happened, one of the issues clearly it was an issue of integrity of the system, we have since the time of the texas city in the onshore business, we've invested $1.4 billion just to -- to change the mechanical in tiger woods task rate of the pipelines,s of the vessels. we have 30,000 pressure vessels on shore, we've gone through and looked at each and every one of them, upgraded them where we needed to, put the proper systems in place, so those could operate differently. portable buildings. we had people in the wrong place in texas city. we had portable buildings in a -- in harm's way. we have not only gone and removed all the portable buildings from harm's way in our onshore operations, but we've even gone and upgraded our permanent buildings, so if they're in, like, for instance, in a gas processing plant, and they're in the blast zone of something that hamed, we've even strengthened the building or in some cases, we've actually moved

the buildings, and we're a long way down that journey on that. there was an issue around blow down stacks, particularly with hydrocarbons that are heavier than hair. fortunately, in our onshore business, we don't have any heavier than air blow down stacks, but what we did do is we said, well, but what about hydrocarbons that are lighter than air, so we did make some modifications to some of our blow down stacks and dryers, so i think there was a lot we learned from texas city that we've applied and i can speak pourfully to the busy know, but i believe other parts of our business have equally responded. >> those examples you cited, those are mainly equipment improvement. i'm talking about safety culture. if you don't change the safety couple tour and safety management system for the entire company, you're going to have incidents, and if you can only correct, like to say the thunder

horse, near capsizing, so you correct that, nobody died, no oil in the water, so therefore, it's maybe a chance to check the ballast system, for example, make sure you fix whatever discrepancy that was, but it does not correct the safety culture or the safety management system of the company that would prevent something like that from happening again. that's what i'm saying. it's not about equipment improvement. it's about a safety culture and a safety management system and i am like to know, you know, this incidents, whether the one that mr. mathews cited, the texas city explosion and the deepwater horizon here, what has -- these things keep happening, and my thing is that they have not changed the safety culture or the safety management system of bp. can you tell me what have you done and the results, not just about your belief or, you know, what has been done and what the results are to ensure that there's a proper safety culture

and an effective safety management system within bp. >> so met me talk first of all about culture, and i -- i understand how what i said could communicate that that wasn't about culture. my belief is there's a couple things you do to alter couple tour. one is you make sure that you set the proper expectations, which it's been very different, how from the top of bp, we've communicated particularly about process safety, we've always had a strong communication around personal safety, but we've dramatically changed since 2005 howe we talk about process safety. we monitor different things, there's different things that are in our performance contracts, and those are what i call expectations. *9 second piece is the actions. taking all the actions that i talked about, that does a lot to drive culture. with people see you're spending significant money to change things, that says to people,

boy, they're serious about that, so i do believe that sort of commitment has a tremendous impact on culture. we always had to focus on things like stopping the job, doing what we call advance safety audits, which is looking at what people do, in a way that allows people to not react defensively to suggestions on how they could work safer, so we continue to drive those things, but the -- this commitment that we put into process safety, i think said something different about culture. that's my view, so i think there was a piece about that. and in terms of management systems, we spent, i believe, it was almost two years studying not only our own industry, but others to come up with our design for the safety management system. this was a very sophisticated system, in my words, it describes what good looks like. it sets standards, which we all each year go through and assess ourselves against and then come up with a prioritized list of

what we're going to do to reduce the risks in our business. so i think we have done significant things to change -- i think both of those things influence culture, but that's my opinion. >> yes, sir. how about, i mean, the situation, back in 2002, in the texas city in 2005, and also deepwater horizon here, can you cite me any example where a senior executive in of the company was held accountable for those incidents? and i think that's a stronger message than it is to spend money to improve the equipment. >> i don't know all the specifics around texas city, because -- but i do believe some people did leave the company during that period of time. mr. hayward, who will be leaving the company, i think our board does respond, and take actions. >> so mr. hayward would be held

accountable for this ins depth, so he -- he didn't -- incident, so he didn't leave on his own? >> i don't know the specifics of that. he may very well have left on his own. >> besides mr. hayward, which other senior executive within bp has been held accountable for this incident? >> i don't know. >> okay. >> now you say that you have been involved in the oil field response, including the killing of the two relief wells, is that correct? >> sorry, say again. >> now you say you have since april 20th, you say you have been involved in the oil spill response? >> yes. >> including the drilling of the two relief wells, is that correct, sir. >> yes. my role in the response has been to communicate from a text calmics preexpect of to the outside world, press, public, governments, kind of what we're doing, so -- because early on, it was very confusing, people didn't understand. technical aspects and so my role has been to try to understand

what we're doing and put it in a language and set of pictures that people can understand. >> yes, sir. admiral thad allen said the relief well is the permanent solution for stopping the oil flow in the gulf. would you agree, sir? >> from day one, we've always had multiple options on what we were going to do to stop the flow of oil into the gulf of mexico and ultimately kill and seal off the well and some did not work. some have worked. so i think for instance, our top kill that we tried, we were unsuccessful in getting the well killed, because too much of it flowed out through the top. once we were able to put the capping stack on and shut the well in, well, we were panel to, with our static kill, shut off the -- shut off the flow and i think what we're trying to do now is understand have we

completely isolated the reservoir from both -- we believe we've isolated it clearly from the casing. what we don't know is whether we've ice late it had from the annulus. we may have and we may have not have. so they're continuing to pursue -- we're continuing to pursue a path right now of looking to fish out some of the drill pipe and if we can, put a different blowout preventer on, and then either complete with the relief well or find some other way to make sure the well is completed. >> yes, sir. but the relief wells, is -- the permanent solution to stopping the oil -- based on past experience. >> i'll just keep saying, it's one of the ways. it was -- what we've always talked about, it's the ultimate backup, if everything else fails. >> all right the ultimate backup. who is paying for the drilling of the relief wells? >> bp and perhaps our partners. >> okay.

which vessel -- yes, sir. and i don't need to know. anyway. so which vessels are engaged in the drilling of the relief well, sir. >> say again, sir. >> which vest -- i understand that two relief wells, which vessels are engaged in those relief wells operations. >> the first relief well which we spotted on may 2, as being drilled by the dd3 and the second relief well, which we have spotted on may 16th, as being drilled by the dd2. >> who owned -- who operated for the dd3, i guess that development driller number 3. >> transocean. >> okay. how about gsf development drill number 2? >> transocean. >> so we have the same two characters here for this relief well, which is the ultimate solution here. now, this is a question that i have for you, both you, mr.

mr. simms, mr. o'bryan and other executives who may be appearing before this board to answer this question. with everything -- there are many factors between the original wells and the relief wells of the same, including the two major players. is it because of greater public scrutiny and government oversight that we have not had a well blowout with the drilling of these relief wells? >> i do not believe that's the case. >> why, why not? >> i think we are good at putting together plans and operating drilling operations. we did have a very unfortunate event. i do not want to -- and i think we need to learn everything we can from what happened on the

macondo well. we put together a good plan. we had already contracted previously to have the dd2 and dd3 work for us. so we had gone through our inspection process, our contracting process, and then what we did was we did some additional testing of the b.o.p., when we drilled this, but those were the only changes, at least that i'm aware of. that we had done in our practices. >> okay. good plan, additional testing of the b.o.p. now through the general public, you know, people look at this thing, you've got your -- you're drilling two wells on the same oil formation, probably have twice the chances of a well blowout, nothing happened, the only thing that the public is seeing the difference is that the greater public scrutiny of this, and government over sight. that's the openly then that the public has so far. so i'm asking you, are you saying that's not the case?

that that -- the things that -- to your knowledge, right now, that prevent another blowout with this formation is you have good plans, does that mean you had bad plans before for the deepwater horizon? >> no, no, it does not. and i think we need to finish this investigation and every investigation to understand what really was the root cause that caused this horrific event. and then when we know that, then we need to make whatever adjustments need to be made, so that something like that doesn't happen again. from my perspective, i don't think we actually know the root cause yet. :

>> i don't know. there is many different decision-makers on every, and there should be. we need to take advantage of the people that have the expertise

or whatever piece of equipment they are responsible for, so there are many important decision-makers on the rig. >> is the well site leader the person that makes the decision to go, no go decision with regard to operations on the rig? >> i think they often decide, i will call it, the what, not the how, things are done. exactly have the crew performed their tasks and actually the execution of it. is run by the contractor. >> are you aware for the well site leader was on this, the date of this incident? >> no. i've heard different people's names but i don't know who was actually on, on at, on the 20. [inaudible] >> the well site leader is one, just make sure of the clarity. >> yes, sir. i am referring specifically to the well site leader. would've bac management decision

to remove that individual a few days before a critical event and not give him access to the person that he relieved? >> i don't know the specifics on that. we have rotations of people that we routinely do. sometimes we bring in people for certain operations. the specifics of the deepwater horizon i'm not familiar. >> would that be an important management decision, i change out other well site leader with regard to the operation and safety of the well speed? we have a scheduling process that we do to make sure that people are there and when we need them, they have their time off, they go to training or whatever it is. and i believe that is managed. >> should a well site leader have access to the person that he relieves so that he can contact that person to find out exactly what the concerns were

with regard to the well? >> well, it's been my experience when you change up as a handover period, and that's discussed at that time. >> so there's no continuing need to have contact with that individual after the relief? >> i don't know. i mean, typically it's handled through a handover. >> would it surprise you that the well site leader on board on the date of the incident didn't have access to the person that he relieved? and, in fact, that cell phone was turned off the? >> no. i mean, that wouldn't, wouldn't surprise me. >> thank you, sir. >> any other board questions? >> mr. wells, let's go back to 2002, 2003. as best as you can recollect,

what was the exposure for deepwater operations at that time for bp? how big were the deepwater operations as far as growing operations go? was in its infancy? was a going, you know, any growing pains? >> i know we have clearly gotten, we are larger today than we were then. it wasn't a startup business. it was a fairly significant business, i just don't recall it's aptly how big it was, you know, whether we -- i know today our deepwater business produces around 400,000 barrels a day. weather was 200 or 250 or 300, i just don't know. >> mr. mathews has a couple follow-up questions. >> earlier we were talking about cost-cutting safety, and there was an e-mail from a bt engineer that reference a risk reward equation. while you were in bp's on

sure, now, or on the shelf when you're doing your drilling operations, were you ever a where of a risk reward equation? >> no. i mean, we try to be very clear that we don't jeopardize safety for costs. i'm not aware of what risk reward you're talking about, equation you're talking about so i've never used it. >> and also going back to the correspondence that you had with the mms, i believe they sent you a letter. i think november 2003 thank you for coming to meet with them. and they were looking for to verifying that you implemented these recommendations that you're going to put in place. do you know if you actually follow up on that? i couldn't find any correspondence to verify that. >> well, if you actually look at the response, we actually had done them before we had the meeting. >> i just want to mature, did anyone ever come back to bp to

make sure they were still in place? >> i can't verify that for sure, but the fact that we were able to demonstrate that we'd already done all of these things, i think, and the letter conveys. they had confidence. >> you are aware of what the annual performance review is, correct? did you ever participate in an annual performance review in the gulf of mexico? >> we do annual performance reviews inside the pit. >> where bp comes in and discuss their performances the? i don't recall that. >> i was just wondering if they verified it later on after 2003 that it was still in place? >> they may have and i'm not aware of the. i don't recall. >> thank you. that's all i had. >> let me ask you here, i believe you indicated bp set expectations? >> we set expectations for what the objectives are for a well, how deep we are going to drill

it. we set the casing plans, et cetera. we also set expectations around safety in terms we expect all of our operations to be done safely. those are the type of expectations we set. >> so if haliburton come in and recommend 21 centralizers and bp only uses six, what was your expectation for halliburton? >> i'm not sure i understand that question. >> from a casual observer, 21 installation centralized would cost more than six of centralizers, is that correct, sir? >> i'm sure that's probably the case, but centralizers, at least -- i don't know specifically for offshore but i no centralizers are not a big cost. it's not a cost issue with centralizers. >> i don't know how much they

cost but what i'm saying is i would assume 21 would cost more. >> and i would you say it's insignificant. shouldn't be a factor of. >> so your expectation for halliburton on that activity speed? activity? >> it's difficult for me to answer that question. i have heard in the press this issue about 21 and six centralizers. i don't know enough about it to add a meaningful comment to it. >> so your expectation, for example, you install six, you have the final say on how your expectations going to be met, write? >> i don't know the specifics of how this went. i don't know if that really lives up to the expectations.

that's sort of in technical design, if that's, you know, i just don't know the importance of the centralizers, where that sits. >> so in terms of setting expectations and those expectations would impact the safety of the vessel, the crew, will you agree, sir? >> well, i want to be -- i don't know if the centralizers have anything to do with the safety of the crew. >> clearly we set expectations that we expect to conduct all operations safely. >> so you are, your expectations would have impact, would have impact because carry out on the vessel, would have impact on the safety of the vessel and crew. i would think that since you are holding the purse strings you

have the final say, is that correct, sir? whether expectation or requirement, you're the one holding the purse strings, you make the final decisions, is that correct the? >> we clearly pay the bills. we clearly have the safety management system that says who makes what decisions. and it's important that we follow that. >> but international safety management system for a vessel, master is responsible for the safety of the vessel and crew and the prevention of pollution. how then, if you hold the purse string, you make the final say. what's, how is that comply with international regulation to sink the master would have the full writing authority? >> your beyond my level of

expertise. i just -- i just don't feel, feel comfortable that i know enough about that. >> and that's one of the issues i have is there are so many completion of this, committee group and you say, you've got use expertise of this individual, that individual. i set expectations, leave it to the contractor. it seemed to me that, seem like everybody in charge here, at the end of the day nobody in charge, nobody have good awareness of what going on and nobody making want to step up and make the right decision here. that's what i'm seeing. you can disagree with me, but that's what i'm saying. >> yeah. i mean, i know it and i can speak more powerfully on shore. you could say we only let one person making every decision, and i just don't believe that's right. we need to count on certain expertise, and we tried to do

that. >> any other board questions? marshall islands? >> thank you, your honor. good morning, mr. wells. my name is greg linsin. i represent the marshall islands, the flag state for the deepwater horizon. in your assessment of contractors that bp engages to perform operations, you testified that you select these contractors carefully and assess the adequacy of their safety management system before engaging them, is that correct? >> and talking to a general philosophy, that's a we try to do, yes. >> and in your assessment of

their safety management system, would you agree with me that a contractor, it would be important for a contractor to have specific guidelines and expectations for their employees surrounding safety critical operations? >> yes. the safety management system should address safety critical -- it should address all aspects of the activity that they're going to carry out. >> and if the guidelines and expectations for those activities should be clear and apparent to the people who are going to be performing them, is that correct? >> the -- we expect that the people that work for us, that their employees are properly trained. and if required by regulations, certified out to carry out whatever activities they are going to do. >> so in your assessment of a contractor, if you observed a

situation where there personnel were not clear about a safety critical operation, or where there was confusion about how to interpret the results of that operation, that would be of concern to you, is that correct? >> if we were aware that someone didn't know how to carry out the activities that they were supposedly cable -- capable of doing, yes, i would think that if we became aware of that we would stop the job and decide how best we could do that. >> is it accurate to say, mr. wells, that in order to ensure continuity of safety management, and in order to ensure a consistency across an operation, that it is important to have mechanisms in place to know what standards people must

meet? >> yeah, that's the purpose of the safety management system. >> and would you agree that one way of achieving, one important way of achieving that, is to ensure that the people performing the operation understand what is expected of them? >> yes. >> what is he peace criteria, or what are bp's criteria for determining whether or not there should be written guidelines and protocols in place for safety critical operations speed? i don't know that i can answer -- i don't know that i know specifically about that.

>> well, can you speak in general about that? >> so your question again. >> what are bp's criteria for determining whether or not there should be written guidelines, or protocols, in place for safety critical operations? >> as a part of the safety management system, we looked to see that company has procedures written out. what i don't know is, is whether we specifically check for procedures around safety critical equipment, whether we have an extensive list. since i'm not involved with that, i just don't know. but i do know that we at least go through a process to sort of understand if this contractor seems to be very systematic in the way they do their activity.

>> and that standard very systematic in the way they do their activity, would apply to bp personnel who are in positions of authority in these operations as well, is that correct? >> well, for whatever activity, they are to do. particularly on drilling rigs, we are very adamant that our employees do not operate the equipment, do not touch the equipment. they are not certified, trained to do it. and were quite adamant that they don't do that. so i would argue that i would want a bp employee touching a safety critical item on a drilling rig. >> yes. your personnel are aboard these wells for some purpose, are they not, sir? >> yes. as i said they are there to set our expectations of what we want. the ultimate wealth to be.

and -- wealth to be. and also to mature expectations are around safety. >> if your well site leader found him or herself in a situation where there was uncertainty as to how a safety critical test should be performed, with that concern you? >> well, you're asking me to sort of speculate about -- i mean, each individual needs to make the appropriate judgments. if there's something that they're uncertain about and they need to seek advice, they need to do so. if they understand what they are doing and feel confident in

going forward, then that's what they should do. >> but if there is uncertainty, they shouldn't go forward, is that correct? >> that's a judgment they need to make. >> and if there is uncertainty as to how to interpret the results of the safety critical test, that also signals a problem with this safety culture you're describing, does it not? >> i don't make the same linkage that you're making here. >> well, can you describe how you would, how you would react to that sort of uncertainty with respect to the results of the safety critical test? [inaudible] >> you don't need to guess or speculate. if you do have an opinion about something, then you're welcome

to express it. the board would appreciate getting it, but if you don't have the experience or the knowledge with respect to particular situation, you don't want to guess or speculate. obviously, a guess or speculation wouldn't be helpful so you don't need to do that. >> and it would require -- as i said before, i've been involved in the response, i purposely avoided staying out of all the activities that came up to it. therefore, i don't really have an opinion spent but from the point of view of anyone, the board or anyone who questioned you, we are not sure exactly how much experience or knowledge you have on certain subjects. so we're going to ask you questions we think you might have knowledge on. if you don't, let us know and then we will go on. >> thank you, your honor. and that is exactly why my questions were general in nature and not specific to this incident. general in nature that related to this witness' background

expense. would you agree with me, mr. wells, that in order to ensure continuity in safety management across an organization, that it would be helpful to have written procedures to ensure that safety critical operations are performed in a consistent and predictable manner? >> we, for many tasks, we do have written procedures, and we expect those to be followed. there are some activities that we don't have procedures. >> and how do you make that distinction? >> i'm not involved in that detail. it's the judgment of the people involved with the operations, and when i say the people involved, not only the people

directly involved, but also our technical authorities, et cete cetera. >> but if you to the extent you have a role in overseeing or assessing safety management, if you detect situations where there is uncertainty on the part of the people performing those operations, would you agree with me that one of the ways to prevent that kind of uncertainty would be to ensure that there are written standards in place so that people know what is expected of them, and what they should do in older to maximize safety and reduce risk? >> we have -- many standards and procedures in place. if those, if people have questions about those, they

should raise those, and that's why we have the stop the job. if there are not written procedures, or technical practices for something, then they are to use their judgment on whether something needs to be prepared. or they feel they have the knowledge and experience to move forward. >> and if there are no written procedures, and the people performinperforming for overseeing the operations wind themselves uncertain as to how to interpret the results of that safety critical observation, they should not go forward, is that correct? >> no. it's their judgment on what the right path forward is. that's their judgment. >> nothing further, thank you your honor. >> how long would you like to

>> any questions you would like to ask? >> no, thank you. >> ms. karis for >> okay. well, transocean? >> yes, sir. honor. thank yu. >> goomorning, mr. wells. i represent transoce. >> excuse me. if you move thatmicrophone over since he is facing that way, it's a little bit easier.

thanks. >> mr. wells, i apologize. i did not hear your exact title. did you say you are senior vice prident? >> yes. i'm bp's senior vice president. >> how many senior vice president does bp have? >> i'm guessing proably around 15 or so. each one of us has a different part of the business. i run the onshore gas business et cetera all over the world. i'm guessing somewhere in the range of that. >> data also, did i hear you correctly that when the texas city explosion occurred, that you in te middle east working in the middle east? >> that's correct. >> and that some subsequent time, a team game to the middle east and briefed you about the causes and the lessons learned from the texas explosion? >> it was actually the individual that was leing the investigation in texas city. his name was john.

i knew john, and when it was all over and done with a i asked him if he would come and talk to m leadership team. >> survive than a team he would substitute john, a single indidual could lead the investigation speak? correct. >> okay. would you agree with me that the incident of april 20 was the largest casualty in bp's corporate history? >> this has been a devastating event. >> i understand the. >> texas city was a devastating event. which one, they're both just devastating events. i wouldn't want to try to say one over the other. >> let's just talk about money. i know that bp has pledged $20 million, and i want to know, is that a number that is in excess of what was paid to texas explosion manner? [inaudible]

>> could you repeat that question? >> sure. i'm just going to get the witness to answer which was the largest casualty in the history of the company. and maybe can't answer that but i think there's a way that i could perhaps refresh his memory. and i want to ask him, in terms of dlars, would you agree that this is the largest casualty in the history of the company? >> well, if you think it is and you want to say yes, that's fine. obviously, no one knows the precise cost. and we all know, i can imagine any what is here's going to say this isn't a catastrophic casualty, both in terms of substance as well as financial cost. and, indeed, they're probably been a number of others in history of bp as well. so we are all operating under the assumption this is a catastrophic and enormous loss, both in terms of human laws, environmental laws, and financial loss. >> let me try it another way.

perhaps i can shortenit with this question. can you think of a casually that is caused greater dislocation to bp tan this one? spent i will say what i said again. this one and texas city hve been devastating event for us. tremendous loss of life. >> before receiving your subpoena to appear before this board, you were aware this board was meeting, taking testimony into the causes of the casually of april 20? >> yes. >> and upon receiving your subpoena, did you do anything to educate yourself about the causes of the casualty so tha you could give competent testimony to this board speak? what i did to my train was asked why i was subpoena sosa never worked in deep water. they sent this letter from 2003, which was one incident that happened in 2002. that was a long time ago.

and so i did sit down with the o people that attended the meeting with the mms with me, and help them remind me about the events and about the meeting we had with the mms. that's just the extent of what i've done to prepare. >> let me see if i can reverse it. tell me what you did to prepare to give testimony about the causes of the april 20 casualty? >> i have done nothing to prepare because i don't believe i have any insights into the causes. >> do you know david sims? >> yes. not well but i surely know who david is. >> do you know who mark is? spent i know, i know of mark. >> do you know brian morel? spent i do not. >> do you know brad? >> i do not. >> do you know greg walls? >> i think i've met him once. >> do you know john?

spent i don't. >> are you aware that some or all these people were involved in one way or another in the designf the macondo 252? >> i have clearly heard their names associated with this event. i don't know to what roles or extent they played. >> so you never picked up the phone and asked anybody of bp's design of this well to find out why it failed? >> no. i've been very clear, once i was asked to be involved in the response, my philosophy is if you start going down the track of trying to find out what caused it you get distracted from the response. that was the last thing we needed. >> i just talking about you, not weak. >> and i was talking about me and the others that were also on the response and a tried to pass along that same philosophy. >> so as you see here today, you have no information whatsoever that you can offer this board as a senior vice president of bp, as to what may have gone wrong with bp's well-planned?

>> what i know is what happened during the response, and i think that with a few things that happen in the responsethat i think will be important to any investigation. and i clearly think that any investigation will want, when we get that b.o.p. available, to bring it to the surface, they will want to look at it. >> let's put the beauty aside and talk about the well-planned. the design of this well, okay? did you get any kind of a briefing in this case, like he got in the exas city case while you were in the middle east? >> no, i did not. >> you didn't want that briefing? >> my focus is on the response. as soon as we finished -- bp es have an investigation going on. i'm aware of that. i don't know what they're doing. i missing any of the reports but when it is done and we understood all the root causes, outsold i will want to look at

it. i will run from and want to make sure this never happens again to us or anybody else in our industry. >> when john flew overto the release to brief you what happened and texas city how long did it take him to brief you about the casualty? >> he spent about two or three hours with our team. we also had the bigger panel report, which i spent some time on my team a. john wasn't there when we do that. and then we looked at, what we particularly focused on was the integrity management issues that we might have on shore. >> the question was how long? how longdid all that take? >> john was there for about three hours. >> you think you could have taken three hours a for appearing before this board to find out about this casually like you did a texas city casualty? >> objections. i'm going to abstain it. he testified he made a decision to focus on remediation and affirmative decision not to look back. now that may or may not be a

judgment that we all agree with. but that ground has been covered at least twice do. we know that the decision you make him is that correct? >> that is absolutely correct. >> later on i suppose the board might say people were involved in remediation for fixing a problem, perhaps should spend time on root causes. maybe they'll turn out to be true here. but we could sa a document i think for later, but we are aware that's what you do. so i'm going to sustain the objection. >> mr. wells, you indicated in order testimony in answer to question from one of the board members that a well site leader is there to ensure our expectations of followed through with. or words to that effect. do you recall that testimony speak was yeah. i said our well site leader is our representative that communicate our expectations. >> menu added our well site leader is beside the what, not the how. do you recall that testimony?

>> yes. >> now when you say the what, the well site leaders arethere to do the what. you're not saying the well site leaders decided whether or not to displace a well before a negative tt is performed. that happens on thebeach, doesn't it? >> i don't know. the specifics of that. >> typically an engineer with bp would make that decision, not a well site leader, correct? >> i said i don't know. >> you dont know that? >> i don't know that. >> would be correct that a well site leader would not determine the centralizers to be used in a bp well? that would be done by it bp engineer on the beach of? >> i'm not sure who does it in that organization. unita as the people that are involved in that organization. >> i am going to do that but i thought perhaps as a senior vice president of bp you would be able to say that that is an engineering decision, and only an engineer would be allowed to make that decision. can you sa that? >> know because i don't know if that is to or not in this case.

>> can you tell areot you lead to a well site leader versus an engineer the decision as to whether or not, and when, to use a lockdown system? >> no, i don't know exactly who makes that call. >> what about cisions with respect to a casing program like, a long string versus a tieback system, that would be left at well site leader, wouldn't? >> no. i believe the well plan, the well design is done well before the well is ever spun. >> not by well site leader, in other words? >> just spent but these are the things all affect the integrity of the well. and these are the decisions that you hope that the bp engineers are making, not well site leaders on a rig, correct? >> what i said is the well design, well plan is created before the well is the spun. and that involves a number of

people. the well site leader could have been involved in part of that. but typically, it's done by our engineering and technical staffs, a number of people. >> so with respect to each one of these what's, the displacement, the number of the centralizers, lockdown sleeves, long string, use of, performing of a cdl, all of those things, the what's, are not really good to well site leaders on a rig. they may be part of a decision but you expect the engineers back on the beach employed by bp to be making those decisions, correct? >> yes on a number of decisions in there, and i'm just not that involved -- surly don't work deepwater, but even in my own business the actual individual decisions around a well, i'm just not -- that's not my role. >> let's talk about the how. you say the well site leaders are in charge of the what, although you may have modified that a bit, but not the how.

the h is something that's done by transocean, correct? in this case. >> in tis case. there are people executing it, and that's what i call thehow. >> and the how they're doing, that is how they do something, it depends upon what they're told to do. they do what they're told to do and the question is how do they do it. that's what you're saying. >> yes. so the what could be quite specific, or it could be quite general. and then keep ending up on what procedures or standards, the contractor uses, in this case transocean, then they would follow those. >> pride to the incident in question on april 20, had you been told by anyone at bp that transocean have not done the part that they are relegated to do, the how that they've not done it exactly as bp wanted? >> i really haven't had any conversations about transocean prior to april 22, for me. spirit and you haven't heard from any source from bp when you

say you haven't had any conversations, i want to take it to another, higher level. from any source at bp, had her that transocean have not done what bp wanted them to do? >> i'm not aware of any conversations like that. >> do you know who pat o'bryan is? >> i doubt do expect who is pat o'bryan. >> pat o'bryan is our currently his role is the well's drug in our epwater business. >> oka is he a good employee? >> he is a very good employee? >> and knowledgeable fans to? i have worked with pat in the past and have a lot of espect for him. >> has he been a longtime employee of bp? >> i think pat joined the firm through the arco fast our acquisition of the was with one of our predecessor companies. so he would have been with bp's since about 2000. >> since you do ith bp has he

been promoted? are increases in pay? >> i believe so, yes. >> obvious he will testify, so my guess we will be running through his credentials and history at the time he testifies. so it would be fresh in everybody's mind and. >> have you seen any of the post-incident interviews by the blight investigation of people who are on the rig? >> i have not. >> do you know what the bly investigation is? >> i know mark bly is. >> and were you aware that people under mark bly's direction interviewed the basic bp employees to find out what they do, what they thought, what they could say in terms of helping understand this casualty? >> i would hope they are interviewing everybody that they think has any knowledge about the event. >> were you aware that pat

o'bryan was on the rig on april 20? >> yes, i was. i have heard that speak so in addition to whatever his job responsibilities m have provided him in terms of insights, he also was a witness to the events, correct? >> i object. he has nothing to do with his. >> i am going to sustained in the sense he's going to be here, we can find that his knowledge. there are other ways to put in information. if it's inaccurate, and as we know, it's been an admirable struggle by a but to get to the testimony, without goi into the test when a people are going to be here who are not yet here. you know, i could see in another context that might be relevant or even time sensible. but given what we have to do, the board would liketo focus on the knowledge that mr. wells has, that other witnesses don't have much more clearly, particularly people who are going to be here. i don't need to carry on too

much now, except other attorneys may have the same goals in mind that i would think we ought to focus on what he knows, that bears directly on the incident that brings us altogether, rather than on his evaluation, the credentials of others. >> judge, i intend to ask pat o'yan some questions on the line does going down and was going to stop it anyway. but i didn't expect pat o'bryan to say i'm a great employed and i've been promoted. i thought his superior would be able to give us that inside, and then i could ask the questions with that in the record. so i think i've established that pat o'bryan is a good employee, he has been promoted, he is viable and you trust his judgment that all those things are correct. >> that was very good. >> tha you. [laughter] >> all right. anadarko and moex offshore.

>> good morning. my name is death commercial. i'm here for anadarko and moex offshore. i would like to turn your attention back to the 2003 letter from the mms that we started with this morning. i know that you said that he was said to responsibilities in shallow water, but what i would like to do is explore some of the topics in this letter, and ask whether or not these general princies would still applaud in deep water, in fact maybe even more so given the unique challenges that we face in deepwater drilling. fair enough? >> sure. >> all right. in the send paragraph of the letter, the mms talked -- >> there are two letters, which letters the? the letter of september 23, 2003, the pink one right on top there. >> okay. >> in the second paragraph near the end, the mms talks about the

fact that there had been a deviation from the permitted plan submitt to the mms in this 2002 set of incidents. would you agree with me that one lesson learned from this come if didn't already know it, was that youdon't want to deviate from the permitted plan that's been approved by the mms, is about right? >> in this case there was actually debate about, it had t do with the use of th diverter, which in a plan covered the drilling, but the context of thisas using it during the cementing of the well. and so there's a great debate about that. that wasn't in the plan. therefore, it was a deviation from the plan. i think over time that got resolved and for the communicate and. . .

it there is a regulatory body and all, then we will look to adjust those plans to the regulations as they exist. >> once the operation is completed, it should be done in accordance with what the mms has approved, should it not? not? >> once again, i'm not going to talk about the mms because i don't know. but i o believe if we made adjustments to a plan and there is a regulatory requirement to refile a plan, then we should do th. we always look to follow all the regulations. >> regardless whether it's deepwater or shallow water, can you think the reason why bp would not be responsible for complying and mms permitted

plan? what difference does it make whether it's deepwater or shallow. it clos has approved the plan, does not need to be followed? [inaudible] >> well, and if you don't know the answer, that's fine. if you don't know reason why it should be one wayman situation and another i don't know of an honest answer. but if you can see a distinction and you want to let us know about it, with a two year it. >> i go back to where they originally said. we put together a plan and if it's somewhere along the process, something says yo should alter the plan. and i think all companies, including anarcho would have situations like that, it would only be prudent to look at adjusting the plan to adjust and information. if there's a requirement to file a plan, i think i would expect us to do that. >> that would be beetroot deepwater, shallow water, land? >> it would be anywhere in the

world. one of our core values as we will follow the rgulations. >> now come on page two of the third level, after furthermore, there's a discussion about a lack of planning to handle some of the pressure situations in that event. and i'm not interested in these 2002 events. i'm interested in the concept of having proper planning to handle issues that will arise during the drilling operation. which you agree with me having written procedures would certainly help facilitate planning and execution out on the rig? >> we have many written procedures that help specifically on this what we did was actually do a lot of drills to try to make sure people knew what the rules were. and what we discovered and that was inadequate. it didn't have everybody know exactly how to operate all the equipment. so there was a learning from those that we took away and we

needed to be more careful in how it made sure people know exactly how to run the equipment. >> prophetically, mr. wells, really my question was wouldn't written procedures have clear communication of the plane to the people who are to exece it and i don't believe you answered that question. >> it's all right to answer the question - [inaudible] >> we did go into a lot previously comes if you want to get for a simple yes, no, depends on the circumstances, what everything does the truth we can move on. >> it depends. with a plan together is, write procedures for different activities and not every single activity town has a written procedure for it. >> well, in fairness to those who were to carry out the procedure and especially if that person did not have extensive experience on the rig, wouldn't make it -- would not facilitate that person's ability to carry out the plan if he had been handed a writtenrocedure on what he was supposed to do when he showed up at the red?

>> hairspray that as an exact question. >> i think the marshall island question when overdose several times. and the witness, his answers were consistent. you might or might not agree with them or disagree with them and obviously a recommendation you might be making to the board is we recommend to the agencies that there be much more extensive written standards. that i don't think, you know, this witness has four times really responded the same way. so i'm going to sit stand that objection. the mac would you agree with me, sir, that it is the responsibility of the bp management and senior management to ensure the decisions being made about operations reflect a company's core values? >> we try to make sure all of our employees understand all of our core values. we have a code of conduct that we share with them every year as a reminder of it and were very

clear about expectations that we expect all of our employees to follow the code of conduct. >> let's talk about the stop work authority that you mentioned earlier. several witnesses in theourse of these hearings have said that anybody on the rig can stop work and understand that bp's policy? >> that's correct. >> in the situation of an employee who has already ised the concern and the concern has been discussed in the decision has been made by the supervisor to the paths forward, is that employees to look acted to stop e job if that is concerned in his mind is still not met? >> yes. just up the job never go away. we can be literally seconds away from executing an event. and if someone sees a hazard that wasn't previously identified and mitigated, the expect tatian is that they should stop the job. >> what is the expectation that this concern has been ddssed,

but in his opinion and his judgment it has not been mitigated and his boss has this is the way were going to do a? is he supposed to stop t job anyway? >> well, you're asking me to speculate on that. i mean, the way our system works that the risk is to be raised and it's to be mitigated. if there's a difference of opinion on whether that risk was ultimately mitigated, then after much discussion, someone needs to make decision, the severed decision it is to be made at that point. >> and honestly, in the real world out on the rig, if an employee raises an issue, the supervisor makes the decision that he still doesn't fe like in this adjustment has addressed her mitited the risk. an employee is not going to stay employed mind if he keeps stopping nowhere, is he? >> you know, i'm going t

substantiate objection in the sense that that is a commonsense argument that the board and others might buy. but they ask this witness to speculate on what happened i don't think we change our minds about what is logical. >> already. i'd like to go back to one of captain nguyen questions earlier and i'd like to use as our demonstrative concepts the wheel that i spoke going to the middle image is now in the middle where it all connects. i uderstand your testimony and some of the testimony of other bp witnesses to say that there are resources and various expertise available higher up in bp that is available for those below them if they have a question on a subject that requires expertise, is that correct? >> various expertise available. it doesn't have to be high up in the organization. in many cases, our expertise by

what we call peers of people. they've had a different career and know a lot more about something. >> so we have some folks coming down to the central gizmo from above and from their peers coming in from the side, correct? >> yes, the multiple accesses to experience. >> you also have information coming up from the people on the rig that converges at some leel of authority, correct? >> okay. >> and you have outside contract reason some of the folks who have testified previously said that bp higher some of the best in their business in the world as outside contractors and you're getting information and recommendations and advice from them. those are other spokes that would lead to the hub of decision-makin corect? >> depending upon the decision made, yes. >> and all that information is being processed a final decision can be made that comports with

bp's core values and policies and procedures, fair? >> sounds at a decent description. >> okay. so where i'm still confused and worried police captain nguyen is confused is where does the buck stop with respect to the decision-making world that comes in, expertise, factual information, where does the buck stop for a deepwater rig? and makes the decision? >> in general what i try to say is there are decisions made at different places. who has the right expertise to make the decision? every decision is not made at the same place. and specifically on the deepwater, you know, i have to stand like a broken record time of addressed in the wrong person. i've never worked a day in deepwater. how could i answer that? if you want to ask me about my onshore business i can talk about that.

like i'm just trying to figure out to as the person with the buck stops there we ould actually ask these questions get answers? >> we will have deepwater people later today, is that correct? >> will have deepwater people today. >> okay, so that is obviously you will both be interested in asking those people that question. >> those are all my questions, thank you. >> okay, thanks for switching from a gizmo to ahab. [laughter] >> i did in the interest of full disclosure comes a gizmo covers everything. >> i couldn't picture it. >> okay, halliburton. >> yes, your honor. good morning, my name is don

john dan and i represent halliburton. we have both spoken before? >> no come we haven't. >> i understand your senior vp with bp and where you based on the stair? >> houston. >> tappan nguyen music asking you some questions about centralizes on the cost of them. and i wrote down a few cents that they arnot at the cost. did i remember that correctly? >> how about the time to install centralize there is? is that a factory tat bp considers and determining whether to use centralized there's for the number of centralized there's on a case in stream? >> i don't believe so. >> okay. we'll have you talked have detector john guide about this issue? >> i have not. has anyone told you that john guide has said previously that it would take 10 hours to read the additional 10 centralizers

at the recalled, 15 centralizers that were called for the halliburton model? >>o. >> have you talked to david sims about the issue of the additional centralizers? [inaudible] >> no, t hasn't come your honor. >> the time factor was not testify to a race by previous%. and if the answer is no because he didn't have the discussions, it won't take long to get it. so what'your answer? >> the answer is no. >> sir, do you believe it is important for bp to one of the models of outside contractors such as halliburton? >> say again what you mean by that question. >> do you believe that it's important for bp and its operations to honor the model of its outside respected contractors such as halliburton? >> what you mean by models? >> and model like for the

cementing here. there's a cementing job that was performed and there are several subject to overdoing was run on the 19th of april and there was a model, a couple of models that came out before that. and i called halliburton's model called f the use of 21 centralizers. it does not help you with what i'm talking about as far as a model? >> ascot matthaeus and engineering programs. >> yes, a simulation. as it is caught in the halliburton business. my question to you is do you believe it is important to bp one attires outside contractors, well respected contractors like halliburton, that it honors their models? >> i think we always listen to what are contractors had to say, whether we ultimately he is exactly what they say sie they may have different object is then we do.

sometimes we don't always do exactly what theyave to say. >> well, the halliburton model's objective was to be able to have a casing run said that it would not allow for channeling. that was in part the reason for the model. was it -- do you understand channeling to be a fact her in the running of the casein string? the [inaudible] >> this could be onshore or offshore. >> certainly the relationship between bp's and itscontractors as one who's very familiar with. say we've know to what extent a genel contractor wld take into account what contractors, escially halliburton, what have to say. so if you have a general information, that plane. if there's particular generic problems that can occur when

concrete support you have awareness of, you can testify to that. and we want to make sure it's relevant as they go. but our understanding is you don't have any knowledge about what recommendations might have been made in this case and how, if at all, bp chose to implement them. and so i'm going to us that the attorney not us qustions about this particular matter. the world the others because there's no point in asking you to guess when you don't know what happened. so for the generic aspect i think that's fine and it probably would be helpful to the board because will have some forward-looking recommendations. >> okay, do i understand you to say that in no time since the incident on april 20 have you beennformed that halliburton recommended the use of 21 centralized there's? >> i have heard the debate in the press. i've not had conversations with anyone inside of bp about it. >> okay. you consider halliburton to be

the leading cementing expert company in the world? >> i have worked with halliburton most of my 30 years. i have had some very good experience with halliburton and i've had se very not good experience with halliburton. >> okay, sir and if again my question is with respect to the presenting of the model by how the burden with regard to the work that was done here on this well, it tu take away from this incident the fact that halliburton's model should've been followed? >> i'm going to object. >> sustain it. he didn't set it outside out that it's fair to ask him questions to evaluate this particular incident. >> thank you, your honor. >> thank you. okay, cameron.

whether for >> no questions. >> drillquip. >> no questions. >> jimmy harrell. [inaudible] >> he's probably saving it. >> good morning, mr. wells. my name is pat fanning. i rresent jimmy harrell who is a fellow who was the oim on the rake of the day of the explosion. i want to ask a couple of questions again about something that captain nguyen brought up in his examination and mr. mccarroll and i have a few follow-up questions. let me ask you with regard to who it bp has been held accountable for the safety issues concerning the explosion on the train to? the only name i heard you mention was tony hayward. am i correct her in my recollection? >> well, yes.

and i must admit i jumped to conclusions because tony had left as a result of this. but what i would say is we haven't finished our investigation yet and i'm sure when t investigation is finished and the group causes are uderstood, the appropriate actions will be taken a that time. >> okay, then my question is is mr. heyward beat in the company because you was held accountable for the safety issues? >> i'm goin to sustain you. he testified he doesn't really know. he knows the timing as we all do, but you have no knowledge of the privy of the arrangement by which he left his decision to you. >> that is correct. i do not. >> not even from the news meeting? >> we would want -- we all have that information, so we could draw our own conclusions from it. next question. >> i'll go to a different issue.

are you aware, sir, that the marine authorities for the bp in the gulf of mexico have testified that he doesn't know whether this is a marine safety problem or well control problems as of this explosion? >> i'm not aware. i assume you're talking about neil cramond. i know he was here. i don't notice testimony was. >> you can see his testimony on c-span or wherever they're showing it? >> no. >> and the testimony of the bp witnesses in the past, i'd like to ask is there some policy or inruction given to bp employees given before the board so as to not educate yourself as to what went on speaking truthfully answer i don't know to these questions? i'm following up on mr. mathews question in preparation for the testimony. >> what was the question again? you can do it again. it's quicker, too. >> there is something going on

at bp and i'm not saying there's something sinister or improper for n't educate yourself about to macondo well disaster and you can truthfully say i don't know what happened out ere. are you aware of that or -- >> i was told i was to come here and talk about the gulf of mexico shelf. i educated myself about that so i could come. i think i've stated several times i have a philosophy winner involved in a responsibility front of the investigation. i've not done that. >> i'm sorry. i don't need to cut you off. >> so there's no bigger point. i've been as honest as they can be with this. >> okay, thank you. >> mr. kurtz to. >> good morning, sir.

my name is kyl sean@represent the captain. how are you today? captain nguyen estes and questions concerning the dede two and a dede three, do you recall tat? >> and again i'm not as conversant in obvious oil and gas issues and i wasn't paying as close attention, that i thought i heard you say that you had some involvement in that process, is tht correct? >> what my role in the response is to what it committee were doing because it's quite technical and put it in a language that we can communicate with the general public, press, different interested parties. i do understand what's going on on our relief of them can talk about. >> with respect to that, the captain had asked you about the use of the contractor for both of those wells. and i understand your testimony to how bad it is transocean, correct? >> now, with respect to does that duties, an you tell me,

sir, whether anyone within bp has said again with respect to the subsequent relief effort at you need to be careful about transocean? >> i have not heard that, >> has anyone with bp told you with respect to these with the falls, you need to be particular about the equipment and the blowout prevents with transocean? >> no one has said -- i do know we have more extensive testing on the b.o.p. and we have in the past. that's all i know. >> has any answers -- have any efforts been made confirm certifications with respect or equipment on te dd2 in the dd3? >> i don't know. >> sir, with respect to the subseque activities, have you attempted to determine whether or not the chain of command,

that is who is in charge, under what circumstances is adequate on the dd2 and the dd3? >> i have not been involved in that. and i don't know if it has been looked into her now. >> has anyone with bp said to you, we're concerned about the system that's in place in terms of the chain of command on either te dd2 are the dd3? >> no, no one has said that to me. >> thank you. that's all i have. >> beeper town. >> no questions. >> patrick o'brien? >> no questions. >> michael williams? >> no questions. >> does bp have any follow-up?

good morning. may i proceed? >> yes. >> thank you. >> you were asked whether you had any involvement in the investigation that bp is currently coduct deemed to recall those questions? >> are you aware whether bp has a team, an independent team investigating this incident? >> yes, i'm aware that mark bly has an investigation team and is financed by the company to look into it lly and i think they've been working it sent essentially almost april 20th. >> and you expect that that team is going to issue a report with a finding that reflects the work that it has done? >> yes, expect that they will share it very openly that we

will do everything we can to learn from this and make sure everybody else does as well. >> have not had involvement in that investigation? >> i have not. >> do you know whether they have interviewed numerous people that were present on the brea as well as folks that were involved with the decision-making in connection with this trend to? >> i don't know who they've investigated, interviewed, sorry. but i do know is typically an investigation would interview as many people as ty could to try to get the best understanding. >> you are not involved with any of the operations that the macondo well prior to april 20th, is that correct? >> i was not. >> every topic. you are awesome questions regarding the presentation he gave to the mms following the incidents that took place in 2003. you have the letter something to be there? >> i do. >> and just do srt of recap

following a presentation that she gave to the mms, did you receive a letter in response to that presentation from the mms? >> i id. >> and as of november 6, 2003 letter to letter you received in response? >> yes. >> and sir, who sent the letter from the mms? >> chris salinas. >> and could you read into the record what mr. orrin hatch come a legal director of the mms told you in the last sentence of that letter? >> the mms acknowledges and coends bp is committed to working together with industry and mms in developing best practices that will enhance the safety of drilling operations in the gulf of mexico. >> thank you, sir, nothing further. >> any board questions?

>> mr. wells coming you stated -- i'm sorry. mr. wells, you stated you were involved in the response i'd give a d. of the relief files. did you all encounter -- and you may not know this based on your level of involvement. did you all encounter any problems with the b.o.p. stacks on the dd2, dd3. i've heard you and answering mr. shauna kiss questions that there were issues -- he conducted some are testing with respect to the b.o.p. does you are running to any issues with the two b.o.p. stacks? >> i don't know the specifics. i know he did; additionally test and then have historically been done and he took a little while. i don't know whether there is some specific issues or not, but i know it took a little while to be able to move forward with the well. i just don't have the specifics. >> did you all have any extra people out to do the additional

testing? ebp higher third-party contractors to come outo contact some additional testing? >> i don't know. i know the mms was out there or the boem was out there during the test. i'm not sure if we had additional people are not. >> okay, thank you. >> mr. wells, when you got involved in the oil spill response operation,? >> april 22nd, so two days late in the day. >> yes, sir, your test when he seems your focus had been strictly on the response operations. as i write, sir? you have no knowledge of investigation? >>o. >> so if they had been discovered by these public hearings in mpeg he operation, you would not have known anything about those?

>> say that again. >> if there were gaps that have been discovered through these proceedings, that impacted your operation, your number operation which isp of partial operation, correct? he would not do anything about them? >> no. >> sthe casualty occurs witin your jurisdiction noble response, which rsulted because some of these caps have been identified at this hearings because you had no knowledge of disgust are not responsible for the casualties come is that correct, sir? >> objection -- [inaudible] >> he has a point. judge, ivory tunic and objection. >> at least make by objection is that she is atmpting to elicit an expert opinion from a nonexpert. >> well, i've repeatedly said to this witness and actually every witness they don't have to guess

or speculate. frankly, mr. wells is a goodhearted, smart, very knowledgeable person and he shown an ability to draw that distinctio. and so, if you have an opinion based on the captain's question, you may give it. it would be a guest and we don't want to guess this. now, since the objection is taken so long, if the captain can restate his question. and if you have an answer to it, please give us your answer. >> i'm not sure if it's mr. fanning. >> i mr. fanning over here. >> i know, that's what i'm referring to. >> what yosay is you have no more responsibility. great-nephew have saved a thing since april 22nd of be focused on response operation. and through these hearings, some gaps have been discovered, whether they're going to be conclusions of whether there's

some potential gaps. now, some of those calves may relate to your operation on shore and there may be a casualty that can happen because of those gaps. because you have no knowledge of what the less permits of some of these gaps. if something happens or you going to claim you have no responsibility for the casuay? >> i think i understand your question. does that appreciate, on apri22nd when it came full-time involved with the response, i set up a delicate to run the onshore business. so it is completely being handled by someone else. okay, so that's where that's happened. in terms of perhaps there have been some gaps that are identified. my experience has been -- and this is just my experience, but over 31 years, when an investigation is going on, what appears to be the obvious issues early on tends not to be the root causes when you get to the end of the investigation.

so i just have a philosophy. wait until we've done all th work. then we'll understand what the real issues a, what the real causes are and we make the right movements going forward. >> sir, i appreciate that. now again, something happened, a casualty happened and some of the gaps have been -- potential gaps have been discovered during these hearings set for later potential to onshore. if that committee that you establish -- are they responsible for the casualty but didn't takany action to address those deaths? and should you know about those calves because h prtty much pressure can degate something but you don't have the accountability, is that correct? >> no, i bet the individual to run th business. i'm not trying to keep track of two things. i'm solely focused on one. and soon i will move back at the right time. >> i understand. so again, the questions i have had to deal with the safety --

cochair and safety management system here. so by doing so, you have shifted the accountability in this committee to this group -- >> an individual, yes. >> so they know they are accountability as a bp has been transferred to this group of individuals? >> yes. >> thank you, sir. >> any other board questions? is there anything the witness hasn't had to say that you would like to say? i would just like to add one thought and that is as i sit through these hearings obviously we don't want there to be casualties in the future, certainly none of this magnitude. but your reflection as to how the response was handled could well provide many lessons fo everybody in the business. so i hope that bp and its complete investigation also investigate how efficiently that process work so that can be

applied reall for any operator worldwide. but is there anything you would like to add? >> if i can just say the one thing to that specif part. at the request of michael brwich from the boem, we have pulled together all of our learnings from the response to date and tried to buy the september 1st, we're going to prepare or we are preparing to strip or two and that will share with him everything we've learned about for better something like this ever happens again, we're much better prepared as an industry, as a country to respond to it. so we have committed to do that and are doing that next week. >> mr. lassar, any >> no. >> thanks very much. thanks for your [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010]

tomorrow, we will have coverage of day 5 of the energy hearing purpose live coverage beginning at 9:00 a.m. eastern provincial -- eastern. >> we have a generation that did not have the arts in the public schools. i am very concerned about that, of people. it is not clear that they are going to come to the art. >> sunday night, he will talk about helping struggling art organizations from th

>> coming out later, a conversation on the 20th it a a amendment and presidential disabilities. after that, joe barton talked to constituents about the economy and immigration. up next, in conversation on the latest economic numbers in wall street. this is a 45 minute a >> "washington journal" continues. host: let us introduce you to roben farzad, senior writer for "bloomberg business week." i will start by engaging in any discussion we had with our audien thi morning. about, given all of the stories we have this summer but the economy and the situation there, with don going on with much of the world, we discussed the theory called rational optimism, whether or not there is a case for having a long view to be optimistic about where society is going in e long run.

what do you think of that. given all you are seeing in the markets and the economy today? are you optimistic? guest: i was listening in and what immediately came to mind is so of the best investors of the world, including warren buffett, saying that they are greedy when other people are fearful and fearful when other people are greedy. it does pay historically to be contrarian. in times ofeak fear and irrational pessimism, as it were, just as we have a rational exuberance 12 years ago, it pays to be contrarian when investing and protecting your money is concerned. host: this week we have seen a number of indicators and the market has acted volatile -- it has gone up after going down with the housing statistics. so many numbers thrown at us.

what are the best indicators to really get a handle on the state of the american economy right now? guest: right now it is bifurcated between joblessness -- which initial jobless claims shot up warningly, i think the number was close to 500,000, which was far above estimates. two, obviously the housing market. that overhang of the epic bubble we are coming off of. housing is shoveling it really is not hitting a bottom any time soon. new-home sales are in the gutter. bankruptcy's, a bank owned properties, foreclosures, really we have not seen the bottom of yet. so much of that was systemically connected. this is the opposite of what we were feeling six or seven years ago when your house was such a store of wealth and was going so well. now it is the exact in verse.

host: this week will close with an annual speech by the fed chairman on economic policy. the daily newspapers -- "financial times" and others, all suggesting this is a votal moment for the fed chairman. then you give us some of the observations about t fed's handling of the economy so far and what kind of tools it needs -- may still have left in the chest? guest: blunt instrument the fed -- controls is short-term interest rates and brought it close to zero. it has shown a willingness to create powers, i think, after that. this series of financial reforms we got entailed much strength and federal reserve. largely he has carved the launch to do what he has to do but the question is after his main instrument, moneta easing, is exhausted, what else is out there? they can by toxic mortgage securities, threw everything but the kitchen sink at the problem

and increasingly you hear people whisper about the paradigm of japan and its lost two decades, actually. japan had a bubble economy in the 1980's and -- when it all crashed and burned, the central bank of japan was very quick to to go in and try to stanch the problem but low rates became a belated way of addressing that and the rates have been at emergency low levels for japan for asong as you can remember, and that does not help. now people are wondering, my colleagues are wondering if the fed is pushing on a string. that is what terrifies the market because how many air rose you have in your quiver, how many different things, how much can you expand the powers and bailiwick of the federal reserve? that remains to be seen. host: our guest watches in the economy and economic indicators and policy moves from washington and the market's reaction. we would like to invite you to

join our conversation. all numbers are on the screen beneath me. will also give the twitter an e-mail address. one aspect that i would like you to explain the effect on society, for many years we heard the big problems with americans is we live on credit, not saving enough. contrasting with the japanese who are a nation of savers. now in the past year and have it seems statistically americans are in fact saving more. we are being told that that has a negative impact on the economy. help understand the american savings rate and how it plays into where we are? guest: the savings rate shot up from something like zero in the bubble years up to the mid single-digs now. a necessi. so many over extended and were up to eir chi and mortgage debt and credit card debt. they lost a lot in the stock

market. pulled money from the market and put it into savings. they used it to pay off medical expenses. the problem with it, it is very wise to do on an individual person by person level but when an entire untry does it and you have everybody saving, it causes kind of a self- fulfilling prophecy. you have to have people spending or else shopkeepers have no incentive to keep people hired. you could imagine kind of the perverse multiplier effect of people ratcheting in spending, ratcheting down spending, and you get more joblessness and that causes even less spending and the vicious cycle that the fed and treasury and everybody right now is trying to undo. so, that's the problem. by the way, to talk about the contrarian in polls, it would have made a lot of sense to say back when everybody was spending because if you husband that cash, you are now sitting in the catbird seat. you could name your price for

houses, can buy assets really you would not get the time of day for five or six years ago. is completely a buyer's market right now. just walked to the studio down stare -- downstairs. nk next to a man's wearhouse, begging people to buy sued to -- by one and we will give you two or three. and a lot of people are too scared to buy. they are in the process of rebuilding their personal balance sheets. it behooves you to espouse the contrarian in polls. when everybody else is spending you might wanto be saving. host: our guest is a graduate from princeton university, mba from harvard business school, started out on wall street then writinabout. reporting fellow at "the new york times" and was a "business week" market senior writer in

2007 and you can find him regularly on twitter. t us get from calls beginning with this call from jacksonville, florida. angie, democrats line. go ahead. caller: i am and economist and i am more interested -- hello? host: we are interesting -- listening. caller: earlier in this crisis i wrote a lettero the president, wrote a letter to congress and a lot of democrats and i was asking them to concentrate on the propensity of the economy to consume because that it is what going to help t multiplier. there is no way you can keep giving money -- making efforts toward recovery by supporting groups that are more sabres then the groups that are more consumers.

at this point, given the state and anticipation and the economy, the best way to stop the problem that is going on is only to support consumption. because you do give money to groups that save more, they will keep saving the money. thank you. host: thank you. guest: here is the bottle -- who is giving money to people who are saving? it is historical awful time in terms of what you get on a 10- year treasury, 30-year, two-year note. the vernment in no way is consenting saving. that is what bringing interest rates to zero and all of fiscal stimulus is to do, to get you to spend. there are people out there, critics that would espouse the opposite position. in that we have been too fixated on consumption for too long and that really this is that our

huge this interest in the long term. everybody is going to max out on credit-card debt and the over- leveraged and the government cannot keep printing money for it. almost mortgaging the fiscal stability of your children's lives and order to prop up spending today. is it sustainable? yes, and the short term, if everybody is ratcheting down the spending. it could lead to deflationary down the road but i would really take issue with the idea that the government is in sending saving right now. you could make an argument that those who have been on their best behavior during the credit to bubble and the subprime both are really getting very little vacation right now. host: annapolis. rosie, independent line. caller: thank you so much for taking my call. my comment has to do with -- i used to be a democrat for 20 years and then this crisis

struck and it is just such an eye opening of experience to really understand ansee what it's going on and how things to work in this country. one of the issues i have is obviously the comment that you made about, that america is a consumer society. how can you create an economy base on consumerism? that is the first point. the other thing is, my issue has to do with the federal reserve. because i never paid attention to that, how banking truly works. but i find it rather disturbing because when you look at the history of the federal reserve and how they managed the money in this country, what you can see over almost the last 100 years is the cycle of cost and boom and bust are getting bigger, more destructive, the american consumer and society is ultimately paying a price by less wages, flat wages.

there is less prosperity. i truly believe that this country is still at the beginning stages of a depression. and the only people, the only people that have benefited from this so far are the private bankers that pull thstring behind the closed doors because there is absolutely nothing federal about the federal reserve and there are no reserv, either, you kw? host: let me jump in and get a response from our guests. thank you for your call. guest: a very valid criticism. there is almost a neo-classical argument that there. a lot of this goes back to the time of alexander hamilton when there was opposition to a strg central bank. with the creation of a federal reserve and what we saw an early 20th-century, these were some of the ideological undercurrents. yes, indeed, you see that. the crises get in -- ever bigger. you keep hearing that this is the worst economic backdrop since the great depression.

the federal reserve hado get it hands of rounds really rampant inflation in the late 1970's and early 1980's and the savings and loan crisis in the end of the 1980's, long term capital management's decline and the russian currency csiin the late 1990's and it all seems like small peanuts cpared to what is happening. this is the cost of the brand of capitalism you could argue, there are a lot of people who believe the federal reserve should be weakened and banks should be allowed to fail. we are paying for the - -- regulatory neglect of the past decades. they enjoy a preferred tier of citizenship to individual businesses, home owners, who are allowed to fail.

whether or not you have people out there electing the likes of ron paul to take down the system, i think that is doubtful. theres largely in in the right now at we need to prop up spending of some sport. -- unanimity right now that we need to prop up spending of some so. and as i said before, j.p. morgan chase, there stearns, everything washington mutual bought over the years. bank of america. merrill lynch, first republic. it is all wrapped up into that. these are far bigger things that

the governnt has to control. this is a particular brand of creative construction that u.s. capitalism goes on. you've effectively have to have national champions, the government. this i not picking winners felt right, and designating firms that it will not allow to get too big to fail. in the past, this was not, fine, just left out there until we had a crisis big enough to contest that. host: if institutions are bigger still, what does this mean for the loss that would prevent the types of meltdown that we saw two years ago? >> all it does -- guest: all it does is to codify the federal reserve to intervene in provide for the orderly demolition of

one of these hydrous. it is a potentially saying we think it is important right now that we are going to put it in this legislation. how that is done in the real time process, i think, a beggar lief. i do not know how they do it. host: next phone call. scott on the independent line. caller: when i was in grammar school, and unearned and interesting point. to really affect change, you have to do something radically different. when we were in a boom and everyone was working, we made a radical change and turn them into the wild west, both now and

the 1920's. we are not in the persi now but we are headed that way. -- depression right now but we are headed that way. people need to get honest, quit stealing millions of dollars. if not, we will not get out of this situation. host: your response? guest: this is what historians call the ones in a generation opportunity for everything to be cleared out there. things that weever imagined the federal government would be of their underwriting. to a much broader extent, the

system was allowed to fail back then, and was rebuilt from ashes, and that memory is pungent in a lot of people's minds. many people cannot fathom the sense of conservation, frugality, and these other fine virtues that were to be discovered in the great depression. the system has become much bigger now. the treasury and federal the serbs have become much bigger. we have the entitlement programs like social security, medicare, medicaid, bigger government bureaucracies, much more in the way of obligations and an interconnected legislative system. it is so much harder to say let the system burned down and we will rebuild it from scratch in how many years, let the depression take place. there are some that aren't you

that instead of -- argue that instead of throwing trillions of dollars at the problem, we should have taken our lumps of from to. host: speak to that, if you will. what suggestions will begin to turn the situation around? people need jobs in order to consume, pay mortgages, etcetera. what is the view of those you talk to about what will start the momentum? jobs,but they do not appear out of nowhere. internet90's, the spanned this huge productivity. we do not know what this will be yet.

these tens -- thesehings tend to happen in silicon valley, labs of innovation. people are suggesting that it can be clean technology. they are not going to stop this vicious cycle. you see how that works. host: bill, and depending

upon thnext call is from georgi. caller: how do we get in a recession? we had to tack a -- two tax cuts? the economy is there? bacon package them and sell them to wall street. what shape it package a proposal. this was a win-win situation.

the homeowner would be flourish. there are increasing amounts of cash. everything was copacetic. we came minutes wouldn't an entire system failing approved. the federal reserve system is the problem until we it just the

fundamental problem but will only get worse to you have any reaction? guest: it is hard to unwind the federal reserve bureaucracy that we have. he won a gold standard deck. there is a fly and the placement. we were incapable of paying our bills. investors would demand more of us. it is unable the federal reserve to sell more? . therefore, enabling companies to go out there and issue debt at lower yields. this is good on one and.

host: as you talk about the economy. caller: i do not want to diminish the discomfort and agony of unemployment at 10%. it is intolerable. you did get it with a little bit of perspective at the united states economy but you realize that all gains that we have made in the last 10 years have not disappeared. the stock-market has not done

particularly well. the individual citizens and you are looking for jobs is greater than any time in the world. this is merely a correction. it is caused by too much spending. thank you. allied to hear your comments. guest: it is hard to put that in perspective. people have been so used to a modicum of prosperity.

housing prices have gone up. stock markets have gone up. there is a promise of 15% a year. that is not happening. there is a record amount of wealth. people are not feeling anything but healthy. it can amplify the fear out there. it is important to put it in perspective. use is up. unemployment looks more chronic than it has in recent years. it is largely a three-year phenomenon. the fear is that it becomes a slow burn promote you have economists talking about a new normal. it has become a cliche that we

will have to get used to this better. we have been deluding ourselves for a credit bubble that has transpired. some people are what is happening in the bond market to. . .

we have had an epic out of spending and rates have

collapsed. shif you take him down too fast and too low, he will have problems. you don't want to see the silver bullet. interest rates are a blunt instrument. the government will use the borrowing costs. typically, you'll have to pick up the tab. many spectators are worried about how we will pay for this when the bill comes due.

>> our next telephone call is from oregon. >> good morning. i am just looking at a book written by the columbia business school. they are putting out to the definitions of recession verses depression. can you define the american people? the newill you define this as a recession or a depression? >> this is easily the worst thing we have experienced since

the great depression. this is not a depression. recession is characterized as consecutive decline. if joblessness gets worse, if you see continued systemic issues, this lens more credence to those or arguing for the depression. >> earlier, you say that people are keeping a watch on inflationary trends. what does deflation look like? >> this looks like ongoing

falling prices. when you have a self-fulfilling prophecy of spiraling lower prices and margins have been no pricing power and they have to keep bringing their prices down, that results in commercial property defaults, increased joblessness, employers, and back and say if you want a job, he will have to take a cut. inflation is a known villain for the federal reserve. deflation, that is quite terrifying. how the idea that the fed will keep pushing on a string and

things will keep falling in price. this is happened several times over the past 20 years. >> the solution to a scrambling economy should be targeted boost of our economy. >> good morning. i am right on top of what is going on because i am a statistician. i am contacting a gentleman who

has already been in a position to change what is going on with waste. the people in our universities are too consolidated. they need to realize the people who are out on the field who have been researching this. people are coming out of the woodwork, they will not retire, they will be there like children. they refused to drop away. they have purified what they're doing in their lives and they're in a position to do what they're doing.

i eat better than anyone the i know. ideal most anything-i do most anything than anyone i know. >> he talked about waste. this is a new way of thinking.

if the government was out there, they says tha that we can invesn clean technology, this would not sit well politically. all of these automobiles suppliers going bankrupt, there would be the daisy chain effect. then there is a battle that is being fault. this is old american industry versus new american industry. silicon valley is begging for money. is begging for the government to get out there and throw money at alternative energy. bill gates just from an essay on this. there are political vagaries in the near term. the need to prop up the ecomy and not just dump thousands of auto workers back into the system. it shows you, in theory, it is wanting to write these things down, and they make for great talking points, eminently

reasonable to allow the old economies to blow away and spend on the new, but in practice, it is vexing lead difficult for a government to do these types of things in a recsion. host: as we await the joble numbers, these numbers will be closely watched. last week's an anticipated report took the markets by surprise. what would be the market's reaction, depending on which windows? guest: the market is your -- it is still a huge number relative to jobless claims. the fact that they are down there trying to slice and dice numbers, hopefully you see a moderation in the growth of unemployment, growth in jobless clai might be good news. it shows you how low we have been laid. in the past, you were just

looking for these numbers to beat them in a mess, with unemployment naturally supposedly around 5%. host: elizabethtown, pennsylvania. harry, republican line. caller: we have been practicing only one side of free trade. until we change it and go back to the tariff system, we probably will never have a recovery. the japanese living standards past nine of the united states in the 1990's. there is a real decline here. until we change our trade policy and build a manufacturing base, we may never had a real recovery. guest: this is a tough thing to comment on. there is a walmart effect in

this country. they are doing well politically because people can go in and buy clothes that were manufactured for pennies abroad. people can afford a digital camera for $150. these are the fruits of the trade. unfortunately, we have the eviscerated manufacturing in this country. you cannot sustain the industry that are used to paying people $25, 30 fund dollars an hour, when the chinese equivalent can be manufactured at a fraction of that. there are beneficiaries of free trade. by the millions. anyone that has experienced discounts at a target, walmart, costco, things that you can do,

efforts and we can get in the country, but there is a phrase -- there is a price to pay. the question is, do we want to be helping these people be replaced in industries where the united states is competitive? maybe in medical devices, semiconductors, a corridor of cleatechnology can be billed out. that is where there is some debate between free trade and protectionism. host: in the "new york times" business section. steven greenhouse's story.

do you have any comments on this case? guest: in a much better economy, it would be much more of the day pr black guy for walmart -- more of a black eye for walmart. people are trading down, people are realizing they really need a mpany like this to help them spend their overtaxed dollar. whereas walmart, in the boom years of 2006 -- you would always see magazine covers portraying it as a psychological guilt trip, providing stingy benefits, tearing apart cities, mom-and- pop businesses -- a lot of that criticism has been muted over the past two years.

host: michael on the independent line. caller: a qui comment and question. i think the only thing that is saving this country is the fact that we have 16 aircraft carriers and stealth bombers. if china own to us, until they get 16 aircraft carriers, we are still the biggest stick on the block. host: that is a good promotion for our look and defense and defense spending. today, we will be looking at military members, what their economic situation is, what their compensation is like. at the close with you here, we started by asking you if you were optimistic. what may happen this fall that

may impact the way the economy is coming? guest: this time of year is just so were some four markets. people come back from summer vacation. they have to come back and open up their statements again and look at the real numbers. kind of day confluence about a locker -- lackluster stock market, the atrocious housing numbers. certainly, right now, the stock market is now on the cat's meow. there is a record disparity between the earnings disparity offered compared to the tiniest of treasury yields, but nobody seems to care because the stock market has gone nowhere. you have to look at this as a two front of thing. it is one thing to be academic,

a very staff-oriented world. it is another thing to look at the peculiar psychology of the stock market. in the past, it has shown that it has a mind of its own. i would caution people from correlating the two exceedingly. host: you can watch and read him regularly business week. >> tomorrow, a look at recommendations to help protect the gulf coast from hurricanes. steven flynn is our guest. a federal court ruled that the government can muster individuals without a warrant. the george washington law

professor towards us to talk about the case. then our week-long series on military continues. later, remarks from chris van hollanen at the national press club. up next, a conversation on the 25th amendment and presidential disability. we will look at presidential succession and the role of u.s. vice-president. this event is almost 90 minutes.

it would be logical that i would be asked because i know absolutely nothing about this subject. i might add that i am in good company. i know nothing about it like everyone else in american media. we know nothing about this subject. that is the tragedy. i was in a debate on the subject of the electoral college. maybe so how much somehow, that is how we got here. this critical subjects has no interest to the american media

until it is too late. maybe this is because sex is not part of the equation. they might not realize that disaster strikes.

does this provide to the inside to make things work properly? robert gilbert is our first presenter. he is a political scientist and a professor and a scholar of the american presidency. in 1996, he was part of the special group that advised president clinton on the issue of disability and presidential

succession. his topic was presidential disability in the age of terrorists. he was the chairman of the political science department for northeastern university. out ruth mcdermott is a political science director at brown university. in addition to her ph.d., she holds a doctorate hints in psychology.

held in nationalistic of drug abuse in san francisco through this executive permit and is also holding fellowships at stanford and harvard university. our third presenter is the sterling professor of law and political science. he is a member of the american academy of arts and sciences and it has delivered in doubt lectures at some three dozen colleges and universities. his writings on today's topics include, is the presidential the session law constitutional?

presidents, vice presidents, and guests, closing the succession gap. we begin with professor gilbert. >> having listened to the speaker's on the first panel, i was reminded that there are many critics of the constitutional amendment, the 25th amendment to the constitution, which is a very brief amendment. only the fourth section is lengthy.

i know there are critics that have arisen over the years. i have heard many suggestions made and some of these are made by physicians and some are not by physician. refer to these suggestions from time to time one of the speakers

referred to woodrow wilson. woodrow wilson was a famous example of a president to suffered a physiological illness why he was in the white house -- while he was in the white house. presidential disability that not begin with woodrow wilson. president john adams was bill while he was in the office of president. president james madison, one of the principal authors of the constitution was ill for about a month off to the point the some of his contemporaries considered presidential succession. president monroe was ill, president jackson was ill first.

zachary taylor became ill and died. president william handley henderson -- president harrison had the brief is history in one month. many of us are familiar with cases of physiological illness.

very little attention has been given to those presidents who suffered from psychological illness. there has been a number of them. before i even discuss the three, psychological illness poses unique problems for the political system. the problems have not gotten any better over time. one of the instances of psychological disability was the president is served in the middle of the 1800's. obviously the learning in the middle of the 1800's is different than it is now. this would be a problem with this political system. there is a great deal of

misunderstanding about psychological illness. many people see this as caring a very -- have the stigma. many people believe that serious psychological illness is the result of sen or weak character. -- sin or weak character. this is true now. this is obvious that the american public is very uncomfortable by the very question of psychological illness and the existence of psychological illness. obviously, this would make it a very difficult for any president of the u.s. in admit that he should invoke section 3 a step aside until the psychological problems could be corrected.

at least three presidents in my judgment, i am not a psychologist, i have not had an opportunity to meet with any of these pres president'ts. many psychologists agree with me. three of them suffered from psychological problems. clinical depression is extremely difficult to diagnose. its symptoms suggest physiologic illness. sometimes this suffer pangs and they believe that they're physically ill. >> bmany people who are depressd

the want to discuss the fact that they are depressed. they know that there's a stigma attached to the illness. many people believe that it is appropriate and customary to react to the death of a loved one and this is normal. there was an article in the new york times that said "grief is noble. this is emblematic of a deep love between friends, siblings, parents. therefore, the press individuals

are very seldom willing to discuss their depression. they tend to conceal their depression. they don't it myth that they are psychologically affected by their experiences and they're able to put on a very happy face. they are able to deceive people who are trying to diagnose the condition from which they suffer." one statistic that i found to be amazing is that psychiatrists failed to diagnose 70% of the oppressive conditions. they are not recognized even by the people of been trained to diagnose them. when it comes to primary care physicians, 90% of the time they do not see the bronco that exists. -- see the problem that exists.

the is also pertain to susteren affected .... one prominent psychologist -- they also pertain to so co effective illnesses. schizophrenia can look like meany it in its active phase, depression with psychotic features, certain forms of drug abuse, extreme obsessive compulsive disorder, post- traumatic stress disorder. two other psychiatrists speak to the same problem, how difficult it is to differentiate between

psychological illnesses. i would wonder what it would be like for a panel examining the president and determining whether they have a psychological problem. some do not the resulting impairment, some result in severe impairment. the level of impairment would be very important in terms of deciding when to invoke section 4 of the 26 -- 25th amendment. "such labels as schizophrenia are used to report to poor prognosis cases where execute schizophrenia, reactive

schizophrenia, are used for the good prognosis cases." and other words, there are many variations of schizophrenia and similar illnesses. these affect patients in different degrees and to varying extents. presidents would not be as accessible as a normal patient to medical personnel. it would be difficult for a psychiatrist to get an understanding of the president's psychological well-being.

i believe that there were the three presidents of the united states who suffered from a depressive illness. the president's i'm talking about are franklin pierce, called in coolidge -- calvin coolidge, abraham lincoln. each of them suffered the loss of a young son during his presidency and sometimes under really terrific circumstances. franklin pierce, forcible, was traveling in a row ricard with his wife and with their last surviving child. they had already see two of their sons die.

they were traveling to new hampshire with their home in new hampshire and the train became involved in some kind of a wreck. it plunged down and in bank went. the future president discovered the body of his son. the back of the boy's head had been ripped off. when the president found him, he was dead. their reaction of the president and the first lady were to be completely enclosed in grief. many said that the first lady never got over this. she avoided social interaction with people. she spent most of her time in

her room writing notes to the dead boy. president pierce overwhelm with grief, unable to deal with the problems. calvin coolidge, the same experience. he suffered the loss of his favorite son who died from blood poisoning. he developed an infected blister on one of his toes and he died within weeks. coolidge cost behavior change dramatically. we sometimes forget that he was governor of massachusetts, he was a long-term member of the state's legislature. in all of the earliest positions, he was respected. he was held in high esteem.

he turned in a very impressive performance. calvin coolidge was nominated and a few weeks later, he lost his favorite child. his behavior changed dramatically. he worked four hours a day. he is to be described as the workhorse of american politics. he was distracted. he told his cabinet to take care of the problems in your area. if you cannot take care of your problems, do not bother me with this. when he was asked at a press conference about the troops in nicaragua, he did not even know

who was there. he said, they have been withdrawn. a r merlon uncertain. this is a president who did not function anymore. franklin pierce is denigrated by scholars virtually unanimously. even before he became president, he was an inept politician. the third president who lost a son was abraham lincoln. he lost his son. his wife was also on the verge of a nervous breakdown.

abraham lincoln is rated the best of the american presidents. despite his depression, he is ranked as the greatest president in american history. i mention these three cases to you. suppose it panel of physicians were trying to decide if they should have been removed from office. perhaps calvin coolidge should have been removed from office because his behavior changed dramatically. franklin pierce was inept before and he was an apt during. abraham lincoln's personality did not change. he was heartbroken but he function effectively as president. if i mention these studies to demonstrate how difficult it would be for any team of doctors to be able to make predictions

on this and to suggest to section four can be invoked. is a be a virtual impossibility. >> think you very much. >> it is and honored to be here. presidential succession is a very important topic. when i was writing my book on presidential illness, i was thinking about the attacks on

9/11. what happens in the case of mass of annihilation where you have an attack or in whole host of leaders and a whole line of succession actually against taken out. you can imagine a lot of members of congress getting taken out by weapons of mass destruction. i was thinking at that time using as a model a kind of network. this is similar to the way the pentagon of developed the internet. he would be able to have redundant and over napping networks. also to think about developing a succession program that involves regional leaders whether their governors, a elected representatives, or

leaders in the chain of succession. as i was thinking for this presentation, it struck me in thinking about ambiguities in the current law, we wanted to look at how we regard assessments of in ability and disability. many past presidential leaders and others to follow them have been very interested in hiding their frailties and disabilities. there has been a lot of questions about what constitutes a disability and who gets to decide. whether someone is incapable of performing their duty. one of the things that struck me in this regard is that we think of our biology as pretty stable.

in fact, our biology is every bit as flexible, malleable, adaptable, as our constitution. one of the scientific realities is the mass of the advances that have been made in 5 biology and genetic sciences by actually doing physiological assessments. i was talking to one of members of the fordham law review about a recent panel that had been done and there are some overlapping issues. it is important for us to be pressured to looking forward on these issues. -- for us to be prescient looking forward on these issues. unless we start to address these issues, these things will come

about in a way that will eventually cause a crisis. i think that a lot of the biological factors i am talking about were not a manageable -- imaginable 40 years ago. there was not enough scientific development did think about if you have information on a leader and they had a genetic risk factor for a particular illness. in this regard, i don't mean to be blunt or crass or talk but that there is a gene for this, that is ridiculous. i also don't mean to talk about illnesses and risk factors that leaders may have but also characteristics that we may decide to screen for on the

upside. let me give you an example. imagine that you have a woman like hillary clinton running for president and you find out as she carries the gene that makes her vulnerable for breast cancer. does that constitute an inability? is this something we should screen for? obviously the iconic example was something like huntington's disease. in many other cases, one of the problems is that you cannot know what is going to happen. there will always be an environmental interaction that will precipitate a manifestation of a given problem or a particular disease. it does mean that there are risk factors.

it is not just whether or not that information should be made public. the issue is that once it is found, once someone gets into office, is that something that constitutes an ability or inability that should be counted for? again, this is one of those kinds of things where there is flexibility in the documents. we need to think about how to consider these things as they arise because the size will move forward with or without us. i have done some work on genetic polymorphism as it relates to regression to inton.

if you have a particular kind of dramatic life event in your past, you are more likely to respond impulsively when you are provoked. the emmys as someone in that circumstance might be able to respond aggressively to a challenge, this is in political areas as well. it is important to think about how those things may manifest. the critical factor in in very aware that it is hard to talk about these things and presented to the public because these

arguments are often subtle. it is not that the influences are simple, they always involved and of our mental component. they can be subtle and they can be profound. it is difficult to represent this in 30 seconds. you will not have these discussions on world news tonight. however, they are very important. it is important to talk about the ways that we might accommodate or scientific advance is that would have been an immeasurable sternly at the time of the constitution was framed. these things always exist in a distinct political ecology. it is not that a depressed leader will be depressed

regardless the certain things can happen. certainly undesirable things i can affect people in profoundly different ways. we elect them to respond. someone like abraham lincoln might not necessarily have gotten depressed if he had not lost both of his children. there has been some discussion on wilson and in this regard, the depression that he had following the death of his wife. that was a very interesting circumstance where had the 25th amendment been in place, there would have been some discussion on removing him from office. his doctor is known to have had

notes that said "i need to get this guy married again." unless we find him another wife, there will be a war. he did, he found him a wife. all of a sudden, there is a quick reversal in his position once his emotional state was stabilized. that is a brief interlude. i think that we can think about these things happening to all of us in our life in unpredictable ways. it is very important to think

about the characteristics that might make certain leaders better suited for other challenges and not as well suited for other challenges. there is also an upside. there are also certain characteristics that will help people be more effective leaders in one way or another. they are more charismatic, they are more resilient. some are less likely to be alcoholics, some are able to have greater intelligence, greater london capacity. that is the something that you will screened for. okay, i will remove someone from

office but it gives you a reason to say, maybe i want this person in office more than this other person in office. can we legitimately make a decision? can we say that we will screen people that have better leadership characteristics? i know this salads like a monty python moment because there is an element of science fiction. the analysis available to us is quite advance. you can swap your own cheek and for under dollars, you can get your genome. pretty soon, we will get this to the leaders. this will get into the hands of those to want to use this for a political reason. we need to think about it at a time. people will use this for a

political advantage. i think that it is important when we think about assessments of disabilities and the ability to consider these kinds of biological and physiological factors. thank you very much. [pause] . >> it is a great honor and privilege to be with you all, especially on a panel with one of my heroes. i had a dream last night.

i spend my life basically telling around with the likes of abraham lincoln and james madison and telling my students what they really thought about this or would have said about that great thing is that there never around to contradict me. now i am with a framer, you see. i have this dream, you remember this from "annie hall?" there is a professor bloviating about something and in the dream, he looks a lot like me. then woody allen pulls out the author that the professor was

talking about andy's the author says "you know nothing of my work." why can't real-life be more like this. it is with a certain trepidation that i offer you three sets of the possible applications, the ways of thinking about the 25th amendment. i don't know how much the framers would have recognize these possible applications and implications. that is why there is ambiguity. that is a topic on this panel. for the first and the most important by far is the seventh implication is that in my

opinion, the 25th amendment ahas been for statutory succession. what happens when both the president and vice president are simultaneously debtor disabled -- dead or disabled. my opinion on the books is really a constitutional accident waiting to happen. an accident of pretty epic proportions. this is a low probability event. as recent things in russia have shown, this is not a zero probability event. the 25th amendment has