using cell

phones. in several countries, we're working with public and private partne to help prevent maternal and newborn deaths by sending timely and critical health messages to pregnant women and new mothers via cell phone. the ll phone has penetrated where health clinics have not. in another exciting example of the impact of innovation, we achieved a significant breakthrough just last month, when scientists in south africa successfully tested the first microbicide gel to hel prevent the transmission of hiv. this proof-of-concept trial was made possible with funding from pepfar through usaid and the south african department of science and technology, and it has the potential to be a major breakthrough in the prevention of aids, because it is an affordable tool that women can use without needing permission from their partners.

too often, the men decide whether condoms will be used. buwith such a gel, women will have the power to protect their own health. fifth, we are improving coordination and integration. and that begins with aligning all u.s. government programs within a coury by finding opportunities to bundle services -- much like pepfar d in kenya, by linking hiv and aids programs with maternal and child health, tb, andamily planning. coordination starts at theop, here in washington. the global health initiative brings together experts from across our government. and here today are the three extraordinary heads of agencies -- who also happen to be three exceptional doctors -- who are leading the day-to-day operations of the initiative. dr. raj shah, the administrator of the u.s. agency for international development.

. eric goosby, the u.s. global aids coordinator at pepfar. and dr. tom frieden, the director of the centers for disee control. their agencies, along with the national institutes of heah and other agencies from the departments of health and human services, defense, the peace corps, among others, will work together under the guidance and direction of deputy secretary of state jack lew who is also here with us today. now, ts is a unique leadership structure and it embeds our commitment to coordination at every level, from the white house down. sixth, we are working with existing partners and seeking out new ones. we want to align our efforts with that of other donor countries and multilateral organizations, many of which do outstanding work to improve global health. let me just mention one in particular. the global fund to fight aids, tuberculosis, and malaria. this organization has had a

transformative impact on the world, not only in the millions ofives it has saved, but by creating a new model for how global community can come together to contribute and to coordinate in the fight against epidemics. the united states was proud to be the fund's first donor and its largest donor. we remain the largest donor under president obama's request for 2011. but our most critical collaborations will be with our partner countries, and we are going to be calling on them to bring their full commitment to is effort. because after all, their contributions will determine whether we succeed with our goal of building integrated, coordinated, sustainable systems of care for more of the world's people. we need only look around the world today to see how critical country leadership is. in places where governments invest in their people's health, where civil society groups are empowered and

engaged, where health is recognized as a priority in every sector and at every level of society, health improves and people thrive. consider the progress in south africa with respect to hiv/aids. this country has one of the world's highest burdens of hiv. for too long, some of south africa's leaders had a view of the epidemic that denied the link between hiv and aids. but that has now changed. under president zuma, the south african government has come forward with a real, renewed commitment to battling the epidemic, with increased funding and strong goals for increasing testing and treatment. the united states has demonstrated our support with additional funng to help south africa build its capacity to meet those goals and address the epidemic over the long term.

to galvanize country leadership, we are bringing to bear the full weight of american diplomacy. our diplomats are working closely with their counterparts worldwide to embed a deep commitment to health -- not only in the office of the health ministe but the foreign minister, the defense minister, the finance minister, and especially at the top, in the offices of primeinisters a presidents. too often, we've seen health relegated to the sidelines and treated as a lesser priority in terms of how much money is allocad and how much attention is devoted. in fact, we've seen that the united states and other dors come in with money and countries actually take money away from health thinking that we're going to make up the difference. the united states is willing to invest our money, our time, and our expertise to improve health in countries. but we are now asking their governments to demonstrate a similar commitment, in terms of human resources, serious pledges to build capacit and where feasible, financial

support. we expect these countries to step up. and their people expect the same. now, this will not be easy. the changes we are working to achieve through the global health initiative are broad and deep, and there are many obstacles standing in the way. but if we succeed, we will have transformed how health is delivered and received across the world. now, we have already come so far as a nation and as a global community in saving and improving lives. and we are grateful to all who brought us to this point, rticularly the heroic health workers, and the visionary leaders, the determined scientists and researchers, and committed activists. thanks to them, we are able -- and i would argue, we are obligated -- to go even further. to save more lives, to take on more difficult tasks, to commit ourselves to the patient, persistent work of building the

foundation for a healthier future. this is a challenge worthy of us, as a nation and as a people. and we are rising meet it, ase have done ma times in the past. together, we can give millions of people the chance at healthy lives, and create a healthier, more stable, more peaceful world. coming to sais to talk about this is truly a privilege because this is a place that will be providing the leaders we need in the future to realize this vision, to ask the hard questions aboutust because this is the way we've always done it before and we've had some success, is this the way we should continue. to challenge the congress whose own structure often creates stovepipes that prevent our own government from working together. to do the difficult, but essential work of convincing countries' leaders that investing in their own people's

health is not just a worthy goal, but critical to the future of security, peace, and prosperity they claim to be seeking. so we're aware of all the pitfalls and all the obstacles, internal and external. but we cannot sit idly by. and we have too all that we can in our power in this time to make a difference. and that's what i know you came to sais in order to find your own way forward in achieving. and we welcome your participation and we invite you to be part of helping to solve some of the world's greatest challenges now and in the future. thank you all very much.

[applause] >> thank you for that comprehensive and compelling description. no one in this audience thinks they heard a speech for a day. this is a speech that people will be standing and that young people will be learning about four years to come. secretary clinton has agreed, most graciously, took some questions fro our community here today. so let me return this program back to her and many thank you again. >> i would be happy.

i do not know what the arrangements are. >> i can call on people for you. ok. please stand up and give your name and your affiliation and be brief and only ask one question. >> ank you for a terrific speech. i appreciate the attention that secretary clinton has brought to global health issues. you said that robo -- that global health hazard to do with foreign policy. what do you think about -- global health has everything to do with foreign policy. >> i would start by making the point that i think the united states has both strategic and

humanitarian interests across the world, not just in the headline places that we are so well aware of right now. whether the problems that the united states and the world will deal with in a year, five years, 10 years, 20 years from now if we do not begin thinking about them and acting on them now held this such a clear example of that. -- acting on them now. health is such a clear example of that. of course, it has to do with foreign policy, national security, the health of our own people, the values of america, how we present ourselves in the world and what's we are seen as

really committed to. when it comes to how we better integrate and coordinate this, diplomacy is a key role. from the very beginning of my time as secretary of state, i have talked about elevating diplomacy and development alongside the fence. of smart power, if you will. when i look at the real world in which we live, they are not separate. they are all cnected. perhaps the military takes a lead in some places, like afghanistan. but arab diplomats and our development exports are in there -- but our diplomats and their development experts are in their everyday to improve government, health and education, and agriculture. it is now a necessary cooperative inteation of american power. we're trying to look at every program and policy is that we have across the governmen and

more effectively design and execute those to deliver on that promise of integrad networked power. we will be releasing the first- ever quadrennial development review that the defense department has done. having watched theffectiveness for both the defense department and congress and the public in putting together a statement of mission and goals and strategies and tactics, we're doing the same. this global health initiative gives life to what we are trying to put forward as our new approach to this integrated approach. there are many real world examples. when you think about a country like nigeria, we have that far, cdc, and usaid all operating in nigeria.

yet we had a polio outbreak in northern nigeria a few years ago. we had our aid programs and development expert on the ground doing extraordinary work. but we did not anticipate and quickly respond t what became a series of rumors about how the polio vaccine was a design to sterilize children. and no matter how hard our development experts or are doctors or nurse or anybody from one o our agencies worked, that problem and did much of the efforts that we were engaged in -- that problem undid much of the efforts that we were engaged in. so when jack lee was with dr. flues be in northern nigeria recently, he went to see the

chief of the area, the emir. we were pleased that the mayor? it -- that the air vaccinated his own grandchild. that was better than any in lecture we could give or argument we could make. we cannot do one without the other. we have to have a coordinated effort. what has half -- what has happened too often is that people have worked so hard. i have not seen harder working people than these people. they worked so hard to save lives, improve lives, change governments, all the things they do on a vehicle -- on a daily basis. but too often, they do not work together. i have had members of congress telle repeatedly who are interested in our development work that they go t the embassy in a country in latin america or africa or asia and they asked to

meet everyone working in development. but that is the only time th come together. we have to end that. we have the smartest, most able, dedicated people working in development and health in the world in the united states government. but if they do not work together, they cannot possibly leverage what they are doing to get anywhere near to the goals that we set. so this is a passion of mine. i want to see our development efforts be viewed as the best in the world across the board, led by usaid, which i want to see a return to become the premier development agency in the world and working with all of the other agencies and departments that do help.

we cannot afford, in a time of limited financial resources, to have everybody doing their own ing. if we are going to have a clinic, then that clinic needs to do hiv/aids, but family planning, polio vaccine, and other matters. if we're going to have a country team in a country working together, they do not only their own suv's. [laughter] we have got to get smart about how wspend our money in. we do not have limitless resources. i feel a particular obligation, as i have said on numerous times in the past 18 months or so, a time when american unemployment is recorded as slightly less than 10%. structural unemployment is worse. we are asking hard working, maybunemployed americans to keep paying their taxes and some of that money will go to fund our development and diploma

efforts worldwide. i have to be able to look them in the eye and tell them they are getting their money's worth. we just can keep doing what we have been doing and be able to tell them that. we have to get smarter, more agile, and i have seen wonderful efforts by russia and eric and tom and others in their own agencies to really bring that idea fourth. now we're going to try to do it across governments. those of you who are checking in for your first year here at ncis, it is -- at sais, it is not easy. [laughter] we're committed to making these changes for the long term. >> any students over here? this young woman with the brown hair. yes. please wait for a microphone. please remember to give your name. >> my name is monica, a second

year student. thank you so much for coming here and speaking to us. it is quite an honor for all of us. i am glad to speak on behalf of my class when i say that. as a current in turn -- i am not speaking on behalf of the u.s. government here -- [laughter] rwanda just underwent elections. another sub-saharan country are coming -- have upcoming elections. how do you keep up with the leership in africa where a lot of our global health funding is going and the impact on if that goes forward a recommendations for key with african adership's? >> great question. at the core so much of the work

that we do and the analysis that we undertake every day. that is why i mentioned south africa. leadership matters. it matters enormously. for years, the south african leadership, unfortunately, was in denial or was refusing to except the facts about hiv/aids and the account -- and