happened. >> dr. priest, do you have a sense of that as the historian of this? >> deepwater role to what -- -- the blogger royalty relief was something that was under discussion at the mms in the early 1990's. it did not pass until 1995. it was sort of a victim of poor timing. i believe it was not necessary when it was passed. the boom was already on in deep water. it'd probably have an effect on sun co's decision to make larger investments, but it is hard to know cause and effect. . .

it came out on a lease by lease basis. >> we were involved in this. it provided a subsidy of 10 civilians and dollars for deepwater development. it is not clear how much it amounts to. they are not paying warrantees. it is worth tens of billions of dollars. >> we do have some more

questions of we live like to pose. and think we will lead to explore with the yeaou question. thank you very much of thing with this. >> we are going to break up until 2:55. then will be starting the next panel. >> there is more about the gulf of alaska oil spill as our special web page where you will find all of our video related to the spill and links to news articles of the. it is all that c- span.org/oilspill.

up next, the u.s. coast guard and other investigators question an executive about the gulf of mexico oil spill. it is followed by the commission on the oil spill. later, a discussion about the role of the private sector in homeland security from the heritage foundation nevada -- foundation. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >> ha there has been cherry picking going on since mid-may. i think covering this for four months now. there are not a bunch of new revelations coming out ahead.

they information came out during new orleans. it does in new orleans. right now there fine-tuning the details with answers to highly technical questions out were raised earlier in the investigation. they blame it on one another. we are getting a pretty clear narrative of bp having designed the plan and making critical decisions to skip tests and safety measures in the days and hours before the rate of live on april 25 1/2. the general narrative is of those decisions adding of to this disaster.

the lawyers for the various companies and individuals who worked on the re marinell to 90 find a husband of villains may have failed their responsibility for it a today we are focused on the boil well proven serve. it is supposed to close of the well in an emergency. a lot of questions about whether transmission failed to comply with the regulation. there may have been -- they may not have complied fully for the regulation that means a recertification every three or five years. the would have required them to bring it into stock -- dock and

disassemble it. it would have taken 90 days to do in costa lot of money. i>> the vice president for bp ws also one of the witnesses. what did he say? >> he talked mainly about his efforts to try to intervene after the explosion. he was in america. he was in america when the reagan blew on april 20. then he is in houston trying to help put together the process of sending down a remotely operated vehicles that are basically robotic submarines. he is trying to close and the blowout preventer activated there a process called "hotsta

b." described how on may 6 they discovered there have been several changes to the valves that are used to access the gop in changes to the mechanisms that close of the well. if not actual pressure the whenssure for the when they tried to activate them, they did not work. there were not activating the right set of valves for the it is a very frustrating moment for them. they had some knows they had taken at the time that displayed that emotion. this goes back to whether trans ocean was making changes to the device without the approval.

it is not know for sure whether they did it on their own or with bp's knowledge. they characterize it as being done without their approval. some lawyers from trans ocean presented it otherwise. we do not have a definitive story there. >> what comice. what can we expect the rest of the week? >> market scheduled to testify on friday. he is a bp engineer who's signed off on a well planned and testified earlier in some new information that has come to light before.

the bp vice president for the gulf of mexico was actually on board the rig when it exploded. he wishes visiting with his vip group. he was called to testify earlier in new orleans. he was only available by phone he was coordinating the relief well in houston. a lot of people are looking for it to his testimony, wondering whether he will have some revelations about why he made it on certain decisions about skipping tests and setting up the structures of the well. it increases the potential for a blowout.

natural gas shut the whole thing off. >> david hammer, thank you. >> i appreciate it. >> here is part of today's hearing where investigators questioned m.v.p.'s vice- president for do this is just under two hours. -- question bp's vice president. this is just under two hours. >> with the next witness please, state your name? would you please stand up? i want to advise you that a false statement given to an agency of the united states is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. knowing this, would you raise your right hand?

i will be representing him this morning. >> thank you for being here. >> any board of questions? penny aplysia name -- can you please state your name? >> my last name is spelled th ierens. >> thank you. >> what position do you currently hold? >> i currently hold the position of vice-president in drilling completions in operations based in london. \ >> common year said he had with

bp? >> approximately 21. >> how long did you had your current position? >> december 2009. >> what other previous jobs it to hold within bp? >> prior to this role, i was the director for the gulf of mexico. prior to that, i held numerous jobs with the bp in various locations globally. >> when were you the well director? how long? >> 2006 through 2009. >> what is your educational background? >> and i had in hnc engineering qualification in mechanical engineering. >> can you please briefly describe what your job responsibilities are as vice president for the operations? >> yes.

i'd be poured into the technology vice-president in mbp and the principal function i have is a functional role. my principal accountabilities were actually focused on several critical produce coming up in bp. i would take over the order greoup?

>> where is that? >> out of london. >> did you put it paid in the deepwater horizon bop your pension? >> yes, i did. >> while you selected? >> i was in the united states on business the previous week. >> did you head of the intervention aside for the bop stack operations? >> from bp's side, yes bu >> do you recall making a log book? >> yes, i do. >> is it the log book that you actually took? >> yes, this is my logbook.

>> just to give me an understanding of how you are communicating with people, who were you working with within transition to address the intervention? >> several people. i do not recall all of the names. >> i was really porting. out working principally with mr. don king.

>> i was aware that transition was doing that. i did not get fully involved in the end of improper for a couple of days. >> do you know what days you action got involved? >> it think it would have been around the 23rd or 24th. i have lost track of the exact time. >> i'm going to referred to in a teammate on april 25. -- referred to a note you made on april 25. do you have that in front of you?

>> i cannot find it. >> it should be tabbed for you. right there should be the first one. >> can you repeat that number? >> april 25. it should start 1415 at the time. >> that is correct. >> can you go down where it says 1500? is that correct? above that, there is a note. >> that word is sum. can you read that to me? >> this is -- there is some confusion about details from the control system. transition was aware a change

had been made in the control system and a they are trying to establish what they have got. >> from this law, any time to get updated drawings? >> yes. >> when was that?

>> i do not recall precisely. it would have been some time after ben. i do not know who brought them. >> we are talking hours? in days? at most, i think it would have been a day. >> do you think not having these updated drawings have been fed on how the response? >> i think there is a time where transition was looking for what was referred to as places of interest. there is a faster response to the operation a bit. >> how familiar are you familiarboip -- familiar are you

if bop? >> and produce a working knowledge. i am not an expert. >> do you know if there is a time stamp on how long the cutting element shear has if it comes in contact with sand? >> i do not know. >> i am going to refer to the time on the very next page. it is 1550 . employs one hour later the -- it was one hour later. can you please read the first part of the? >> his address 1550.

it is comparable to the function prevent i asked when this change happen if transition could provide drawings of the change and is told in no. i've been contacted but people who have made the change. i was told then. >> can you elaborate on what the function is? >> is actually saying st system. the function of the st lock is to provide a locking mechanism once the rounds of an actuated into a closed position.

the crack>> i saw a drawing whih reflected in initially handwritten red felt tip pen or something like that it showed overlying original drawings where the modification had been made. >> who provided you with the drawing? >> i do not know. i do recall seeing the drawing on the walls in the room. >> can you continue to read the last paragraph? >> my concern right now is that trans ocean may possibly make an

uncontrolled change locally on the rig. it does not appear at this time that they have a control process for this change on something which is critical. >> he confirmed that you still think it is a safety critical element? >> absolutely. what did you mean by "uncontrolled change." >> it is control of work. it is with the company procedure. >> with that the bp? >> this to be a transition procedure.

it took some time to understand. it had an impact on the time we had to respond to the intervention. >> when you say "took some time" can you give me a better definition of "time?" >> it may have been 12 or 24 hours. it was a considerable amount of time trying to understand what changes were being made. >> i'm going to go through a list of some possible issues and modifications they might have become aware of. i'm going to ask you about them. i'm glad to ask if you were aware about them. alecky determine the possible of that it would have on the intervention. where you aware there were any leaks? >> at what time? >> after the intervention commandeering parana -- after the intervention, during the

intervention. >> no. >> we aware of any leaking on the pot after the incident? >> no. meanwhile prior to the incident? >> no, i wasn't. >> we talked about the leak on the bop circuit. >> i was not aware of that before the incident. >> we aware of any dead man series modifications? >> no, i was not. >> were you aware that there was a conduit things which out with one made by atag? >> no, sir. >> were you aware that fail-safe kit were removed and replaced with an alternative arrangement? >> no. >> were you aware of the lower pipe was replaced with a tet-

ram? >> i was a with a change had been made sometime in the past, yes. >> with that have an impact on the intervention? >> it would not. >> real where the lower stack panel was reconfigured? >> the prior to the intervention. >> we you aware that after? >> i was made aware of it during the intervention. >> what type of panel was it? >> i do not know the type. >> were you aware that the middle pipe on the boers? was in these test ramp? >> the prior to the intervention. >> after? >> yes. >> with that have an impact on the intervention? >> yes. >> can you elaborate? >> in the instance where it being rov port is incorrectly

corrected, when you think you are operating the metal pipe ramps, the test is designed to hold prssure from the top and not the bottom. it would have a misleading impact for us, yes. >> where you made aware of any modifications to the pods defective their ability to be retrieved without intervention? >> no, i wasn't. even not confirm they did have outdated drawings. >> we have modified drawings, yes. besides have vp been made aware? where is bp made aware of all? >> who would be made aware?

>> it did was to be made aware, it to be made aware to the well team. >> would you agree that bp cannot have control over the modification? >> i do not know. >> did you know who made the modification? >> no, i did not. >> earlier, you name two

gentlemen that you worked with the the gentleman. where there any problems that they had with modifications that delayed their response? >> i do not know what problems they had. and do not know was going through their mind. >> did you work in the same room? >> we were collected in the same room. >> did you have david conversations? >> yes. >> did they discuss any problems with you? >> i do not recall. >> do you know that during the intervention the rov and a small leak on the injection port? >> no, i do not recall that. >> at any time, when you made

aware of any type of solenoid the issues on either the pods? >> and not during the intervention, no. >> were you involved with pulling the pods? i was involved with the removal, but wanted had been retrieved, i left on a break. >> have you ever visited the deepwater horizon prior? >> yes, i have. >> some of the last time you were there? >> i cannot recall the exact date. i believe it was possibly october or november time frame in 2009. >> this is the name of thing over the group in london. did you see anything that had any concerns? >> i did not take the audit

group until the march timeframe. >> when you are on the rate, did you see anything that indicated any type of concerns? >> no. >> well you -- while you were the director, when they had bop issues reported on thed daily reports, who is responsible for making the determination that the pods or equipment was functional? >> transition would be responsible for making sure that anything on behalf bop was functional. >> when they pulled the yellow pawed, did you read any report on that?

>> no, i did not. >> do you know who did? >> no, i don't. >> did anyone tell you there was a solenoid failure on the yellow pod? >> i did hear that. i do no recall where i he it. >> i'm going to refer you to some logs that bp provided to us. i think it is in front of a start with number hzn-mvi.

>> take your time. there is a section of the yellow solenoid failure. >> i'm sorry.

>> with all due respect, he had no firsthand knowledge of any issue with the yellow pods. i think there are witnesses who will testify who did that might be better to address this. >> in response, this information was gathered from bp team. i assume you have been working with. at one to notice the mayor of this document -- i want to see if he was familiar with the document. >> i went several years trying to see how to do it. i want to make sure that you

actually can see it. if there is difficult, i always carry a spare. >> you are referring here to the sixth of may. >> yes. >> i have not seen this document. >> i do not. crack>> are you still got to the intervention?

>> were you involved when they made the cut above the riser package? >> i watched that. quite the you recall what they saw? they moved it out of the plume. it appeared there were two sections of pipe. >> that the summit to what you are looking at?

>> had bp done any work? >> the engineering group were looking at the analysis of how that could be. and do not have any information. >> another has been a lot of discussion. mention the new responsibilities. had you ever looked at the rate audit prior? >> no. >> were you made aware of this? >> >> i do recall seeing a note

in 2009 the mentioned below. >> why you were the director, did anyone indicate to you that the staff was not in compliance with the regulations? >> i do not recall. >> did you note any problems that might have future concerns with? do you have any faith in it? >> that is a very broad question. >> do you have any faith? you think it is a reliable source.

>> yes, i do. >> how many have you been on the floor? >> i do not recall exactly. i know it is a least one prior to this. >> where was that? >> the gulf of mexico. it would have been around 2003. i cannot recall exactly. >> it was successful? >> yes, it was very successful. >> you and i were together for 10 days.

>> good morning. >> [inaudible] i ends today as he to answer as the -- i ask you to answer from the perspective of the bp and the perspective of being with your years of experience in the oil and gas industry as a senior statement. -- statement.

i'm asking for your opinion on some things. you do not have to speculate. you can make a recommendation to the best of your knowledge possible. i would appreciate it. >> have you been following the investigation pretty closely and turns a transcript? there is progress. >> i've not been following the investigation. >> i will provide you some information that have been presented at the hearings. he had se>> if you have knowled,

please, let me know. for you aware of the march 23, 2005 explosion occurred at the bp texas city refinery? >> i am aware. >> were there any lessons learned for bp after that incident? >> i believe there were lessons learned, yes. >> what were those? >> i do not recall. >> the note would bp did with those lessons learned? >> i cannot remember. >> in 1999, this involved bp. the crew experienced in your well blowout.

how far [inaudible] >> i was aware of that instant. >> what lessons learned came out? >> i did not see it. >> was there an investigation? >> i believe there was. i do not know who ran the investigation. >> you are not aware of any lesson learned? >> i do not recall. >> so any action that bp to ooko improve the effectiveness, you are not aware of it? >> i am not aware specifically. >> you been in the industry for

a long time. there is a disaster in 1998. did you did are you familiar? >> i recall that incident. >> what your member the details? >> i didn't remember anything. >> what if i tell you that there was a ghastly that cause an explosion killed 167 people? did that refresh your mind? >> what i see as the previous

casualty. the guerrillas set out in my mind a lot of things were identified i 1998 [inaudible] let me run through some of these items here.

you understand what we call the safety net, and do not you? >> i have not. >> in terms of rules of a various entity. half year never heard of that? >> i do not know that phrase. >> within the safety net, there are different in ditties with different responsibilities. they have different trees bonds abilities in insuring the safety of the vessels. >> let me go first into the response aspect. yesterday, we receive testimony from the rig manager for the deepwater horizon. later on, we received testimony from mr. john winslow.

>> he said no. i think this is an area that it

to be looked at in terms of fellini to do anything to enhance it. you operate in the gulf of mexico. >> there is the characterization that mr. winslow's testimony is that he ordered the captain to do what ever it was. >> that was a long question. your recollection is undoubtedly better than mine. we can do this on this. we will be satisfied. >> i think the captain morning to set the setting for the audience for th. the real question is a forward- looking recommendation. >> i appreciate that.

i would snojust note that his aa of testimony that was identified in the area for which she was prepared is the bop intervention. i understand your question, but that is the area of his concentration. >> i understand that. he has extensive experience in the oil and gas industry. i would think that he is the senior statesman for the industry. >> i am sure you he is a qualified person in his field. more than qualified. a senior spokesperson is a heavy burden to carry. >> theories of what i am telling you is there is some confusion

that i can see here in turn and coordination. do you have any recommendations in terms of improvements for drilling for exploration? to you have any recommendations? >> it is not my field of expertise. i am not capable of forming an opinion of that. >> had ever served as in oim aboard a vessel engaged in drilling operations? >> no, i have never done that. fif>> i will continue. in terms of search and rescue,

there was an office supply vessel. were you aware of that? >> no. >> it has taken the ability of rescuing crafts. it was very critical in rescuing survivors. one of the questions i asked today about the recommendation to have a standby vessel for a motive in gauging during operation, [unintelligible] it is not a requirement right now the mr. winslow said no. they have a lifeboat could if -- lifeboats.

ben >on board the vessel, it isa three legged stool. you have the master, manager, and the well site leader. those three people are supposed to make decisions. are you aware of that arrangement? >> i am not aware of the arrangements that were in place on the horizon with regard to this. >> i understand it is pretty much the standard on all engagements. it is not just the deepwater horizon. >> although i am the well site leader, it sounds like part of

the compliment of the vessel, yes. >> it is not a bp vessel? what i'm sorry. at that you were referring to mobile drilling units. >> you are the vp for drilling and completion for bp and you do not know the chains of command aboard a vessel in case in this activity? >> i do not know the chain of command of board precisely the vessels. >> any vessel operated by bp? >> i do not know of the tin

command is a navy vessel. i believe the oim is in charge of a bp drexel -- vessel. >> what you mean by a bp vessel? >> you refer to thunder course. does the he have any vessels? >> not that i am aware of. four vessels operating, the deep water horizon is a vessel. who should be in charge? cle>> i hate to be defending a p

witness, but [inaudible] i do not think this is bible information. >> the board has some for the we have lived to each witness to see if they have any recommendations to make things safer. it would be great if your experience have let you. we do not want to experience the benefit of your knowledge. i think the board members fill

it is our duty that we have for the thing recommendations if they have any. this is not a test. he did not have to answer. if you have an opinion, we would welcome on the deepwater horizon, being oim is in charge from what we understand. for you aware? >> i am not absolutely eschesuro is in command. >> give a cruise director in charge of entertainment for their energy entertainment.

>> of expected capt. to be in charge. >> does it make sense for the deepwater horizon to have a single person in charge evelyn to in the hood is? >> i do not know. -- in charge to know who it is? >> i do not know. >> do you have an opinion? >> i do not have an opinion. >> how much knowledge do you have in regard to international regulations governing? >> i do not have knowledge of that.

who in bp at your level would have knowledge and maritime operations including international regulations that limit -- regulations? >> i do not know. >> is bp a growing company? there is very little attention paid. >> there are stovepipes aboard

in terms of the system. on the company side, you have the stovepipes with the marine system. i do not see how everything is coordinated. that is why my questions have to be received a management assistant for the is to be the framework that everything is tied into. the system identifies one person in charge that is accountable and responsible for upgrading the vessel. it seems to me that not everything is focusing on drilling here. especially when we go into the emergency situations. it makes it difficult to do have an effective response. you say you are out there.

the things you would not know anything about. it seems that and not a lot of things are very well coordinated. . .

>> i am not trying to nail down here is responsible for what. it is a conversation between you and die. i am not holding you accountable for your answer here. but that is what i am seeing. >> i would like to respond. there is a lot of data that is yet to be understood, how this whole event occurred, which has to incorporate everything that has to do with the technical side, the drilling side, for the marine side, who does what, who responds to whom, who takes what responsibility. i think that is the time you can really understand what happened with regard to accountability. i do not have data of that

nature. and i also do not have a thorough understanding of the chain of command it through the sequence of the bands. i do not have an opinion on that. >> yes, sir. i appreciate that. since you are involved in the oil industry for a long time, that is why i am asking you for your opinion. if i am asking the ceo of transocean and he is giving me the same answer you are telling me, and i am getting the same answer, that is not a good thing. somebody has to be in charge here. somebody has to have an overall picture of what is going on, not only in the vessel, but all whole company operations in the industry. i just do not have that clear a picture in my mind of who that is right now. that is why i am trying to ask you your opinion.

that is why i am trying to bring it back to the piper alpha incident, 22 years ago. it is something that people say this catastrophe happens every 20 years or something like that. history,n't learn from you repeat -- or what ever the phrase is. that is what i am seeing. a lot of what is identified 20 years ago is happening right here. i prefaced before i question to is that what i am looking at you as a senior statesman for the industry to tell me your opinion on things we can improve and things that we can prevent something like this from happening again. this is simply a conversation between you and i.

not asking you who did what -- it is not that. >> [inaudible] ased on the board's classification -- and i think he is happy to answer all questions related to that, things that were his direct involvement. unfortunately, he does not have all the facts related to it. >> yes, ma'am. i understand that. that is one item we identified. it does not restrict the board from exploring questions. >> understood, but these arc -- some of these things i think mr. harry thierens expressed he does not know. >> i appreciate that, ma'am. >> any other board questions?

>> [inaudible] -- from the mms? >> i don't recall. >> when you were the director of the wells in the gulf of mexico, did you receive engineering bulletin's from cameron? >> i don't recall. >> did you review the audits for bp? >> no. >> so the rig you were responsible for you never reviewed any type of audits or bulletins or safety alerts from anyone? >> not that i can recall. >> any other board questions? >> mr. harry thierens, as the

wells director for the gulf of mexico from 2006-2009, what were your areas of responsibility? >> i managed the engineering and operations group in the gulf of mexico, and those duties changed in that period of time. when i first came, the engineering and operations groups were dedicated to individual assets in the company. the long-term goal was to pull those together into a centralized group, which is where we finished up. >> you had engineering and operations? >> correct. >> just to make sure i understand -- so it was part of that -- who withini tha that grp

working for you reduce the operational aspects such asri rg audits, notice to lessees, bulletins, who handles that within your group? >> with regards to audits, they are managed through the wells teams, the operations teams. with regard to notice to lessees, i don't know. and with regard to industry bulletins, i am not sure who they would be addressed to. >> have you ever seen an notice to lessee? >> i do not recall seeing one. . >> not in the three years that you worked in the gulf of mexico? >> i do not recall. >> you were the walls director

and you are currently the vbp -- for operations. in those roles, how did you ensure the people answering to you are actually doing their job if you are not doing spot checks are having some type of accountability to make sure they are doing what you pay them to do. >> we would check with people what they are doing, but this would go down to the chain of command. so i would not necessarily go direct to a single person. i may go to a manager, are we on track? are things going ok? are we managing the way things should be? >> one more question. as the wall director of the gulf of mexico, were you responsible for specific projects? >> no. >> did you normally have an a projectraction in

like this one? is a typical for bp to have approval come from anadarco? >> i would not be involved in that work. >> any other board questions? >> thank you, a judge. i represent the republic of the marshall islands. i have just a few questions for you please, sir. you testified in response to the questions from mr. matthews that as you were involved in the intervention activities you came to learn that there had been some changes made in the

bop, but that it appeared to you that there had not been a management of change procedure within transocean with respect to the safety critical equipment. i understand said testimony correctly, sir? >> yes. to be precise, what i said was my concern right know is that transocean made possibly an uncontrolled change. >> i want to explore that we do a little bit. you testified that you were working with mr. stringfellow, mr. hand, and mr. schultze from transocean. >> amongst others. >> did you discuss that issue with any of those three individuals, whether or not transocean had an mrc procedure?

was that a topic of conversation with any of those three individuals? >> i do not recall exactly the conversation. i recorded what i heard from mr. hand at the time. >> did mr. hand tell you what you had recorded their? wamr. handset told m told me te s a change made a couple months ago. >> to explore with him whether or not the company had a procedure for managing that kind of change? >> no, i did not. >> in your capacity as director for dnc ops and specifically

with regard to your experience in the gulf of mexico, do you have knowledge or oversight as to the activities and procedures that are involved in the temporary abandonment of wells? >> i am not involved in the detail of that. i do understand what temporary abandonment of a well means, yes. >> do you have knowledge of what tests and activities are required before a well can be safely, temporarily abandon it? >> no. >> i have nothing further. thank you. >> do you have any questions? >> bp? >> yes, thank you.

good morning. on behalf of bp. may i procede? thank you. good morning. what is your current job title? president fore- drilling and completions operation. >> where are you currently based? >> london. >> to you have any current responsibility for drilling and completions operations for the gulf of mexico? >> no. >> so when you were asked questions regarding your

involvement in drilling incompletions operations with respect to the gulf of mexico, you have no responsibilities in the gulf of mexico currently, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> have you ever held the position of director of drilling and completions operations for the gulf of mexico? >> yes, i have. >> and when were you involved with gulf of mexico operations? >> between 2006 and 2009. >> now, with respect to your involvement in the lacanodo well, you were asked about a rig audit. are you a marine authority? >> no, i am not. >> are you a professional manner. >> no. -- are you a professional mariner? >> no. >> are you personally involved

in conducting e rithe rig auditn the deepwater horizon in september, 2009? >> no. >> who with in the gulf of mexico operations had responsibility with respect to monitoring or following the september, 2009, a rig audit. >> that is the responsibility of the team leader associated with the vessel. >> did you have any responsibility associated with monitoring that 2009 audit? >> no. >> yesterday we heard testimony from mr cramond, who was the marine authority in 2009. did he report to you? >> he does not report to me. >> and did he report to you in

connection with the 2009 rig audit? >> no. >> i want to turn to discussing your involvement with the post- incident intervention efforts. when did you first become involved with the post-incident intervention? >> i received a call or a text in the early hours of the 21st of april informing me that there was an incident on the deepwater horizon and there were not a lot of details available. >> and where were you physically located, which country were you and, since you are normally based in london? >> i was in the united states, in houston. >> was it a mere coincidence that you were in the states when

this incident took place and they were asked to become involved as a result of that? >> yes. >> could you describe for as a generally what you're involved post-incident was specific to the bop? >> yes, i can. there was a lot of confusion and a lot of activity in the first couple of days of my involvement. i stepped up to help with putting together a resource- loaded plan that would help us move forward. so the first few days, i was not directly associated with the bop. i was associated with putting teams together with regard to relief well response, with regard to contain, etc.

so i had some knowledge of what was going on during the early days, but not first hand knowledge. call then't re date, but i was then asked, ok, we need to get focused on how we respond. i was then told, your duties are to work with the team, the combined response team on the bop. that would be around the 23rd or the 24. >> when you state the combined response team, what team that you refer to? >> the combined team are referred to is transocean who were leading the response. cameron, companies like oceaneering that could be involved with above bop

response. >> the team you worked with was that -- was that a team comprised of members from different companies including cameron, transocean and others? >> yes. >> what were your duties in connection with that response team? >> transocean had an outline plan going forward, and one of the first things we had to do a combined plan for which was agreeable with us, with transocean, and unified command, and mms and coast guard. when my first duties was to do an outline plan. i do recall discussing some of that with mr. carroll and the coast guard. and then we would put that forward for approval, as a work plan, and we would agree that that would be our work plan so

that we could plan ahead to come up with the right response and the right tools. >> so what was the purpose of that team and you were working on -- to understand what had happened with the bop or to understand going for what could be done with the bop? >> the purpose of the team was to close the bop. >> in connection with the work that you did for the purpose of deciding how to close the bop, did you come to learn of various changes that had occurred to the bop? >> yes. >> could you tell us what some of the modifications were that you learned about? >> well, early on, there was an

inability to close the bop with the rov functions, and it was not fully understood what it could not occur. there was speculation it may be leaks, something else, but it was important to establish why we could not create sufficient pressure in the system. and it was during the process of looking to establish what the problem was that we discovered a leak. >> what leaks was it? >> if i recall, the leak was in the vicinity of the blind sheer round of shuttle. it was a connection on one of the control lines. >> who was it that discovered the leak? >> deepwater hotransocean were g the work, and it wasn't until we

installed a bladder on the seabed, which is a reservoir, with dye, then we could pull it slid through the control system and observed where it may be leaking -- pump it through the control system and observe word could be leaking. -- where it could be leaking. >> did transocean indicate if they were aware of that leak prior to this incident? >> no. >> do you know whether they were aware of that week prior to this incident? >> that calls for speculation. hearsay. >> you can ask if he knows. tellf he knows, he can us. >> i can clarify.

the first time i asked if transocean knew. now i want to know if he knows if transocean knew of that leak. >> i do not know. >> fair enough. >> were there any other modifications identified as a result of the work that you did post-incident? > i don't recall any further modifications to the control system during that, but it was highlighted to us near the end of the bop intervention work that one of the rov function lines from the panel which we assumed was to the metal pipe ground was to the lower round, a test round. >> mr. harry thierens, did you

take notes of your observations as you're going to use different process these? >> yes, i did. >> and did you create logs of what you were observing as you were going through these steps? >> to the best of my ability. >> let me give you a notebook. i apologize. i handed them out, but i do not think i gave one to the witness. aside.uld just steop if i can approach? thank you. mr. theirens, i have handed you a notebook with the various logs.

if you could tell us whether these are the logs you created as a result of your post- incident intervention efforts. while you are looking at them, i will identify them for the record -- they are three logs. -- 137274 through 303. 4/22. a log dated the second is a log dated 4/28. bph znmbi 00171039 through 1063. and then there is a log dated may 1st. bphznmbi 00171007 through 038.

do you have those logs? >> yes, i do. these are my logs. >> we will not go through all of them, but to be clear, for the record, are these notes you created it while you were involved in this effort? >> yes, they are. they are notes i created but in ed notes s i 8 added notaddded that were handed to me. all the handwritten notes are mine. >> you are talking about learning about plumbing, do you recall that? >> yes. >> if you will turn to the third tab, the log dated may 1st.

that is my second tab. >> sorry. the page ending 1028. >> yes, i have that. >> could you read for us what you noted in connection with the plumbing of the test ram in you r log book, beginngiing with "stat". >> "on the middle pipe rams is beings plumbed for --" >> is 13:50 the time? >> it must have been? >> do you know that date? >> i don't recall exactly. that was the date there.

maybe the 3rd? i don't know. >> sometime around may 1? >> probably. >> "that stab in on the middle pipe rounds -- and that was a statement we received from mr. ray picard who was from transocean. >> it was mr. picard who notify you that the npr was for the test ram and not for the mp. r. >> he did not notify me personally. he was called into the room and we had open communications. was made it werehaaware that e discovered this, but he wanted

confirmation. >> what does it mean to stab into npr? >> you have to realize that when things are moving dynamically, you put down a note to the best of your ability. the stab in port for the rov panel has been plumbed for the test rounds. >> so the plumbing that should have been in a metal pipe ram was in the test ram? >> yes. it says pipe rams on the rov panel. our assumption all along was that plumbing was to the metal pipe ram. >> is the test ram a ram that is capable of activating in order to assist with a well controlled event? >> no.

it does not hold pressure from below. >> so if the plumbing is to the test ram rather than the vvr, what effect does that have on the upper ability of the bop for purposes of activating and well controlled event? >> it would mean that the pipe rams could not be closed. the test ram would close in an emergency, but it would not be capable of withstanding pressure from below. >> continue reading your notes, please. >> "met immediately with steve hand, robert white, transocean, lawrence, who i believe was transocean, and coastguard,

chris martin. we also have present then -- jose and frank. jose santos had -- was there from petrobras assisting us. and frank gillander was in a similar way in giving whatever assistance chevron could. and we met immediately, because -- and i do recall it was a significant event. there's a lot of commotion in the room at that time. we have come a long way. to find something like this was quite emotional. so we met, and i spoke frankly about the seriousness of this. and i was frankly astonished that this could happen. >> is that what you noted in your notes?

spoke frankly about the seriousness -- >> yes. it says i spoke frankly about the seriousness of this issue, and quite frankly was astonished that this could have happened. i told transocean to get photographs. to get with their subsea engineers and to understand what has gone wrong. when i heard this news, i lost all faith in the bop. billy stringfellow, clearly emotional at that point, told me, this is plumbed wrong. >> and to be clear, who is mr. stringfellow? >> mr. stringfellow was transocean's subsea superintendent who is effectively leading the operational side of the bop stack intervention. >> you have the words "--

billy stringfellow told me, "this stack is plumbed wrong." why quotes? >> this was something i heard police sbilly say. >> did the fact that the plumbing on the bore rams was mistaken, they appeared to be plumbed it to the test ram, did that have any affect on the -- >> i would object. that is mistaken. this witness is involved in intervention, it only served a purpose of promote a closing the bop after a blowout. and what was a known, what was

ordered, what bp and transocean did prior to the casualty is not within the realm of this witness's knowledge and should not be in testimony. whether he was mistaken or not it's a mischaracterization. >> two things. as we all know, what one of the attorneys says in a question for is not really evidence. however, your objection is well- taken. without necessarily its forbidding any motive for or historical knowledge -- without necessarily in attributing any motive or historical knowledge, could you get to the conditions and the impact of the conditions, then he can answer the questions without including any speculation as to cause of it that others might dispute. >> certainly. >> thank you per >> does the fact that the mpr had been plumbed to the test ram and not

to the middle pipe ram, did that have any effect on the intervention efforts? >> yes. >> what effect did it have? >> we did not agree to a program to try to close the metal pipe rams. we got to this point in the program and we found all of our efforts to do that had actually been directed to a different set of rams. >> and did mr. stringfellow said it was in his view -- this had been plumbed wrong? >> yes. >> mr. thierens, were there other modifications you identified during the course of your intervention efforts? >> and no. >> now, you referrenced a drawing you saw for the bop, is

that correct? could you repeat the question? >> you had asked for a drawing of the bop. >> that's correct. i did not receive it. it was on the wall in the room. >> were there any markings on that drawing, as best you can recall? >> yes, there were. >> can you describe what those markings work? >> not precisely, but there had been some red lines put on the drawing which were indicating that this was a new route for pipe work. bop not an expert on th piping systems, but there were

some red line drawings overlaid on the drawing. >> to you know whether those red markings were intended to denote the difference between the bop as built versus the condition were finding it in the intervention? >> as a recall, i recall seeing a as-built diagram for the bop. there were some modifications made to the drawing. lasterter, i would see another drawing which brought more clarity to that. >> do you know what the purpose of the later drawing was? >> i don't know. it was highlighting and a more specific way the findings that transocean had. >> did you make any of those

ridings or were those made by others? >> there were made by others. >> do you know who made those writings? where was it posted? >> it was posted on the wall in the operations room. >> at whose offices was this drawing was marked up? >> it was not place in an office. it was placed in a room on the third floor and the incident command center. >> fair enough. discuss modification you identified. i think you also discussed leaks discovered during the course of this incident. were you aware of any of those prior to this incident? >> no. >> i have nothing further.

thank you 3 >> thank you. >> transocean? >> thank you. good morning. i represent transocean in this litigation or before the board. >> good morning. >> as i understand, sir, your first involvement with regard to this bop was after this casualty. >> that's correct records for purposes of the introduction? >> that is correct. >> did you review the may news records of thistenance

bop? did you interview any bp witnesses about their satisfaction? and had you for any reason seen the bop prior to the casualty? if you did, you don't remember. it was incidental. >> if i had seen it, it would have banned it sometime in the past when i visited the rig. >> i take it you have no comment regarding the fund sodalifunctionality of the bop r to the incident? >> no. >> you did not undertake to determine why if any modifications were made, the new, for what purpose, any of that?

>> my job was to expedite with transocean the close of the bop. i did not have time or desire to do that. >> i understand. would you take a look at page that she directed to you in her tab two? i hope you will find it ands spare -- >> i have that. >> i'm curious. is the handwriting on this page yours? >> yes. >> is all of it yours? parte directive - you -- the to be a it papearappears

different style in handwriting. writing.is my rid sometimes i write in capitals and sometimes in free hand. >> ok. with regard to your writing at the top of the page, as i understand this is a product of the notes you made with mr. picard. do you agree? >> that's correct. it's a record of what i heard in the transcript from our conversation. >> mr. picard wanted confirmation of this? >> he identified this as an issue, and if i recall, we asked at that time for cameron to

step into the room and look at the rov pictures and confirm if that was correct. >> and the test rams to which your comment refers, i believe you testified were not used for well control. that is not the function of those rams. >> their function was for testing the bop. >> ok. at this point, you were -- your goal, the mission for which you were assigned here was to see if he could get the bop closed, and you were trying to do that by stabbing from an rov. >> for the purpose of trying to close the piper rams, that is correct. >> the scope of your study was not to determine whether any of these pipe rams, the test rams,

could still be closed from any of the bop panels on the deepwater horizon. rather, your determination was simply that you had difficulty closing them by stabbing from an rov. is that correct? >> i do not understand your question. could you repeat it, please? >> mr. picard did not comment, and your group did not study whether the test ram could be closed from any of the bop panels on the rig in the normal course of operation? >> i do not know. >> all this simply relates to your task of the rov intervention while after the casualty? >> yes. all of my task was after the

casualty, yes. >> were there other rams your team sought to close by stabbing from the rov which did not have any plumbing issues? >> no. >> make sure we are not missing a connection -- were there other rams that to not have any plumbing issues? >> if i understand your question, if there other rams that could be closed from the rov that did not have plumbing issues? my answer is no. >> do you agree with me that the plumbing issue was only raised with regard to the test rams? >> that's correct. >> how many days did it take bp to shudder this well. >tter this well.

>> we worked on it about 12 days and we did not shut the well in. >> how many days did it take to get to where we are now in the control of this well, with the subsequent modifications? 90? 100? >> i do not know exactly. you have to look back from the 21st of april. >> thank you. as i understand, the time it took for you to get modified drawings was a day. >> approximately. i do not recall exactly. >> that is what you said under direct examination. he said with respect to getting a modified drawings, you got them in a day. >> it was about a day, yes. >> ok. and the time it took to

understand what mr picard raised took, and i understood you to this indirect, was between 12 and 24 hours? >> i don't recollect that. you are referring now to the test ram? >> yes. the drawing you saw, the concern you raised. i understand it took approximately 12-24 hours per >> cannot clarify? -- can i clarify? that was regarding the leak and the control changes associated with the st lock system. they are not associated with the plumbing for the test ram. >> i would like to focus on whatever delayed this must have resulted in, and ask you are we talking about a day and a half

to two day delay? the delays the items may have caused when you testified. i may have got it wrong. i thought you said it today to get modified drawings provided to you. and 12 to 24 hours to do something else. >> maybe i can clarify. was about a day before the during arrived. i do not know exactly. this was early on. the time that transocean had taken to understand what possible changes had been made to the control system when we were looking for the leak to somewhere between 12 and 24 hours to serve a that portion of the bop. that work is not connected to the issue here that we found

later, which was the lower pipe ram. >> i may have missed characterized the work. what i am trying to get to is the delays you are talking about. 12 to 24 hours to arrive at the understanding on the other item. >> no. 24 hours was the time taken to understand the leak on the first round. >> were there a lot of people involved in this intervention project? q>> yes. >> did bp ever commissioned a critical path analysis to determine whether this one and a half to two day delay or items caused any real delay in this project? >> i do not know.

>> you have never studied that? >> i have not heard >> and you did not know if any of the other tasks undertaken by the teams would have caused delays at that time anyway? >> i did not recall. >> thank you, sir. that is all i have. >> thank you. >> next we have anadarco. >> good morning. i represent anadarco. on our witness list, which means you, we have you identified as executive vice president of the

drilling and completion operations. is that right? >> no. >> so there is no executive in front of a vice president? >> no. >> now, is there a region you are responsible for? >> no. >> let me give an example. i am just trying to understand how the bp organization is set up. we have coming to testify before us as well pat o'brien, also is a vice president of drilling and operations -- drilling and completions. what is your relationship to him? are you co-equals? >> clearly we know each other, but pat o'brien is vice- president in this particular business unit for drilling and operations in its entirety. in the same way that we have vice-president for drilling and operations in the north sea or

in gold or other countries. my role is a functional role, not a line role. so i am not accountable through the line for any operations that have taken place within bp. that is the accountability of the incumbent vice presidents for that particular area. >> right. did i hear you say you have a function that is development of best practices? >> no, i did not say that heard >> do you have that function? >> the purpose of the function in bp is to ensure that across the business in the segment -- our particular area -- that we are managing our operations in accordance with the functional agenda. >> "with the functional agenda."

what you mean? >> when you look at strategy, technology, are we doing things for the common good? do we manage people and places at the right time? can we ensure that people go prepared? >> do you, in the course of managing under the functional agenda, attempt to impose some uniformity in practice across the organization? >> bp has a set of standards for many parts of the drilling and completions function. and the expectation is that people work to those standards globally, yeah. so we -- part of our role is to ensure that people are

adequately provided with an adequate prepared for their operations. >> in the course of being adequately prepared for the operation, for instance, the drilling and temporary abandonment of the macando well, is it the best practice to ensure that the procedures are written in advance of their actual implementation? >> i do not know. >> let me give you an example. a negative test. is it a bp breasest practice to ensure that there is a test written before the time it is to be conducted? >> i do not know. >> does bp endorse a doing a negative test on the, flig makig fly, making it up as you go along?

>> objection. >> if you want to clarify again what you mean on the fly? >> do you have any knowledge of this area at all? >> no, i do not. >> you do not know about-testing procedures? >> no. >> do you know what procedures are uniform in the context of drilling and exploration well? >> only a very high level with regards to policies, etc. with regard to the design and drilling of a specific well, no. >> please give me an example. >> bp has a policy procedure within the company, which covers a range of expectations around well designed. >> and when you say expectations of around it will design are

those expectations regarding safety? >> they incorporate safety. >> today incorporate cost efficiency? -- do they incorporate cost efficiency? >> i do not recall. >> what do they incorporate? >> i do not recall the entirety of policies and procedures. >> did you have any part in developing those? >> no, i did not. >> do you know as well site leaders are giving broad discretion to participate in the development of, for instance, cementing procedures while on the rig? >> i do not know. >> you just do not know at the level of what is conducting on the rig, you are not aware of what those procedures are? >> that is not my job. i do not know. >> no further questions. thank you. honor,uestions, your thank you. >> cameron?

>> good morning. my name is david jones and i represent camera. on. you mentioned leaks observed during your intervention efforts. were those leaks you saw on couplings on hose lines? >> not all of the leaks were on hose lines. >> where were they? >> we observed one leak on a solid hose coupling at the st locke area of the blind sheer rams. we observed another leak --

it was a plug of some sort that was attached to a surge bottle. and other leaks we found were associated with hose couplings. >> very good. the test ram, pipe ram plumbing issue. do you know how the stack was plump when it was delivered in 2001? >> no. >> when a stack was delivered in 2001, the lower pipe ram was not -- >> i do not know how it was configured in 2001. >> you do not know if there was a change between 2001 and april, 2006? >> i heard there was a change made some time, perhaps 2004.

>> do you know how those changes were made, mechanically how he would switch uplight bram inta ? >> no. >> do you know if there were any plumbing changes that were done at that time, at the conversion? >> i don't. when that occurred, in 2004, i was not involved in the gulf of mexico. >> i assume he did not know if any plumbing changes were made? >> i do not know anything about that. >> when there's a discussion about this? being plumbed wrong, i want to be clear that you were not -- this stack being plubmembed wro, i want to be clear that you were not -- >> there is no suggestion of what the status of the stack was when it was delivered by cameron. >> that's all i had. >> it has been a couple of hours

now. we appreciate your patience. we want to take about a 10 minute break. we will reconvene at 10:45. >> ok. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] coming up next, a commission on the deepwater horizon oil spill. later, a discussion about the role of the private sector in homeland security at the heritage foundation. tomorrow on "washington journal," a look get the economy with a bloomberg "business week" writer, roben farzad.

we will also talk about military personnel policy. "washington journal" is live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. following the bp deepwater horizon oil spill in the gulf of mexico, cult -- president obama created a commission to see how the spill happened. in this part of today's hearing, the question executives from bp and shell as well as the president of the world wildlife fund. this is 1.5 hours. >> i will be helping to guide

us through the hearing date to date. i would like to familiarize everyone but the safety features of this building. to your left -- my left into your right, in the back of the room you will see two exits. if there is an emergency, please file to one of those taxes. you will see all way that goes to the back and a stairway will take you outside this building and to safety. that is in case of an emergency. the person who established this bipartisan commission to examine the root causes of the bp deepwater horizon oil disaster and provide recommendations on preventing future disasters and mitigate their impact should they occur. the president appointed two cochairs to lead this commission, bob graham from

florida and william reilly who led the environmental protection agency under president george w. bush. it is rounded out by five other distinguished americans to work but -- selected on their scientific, legal, and engineering expertise and their knowledge of issues pertaining to offshore operations. they include the president of the natural resources defense council, the president of the university of maryland's center for environmental silence, the executive vice president and the national geographic society, the dean of the harvard school of engineering and applied sciences, and the chancellor of the university of alaska anchorage. this committee is kemp -- this commission is conducting its work in openness and transparency. as such, today's hearings are being held in a public forum and

are being broadcast live by video feed. before and this over to our distinguished cochairs, i like to provide quick summary. our first panel will cover the history and expansion of offshore drilling and we will hear from panelists from shell as portion of productions and the world life -- wildlife fund. our next panel covers existing regulatory structure and agency roles with the council of and our mental quality and the national oceanic and atmospheric association. we will break for lunch and then we will reconvene at 1:30 p.m. with a panel on meeting the regulatory challenge. it will feature panels from the university of easton and directors from the materials management service. our final panel will cover managing risk and will feature panelist from the institute for

nuclear power operations and the allied industrial and service workers international union. we will conclude with public comments at 4:30 p.m. that will stop at 5:25 p.m.. any member of the public who wishes to submit a written comment to the commission may do so by the website. oilspillcommission.gov. we have many witnesses so we asked all panelists to keep to your time limits. there will be a timekeeper right here in front of you who will help to keep you on track and we want to make sure that we dedicate as much time as possible to the question and answer period which will be run by our co-chairman. at this point of light and the

floor over to our co-chairman, bob graham and -- bob graham and william reilly. >> thank you very much, chris. last month we began our journey in new orleans where we learned firsthand from the people of the gulf about the impact the spill was taking on their lives. we'reay we're -- today trying to understand the root causes and the critical question of whether our regulatory system and business practices are adequate. adequate. we will be hearing from a distinguished group from past, and present government officials as well as experts from private indust, academia, and nonprofit organizations. deep water drilling is a new frontier for energy exploration. some statistics tell the story. in 1990, wells deeper than 1,000 feet accountedor just 4% of

total gulf of mexico oil production. in 2009, that figure was 80%. and we're going deeper. in the past five years, the share of the gold production from altered deep wells, well's deeper than 5,000 feet, climbed from 1% to 32%. but altman played deep water drilling has special risk including that which appears to have been the primary cause of the deepwater horizon tragedy. an uncontrolled blowout. these risks were there to be seen but were largely unprepared for or ignored by both government and dustry. we want to know why. it is clear that the move could deepwater represents an enormous change in u.s. energy exploration. unfortunately our government and industry did not undergo a similar transformation in its

regulatory, safety, and response focus. we need such a shift now, and today we will be hearing information to guide our thinking about what it should be. many of the causes of this disaster go back decades, and are attributable aoss the spectrum to government,o industry, to the white hse, congress, to replicans, to democrats. we should be clear -- this disaster represents an enormous and shared failure of public policy. we are holding all responsible polyps -- all responsible parties to account, not so that we can play a blame game, but because we must diagnose what happened. what was the course of progress of this policy collapse before incredibly prescribe new direction for the future? i think our speakers in advance

for taking the time to contribute to our effort to understand what went wrong and what can we learn from it. my colleague and co-chair, mr. bill reilly. >> good morning. the consequences play out over a long time, often in unexpected ways. some issues undoubtably will turn out to be less severe than we had feared, and others may be worse than we had imagined. even if it is too soon to spell out the full impact on the gulf, we do recognize the immense human and economic costs that have already been experience 11 lives were lost and many more were injured.

billions have been lost an tourism, fishing, oil revenues, and other elements of the gulf and economy. the psychological impact on the people in the region already traumatized by katrina and other pressures has been notable, as we saw and heard in our visits to the gulf. the continuing moratorium on deepwater drilling is taking its toll as we heard repeatedly in new orleans. before april, many of us were under the impression that the risk of an accident like this were small. that view has been shattered. what we do not yet know is whether the accident was the result of one company's missteps, bad judgment and human error in management of complex drilling technology, or whether it was caused by something more systemic in the way that the country and industry has sought

to cap -- tap these deep water oil well reserves. these impacts have been profound. we do know that we must seriously rethink how we regulate offshore drilling and how the industry meets its safety responsibilities. it would seem in everyone's interest when dealing -- when drilling that every operation is run in accordance with world- class standards with agreed upon best practices. the government has to take a leak in ensuring this. the industry has a critical part to play as well. today we will hear about an industry sponsored approach that has been used effectively with great success in the nuclear power industry, an important safely complement to, not a substitute for, if government oversight and regulation. a kind of defense in depth.

the president has charts are commission with determining the rig causes of this accident -- has charged our commission with determining the root causes of this accident. the industry and its culture, the technology and its adequacy, and other factors. we're talking to extract the message from this spill and develop policies to guide the long-term future of offshore drilling, not just in the gulf, but elsewhere in u.s. waters. as one of the staff papers we are releasing today makes clear, the future of significant oil recovery is in the deep waters. we have all better figure out how to do it, because that is where thhydrocarbons are and that is where the industry is headed. will make recommendations to the president and the american people that will make a disaster like this one are less likely to occur again. and should something happen for

whatever reason, that we're better prepared and have a greatly improved containment and response capability. it is also vital to looked at the region's environment. the gulf has suffered over tickets for policies -- for decades. the result along with the channels made for oil and gas development has been an alarming loss of wetlands to protect shorelines, but for the effect of storms, serve as nurseries for economically important fisheries, and provide recommendations -- recreation and enjoyment for residents and visitors alike. they are as important to the gulf shore recovery, the economy included, as the region's other resources, and this commission will consider restoration's priority for the first time in my career in

conservation. there is a realisticrospect of serious funding for restoration of the marshes of the gulf. i hope that we can be helpful in ensuring that they are protected. the commission will be taking up all these topics here and in subsequent hearings. today our focus is primarily on the policies cover regulatory and otherwise, if needed to prevent future disasters. we thank you. >> thank you, mr. riley. our first panel is on the history and expansion of offshore drilling. we're fortunate t have three stinguished witnesses. r first presentation will be by mr. j. robinson west, ceo of pfc energy. >> good morning. we advised many of the world's

leading oil and gas companies on strategy and market solutions for the industry. we have been retained by bp on certain matters relating to the macondo spill and therefore i cannot comment on that at all. the 1981-1983, i served as the assistant secretary of the interior with responsibility for u.s. offshore oil leasing and policy. i developed a schedule and manage the $14 billion per year program which was the largest nonfinancial auction on earth that that point. during my time in interior, the program was surrounded by bitter controversy. i was confronted by an unloving itics and uncritical lovers. it critical lubbers urged to step open up all federal waters to leasing and virtually give the leases to the industry with little or no regulation. that struck me then and now as a very bad as illegal idea. likewise the unloving critics

demanded that we prove a negative, that there was no risk of any possible damage from offshore oil and gas operations. if the only way to satisfy them would have been tohut the program down. that struck me as a really bad idea. the challenge then as now was to define constructed compromises. on national governments including the u.s. have a responsibili to review their offshore hydrocarbon resources in a number of different ways that require compromise. they must consider the amount of oil and gas to provide the nation's energy security, the terms under which they can open up these resources, how to decide which companies can participate based on nationality, if technical capability, and other criteria, the potential revenues to the state from least bonuses and other sharing, appropriate safety and operating standards including worker and environmental safety, and the employment and economic development impact to the domestic economy as a whole. many do not appreciate the scale of the industrin the u.s.

millions of high paying export- generating jobs are at stake. one small example is the offshore oil oil and gas industry which uses helicopters after the pentagon. these helicopters are now built in louisiana or mississippi, if but in states like pennsylvania and connecticut. there are hundreds of such examples. in total, it provides directly and indirectly 9 million full- time jobs. every country faced with these various policy issues -- the net benefits are sply too large to be discounted. this is true even in countries we think of us have a higher levels of informal awareness and being less pro-business than the united states. for example, denmark, famousor its bicycles and windmills, produces the equivalent of 127% of its domestic energy needs by

aggressively developing offshore oil and gas. if brazil, with the repetition of running sugar cane at all, produces at the equivalent of 45% of its energy needs and is planning a dramatic increases from the deep water. offshore oil and gas includes proximity to shore as well as near active fishing grounds. before this, they had an exemplary safety record. between 1971-2010, a total of 24.7 billion barrels of oil were produced from u.s. waters. at the same time, oil spills were 1,715 barrels. this is an average of 44 barrels per year, one at every 14 million barrels produc. most oil spills in the u.s. and global waters come from accidents involving tankers, pipelines, and loading facilities.

you might say the challenges are even greater sense that humans can walk on the moon but not at 5,000 feet of water. neither are offshore regulations or cleaning up after accidents have kept pace with our ability to find and produce oil and gas. we have gone from exploiting and water depths of 1,500 feet to over 5,000 feet and in some cases over 10,000 feet by 2010. drilling may go an additional 20,000 feet below the mundelein. this is an extraordinary accomplishments, requiring some of the largest commitments of capital and technology of any industry on earth. each is a massive undertaking. cleanup technologies did not claim -- keep up. the industry did not invest in them because they were not commercial. government did not sufficiently to imagine the potential risk to make it necessary investment or

require the industry to invest. the macondo blowout has been a significant and expensive learning experience to begin to improve our containment and clean-up capabilities. the deepwater coll holds the largest and most productive oil resources in the u.s., producing about 1.8 billion barrels of oil from the gulf of mexico, about 30% of our domestic production. in comparison, we import about 1 million barrels of oil from saudi arabia. we produce more oil in the gulf of mexico than we import from all persian gulf sources combined. in the short ter ever barrel of oil we do not produce domestically must be imported. it is quite likely that the marginal would be producing countries like mexico or others. the economic, political, and moral conclusion is that we must use the sources of the gulf of mexico and use tm responsibly.

this means the extreme caution for stopping is not an option. on that second-hand -- on the other hand, this is not good enough. i repeathat the incident is absolutely unacceptable. never again can we allow such a powerful flow to flow for so long. we must prevent the accidents and contain them and clean up after them. at and specifically been asked to comment on the comparisons between u.s. and air national regulatory regimes. this is punctuated by track to it -- tragic accident beyond the imagination of the industry is regulated. each is followed by a commission and a report, and then they introduce better rules and practices. the macondo blowout has been history's largest such event in terms of the volume of oil

spill, the level of media attention, the scale of the cleanup effort, and the financial responsibilities assumed by the operating company. this is not the first tragic offshore accident. . three defining events. the first in the north sea, blowout preventers were mandated on all well. in 1980, of fire in the norwegian sector killed 123 people. in 1988, one platform explosion in the u.k. sector killed 167 people and triggered what were until the end record insurance claims. in canada, 84 deaths, 84 people died. most recently in 2009, an australian -- it took five

tribes more than 72 days to kill the well. no country chose to stop offshore activity and neither should the u.s.. just last week, the canadian senate committee concluded there was no cause to halt offshore drilling in canada. the fundamental challenge all regulators faces the potential mismatch between paris dynamic business process these and static regulatory. there is a trade-off between production and safety. the offshore industry progresses and meets the growing global command for oil off by constantly advancing the barriers of what is possible and said. a static regulatory system cannot keep up in this dynamic environment. static thoma prescriptive regulations resulting static, perspective safety practices. what we need is the same dynamic. i'm the best companies use to ensure quality. if some key features of this are everyone responsible for safe operation. safety is cultural, a way of

thinking through and anticipating potential problems that affect all activity. safety is about active performance rather than defensive compliance. responsibility lies in operators and their contractors, supervised and audited rather than inspected and improve. the goal is not good enough but zero failures. no accidents, and the fatalities, and a spills. safety is encompasses not only personal but the entire process, including in formal safety. with design, implement, and all that a four-man management systems read and then the rules. there is active collaboration, trucks, and sharing between operators, contractors, employers, and rulators. was the mistakes and near misses as opportunities to learn rather than an occasion to think of a guilty or even cover up systemic weaknesses. we have greater transparency between different operators,

contractors, and regulators to accelerate that kind of warning. organizationaltructures and motivations promotes safety rather than undermining it. we have seamless unified system that covers operators and contractors, not marine systems for votes -- for boats and different ones for platforms, and not a patchwork of rules that can be played off of each other. these are purchased of flexibly and accommodate changing situation. and the process of continuing improvement addressing new risks which always arise from new technology and from adapting older installations to new things that were not imagined when they were first to sign. i am not advocating self regulation. making operators actively responsible under the vigilance supervision of a well-designed, while resourced regulatory system is not the same thing as just letting the industry regulate itself. if a worker was confident in

time to supervision by regulators to understand the risks of the operation and can properly evaluate the mitigation the operators proposed. you have received the report describing offshore safety regulation in 12 foreign countries. the differences are arrive from different goals and constraints. how efficient the contras want to be, how capable the regulators, how much capacity did they have to write regulations and enforce regulations, how what tended to they want to be on the oil industry- different countries all into thregrps. prescriptive, which is how we would characterize e u.s. system, self regulation in which countries -- companies largely regulate themselves, an approach is based on the safeties first introduced in the u.k. and norway and canada.

i would like to focus on the united kingdom. i chose them for a number of reasons. the north sea is a major offshore place of critical importance to that nation's economy. the u.k. used to have a primarily prescriptive system like ours but 20 years ago in response to the accident, radically transformed it to incorporate the kind of principles i have let out. the british system had been successful in controlling major offshore accidents and you case system is widely admired in many countries, modeling their approach after it. some history before the accident. the approach of the government agencies was the micromanages the specifics and design procedures, new look -- removing responsibility for the lack of safety from the operating oil company as long as they comply with government specifications. this policy simplify the task of

the offshore operators who simply had to show that they have sat if -- they had satisfied the requirement. evything is permitted unless explicitly forbidden. it was not on the actual level of safety but unsatisfying regulation without seriously considering the resulting risk. these regulations were often incomplete because the reagan letter cannot always keep up with developments and expansions in t production area. therefore this process was even stifling safety innovation itself. after the inquire into the 1988 disaster, the u.k. introduce the offshore installations for safety based regulation. if before beginning operations on a project and every five years thereafter, u.k. offshore operators must file a comprehensive sety case with the board. it must demonstrate that they have anticipated every possible accint and have emergency responses to them. they must address the role of

contractors and subcontractors and consider how to keep accidents from escalating if the management systems do not work. i urge you will look seriously at this approach and consider what our regulatory system could learn from it. it is our rigorous but not adversarial system under which the industr government, and other stakeholders have all were off successfully for close to 20 years. is essential that our government keep people of the highest quality to oversee this industry. as the former government officials, i would say that these bureaucratic responses would be a false economy. adding a more effective regulatory system or reduce the risk of a major accident but we must also plan for the worse which means reducing in -- reducing impact of any accidents should dispel up occur. if macondo taught us that we're not prepared to based -- except a worst-case -- accept a worst- case. we must upgrade our capacity for containme and clean-up.

as part -- i will move briskly. as part of the responsibility to manage our offshore resources, the federal government must ensure that we have the necessary technology to catch leaking wells quickly, and clinton containment -- contaminated water and land. this cost should be borne by the industry of which means all the valid by the consumer. we must build insurance into the cost of oil would produce offshore. have the makings of a response system that would dramatically reduce the risk. the macondo spell has triggered extraordinary cooperation between different operator service companies and government agencies. they have learned a great deal. we can build on this experience to create a technology if response systems that we need. >> if you could please summarize. >> the industry has made a great

deal of progress on containment. much of the depredations of the gulf did not take place because of the oil industry in state waters. this is some you alluded to earlier we should be considered. and the gulf of mexico is part of global tech assistant. what we learned in the united states should be shared worldwide. operations and safety can constantly improving everywhere. >> and bank you very much. >> it is a pleasure to be here today and a pleasure to give you an overview of offshore drilling in the gulf of mexico, and also provide an overview to you or were the challenges are and what we see is the solutions to those challenges as we go forward in

deep water drilling. what i like to take away is that there is an operating environment and an are within which we can operate and build these will safely. it is enabled by a framework of standards and procedures. it is assisted by a great faking management system and a great safety culture. it will help manage the top risk. the third thing is that there are risks of a physical nature when we look at the forces unloads involved, but they can be managed as we drill these wells. we cannot really talk about the challenges in deep water without having an understanding of what the processes involved. we drill bit from one of three structures, to shift, semi submersibles, and then platforms where you have a combination of drilling and production from the

same facility. a drillship is just a ship with a drill rig included. semi submersible is commonly rectangular or triangular. it is a mergers -- submerged for stability to the right level. and then there are production systems where you have a platform -- these of the largest in the gulf of mexico, pretty much the world, they handle production in the field below. all of these have the same common components. they all require staying put. there is a mooring system to settle drill the well. they all require a blowout prevention system to connect the will from the floor. enables it to sets contain the pressure and -- on the pike and also the rig is installing the riser that drills the wells a

cements the casing in the place. to briefly go to the process of what it takes to draw these deep water wells, it is important maintain de concept of size. this is our platform in 3,000 feet of water. the bulb attached to it is a 280 ft service bessel, approximately the size of a football field. to give you a concept of size, the more and would include the entire metropolitan area of your lens. these are large stretches. the challenge of building includes keeping the rig on location, the riser and gop control systems, the well design itself, and then the raid. it by halftime and i probably will not, i willover the rig and the casing, but i won a

focus in on the riser and the b o p system and the well designed. you get on location, you put your begins on the seafloor to establish position, and you'd dynamically reference off of satellites for redundancy. the first thing you will pick up this 36 inch diameter pipe, at 3 feet across, and you put that assembly about 300 feet long, yellow or that to the seafloor, and you ease into this segment. inside the drill pipe is a bit with a motor to turn it. you will create a large water. and ea that down into the settlement. you want this to happen with friction to keep a hold from caving in and provide support later ron. and then you will drill. the drill ahead with a combination of water and mud. you are anywhere around 2,000 feet at this point.

once we get that drug, you will keep it open and then run the surface pipe. attached that will be a high pressure wellhead which will buy -- which will provide support. with cement that in place. we will pump some and until we see cement come out on the seafloor. we observe it through the remote operated vehicle cannons. we will then switch the water, at this place to water, and a check housetops the cement from coming in. at this point we are ready to drill so we connect to the rig. we run a marine riser 21 inches in diameter. he can truly only handle the weight of the mud, not the high pressures of the water, so there are lines and the side of it. they are rated to the full pressure of the wellhead. we run the blowout preventers and now we're ready to drill. we will test the blowout

preventers. you have a good sound foundation for that. drilling had really is the same process repeated to reach your objective to what you like to investigate. to do that, you have to determine what iraq is below. -- what rock is below. in this case, it is a hydraulic factor. we will set a much weight below that for safety and we will drill until we get pressure close to that level. we will drill until we have a 9.8. you must run another string of pipe otherwise. you have to ensure that the pressure from your much exceeds the pressure of the oil and gas in the reservoir.

at the fundamentals of primary well control. achieve that and you have the most reliable barrier in existence. we do that to determine how far we will drill ahead. if we drill hole. we pull the drill at aole and we run and with the surface and conductor pipes, and once again the same sequence, which pumps and meant until we see it in the bottom. we have that full cemented into place. we will repeat the process as often as necessary until i reach my objective. in the gulf of mexico, the margin between the strength of the rock and the fluid pressure is at the beginning, so we have to run a lot of street. it is not uncommon to start the whole that is 3 feet in diameter and end up with the producon hold that goes through a 7 inch pipe.

there is a man on the bottom of the deck for scale. they have to be held and supported, d there is the riser that attaches to the top. you have to hold it all intention. you have to hold it up so that it stay straight to drill. you have to manage the way. the riser is encased in four feet of fun. how you create phone that countermand -- standard did. the deep pressures. they operate over range of water debts and essentially build or riser system in 12,000 feet of water, but whe it is in the water, it is neutral wait. subsea access is an issue for function testing and maintenance. i'm sure you've seen the capability that they have in the

macondo recovery effort. the other challenge is blowout preventer control. you cannot simply took a line and pressure up on it. the response time ituzla. this is a system that consists of fiber optics sending a signal down to the stack. electricity control the valves which releases the pressure on the system. the whole system is capable of response to go from operations totaled disconnect system -- sequence in two minutes or less. and then the status disconnected so it is in a tremendous amount of capability. the systems are well designed. i've already mentioned that challenges between fluid pressures. at its origin, the goal of mexico is similar to the great salt lake. tremendous deposits of salt were id at the bottom. 40,000 feet of salmon -- a sad

and i was laid on top of it by the gulf of met -- by the mississippi river and other rivers. -- 40,000 feet of sediment was laid on top of it by the mississippi river and other rivers. here well-designed has to account for that. there are temperature changes. it is cold down there and we drill into production ranges that maybe 200 degrees or hotter. in your well-designed, you have to account for what is going to happen to the well when it goes into production. be a systems that did that very well. and then there is the transition from drilling to production. in a subsea wells in deep water, q have to remove your blow up for dinner stacked. you have to make sure that you have adequate barriers installed at that point in the process to

settle a manage the transition. the solutions that address one more those challenges are high- capacity well headings. we employ expanding casing systems in the initial design. this is a system that may run -- expanded and physically cold forced to steal to the prior casing street. you can apply service pressure inddition to the pressure from your mind as additional control to give you a greater flexibility. ofre one of the pioneers deep water. we certainly have the oldest. my field is responsible for depleted feel that dream. -- drilling. to do that, it enables me to do that with a high group -- a high degree of safety. we deploy a real-time operating centers with a second set of

eyes. would deploy rotary spherical systems tt allow you to steer the bet. and then we measure all the various parameters in iraq. within minutes after drilling, a computer directly located above the system and we have information that comes back to the real-time operating system that tells you whether there is oil and gas, the process of the raw, all the various parameters for you have the capability of stopping the drill strength, to insert a probe. we have a high degree of control and a high degree of information that we can use to safely drill the well. all that has to operate within the right design parameters. one of the fundamentals is having a good robust system of barriers and control in your operations. it is one of the most

fundamental components. we have been operating since 2002 in the gulf. they require the drilling contractor that demonstrate that they have manage the risk and identify the top risk and then use a analysis to demonstrate th hazard is manage with proper barriers that are in place so that top of and does not occur. if that does not occur, we have controls that stop the escalation of that event and mitigate the consequences that are realized. barriers and designs to stop the top of events in the analysis from happening. the well control aows the fluid to stay in place until we're ready to produce that. and control is used to mitigate the impact if a top event occurs. in terms of primary well control, the blowout preventer as a control and not a barrier. the blowout preventer could become a control as well as being a barrier earlier in the

process. the best practice in designing your well with sufficient barrier to include your means of control. when you move from -- to production, if you have adequate barriers for putting barriers and the whole you just a minute. you mt always have at least independent very viable barriers. other tools -- i know my time is getting short. we use automated pipe handling systems which essentially is hands free for the handling of the drill pipe. the less well we drilled was up 31,000 feet of water down 6 miles, total depth. 6 miles down, we hit a target of 50 feet.

the real-time operating center, we have one and houston and new orleans that maintains a second set of eyes erseeing the operation to provide real-time storage of the data all site. is all offshore drilling the sam? no, it is not. in alaska, comparing that work in 130 feet to the gulf of mexico, the pressures are different, the rocks street is different, and it is not as challenging. if you look at a typical deepwater well-planned, you see the complexity. you drill in shallower wer in aska and a great -- a much greater margin between the mud required and the strength of the rock resulting in a different well planned. but you need to put it altogether. indeed a great drilling contractor.

the must all have a sufficient safety management system demonstrating they can manage the risk. we have our own safety management system. how well executed planned and critical risk identified. we bring that together with a bridng document. it made sure that everyone understands the roles and responsibilities and that changes are managed and total operation. >> if you could please wrapup. >> that denigrate job of keeping that concept and including it in the specifics for th well from design to barriers to what other specifics you need for the well. that docent is ready for release. i encourage you to take a look at that. it is a great piece of work to help manage the rest from the total systems base. at the end, it all comes down to health, safety, and environment. in this current environment, we

as an industry have an obligation and duty to commicate the total capability we possess, and when we put everything together and we were very constructively with our contractors and regulators, it can be done safely. it enabled by tremendous technology and sustained by production, and that is the importance of that. >> thank you very much, sir. the president and ceo of the world wildlife fund. mr. roberts. >> tha you chairman, and members of the commission, and staff for the oil spill for allowing me the opportunity to talk to you today. i am president and ceo of world wildlife fund which for 50 years has sought to build a future in which people live in harmony with nature. what that means is we work on creating parks, studying

species, creating smart policies, but also all around the world working with industry on sustainable practices on the extraction of commodities. we now enjoy the support of 1 million members in the united states, 5 million members globally, and we're the largest multinational global conservation organization in the world. we have met the needs of humanity without destroying the planet, and that is why i am so glad to be here today, to talk about what we learn from what is one of the world's great environmental disasters. the question is -- how do we -- and how we regulate and plan for oil and gas development without destroying the places where it occurs? we support all the efforts that have gone into the response to the gulf, and as chairman reilly

mentioned, the restoration of the all-important marshes all the gulf, and understand that future hearings will deal with that topic. the question that concerns us, and i think that concerns the public, -- what will changin the future as a result of the efforts of this commission? what would change so that we do not repeat this kind of disaster again? it is obvious over the lg term that we will need to move away from fossil fuel-based economy, and you could not help but notice that the electric cars that decorated the lobby on the way into this hearing. in the meantime, as we continue to depend on fossil fuels in that transition, we need to make sure decisions about the extraction of fossil fuels do not destroy the basis of our current and future economies as well. i propose two specific

recommendations to the commission. one is to bring science back to the table, and the second is to implement the present executive order establishing a national policy to incorporate science, not just about oil, but also about the natural resources of the ocean and the use marie so spatial planning to balance the need of extraction with conservation act, and define those areas where we move ahead and those areas wheree do not, to manage risk more honestly to avoid disasters in the future. amid talk about science for a second. i work with colleagues all around the world and they continued to be amad at the level of science we have in this country and argues for technology to guide decisions to look at trade offs and invent new ways of solving the problems

in the world. when you compare our ability to do that with our management of the oil and gas development, it makes our management of oil and gas look antiquated at best. it is utterly dependent on what the industry tells us of what will be gained with very ltle knowledge of what we stand to lose. it is time to bring balance back to that equation in understanding how weak they can can meet the needs of humanity without destroying the planet. our first recommendation is to create a director of informal science shielded from the pressures of a leasing and fees that can collect data with other agencies to apply that data against environmental standards and permit regulations, explicit and possible, and other regulations. this calls for minimizing and far more harm, allowing

activity unless effective containment is possible in real- world conditions. second, we need to make sure the science we use is reliable. a small snapshotf the conditions in many of these places is insufficient and we're calling forhree years of baseline data to guide decisions in these places. noaa would be the logical place to collect this data. we need to make sure science actually guys decisions across all phases of oil and glass planning, leasing, and production. noaa in consultation should outline important ecological areas for oil and gas development prohibited or where higher protection levels should be required. we saw an example in bristol

bay this past winter when the administration actually set aside bristol bay in alaska from any oil and gas development because of the value of the fisheries there. agencies like noaa and the coast guard should set a permanen restrictions and a requirement should be set to follow the recommendations followed by these agencies. the bottom line is that we need signs, we need independent science, and weaknesses -- we need science that can be applied against these permit regulations in a rigorous way. my second recommendation and central regulation -- recommendation is to make smart decisions about our future using coastal and marine special planning. it is a mouthful for saying we should map what is in the ocean

and make smart decisions based on that information. if you look at the goal of the last 90 years, oil and gas development had been allowed to proceed with insufficient consideration of the many benefits the goal provides. and with obvious negative consequences, and it is time to put in place at 21st century approach, an approach that will make us let -- let us make smarter decisions about areas already developed and areas where we had a chance to get it right from the very beginning like the arctic, which is still relatively untouched. these concepts are at the heart of the president's july 19 executive order which sets the nation on a path toward establishing a more integrated approach to the ocean integration and management. it establishes the first ocean policy and identifies coastal and marine spatial planning is the key tool to get us there.

we strongly believe that oil and gas development must proce only to its consistency with a national policy. this is not about saying, yesr no, to drillg. this is about making smart choices based on great available science and information and using the best available tools. plans developed to govern federal activities offshore should to a number thing. they should collect ecosystem data on the use and value of ecosystems, and they should at identify important ecological areas, sensitive environmental havoc that's, that should be off-limits for leasing. we should identify areas where seasons most important for activities such as fisheries or renewable energy development to reduce conflict.

and last but not least, we should bring the public in to deliver process, science-driven process,bout how our oceans are managed and times that that process reveals. fortunately we are not starting from scratch. the executive order already lays the groundwork for making this happen. what does it look like and how it should be implemented. we can also learn lessons from how other countries manage their oil. there are very few countries that know asuch about oil and norway, they have a plan that maps their ocean, maps the resources in their absence, and then make smart decisions based on that. that plan to raiseere oil and gas development occurs, it directs where it should not occur. that plant closes certain areas for fisheries. that plan has rerouted shipping

lanes. that plan is the smart way to approach our oceans. i want bring up some slides at this point man. i think there is a clicker there. i would give you a brief example of what this will look like in alaska. alka has many resources and we do not know about the arctic and alaska is so vast. it is amazing that think it is part of the united states. it is one of the most spectacular places on planet earth with incredible resources and a lot of places that we still do notnow what about them. on marine spatial plan alaska could map polar bear range, whale migration, the ability to map areas where the

administration has recently opened up for lease sales without knowing enough about the region in the ability to match some of the proposed oil and gas drilling in the region. there many data letters that should be part of this on minerals, but this kind of approach gives you the tools to make smart choices. not just based on one sector of oil an gas using all thereat information we have already heard, but based on many sectors and many values that the ocean presents to us. i was fascinated by the previous speaker in listening about the incredible technology in drilling and how that technology is applied. this is about having the same level of sophistication about the natural world and the things that are important to us so that we're not driving this decision is based on what the oil industry tells us can be gain.