have on certain subjects. so we're going to ask you qutions we think you might have knowledge on. if you don't, let us know and then we will go on. >> thank you, your honor. and that is exactly why my questions were general in nature and not specific to this incident. general in nature that related to this witness' background expense. would you agree with me, mr. wells, that in order to ensure continuity in safety management across an organization, that it would be helpful to have written procedures to ensure that safety critical operations are performed in a consistent and predictable manner? >> we, for many tasks, we do have written procedures, and we

expect those to be followed. there are some activities that we don't have procedures. >> and how do you make that distinction? >> i'm not involved in that detail. it's the judgment of the people involved with the operations, and when i say the people involved, not only the people directly involved, but also our technical authorities, et cete cetera. >> but if you to the extent you have a role in overseeing or assessing safety management, if you detect situations where there is uncertainty on the part of the people performing those operations, would you agree with me that one of the ways to prevent that kind of uncertainty

would be to ensure tat there are written standards in place so that people know what is expected of them, and what they should do in older to maximize safety and reduce risk? >> we have -- many standar and procedures in place. if those, if people have questions about those, they should raise those, and that's why we have the stop the job. if there are not written procedures, technical practices for something, then they are to use their judgment on whether something needs to be prepared. or they feel they have the knowledgand experience to move forward. >> and if there are no written procedures, and the people performinperforming for overseeing the operations wind themselves uncertain as to how to interpret the results of that safety critical observation, they should not go forward, is

that correct? >> no. it's their judgment on what the right path forward is. that's their judgment. >> nothi further, thank you your honor. >> how long would yolike to

>> any questions you would like to ask? >> no, thank you. >> ms. karis for bp? [inaudible] >> okay. well, transocean? >> yes, sir. honor. thank you. >> good morning, mr. wells. i represent transocean. >> excuse me. if you move that microphone over since he is facing that way, it's a little bit easier. thanks. >> mr. wells, i apologize. i did not hear your exact title. did you say you are senior vice president? >> yes. i'm bp's senior vice president.

>> how many senior vice president does bp have? >> i'm guessing probably around 15 or so. each one of us has a different part of the business. i run the onshore gas business et cetera all over the world. i'm guessing somewhere in the range of that. >> data also, did i hear you correctly that when the texas city explosion occurred, that you in the middle east working in the middle east? >> that's correct. >> and that some subsequent time, a team game to the middle east and briefed you about the causes and the lessons learned from the texas explosion? >> it was actually the individual that was leading the investigation in texas city. his name was john. i knew john, and when it was all over and done with a i asked him if he would come and talk to my leadership team. >> survive than a team he would substitute john, a single individual could lead the

investigation speak? correct. >> okay. would you agree with me that the incident of april 20 was the largest casualty in bp's corporate history? >> this has been a devastating event. >> i understand the. >> texas city was a devastating event. which one, they're both just devastating events. i wouldn't want to try to say one over the other. >> let's just talk about money. i know that bp has pledged $20 million, and i want to know, is that a number that is in excess of what was paid to texas explosion manner? [inaudible] >> could you repeat that question? >> sure. i'm just going to get the witness to answer which was the largest casualty in the history of the company. and maybe can't answer that but i think there's a way that i could perhaps refresh his

memory. and i want to ask him, in terms of dollars, would you agree that this is the largest casualty in the history of the company? >> well, if you think it is and you want to say yes, that's fine. obviously, no one knows the precise cost. and we all know, i can imagine any what is here's going to say this isn't a catastrophic casualty, both in terms of substance as well as financial cost. and, indeed, they're probably been a number of others in history of bp as well. so we are all operating under the assumption this is a catastrophic and enormous loss, both in terms of human laws, environmental laws, and financial loss. >> let me try it another way. perhaps i can shorten it with this question. can you think of a casually that is caused greater dislocation to bp than this one? spent i will say what i said again. this one and texas city have

been devastating event for us. tremendous loss of life. >> before receiving your subpoena to appear before this board, you were aware this board was meeting, taking testimony into the causes of the casually of april 20? >> yes. >> and upon receiving your subpoena, did you do anything to educate yourself about the causes of the casualty so that you could give competent testimony to this board speak? what i did to my train was asked why i was subpoena sosa never worked in deep water. they sent this letter from 2003, which was one incident that happened in 2002. that was a long time ago. and so i did sit down with the two people that attended the meeting with the mms with me, and help them remind me about

the events and about the meeting we had with the mms. that's just the extent of what i've done to prepare. >> let me see if i can reverse it. tell me what you did to prepare to give testimony about the causes of the april 20 casualty? >> i have done nothing to prepare because i don't believe i have any insights into the causes. >> do you know david sims? >> yes. not well but i surely know who david is. >> do you know who mark is? spent i know, i know of mark. >> do you know brian morel? spent i do not. >> do you know brad? >> i do not. >> do you know greg walls? >> i think i've met him once. >> do you know john? spent i don't. >> are you aware that some or all these people were involved in one way or another in the design of the macondo 252? >> i have clearly heard their names associated with this event.

i don't know to what roles or extent they played. >> so you never picked up the phone and asked anybody of bp's design of this well to find out why it failed? >> no. i've been very clear, once i was asked to be involved in the response, my philosophy is if you start going down the track of trying to find out what caused it you get distracted from the response. that was the last thing we needed. >> i just talking about you, not weak. >> and i was talking about me and the others that were also on the response and a tried to pass along that same philosophy. >> so as you see here today, you have no information whatsoever that you can offer this board as a senior vice president of bp, as to what may have gone wrong with bp's well-planned? >> what i know is what happened during the response, and i think that with a few things that happen in the response that i think will be important to any

investigation. and i clearly think that any investigation will want, when we get that b.o.p. available, to bring it to the surface, they will want to look at it. >> let's put the beauty aside and talk about the well-planned. the design of this well, okay? did you get any kind of a briefing in this case, like he got in the texas city case while you were in the middle east? >> no, i did not. >> you didn't want that briefing? >> my focus is on the response. as soon as we finished -- bp does have an investigation going on. i'm aware of that. i don't know what they're doing. i missing any of the reports but when it is done and we understood all the root causes, outsold i will want to look at it. i will run from and want to make sure this never happens again to us or anybody else in our industry. >> when john flew over to the release to brief you what happened and texas city how long did it take him to brief you about the casualty? >> he spent about two or three

hours with our team. we also had the bigger panel report, which i spent some time on my team a. john wasn't there when we do that. and then we looked at, what we particularly focused on was the integrity management issues that we might have on shore. >> the question was how long? how long did all that take? >> john was there for about three hours. >> you think you could have taken three hours a for appearing before this board to find out about this casually like you did a texas city casualty? >> objections. i'm going to abstain it. he testified he made a decision to focus on remediation and affirmative decision not to look back. now that may or may not be a judgment that we all agree with. but that ground has been covered at least twice do. we know that the decision you make him is that correct? >> that is absolutely correct.

>> later on i suppose the board might say people were involved in remediation for fixing a problem, perhaps should spend time on root causes. maybe they'll turn out to be true here. but we could save a document i think for later, but we are aware that's what you do. so i'm going to sustain the objection. >> mr. wells, you indicated in order testimony in answer to question from one of the board members that a well site leader is there to ensure our expectations of followed through with. or words to that effect. do you recall that testimony speak was yeah. i said our well site leader is our representative that communicate our expectations. >> menu added our well site leader is beside the what, not the how. do you recall that testimony? >> yes. >> now when you say the what, the well site leaders are there to do the what. you're not saying the well site leaders decided whether or not to displace a well before a

negative test is performed. that happens on the beach, doesn't it? >> i don't know. the specifics of that. >> typically an engineer with bp would make that decision, not a well site leader, correct? >> i said i don't know. >> you don't know that? >> i don't know that. >> would be correct that a well site leader would not determine the centralizers to be used in a bp well? that would be done by it bp engineer on the beach of? >> i'm not sure who does it in that organization. unita as the people that are involved in that organization. >> i am going to do that but i thought perhaps as a senior vice president of bp you would be able to say that that is an engineering decision, and only an engineer would be allowed to make that decision. can you say that? >> know because i don't know if that is to or not in this case. >> can you tell are not you lead to a well site leader versus an engineer the decision as to whether or not, and when, to use a lockdown system?

>> no, i don't know exactly who makes that call. >> what about decisions with respect to a casing program like, a long string versus a tieback system, that would be left at well site leader, wouldn't? >> no. i believe the well plan, the well design is done well before the well is ever spun. >> not by well site leader, in other words? >> just spent but these are the things all affect the integrity of the well. and these are the decisions that you hope that the bp engineers are making, not well site leaders on a rig, correct? >> what i said is the well design, well plan is created before the well is the spun. and that involves a number of people. the well site leader could have been involved in part of that. but typically, it's done by our engineering and technical staffs, a number of people. >> so with respect to each one of these what's, the

displacement, the number of the centralizers, lockdown sleeves, long string, use of, performing of a cdl, all of those things, the what's, are not really good to well site leaders on a rig. they may be part of a decision but you expect the engineers back on the beach employed by bp to be making those decisions, correct? >> yes on a number of decisions in there, and i'm just not that involved -- surly don't work deepwater, but even in my own business the actual individual decisions around a well, i'm just not -- that's not my role. >> let's talk about the how. you say the well site leaders are in charge of the what, although you may have modified that a bit, but not the how. the how is something that's done by transocean, correct? in this case. >> in this case. there are people executing it, and that's what i call the how.

>> and the how they're doing, that is how they do something, it depends upon what they're told to do. they do what they're told to do and the question is how do they do it. that's what you're saying. >> yes. so the what could be quite specific, or it could be quite general. and then keep ending up on what procedures or standards, the contractor uses, in this case transocean, then they would follow those. >> pride to the incident in question on april 20, had you been told by anyone at bp that transocean have not done the part that they are relegated to do, the how that they've not done it exactly as bp wanted? >> i really haven't had any conversations about transocean prior to april 22, for me. spirit and you haven't heard from any source from bp when you say you haven't had any conversations, i want to take it to another, higher level. from any source at bp, had her that transocean have not done what bp wanted them to do?

>> i'm not aware of any conversations like that. >> do you know who pat o'bryan is? >> i doubt do expect who is pat o'bryan. >> pat o'bryan is our currently his role is the well's drug in our deepwater business. >> okay. is he a good employee? >> he is a very good employee? >> and knowledgeable fans to? i have worked with pat in the past and have a lot of respect for him. >> has he been a longtime employee of bp? >> i think pat joined the firm through the arco fast our acquisition of the was with one of our predecessor companies. so he would have been with bp's since about 2000. >> since you do with bp has he been promoted? are increases in pay? >> i believe so, yes. >> obvious he will testify, so my guess we will be running

through his credentials and history at the time he testifies. so it would be fresh in everybody's mind and. >> have you seen any of the post-incident interviews by the blight investigation of people who are on the rig? >> i have not. >> do you know what the bly investigation is? >> i know mark bly is. >> and were you aware that people under mark bly's direction interviewed the basic bp employees to find out what they do, what they thought, what they could say in terms of helping understand this casualty? >> i would hope they are interviewing everybody that they think has any knowledge about the event. >> were you aware that pat o'bryan was on the rig on april 20? >> yes, i was. i have heard that speak so in addition to whatever his job responsibilities may have provided him in terms of

insights, he also was a witness to the events, correct? >> i object. he has nothing to do with his. >> i am going to sustained in the sense he's going to be here, we can find that his knowledge. there are other ways to put in information. if it's inaccurate, and as we know, it's been an admirable struggle by a but to get to the testimony, without going into the test when a people are going to be here who are not yet here. you know, i could see in another context that might be relevant or even time sensible. but given what we have to do, the board would like to focus on the knowledge that mr. wells has, that other witnesses don't have much more clearly, particularly people who are going to be here. i don't need to carry on too much now, except other attorneys may have the same goals in mind that i would think we ought to focus on what he knows, that bears directly on the incident

that brings us altogether, rather than on his evaluation, the credentials of others. >> judge, i intend to ask pat o'bryan some questions on the line does going down and was going to stop it anyway. but i didn't expect pat o'bryan to say i'm a great employed and i've been promoted. i thought his superior would be able to give us that inside, and then i could ask the questions with that in the record. so i think i've established that pat o'bryan is a good employee, he has been promoted, he is viable and you trust his judgment that all those things are correct. >> that was very good. >> thank you. [laughter] >> all right. anadarko and moex offshore. >> good morning. my name is death commercial. i'm here for anadarko and moex offshore.

i would like to turn your attention back to the 2003 letter from the mms that we started with this morning. i know that you said that he was said to responsibilities in shallow water, but what i would like to do is explore some of the topics in this letter, and ask whether or not these general principles would still applaud in deep water, in fact maybe even more so given the unique challenges that we face in deepwater drilling. fair enough? >> sure. >> all right. in the second paragraph of the letter, the mms talked -- >> there are two letters, which letters the? the letter of september 23, 2003, the pink one right on top there. >> okay. >> in the second paragraph near the end, the mms talks about the fact that there had been a deviation from the permitted plan submitted to the mms in this 2002 set of incidents. would you agree with me that one

lesson learned from this come if bp didn't already know it, was that you don't want to deviate from the permitted plan that's been approved by the mms, is about right? >> in this case there was actually debate about, it had to do with the use of the diverter, which in a plan covered the drilling, but the context of this was using it during the cementing of the well. and so there's a great debate about that. that wasn't in the plan. therefore, it was a deviation from the plan. i think over time that got resolved and for the communicate and. . .

through the regulations as they so exist. >> once the action is undertaken it should be completed with an organization with what the mms has approved, should not? >> once again, i'm not going to talk about the mms because i don't know. but i do believe if we made adjustments to a plan and there is a regulatory requirement to refile a plan, then we should do that. we always look to follow all the regulations. >> regardless whether it's deepwater or shallow water, can you think the reason why bp would not be responsible for complying and mms permitted plan? what difference does it make whether it's deepwater or shallow. it clos has approved the plan, does not need to be followed? [inaudible]

>> well, and if you don't know the answer, that's fine. if you don't know reason why it should be one wayman situation and another i don't know of an honest answer. but if you can see a distinction and you want to let us know about it, with a two year it. >> i go back to where they originally said. we put together a plan and if it's somewhere along the process, something says you should alter the plan. and i think all companies, including anarcho would have situations like that, it would only be prudent to look at adjusting the plan to adjust and information. if there's a requirement to file a plan, i think i would expect us to do that. >> that would be beetroot deepwater, shallow water, land? >> it would be anywhere in the world. one of our core values as we will follow the regulations. >> now come on page two of the third level, after furthermore, there's a discussion about a lack of planning to handle some of the pressure situations in

that event. and i'm not interested in these 2002 events. i'm interested in the concept of having proper planning to handle issues that will arise during the drilling operation. which you agree with me having written procedures would certainly help facilitate planning and execution out on the rig? >> we have many written procedures that help specifically on this what we did was actually do a lot of drills to try to make sure people knew what the rules were. and what we discovered and that was inadequate. it didn't have everybody know exactly how to operate all the equipment. so there was a learning from those that we took away and we needed to be more careful in how it made sure people know exactly how to run the equipment. >> prophetically, mr. wells, really my question was wouldn't written procedures have clear

communication of the plane to the people who are to execute it and i don't believe you answered that question. >> it's all right to answer the question -- [inaudible] >> we did go into a lot previously comes if you want to get for a simple yes, no, depends on the circumstances, what everything does the truth we can move on. >> it depends. with a plan together is, write procedures for different activities and not every single activity town has a written procedure for it. >> well, in fairness to those who were to carry out the procedure and especially if that person did not have extensive experience on the rig, wouldn't make it -- would not facilitate that person's ability to carry out the plan if he had been handed a written procedure on what he was supposed to do when he showed up at the red? >> hairspray that as an exact question. >> i think the marshall islands question when overdose several times. and the witness, his answers

were consistent. you might or might not agree with them or disagree with them and obviously a recommendation you might be making to the board is we recommend to the agencies that there be much more extensive written standards. that i don't think, you know, this witness has four times really responded the same way. so i'm going to sit stand that objection. the mac would you agree with me, sir, that it is the responsibility of the bp management and senior management to ensure the decisions being made about operations reflect a company's core values? >> we try to make sure all of our employees understand all of our core values. we have a code of conduct that we share with them every year as a reminder of it and were very clear about expectations that we expect all of our employees to follow the code of conduct. >> let's talk about the stop work authority that you

mentioned earlier. several witnesses in the course of these hearings have said that anybody on the rig can stop work and i understand that bp's policy? >> that's correct. >> in the situation of an employee who has already raised the concern and the concern has been discussed in the decision has been made by the supervisor to the paths forward, is that employees to look acted to stop the job if that is concerned in his mind is still not met? >> yes. just up the job never goes away. we can be literally seconds away from executing an event. and if someone sees a hazard that wasn't previously identified and mitigated, the expect tatian is that they should stop the job. >> what is the expectation that this concern has been addressed, but in his opinion and his judgment it has not been mitigated and his boss has this is the way were going to do a? is he supposed to stop the job anyway? >> well, you're asking me to

speculate on that. i mean, the way our system works is that the risk is to be raised and it's to be mitigated. if there's a difference of opinion on whether that risk was ultimately mitigated, then after much discussion, someone needs to make a decision, the severed decision it is to be made at that point. >> and honestly, in the real world out on the rig, if an employee raises an issue, the supervisor makes the decision that he still doesn't feel like in this adjustment has addressed her mitigated the risk. an employee is not going to stay employed mind if he keeps stopping nowhere, is he? >> you know, i'm going to substantiate objection in the sense that that is a commonsense argument that the board and others might buy. but they asked this witness to speculate on what happened i

don't think we change our minds about what is logical. >> already. i'd like to go back to one of captain nguyen questions earlier and i'd like to use as our demonstrative concepts the wheel that i spoke going to the middle image is now in the middle where it all connects. i understand your testimony and some of the testimony of other bp witnesses to say that there are resources and various expertise available higher up in bp that is available for those below them if they have a question on a subject that requires expertise, is that correct? >> various expertise available. it doesn't have to be higher up in the organization. in many cases, our expertise by what we call peers of people. they've had a different career and know a lot more about something. >> so we have some folks coming down to the central gizmo from

above and from their peers coming in from the side, correct? >> yes, the multiple accesses to experience. >> you also have information coming up from the people on the rig that converges at some level of authority, correct? >> okay. >> and you have outside contract reason some of the folks who have testified previously said that bp higher some of the best in their business in the world as outside contractors and you're getting information and recommendations and advice from them. those are other spokes that would lead to the hub of decision-making, correct? >> depending upon the decision made, yes. >> and all that information is being processed a final decision can be made that comports with bp's core values and policies and procedures, fair? >> sounds at a decent description. >> okay. so where i'm still confused and worried police captain nguyen is

confused is where does the buck stop with respect to the decision-making world that comes in, expertise, factual information, where does the buck stop for a deepwater rig? and makes the decision? >> in general what i try to say is there are decisions made at different places. who has the right expertise to make the decision? every decision is not made at the same place. and specifically on the deepwater, you know, i have to stand like a broken record time of addressed in the wrong person. i've never worked a day in deepwater. how could i answer that? if you want to ask me about my onshore business i can talk about that. like i'm just trying to figure out to as the person with the buck stops there we could actually ask these questions get answers? >> we will have deepwater people later today, is that correct?

>> will have deepwater people today. >> okay, so that is obviously you will both be interested in asking those people that question. >> those are all my questions, thank you. >> okay, thanks for switching from a gizmo to ahab. [laughter] >> i did in the interest of full disclosure comes a gizmo covers everything. >> i couldn't picture it. >> okay, halliburton. >> yes, your honor. good morning, my name is don john dan and i represent halliburton. we have both spoken before? >> no come we haven't. >> i understand your senior vp with bp and where you based on the stair?

>> houston. >> tappan nguyen music asking you some questions about centralizes on the cost of them. and i wrote down a few cents that they are not at the cost. did i remember that correctly? >> how about the time to install centralize there is? is that a factory that bp considers and determining whether to use centralized there's for the number of centralized there's on a case in stream? >> i don't believe so. >> okay. we'll have you talked have detector john guide about this issue? >> i have not. has anyone told you that john guide has said previously that it would take 10 hours to read the additional 10 centralizers at the recalled, 15 centralizers that were called for the halliburton model? >> no. >> have you talked to david sims about the issue of the

additional centralizers? [inaudible] >> no, it hasn't come your honor. >> the time factor was not testify to a race by previous%. and if the answer is no because he didn't have the discussions, it won't take long to get it. so what's your answer? >> the answer is no. >> sir, do you believe it is important for bp to one of the models of outside contractors such as halliburton? >> say again what you mean by that question. >> do you believe that it's important for bp and its operations to honor the model of its outside respected contractors such as halliburton? >> what you mean by models? >> and model like for the cementing here. there's a cementing job that was performed and there are several subject to overdoing was run on the 19th of april and there

was a model, a couple of models that came out before that. and i called halliburton's model called for the use of 21 centralizers. it does not help you with what i'm talking about as far as a model? >> ascot matthaeus and engineering programs. >> yes, a simulation. as it is caught in the halliburton business. my question to you is do you believe it is important to bp one attires outside contractors, well respected contractors like halliburton, that it honors their models? >> i think we always listen to what are contractors had to say, whether we ultimately he is exactly what they say since they may have different object is then we do. sometimes we don't always do exactly what they have to say. >> well, the halliburton model's objective was to be able to have a casing run said that it would

not allow for channeling. that was in part the reason for the model. was it -- do you understand channeling to be a fact her in the running of the casein string? the [inaudible] >> this could be onshore or offshore. >> certainly the relationship between bp's and its contractors as one who's very familiar with. say we've know to what extent a general contractor would take into account what contractors, especially halliburton, what have to say. so if you have a general information, that plane. if there's particular generic problems that can occur when concrete support you have awareness of, you can testify to that. and we want to make sure it's relevant as they go. but our understanding is you don't have any knowledge about

what recommendations might have been made in this case and how, if at all, bp chose to implement them. and so i'm going to us that the attorney not us questions about this particular matter. the world the others because there's no point in asking you to guess when you don't know what happened. so for the generic aspect i think that's fine and it probably would be helpful to the board because will have some forward-looking recommendations. >> okay, do i understand you to say that in no time since the incident on april 20 have you been informed that halliburton recommended the use of 21 centralized there's? >> i have heard the debate in the press. i've not had conversations with anyone inside of bp about it. >> okay. you consider halliburton to be the leading cementing expert company in the world? >> i have worked with halliburton most of my 30 years.

i have had some very good experience with halliburton and i've had some very not good experience with halliburton. >> okay, sir. and if again my question is with respect to the presenting of the model by how the burden with regard to the work that was done here on this well, it tu take away from this incident the fact that halliburton's model should've been followed? >> i'm going to object. >> sustain it. he didn't set it outside out that it's fair to ask him questions to evaluate this particular incident. >> thank you, your honor. >> thank you. okay, cameron. whether for >> no questions. >> drillquip. >> no questions. >> jimmy harrell.

[inaudible] >> he's probably saving it. >> good morning, mr. wells. my name is pat fanning. i represent jimmy harrell who is a fellow who was the oim on the rake of the day of the explosion. i want to ask a couple of questions again about something that captain nguyen brought up in his examination and mr. mccarroll and i have a few follow-up questions. let me ask you with regard to who it bp has been held accountable for the safety issues concerning the explosion on the train to? the only name i heard you mention was tony hayward. am i correct her in my recollection? >> well, yes. and i must admit i jumped to conclusions because tony had left as a result of this. but what i would say is we haven't finished our investigation yet and i'm sure

when the investigation is finished and the group causes are understood, the appropriate actions will be taken at that time. >> okay, then my question is is mr. heyward beat in the company because you was held accountable for the safety issues? >> i'm going to sustain you. he testified he doesn't really know. he knows the timing as we all do, but you have no knowledge of the privy of the arrangement by which he left his decision to you. >> that is correct. i do not. >> not even from the news meeting? >> we would want -- we all have that information, so we could draw our own conclusions from it. next question. >> i'll go to a different issue. are you aware, sir, that the marine authorities for the bp in the gulf of mexico have testified that he doesn't know whether this is a marine safety problem or well control problems

as of this explosion? >> i'm not aware. i assume you're talking about neil cramond. i know he was here. i don't notice testimony was. >> you can see his testimony on c-span or wherever they're showing it? >> no. >> and the testimony of the bp witnesses in the past, i'd like to ask is there some policy or instruction given to bp employees given before the board so as to not educate yourself as to what went on speaking truthfully answer i don't know to these questions? i'm following up on mr. mathews question in preparation for the testimony. >> what was the question again? you can do it again. it's quicker, too. >> there is something going on at bp and i'm not saying there's something sinister or improper for don't educate yourself about to macondo well disaster and you can truthfully say i don't know what happened out there. are you aware of that or --

>> i was told i was to come here and talk about the gulf of mexico shelf. i educated myself about that so i could come. i think i've stated several times i have a philosophy winner involved in a responsibility front of the investigation. i've not done that. >> i'm sorry. i don't need to cut you off. >> so there's no bigger point. i've been as honest as they can be with this. >> okay, thank you. >> mr. kurtz to. >> good morning, sir. my name is kyl sean@represent the captain. how are you today? captain nguyen estes and questions concerning the dede two and a dede three, do you recall that?

>> and again i'm not as conversant in obvious oil and gas issues and i wasn't paying as close attention, that i thought i heard you say that you had some involvement in that process, is that correct? >> what my role in the response is to what it committee were doing because it's quite technical and put it in a language that we can communicate with the general public, press, different interested parties. i do understand what's going on on our relief of them can talk about. >> with respect to that, the captain had asked you about the use of the contractor for both of those wells. and i understand your testimony to how bad it is transocean, correct? >> now, with respect to does that duties, can you tell me, sir, whether anyone within bp has said again with respect to the subsequent relief effort that you need to be careful

about transocean? >> i have not heard that, no. >> has anyone with bp told you with respect to these with the falls, you need to be particular about the equipment and the blowout prevents with transocean? >> no one has said -- i do know we have more extensive testing on the b.o.p. and we have in the past. that's all i know. >> has any answers -- have any efforts been made to confirm certifications with respect or equipment on the dd2 in the dd3? >> i don't know. >> sir, with respect to the subsequent activities, have you attempted to determine whether or not the chain of command, that is who is in charge, under what circumstances is adequate on the dd2 and the dd3? >> i have not been involved in

that. and i don't know if it has been looked into her now. >> has anyone with bp said to you, we're concerned about the system that's in place in terms of the chain of command on either the dd2 are the dd3? >> no, no one has said that to me. >> thank you. that's all i have. >> beeper town. >> no questions. >> patrick o'brien? >> no questions. >> michael williams? >> no questions. >> does bp have any follow-up? good morning.

may i proceed? >> yes. >> thank you. >> you were asked whether you had any involvement in the investigation that bp is currently conduct deemed to recall those questions? >> are you aware whether bp has a team, an independent team investigating this incident? >> yes, i'm aware that mark bly has an investigation team and is financed by the company to look into it fully and i think they've been working it sent essentially almost april 20th. >> and you expect that that team is going to issue a report with a finding that reflects the work that it has done? >> yes, expect that they will share it very openly that we will do everything we can to learn from this and make sure everybody else does as well. >> have not had involvement in that investigation? >> i have not.

>> do you know whether they have interviewed numerous people that were present on the break as well as folks that were involved with the decision-making in connection with this trend to? >> i don't know who they've investigated, interviewed, sorry. but i do know is typically an investigation would interview as many people as they could to try to get the best understanding. >> you are not involved with any of the operations that the macondo well prior to april 20th, is that correct? >> i was not. >> every topic. you are awesome questions regarding the presentation he gave to the mms following the incidents that took place in 2003. you have the letter something to be there? >> i do. >> and just do sort of recap following a presentation that she gave to the mms, did you receive a letter in response to that presentation from the mms? >> i did. >> and as of november 6, 2003

letter to letter you received in response? >> yes. >> and sir, who sent the letter from the mms? >> chris salinas. >> and could you read into the record what mr. orrin hatch come a legal director of the mms told you in the last sentence of that letter? >> the mms acknowledges and commends bp is committed to working together with industry and mms in developing best practices that will enhance the safety of drilling operations in the gulf of mexico. >> thank you, sir, nothing further. >> any board questions? >> mr. wells coming you stated -- i'm sorry. mr. wells, you stated you were involved in the response i'd give a d. of the relief files. did you all encounter -- and you

may not know this based on your level of involvement. did you all encounter any problems with the b.o.p. stacks on the dd2, dd3. i've heard you and answering mr. shauna kiss questions that there were issues -- he conducted some are testing with respect to the b.o.p. does you are running to any issues with the two b.o.p. stacks? >> i don't know the specifics. i know he did; additionally test and then have historically been done and he took a little while. i don't know whether there is some specific issues or not, but i know it took a little while to be able to move forward with the well. i just don't have the specifics. >> did you all have any extra people out to do the additional testing? ebp higher third-party contractors to come out to contact some additional testing? >> i don't know.

i know the mms was out there or the boem was out there during the test. i'm not sure if we had additional people are not. >> okay, thank you. >> mr. wells, when you got involved in the oil spill response operation,? >> april 22nd, so two days late in the day. >> yes, sir, your test when he seems your focus had been strictly on the response operations. as i write, sir? you have no knowledge of investigation? >> no. >> so if they had been discovered by these public hearings in mpeg he operation, you would not have known anything about those? >> say that again. >> if there were gaps that have been discovered through these proceedings, that impacted your operation, your number operation which is bp of partial

operation, correct? he would not do anything about them? >> no. >> so the casualty occurs within your jurisdiction noble response, which resulted because some of these caps have been identified at this hearings because you had no knowledge of disgust are not responsible for the casualties come is that correct, sir? >> objection -- [inaudible] >> he has a point. judge, ivory tunic and objection. >> at least make by objection is that she is attempting to elicit an expert opinion from a nonexpert. >> well, i've repeatedly said to this witness and actually every witness they don't have to guess or speculate. frankly, mr. wells is a goodhearted, smart, very knowledgeable person and he shown an ability to draw that

distinction. and so, if you have an opinion based on the captain's question, you may give it. it would be a guest and we don't want to guess this. now, since the objection is taken so long, if the captain can restate his question. and if you have an answer to it, please give us your answer. >> i'm not sure if it's mr. fanning. >> i mr. fanning over here. >> i know, that's what i'm referring to. >> what you say is you have no more responsibility. great-nephew have saved a thing since april 22nd of be focused on response operation. and through these hearings, some gaps have been discovered, whether they're going to be conclusions of whether there's some potential gaps. now, some of those calves may relate to your operation on shore and there may be a casualty that can happen because of those gaps. because you have no knowledge of

what the less permits of some of these gaps. if something happens or you going to claim you have no responsibility for the casualty? >> i think i understand your question. does that appreciate, on april 22nd when it came full-time involved with the response, i set up a delicate to run the onshore business. so it is completely being handled by someone else. okay, so that's where that's happened. in terms of perhaps there have been some gaps that are identified. my experience has been -- and this is just my experience, but over 31 years, when an investigation is going on, what appears to be the obvious issues early on tends not to be the root causes when you get to the end of the investigation. so i just have a philosophy. wait until we've done all the work. then we'll understand what the real issues are, what the real causes are and we make the right movements going forward.

>> sir, i appreciate that. now again, something happened, a casualty happened and some of the gaps have been -- potential gaps have been discovered during these hearings set for later potential to onshore. if that committee that you establish -- are they responsible for the casualty but didn't take any action to address those deaths? and should you know about those calves because he pretty much pressure can delegate something but you don't have the accountability, is that correct? >> no, i bet the individual to run the business. i'm not trying to keep track of two things. i'm solely focused on one. and soon i will move back at the right time. >> i understand. so again, the questions i have had to deal with the safety -- cochair and safety management system here. so by doing so, you have shifted the accountability in this committee to this group --

>> an individual, yes. >> so they know they are accountability as a bp has been transferred to this group of individuals? >> yes. >> thank you, sir. >> any other board questions? is there anything the witness hasn't had to say that you would like to say? i would just like to add one thought and that is as i sit through these hearings obviously we don't want there to be casualties in the future, certainly none of this magnitude. but your reflection as to how the response was handled could well provide many lessons for everybody in the business. so i hope that bp and its complete investigation also investigate how efficiently that process work so that can be applied really for any operator worldwide. but is there anything you would like to add? >> if i can just say the one thing to that specific part. at the request of michael

bromwich from the boem, we have pulled together all of our learnings from the response to date and tried to buy the september 1st, we're going to prepare or we are preparing to strip or two and that will share with him everything we've learned about for better something like this ever happens again, we're much better prepared as an industry, as a country to respond to it. so we have committed to do that and are doing that next week. >> mr. lassar, any questions? >> no. >> thanks very much. thanks for your >> that was part of yesterday's deepwater horizon joint coast guard-energy department hearing.

this continues at 9:00 eastern where we will hear from engineers. that will be live coverage of our companion network c-span to carry you can watch all the oil spill your honor website. go to c-span.org/oil spill. "washington journal" is next and we will look at the day's news and take your calls and later, remarks from chris then holland at the national press club. the maryland congressman overseas contributions for democrats. coming up this hour, we will look at a report on hurricane season and the bp oil spill. the federal court ruled that the government can monitor individuals without a warrant using gps technology george washington university law professor will join us to talk professor will join us to talk about