into putting alternative fuel into any of these vehicles? not so sure that would extend to mrap's right now. i know it has been a focus in the aircraft as well as the navy. host: are there slightly different models for the army and for the marines? guest: i think the marines have wanted some of the lighter ones. just based on where they are operating. but they're all using essentially the same vehicles. host: in just a few minutes we will be covering an event of the brookings institution talking about the future of afghanistan, in laying out the military presence there as well as diplomatically. how much of the forward future of the military in afghanistan

is based on being able to have a sufficient number of mrap's in the country? guest: i think the military has made it quite clear that they won troops to be on patrol in these vehicles. it is going to be a big part of the presence there, i would think. host: are there any lingering issues with the mrap's that have not been resolved? are they doing anything to work on the top heaviness? or is such as a function of the truck to be the top heavy? guest: i think it is where the function of that vehicle. the eight tv, the altering vehicle functions 62 -- the all terrain vehicle function sixth to remedy that to some -- seeksd to remedy that to some degree. host: if you want to read some

of the articles that mr. vandenberg has written regarding the website, you can to that usatoday.com. the mrap's that are going from iraq to afghanistan, how long does it take to be retrofitted in order to go from iraq to afghanistan? guest: initially they were just a straight line than in, but now they are replacing the suspensions, the ones in iraq with a suspension that is more suited to the train in afghanistan. i could not tell you how long that takes, probably a couple of weeks. but i'm not sure. host: tom vanden brook, thanks for being on the program today. we are not going to go to the brookings institution [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

the panelists include steve coll, vali nasr, michael fellow andenior director of research at the brookings institution of foreign policy, and general karamat who is retired, and a past chairman of the pakistani joint chiefs of staff. this will be live and should run for about an hour and a half. thank you very much for watching this edition of the "washington journal." see you tomorrow morning again at 7:00 a.m. eastern.

>> good morning, ladies and gentlemen, and welcome to the brookings institution. thank you for joining us in the dog days of august. anotherso joined by audience and the next room, so you on closed circuit television, thank you for coming too. today to discuss afghanistan, the great off debate, part iii, as labeled internally. we will discuss, will u.s.

strategy succeed? i am martin indyk, the director of the program here at brookings. we have a distinguished and experienced panel to discuss this question, and related ones. i will introduce them all, and then ask each one a very open- ended question to get us going. we will have a conversation among the four panelists before we come to you, the audience, for questions. we are delighted to be joined this morning by vali nasr on my right, who is a senior adviser to ambassador richard holbrooke, who is in turn the president's special representative for pakistan and afghanistan. job is professor of

international politics at the school of law and diplomacy at tufts university. he is a specialist on south asia, the author of several wonderful books, in particular "rise of islamic capitalism" among others. he has also written widely in foreign policy journals and in the op-ed pages of newspapers, and we are very glad to have the opportunity to hear him today. are also joined by a distinguished visitor to the foreign policy program at brookings. that is general karamat, on my far left. he retired as chairman of the

pakistani joint chiefs and chief of army staff in october 1998. since then he served as usharraf's special envoy, and served from 2004 until 2006 in a capacity for the u.s. since then he has been active in a range of track two of balance between india and pakistan and the u.s. he is a member of aboard in a small blog, and a number of think tanks there, and heads the research consultancy. on my left here is steve coll who is president of the new america foundation, and a

contributor to "the yorker did he spent 20 years as a foreign correspondent and then as senior editor at "the washington post to get he was the managing editor of the paper from 1998 until 2000 for. is the author of four books. -- from 1998 until 2004. his professional awards include two pulitzer prizes, the first for a series of articles on the sec. the second for his book "ghost wars" which also won other awards.

he has all whole list of other awards as well. he graduated from occidental college in 1980 with a degree in english and history. finally, our very own the michael o'hanlon, a senior fellow in the 21st century defence initiative's ad bookings. mike is a prolific writer, analysts, and contributor to the public policy debate. he is a visiting lecturer at princeton, an adjunct professor at johns hopkins, and has written seven books that it would take probably all the time we have to do for me to read out the list. but his latest ones, particularly pertinent to today's discussion talk about

afghanistan. he has a recent book on budgeting for war. he is now working on a book concerning nuclear weapons policy. he is the principal researcher for our indexes at brookings on iraq, pakistan, and afghanistan. so, as you can see, we are honored to have a very distinguished panel. i wanted to start by asking vali if he would give us -- first of all, what the strategy is. let's try to get that out in clear terms. and how you view it in terms of whether you feel it is succeeding or not. >> thank you. it is a pleasure being here. let's begin by outlining the

way in which we think about this concerning the tapakistan and afghanistan strategies. these two components must work together. we must be effective in both places. the reason is that the issues that have brought the u.s. to that region straddle the boundaries of these two countries. you cannot have a solution in the one without a solution in the other. it is also clear that if afghanistan were to collapse into the situation that existed before 2001, it would imperil pakistan, particularly given the issues pakistanis are now facing. if they were to face a serious threat internally either because of natural disasters, because of the onslaught in the parliament in swat and the northwest, it

would make it nearly impossible to succeed it in afghanistan. the u.s. strategy encompasses both. its elements are not the same for both. in afghanistan the u.s. has a military presence on the ground. the idea behind the strategy is to leverage u.s. military presence to create time and space to stand up afghan secret forces and state institutions to take over security for most of the country. then provide the room for the u.s. to reduce its combat footprint on the ground. in pakistan our strategy has been multi-faceted, in some ways more complex. it is to strengthen and deepen relations as a context to do all we want to do, to strengthen

state institutions, the economy. to that end, the u.s. began a serious, strategic dialogue to assist pakistan and economic development, and also current engagement with flood relief. the other element is to bring afghanistan and pakistan closer together diplomatically so that the policies of the two countries would support all we're trying to accomplish in both. this is a multi-faceted strategy. id has had many different tentacles, some specific to either, some which apply to both -- it has had many different tentacles. in afghanistan, we are still just about seen the full implementation of the additional troops that were committed.

we had a change of command on the ground when general david petraeus took over. many elements are only beginning to have an impact. there we have a concerted civilian and military push to get the different pieces together. in pakistan in some ways we have had more successes, largely because of government engagement. our impact in assisting pakistan gills with some civilian economic issues. -- deals with some civilian economic issues. the goal has been to change the direction, shape, and nature of the u.s./pakistan relations. it has become quite palpable. obviously, we're dealing with the impacts of long neglect of

the relationship over a long time -- essentially since leaving afghanistan in 1989. overall, we are doing well. the strategy is still moving forward. i concentrate most on pakistan -- there we see much more impact of effort to change that relationship. >> say a word, if you will, about the impact of the floods we did this terrible humanitarian disaster now afflicting pakistan -- about the floods -- this terrible disaster. >> i'm just looking at the numbers. the size of the water is larger than that of italy. more people are affected than the population of new york state.

millions of people have been displaced, about 20 million. enormous pressure is brought to bear on other parts of the country as refugees move. it has put a lot of pressure on governments in pakistan. literally on the ground governance, not just on the national level. reconstruction will be difficult going forward. the fact that pakistan has lost a good share of its export crops, much of its food -- an enormous impact on poverty issues. the sheer damage to infrastructure. several hundred bridges have been washed away. water canals have been damaged or deliberately broken to manage

the water. all these issues face pakistan. we are very concerned that it will not have a long run impact on governance and stability. the way in which the u.s. has reacted in some ways goes to the importance of the strategy it put into place. namely, the u.s. was able to react quickly because of the inter-agency team said had put together, especially in the office of the special representative of afghanistan and pakistan. it has made for much more rapid turnaround. this has been coupled together to address refugee efforts from last year. that allowed rapid collaboration, to get

helicopters, aircraft to pakistan for immediate relief. also, we were very cognizant to convince pakistan and pakistanis that there is a strategic partnership. it would best be exemplified by the way in which the u.s. was first and most effective among all other members of the international community, including pakistan's other close friends. so, it in terms of moving the ball for word, impacting pakistan-u.s. relations positively, the flood has been a challenge that the u.s. has risen to a properly. it does not mean that the challenges are not daunted. there are cars working with pakistan closely -- it does not mean challenges are not ballantine.

-- daunting. >> things for joining us, in general. could you give us a pakistani perspective on these two issues? -- think you for joining us. in this context. the first, the striking point made in strikingpew poll that a striking percentage do u.s. as the enemy, and the same number want to see an improvement in the relations between the two countries. the second factor i would like you to help explain is, i think it kind of confusion on the part of americans who watch this unfolding that pakistan seems to be playing both sides in terms

of working with the u.s., but also maintaining an ambiguous relationship with the taliban. that is supposedly our joint enemy. >> thank you. it is a pleasure to be here. as vali said, what happens or doesn't happen in pakistan -- afghanistan, is hugely important for pakistan. the two are linked in many ways. currently, the insurgency in certain areas is linked to the violence in afghanistan. so, a stable afghanistan with u.s.-nato successes there becomes extremely important for

pakistan. as we see the strategy which vali outlined unfolding in afghanistan, we see it moving on separate tracks. we have a view on that because it is so important for us. i think, without going into the evolutionary process to which we reached the present strategy, i really think there is no real alternative to what the u.s. is doing in afghanistan. we are on the track of capacity building which pakistan supports. it would like afghanistan to have capacity to take care of itself so that other forces do not have to do that. we want an economy in afghanistan which can work in that country. we want political governance to

improve, and of course we want the security forces to have enough capability to take care of the situation. so that there is no spillover into pakistan. we are supportive of that. the other track is reintegration or reconciliation -- we are supportive of that. we are working with the u.s. to bring that about. reconciliation is more of an afghan initiative. reintegration as what the u.s. is talking about, but somewhere it comes together. pakistan is supporting that, and once that to happen to end the violence which impacts pakistan hugely. the third track, the military track, on which the study is moving has also evolved -- on which the strategy is moving. we see the u.s.-nato strategy --

helmand, which is good -- and pakistan has been supporting that. overall, i do not see a major or even a minor difference of opinion and pakistan over the way that things are going in afghanistan. pakistan would very much like for afghanistan to stabilize as soon as possible. then, outlining the u.s. strategy in the pakistan, perhaps less clear. from our point of view, we're very clear that the u.s. is helping pakistan to stabilize, developed capacity, developed economic security to cope with the threats it faces at the moment. internally and from the

insurgency in the west. of course, the u.s. has been doing this over a period of time, and there are various figures there in terms of billions of dollars that have come into pakistan from the u.s. right now the u.s. is heavily in support of the pakistan government to take care of the floods. martin posed the question as to why the u.s. is on popular in the pakistan. i have seen those poll reports, and i guess it depends on who you are talking to, and how much there are aware of the intricacies of the relationship. the many ways in which the two countries are interacting. the many ways in which the u.s. is supporting pakistan. i think not many people in pakistan are aware that the goals of the financial

institutions, whether the imf or the world bank, has a lot to do with the relationship with the u.s. to answer his question, i would say what happens between pakistan and the u.s., the positive side does not come up in the media. it is the negative side that comes up in discussions in the media. that takes over the entire discourse on u.s.-pakistan relations. it is driving the opinion that u.s. is unpopular in the pakistan. in in formed circles -- in and formed circles it is not what the u.s. is doing for pakistan -- in informed circles. the second question he posed is more difficult. he talked about pakistan having a double policy, one of supporting the u.s. and its

interests, and the other of having its own interests. of course, pakistan has its own interests and concerns. but i think when pakistan gets accused of this, we forget there's a past, present, and future. we put all the three together and come to the conclusion that pakistan is doing this. there is a past. when pakistan in its interests have a strategy -- and it has nothing to do with the present. the present has not even involved from what it was doing at that time. there was a time when pakistan bought in its interest it must project across its borders to take care of the threats it faced.

that situation has changed. so many things have happened since then that the same strategy is not thinkable. pakistan has so many intricate links with the u.s., and is not in a position to follow, to play any kind of double claigame the. i hated these articles were unnamed officials are talking of a one-off some kind of stunt. -- talking about plan of some kind of stunned. -- stunt. even with the wikileaks -- who is going to be in contact with the taliban? it does not mean that the isi is supporting the taliban against the u.s. -- is possibly helping

the u.s. to resolve some issues with the taliban. as we move into reconciliation or reintegration, this factor will become more important. the last point i would like to make is that whatever may have been of pakistan's ambitions in the past, those have been scaled down drastically. they have been scaled down in afghanistan, and within the country. the most important factor to pakistan today is the economy. that will take center stage. all policies will recalled around recovering" we have lost in making it sustainable. -- recovering what we have lost in making it sustainable. >> i want to get steve it to

focus for a moment on afghanistan, and the strategy there. you in short critique of the strategy suggested it was placed on two false or at least shaky assumptions. one that office skippable playing its role the reassigned, and second, that the taliban would be prepared to break with the taliban -- one, that afghanistan would be capable of playing its role that we assigned. i wonder how you view the u.s. strategy at the moment? are you still concerned about those two assumptions? >> i'm not sure about the second as a linchpin of my argument, but i would like to take the opportunity to thank you for having me here today, in giving

me the opportunity to think what about these subjects. i want to say something briefly about the afghan setting and imitate a little of bit about what the prior two guests were saying. my concern all along in evaluating the u.s. international strategy in afghanistan has been the extent to which it is cognizant of afghan politics as recognized by afghans. this strategy in afghanistan is comparable to the one now being executed in iraq, to build up afghan security forces to take the lead in combat gradually, to allow nato forces to exit the costly it will they have them playing. and perhaps to remain in a supporting role to provide the

afghan security forces with a monopoly on technology and air power. we see in iraq now the dilemma that the u.s. has successfully built up indigenous sicker divorces more capable, security forces, more capable, but not enough to stand alone. what are the loyal to? that is still at issue in iraq this summer. we have been quite patient with iraqi forces. with afghanistan, there is not as much political resilience for a mismatch between security forces and national unity politics. my concern about the way american political strategy has been executed in afghanistan until recently is that it has been very -- focused, and has

not been able to bring in regional stakeholders to help. in the essay he referred to my principal goal was to outline the imperative of the strategy of national political unity in afghanistan. that is in order to create the resilience to build security forces, and to consider the possibilities of reconciliation with the taliban. i do not believe that the body politic of afghans can consider it unless abridged with regard to true unity. if the taliban becomes a wedge in the afghan politics, the risk of return to the 1990's this solution is significant. -- dissolution is significant.

i want to return to the question concerning ambiguity of the security institutions. i respect with the general said about the difference between thinking about the past, present, and feature. you cannot wish away the past which does include pakistani strategy of hedging against india through the promotion of militias that were either believed to be loyal to the pakistani stake, or manageable. that complex built up, and has to some extent not turned against the state. the state is paying a high price bowling those elements of the complex that it nurtured it earlier. at the same time, some of those elements are an inevitable part

of a political settlement in afghanistan. it would be natural to ask whether or not the pakistani state is prepared to give up its relationship there, access to this potential elements. secondly, we have to take into account another, particularly in light of the flooding. it is an institution that grew up to pursue roles primarily in kashmir, and a more broadly in india. it is rooted in punjab and has been getting traction. that area has been badly affected by floods. let me finish with one proposition. a question for american policy, general karamat implied general said, would be to ask whether as partners with the state of

pakistan and with its military, as providing generous aid and dollars, is the pakistani state doing everything it could be reasonably asked to do to contain and breakdown the historical legacy of its relations with these groups? is it doing everything it could be reasonably asked to do? i would say two things in answer. it is obvious there is a disagreement about that answer within the u.s. government. some think absolutely yes, they are taking it on the chin. there are others who say no, i do not think so. i think that they are continuing to hedge in ways that are costing american lives, and undermining the project in afghanistan, and threatening

regional stability. that question is doubly difficult because it is so opaque. there is no transparent information. i would love to read michaels indexes about it over time, but there is no way to measure it. >> thank you. mike, you have just returned from afghanistan. you advised general stemming the ccchyrstal, and have now advised general david petraeus. you just have a piece in which basically argued that it can work as long as we stay the course. i wonder if you could specifically address some of steve's concerns, but about

afghanistan and pakistan. >> thank you, and especially to my co-authors to help me to write this wonderful story of courage. and also people here who have helped with the afghanistan index. 2010 has certainly, even for guarded optimism, gone more slowly in terms of progress on the strategy. there was a hope, not expectation, and certain parts of the nato command that 2010 would show clear shift in momentum across afghanistan, or at least that the aggregate said of trans would point in a positive direction. there are not too many people saying that.

general david petraeus showed some optimism in his recent flurry of interviews a few weeks ago. we talked about helmand province. we got ourselves in an academic knot talking about it this past year because we expected such great things in this one little city. it was nearly treated as a litmus test as to strategy. then progress was lower there than hoped. now the impression is that helmand is not going that well. every other town that i know it in a major part of the central river valley is doing better than the other town. there are a couple of exceptions in extreme areas not going as well. but generally speaking, we are seeing some progress there. does it really address the

question of the fundamental dilemma as to whether we have a strategic partner in the president karzai? and as the current government reflect enough consensus among afghans to move it forward? steve asks the correct questions. i don't have as positive a bottom line there. i remain hopeful. the best way to explain my helpless without disagreeing with steve -- but instead of putting too much emphasis on alsoi or the palace, let's think about the afghan people who are adamantly anti-taliban. the only support is among the pashtun. the only part of them tends to be a tiny sliver who agree, or larger fraction who are afraid of them. the question is how to make

those people less afraid? that really is a more limited problem. we have seen in other insurgency's whether was of fundamental desire to overturn the existing political order. we do not see that in afghanistan. people are generous and supportive of the central government, and of president karzai despite what happened last year, and the accurate perception that many of his cronies are corrupt. the general belief is that nato is there to help. we do not see what we did in either iraq or still in pakistan. martin, it is not to rebut steep, but to take a different light on the problem to said that we have allies who are interested, and very committed.

one more point about the afghan army. it is also a very promising institution. people talk about cracks between the staff and the minister of defense of another tribe, and their efforts to address it. it is true that the certain groups are somewhat over- represented. they are primarily in the northeast, and where the corn north alliance in the resistance you're up against the taliban. -- they were the core north alliance in that resistance. generally, you see that the army is not showing sectarian or ethnic cracks. it is generally working together. there are problems to recruit south.sou the

as an institution is way ahead of where the iraqi army was in 2004, to testify. it is not contributing to sectarian war. it is doing a good job trying to reduce that tension. these are not definitive or conclusive proof that the afghan army or the country in a general is going in the right direction. here are a couple of reasons to be more hopeful than some have been. we need a balanced debate, not necessarily as an optimist abutting a pessimist, but a more balanced understanding -- not rebutting a pessimist. we have 95% parted with a nato counterpart. it never happened before. it is a legacy of the remarkable

command of general mcchrystal. i think he was great. even after basic trading, unitrin, the army units. what into the field and are based next two -- even after basic training and army but it is always within one step up or down and the size relative to the afghan unit is deployed with. they live together, plan, patrol, fight together. when they are embarrassed, the nato soldiers call in support. the afghans can survive a fire fights as never before when on their own. i will stop there. it is a vivid point. i don't think our lexicon does justice. partnering is at too weak a word

for what is going on in the field. it has further to go with the police force them with the army. people need to appreciate what is going on in the field. >> if you could also speak to steve's point about the need for broader reconciliation, different political groupings and leaderships in afghanistan? >> the point is well taken. whenever you want to have a viable solution institution and the government they must be inclusive of the entire population. you never want civilian institutions the way that they develop with fractures. when you have a fragile institutions just growing, there is always a danger.

particular wage issues could threaten them. we have to remain vigilant as things go forward. there are some fundamental differences -- particular wedge issues could threaten things. afghanistan had a political leadership that did not assume power. in iraq the problem is to produce the leadership itself. they cannot elect a prime minister. the picture is changing. there is no formal reconciliation. president karzai initiated a pieeace jurga. it will have to address all the issues.

about the other side of the issue, about pakistan -- whereas in afghanistan we return to build government capacity, in pakistan our long run it and should be to prevent it from eroding. particularly with the danger of the floods -- all engagement is for humanitarian reasons now. over the long run, the greatest impact of the floods is on local governments. on the very things we're trying to build. the criticisms made pakistan's strategy are all fairly familiar in this city, in the public media, and government. we're dealing with a country of 175 million or more people.

we are also dealing with a legacy since 1989 of relations that have gone and the wrong direction. every pakistani knows a given senator, and no american does. that legacy looms large on pakistan's thinking of will recall of a gap of trust. we have to deal with that to set the relationship right, to impact the war in afghanistan, to sustain pakistan. we are intensifying our engagement with a region of the world of which was largely on the periphery of policy in the middle east and south asia for a long time. we cannot cover the entire space required in short order, but if we were to say that our

engagement with pakistan over the past year has gone far in trying to convince pakistanis this is not a fly by night engagement, that we will address their issues, that we do care as americans, not as a government, but as people who care about the suffering of others -- that we're willing to rise to the occasion, and that we would like to have a road for word that would turn a relationship that was by and large transactional into a strategic relationship, then i would say we have made progress. this is an ongoing effort. the picture is changing rapidly. the pakistan of the past year since i have been working there has gone through enormous peaks and troughs. one year ago there was talk in this town that its government

may collapse before the taliban onslaught, 70 kilometers from islamabad. it has been engaged in civil war. its economy was severely challenged by shortages of water and electricity. the flood has completely turned society and its economy upside down. those are all important factors here, and the relationship, and also important challenges to the pakistani government. they look forward in terms of stability in the region. i do not see this as black and white. that we had a policy, and the measure would be whether it has

changed 100%. we have embarked on a policy of serious engagement in a different way in afghanistan and pakistan. given the issue raised in pakistan, in terms of impacting our goal of impacting the view of afghanistan, and its relationship with us, we have moved forward. we are still at maybe 15%, 16% approval rating -- of dismal and a country we would like to think of as a close ally. but that is double what it was. [laughter] me, a glassst like half full kind of guy. >> but also, steve has put the issue of the taliban on the table. i would like you to tell us how

pakistan views l.e.t. which is looming for america as a larger threat than we had previously imagined. >> i do not speak for the government, but i am giving my opinion. steve ask a very important question. i think he is correct. there is a divide here on this question. his pakistan doing everything it could be asked to? or is it actually hedging? my short answer is, without unraveling the state, and without creating internal chaos within pakistan, pakistan is doing everything possible to support u.s. strategy in afghanistan, and to work things out with india. is in eaching this

of the tracks we identified, there are massive and uncertainties. will the capacity the build up their which you want, in the afghan security forces, and government, to manage itself? that is still on the table. there are attrition rates as high as 40% and the forces which have been built up and it off right now. we want those to be built up, but right now there's a question. we all want it to be moving ford, but there is uncertainty. many of the things steve spoke of, the ability to bring about unity in the government, and to balance its ethnically -- those are the uncertainties we will have to live with. we are afghanistan's neighbors.

there is uncertainty whether the strategy will result in victory. it is going well, but the casualty figures are high after the surge -- which was expected. the fact is that violence has spread into other areas of afghanistan in the east and the north. that is some uncertainty there. on reintegration, yes, that is uncertain as to whether the taliban will come in and be part of the government. will they be accepted, or continue to be ethnically and balanced? these are the uncertainties that pakistan must live with. within these constraints, pakistan is doing all possible to support the u.s. strategy in afghanistan. the other point is, there was

enormous public opposition to any commitment of the pakistan military in to its western border areas -- into its western border areas. today and no one is saying anything against those, starting from swat, and all the other agencies there. we did not rush things. we waited for public opinion to change, and it did once the taliban were identified as anti- state, and as people who commit atrocities, and to a basically -- who are basically political fodder. the public opinion changed, and is not usually supportive of a counter-insurgency campaign.

>> to interrupt you on this point, how will the floods affect the public support operations and midwest? but now clearly it would expect that the army will support different kinds of operations to help flood victims. will it divert attention, delayed the expected campaign back in the north, waziristan? >> yes, of course. the military is the lead agency tackling the floods. it has diverted 60,000 or 70,000 troops. most of the limited aviation assets which will be used in the west have been diverted to disaster relief. so, while i can say it, this dire flood situation will eventually have a political, economic, security impact. it is the economic impact that

will be the worst, and will possibly take years to recover from. once the flood waters receded and the civil agencies take over, the military will be free to get back to his duties. i would say that perhaps whatever gains the military has made in the west will not be lost. it is quite capable of holding in that area against any type of threat, but some of the offensive operations which may have been planned are likely to be delayed. you read this question of the l.e.t., that these types of organizations are caring not flood relief operations. it must be because they live in those areas. they would like to get into the public and create sympathy, but their capacity is limited to dishing out just odd things here

and there. this is a disaster on the national scale where you need relief from helicopters, military troops -- everything. they have nothing like that. it will be insignificant, it in my opinion. >> there is one question i would to shift to, steve, if you like to answer that before we go to the audience. how has president obama's timetable affected calculations of starting to withdraw troops next summer? how does that lead to the calculations? >> and has been a very significant factor, although i think the assignment of david petraeus has had a countervailing affect our the past few months. in the markets you have the

concept of discounting for future events. if we look at market prices today, we would assume that the wisdom of crowds will discount the possibility of future deflationary or recession. causedact of 2011's date actors on the ground to start hedging. i think general karamat refer to the uncertainties even before you introduced a particular time line in the midst of a whole series of and certain projects that would have been reasonable cause to hedge against uncertainty -- that the date caused that hedging to increase and the pace and intensity. i think that is not limited to the government of pakistan. that is everybody, including a lot of actors inside pakistan and other regional governments. i do think that the president

and general david petraeus have done as much as they possibly could to walk back the effect they created by naming that date. to some extent now, there is more stability about the timeline -- the perception of the timeline, then there was six months ago. i was in afghanistan in late april and there was a great deal of uncertainty. i think things have settled down this summer. there is a kind of an understanding that we're talking abut transition that will last from 2011 until 2015. and that general david petraeus'influence in a buzzing about the pace is politically and barring some catastrophic set of events in afghanistan or the sudden collapse of american strategy there, the timeline is now more or less understood.

there's still some hedging going on. >> if i could add to that. i agree that the administration is doing a little better job now of trying to explain its strategy. but i think it would help to have an explicit statement by the president at about what its thinking is. i am not suggesting that he take away any and all ambiguity on his policy. he deliberately wants some flexibility about what to do next summer. what i interpret his thinking to be, from of the differ, as we have seen from the administration and from him, is that he does intend, if things are going well, to have a gradual kush dead -- gradual conditions hand over. but he reserves the right to reassess should the strategy not be succeeding and perhaps go to the mormon almost count -- plan b with a counter-terrorism specific approach. we know some people in his administration were advising him to adopted last fall when i

opposed the idea of a larger troop increase. they should to the following, i and, i hope for, a gradual conditions spaced plan. he never sets that. gates says that. clinton says that. petraeus says that. the president does not like to say that. the most robust thing he said was in june when the russian president came in he said we're not going to turn off the lights. i would expect a stronger statement from the commander-in- chief. he can be a little more direct and simply say that it will take three to four years to phase out. the good news is we're getting 30,000 u.s. troops year starting late next year if that is the reality. and frankly, if it does not work out, we're probably going to leave even faster. and i reserve the right as president to make that call. i think that kind of statement would be more productive for

most of the audience is listening to him than the extreme discretion, bordering on a policy of deliberate confusion. but i think he has sometimes adopted that. but i understand the strategic logic, but i do not think his approach is maximized his own benefit to the current policy. >> thank you. let's go to the audience for questions. identify yourself, and have a question at the end of your sentence. right in the back from philadelphia. >> philadelphia inquirer. i would like to ask vali and general jehangir karamat a pakistan question. the civilian government -- government has been unable to build in the areas that have the military cleared, even before the flood. what i am wondering now is since

they're so many new areas which will desperately need building, who is going to do that building? and if the military is called on, does that mean basically that the fight against insurgency basically comes to a halt? and is the military capable of that, or is the civilian government capable of coordinating with international agencies, which does not appear to be the case? and one further question along that line, internal stability, the number of inter sectarian killing is rising sharply. the civil war is going on in karachi between factions. shiites are being blown up and others. is the social fabric, which was already under great stress, going to be stressed even much more dramatically by this flood in government ineptitude, and if so, then what?

>> well, let me first of all say that the issue of the government response to the flooding in pakistan is not quite as it appears on the outside. first of all, the number of deaths are not as high as they were because the evacuation plans, particularly as he moved to the southern areas where they were carried out. one city was mostly thought it would be overrun and a tremendous amount of damages there, but that has not happened because of defective building of embankments and releasing the water out. the issue does not the the government has completely failed. the second focus is on larger national government in pakistan. the most important element in management in the unfolding of the disaster in the early response going forward is local government.

the waters of literally force the local government to pack up its bags and moved to a refugee camp. they have basically worked well. the northwest is a very different place than sindh and anpanjab. the local governments are different. the capacities are different. the management is quite different than it was in the northwest frontier. i am not convinced that we just take it for granted that the government will be completely incapable here in the military has to do everything. also in the northwest, the main area where the issue of reconstruction came up was the area of swat. it has to do with the way in which the taliban france what in

the damage they did to the government in that region would relieve this rating local government. this what remained the war zone. the other areas are not the war zone. there many other elements that can be brought to bear. but whatever the political issues that might be in pakistan -- i mean, this disaster has put the most significant pressure on the pakistan society and economy at this point in time. somehow this is the address, how the international committee acts on the immediate need is probably far more indicative of how quickly pakistan can regroup in the social-political crises of there. also, there is a great deal of indication that the country has come together around this issue. we do not see the floods as

breaking up into political factions. yes, there continued attacks over the bombing of a mosque in the northwest area yesterday with 30-some people killed. there will be continued acts of violence. the extremists are operating on a different agenda. but that the local government and national government level, they all have come together. they're facing the same problem, calls from the people, the same set of challenges. for now, the floods have had a unifying impact. >> would like to add to that? >> i think he is doing a great job. my experience is that in these disasters, government, regardless of what they're doing, always get criticized. whether it is katrina or the

tsunami. whatever it is, the government faces the brunt of the criticism for not responding quickly or not doing enough. comparing the western border with the interior, there is a difference. the civil agencies had difficulty operating in the western border area because it is an ongoing situation. it is a security hazard. so the military became the lead agency not only for clearing the area, but was actually in the of -- the process of rehabilitating the area and moving back when these floods hit. so that is different. in the rest of the country, it will be easier once the waters recede, which we're toad is likely to happen in two weeks or so. and quickly, people start moving back. then there will be more economic assistance, which the government has already announced, and

taking care of epidemics and things like that, which they are getting enormous international support, and i think they will be able to handle that. yes, internal security, which you talked about, is a huge problem. karachi, if you remember in the 1990's, went through that phase and stabilized. it is going through a bad face it, politically motivated. we have had assassinations taking place, targeting a low- level dissident movement. not significant but still causing enormous damage in terms of damage and loss of life. and the government is trying to get over that situation. >> let's take one from the back. >> thank you. i am in retired foreign service of a separate i am not an

expert, but i have served in islamabad in spend some time in afghanistan more recently. i have two questions. one four steve coll and one for general karamat. first, in terms of local afghan governments and what we perhaps slightly labeled the building of civil society, former warlords have come back and establish themselves and running basically the same kinds of patronage network said it before. in many cases, that brought a measure of stability to many areas. and they're not getting support for that. of course, it is a trade-off. the long-term interests are trying to build what is good for an afghan society or are the present contributions such that they really cannot be dispensed with? i wonder what your views are on how bad the bargain is? for the general, for many years

with pakistan has done related to afghanistan, or has not done, has been seen through the complicated prism of the strategic political relationship with india. although i do not want to suggest that the india problem with relations has gone away or changed significantly with pakistan. i wonder how candid you care to be, how thinking within the pakistan army might have changed in terms of being mesmerized by the indian threat? thank you. >> well, the observations are certainly indoors in the sense that there has been an obvious trade-offs in american engagement in afghanistan since the fall of the taliban in december between the pursuit of security and the pursuit of plausible stabilizing politics and the expedient pursuit of security, particularly in the

time between 2002 and 2007 or 2008. the united states was engaged in another war during most of those years, did not resource the afghan conflict anywhere near adequately, and one of the ways that got away with the approach to the country was to develop expedient relationships with former warlords and essentially turned politics over to them in some areas. it is a bargain. it is very difficult to unravel a bargain like that instantly in the context of even an ambitious counterinsurgency campaign. to go back to my drumbeating about the importance of the afghan politics, per se, is that a successful, conclusive approach to afghan politics during the transition time ahead, one might have a prayer of success at requires a vision of national unity but also a

response to the dilemma that you described. that is, more inclusive local politics. it is stunning when you travel around afghanistan to appreciate how top-down local administration remains, and governors come and go, exiled to win favor with the palace or with the americans were shuffled around from province to province. operation can the hearth was suspended in part because -- operation kandahar was suspended in part because they got to the edge of the campaign they intended, and they realized they did not have that it plausibly inclusive and successful local political strategy to complement their military plans. actually, in my ear the decision to go forward in the recognition of that. -- i admire that decision. buchanan make it up as you go along, which was more or less

the plan in that case. -- you cannot make it up as you go along. parliament is probably the next concrete way in which this bargain is going to be measured by the afghan people. i will leave it there. >> general. >> cashmere -- the cashmere figures in pakistan's strategic talked very prominently. i want to say that we do not consider india a threat anymore. that situation is still there, but the conversation with india as a threat to in terms of premeditated, deliberate attack on pakistan i think has receded into the background. because for india and pakistan, the economy has become extremely important. it is obvious in both india and pakistan, which are working on a peace track.

pakistan, for several years now, has been taking a good, hard, in word look at itself. it is facing internal instability, economic decline, and under those circumstances, while the threats are there, its policies to work on threat reduction through diplomacy, dialogue, talks, all non- military means so that it can focus its energy on its internal stability. >> i want to put another issue on the table here. on the front page on the "new york times" today is another story about corruption in the palace. you have strong views on this issue and what we're doing wrong in what we should do write about it. would you like to address that? >> thanks. and i would like to mention that on the issue of the indian threats, steve cohen is finishing his book, and in two weeks, we will have an event

here. on the corruption issue, this this such a complex matter. we have seen our afghan friends pushed back recently. whenever we criticize them too much for corruption, they point out we're part of the problem. frankly, everybody who is criticizing the other is correct i do not think they're too many americans, there are some, but not too many were deliberately personally corrupt. but the system is not very effective. in my trip in may in afghanistan, i was concerned by how many top nato american officials were not yet even on the same page with each other about what the strategy should really be for confronting this. the specific issue i felt i gained an understanding of, and this is only one element of the broader afghan corruption problem, but it is the way in which our military deployment depends on certain afghan contractors, that can strongmen it disproportionately. karzai is the most famous, of course.

there are a couple others. what we have done is in the interest of trying to meet the deployment schedule set up by the president. we have rushed. one of the days we rest is by working with people you already know. that means that you pump more money into the same hands who are already benefiting from this system. and therefore to the exclusion of many other afghan tribesmen leaders who were not of the karzai or shearzai families in kandahar. we're not going to eliminate corruption in afghanistan, but we need to review our president as providing a certain form of patronage which needs to be better distributed, needs to be more equitable. if some of that is corruption, then we have to distinguish between different types of corruption. sometimes which are regrettable but powerful. and other types which actually fuel the insurgency. it is the laughter that troubled me. specifically, you put all your money into a couple people's

hands. any make others upset. then there tribes are more likely to spur the insurgency. i do not think there has been enough appreciation on what to do about this. the simplest answer is to broaden the base of those who benefit from our build up. that is easier said than done. but it was not even being commonly recognized as a core element of what our strategy should be going forward among all the different people i spoke to in may. i think there has been progress since then, but i think we're behind the curve on this one. >> ok, let's take another question. the lady here. >> i am from the irish times, and i would like to ask mr. coll when presidentn, obama announced he was sending another 30,000 troops coming he tripled the number of u.s. troops in afghanistan, and at the very same time said the drawdown will begin in july 2011, was he actually thinking

-- was the actual providing himself with an alibi in advance, so that he gets a to the generals and the military that i gave you what you asked for and gave you the surge, and it does not work and we're getting out? and second, you talked about the different perceptions in the pentagon and the white house of the war in afghanistan. is there a certain tension there between, for example, vice president biden's strategy of using drones and using far fewer soldiers, and also, are we headed for confrontation? general petraeus in recent interviews has said he would be willing, i believe that he would be willing not to start this at all. whereas, one has the impression that the president is much more keen on actually pulling the troops down. thank you.

>> michael, you go first. >> good question. i would start by saying that the president and many have been trying to avoid the likelihood of another vietnam by saying i am going to try to minimize exposure here. that is part of the logic of july 2011 could but i think, frankly, he knows better than to think he can simultaneously trouble combat forces and limit his exposure. he is very exposed. and i congratulate him for his resolute decision making on this issue. i think he has made excellent decisions all along. that is my personal take. regardless, he is exposed. i do not think that can be his primary motivation. the primary motivation was to speak to the immediate needs of the democratic congress and the broader public that are tired of this war and needed to understand this was not going to last forever. i think he needs to continue on by trying to clarify what his strategy includes. the july 2011 by itself is, my opinion, causing more harm than

good, even politically at home right now. nonetheless, i think that was a bigger part of his motivation. plus, trying to put a little bit of a stir into the side of afghan politicians to understand the have to start delivering on reform in the near term. i think those were more airport reasons than they should have an alibi. on the question of the unity or lack thereof for the administration right now, i understand your question, but i read them as doing a little better job than you suggest. vice-president biting give a speech yesterday in which whatever doubt he may have once had, you certainly put them aside, at least publicly, for the purposes of the speech, which was a fairly strong and firm defense of the a minister should policy, we have the right general, the right strategy, and we will stick with this. i think general petraeus recognizes that all he can do is give military advice. he was asked in a recent interview, would appear military advice is not heated, and he

said, i salute smartly and keep going. i am sure that is what he meant. i am sure he will do whatever he is asked to do under the reasonable kind of parameters at the attractively in play. i see the administration as being reasonably well unified. but the president himself is to be more clear about what the july 2011 date means, and i would advocate that he do so. >> on the question of what the president had in mind at that time with the july 2011 did, yes a wedding for what word's next but -- just looking for bob woodward posing next book. i agree with everything michael said. i had the impression, although u.s. the waiting for bob woodward's reporting, that there was a little bit of a civilian military element to this between the white house and the pentagon, that a factor, at least in the minds of some of

the civilians in the white house, was to signal the u.s. military that there was a firm belief on the civilian side that it cannot have an open-ended timeline. and secretary gates saluted the decision and defended it in public for another reason, which was country and important, also to signal the karzai government but they do not have an open ended timeline. and they organize themselves to participate in the buildup of afghan security forces much more effectively than they have done today. they accepted the president's decision with enthusiasm because that signaling the afghan. they would recognize it would have this other affect in causing actors to hedge and be a concern. >> ok, let's take one last question.

>> i am it retired from the world bank. a couple suggestions. when you have sessions like this about afghanistan, how about having an afghan on the table? >> on the table, yeah? >> yes, that is what we're talking about. anybody might do it. going back to your position on ethnic groups in afghanistan, i am not sure we can talk about afghanistan, and in the current economy, this is only 3% of the army are pashtun. >> what is the question? >> you have to look at the ethnic part in afghanistan. there are certainly people who are out for revenge. i know what they think.

now they want revenge. you like an afghan army are afghan police at all ever. what is your reaction? >> i just want to quickly say in terms of our approach, brookings is the only place i believe that has published a book by an afghan woman and an american scholar. we have also done events with my colleague, and we're delighted again to have the panel that we have today that the represents the diversity of views. i will make that simple, it and leave the matter to my colleague. >> i disagree. i do not believe the ethnic issue, as he put it, even though afghanistan has had a great deal of difficulty, elemental revenge is not on the table. it is not sort of a replay of iraq.

this is not a country where ethnic groups are trying to leave the country. it is overall dynamic to protect afghanistan's political integrity, territorial integrity, maintain its position. it maintains the distribution of power. we have to leave it up to them whether the pashtun's think we are underrepresented or over represented. and that is part of the whole afghan dynamic. but i do not believe that it is not possible to build an afghan army are afghan police. the police in the north will be where the tadzhik areas are. in the south, it will be pashtun. then they will be the police and kunduz. the pashtun's of kandahar will be the police in kandahar.

as the afghan army goes, it has done fairly well. it is making great strides with the army in establishing this. the question in afghanistan is not whether an army as possible. the question has been whether the pace or scheldt could possibly achieve that. it is a very different challenge that we face. >> well, we need to conclude, but i want to thank all the panelists very much for their contribution today and ask you to join me in expressing our appreciation. [applause]

>> the c-span network covering several hearings this week on the bp oil spill in the gulf of mexico all week, federal investigators have been conducting their fourth round of hearings looking into the cause of the border horizon oil spill. already under way today on c- span2, testimony with officials from bp and halliburton. again, you can watch live coverage from houston right now and all this week on c-span2. tomorrow, a national commission created by president obama holds its second public meeting looking it to federal regulation of offshore drilling and whether those rules need to be changed. live coverage of that hearing here in washington starts at 9

eastern here on c-span. around the country, it is primary day in a number of states including alaska, arizona, florida, and vermont. tonight, our 2010 midterm election coverage will continue with a focus on the florida democratic and republican primaries as well as the republican senate race in arizona. here on c-span, starting at 8:30 p.m. eastern, you can watch live results from florida and canada its speeches. at 10:30 p.m. eastern, we will head to arizona to look to the republicans in the contest between senator john mccain and former congressman. we will have more levers of old -- results intended speeches plus your phone calls and feedback on facebook and twitter. watson added a 30 p.m. eastern for full coverage of some of the key national private -- watched tonight at 8:30 p.m. eastern for full coverage of some of the key national primary races. later today here on c-span, we will go live to the national

press club in washington for the arms services suicide prevention task force who will release the results of its yearlong report on military suicide. live coverage begins at 1:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span. >> it is my pleasure and privilege to welcome back to the pentagon briefing room the 34th,

thought of the united states, the marine corps general. general conway has served as commandant since november 13, 2006, and is one of only two commandants to serve his entire tenure during wartime. the last three to this group on december 15, late last year. general conway just returned from a trip to the central command region, specifically he and his group visited romania, pakistan, afghanistan, and germany. he spent the majority of his trip visiting marines and sailors in helmand province in afghanistan, and general conley will retire this fall after more than 40 years of service. and he will begin give you a briefing on his travels in and take your questions. >> hello, ladies and gentlemen. as dave indicated, it has been many months since i have been

before you, and also, we did just the back last night from a trip in the theater. so if i look a little ragged, that is it. i am not getting old, just getting tired i would like to offer a quick statement and then look forward to your questions. and as days reference, romania, afghanistan, pakistan, and we came back up through germany. romania is a good partner and ally. we attended a navy day there at the port city and we're reminded many times that romania and stood with us in iraq and has now increased their presence in afghanistan to some 1800 troops. they have sustained 15 killed in action to date in afghanistan but they are dedicated to that task and can rightly be said that as a nation, we believe there punching above their weight. for pakistani leadership, it is consumed with responding to the aftermath of the flood disaster. since august 12, we have had 2200 marines from the 15th area

responding to the crisis. as of this morning, we have aircraft deployed that have been evacuated 3075 people and delivered more than 650,000 miles of cargo. to contribute to the disaster relief, it should be off the coast of pakistan by mid to late september. i was cautioned that the involvement of the army in the flood relief will detract from efforts to secure the pakistani frontier for a time. we came up through lance ito, germany were we witness dedicated people at the hospital perform a myriad of past -- tasks. the number marines and american servicemen in general was down from previous states. our primary purpose for the trip was to visit marines and the great sailors who support us in afghanistan. i have several observations for you from there. first, the marines in helmand

are exercising our definition of expeditionary. that is fast, austere, and legal. to keep the enemy off balance. partner with afghan infantry, it is not uncommon to find minutes away from their forward operating basis for 30 days at a time. using superior firepower and battlefield mobility, i believe they hold the initiative, even in the height of the taliban so- called fighting season. they're making the enemy react to them. second, morale is high. though it is a tough fight, marines consents conditions are turning their direction. recently contact went into afghanistan and reenlisted several hundred marines. they do value the support of their fellow americans, and the only concern perhaps best expressed by the lance corporal i spoke to was when he said, sir, do not let our country go wobbly on us now. third, the capacity is sitting at a critical stage. the general was ahead of schedule with his infantry

crunch -- companies. and the quality varies widely. now he faces the toughest part, i believe, to reach -- recruit and train aviators and what is called enablers for combat support. those troops will require a higher level of education and skills training. the organization and approach that he and the joint combined team have taken appears to be to the interest of the observers just right for the task at hand. next, the key to success in the helmand province is to get people on the side of their security forces, the government, and my marines. ever so slowly and even incrementally, that is beginning to happen. better and less corruption, governors to oversee the rule of law are making a difference. i said was able to construct the itself contains cell phone system, and i am positive that chips will come in, making it

impossible for the taliban to operate behind citizens. their unit summer in afghanistan that will turn over responsibility to afghan security forces in 2011, but i do not think they will be marines. helmand province in kandahar aren't the birthplace of the taliban. it'll be a few years before conditions on the ground are such that turnovers will be possible for us. our country's increasingly growing tired of the war, more troops will arrive. i will mention the analysis of the general commander when asked about the face of a war. he says we can either might lose fast or winslow. and i think the first question is yours. >> the marine corps will be facing big changes on two friends. one would be the discussion about the role that marines play in future were fair and to change personnel policy under don't ask don't tell if it is

lifted. what advice would you like to leave your successors considering these changes will probably take place long after you're gone? >> first of all, in terms of the size of the court, we grew 27,000 additional marines. we saw the requirement come down in afghanistan through iraq. we're getting or close to that objective out there. although we have resolved that this is something we need to look at at what post afghan figures will be as a solid planning figure. for purposes of staffing and deployment and the unit's plans in the pacific. we have a fairly significant beq build not taking place. we need to know where to cease all of that. i would not start any of that until after this activity in afghanistan is complete and we

can do it without hurting the troops. in terms of don't ask don't tell, you know, we will obey the law. we are anxious to see what the survey indicates when it is made public towards the end of the year. but i caution our marines and marine leadership. if the law changes, we pride our core in leading the services in many, many things, and we will have to lead in this, too. the robie 100 issues other that we will have to solve is the law changes in terms of how we do business, but we cannot be seen as dragging our feet are delayed implantation. -- implementation. >> general, i want to pick up on don't ask don't tell. the senate is going to pick it up next month as part of the authorization bill. you have told the hill you think the current policy worsen that you would never ask marines -- and that you would never ask marines. you have been involved with

other marine generals. in opposing a change in the policy. also, if you look at the polls than by military times, the marines seemed to oppose any change in policy by a fairly significant margin. i want you to focus on what it is about the marines said they oppose this change in policy, repeling don't ask don't tell. you have been in there for four years. you have spoken to marines. what is it that marines oppose about this, more so than the other services? >> it is a tough question to answer. i am my own corps. so any comparison are contrast is difficult. but we recruit a certain type of young american, pretty much the guy or gal willing to go fight and perhaps die for their country. that is about the only difference that i see the 20 other services. they recruit from a great string of young americans as well.

the document the same areas. i can only think that as we look at our mission, how we're forced to live in close proximity on ships and in the field for long time spans and that types of things, that the average marine out there, and my own surveys indicate that it is not aged- dependent or rank-dependent, not where you're from, it is pretty enough formally not endorsed as the idea we had. i think all those things have impact on the marines and wheat this do not see it change. but we will follow the law. >> living in tight quarters. is that the issue here mostly? >> well, unlike the other services, we have consciously for decades now built. so we start out when the law changes in terms of how to address that. we will deal with it. i do not believe there is money

out there to build another to allowent for beq's every marine to have a room for his or herself. so that will be one of the marriott of issues will have to face. i do not know. i do not know. we sometimes ask marines with their preference is, and i can tell you that an overwhelming majority would like not to be room with a person who is openly homosexual. some did not object, and perhaps a voluntary basis might be the best way to start without violating anybody's sense of moral concern our perception. i do not know. we're not there yet. it is one of those hypothetical is that we have to consider, but we will not have to deal with until the law changes. >> you said that the country is growing tired of the war in

afghanistan. your perhaps the first member of the joint chiefs to openly say that the country is growing tired of this war. how do you, having said that as commandant, how the maintain the morale? what are your concerns for your troops if the country is really tired of this war? because you all so say we will be there for a few years with the country tired of this war. how many years? >> first of all, what i am say to you is what i am reading from you folks really, and those are the results of the public opinion polls. i read this morning were 70% or 60% of americans oppose it. but i think it is an important back door in this whole discussion. i think that we come with the military leadership, had to do a better job of talking about the last chapter of this book if we simply try to walk away. i do not think we have done a

strong enough job. they're good and just reasons why we have to destroy the al qaeda and the taliban in afghanistan, so it to what we did in iraq. surly to the point where there was no future opportunity for safe haven, lead to the degree we can create conditions for the afghan government to rule the country and avoids a tavon. i just finished telling our troops for 11 days that we need to understand that public opinion in the united states will be whenever it is, ok, but that our country has matured to such a degree, i think it's some is from our lessons learned of the vietnam, has matured to the degree that our fellow countrymen can be against the war but still support the troops. i honestly think that 95% of americans support with the troops are doing and do not associate them with the policies of any administration. >> when you said that the

military will be there a few years, what is your instinct on that? what do you think? >> i cannot say it will be a few years. what i can tell you is what i said is that i think it will be a few years before conditions on the ground are such that we would expect to be able to turn over to afghan forces. i think there is a mind-set that needs to a company that that it may be a while. >> five years? more? >> i cannot say that for sure. things twist and turn. u.n. is our experience is that in iraq. we have intelligence officers in 2006 sang all was lost. by the end of 2006, we had conditions change completely in iraq. i do not see the culture in afghanistan permitting something like that, but i do think that reconciliation could be a game changer. when that will come remains to be seen.

i will come back to you. >> in boca nauert, they said the u.s. position has been -- in okinawa, the have said the u.s. has a position -- [unintelligible] the have opinions on that? >> well, you know, from the original talk, the v-shaved runway was agreed upon. in terms of aircraft safety, we still believe that is the best way to do things. so it is entirely at this point is an area to be resolved between the senior levels of the japanese government and the u.s. government. but given a set of options, we would prefer a runway that is entirely safe for our pilots and air crews taking off and landing there. >> how is marcia going right now? -- how is marjah going right

now? and can you say that a year from now, the will be no withdrawals of marines from helmand? i first of all, marcjah believe is the pivotal battle that is ongoing. they're intelligent, and i realize that marjah has the capture of an international audience. so they're not giving up that easily. we drove them out. we out-maneuvered them. there was not as much fighting as we thought would be the case because they sensed our overwhelming fire fighter and our ability to disrupt their command. a lot of shaping came into it. so the clearing of marcia was very successful and a fairly rapid evolution. the taliban realized that if that is the end of it, ok, that would be a major defeat for them.

so they are trying to string this out as long as a possible can. they are sniping at us and throwing a few odd rounds here and there, but mainly they are and disseminating the people. they want to maintain a presence there and keep marjah from being a strategic victory on the part of the marines in the south of helmand. let me make it clear if i have not, ok, i cannot say that marines will be in helmand or start withdrawing next year are not. that is the president-level decision. i think educated and informed by the best military minds of general petraeus and the secretary of defense and more. but i can say that i do not believe conditions in the birthplace of the taliban, in helmont or kandahar, for that matter, are going to be such that we think we can simply turned over afghan forces and leave. that is what i am trying to prepare our marines for. >> do you anticipate u.s.

troops in helmand province and kandahar for a few more years? >> it is the birthplace of the taliban, and conditions there are not such as they are in other regions of the country. if you look at the numbers of attacks in numbers of casualties, if you look at the focus of the commanders there, the fight is in the south. >> in marjah, is there an estimate of how many insurgents are left there? >> i do not know. i would put it in a couple hundred percent in like that. it is not significant, but based upon the way they fight, trying to induce us to create civilian casualties, firing from compounds were they have women and children driven into the rooms, having a positive identification on a man carrying a weapon before you could take him down, not wearing uniform. that has been the case the whole nine years. it makes it tough.

>> thank you, general. you mentioned that conditions are the key to deciding whether or not troops consider pulling out in large numbers. what exact conditions would you be looking for before you advise the president and the rest of your superiors -- >> ok, you know, a military force ships the environment. we cannot fix the economy. we cannot fix the government. what we can do is affect the security. we can 89 these other things. we shape the environment that allows these other lines of operation to take place. initially, in both iraq and now in afghanistan, we have had to do that at the start by ourselves. but increasingly, there are calls for turning that over.

that is what the general is doing and why it is so important. that is what we're pardoning -- partnering right now with afghan security forces when we go out. that is why we want to posture the police so they can be successful. so the time that we're there, the shaving operation is a transition for the entire time. transitioning most forces to the point where they can do those things. that is what we hope to accomplish. when we think we have sufficiently been down the insurgency in the area, we have sufficiently build up the afghan king abilities to do what is there, then i think we have done the essence of what we were sent there to do. >> general called will mention yesterday that the afghan security forces, one in 10 show sign of drug abuse, four out of five are illiterate. desertion is a real problem.

is there any indication to you that these afghan security forces are going to improve such that if we get the number we want, that they will be of the quality we need? >> you know, the biggest problem i think we face in all of that is the literacy issue. as i said, as we continue to build up the force, it will become even more important. these people are fighters at heart. they're every bit as good as the iraqis, some ways even more so with regard to their willingness to really mix it up. they're quite effective when a partner with us. they operate with us in helmand. we have had to fire some police because of correctness. but those that we train, and most of them that we get from program aredwell's pretty good. but the need to understand they will be supported by the afghan army and by u.s. marines if

things get too intense for them. we think there's a good construct that is working. and again, it is never going to be, you know, a british royal marines at we're training there, but they only need to be better than the insurgency. we think we can achieve that in a reasonable time span. >> two of their most controversial programs, one is the v-22. how well was a performing in afghanistan in terms of readiness rates? it had an issue in iraq. and what if a system is not performing? >> readiness rates are about where we would expect them to be for the aircraft, based upon the fact we toss them immediately into combat. we thought we had learned all we needed to know about harsh environments in iraq, but quite frankly, the environment in iraq -- afghanistan is different and we have other problems causing as issues with regard to rating is and availability. but those have been identified

and have been put into the system. we are seeing a slow but steady increase in availability. as we apply those parts, our mechanics are getting better and faster and can find shortcuts. they're still apply proper safety procedures. the aircraft is down wanted to do and more. it is our new helicopter. it is involved in some of these insurgents, behind the enemy. it is involved in the resupply, involved in transfer of equipment and personnel all over the theater. it has been shot at and hit a few times. all of those things that we would expect is doing, and as it is doing them, it is in ways that still have us, in terms of how best to employ such a state of the art capability. there are ospreys on board. some arrive in some timber. we offered an amazing

capability. we offer to have the aircraft sell for deploy all the way to pakistan to the eastern coast. the issue has to do with the availability and the terms of the pakistani air fields. and the new centcom commander wants long-term capacity there. >> there is the biggest acquisition program you have had going they believe it is entering its crucial reliability test. do you sense support for the program starting to wane within the navy and within the office of the secretary of defense? >> you know, the program is under continuous scrutiny. it has been a beleaguered program. but at this point, i think everybody is anxious to see how it performs. these new, more reliable vehicles we think are going to perform much better. we're looking at affordability, the program in the out-years.

if you believe there will be a custom defense budget. we have to ask ourselves if it is affordable. but we are excited about the capability, and there is certainly a need for that kind of capability in the out years. >> when you leave, you said the knives will come and try to cut it. >> i can say i hope not. i do not since it, but i hope not. >> looking ahead to the future, the secretary is done two things. one, he tossed the review of the core with expeditionary commissions. at the same time, he questioned the amphibious, how much facilities we need, and that could be a navy shipbuilding problem. are you concerned that it is not necessarily including that? >> i am really not.

any person that looks at the u.s. is a maritime nation accepts our dominant defense theory of for deployment, forward facing, engaging away from the and i did states has to have a strong appreciation for a navy marine corps coast guard team that is able to do whatever has to be done out there. there are -- there's a lot of blue on that map of the instability. although we have been fortunate, i guess the last couple times our nation has engaged, the host country would allow us to come in, bill the iron mountain, mask the forces, across the border for attack. they're not a lot of places like that in the world where some of the people that might challenge us exist. i think it isn't asymmetric advantage our country holds. and i think although the secretary's question is right, how much is enough? now, that is pretty much laid out previous leasing we will have two brigades prepared to

conduct this. it will be augmented by all the other services because they also believe -- it is not just marines and navy. the other services will be deeply engaged, and i think they deplete believe it is a capacity the nation needs to sustain. -- and i think they deeply believe it is a capacity the nation's needs to sustain. >> i want us but to the challenges for marines. one is the issue the rules of engagement, avoiding civilian casualties. how big a challenge is that what marines getting the job done? the other one is a perception issue. the president's july 2011 date, the beginning of this withdrawal and the impact that has a local afghans and there's expectations, does that make the job more direct role in terms of getting things done, especially winning hearts and minds? >> first of all, i ask that question every time i go into the theater. now three two commanders and multiple pellet commanders, the answer is always the same.

it does not bother us much. we understand the nature of the afghan culture and society, and we accept that if you want -- that you need to avoid civilian casualties. in execution, we're very good about that kind of thing. our communication is good. our fires are precise. we make all of this work. so at every level when i ask my commanders that question, we are ok with it. in terms of the july 2011 issue, you know, i think if you follow closely, and of course we all do, we know the president was talking to >> in some ways, we think it is probably getting our enemy sustenance we think he may be saying to himself and we had intercepted communications that say they only have to hold out for so long.

let me give you a different thought. if you accept what i said was true that marines will be there after 2011, what will the enemy say then? what will he say when you have the leadership outside the country trying to direct operations with them. the ft troops have been believing what he says and they will lead. come the fall, we are still hammering them like we have been. i think it could be very good for us in that context in terms of the enemies psyche and what he has been posturing now for the better part of one year. >> could it take until after july of next year for any difference to get going? >> we visited with admiral harwood in afghanistan. it was interesting to talk with him about the forensics of what

he is discovering as he goes about his interrogation and questioning prisoners. our estimate is getting tired. they are getting hammered. two women escaped greater degree than we are. -- to a much greater degree than we are. the combined affects of that over the next year or so until next summer, when they realize that we may begin the process in july of 2011, but it certainly will not be done in one month or three months. i think it will only compound his thought process that maybe this will not end well. >> how does this impact in your mission in afghanistan?

[unintelligible] how do the people in afghanistan at say that you can learn -- can you learn lessons from iraq and use it for your mission in afghanistan? would you restate your first question? >> this was not helpful that we could have a serious breach. at the same time, i have not examined all the documents and have not asked anybody to do that. except for compromising some of our sources, i don't think it is being felt tactically on the battlefield. i don't think the impact is severe s -- except as it relates

to our capacity to maintain secrecy. the mews that are holding pakistan -- there are crisis requirements. it strips him of some of that capability to respond elsewhere in theater. for purposes of marines in helmand, there is no impact. in terms of iraq, we are out of iraq for all intents and purposes and have been now for the better part of one year. we started the process one year before that. what lessons are transferable that we learned over four or five years in iraq to afghanistan? we found there was about 70%

application, probably. you have a different culture, a different environment, a different language, different tribal construct and different leadership that we have to deal with. we focused on the 30% and tried to inject it into our training. that is working for else. -- that is working for us. marines back in the 1920's and south america learn many of these lessons in terms of transition process these. emanuel that as soon to be 100 years old has been our beacon for the way -- a manual that has been our beacon for the way. >> how you keep the morale? >> i emphasize that the number one concern on the part of american troops anywhere they go

is the country behind us. that was the case in 2003 and the case now in 2010. i am so proud of our american public that regardless how they see what happened in iraq or what is happening in afghanistan, they support the troops and that is the message they get from me and they see it when they come home. in that regard, i am proud of my country. >> you mentioned safe havens and the leadership is outside the country, only foot soldiers are there. why are we still there and why don't we focus where the leadership of the taliban and al-qaida are? >> first of all, does not a black-and-white situation. significant elements of the leadership are out of the country and not susceptible to the day to day contact and not susceptible to our special forces that focus on such things.

they are avoiding that type of of jeopardy and that is noted by their front soldiers. there is something there we can exploit. >> some marines to equate the future of the marine corps with eftc platforms. do you agree with that? does the marine corps run the risk of clinging to the platform to much much in the same way the air force claimed to the f-22? >> it is not the platform, it is the capability. this is the only thing out there that gives us the capability. when the secretary made the determination to trim away determinationf-22, there were a number of u.s. aircraft that could perform that function. this is the only capability that exists out there to get us from over the horizon. we all appreciate and we will

have to come from over the horizon. you are at least 12-40 miles out and you simply can't do that in a vehicle that moves 6 miles per hour effectively. i would be hesitant to put those vehicles in the water. it is not necessarily efb made by general dynamics that goes 25 knots that we need to be wed to. if that program were cancelled, we would still be lookeding to come up with that capability and some other context. >> you mentioned small wars. many prognosticators say that after afghanistan, the real threat will be small engagements in north africa and the middle east and around the world. what about the state and readiness of the force and how should it be shaped to meet that

threat? >> both the review of this last year and the study group we put together shortly after i became commandant said the same thing. 2020-2025, they said the most likely conflict is what they called hybrid warfare. as regional conflict so we have to have a marine corps that's build toward that. we do windows. we do whatever the nation asks us to do. secretary gates has said that he supports that. that is his belief. there is in our history, a routine element of surprise where we fight the battle that we were not prepared to fight or did not think we would have to engage in our guidance to the corps has been what it has always been as the shape our future. we need to be a two-fisted fighter. we need to do what we're doing now in afghanistan but witwe

need to be able to do what we did in 2003 when we crossed the borders of iraq. we need to roll into baghdad with heavy artillery. we are trying to build both and train both now that we have more time to is not just counterinsurgency skills. ines will be inri will they be prepared? >> when we are home, we can do a lot of that kind of training. they can also get time with their families into the preparation to go back to afghanistan with forces in that rotation. we think that 14 months will be valuable. >> since july, the marines

destroyed many operating basis. can you explain the thinking behind that and does that imply that a tactical job is not being done in the right way? >> first of all, the marines are not out of sangunie yet but they will not be replaced we have a different approach. we believe that we need to challenge the enemy where he thinks he has strength ^ we are less prone, i think, to move into a forward operating base and simply use that as a base of operations. that may go back to our vietnam days. i'm not sure.

there is no place in the zone where we will not go. hopefully, we could stay with sufficient force to build behind us with of the transition of afghan police spread there is a minor difference and operating policy. we consider that the marines did a good job and they took a lot of casualties. there are minor differences in how we approach the matter. >> are you suggesting that it is wrong to have six positions? >> we have fixed positions, too. you have to have a place of a base of operations. you have to have a place where you can go back to rest and resupply. most of those places will have a secure a helicopter pad. we don't want helicopters flying in supplies that are not secure. fixed bases are absolutely necessary.

we believe that last because then you have to have a security force at that base and protected and that the top of manpower. we want a minimum of those. you can then get out and run the countryside -- and roam the countryside. >> the army is beginning a complete overhaul of the carbide and we're wondering if the marine corps is looking at their own weapons or small arms systems? >> we have been looking at small arms for a long time. we are never going to be a carbine marine corporate we will never go completely to the m-4. we are a rifle marine corps and we believe in long-range shooting skills and those skills are not as resident on the

carbine as they are at a rifle. that does not say we don't use them. it is an extension of the pistol more than an adjustment to the rifle. we are experimenting right now with an automatic rifle as opposed to a light machine gun. we have three battalions that will go forward with both weapons systems. they will give us an appraisal of the two systems and how the marines like them. finally, we have looked at the 762 system and a6.8 system that had interchangeable barrels and receivers. before we get would go to something like that and go to a new rival which would be expensive for us, we want to make sure we are getting all we can out of the cartridges we fire out of the 556 m-16a2. >> how soon will those come into

play? >> pretty soon. in the back over here, please. >> after the four structure review is done, do you have any doubt that the marine corps will be less capable? >> that is not the intent of the guidance given to a four- structure review. don't have that concern at all. after afghanistan, in time, 200,000 marines in may peacetime marine corps is probably too many. people are expensive. i don't know that we can keep them occupied. in the end, we will probably take the options given to us by this four-structure review group, makes some assumptions as to the climate and the world status at that point, and try to come away with a strong assumption that allows us to

look toward that figure in terms of reset beq number requirements. we need something out there in the out years. in no way would we accept that we would build a less capable marine corps. sacrificeou have to certain capabilities to make the overall force what you want? >> no, i don't see that we are going to eliminate in a vertical slice any of our capabilities. there will be less bahrain's eligible to deploy when we have a smaller marine corps in peacetime. that is the only place i would say that we would be less capable of responding to the call from the secretary. in the back, yes, sir? >> what do the commanders on the

ground attribute the casualties to this past month? >> first of all, we took some losses early on through active snipers in marja and other places. the best counter sniper system on the battlefield is another sniper. our snipers are very good and we have taken down that threat significantly over the last several months. secondly, we are impacting supply lines and our read as we intercept and question and interrogate is that the enemy is having a tougher time getting the elements of the ied's in place and being able to attack us through that system. no, security has not turned sufficient for us today that the afghan security forces can take it.

we have the momentum. we have the initiative. that is different from declaring that security positions are changed dramatically. >> let me bring you back "don't ask, don't tell. " you said some marines are skeptical about this. you said the moral perception that marines have of people serving in the marine corps who are openly gay -- what do you mean by "moral perception?" >> we have some people who are very religious. we will have people in some estimates is that said that homosexuality is wrong and they simply do not want to room with a person of that persuasion because it would go against their religious beliefs. that is my belief about some percentage of marines and our core.

e. in our corporate and > >> should those people leave? should a commendation be made? what do you do about them? >> >> as a commander, you try to accommodate all the marines. we will be as concerned about a homosexual marines as we well about any marines who feel differently about that paradigm. local commanders will be required to assist us in making sure that everyone is provided for and focus on the fight. do we have time for one more? [laughter] remove bad word"still." >> you said several times that

the birthplace of the taliban in hekamnd. that was also the birthplace of opium. pare what is the state of that now? >> it is dramatically reduced and will be further reduced in the future. when we started to deploy into helmond, we had a report on the drug trafficking between $70 million per year up to $400 million per year in terms of resources. that allows them to buy the tools of war and use them against us. we knew we had in conjunction with the afghan government attempt to beat that back. frankly, it was our perception that the farmers in and around marja gambled and lost because they put poppy in the ground at

a time when the governor told them not to do that. by the time of the harvest season, we of marja and the harvest was blighted this year and secondly, we said we would not allow people coming here to work the fields to transport the poppy and so forth. in many instances, we gave them a subsistence payments to burn their own fields. the production this year was very much disrupted. in the meantime, we know you create enemies if you take away the ability of a man to feed his family. through education and seed distribution and instruction on how to create a different crop and try to make sure the infrastructure is there at harvest time to get the crop to market because you will not have bad guys come by and pick up for you, we think we are giving them through the afghan government, i cannot overemphasize that, another way to once again be a productive

and successful farmer. russian wheat is going to be less available on the market. the pakistani wheat fields will be problematic for probably some time to come. we think the price of wheat will do pretty well in the next year or 18 months. in that regard, we could be fortunate that we can transition the afghan farmers to something other than poppy. >> what is your retirement plan? >> fishing ,huh? [laughter] i have to go, folks. thank you very much. i'm sorry? [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> starting in under 40 minutes,

the armed services suicide prevention task force will do a debriefing to release a year long sought -- report on suicide in all branches of the military. that will be live from the national press club starting at about 1:00 eastern here on c- span. until then, a segment from this morning's "washington journal." this is a emrap . "washington journal" continues. host: tom vanden brook content -- and joins us from usa today. he is here to talk about a minor resistance ambushed protected vehicles, otherwise known as an route's. -- as mrap's. the first, tell us what is an mrap, and how does it differ from the humby? guest: it is a big truck, basically, that has a v shape

cone on the bottom that deflects the blast forced from a bomb in the road. it also said about 3 feet higher, the crew capsule's it's about 3 feet higher off the road. a blast, when it happens, disobeyed pretty quickly. it makes a big difference. whereas, a humvee, about half the way to at least of an mrap, has a flat bottom and it tends to observe the blast and is that much closer to the ground as well. host: when did become apparent to the military and civilian hierarchy that they were going to need more of these mrap's in iraq and afghanistan? guest: initially it happened in 2007. we ran a story in april of 2007 in which we talk to some marines in anbar province abo the

performance of mrap's there. i was told by general allan at the time that in 300 attacks on mrap's, no rain had been killed, and that differ quite a bit from the humvees at the time. i was traveling with defense secretary gates at the time and he saw the story and took interest in its. the military advisor, then cieutenant-general peter kwel orelli also took interest in it and they began to look at the use of mrap's in the valley. there are about 10,000 of them in afghanistan right now. they are shifting more over to iraq.

about 4000 of those vehicles are specifically designed for afghanistan, called and altering mrap. host: wider than the degree reconfigured for -- why do they need to be reconfigured for afghanistan? guest: afghanistan has few paved roads and they need to have the ability to get around. having that ability allows them to be less predictable for insurgents to attack. host: we are talking about my resistance ambushed projected vehicles, otherwise known as mrap's with tom vanden brook of a and "usa today." if you'd like tget involved, please give us a call. you can also send us an e-mail or a twitter.

if you have had experience with these mrap's in iraq or against them, please give us a call. some of the specifications for both of these vehicles that were listed in a graphic that we got from the associated press, on the left, the specifications. the humvee, lord to the ground and more vulnerable -- lower to the ground and more vulnerable to bombs. these are big vehicles. they'relmost the size of tanks. guest: their big trucks and their unwieldy and that is part of a problem with -- the troops

have had with them. they're like driving a big moving truck, and that has been a bit of an issue and they can be somewhat top-heavy. there have been a number of incidents in which these things have tipped over, sometimes into canalsand soldiers have died that way. host: how many troops can you put into an mrap? guest: there are different variations that will cure or more troops, but the standard one of about four in the back and to in the front. so, six. host: and in the humby? four in the compartment and one in the gun turret. host: and what is theiles per gallon? guest: they do not like to talk about that. but it is pretty safe to say that they are guzzlers.

host: our first phone call, steve ahman of 94 republicans, go ahead. caller: i would like to know where these vehicles are assembled and where the parts come from? guest: that is a good question. there have been a number of different manufacturers over the years. the initial group came from south carolina. another built many out of mississippi. and right now, virtually all of the new one's going to afghanistan are billed by oshkosh truck. host: next up, gloucester, va. caller: i was wondering the distance they could travel on the fuel capacity they have and also, the strength of the metal that they use.

host: guest: i'm not really sure about the distance that they can avel -- guest: i'm not really sure about the distance that they can travel. they are not necessarily in entering all of that -- all that far. host: one of the graphics that we have from the associated press talks about the cost of these vehicles. it says, that cost of a humvee is roughly $150,000 per vehicle. the cost of an mrap is anywhere from a $450,000 to $1 million per vehicle. is there any thought to cutting back on the use of the mrap and going with more humvees? guest: i have not seen that at all.

$26 billion has been advocated -- allocated for them, so i do not see that happening. one thi that is happening is the -- is just a fact that it is expensive to train troops and when they die, their benefits paid out as well. this kind of ghoulish, butt is true. if you're saving lives, you are saving money as well. host: how much training did you have to go through before they put you behind the wheel? guest: i did not have any training. they just put me behind it when i was at the manufacturer. but i think it takes a couple of weeks. i just drove them domestically. it takes a little bit of time for this -- these guys to get used to it, but is pretty intuitive once you are inside. host: next up, fred on the line

for republicans. caller: what have you heard about what they're going to do with these million-dollar vehicles now that we are drawing down in iraq and not using these vehicles in afghanistan -- rather, we are using the mindy mrap's in afghanistan. guest: that is a good question. they are moving them out in some fashion so that most abubakar combat units -- so that most of the combat units are using them. itould not be a whole lot of them, but most units would have the capability. host: he used the phrase "min mrap." can you describe the difference? guest: it is the one i was

speaking about, the all terrain vehicle. it is somewhat smaller. they still has a lot more weight than a humvee and is still has that cone-shaped wholhull. next host: call from pennsylvania. caller: no price can be put on a life, and as far as these mrap's go, they have to be the most wonderful vehicle ever made so far. could not have lived without the things, i tell you what. and believe me, i spent some sleepless nights sitting inside one d i never felt safer. host: what was your expience with the mrap? were you in iraq? caller: yes, iraq and

afghanistan. we had a full-size in afghanistan as well and personally, i was never in one of the mini mrap's. host: what was it like in one of the mrap's driving around the maturing in afghanistan? caller: if you could imagine yourself being pulled across boulders -- comfort was not there, but psychologically, you cannot beat it. it raises moral and it saves human lives and you cannot put a cost on that. when a battle is being fought, soldiers need the proper equipment and this vehicle is proper equipment. too bad my father did not have it in vietnam. it would have made a helluva difference.

guest: and that is what i was going to mention, the mrap's they have been using their in afghanistan now have resulted in 30% fewer deaths this year. that could make the world a lot different to a lot of people. host: agusta, georgia, go ahead. caller: how come we are always giving a vital information on our troops? my husband is in the military and i feel that this is more of a threat to our own troops by giving all this public information. guest: i'm happy to answer that. i think most of this information is widely available, and certainly, unfortunately, insurgence know a lot re about the vulnerabilities of these vehicles than we do.

they study them all day. there is nothing that the militaryas not released about them that is not widely known already. host: the department of defense numbers, 15,327rap of vehicles were in iraq and afghanistan. tom, your on the line with tom bender burk of -- tom brook.ervander caller: i was in vietnam and i was wondering, what is the offset in the cost -- whenever after by a boost for these men because i never see them -- we never how to buy a pair of boots for these men because i never see them walking.

guest: they tually do a lot of walking. time and again, thesare a means to get soldiers to where they need to work, and a lot of that work is on foot. host: next call is from louisiana. caller: i have a question. why does the mrap not have a probe that extends 20 or 30 feet to detect when minds? guest: i'm not sure i understand the question. host: i think he was asking about why there is not a probe of fitted onto the front to detect whether there is a mine out on the road.

guest: some of these vehicles and do have controllers that they put in front of them to detonate mines before they reach them. they also have electronic deces that can prevent devices that are radio controlled from going off. host: next up on the line for republicans, brian, go-ahead. caller: dollars is going to talk about the relative performance -- i was just going to talk about the relative performance between the three vehicles. for some reason, the government of vehicles at a higher cost and a half lower performance. can you talk about that? guest: to an extent i can. on the shirt you're talking about available -- i am not sure if you are talking about the

availability for use or things like that. a roundtree dozen aid, the government made the decision thatavistar was able to produce these much more quickly. and that really drove this. the same thing with oshkosh, they were told that they could produce these vehicles at a rapid rate. that was a primary ncern, in the vehicles aren't as fast as they could. host: the defense department and chief of staff was a letter ground combat vehicle.

is it possible the ty are born to abandon the m1 for a vehicle that is closer to a tank and a truck? guest: i do not think so. i think it will continue to have tanks, or some version of that. and they were talking about a vehicle that would replace aid bradley -- replace abruptla bray with a humvee, but some the necker have a bit more harmonic. it did not -- a bit more, on it. host: any plans to put a gun

turrets or canons on these mrap's? guest:hey all have gun turrets. they're all made such trips can stay inside the vehicle and they have cameras that show them where their targets are. host: how big are the guns? guest: it depends. they can have 50 caliber machine guns or smaller. host: minneapolis, minnesota. i'm sorry, i have leveaux, texas -- the louisville, texas, robert, go ahead. i just heardreckebrook, true -- the response to the question that the military's jost asked you and i have a problem with thatype of response - that the military wife just ask you and i have a problem with that type of

response. i've spent the last 13 years working in kuwait. i have a short tour in afghanistan and are also done iraq. that information is highly dangerous. we should come up with a better response to our military wives about the security of their spouses in that particular environment. that was not good at all. guest: sir, again, i would tell you that nothing that we have reported is not information that the government hasot put out, or deems not sensitive enough to keep classified. there is nothing in the reporting that we have done that dells -- delves into classified material at all. and i would also suggest that if we have not reported about the vulnerabilities of humvees, the mrap's probably would not exist in the numbers that they do now

and savings -- that they do no and they would not have been saving lives. by any measure in this circumstance, the soldiers and troops have benefited greatly from this information. host: the infmation from the ap report in the mobility of the mrap says that if sacrifices speed and fuel consumption for the safety of having armor. cruising range is 420 miles and

top speeds are 40 to 50 miles. what is the 14 death? -- the fording death? guest: that is the problem have mentioned it with turning over in the creeks, but by and large, that is a smaller issue. host: next of compromise ohio. -- next call is from ohio. caller: i do not understand where their supplies, shoes, clothing, whatever was made with this country in a recession like this- where there supplies, shoe clothing, what ever, was

made. with this country near session like this, it seems like we should be able to do this. guest: all of these supplies and vehicles were made in the united states. south carolina, mississippi and elsewhere. host: and where the plans for more mrap's as we increase the number of troops going into afghanistan? guest: there will be 27,000 all told. there are 4000 in afghanistan and i think they're going have to about 10,000 total that will be used there. host: is it just the troops using the mrap's, or is this spirit are among coalition troops? -- is this spread out among coalition troops? est: they have been widely used. we're learning some to other countries, but as secretary

gates points out, u.s. troops needs ranked first. host: next call, michael in minneapolis, go ahead. caller: two questions. i can recall in 2004 and 2005 seeing members of the defense department driving in these vehicles. seems that the humvees or not adequate to protect soldiers. and also, it seems we have very difficult times in 2004 through 2006. what kind of thought was it -- was put to retooling general motors the way we did before?

guest: in 1994 there was a report to the army and marine cos based on their experience in somalia. that report noted that humvees could be a death trap in an attack by a mine. it goes back 16 years, basically. that volatility was known. there were requests that were made for -- that vulnerability was known. there were requests that were ine for additional mrap's 2004 and in 2005. the largest one was in 2004 by the marine corps and ty ask for hundds of these vehicles. that request languished for 15 nths. you can go back even further. the south africans and regents had this technology in the 1970's. they were fighting their own insurgency and they had raised chassies and adis holt shaped

vehicles. -- end of these hull-shaoed vehicles. is this per year or over the entire length of the mrap program? guest: no, this is per year. a lot of money -- money is being spent. $26 billion has bn spent just since 2007. host: is there any ristance in congress right now or in the questioning about how much is being spent on the mrap program, and any thought about reducing either the cost of the mra program or shifting money from another weapon system or another military program to cover the cost? guest: i think to an extent that might have already happened.

the next generation of humby is called the joint light tactical. that has been put to the forefront because demand for these is high. host: next call from georgia. caller: i'm a soldier and i served in both theaters, iraq and afghanistan. my question is, why isn't the government pushing more of matv's? it is a lighter version of the mrap. guest: that is a good question. i was on a flight in 2007 with 3 a c-17 and they had

to do refueling a couple of times to get them there. it costs something like $100 to get them to afghanistan. that is -- $100,000 to get them to afghanistan. host: tom vanden brook was previously a reporter for usa today and has also spent some time writing for the milwaukee journal and the milwaukee journal sentinel. he has been in local and state government, higher education, and the environment. his first job as a new tzipi -- newspaper reporter was with the green gate gazette. back to the phones in georgia on the line for independence. caller: mr. vanden brook, i have

to say this sudde concern course safety and security because of this information is coming from left field. i do not uerstand the connection between the two. but my main point is, i remember when they realized that the humvee was not for the adequate for what they were facing up there. there was a push for a more armored vehicle. there was, in fact, in production already -- and i think it was an israeli vehicle that have the same characteristics of the v-shaped hull. why did they take years to go to the mrap? guest: that is a great qstion and i do not think it has been fully answered yet. part of it stems from the fact that the military and civilians

here did not think we would be in iraq as long as we have been. and the thought of spending a lot of money on a vehicle for what they thought would be limited use was not very appealing. and you are right, other countries had built thesend have have been around for long time. we have used them in our own fleets, primarily for the disposing of bombs. but it was not until 2004 or 2005 that we realize they would have applications for trips across the board and not just an explosive ordnance disposal. why did not happen before, i do not think that has been answered yet. host: the caller before mentioned the letters matv's. tost: that's simply refers -- that simply refers to the mrap's in afghanistan already.

it is justhe mrap all terrain vehicle. next host: call from maryland. caller: can you hear me? c-span3 i can. -- host: i can. turn down your tv and you will not get the feedback. caller: ok. i do not understand or losses we are taking with these new strategies with these armored vehicles. i feel it is wrong. there is just no excuse for losing our people the same way, every time on a roadside bomb. they can smell as coming in those arred vehicles. -- they can smell us coming in those armed vehicles. we should be using better searching and extraction process of joy. these humvees -- we should be

using better searching and extraction processes. these humve are a waste of money. we're just telling everybody that we are coming. we should be using helicopters. i just do not understand this. both in iraq and afghanistan, it does not make sense. guest: part of the issue with counterinsurgency is that you need to get out and interact with local populations to understand what their needs are and to provide security for them. you cannot be inside a vehicle. and many times, soldiers now are dying on foot patrols. they are stepping on these bonds. there is not much you can do about that, unfortunately, except to have a hand-held mine detectors, which they are sending over a fourth of the use

of their. helicopters are a help -- which they are sending over for use over there. helicopters are held, but it is not the only way they have to get around there. host: i would imagine, given the size of these mrap's, you can hear them coming from several miles away. guest: is true. it is a big, bulky vehicle. that is not to say that a humvee is a lot quieter, but you do hear them coming. it is taking soldiers to work, basically. host: next call from massachusetts. caller: i would just like to say that these things to save military les and at the end of

the day, that is and what the job of the pentagon is. host: david, did you serve in the military? caller: i served in iraq and afghanistan. the mrap's ey're just so much better equipped. there are fewer casualties, even when you do hit roads i bombs. host: were you ever in one that hit a roadside bomb? caller: yes. host: what does that feel like? caller: it gives you a good shot, but is not devastating allied it is -- devastating like is to ra humvee. host: did it roll over or flip over? caller popped us up a little bit, but it did not hurt

anybody. host: was there damage the under kerridge? or were you able to keep driving? caller: it was inoperable after that. guest: is poetry lieutenant a couple of weeks ago who has a platoon -- by spoke to a lieutenant a couple weeks ago has a platoon near kandahar and he's -- he said that his troops walked away saying a few cusswords, but that was about it. host: once these mrap's are blown up, so to speak, how difficult is it to get them back on the roads? guest: some of them are totally destroyed. others, they can replace axles and other things and put them back into service. host: atlanta, georgia, you are

on the line with tom vanden brook. caller: my question is on the department of defense spending. according to government sources, before 9/11 there was an investigation because they could not locate $1 trillion. in a speech given by rumsfeld in 2003 after the big corporations started spending money for the military, mr. rumsfeld said that he could t locate $2.3 trillion, the department offense >> will go live to the press club this afternoon and the armed services suicide task force.

this is live coverage on c-span. >> you want to make sure we get it all on tape. following the end of the formal press conference, we will be available to take one-on-one interviews. come to the front and let us know if there is someone you want to interview and we will make that happen. thank you all for being here today and we appreciate your time. are you ready, sir? i will give them a break. [no audio] [no audio] [no audio]