and settled a great many of them but not all. eventually the security council in 1441 said, "on those points which blix and al-baradei have not been satisfied we decide the iraqis have to abide by what they said." so it was the first time in my life that anything i had written in a letter was elevated to world law, which was nice, but the main point on it was really that it strengthened our position and we thought we could thereby avoid having a lot of debates with iraq about the mandate. >> so you were broadly content with 1441? >> i was content with it and there was one other reason. that was i liked the idea of a new declaration. the declaration i felt might give iraq a chance for a new slot. if they had weapons, which i thought might very well be the case, they had an opportunity now. here it is, and they could put the blame on some general or other. so i was hoping for that. i was in favor of the resolution.

>> did you feel that it gave iraq a realistic possibility of meeting the requirements of the resolution? >> yes, except that it was very hard for them to declare any weapons when they didn't have any. they, but we didn't know didn't have any. i mean, i ask the question because we have had at least one witness that has said that actually the way it was drafted was actually as a trigger for military action, but that's evidently not what you felt at the time from what you have just said. >> no. there is this big discussion as to whether a second resolution would be required. i for my part thought that to me it was clear that a second resolution was required. i have seen from some of the testimony that some of the british felt that it was desirable, but it was not absolutely indispensable. i saw that jeremy greenstock

had said that he certainly wanted a second resolution, but he also recognized that the views in the security council were very divided on it. i think it was ambassador meyer who said there were the three groups. there were the americans on the one side who said, "no, nothing is needed." there were others who said, "you need a second resolution", and the british were somewhere in between. now the resolution, as you recall, simply says that if something happens, in the inspectors' report or status report there is a violation, then the council shall convene and they shall consider the situation. well, in diplomatese of new york maybe this implies that something will happen, but i don't think that's necessarily how i would read it as a lawyer. if i sat on the other side of the security council, i would say, "no, we will convene and reconsider but it is an absurdity that we should hand it out, give a free hand to anyone in the security council to decide that this resolution

has not been respected and therefore we have the right, unilaterally, individually, to take military action." it would accrue to the russians, to the chinese, to anyone. this to me was not a very reasonable invitation. >> in your book, just talking about the divided views, you say that the french consent was given on the understanding that a material breach could only be registered and acted upon on the basis of a report from the inspectors, i.e. from yourself. now some witnesses have argued to us that when the french were voting for resolution 1441, they were fully conscious of the american position that no further security council decision was required to determine a further material breach. were the french really of the

view that the council would have to take a further decision or had they, as some witnesses have put it to us, lost that battle? >> no. i don't think they had lost the battle. i think they were aware of the american interpretation. they had wrangled about it. my reading is that the french and the germans too had tried to get it clearly put into the resolution that there would be a new resolution needed, but they had not succeeded. they had to give up on that one. so they went into the resolution accepting it with the open eyes that some interpret it one way and others interpret it the other way, which not a very exceptional event in the un, i may say. but reading simply the words of it, i would have said that "convene and consider" does not really give an authorization to go to war. i think jeremy greenstock first also was of that view but later said maybe it could be interpreted otherwise. >> so was it then your

understanding that it was the reports of unmovic which would be the element that would determine whether or not there had been a further material breach, or did it leave it open to members of the security council to determine on the basis of the reports you made a failure by iraq to meet its obligations? >> well, i think our job was to provide evidence and we might say that, yes, we think this is a breach of their obligations, but in the last resort i think it would be for the security council to judge whether in their view it was a breach or not. not only that, but also decide would it follow from there that they would authorize armed force? this is not what 1441 said. this was sort of implied and i think jeremy greenstock in his testimony said, you know, there was an expectation that the council would take action, but i would have sided clearly with

the french and the germans that this was not a necessity. i find it also sort of absurd that the security council would sit there and say, "yes, if any one of us comes in and maintain this is a breach, then any one of us can take military action." i don't think that's the way the security council operates or we want it to operate. giving it a clean hand -- i am sure they will be more cautious in the future about drafting their resolutions and not leaving any such implication open. >> so, just to be clear, there are really three points there. the first is that the responsibility for determining the material breach did not rest with you. you were providing evidence on which the security council would, as you say, make a judgment. >> no. >> that we are agreed on. secondly, your interpretation of 1441 was that a judgment needed to be made by the security council. having a discussion was not enough.

there was an implication that a judgment was needed, that iraq was in further material breach. am i right on that? >> also a decision to authorize. >> then the third point is that before using military action, in your view, an actual decision was needed to authorize that? >> an authorization, yes. >> this was absent from security council resolution 1441. i know you are among many other things a very distinguished lawyer and the legal argument has been made that you didn't need a decision, because you reach right back to security council resolutions 678 and 687, which had not been revoked, which would authorize military action against iraq in the event of a breach of the ceasefire conditions. so was it necessary to have a further decision? >> yes, i still think it was indispensable. first of all, the 687 and the earlier resolutions, they were

authorizing use of force against an iraqi aggression against kuwait. we were not in such an important situation now. secondly, i think that when condoleezza rice, for instance, said, and i quoted in my book, when she said that the military action taken was simply upholding the authority of the security council, it strikes me as something totally absurd. here you are in march 2003 and they knew that three permanent members, the french and the chinese and the russians, were opposed to any armed action, and they were aware that they could not get a majority for a resolution that even implied the right to military action. to say then that yes, the action upheld the authority of a council that they knew was against it i think strikes me as going against common sense. >> although the military

pressure from the united states had helped to uphold the authority of the security council, because for the first time in many years iraq had paid some attention to the security council resolutions. >> yes. >> so your distinction is between pressure and action. >> that's true. threat is a different thing from actually taking action. >> but at a certain point someone calls your bluff is the problem. >> that's true. you might be called a paper tiger eventually but the charter prohibits you from using armed force. it does not necessarily prohibit you from exerting pressure. there is a grey zone there. you are not allowed to go too far in the pressuring either. in any case i would have tolerated that and i think that's frequently done, economic and military pressure. today we have economic pressure against iran. i do not think that's illegal. i think the use of weapons or force against iran today would be illegal. >> without a security council resolution. >> without a security council authorization. as you say, the americans, to them, it was indifferent. they had already a doctrine that said, why should we have a

permission slip from the security council? so they didn't need it. i admit i agree with you that the pressure was the one that moved the iraqis and as the pressure mounted, yes, they became also more cooperative. >> i think we will want to come back to that a little later on in the story. i am going to turn to sir lawrence freedman in a moment. we are in for quite a long afternoon and it would very much help with the transcription if we could take a measured pace. thank you. >> just following up from what has been said, i mean, you have made the point about the americans suggesting that they were upholding the security council resolutions and you noting that the security council as a whole did not seem to go along with that at that time, but, as i recall, part of the american argument was to challenge the security council to uphold its own resolutions. there was a concern that from

the late 1990's a number of key security council members had lost interest in pursuing this question and therefore this whole exercise might peter out. do you think that was a reasonable concern? >> well, i think there was at least implied from the us side that if the security council doesn't agree with us and go along with our view, then it sentences itself to irrelevance. i think that's a very presumptuous attitude. i think the us at the time was high on military. they felt they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable to do so. i think this has changed with obama. obama says yes, they will still retain the right to -- they reserve the possibility to take unilateral action but they will try to follow international rules. >> even before 9/11 and the

bush administration even there was a concern that the security council was losing a grip of this issue. >> well, from the cold war, of course, the security council was paralyzed. the security system of the un did not work during the cold war, but i think it changed completely with the end of the cold war. in 1991, 1990 the russians and the others went along with the action against iraq, and bush the elder, the president, said that this was a new international order. well, that collapsed with his son and i think that the world has changed dramatically with the end of the cold war. it is only recently in the last few years some american statement with samman and others have said, well, we ought to re-discover, the cold war is over. so the security council in my view was not paralyzed in the 1990's. they are still not paralyzed. that's why it is reasonable to look to it and to have respect

for its decisions. >> thank you. what i want to ask you about is the various assessments that were published on iraq's weapons of mass destruction. there is a number published in 2002, the 9 september one by the institute for strategic studies, the british government's dossier of september and then there was an american one in october 2002. i would just be interested in your views of these assessments at the time you saw them and read them. obviously we are particularly interested in your view of the british dossier. >> right. well, the british dossier was shown to me in new york. i read it and i said to the young diplomat who took it to me that i thought it was interesting, useful. i think i probably also said, as he has quoted me saying, that i did not think it was exaggerated. however, i said this at a time

we had not restarted inspections even. much of it of the dossier was taken based upon unscom's accounts, but there was this big difference that unscom never said these items exist. they said these are unresolved issues. in fact, i don't think there is any resolution of the security council in which they assert affirmatively that the weapons exist. so this was a big difference. however, it seemed plausible to me at the time, and i also felt -- i, like most people at the time, felt that iraq retains weapons of mass destruction. i did not say so publicly. i said it perhaps to mr. blair in september 2002 privately, but not publicly because i think there is a big difference between your role as a trustee of the security council, "investigate this and report to us", and the role of a politician. individual governments here could prosecute and say, "we are accusing you, you have

this", but that was not my role. the security council did not assume it and therefore i didn't say anything about it publicly. privately, yes, i thought so. there was one particular type of weapons of mass destruction of which i was suspicious and that was the anthrax. we had an inspector in australia, rod barton, who later wrote a book about the whole thing. he came to me and said, "here is the evidence we have on anthrax." it seemed to me to be very convincing. it had one element that was worrying me. that was that it relied on some cia document, finding. they were not willing to show it to us. i was not willing to say or affirm then that, "yes, we assert that there is anthrax", but we were very suspicious. i came out right from september 2002 on to the very end when i said, "yes, there might be weapons of mass destruction." i had this in mind. i could not exclude that others existed but when i saw this

dossier that was taken to me, yes, i thought it was plausible, because what unscom has said in its report 1999 was these things are missing and they assert that is there. they might have had information which we have not had. i hoped that at any rate. so that was my view on the british dossier. the american dossier differed somewhat. in some respects it was a little milder and others a little tougher. the institute, iiss, i have not been able to recheck, but they were fairly severe as well. they all went in the same direction. they were not directly useful to us, because they didn't say how did they come to this conclusion or where was the stuff. they simply asserted "yes, it is here." >> just then to confirm what you have just told us, your feeling at the time was that there probably was something there. >> yes. >> and that, as you say, you were sharing quite a broad consensus. i would just be interested in your views at this point about the difficulty of modulating

assessments of this sort. there's a question of whether iraq was in violation of past un agreements which could actually have been quite trivial amounts of material or non- disclosure of documents, but would nonetheless strictly be a material breach. there is questions about the degree to which iraq was preparing for reconstitution should the opportunity arise. there is questions about whether they actually had a program and stocks working at the time. was it your view that these things could get rather muddled up in the way that the issue was being discussed, whether in these papers or in the wider public debate? >> well, in september 2002 i don't think anyone really was talking much about the

reconstitution, but it was about the actual existence, and the british dossier simply said that iraq has b weapons, it has c, and it has missiles. it didn't assert nuclear. i think it was talking about the possibility of reconstitution and bush certainly in the autumn of 2002 pointed to various buildings and said these were connected with nuclear in the past and they are now rebuilding them. the iraqis shortly thereafter opened the buildings to journalists and they were empty. so at that time i don't think the reconstitution was a major problem. on the nuclear side we were fairly sure -- we were sure in 1998 there was hardly anything left. like i said, we wanted to close the dossier. this was an area that i was no longer responsible for, it was iaea, but in the autumn of 2002 we began to hear about the contract allegedly made with niger about the import of raw uranium, of uranium oxide, and i reacted -- that was perhaps the first occasion when i became suspicious about the

evidence because i thought to myself, "why should iraq now import raw uranium which is very far from a weapon? they have to refine it. it has to go through enrichment and all these things." so i became a bit suspicious about it. that was muhammad's responsibility. as we know, in march 2003 he came to the security council and the iaea had eventually got a copy of the document and concluded i think in less time than a day that it was a forgery. he said it was not authentic. it was a diplomatic way of saying it was fake. perhaps it would have been better if they had said that. that to me and also the nuclear business about the aluminum tubes which figured very long -- i forget which one was in the british dossier but they mentioned one of them. they also mentioned the mobile laboratories i think.

the niger document was scandalous. if iaea could conclude in a day's time that this was a forgery and this document had been dancing between the italians and to british and the americans and to the french and they all relied upon it and bush alluded to it and mentioned it in the state of the union message in 2003, i think that was the most scandalous part. >> i would like to say something about the niger question just in the light of what you have said because the butler committee, which you recall, concluded the british government had intelligence from several different sources, that the visit to niger was for the purpose of not actually the acquisition of uranium but acquiring it, the forged documents were not available to the uk government at the time it made its assessment. so the fact there was forgery does not actually change the british government's assessment on the niger issue.

i thought for the record i should just say that. >> i am glad they didn't manage to misinterpret that one. >> just then to conclude this bit here, i suppose what i am interested in is the question of threat. your job really was to say this is the evidence. it was not up to you to say you should be really worried about this. your job was to say, "this is the evidence of the extent to which there is a breach of un resolutions", based on the evidence you had. it was not to go further than that. >> well, i think you would have to distinguish between different types of revelations or evidence that you find. you know we were given sites to inspect by the uk and the us and we wanted these sites and felt, "these people are 100 per cent -- 100% convinced that

there are weapons of mass destruction, but they also then should know something about where they are." we went to these sites and in no case did we find a weapon of mass destruction. we did find engines that had been illegally imported, we found a stash of documents that should have been declared. they did not reveal anything new. so there is evidence of more or less grey things. even the missiles i think falls into that category. they certainly violated their obligations on the missiles, but we concluded that the al- samoud 2 type missile was prohibited, because it had a longer range than 150 kilometers and they had performed a test flight i think with 180 or 183 kilometers. so our international experts that we consulted concluded they were banned, but still it

was on the margin. perhaps even more serious was their plan to combine several engines and make missiles of much longer range than they really had tried. here in answer to what you said i think that yes, you still have to retain your common sense, that there are some things that are more serious violations than others. >> just on that, i mean, i recall an argument i think from rolf ekeus that it would not be surprising if the iraqis were concentrating on delivery systems because it is not that difficult if you are determined and have the know-how to rebuild your stocks of chemical and biological weapons but there is no point in doing that unless you had a delivery vehicle. would that be -- would you share that view? >> yes. above all, they were allowed to have this. so it enabled them to continue to do research and development, and to cheat a bit which they

did. >> thank you very much. >> dr. blix, i have really a single question, which is about the burden of proof and where it lay. i know from your book you have formed a view about it. so here we are. we have resolution 1284. we have resolution 1441. now we are at the end of 2002. there is much international concern about iraq's failure to comply with the will of the international community and some nations more troubled than that about possible holdings of weapons. so was it up to iraq to prove through your inspection regime that it, saddam's regime, was innocent, or was it up to the international community through yourself to prove that iraq was guilty? which way did that go, because it was both a political question, i take it, and a legal question?

>> i think the iraqis tried to say that the general legal rule is unless you are proved guilty, you must be presumed innocent, and i tried to explain to them that this was not a parallel when it comes to a state, that a guy may be accused of having a weapon illegally and if he is not proved guilty, then he will be innocent. however, i said with regard to iraq, you had these weapons, and people would laugh at me if i said i should presume you were innocent. we make no assumption at all. we do not assume you have weapons and we do not assume you don't have weapons. we will simply look for evidence. of course, it was difficult for them. it is difficult for anyone to prove the negative, to prove they didn't have it. they said so, "how can we prove this?" i admitted in public, "yes, it

is difficult for to you do so but it is even more difficult for us. you after all have the archives and people, etc. you must make best use of this." >> in effect then the work of your inspectors could go forward without having to form a final view. that would be for the security council in your judgment. >> yes. >> yes. thank you. i think i will ask sir martin gilbert to pick up the questions. >> i would like to turn now to the iraqi declaration which was received by unmovic in baghdad on 7 december 2002. unscr 1441 required that iraq make "a currently accurate full and complete declaration of its wmd holdings and programs." how important did you expect the declaration to be in assisting you in your objectives? >> well, my hopes were that they would declare whatever they

had. i did believe at that time that yes, they might well have something and that this would be the occasion to put the blame upon some authority or some general in iraq. so i was quite hopeful that this would come. now that was also the reason why i was very disappointed when it came. it was 12,000 pages. it could have been slimmer if they hadn't repeated several things several times over, but they had only had one month and it was a lot of work. so i was very disappointed. it did give some news regarding the period 1998 to 2002, and especially on the biological it gave some news, but it didn't really resolve any major point on the unresolved issues. >> what were the major deficiencies you saw in it at the time? >> i don't think that anyone would have been satisfied unless they had come up with a report that, "here are the weapons." certainly the americans would

not have been satisfied with anything less than that and i was also perhaps unfairly saying this is a deficiency in the document. they had the difficulty. they could not declare something very much because they didn't have it very much. >> but in terms of the material breach did these deficiencies as seen by you at the time constitute a material breach? did they go some way towards resolving that? >> no, we were disappointed that they didn't come out with them, but we had never maintained they had them. so i didn't -- i certainly could not construe it as a material breach. >> i mean, looking back now with the benefit of hindsight and what we know, is there more that iraq could have done with this declaration? >> yes, maybe, because when we look forward to the 2003 in february and march, then they became more proactive, as the

term was. the resolution required active, unconditional and immediate cooperation, and as the us pressure mounted and they really saw the dangers, then they also became more active. maybe it was also a difficulty for the iraqi leadership, i mean under saddam, to persuade him to go along with something. that is possible, but certainly i have been criticized and people said that at the end of january 2003, "you were very critical of the iraqis, but then 14 february and 7 march in your statements you became more upbeat." they say, "why did you change your opinion?" i say, "look here, if i am there to observe and the circumstances change i damn well ought to also change my report." that is what happened, the iraqis became more cooperative. let me take examples. a major matter was what had they unilaterally destroyed in

1991? unscom had undertaken some excavations of things, places where they had destroyed things, but not all. some places they had not dared to, because it was dangerous. the iraqis then in february 2003, i think it was in february, offered that we will excavate some of these things again. i remember we were in baghdad, mohammed and i. they said, "look, with modern techniques we might even reconstitute and re-find the volumes that had been destroyed." i was a bit skeptical, as a scientist. i thought if you pour 10 liters of milk in 1990 will you be able to ten years later find there was 10 liters? i was a bit skeptical. our scientists said, "yes, we can go along and excavate and look for this." that was one thing the iraqis did in 2002 and it did give results, actually, because the place we dug up, they did not find the anthrax or chemical

weapons but they found the fragments of the bombs that had been exploded. they were able to reconstitute them and come up with a conclusion that the iraqi statement had been fairly correct. so it was an active cooperation. i take another example. that related to who participated in this destruction, and we said, "look here, you must have some idea of who did it. can we talk to them? can we interview them?" they came up with quite a number of numbers actually. i think 50 or 60 names, maybe more. i said, "if you have a list of people who participated, don't you also have lists of what you actually destroyed." they had shown earlier on a diary of somebody who did something but not so much. that was another one. another item was interviews. i was always skeptical about the interviews of iraqis because any interview in iraq would be -- they would probably know about it. they would have a tape recorder

hidden somewhere if they were alone or they would have a minder. very frequently the witnesses wanted to have the minder present because thereafter they could have their testimony that they had not revealed anything they should, but we were given both on the us side, especially on the us side but also from the uk, they say that -- why don't you take them abroad? at first i had the feeling they just wanted us to kidnap these people and take them abroad. i thought it was an atrocious idea. later on there was a great deal of pressure and i concluded that you must ask the iraqis to say that you will release people to go abroad, but i must say i never thought we would get very much from them even abroad. the americans said they can take their whole family with them, ten people, but they will still have some relatives, someone against whom reprisals could have been taken. now in retrospect we know they would have said they did not know about anything. these were areas in which the iraqis were forthcoming in the end of february and the march, under us military pressure, to be sure, but nevertheless that

was a big change. i was cautious in reporting it to the un security council, saying, "i note these things but at the same time we must see how much does it actually produce." so i was cautious all the way through, but this was the reason why i changed my view. i talked to prime minister blair on february 20, 2002 and then i said i still thought that there were prohibited items in iraq but at the same time our belief, faith in intelligence had been weakened. i said the same thing to condoleezza rice. both condoleezza rice and prime minister blair, i sort of alerted to the fact that we were skeptical. i made the remark that i cited many times, wouldn't it be paradoxical for you to invade iraq with 250,000 men and find very little. so certainly i gave some warning that things had changed and there might not be so much. >> thank you very much. >> just for the record i think you were referring to a

discussion between yourself and prime minister blair in 2003. we heard 2002. >> yes. >> by the way, it would be very helpful if we could keep it as slow as possible. >> i talk too fast. >> i will now turn to sir lawrence freedman again. >> there was a lot of interest in the potential of the smoking gun and you have already given an indication that's certainly not what you found, but you have mentioned a number of other things that you did find which were small in themselves but not without significance. i think you have mentioned the chemical warheads didn't have chemicals in them but they could take them, the missiles, nuclear documents. was there anything else you found in addition to those that were prohibited items or indicated something suspicious? >> well, there were the missile engines.

the warheads i think was the most important, i think that was in january that we found them, and i remember i was in london at the time when i was told about this, and i thought, "well, maybe this is it." maybe this is the tip of the iceberg that we are now seeing and maybe we will find more. as time went by and we really found more fragments, i think -- i concluded that it was an ice -- might well have been an ice that had been broken long ago and these were the flows that remain of it and that was the reality, but in january, yes, i still thought that maybe you find more, but as to actually findings, no. it is true that we were -- we were looking for smoking guns, and rather towards the end the us when they wanted to discredit us came and said that, "look, we know that you have found the pile of automatic non-piloted --"

>> the drones. >> the drones. "you have not reported that. you have also found a contraption for spreading of chemical weapons." i talked to our people about it and they said, "yes, we are dealing with these things, but they are not really significant" and these things disappeared. so there was very little we found. the missile was the most important. of course we ordered them destroyed even though they did not exceed the permitted range very much. we had time to destroy about 70 of these missiles, which was quite a significant thing. >> in terms of the things you have mentioned how did the finds come about? was it because of just regular inspections, because the iraqis had declared them or because of intelligence that you had received?

>> the chemical munition was something that we found ourselves and it was at the site that had been declared by the iraqis. so it was a well-known site, and i think that the us later on tried to blow it up a bit, but this was something we found. we received altogether some 100 ideas, tips about sites to go to and we had time to go to about 30 of them during the period, and in no case did we find a weapon of mass destruction, but we did find something illegally imported. i think the missile engine was on the basis of a tip from the uk maybe. the stash of nuclear documents also came from a tip from the uk. when i read some of the testimony made and given here, they seem to be very proud that, "yes, we made four hits out of ten." they should ask what was the hit? if the hit had been a weapon of mass destruction it would have

been interesting, but these were hits of fragments. so they were not so important. >> so, just to conclude, what do you think these finds did indicate about iraq's level of compliance with past resolutions, including 1441? >> yes. i mean, they ought to have declared the documents. they should have declared the engines, etc. so that was a lack of compliance. you can say that. i think one can also say that was compliance with every detail of the instructions the most important, or was the weapons of mass destruction that we wanted? there is the different value and different types of evidence and i didn't think the evidence we got was very important. >> thank you. >> i will ask baroness prashar to pick up the questions. >> thank you, chairman. dr. blix, i want now to look at the question of the iraqi cooperation with the inspection regime. starting first of all with issue of access to sites. access to sites was clearly a

very key measure of iraq's willingness to cooperate. how did they measure up to this particular criteria? >> from the outset their cooperation on this score was good -- >> yes. >> and i said so. borrowing from muhammad al- baradei i made a distinction between cooperation on procedure and cooperation on substance. i said that iraq cooperates on the whole well on procedure, in particular on access. on no particular occasion were we denied access. in this sense, of course, it was a contrast from unscom which were frequently denied access, perhaps sometimes because they felt humiliated and they were frustrated and wanted to demonstrate, but, of course, that was interpreted as a will to hide something. we never had a denial of access. we had some difficulties of access when we came to saddam's palaces.

i think there was a short delay of a quarter of an hour or something like that, but there was never a denial of access. so i think they had made up their mind, and that was in marked contrast to unscom and should have been noticed. on substance on the other hand we felt that, no, we did not get that proactive cooperation in the declaration or in january, and i said even in january my statement on january 7 that was seen as very critical of iraq, that they don't seem even to have come to terms with the idea of disarmament. it was a very harsh statement. perhaps partly out of disappointment, but also in part because i wanted to warn them that, "look here, if you are not more cooperative, this is the kind of reports you will get." i remember reuters reported from london that we had said that we would like to have the

cooperation and if we don't get that, they will get critical report. so in january we came out with these very critical comments and then they changed, whether as a result of my comments or probably more as a result of a build-up, the military build-up, yes. >> you have already mentioned the question of minders. in your book you note that on one occasion you complained to the iraqis that the ratio of minders was about 10-1. how did you view this heavy presence of minders? did it signify lack of cooperation or were they a source of obstruction to you? >> that case had regard to the helicopters i think. they wanted to have -- we said, "ok, you can send minders along with our helicopters." they said 10-1. we complained and they changed it immediately to 1-1. otherwise the minders, of course, were necessary, but they were not there to guide us. we could go anywhere we liked. the procedure was that in the

evening before an inspection the chief inspector would tell the iraqis, "we will start at 10:00 from this place and you should have a minder to go along with us." he was not told where they were going. we never discovered or saw they had known in advance where we were going. then they were there to be a liaison, if you like. when you come to the site, if there is any problem, then they had authority and they could contact their authority. so minders were necessary, but 10-1 was an absurdity and they went away from there. >> did you find that obstructive, there were so many of them? >> i think they were a necessity. they were sometimes helpful. we had an accident in which unfortunately the chinese inspector died on the road. the iraqi minders were there and they helped us for a hospital and all that. so they were necessary. they cooperated on procedure. >> but when you briefed the security council on january 27, 2003, you noted some recent disturbing incidents and harassment? >> yes.

>> now that was a question of demonstrations and so on. how serious were these incidents and what did they signify? >> well, it is hard to believe that they could have occurred without the consent or perhaps even authorization from the dictatorial state. so we took them rather seriously and i didn't say i immediately reported them to the security council, because that's the means of pressure i could have on them. i can't imagine they were spontaneous. i saw one testimony here we had given -- i forget who it was testified that the uk had given them a lot of sites and all they met were demonstrations and stones almost. that's not really true. we performed on 30 of these. yes, there was some harassment and some demonstrations, but by and large this was very useful. i certainly wanted to continue. we found material, but we didn't find material that was relevant to weapons of mass destruction. i think what was really

important about this business of sites given was that when we reported that, no, we did not find any weapons of mass destruction, they should have realized i think, both in london and in washington, that their sources were poor. their sources were looking for weapons, not necessarily for weapons of mass destruction. they should have been more critical about that. we on the other hand had very rarely contact with any sources. we based our conclusions upon the overhead imagery or upon interviews, etc, and that did not hold these errors. intelligence will be used to this, that there are people that defect and give them intelligence and they want to get some reward for it so they will be inclined to give what they think the interrogators want to hear. we were not subjected to that danger. so the lesson from this site affair would have been, i think, they should have drawn the conclusion that their sources were poor. >> can i come on to the

question of concealment, because throughout this period there were repeated allegations by the united states and the uk in particular that the iraqi regime was involved in concealment activity. how did you view these allegations and was there substance in them? >> well, we had learned from the whole 1990s that they might have been concealing things, and we -- to take the case of anthrax again, that was the prime case. where was it? 10,000 liters, where? did they keep it somewhere? so we assumed that they might be concealing something and we had lots of sites to inspect, inherited from unscom and also from the iaea. so there were lots of places we wanted to go. so we certainly did not exclude. no, no, we really thought if there is something, it will be concealed. >> i mean, in cases of small

items, such as test tubes and technical documentation and so forth, what chances would there have been of you actually uncovering them? >> no. on very small items it will be difficult to do so and computer programs, etc, or prototypes of weapons, but stores, stocks of chemical weapons or biological weapons is another matter. we went to military sites. we went to the biological laboratories. we went to industries, to places where it could be plausible these things would be kept. >> do you want a break? >> yes. i think we have been going for an hour and a quarter. let's break for ten minutes and then come back. thank you. >> you can see the entire hearing at our website at c- span.org. the british house of commons is in summer recess. prime minister questions returns wednesday, september 8.

>> a up next, a discussion of muslim life in a united states. after that, "q&a" with phillip terzian. and then another chance to see han blix. monday, a discussion on maritime security. live coverage begins at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> i am not saying senator mitchell's report is entirely wrong. i am saying that brian mackey statements about me are wrong. let me be clear -- i have never taken steroids. >> with the indictment for falsely testifying under oath to congress, go back and watch other hearings on steroid use

in baseball online at the c-span video library, all free, if ever program since 1987. watch what you want when you want. now discussion on the life muslims are living in america today and did construction of a proposed mosque near the site of the 9/11 attacks. bobby ghosh, is deputy editor from "time" magazine. he joins us from new york city. the cover story is "is america islamo-phobic?" you start off in wisconsin, talking about the struggle of one community to get a mosque and the communities response. talk about what is happening in wisconsin. guest: this takes place in

sheboygan, wisconsin. we started the story there because we wanted to make a that controversies over mosques are not unique to new york. there have been for several months now anti-mosque protests all over the country, in places where the ground itself is not in question. it is not sacred in one way or another. in sheboygan, wisconsin, it is a small muslim community. a muslim doctor who had been in that community for several years, an internist, wanted to build a mosque on the outskirts of town close to farmland. we see him at a town planning commission meeting. he is not expecting any serious

opposition. he owns the land. he has been there for several years. he is well-known and well-liked in the community. to his astonishment, when the subject is opened up to public discussion, a series of people who live in or near that town stand up and say the most appalling things about islam. and he realizes that his position in the community is not exactly what he thought it was and people question whether is long is the fate of peace. one person says, it is well- known there are 20 terrorist training camps hidden in rural areas, and we do not want our community to become something like that. things like that. and so the doctor is taken

aback. he's so stung by these allegations that he is on able to actually moves. that is where our story begins. i am delighted to report the story and as welends well. but in new york and other parts of the country, it has become clear that muslims themselves are under a greater degree of suspicion and they are being treated with far more hostility than any community has been treated for many years in this country. to answer the question on our cover "is america islamo- phobic?" america as a society is not, but there is a lot of it in this society. it is growing more vicious. the hate speech we are seeing connected to islam is now coming

into the mainstream. that is the gist of our story. host: you can join the story with "time" magazine's bobby ghosh. 202-628-0184 for muslim- americans. republicans, 202-737-0001. democrats, 202-737-0002 and independents, 202-628-0205. time aake a look at the magazine piece by our guest. reports that some of the doctor's 100 a fellow muslims would say he was naive to move forward with the mosque. the majority were albanians who fled to the u.s. to escape persecution after the collapse of yugoslavia. some chose to keep their faith under wraps. they feared their plans to build a mosque would draw too much attention. how did things shake out?

-- within the muslim community itself? was there internal debate? guest: sheboygan, wisconsin, was interesting because so much of the discussion about muslims in this country seems to surround people of asian-south asian or middle eastern origin. here you have a muslim community that is european. there from bosnia and albania. these are people who fled the most repressive, anti-islamic regime in history. people were being killed in the hundreds, in some cases, in the thousands. when they came to this country, they carried with them the trauma of what they suffered. in this particular community, many of these albania muslims have chosen not to state their faith.

the fact they are europeans, there is less attention on them. some of them have local businesses and stores. some have chosen not to say they are muslim. there was some discussion in the community about whether a mosque should be built at all, and if it was built, whether these people would attend the moscow or stay away because of their fear of being exposed -- whether these people would attend the mosq2ue or stay away because of fear of being exposed. they needed to hide their faith. that made the sheboygan example poignant.y pi caller: i think the title insists that americans hate is long. is a stereotypical of the way

the bigotry is seen -- the title and says that americans hate islam. it does not seem like the numbers add up. there are plenty of mosques. in our rural community, we tolerate. there is a freedom of religion and nobody cares. guest: i am not sure it is quite as cut and dried as that. it is largely true that there are more mosques in the u.s. now than there were 30 years ago. more moscow building has taken place in this past decade -- more mosque building taken place in the past decade. it is happening all over the country. we did some polling to get a sense of how americans feel about islam. the numbers are quite alarming. about 1/4 of americans think that american muslims are

unpatriotic, that they do not regard themselves as american. another 1/4 are not sure whether american muslims are patriotic or not. that is not a good picture of where the community is right now. i want to make sure i get these numbers right. about 43% of those polled have an unfavorable view of islam. one of the statistics that has gotten attention in recent days is that 1/3 of the people polled do not think a muslim should stand for president in this country. these are attitudes that were once true of other communities, but many communities in the united states have had to go through this kind of suspicion and prejudiced -- jews, catholics, some suggest that

mormons are held in suspicion. as a whole, america is a tolerant society, and many muslims continue to come here because they feel it is more tolerant and europe. -- more tolerant than e urope. you have many neo-nazis thugs beating muslims up in europe. when we see these attitudes growing, it is important for us to pay attention to that. while we celebrate inclusiveness, we need to guard that inclusiveness. that is the preface of the story, to notice that people oughand-- host: comparing the number of

mosques in the u.s. versus europe. looking at the population numbers -- 2.5 million moslems in the u.s. compared to 3.4 million in germany. total population is higher than germany. jay in charleston, south carolina. good morning. caller: good morning. this is not so much a question. this is more of a statement. i want to verify what this gentleman is saying. i believe there is a lot of accepted it raises some post- 9/11. the main topic is when you look at the three major religions, judaism, christianity, and islam, they should be brothers. they should be holding hands.

islam just simply verifies the old and new testaments. when we look at many of the figures in the bible as profits. the only difference in christianity is that they see christ as the son of god and muslims see him as a prophet. i grew up in a big city. you need to look at people as individuals. host: do americans understand islam? guest: the muslim population is a very small. they are very widely dispersed. that is one of the reasons you have so many mosques. they are distributed across the country. many of the 1900 mosques are a single room in someone's house or in the back of a store.

because the population is so small, they do not get noticed as much. that leads to the fact that 2/3 of the people polled don't know any muslims. that means that all the knowledge they have about islam, regrettably in recent years, has come from up watching the news on television. in that context, is lamslam coms across negatively. community elders need to do much more to spread the word about islam and explain it. ironically, the project in lower manhattan was designed to do that and is having the exact opposite effect. host: let's go to minnesota, where jennifer is calling. caller: good morning.

mr. ghosh, i can understand why people are against -- hello? host: go ahead. caller: is because, i know why they do not want it down by ground zero. only about five blocks away there is already a mosque by ground zero? true?t that those buildings around their were covered with the ashes of people that died in those buildings. people they never found, and their ashes went everywhere around ground zero. host: let's make a distinction.

it was "time" magazine. he is not advocating for the mosque in the new york city. guest: the mosque you are talking about is 10 blocks away from ground zero. there are more worshipers then they can deal with. the same imam is one of the people behind this mosque, because he needs some place to expand. not everyone who opposes that mosque is an islamo-phobe. and many have a genuine objections. many feel sympathy towards the families. they believe it would amount to an insult.

that area being sacred is undermined that there are strip clubs within two blocks of ground zero. it is lower manhattan. there is a mcdonald's, toerhothr stores of various kinds. there are many other things that feel far from sacred. having a religious center that is built for dialogue between all kinds of fayette, which is the purpose of the promoters behind the project -- a dialogue between all kinds of faith -- where at the moment there is not. if it is ok for there to be strip clubs, it seems odd to me

to oppose an inter-faith center. host: mohammed is calling from minneapolis. caller: i am iranian and raised as a muslim. since the failed times square bombing, a young man integrated into american society who attempted to kill people in times square, it is made me embarrassed about my background, my religion and my name. i have lived in united states in 3for 32 years. guest: i am sorry to hear that, mohammed. you are far from alone. i was in dearborn, michigan,

which has a quite strong concentration of muslims from all over the world. there is a certain amount of this quiet there -- disqueiet there about whether this mosque increases the hostility they encounter every day. then you have the people who say that is important for it to be built, not just on principle, but also because, after all this uproar, if that center is allowed to be billed and if it functions in a matter that it is intended, then they can do more good than harm, because it will reach out to all the communities and encourage a discussion on is role in society

and america's role, and that discussion will lead to greater understanding. hopefully people such as yourself will not feel quite so constrained to introduce yourself. host: "the new york times" has a profile of the imam. after 9/11, he denounced terrorism and said killing civilians are violated islams. he wrote a book -- "what's right with islam is right with islam." do we know who this man is, who this community is? guest: we nkoknow him very

werel. ll. he has been an active member of the inter-fatiith community. he is well known and within the american muslim community as a conciliatory figure. he is not only moderate, but also takes a fairly global view about islam and is very good at being able to criticize where criticism is merited. a lot has been made in recent days of a radio interview, and "the new york times" references this, where he was asked to criticize hamas, and his answer was seen as being equivocating. in that interview, he said he is a supporter of israel. that is a very, very hard

position for a leader in the muslim community to take. but the fact he was able to do that, tells you a great deal about him. host: the problem is that a few muslims have been living peaceably in society for years and suddenly do something hostile. how do we know which are the good ones and which are terrorists in waiting? guest: that is a question for law enforcement. i spent last year covering the national security beat, and i am reassured that law enforcement is doing a far better job of that than most of us know. it is a question for the community to deal with, also. there is a famous case took place where five young men from the washington, d.c. and virginia area traveled to pakistan apparently to try and get training and join the holy

war. the most interesting aspect for me was that they were turned in by their own families. it was their own families that brought this to the attention of the fbi. then the authorities were able to pick them up in pakistan. i believe their case is being heard in the courts. there is evidence that the community has been addressing extremism in its midst. there are many imams who are working at a very hard to speak with young people and to deal with frustration and resentment they feel. need to be more? yes. but it is not like it is not happening at all.

imi "new yorker", and i do not feel particularly at risk because of tyhe fact there is a large number of muslim-americans who live in enwnew york. hi, richard. caller: i think the feeling of the public has to do with the islam religion itself. they seem very intolerant and have a very radical, hostile element in the religion. i do not know if that is true, but after 9/11, very few islamic clerics came forward to denounce the terrace. let's take what is going on in europe. london, england, had over 100

honor killings in the city itself that law enforcement refused to investigate because they were afraid they would inflame the islamic community. guest: let me correct you on a couple of things, richard. it is not true that after 9/11 the leaders of the communities did not criticize. that is far from true. tens of thousands of islamic preachers all over the world came out and unequivocably condemned this. if you feel they have not done enough to condemn extremism or terrorism in all its forms, then perhaps, part of that blame lies with the media. perhaps we have failed in bringing that adequately to our

attention. i've spent many years in the middle east. of course, i have been covering the community here. it is not sure the community has not criticized 9/11 or any other act of terrorism. the imam in new york has done this. tens of thousands of liters of the community over the world - have-- -- tens of thousands of liters in the community around the world have condemned thus. host: let's get a dial in tallahassee -- donald in tallahassee, florida. caller: this is more of a comment, not a quote. but americans, we do fear other

religions, but i want you to be sincere with yourself today. will you go to your church today -- when you go to your church today, and you hear your pastor who will teach you, tell you about the rapture is true -- which it's not -- who will tell you about easter egg, which is nt's not. we don't fear this? we should fear a man who teach us one verse a week, and they beg for money. from let's go to a survey the pure research center. research center.pew

more than a year-and-a-half into his presidency, the public says they do not know what religion president obama follows. you can see the numbers on your screen. this survey out just this month. 34% believe he is kristin. 18% believe muslim. 43 perce% do not know. -- 45% believe he is christian. guest: we did a survey last week while the anti-mosque fervor reached fever pitch. something like 24% of the people we polled said they thought the president obama was muslim. i cannot talk to why that is the case. it has the white house a very

alarmed. they felt it necessary to issue a statement saying that the president was christian. i am not sure that necessarily helps in this particular debate about american attitudes towards islam, because it gives the impression that the white house feels that the perception that the president being muslim is a bad thing. it is hard to understand why two reverend wright how people could come to that conclusions that president obama is muslim. it is only tangentially germain to the problem. there is probably a place where

islamophobicarbor as lo sentiments and those who believe obama is a muslim overlap, but you need more information. host: as daniel patrick moynihan said, everybody is entitled to his own opinion. but not his own facts. gary is calling. raller: jsust to answer you question, sir, is that the reason the people believe he is not a christian is because he is disrespectful -- he plays golf on sundays. i hope this clarifies.

guest: thank you for your opinion. that is an interesting insight and something that -- i am new to this country. i am learning how people think. host: brooklyn, new york. good morning. caller: i want to make a few comments. one of the things fueling is the aftereffect of 9/11. i think part of it is the ignorance -- americans' ignorance of islam and not knowing some of the basis tenanents. i read an article in the

thursday edition of the "daily news" that showed that the choice of the site was made by the real a state company engaged by the administration of the mosque. this selected a person to bird dog, look for sites. that was how the site was selected in new york. guest: that was an interesting story. quite ironic and amusing and itself. i worry that those opposed to the mosque, that that is being lost. people do not care who first found the spot and why is chosen.

people are much more concerned about the people behind it. host: maureen joins us on the democratic colors line in the new hampshire. good morning. caller: freedom of religion is basic, but with everything the world is going through, and our country is a very humanitarian, but just the amount of money they're going to spend on this. it is a place of worship. is that money what's needed? you can worship, like he has had, in their homes. you can worship anywhere. that amount of money right now, i think it's -- i mean, it could be used so many places. guest: that is an interesting point. being a new yorker, in downtown

million is what00 it takes. building here is very expensive. could they have spent the money to other places? but that could be said of any place of worship anywhere in the world. why spend money on building large monuments to the faith when you can spend that money among the faithful and improve their lives? i do not hold any beef with them. i am judging by what the promoters have said. their objective is to create a place where people of all faiths can, and understand each other and develop an understanding of each others' beliefs and concerns about their fate and the fate of others. -- the faith and the faith of others. that is a noble idea. judging by the upheaval taking

place over the last few years, if anything, it is an argument for such a center. the one thing we have learned from all the angry rhetoric on all sides in this discussion is that we need a place where we can go and understand each other better. whether that takes place in the physical building in downtown new york or in some other context, i do not know, but i guess the question is -- why not in downtown new york? why not in a building built for that purpose? i do not think we should get too bogged down with the numbers, the amount of money spent. i think the purpose of the building is more important than .he finances appeared host >> our enemies respect no religious freedom. al qaeda's cause is not islam.

it is a gross distortion of islam. these are not religious leaders. they are terrorist who murdered innocent men, women, and children. al qaeda has killed more muslims than people of any other religion. that includes innocent muslims killed on 9/11. host: that is president obama talking about the enemies of the united states respecting no religious freedom. let's go to carl in erie, pennsylvania. good morning occurred caller. caller: good morning. the catholics of the pope was their leader -- have the pope as their leader. the muslims turn to saudi arabia. in saudi arabia, women are treated as things not human

beings. if someone is killed and is yred, do they go to paradise with virgins. guest: it is true that people turn in the direction of mecca to pray, but that does not mean there is one figure or one mosque in saudi arabia the commands of the equal respect of all muslims. there is no such figure. as to the condition of women in many muslim countries, it is undeniable that in some muslim countries, women are treated poorly. i would argue that is true in many countries, despite their faith, in the developing world. it is a function of economics,

education and other development indices. yes, it is true that women in islam did a lot of attention in this country because, in some societies, they are required to be veiled, they are not allowed to drive. just for perspective, keep in mind, there have been at least three women heads of government in the muslim world. there is benazir bhutto in pakistan, -- in turkey, forgive me, but the third one -- the leader of indonesia, the largest muslim country in the world. and america has not yet had a female head of state. there are various ways of looking at these things. in any case, none of that should affect our view of muslims in america.

american muslims should be treated the way all americans are treated, and they should have the same rights. what goes on in saudi arabia, should not have a direct effect on their lives in this country . host: sahid from columbus, ohio. caller: hostcould morning. for the past few years, i have listened to how is llam has come up and people want to believe that it is new to this country when, in fact, over the last 60 years, there has been a muslim population. the black muslims such as the nation of islam. caller: host

host: we only have a few moments for a response. guest: it is true that african american muslims and do not get the same amount of attention. it is one of the most diverse and muslim communities in the world. there are muslims here from every country in the world. in many ways, they feel much freer here than they feel in many places in europe and other parts of the world. that is something to be celebrated. that is not something to be regarded with hostility. needs to be communicated better. host: anna, democrats line in ohio. caller: i was glad they showed the president talking about al qaeda and terrorists. why wouldn't people of pakistan,

afghanistan, the rock, on that same standard consider the u.s. terrorists in regards to the innocent people killed in pakistan, afghanistan by drones? our media does not even talk about how many innocent people have died in iraq or been injured or displaced. guest: there is a big difference between what the u.s. is doing and what al qaeda is doing. al qaeda sometimes kills -- the u.s. sometimes kills people without meaning to. it is called collateral damage for a reason. the u.s. is not specifically trying to kill innocent civilians or muslims. whereas, when al qaeda plots a terrorist operation, the specific purpose is to kill innocents, civilians. more often than not, it is to

kill fellow muslims. i do not think there is a moral equivalence between the u.s. position and the al qaeda position. i am sure there are some people in pakistan and ira [no audio] >> to morrill and "washington journal," a discussion of tuesday's primary races and florida and alaska. from afghanistan, michael ward talks about the u.s. and nato forces training program for the afghanistan national police, security forces, and afghan

border police. of marine science professor at the university of georgia talked about his book that says that 80% of the oil from the cold spill remains. and we be in the week-long series on defense issues with the retiring director who is the former director of the striper program. we'd talk with him about the aircraft programs. our series continues on tuesday with a look at mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, and wednesday the military use of drums. thursday, military pay, compensation, and benefits. friday, a conversation on rehabilitation programs for injured veterans. "washington journal" live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> next, "q&a" with phillip terzian.