to be being greeted with more suspicion than they have in the past. i thought that was interesting. also the prospects for middle east peace, he was pessimistic. most people are. but i think he has laid out a point that a lot, that many others have made, that at least they've got them back together at this point. >> all administrations struggle with this question. that the opposite is just not to engage at all. i'm wondering about the 20 month lag since the last peace talks and why the timing now seems appropriate for this administration to get involved in the view of the people that you talk to. >> i think the timing is now they just finally got it done. i mean, it took them 20 months. they sort of bobbled the issue at the start when they told israel it must stopped settlements and they backed off. the prime minister sort of staired him down. and then they had to

recalibrate and start over. they finally got the parties to the table. i think pessimism is war ented. he also made a point about timetable. this administration does seem to have a pen chant for meeting time tables. i'm afraid that's not the way the world works and it's very unlikely that events on the ground or in the middle east or in iraq will go the way the administration thinks it will. >> one debate was the discussion over the new star treaty. you mentioned there's very little support now but the senator seems to think that will change over tifplte >> he does. and resumeably he is privy to conversations in the republican caucus that we're not but it's no secret that some members, some republicans in the senate are using this as a political hammer to kind of go after

democratic administration. senator lugar said he thought it would be unfortunate if that continued, but i think that's just the way things are in this world, poll rised political world that we live in washington right now. >> is it a political hammer for the 2012 elections or the 2010 elections? >> probably for both. >> because the senator talked about when you asked the question about what people are talking about at home, it's really about jobs and the economy. both of you are on the foreign affairs and policy beat but the nation doesn't seem to be thinking about it. how much traction plit -- politically do foreign issues have going into the mid-term elections? >> it's very clear that his mind was, he's obviously the leading voice but his mind is on domestic issues, too. everything is going to be politicized until the election is concluded. i tend to think foreign policy

doesn't help you that much in terms of a mid-term election it doesn't hurt you to have a progress in the middle east or declare that the iraq war, the combat has ended. but in the end, that's not where voters' minds are. >> that's exactly true. foreign policy has no domestic constituency here. people in indiana or ohio or wherever they are, are not, this is not the top thing on their minds right now. jobs and the economy are. that said, the u.s. government has spent and is spending a tremendous amount of their -- our taxpayer money on these foreign policy issues, iraq and afghanistan in particular. so i think that there is some political hay to be made from foreign policy in the run-up to november's elections. >> thank you very much for your time. we're out of it. thank you for your questions for the senator. >> thank you. >> president obama is in new orleans today.

he will speak at the university marking the fifth anniversary of hurricane katrina. live coverage at 3:00 p.m. eastern here at c-span. >> we now have a generation coming up who didn't really have the arts very much as children and didn't have the arts in the public school certainly. these are now the 20-year-olds. i'm very concerned about that group of people because it's not clear to me that when they get to be 40, 45, 50 that they're going to come to the arts. >> michael kieser heads the kennedy center. tonight he'll talk about helping struggling arts associations and the impact on the u.s. >> a joint u.s.-coast guard and bureau of energy management committee investigating the deepwater horizon explosion on april 20 continued this past week in houston. next, we're going to show you some of that testimony. we begin with halliburton

technical adviser john gal leano. he told federal investigators that he recommended bp use 21 centralizers instead of six to control a potential gas flow problem with the deepwater horizon well. this is an hour and 45 minutes. ? >> we are, your honor. >> stand up and raise your right hand. as i do with all the witnesses i want to remind you that false statements given to agency of the united states is punishable both by fine and imprisonment. knowing this, do you solemnly swear that the testimony are about to give me the truth, the truth, and nothing but the truth so help you god? >> i will. >> thank you very much. we will begin as we have with the other witnesses, with members of the board asking any questions they may have. >> before we get started, would you explain your purpose at the

table, please? >> yet that i represent haliburton cut county. mr. gaziano is a employee of the company. i'm not his personal attorney but i'm the attorney for the coming that employs them. >> thank. mr. gaziano, your couple with him sitting at the table with you. >> yes, i am. >> thank you, your honor. >> thank you. >> mr. gagliano, for the record please take your full name and spell your last name. it's jesse mark, m. a r. see, gagliano. g. a g. l. i a n. o. >> thank you. and by whom were you employed, sir? >> haliburton. >> what position do you hold with haliburton? >> technical sale is pfizer. >> what office do you work in. >> i work at how byrnes oak park facility. >> do you work with and vps office as will? >> i no longer, no. >> how long did you work with

vps office speakers started with them approximately january of '06 and i was recently, left probably sometime in june. june of this year. >> how long have you been with haliburton? >> started october of 99, so about 11 years. >> prior to haliburton get any other previous oil and gas experienced? >> no. >> images through the describe your job responsibilities, sir? >> working at vps office, i filled the role of account representative. i was responsible for doing basically the design for the well portion, doing runs, provide technical support and operations to the main lab tests test, things of that sort. i also work with the guys on the rigs, logistics, order in products for the jobs coming up the. >> the guys on the rig, who would that be? haliburton or bp and transocean speakers i work directly with

haliburton. >> to the guys in the rig report to you or did they report to personnel on the rick? >> they reported to service coordinators. >> who is that service coordinator? >> at the time was gaining many. >> while you're at bp, who do you work with? >> i mainly work with the horizon exploration group. do you need me to name all the names or just the groups be? just a core group you worked with. >> many was john guide, rick, brian morel, mark, those are specific to macondo well but there were others on other wells. >> what was your interaction with those gentlemen? >> i worked in the office and the office on the same floor with those gentlemen. i attended morning call with him everyday and i interacted on a database with an. >> so every morning call, throughout the duration of the in seat 252 you participate in?

>> that is cracked and also on the weekend and conference calls. >> and i assume other sat in the. >> the majority, yes. >> did you have any concerns about any of the personnel that you worked with on the deepwater horizon with respect to your job responsibilities, or the respect? >> as for the people in how? >> yes. >> know. i worked with them for about five years. there was no major issues. >> you recently told me you would left in june of 2010 year quest out on your own accord, or was there some reason behind that? >> i had recently been promoted march first. and i had volunteered to stay in the macondo well because of the big issues going on, and then

once the incident took place i stayed and worked on the relief well to a certain point in jim. >> anytime during the macondo well, did anybody within the deepwater horizon team, the names you mentioned earlier, did anyone address concerns to you about your performance be? no. >> have you been replaced by someone else within that team, sir? >> yes. >> who would that be? >> rick gosen. >> can you give me a brief synopsis of that, and what you actually do when you run the model? what privilege are looking at, what you input into computer, to get an output. >> okay. basically i get information from bp, pipe tallies, pressures, directional data, if available,

majority of the data i receive from bp to model this software, and then i do a cement design based on the mud properties given to me. and would run this in relation. those are the main variables we use. >> and all that data is supplied to you by bp? >> all the well david is supplied to me by bp. >> and how long, how many options, actual models did you run for this will? >> specifically production chasing? >> yes, sir. >> we ran so. probably in february new the rise would get back to location. we are looking at a number of different scenarios. so cal is there going, 30, 40 plus. >> did you ever run the model with a lighter? >> yes. >> when did you run that models be?

i'm sorry. you probably ran multiple. when was the last one? >> probably seven weeks, a couple weeks before the job i think. >> were you involved any of the discussions between going with either a long string or lighter tieback? >> no. >> from you doing the models, either cementing the option indicate that one was better from a cementing standpoint? >> i know they prefer to go with a long string. they were basing everything, the decision based on if we get cement in place. and the last model we ran on the 14th with a long string. we were all satisfied with the results think could get cement in place successfully. >> and when you perform the optic in -- so if i say rongen, but out the cam on, with all the data that you had, input for the

last one, april 18, accurate, to the best of your non? >> yes yes, it was. >> and who verified that data is correct? someone you work with or is it brian morel, someone else because i'll input the data and do what i generate the port i will send it out. and usually i will get feedback from them saying hey, this is off, this is all. but i never received feedback on the 18th model run. >> how reliable is that model, sir? >> i feel very reliable. >> i add to have something in front of you that it is. it is haliburton's primary cementing best practices. there's no base number on this. but was provided. >> we have it, sir spirit can you take it out?

if you can refer to item number seven, which is a section that is entitled gas, oil. >> yes. >> can you read what starts the optic in through the end of that sentence, paragraph, sir? >> the program can be utilized as a tool to determine the gas potential in a primary cement job. the haliburton calculation when combined with local engineering experience is the premier industry solution to problems to unfit seem it. >> and you stand by that, sir? >> yes. >> had the model ever been questioned prior to april 18? >> yes. >> who questioned the model, sir? >> i remember brian morel did. >> do you know why he questioned the model? any specific reasons be? no. through the summer runs we did,

some on output he didn't necessarily agree with. or questions. so i try to provide the best answer possible to him. also come on the 14th when we were modeling, we were looking at compressibility function on the model. that was different than what they were reading off the logging tools. so there's a slight difference there, but the model -- my model -- i can only do inputs and we had in my on the rig so they would be different there. so that's a leak out the difference for. so basically we uncheck it and hard injured the compressibility they were reading off the logging tools. >> so as you complete them on april 18, you stand and the actual output that you see running less than seven centralized? >> yes. coming, the output is based on the information and it calculates which input is actually. >> had work with any other ocs operators, sir? >> ocs opera? >> unser.

i'm sorry. >> men and house with bp. >> i'm going to refer to now the document that we present a few times within this investigation. and that is the report that you supplied bp on april 18, entitled design reports and the base number on that is eight h. bell underscore 001-0988. do you have that in front of you? >> yes, i do. >> from the standpoint, sir, which is the most important component of that report? >> i feel there several, but in this particular case, when i remove the additional centralizers, it showed that the channeling would occur with the seven left in here. >> what page is that on, sir?

>> on page 23 there is a well schematic and it is color-coded with the fluids in the all. and at the bottom of the schematic, the yellow here indicates speed is just so we're all in the same page, on the top? >> yes. the top picture. the yellow indicates the cement and the green left behind indicates what's left behind to channeling. >> is it any other within that report that makes the reader aware of the potential, outside of the image? >> yes. >> what pages that on, sir? >> on page 18.

>> can you read what it says, please? >> under section 5.4 labeled gas potential. in this case the gas potential is 10.29. and against a reference depth at the reservoir and this is based on this analysis of the above outline will conditions, this was considered to have a severe gas flow problem. wills in this category fall into a flow condition three. >> is an executive summary are anything that goes in there? with that testimony in front of the board about how they don't read the whole document because 20 some pages, 30 pages. is there any kind of executive summary are anything in there to indicate there is a gas flow potential? >> no. >> all right. i'm going to refer now to an e-mail on april 18 that you sent out at 8:58 p.m. it should be right in front of you. and it has, it has a string of

e-mails. it was introduced last hearing, and i think the top response was back to you from mr. nathaniel chaisson. is that what you're looking at, sir? >> yes. >> and you read which are e-mails as at 8:58 p.m.? >> the e-mail i sent? >> yes or. >> is has attached is a revised information for the upcoming nine and seven-eighths production job. the pressure strength is not yet completed. not completed yet and truly has 34 hours. the chart of the progress is below. let me know if you any questions. thanks. >> can you just do a quick review of the two left and the cc list? you don't have to read the names. can you look at? >> okay. >> are any of those employees work outside of bp or haliburton? >> no. i believe they are all employed

with haliburton or bp. >> is there a reason, and i'm only looking at this from my side, hindsight . is any reason why there's no warning or any type of indication that there was potential for gas flow in this e-mail? >> no. on april 18, excuse me come on april 15 when i first noticed the problem, i put out a similar graph that showed the channeli channeling. once i've noticed that was occurring, i printed out that -- not that exact graph but one with several results. i print the grass out and notified bp of the potential issue that we are facing. >> and that only went to the same list your? >> no. i did send it out by e-mail. i was in the office working on and when i noticed, i printed out and got up to go show bp. when it came round the corner, i ran into greg and mark in a put

up to them and said i think whether potential problem here. a potential for flow due to the channeling. i remembered a conversation that mark was on way out to the meeting and we briefly discuss it any safety with brad to see we can do to fix the problem. and mark left eye stay behind. and later on great joined us and we worked through the afternoon. to see will be to do to take care of that issue. >> i'm going to jump to the morning of april 19. did you participate in the morning call to the rig, sir? >> yes. >> was mr. john guide on the phone call with you? >> i believe he was, yes. >> and you sent that out to them i believe almost 9:00 the day before? >> that's correct. >> did anything come up with the personnel on board the rig about the potential? >> no. i don't never anything being said about it.

>> to your knowledge was ever brought in was attention prior to doing the cement job on the rig that they had the potential for severe gas will? >> i know brett had conversations with brian morel about the channeling effects. on the evening of the 15th when we worked late that evening prime to run difference in his. and women funny came down to 21 centralizers would take care of the issue, he called bryant who is on the rig at the time and discussed it with him. the results. >> didn't haliburton personnel on the rigs have any conversations with mr. morel? >> not that i'm aware of. >> is a typical protocol for haliburton to only notify the operator, bp in this case, or for example, if you did work molex, do you know we just send it to the operator or do you have any contact?

a veteran indicate a santos deep ecologist giving and example of an operator. i apologize for that. [inaudible] >> i was just trying to explain and operated i apologize, ma'am. i just looked around the room and saw an operator and pick your name. [laughter] >> but is a protocol for you all to just notify the operator? >> yes. i just had to bp. i don't get involved with partners or anything like that. >> were you aware of the returns of this well, sir? >> yes. >> didn't have any effect on the cement job? >> well, when we were modeling fee job several days before that, i wasn't aware of any losses. when it came to closer to the cement job. they had terrible losses throughout the well. but amazing they were they were looking at was modeling the liner compared a long string and

their preference was the long string to see if we get that cement job. they were banking everything on that, to get the cement job in place. >> is the model capable of indicating what would happen to the cement job it was, if it experienced and have it -- negative test. >> no, i don't believe so. >> who actually propose the use of nine to five seem at? >> i did make it recommended that at first brian morel who was the going engineering was back and forth with it and then finally he also came to me and said we'll go ahead and microfiber i did recommend. he decided it would be a good option as well. >> why did you make that recommendation. it has good mechanical properties as a production casing topic also gives you the ability to be very flexible. especially in this case with this well, with way changing what you can pretty much changed on-the-fly just by just by adjusting the nitrogen.

you don't have to change the test again. >> did you actually prepared the design of the cement job? >> yes. >> are you a licensed engineers to? a? >> yes. >> no. >> was the time required to achieve minimum compressive strength with nine to five seem it. >> these crush tests showed zero at -- [inaudible] but that test is not done in the well conditioned. it's not done in the pressure. is done at a core temperature than the well experiences. >> i'm not a nitrified seaman expert but doesn't ever become effective if he comes in contact with hydrocarbon? >> with hydrocarbon? >> yes, sir. >> it combats the flow with energized but.

>> do you know why it left a 16 play seven-pound per gallon see ms. lurie and the cement issue track above the open hole which i think had a 14-point, 14-pound per gallon i'd? >> i believe in this case there was discussion. they may have to drill out a bit and you don't have the nitrified seem in their intro out. so we unfold the shoot track. also, for testing the casing purposes it sets up quicker. i don't have this infamy but you can see the compressed strip develop from the and you know when you contest a casing and test the shoe. >> is there any risk they could fall into a rattlesnake was it potentially could swap, yes. >> did you all considered at risk when you designed this? >> i don't recall having those discussions, no. >> what and how did you learn about the number of centralizers

being reduced from 21 to six? >> nobody from bp told me. i found out through haliburton personnel on the rig that that took place. >> i want to refer to an e-mail that is about this discussion, and it is bp cash in be i 00128489. do you have that in front of you, sir? i'm only going to refer to the top e-mail which is from the own two mr. morel and others. i don't know if i highlight it on your e-mail, but d.c. the second paragraph? >> yes. >> would you please read with ssp? can you also confirm if you're running additional centralizers or not? i heard from the rig we were not

going to run them. if this is the case out update to reflect expected you ever receive a response from either one of the gentlemen in this e-mail? >> no. >> and to inform the rig? >> i'm not sure who informed the rig. >> do you know who made the final decision to go from 21 to six? >> now i'm not sure. >> at any time to get any conversation with the rig about the gas potential, haliburton personnel performing the job? >> that i talk to personnel on the rig? >> yes, sir. >> know. i talk to individuals in the office. >> who was that? >> when i first noticed the problem i talked to brett and then greg. and as we start working on a different centralizers options on the evening of the 15th. >> just for purposes of the audience can you please explain channeling and what castle potential is? >> channeling is when you circle

cement around and you don't get the full displacement of money. you actually some mud behind. we have seen on one side and mud on as i. that is consider channeling. >> what is the point of having centralizers? >> it keeps the casing centralize in the whole. fluid will tend to go path least resistance of have a casing lying on one side and have a restriction, it will tend to go the wider side and channel. >> if you have a reduction in centralize. the likelihood of channeling is increased? >> in this particular case, yes. >> does albert have its own internal best cement practice is? >> yes, they do. >> such as minimum hole size be? yes. >> circulate and bottoms up prior to pumping cement? >> yes. >> could you please refer back to the best practices i asked you about earlier, and refer to

item number six entitled hole size. and can you read item number six, sir? >> best mud displacement under optimal rates is achieved when and your approximately or approximate one and a half to two inches. centralization from very small and very difficult. the pipe movement and displacement rates may be severely restricted. very large may require extreme displacement rates to generate enough flow energy to remove the drilling fluid and cutting. combines small and large intervals resulting from the use of five center bids below small casing can be very challenging. very carefully, very careful in such cases. >> what would the open hole size for a seven-inch casing be? >> it was eight and a half by

nine and -- >> all at the bottom. >> eight and a half i'd expect does that make the best in the practices you all have, sir? >> yes. one half inches, yes. >> are you play with 65? >> i am. >> did it meet the best practices of that? >> to my knowledge i believe, yes. >> did you look at the procedure that was sent out to the rig for the cement job from bp? >> actually the procedure was sent into me. >> and you review that? >> yes. >> that required him to circulate and bottoms out that? >> no. the procedure didn't stay bottoms up. it said 133 approximately at one

stage. >> did that meet haliburton's best practices? >> no, it did not. >> did anyone that bp or haliburton -- i'm only come when i say bp i'm talking about the gentlemen that you work with any office because you were not on the rig -- did anyone that bp or haliburton ever consider using what they call a big stockard or stop work knowing the actual potential of risk they were facing? >> not that i'm aware of, no. >> you are aware of those programs? >> yes, i am. >> what type of stop work authority do you think you have within your office? >> you deem the job unsafe, anyone can stop the job. >> did you deem this job and save? >> no. i mean, channeling does not

equal blowout. channeling equals, unicom increased risk of mitigating the problem. >> were you aware that bp had set up schlumberger to be out at the rig to basel run a cement evaluation to will i was. >> were you involved in any type of discussions with bp or haliburton at the rig on why that operation was deferred? >> no. >> were you involved with decision tree to go by mr. brian morel on the production case in cement job would indicate that they would possibly need to run a cement if i wish until? >> i was not involved in the planning but i was aware of the decision. >> did that decision to have any decision with channeling?

>> my understand was a fall indication that surface was that the job would find. wiffle returns, that they would opt not to do this he meant model and. but there were any indications that read losses waiting like that, that was my understanding. >> jump back. how many nitrified cement jobs have you been associated with before, sir? prior to this well, not including this will. >> in bp's office or throughout my crispy? your career. >> over 100. i've been involved with seeming since i'd been with haliburton? >> have you ever use one at a depth you were using a? >> yes. >> where did you do that? >> actually, i did besides this one several when i was in the field working out of latvia with various other customers. >> at this bp? >> i believe so, yes. >> are there any failures or

problems are a type of issues you have concerns with, with using nitrified cement? >> know. i mean, i've used it on every good base that i'm very for my with it and i have no issues with it. >> how many high castle potential's -- with a high castle potential, i think indication in the report is somewhat greater than a seven, is that correct -- how many of those jobs have you done likely gone out and completed that has that type of potential? >> i can't remember. i've no idea about and said that i don't number a number. over five years ago, six years ago. >> just to put into perspective, correct me if i'm wrong we provide some numbers by haliburton through a subpoena. the accuracy of these numbers i'm going to preface what i give you. they were not certain autistic as the model is that it. is not a quickly but they would like to try to give us the best numbers that they had. it appeared that they did 21

with a castle potential to be severe, or higher, on the outer continental shelf in the gulf of mexico. does that sound correct to? >> i guess. >> and about 53 in the gulf wide-area? >> yes. >> of the fun would it look like bp only had two of those. so they are other operators that actually take the chance, the risk to go out and uses castle potential as-seven? >> that indicates that they have, yes. >> have you been involved with any other operators that you're aware of? i know you are slowly working with bp. were you aware of any other operators stay? i know i did a couple for some other major operators. i don't recall, but they were production liners. >> are you where of the e-mail i talked to you earlier about mr. than to chase on sent you back, i think indicated, it's

his view it does reveal a response on tuesday april 20 at 5:44. and a bunch of attachments on a. i think it was just. it's as we completed the job and it went well. all returns were observed throughout. and i estimate that about 100-psi was pressure before we bumped the blog. at any time have you reviewed any type of data that indicated that there was not full returns? >> no. i did not analyze any data. >> what are all of these attachments because this looks like the job data, this is a program that captures all is all pressures, rates, everything and uses e-mail and job data for the job. >> have you ever been out of the deepwater horizon?

>> yes, i have. >> was actually during a cement job are we just out there to visit? >> when i was in the field, when the horizon first came into the gulf of mexico i caught several different jobs after that. >> do you know what flow in and flow out meters is? >> yes. >> i'm going to refer to this chart over here. this is during the cement job. we look at the flow in and flow out. the top line, blueline, being flow in, and the pink line being flow out. okay? from the data there during the cement job indicates there was about 80 barrels lost. do you monitor the flow in and flow out during a cement job? >> i was not on location. >> but when you were eight cement job, do you? >> no. our priority was taking care of the job, we would monitor the job we relied on others to let us know if we had forward returns or not. >> and how many barrels was the cement job for this production?

>> roughly about 50, 55, 60 barrels. >> i have no the questions at this time, but is it anything we haven't asked you that you can provide the board that may be beneficial to this investigation? >> not at this time, i don't believe so. >> thanks for testifying before us. >> no problem. >> any other questions from the boer? >> yes, i have a couple follow-up questions real quick. on the decision tree from bp, is that bp's decision tree? >> that's correct. it is that bp's. >> is the decision tree flawed? because, and here's my logic, if you had channeling you would never see that on loss returns. and the decision traces look for lost returns. >> correct. >> should the decision tree of something in there to look for

channeling to determine whether you should run the schlumberger or not? >> the only thing i know to verify is to run the cement job law. >> so i was just confused as to why the decision tree didn't have something better to make a decision related to channeling such as centralized which aims at the last moment. [inaudible] >> any others? mr. dykes? >> mr. gagliano, mr. matthews asked you earlier about the model and what was the most important information in that model. would you kind of recap for us -- we never did get to a full answer for the. what is the most important information, or the top five, pieces of information in this model that are most important? >> for this particular job in this case, the directional played an important factor in the caliber log, and also

centralize placement and the fluids information. and, of course, the casing information are the top five, i believe. >> gasol potential doesn't fall out in there has been an important piece of information one way or the other? >> guest list template off a lot of those things i just mentioned. >> so as a result of you punch in numbers, what is the most important information that is fed back to the operator? >> hobley in this case the gas flow potential and the potential for flow. >> that's what you provide to the operator? >> correct. >> so there's no executive summary in this model whatsoever that identifies, here's the feedback from the parameters that you gave me to plug into the model? >> no. having, they have reviewed the models. for agassi of my inputs but there's no executive summary. >> thank you.

>> mr. gagliano, just a few questions regarding the optic can suffer. i'm an outsider so i don't know whether the software their a whether it is a good. can you give me some idea about optic can in terms of them is industry standard? if it's not how does that compare to the industry standard software? >> this software is haliburton specific. our competitors have their own version. my understanding they all provide very similar information as far as placement into the position that is in the job. it is a model. it is as good as information you put into it. so the more accurate the information you have, the more accurate the output will be. >> are there other cementer's engaged in deepwater drilling beside haliburton's? >> yes. we have competitors in deepwater market, yes. >> who are they?

>> schlumberger and bj, excuse me. the two major. >> could have their own software to do this kind of our? >> yes, they do. >> at all three, software packages, based on same theories, principle, engineering principle? what are these? how are the software? >> are not software with them, but i'm assuming it's based on -- i'm not mired with their software that their input. >> but it should be based on the same theories, same operation? >> i would think so, yes. >> now, how do you know -- is there a process where you continually improve the agassi of your software? >> as far as software upgrades? >> yes, sir. >> yes. we have a department of how burden that's, you know, improves or adds features to the models. >> what kind of feedback do you get to cause you to upgrade to

increase the accuracy? i don't know. that's why we ask these questions. is a cement log data -- how do you know whether -- you compare the simulation and actual results somehow that we can go back and say, yeah, maybe we can tweak this broader and there. is that something that you -- >> yes, you can go back in and take the actual data and do what's called a recalculate, actual versus models. >> and the academic, would that be the bond law did? would that be one of the source of data? >> the cement bond log data received from schlumberger i directly give, but the data we taken to recount is the data we collect from the haliburton unit is frustrates and pressure and volumes and we could import that and deal to compare actual

versus model. >> all right. so this even -- if the cement bond log which was not done, with this particular operation, then it would not be the only data you do this, you know, to assess the accuracy, write? >> that's correct. without the cement logs we can't model that that we don't take the data we collect and model that. >> maybe i'm not raising my question quickly. when a cement bond log was conducted, will you take that data and try to compare it to the result of assimilation to see whether your assimilation was acted on us because you are referring to the actual output? >> yes, sir. >> we can compare that and look to see for comparable to what we

modeled. >> all right. thank you, sir. >> any other questions from the board's? >> i does have a few questions, mostly for clarification here. earlier when mr. matthews was asking a couple questions about differences between long strings and lighters, you indicated that bp indicated they had a preference for long string. to anybody at bp ever articulate to you why that preference was? >> no. i was not involved in discussions why, no. >> long string and the latter options basically acceptable in district and/or? >> the three prior production casing jobs i was involved in in bp were all long strings at my expense with bp was standard. >> could you briefly outline for me basically the advantages and visit edges of each of those two options of? >> the long string does provide only fewer barriers to have a cement bear, my very.

and you b.o.p. if you did a line if you barrier there, and i would think they might run a tieback, tieback which would require additional casing run, more seem it to be part. but it would provide more barriers than long string. >> in your opinion didn't one give a higher level of integrity or safety? >> i'm not real familiar with the well construction or integrity of the casing, so i can't comment on that. >> the know, is one of the other methods more cost -- more costly than the other? if so, which went? >> i would think the line and tieback would be more cost, but i've not done economic analysis myself on that. just from what i've heard. >> thank you. i have nothing further. >> any other questions from the board? marshall island?

>> thank you, your honor. my name is craig. i represent the marshall islands. would you describe, please, sir, what risks are created when you have channeling in a cement job? >> the primary risk would be, you have to go back and you remediation. in this case, production casing. the goal is to lay with significant channeling occurred in you potentially have to go back and perforate your casing and squeeze. >> is it fair to state that if it was determined that there was channeling in a cement job, that it would weaken the integrity of that cement barriers to? if channeling would occur would weaken a? >> yes, sir. expect you would not have gone. you would not have a cement bond to the formation or pipe or whatever it channels.

>> so it would weaken the ability of that cement to actually create a barrier in that zone, is that correct? >> when you say weekend, i'm thinking compressed that it would still get hard but it would not obtain the isolation. >> okay. when you created your report on april 18, the report for the nine and seven-eighths, seven ends production casing george's question about, they would understand correctly that you incorporated into that model a recommended rate of flow for the space or and, for the circulation, the space and a cement as it was being put into a whole, is that correct?

>> actually, rates were designed initially with bp on the 14th when we determined those rates. that carried over to this version. >> okay. i'm looking at page 11 of that report, sir. do i enter stand it correctly that the critical rates that you incorporated into this model presumes a rate of flow of 18.7 barrels per minute for the space or, and 11.55 barrels per minute for the cement. am i reading that correctly, sir? and second 1.12, critical velocity and the fracture zone. >> yes, you're reading that correct, yes. >> now, isn't also accurate to say that in determining what flow rate you want to build into

this model, one of your objectives is to achieve a turbulent flow through the zone in order to most effectively purge the zone and accomplish complete mud removal. is that correct? >> yes, that is ideal but in this case we were limited by the ecb would stay under to attain the objectives of giving cement, full returns through job. >> and the ecb's our? >> equipment density. >> and as a matter fact, i forget, sir, do you have the post job report in front of you? >> no, i do not. >> we do not have that. >> all right, sir. if i may, the page number for the docket about to show the witness is in the eye 00170993.

that is the page of this exhibit. the exhibit actually begins on 0986. do you recognize that as the post job report that you're prepared, sir? >> i did not prepare the report. they sent it to me. >> did you review it after receiving its? >> yes. >> all right. the page that i reference there, does the crowd on that page reflect the actual rate of flow that was accomplished during the pumping of the space or and the

cement? >> yes, the rates indicate indicated, do not color-coded so it is hard to see which one, but it is on here. >> even without the color coding, i apologize for the on the black and white copy, do you recognize that the nearly horizontal line on the right side of the chart indicates that the rate of flow, once these matters were being pumped into, was only about four barrels per minute speed? yes. that was part of the design. >> that was part of the design? i don't understand them. >> when we met on the 14th to run the opticam, i met with several bp representatives going through and is told to me by bp we need to keep out the cds below 14.7.

>> to achieve full returns. in order to do that we had to bump all the job, four barrels a minute or less. to achieve that goal. >> all right. so you were told that you have to pump four barrels or less, even though your initial plan had been based upon rates of 18.7, and 11.55 euros per minute for the space or and the cement, is that correct? >> no. the 18 -- those are calculators. those were not put there by me. it shows 18.7. >> yes. and 2 actuated those numbers? >> is by the officer who generate the report. i guess i misunderstood you early. this was not designed to pump that fast. so the rates you should be looking at that are inputted.

>> let me perhaps if i can shorten -- i'm sorry, go ahead, sir. >> on page eight species of which documents the? dated april 18. >> yes, sir. >> under 1.6 called pumping schedule. >> yes, sir. >> these are the designed rates of the job. and it shows four barrels and to barrels of cement and four barrels of displacement. on page eight, i'm sorry. >> all right. under the columnist is rate, is that correct? >> yes, that's correct. >> let me ask you this. do you believe that pumping rate for the space or in the cement was adequate to achieve a turbulent flow speed?

the phone system when it turns the corner is energized good. it will generate more energy to remove the mud. based on the modeling with a 21 centralizers we were successfully removed all the mud. now i don't know if they determine the flow in this case, but it did essentially move all the mud was 21 centralizers. >> giftware one centralizers had been use? >> that's correct. >> but what we wound up with in this case, if i'm correct, is a less than a third of that number of centralizers, and a flow rate that was below what had initially been generated in this design report, is that correct? >> i believe they kept these rates with computer centralize centralizers. >> before -- four barrels a minute, is that correct? >> that's correct.

>> and in the to barrels a minute would be cement? >> that's correct. >> and do understand your testimony than to be that the slower rate and the lower number of centralizers when of compromise the ability to have cleared -- to accomplish a complete mud removal? >> yes. the model indicated that would occur. >> did you -- were you concerned about the volume of the cement cap that was pumped in this job? >> cement cap referring to the non-moment cement? >> yes, sir. >> no, sir. i was not concerned, no. >> you were shown an e-mail in

your testimony a moment ago indicating that the lift pressure was approximately 100-psi, is that correct, sir? >> yes. i state that in an e-mail, yes. >> all right. do you have an opinion as to whether that psi is suggestive of channeling in this job? it's hard to say because that includes, i believe that also includes friction pressure so it's hard to see. >> all right. are you saying you would want more information in order to evaluate that? >> yes. i would need more information.

>> did you receive information as you are working on this job, concerning the circulating pressures for the mud? >> referring to when they were pumping mud a head of the cement job? >> yes, sir. >> the only thing i was told was for this model we had to keep the ecds below seven. well-shaved leg mud without losses. >> well, let me ask you this. were you aware that there were variations -- there were significant differential between the circulating pressures that had initially been calculated

and what was achieved during the job? >> at what part of the job are you referring to, sir? >> during the, what was of a bottoms up procedure. >> you are referring to the casing in the whole? >> yes, sir. >> are you referring to floats stick as i'm talking about the pumping of mud prior to the cement job. >> okay. >> all right. and are you aware there were variations of differences between the circulating pressure that was initially calculated and what was eventually obtained during the job? >> that incident took place after they had trouble converting the float. once the referred to floats yes, they did notice a lower pressure than expected while securing. >> and do you recall that, in fact, in this case they were

asked to go back and rerun the hydraulics after the job was completed? >> yes. >> and do you have any understanding as to why there was that differential in the pressures on this job? >> i do not know why the pressures were lower than the initially modeled? >> is a fair statement that both an in comparison between the initial modeling that's what code did and even after the next week actually should were done after the job that the actual pressures achieved were significantly lower than you would expect, based on the modeling? >> i did not run the model. it's my understanding that it modeled lower pressures. >> i have no further questions. thank you. . .

>> my name is rick godfrey and if i may approach the witness. >> sure. >> thank you.

after the deepwater horizon rig sank on april 22 of this year, did you send a post-job report about the quality and the successful nature of the hell burn cement job to bp? >> a post job was sent out of version two. yes. >> was that sent to bp by you on april 23rd in the afternoon of this year? >> do you have an e-mail in here? >> tab two. marked as bp exhibit 71. >> yes, sir. >> mr. godfrey do you have another copy of the exhibits? >> i'd like one too. >> go through them more quickly rather than me have

to look over his shoulder. >> skied the question -- i asked the question before. >> if you want to take a few minutes. >> we have no way of knowing which one he's going to use. fumbling around trying to find the document. >> i find it ironic the first time you raise this objection is with bp since i raised the question about passing out notebooks repeatedly so i don't have to do so. >> well, we agreed, we're learning as we go. [laughter] >> this morning a response to his inquiry mr. godfrey i asked him if he would make sure all of you know all the documents he thinks he might use and any of you might use the next day of the hearings with special designation as soon as you know of it ones you think you're very likely to use. so i gather he distributed all of them but the very likely special request didn't come in until this morning.

if during the course of the examination we need to take a little longer to get to take a look at the documents obviously this is important, we can do that. or perhaps -- >> if we want to take five minutes now. pass out the notebooks. i offered to this morning. >> it will help me. >> how many of the parties and interests would also like a notebook now? okay fine. >> as long as we have them. 18. >> right. >> you can even add two for the board. >> i come prepared i asked a question. >> i'll read numbers if that's easier. >> is it possible there are questions you could and. >> i'd like to start here. i think it is better to start and work backwards. do you have the exhibits there? if you'll wait a moment.

i assume your honor equal treatment going on the rest of the day when transocean lawyers use an exhibit i'll have copies as well. >> i'm making copies. >> and also the commander points out defendant can do everybody a -- government can do everybody a service here if each of you designate the document use're likely to use then he can put together a notebook for each of us. perhaps even including the board so we won't have to have lots of notebooks circulating. >> and my rule as a federal judge was any exhibit abandoned becomes my personal property a week later which means i have a nearly life -- lifetime supply of three ring notebooks for myself and all of my children and grandchildren. [laughter]

>>. >> okay. so he's not going to print it but if you give commander the base numbers he'll distribute those for you so it will be easier to compile things. >> think we all have the notebooks now. >> that was quick. way to go. >> i had them prepared. tab two please. we've marked this as dp exhibit 71. have you seen that e-mail before sir? >> yes. did you send the e-mail to bp on friday april 23 at 11:20 p.m.. >> the time i have is 8:41 p.m.. >> fair enough. you're quite right. and did you attach to that the post job report? >> yes, it shows an

attachment, yes. >> all right. can you turn to the post-job report it's two pages further in. can you turn to page two of that report sir. do you have it? >> yes. >> what is page two of the april 20, post-job report by halliburton sent to bp on april 23rd? >> top half section has job information and the bottom half section shows fluids pumped. >> okay. i'm going to put a board up here if i might your honor. which is a copy of the -- of a page there. do you have it? may i take my exhibit from the witness before it becomes property of the board? [laughter] >> is this yours? yes. government has no interest in keeping these things.

>> can you see that okay? >> yes. >> all right. and so what you have here is you have a summary of the various tests that the cement job passed after halliburton reported on the 19th of april. correct? that is the job information for that job. i wouldn't say your test passed. >> well when you told bp that the cement design on the deepwater horizon meant the requirement was that a truthful statement or an untruthful statement when you told bp that three days after the explosion and blowout? >> aidid not write this report. it came from an engineer. >> well when halliburton told bp -- [inaudible]. on the 252 well on april 1920. 1 that a true statement or untruthful statement when

you sent it on april 23rd after the vessel had sunk? >> what is the requirement that you're referring to. >> you don't know -- >> footage pump or? >> have you ever reviewed this report at all sir in any detail? do you have any understanding of it at all? >> yes. >> so when it said that the -- returns while cementing. do you see that? >> yes. >> is that a true statement that you told bp? >> that's what we were notified on the rig, yes. and that notified by halliburton's personnel on the rig? >> i'm not sure who told the engineer location who had full returns but they were notified. we did not monitor returns on the job. >> in fact you had six people on that rig. didn't you sir. that is you halliburton? >> cementing? >> yes. >> okay. do you think they were the ones that prostlid information -- provided this information to you? >> no, all six individuals have specific jobs regarding

that phone job. two of the individuals were operators who required to man their pumps. the phone team leaders required to monitor the entire job plus liquid ads the engineer is required to monitor the job real-time for the computer and the two cementers mixed the cement. all very busy with the cement job. >> any of those six people on board the deepwater horizon from halliburton inform you or anyone else at halliburton or bp on the 19, 20 or 21st of april 2010 that the cement job halliburton designed and poured was unsuccessful? >> all indications that surfaced was everything went fine. >> the and that's what you reported to bp in this post job report. right? >> what specific box are you referring to? >> let's turn to page 7.

you've seen page 7 before haven't you sir? >> yes. >> the summary of the -- the summary of what halliburton is telling bp about the quality of the cement job you designed and poured. right? >> shows significant points of the job. >> first significant point is cement job pulled as planned correct? >> that's correct. >> that means the cement job in the judgment of halliburton was successful, was it not? >> it was pumped to density. liquid adds were added to plan and pumped to plan. >> i take it halliburton did not plan an unsuccessful cement job right? >> no, we planned for success. >> all right. second point you told bp is the chemical traps determined pumped to volume right? >> yes. >> what does that mean sir? >> that means planned volumes required to pum than

amount of cement wrs were pumped. >> the third thing you told bp post-report. post-incident was the rig completed displacement and -- replace sqm both were bumped right. >> yes. >> what does that mean bumping the pollution. >> we had positive indication of bottom and top. >> that means the cement was pumped as far as it could be as grurs could determine right. >> assuming it didn't pump around the pollution yes. >> fourth point you told bp on your document dated april 20, sent april 23rd is full returns were seen throughout the entire job. right? >> that's what we were told on location yes. >> and that was an indication that you were looking for that was end kative of a successful cement job that was bp's requirement for success. cement job. >> not just bp's. >> that was set forth by bp to me they wanted to have this job executed and have full returns to the job.

>> something halliburton looks for is it not? >> yes. >> also because m ms is -- mms requires it is it not? >> requires full returns? >> as an indication of one of the things you're look for far successful cement job. you've seen the mms regulations have you not sir. >> i've reviewed them yes. >> read about full returns. >> yes. >> next thing the summary says that was sent to bp on april 23rd was estimated 100 psi of lift pressure 350 psi circumstance lateing the 450 before bumming top plug that's another indication of a successful cement job from halliburton's perspective, right? >> it's not necessarily. you can't tell the distance indication of the channel of the or not. >> floats held after the job right? >> yes. >> now, is there anywhere in this report dated april 20th 2010 sent to bp on april 23rd, 2010 after the rig had

exploded and sang -- and sank that said oh, we think there might have been channeling? >> that discussion was with bp on the 15th when i showed them what was happening with the six centralizeers. >> my question sir was, there may be more follow-up, i'm sure there will be by others. but the lawyer is entitled to have his question answered which was is there anything in the report that was transmitt on the 23rd that indicates there was channeling. >> thank you your honor. >> no, no indication. >> and nothing in the report that indicates that you recommended that as you or halliburton recommended 21 or 14 or any more centralizeers than the number of centralizers used correct? >> in the report no,. >> right. nothing in the report that says you mr. gagliano or anyone else at halliburton ever recommended that a cement bond log test be

done. right sir? >> that is the call of bp. >> my question to you sir was there's nothing in the report that halliburton sent post-job that said you recommended a cement test to be run. right sir? >> no, we do not recommend cement bond logs. >> also nothing in the report you sent on april 23 dated april 20 a day after the vessel sank that said halliburton recommended a bottoms up before the cement was pumped. right sir? >> those discussions took place in the office and on the rig prior to the job. >> my question was a simple one anything you put in writing in the report after you sent it after the job was done that said you had recommended a bottoms up. >> i object. he's punching kind of hard. >> tell me about it. [laughter] >> i thought mr. fanning was setting the tone. >> well, it's a little variety makes these long days move better. but i'll take the answer to the lawyer's question being

no that there isn't anything in the report to that effect even though there may well have been discussions earlier. you don't have to and twice the answer. we'll take his response as no there's nothing in the report. >> and i take it that there's nothing in the report that you sent to bp a day after the vessel sank that suggested to bp that severe gas pump potential was a warning the job should not have been pumped as designed and planned by halliburton right sir. >> at it does not state that in the post-job, no. >> right. >> sir can you turn to tab 7. please. we've marked this for identification purposes as bp exhibit 100. this is an e-mail from

nathaniel to yourself dated april 20 at 5:54 central, i think it's 5:54 in the afternoon. is that correct? >> yes. >> all right. >> and who is he? >> he's an engineer on location for the job. >> he one just an engineer. he was a halliburton engineer right sir? that's correct. >> he work for you. >> he worked for halliburton. he does not report to me. >> and he's an engineer? >> yes. >> technical specialist. >> yes. >> and he sent you this e-mail late in the afternoon on april 20th before the blowout and the explosion and what did he tell you about the quality of the cement job in the first line of the e-mail? >> we have completed the job and it went well. >> now he in his e-mail didn't say i have concerns about severe gas blow

potential right? >> no, he does not state that. >> in his e-mail on the afternoon of april 20 doesn't say i have concerns about the number of centrallizers right? >> no. >> in his e-mail on april 20 doesn't say i have concerns about the failure to run a cement bond log. does he? >> objection your honor. the document speaks for itself someone who wrote it just witnessed and it write it. >> and i think this is the information that would have probably been included in the summary on april 23rd. so if you want to get this into the record at this point in time. make one complete acceptance -- sentence to verify it that would be fine but i think this is information the board already has. >> fair enough. he never wrote you on april 20 raising concerns about severe gas flow potential. gas flow problems. centralizeers bot toms up. liner versus tieback or a long string did he sir. >> same objection. the document speaks for itself. it's repetitious. >> i invite you to m

compress it all into one question. >> improper question. >> overruled. if you can answer it. is that a true statement that mr. godfrey made? >> this r e-mail does not state any of that. no. >> okay. let's turn now to tab 8. please. now, we're looking at this e-mail on the 20th but on the bottom it has an e-mail on april 18th where you circulated the final plan and job recommendation that halliburton had to various people including people at bp right? >> that's correct. and actually you circulated three different attachments that were combined into one on april 18th to bp and the various halliburton engineers didn't you. >> that is correct. yes. >> one you circulated design report. right? >> yes.

report. correct. >> two you circumstance late -- circulated some testing data right. >> yes. >> we talked a little about those earlier today right. >> yes. >> but you also circulated something called a job recommendation didn't you. >> yes, the procedure. >> okay. so can you look at tab 8 please che -- which we marked for identification purposes as bp exhibit 101. have you seen this document before sir? >> yes, i have. >> it's a 12 page document. right? >> yes. >> did you prepare this? >> yes, i did. >> so you personally prepared this document. >> yes. >> h reflects your best -- this redirects your best engineering judgment and analysis. >> this reflect what is the job was pulled as. >> which i assume reflects your best engineering judgment and analysis. >> no, my best engineering analysis would have been to run 21 centralizeers.

>> i see. >> so let's take a look at the first page of this report. the first line that you wrote to bp underneath the forward there. >> this is a forward that's automatically generated so i did not personally write it. >> when you sent to bp the language that says enclosed is recommended procedure for cementing the casing strings and the reference well. did you mean that when you made that recommendation to bp or did you not mean it? >> the procedure in this came from the rig. >> my question to you sir is, when you on behalf of halliburton sent this exhibit which is tab 8. marked as bp 101 and you said enclosed is our recommended procedure for cementing the casing strings in the referenced well. did you mean that when you sent it or did you not mean it? >> that's what the forward states, yes.

>> so did you mean it or not? >> in this particular case no, this was not my procedure. the procedure came from the rig. >> okay. let's go then to page number 6 please. page six at the top says halliburton does it not. >> yes, it does. >> you repaired this report on behalf of halliburton did you not? >> yes. >> what dwrid say here on the top on this report when it came time to discuss the design and the additives. you called it job recommendation right? >> that's correct. >> so that this exhibit which we've marked as bp 101 which is the 12 page production casing job recommendation. that was the recommendation which you made to bp which bp adopted correct sir? >> yes, that's the cement i

recommended for this job. >> and the procedures for this job. right? >> incorrect. that came from the rig. >> when you mean the rig, you mean the halliburton engineers on the rig? >> no, i mean the halliburton engineers along with company men and brian morale and some other individuals in the job that produced this procedure. >> let me make sure i understand this. this report sir is addressed with a signature line by you to bp right? that's correct. >> doesn't say anything about this is bp's job recommendation says it's halliburton's job recommendation right. >> it states that in the procedure it came from the company man as per company man. that's why it was put there sir. >> is there anything in this report which you have prepared and sent to bp on april 18th. which says that you wanted 21 centralizers. >> the 21 centralizers are reflected in the report not the proposal. >> not the job

recommendation right? >> the job recommendation in this case is sol yum of slurrys and the slurry design. >> is it correct nowhere in the 12 page stand alone job recommendation from halliburton did you or halliburton ever propose 21 centralizers, cement bond log test a full bottoms up or liner tieback. is that correct sir? >> the proposal is designed to show what flute fluids would be pumping and what rates. report reflect central recommendations and rate recommendations. >> is it correct sir that nowhere in the april 18th job recommendation under your signature that you proposed to bp did you recommend 21 centralizeers, cement bond log. full bottoms up, a liner tieback is that correct sir. >> objection your honor he's already asked and answered. he already said this document swhas it says and

the other one regarding the centralizeers is covered in another document. >> the document does say what it says and previously if he responds about other things that in fact his answer would be no. and the document does speak for itself. so if the witness isn't automatically responsive unless that's some reason to doubt what's in the document so we need to follow up, i think the board would -- will understand that what he means is no and that he's adding some qualification to it. >> what i think he said your honor is to clarify the issue involving the 21 centralizers was in the job report. which does not say it's not here. just in a separate document. >> correct. he did and obviously mr. godfrey characterized this as stand alone and it is a separate document. but you know, we understand there could be a dispute regarding that but nothing in this job recommendation refers to the matters that mr. godfrey asked about.

okay. next question. >> okay. now let's turn to the document you just referred to which is tab 9. bp exhibit 102. this is the design report. right sir? >> that's correct. >> dated april 18th. >> yes. >> dud you prepare this? >> yes i did. >> okay and this has a number of centralizers in it does it not? >> yes. >> how many centralizers are listed in this april 18th report? this one reflects 7. >> doesn't reflect 21, does it sir? >> no. >> okay. and this was the design report that accompanied the job recommendation that we just saw which was the previous exhibit. right sir? >> that's correct. >> okay. and is there anything in this exhibit which is called the design report of april

18th that says severe gas flow problem or potential is a design or well that should not have cement poured down it? >> on page 18 it reflects the gas flow potentially to be at 10.29. >> right. >> and also on the well schematic on page 23 indicates there will be severe channeling for this job. if you had a color copy. >> but nowhere in this report does halliburton say that when the model predicts based upon the inputs into it that a well condition is considered to have a severe gas flow problem, nowhere in this report does halliburton say that means you shouldn't

use or pour the cement that we're recommending. correct sir? >> the report on the 15th i had those discussions with bp representatives in their office with the concern, potential for flow and that would have channeling and objectives bp forced to make. >> i'm asking about the report on the 18th which is final report sir. nowhere in this report do you tell bp that a severe gas flow problem or prediction of 10.29 equals a warning or a well that should not have cement poured down in it. correct? >> objection your honor. been argumentative. >> the document says there will be a severe gas flow problem using 7 centralizeers. he could just as easily say nowhere in the report does it say you shouldn't go swimming at night for fear you may be eaten by a shark. breaking up words, he's --

me he's make up words to try to argue with the witness. >> that's not what the document says. if it said that i wouldn't be asking the question. >> well, obviously there's an important disagreement between the parties here. no one's surprised i don't think by b p's disagreement with some of the testimony. and i think the board as well as the public that's here is entitled to get the view of both parties. so as long as it's not overly repetitive and as long as you're not beating on the witness because not an easy spot for him. think you're entitled to and -- to ask your questions and in this particular case there might be an opportunity since he hasn't exercised yet perhaps at the end when the witness makes a statement for his lawyer to and a few more questions. so be -- so what's your next question? >> well, sir severe gas flow prediction 10.29 is something that halliburton routinely pours, correct? >> no, it's pretty high. >> all right. turn to tab 6 please which

is marked as bp exhibit 88. have you seen this halliburton document before sir? >> looks familiar, yesment. >> if you turn to the stamp number that ends in 1138 and it's in the upper right-hand side horizontally. so it's 1138. >> i hate to interrupt. 1138 -- [inaudible]. .. yes. >> and it divides the predicted

numbers into moderate and severe, right? >> that is correct. >> and that is called the flow condition 3? >> yes. >> and that was predicted april 18, right? >> that is correct, yes. >> and at what point did halliburton say that with it being severe, it should be designed the? >> is because the channeling occurred. >> the documents as about 15 as the number is? >> yes. >> your personally had four cement jobs with severe problems? >> yes. >> but halliburton markets itself as the premier company doing this in the world the? >> yes.

>> and you market yourself as solving channeling, and others of their predictions? if the best, practices are in place? >> in use all the channeling -- by adding -- you solved it by adding nitrogen and other things to the cement? >> not alone. we had not enough centralizes. >> [inaudible] >> no, i have verbal conversations on the 15th with them. you? >> i have verbal conversations with them on the 15th. >> you thought this amount job was not going to be successful because of lack of centralizes sit on at&t sent to documents and didn't say that and on the twentieth cent another document which did not say that, is that your testimony? >> i sent documents to bp indicating 25 centralizes would

take care of the channeling. >> on $0.82 a job recommendation where you designed a salary that was supposed to take care of the issue successfully. >> that would not take care of the issues in this case. >> is it your testimony that you recommended a job to bp you thought was going to fail for lack of central as your. >> recommended the job to bp with the 21 boehme the would meet the objectives by bp and then in turn decided not to run the centralize are on their own without consulting me or specialists. >> when you did the design report on may 18th which showed seven this before you knew you weren't running 21. >> this started running the casing. >> are you prepared -- you signed the report. >> isi did. >> you put in the centralizers. >> correct. >> you knew when you put it in their less than 21.

>> by that time i was notified by halliburton bp did not run in the initial 21 as planned. >> win a bp hires or retains halliburton it retains it for its expertise in designing the cement slurries, correct. >> yes. >> one of the functions they retain halliburton four is the design particularly challenging task blow issues, correct. >> in this case yes. >> that is what you're retained and paid to do. >> yes. >> halliburton charges mark, the more difficult the job the more they charge. >> not necessarily but in this case is required additional equipment. >> in this case because you thought it was more difficult to charge bp more money. >> i did not charge -- design for more money but for the best solution for bp. >> was the solution that you're recommended on april 18th job

recommendation and the designer reports, solution is out of work successfully at the mcconnell 252 well? >> in the slurry design, yes. >> did you think it would address the channeling gas below potential you identified earlier? >> with centralization it would yes. >> did you think it would address the channeling and gas below potential with a number of centralizers as reflected in your design report of april 18th. >> no, it indicates channelling would occur. >> so when you set the job recommendation on the 18th to bp if you believed there would be challenging cement job not work due to centralizers. >> the model indicated there would be channeling with high probability of remedial squeezing in the same place. >> what tests have you done or did you do the time to determine whether the cement slurry as designed was a slurry that had a chance of success? >> i submitted the lab testing

to verify it pomp time, things of that sort, stability. >> what specific tests? >> all of those. >> did you test the atmosphere pressure or down below pressure? >> it was tested the ads down the low pressure and temperature pressure, the foam crash test was done atmospheric and 190 degrees more than stacked. >> did you have any food additives? >> no, foam is by itself. >> did you have any teeth all mercs? >> have some air in its yes. >> what time did you use? >> .5%. >> do you know whether or not there's any recommendation by halliburton regarding the use of a 3,000 with the foam? >> i'm not aware but we have jobs in the past with its. >> did you test the effects of the br3000 on the nitrogen

newport? >> yes, we have a lab test showing a stable system. >> when you do these tests it is on the root rig. >> no, it's done in the lab. >> the juice mix on the rig. >> we pump in the whole. >> bid to keep samples? >> we have samples from the location, we use it or the rig water and do the tests in the lab and. >> do you have those samples today? >> i believe we do have some in the lab still. >> from the cement slurry actually used in the well? >> two my knowledge there is some left yes. >> it's really in your possession. >> in the halliburton lab. >> heavy maintain it in its original state? >> yes, we isolated all of the samples. >> do you know by the way of whether this laurie design samples whether or not they will be graded over time? >> no, one is in a lab -- they could potentially degrade over time yes.

>> so with the board or the government wanted to test of the design to determine whether or not it was as marketed and advertise to bp they need to test sooner rather than later so it does not degrade? >> there would have to be done pursuant to the court in new orleans and we have been working with several different parties year regarding that. >> who ever wanted to i'm sure the core there is interested in the off chance that would become subject of litigation. [laughter] >> hard to imagine that. >> would council is saying that parties have a duty to preserve and if you want to present to some other form of war if the gentleman here on this board decide they want to get tests will alleging no. >> regarding preservation of evidence and halliburton has and intends to fully comply. >> excellent, my question was designed to determine an eyewitness to me the answer, the sooner the test is run the better so the possibility of

degrading the sample over time. >> whether or not this witness would know that, he may not have the qualifications and there's been no evidence use a chemist or someone who do the testing. he may not know, i just don't know, but the way the question is phrased is objectionable. >> if board members want to give a test of the near future of we will advise you and obviously with respect to any litigants' or litigation they can let halliburton know and of halliburton for some reason was to resist that then the proper judicial official can decide. >> so you have raised that point. >> thank-you. >> the board will probably discuss it. >> thank you your honor. >> did you perform compatibility testing. >> yes. >> what type? >> spacer, monday, and i believe spacer cement i believe? >> to use an stia analyzer?

>> we did in compatibility testing with the fluids? >> did you use am a csm analyzer? >> no, i did not. >> and the test results that halliburton has come into the show at the time the design was passed? >> yes. >> let's go back to centralize serve for a moment. cementer -- centralizers are important to center of the casing in the hold? >> that's, correct. >> that is the theory. now, if the hydrocarbons are coming up high one or the well bore, centralizers have nothing to do with that? >> centralizers helped get cement around the casing and which would prevent that if isolation took place. >> hi bp -- halliburton reach a

conclusion it didn't take place with respect to this and a job on april 20 of? >> the only way to verify was to run a cement blog. >> i will rephrase the question. you already answered that. by the way halliburton does not recommend nowhere in these recommendations their recommended to bp running a log and. >> that is the call to bp that halliburton placed. >> as a cementer and the party that designs and enforces the cement you don't have best practices to tell your customers to always use this, right? >> nobody asked me my opinion. they just decided to send them in was no discussion from a. >> my question was halliburton as a cementing expert, world-class expert has no recommendation of best practice to his customers to run it is meant by logged. >> you're honor, he's imposing the duty on halliburton that is not their duty?

the witness said it belongs to bp. >> he has, but then he didn't answer whether you have the best practice and somebody else can decide and maybe the board will have recommendations regarding who should recommend or make the decisions, but does halliburton itself have the best practice? >> i'm not aware of one, no. >> since april 20th, has halliburton it included a dissonant work failed? >> i do not know what happened in the incident on matt rig. >> has halliburton concluded that, not you personally but halliburton? >> i am not aware of their opinions out there. >> since april 20, 2010 has halliburton reached a conclusion that the addition of central -- centralizers would make a difference to this a blowout? >> i'm not aware of any.

>> since april 2010 and 2010 has been average conclusion if bp conducted a full bottoms of the wood made difference in this blowout? >> i haven't been a part of any investigation regarding this incident so i'm not aware of anything being looked at my halliburton. >> okay. let's go back tab nine please. you'll find the page 23, do you see that?

ever going to call a break, let's have a brick. >> we thought after you finished. >> five minutes. >> page 23 is almost illegible as far as the well itself. is there one in caller? >> yes. >> do you want us to close the book? >> keep it open. >> let's see if there is a problem answer in the question, in view of the exhibit plus the no burke, the witness doesn't have to gas or have a doubt. >> what i put up here, page 23 that has been used in this hearing for the past two sessions. this one is in color so unit can see it, right? >> just a minute. >> absolutely take your time.

do you have it? >> i am assuming that's the same team because the date and time is showing. >> the one we have here doesn't match what he has their. >> rights that's the point i'm getting too. >> a point not just in the color but also there's material at the bottom of regarding the date and time. >> that's the point i'm getting too. this language down here. >> the board member has a question. [inaudible] >> let's make the record clear.

>> the actual page sent to bp that is before you did not have this language down at the bottom that's is based on an analysis of the above alibiing well conditions. this well is considered to have a secure gas flow problem with flow conditions repaired page 23 of original reports sent to bp does not have that language. >> no. >> am i correct? >> that language is not at the bottom of this. >> that was part of a prediction which got you to a 10.29 number, right? >> is that when you all have? somebody stranded out. >> i am not suggesting you did it, i am suggesting is showed up. >> with the board explain how that language got there. >> we developed some visuals for a hearing i think the last in new orleans. instead of putting all 20 pages

we took a section of the image you're looking on the top and on the warning as indicated below to indicate what they were looking at. we never did say it came from the same page. we actually talked about in testimony and you can refer back to it that says what are we looking at here and actually has the verbiage on the bottom the senate that's -- i asked earlier to mr. gagliano asset web section is the amazon. the page number of the actual burbage. i don't think the board every besides putting on this thing in front of everyone i don't think we've indicated that verbiage was put on the same page to present to bp. >> actually if one reviews the transcripts from the last session of which i carefully down this page was referred to the witnesses were questioned as though that language was on this page. mr. dye that was questioned as though this was the original language and that's why i ask. let me ask 12 questions, mr.

gagliano. >> the original language that is a copy and paste? >> let me ask a few more questions about this page. we will put up the real page. >> your honor, we object to his reference of the real page. my client said to the report in the book of the accurate copy of what we sense. the change was made by the board and the panel, not by us and for him to suggest you're on the record, on national tv that when we put the real page tries to present some motive on the part of halliburton which is unfair. >> know, the board clarify that halliburton did not produce in this exhibit, but the real -- sale original -- this is the original pay that was sent to bp. >> yes, that's what i'm getting to. on. says food position and job value. do you see that? >> yes.

>> know where on this page, the original page 23, does it say fluid is that job and peer by the way there is a severe class below problem at du pont this event, right? >> it is isolating the zone. in my conversations with bp representatives on the 15th they clearly understood that when we had discussions and that's why they directed me to add additional centralizers on the 15th. >> this is dated the 18th. >> that's, correct. >> or in the report on the 18th does it say that halliburton its cement slurry design will not control and prevent a severe test flow problem, right? >> issues channeling so as to just to have potential flow between so sort out the will board. >> is there any document to writing at any time, pre casualty, a day of casualty, post casualty, where halliburton

wrote to bp and said by the way although we have designed it this laurie and although you are paying us all this money you should be aware that there still remains a severe gas flow problem with channeling. and that a blowout could occur? >> the report on the 15th is a combined effort between myself and greg waltz in designing this job and to be successful and that was the report sent out. >> on the 18th, 191020 if you sent out there for reports, right? >> asked and answered a. >> i will move on. one final question. sitting here today which you pour the same cement job at the airport before for bp? >> i'm comfortable with the design yes. >> thank you come on over the question. >> thank you.

we are going to take a few breaks and come back at 4:00 o'clock. [inaudible conversations] >> changes to the deepwater horizon's blood device harmed manners to manage it in the days after the blowout. that is what they told the governmental agencies. he testified that after several failed attempts to get the blow up a vendor to work, he learned that its security function was replaced by a testing device not designed for well control -- this is one hour, 50 minutes.

>> with the next witness please state your name? would you please stand up? i want to advi the united states punishable by fine and/or imprisonment. knowing this, would y raise your right hand? >> they keep for being here, sir. >> for the record, could you please state your name? >> harry thierens.

>> thank you -- by whom are you employed the? >> and bp. currently, vice-president of the drilling completions and operations, based in london. . \ >> common year said he had with bp? >> approximately 21. >> how long did you had your current position? >> december 2009. >> what other previous jobs it to hold within bp? >> prior to this role, i was the director for the gulf of mexico. prior to that, i held numerous jobs with the bp in various locations globally. >> when were you the well director? how long?

>> 2006 through 2009. >> what is your educational background? >> nd i had in hnc engineering qualification in mechanical engineering. >> can you please briefly describe what your job responsibilities are as vice president for the operations? >> yes. i'd be poured into the technology vice-president in mbp and the principal function i have is a functional role. my principal accountabilities were actually focused on several critical produce coming up in bp.

i would take over the order greoup? >> where is that? >> out of london. >> did you put it paid in the deepwater horizon bop your pension? >> yes, i did. >> while you selected? >> i was in the united states on business the previous week.

>> did you head of the intervention aside for the bop stack operations? >> from bp's side, yes bu >> do you recall making a log book? >> yes, i do. >> is it the log book that you actually took? >> yes, this is my logbook. >> just to give me an understanding of how you are communicating with people, who were you working with within transition to address the intervention? >> several people. i do not recall all of the names.

>> i was really porting. out working principally with mr. don king. >> i was aware that transition was doing that. i did not get fully involved in the end of improper for a couple of days. >> do you know what days you action got involved? >> it think it would have been around the 23rd or 24th. i have lost track of the exact time.

>> i'm going to referred to in a teammate on april 25. -- referred to a noteyou made on april 25. do you have that in front of you? >> i cannot find it. >> it should be tabbed for you. right there should be the first one. >> can you repeat that number? >> april 25. it should start 1415 at the time. >> that is correct. >> can you go down where it says 1500? ithat correct? above that, there is a note. >> that word is sum. can you read that to me?

>> this is -- there is some confusion about details from the control system. transition was aware a change had been made in the control system and a they are trying to establish

what they have got. >> from this law, any time to get updated drawings? >> yes. >> when was that? >> i do not recall precisely. it would have been some time after ben i do not know who brought them. >> we are talking hours? in days? at most, i think it would have been a day. >> do you think not having these updated drawings have been fed on how the response? >> i think there is a time where

transition was looking for what was referred to as places of interest. there is a faster response to the operation a bit. >> how familiar are you familiboip -- familiar are you if bop? >> and produce a working knowledge. i am not an expert. >> do you know if there is a time stamp on how long the cutting element shear has if it comes in contact with sand? >> i do not know. >> i am going to refer to the time on the very next page. it is 1550 . employs one hour later the -- it was one hour later.

can you please read the first part of the? >> his address 1550. it is comparable to the function prevent i asked when this chan happen if transition could provide drawings of the change and is told in no. i've been contacted but people who have made the change. i was told then.

>> can you elaborate on what the function is? >> is actually saying st system. the function of the st lock is to provide a locking mechanism once the rounds of an actuated into a closed position. the crack>> i saw a drawing whih reflected in initiay handwritten red felt tip pen or something like that it showed overlying original drawings

where the modification had been made. >> who provided you with the drawing? >> i do not know. i do recall seeing the drawing on the walls in the room. >> can you continue to read the last paragraph? >> my concern righ now is tht trans ocean may possibly make an uncontrolled change locally on the rig. it does not appear at this time that they have a control process for this change on something which is critical. >> he confirmed that you still think it is a safety critical element? >> absolutely. what did you mean by "uncontrolled change." >> it is control of work.

it is with the company procedure. >> with that the bp? >> this to be a transition procedure. it took some time to understand. it had an impact on the time we had to respond to the intervention. >> when you say "took some time" can you give me a better definition of "time?" >> it may have been 12 or 24 hours. it was a considerable amount of time trying to understand what changes were being made. >> i'm going to go through a list of some possible issues and modifications they might have

come aware of. i'm going to ask you about them. i'm glad to ask if you were aware about them. alecky determine the possible of that it would have on the intervention. where you aware there were any leaks? >> at what time? >> after the intervention commandeering parana -- after the intervention, during the intervention. >> no. >> we aware of any leaking on the pot after the incident? >> no. meanwhile prior to the incident? >> no, i wasn't. >> we talked about the leak on the bop circuit. >> i was not aware of that before the incident. >> we aware of any dead man

series modifications? >> no, i was not. >> were you aware that there was a conduit things which out with one made by atag? >> no, sir. >> were you aware that fail-safe kit were removed and replaced with an alternative arrangement? >> no. >> were you aware of the lower pipe was replaced with a tet- ram? >> i was a with a change had been made sometime ithe past, yes. >> with that have an impact on the intervention? >> it would not. >> real where the lower stack panel was reconfigured? >> the prior to the intervention. >> we you aware that after? >> i was made aware of it during the intervention. >> what type of panel was it? >> i do not know the type.

>> were you aware that the middle pipe on the boers? was in these test ramp? >> the prior to the intervention. >> after? >> yes. >> with that have an impact on the intervention? >>es. >> can you elaborate? >> in the instance where it being rov port is incorrectly corrected, when you think you are operating the metal pipe ramps, the test is designed to hold prssure from the top and not the bottom. iwould have a misleading impact for us, yes. >> where you made aware of any modifications to the pods defective their ability to be retrieved without intervention? >> no, i wasn't. even not confirm they did have outdated drawings.

>> we have modified drawgs, yes. besides have vp been made aware? where is bp made aware of all? >> who would be made aware? >> it did was to be made awar, it to be made aware to the well team. >> would you agree that bp cannot have control over the modification? >> i do not know.

>> did you knowwho mae the modification? >> no, iid not. >> earlier, you name two gentlemen that you worked with the the gentleman. where there any problems that they had with modifications that delayed their response? >> i do not know what problems they had. and do not know was going through their mind. >> did you work in the same room? >> we were collected in the same room. >> did you have dvid conversations? >> yes.

> did they discuss any problems with you? >> i do not recall. >> do you know that during the intervention the rov and a small leak on the injction port? >> no, i do not recall that. >> at any time, when you made aware of any type of solenoid thissues on either the pods? >> and not during the intervention, no. >> were ou involved with pulling the pods? i was involved with the removal, but wanted had been retrieved, i left on a break. >> have you ever visited the deepwater horizon prior? >> yes, i have. >> some of the last time you were there?

>> i cannot recall the exact date. i believe it was possibly october or november time frame in 2009. >> this is the name of thing over the group in london. did you see anything that had any concerns? >> i did not take the audit group until the march timrame. >> when you are on the rate, did you see anything that indicated any type of concerns? >> no. >> well you -- wle you were the director, when they had bop issues reported on thed daily reports, who is responsible for making the determination that the pods or equipment was

functional? >> transition would be responsible for making sure that anything on behalf bop was functional. >> when they pulled the yellow pawed, did you read any report on that? >> no, i did not. >> do you know who did? >> no, i don't. >> did anyone tell you there was a solenoid failure on the yellow pod? > i did hear that. i do not recall where i heard it. >> i'm going to refer you to some logs that bp provided to us. i think it is in front of a start with number hzn-mvi.

>> take your time.

there is a section of the yellow solenoid failure. >> i'm sorry. >> with aldue respect, he had no firsthand knowledge of any issue with the yellow pods. i think there are witnesses who will testify who did that might be better to address this. >> in response, this information was gathered from bp team. i assume you have been working with. at one to notice the mayor of this document -- i want to see

if he was familiar with the document. >> i went several years tying to see how to do it. i want to make sure that you actually can see it. if there is difficult, i always carry a spare. >> you are referring here to the sixth of may. >> yes. >> i have not seen this

document. >> i do not. crack>> are you still got to the intervention? >> were you involvedwhen they made the cut above the riser package? >> i watched that. quite the you recall what they saw?

they moved it out of the plume. it appeared there were two sections of pipe. >> that the summit to what you are looking at? >> had bp done any work? >> the engineering group were looking at the analysis of how that could be. nd do not have any information. >> another has been a lot of discussi. mention the new responsibilities. had you ever looked at the rate

audit prior? >> no. >> were you made aware of this? >> >> i do recall seeing a note in 2009 the mentioned below. >> why you were the director, did anyone indicate to you that the staff was not in compliance with the regulations? >> i do not recall.

>> did you note any problems that might have future concerns with? do you have any faith in it? >> that is a very broad question. >> do you have any faith? you think it is a reliable source. >> yes, i do. >> how many have you been on the floor? >> i do not recall exactly. i know it is a least one prior to this. >> where was that? >> the gulf of mexico. it would have been around 2003. i cannot recall exactly. >> it was successful?

>> yes, it was very successful. >> you and i were together for 10 days. >> good morning. >> [inaudible] i ends today as e to answer as the -- i ask you to answer from

the perspective of the bp and the perspective of being with your years of experience in the oil and gas industry as a senior statement. -- statement. i'm asking for your opinion on some things. you do not have to speculate. you can make a recommendation to the bet of your knowledge possible. i would appreciate it. >> have you been following the investigation pretty closely and turns a transcript? there is progres >> i've not been following the

investigation. >> i will provide you some information that have been presented at the hearings. he had se>> if yu have knowledg, please, let me know. for you aware of the march 23, 2005 explosion occurred at the bp texas city refinery? >> i am aware. >> were there any lessons learned for bp after that incident? >> i believe there were lessons learned, yes. >> what were those? >> i do not recall. >> the note would bp did with those lessons learned? >> i cannot remember.

>> in 1999, this involved bp. the crew experienced in your well blowout. how far [inaudible] >> i was aware of that instant. >> what lessons learned came out? >> i did not see it. >> was there an investigation? >> i believe there was.

i do not know who ran the investigation. >> you are not aware of any lesson learned? >> i do not recall. >> so any action that bp to ooko improve the effectiveness, you are not aware of it? >> i am not aware specifically. >> you been in the industry for a long time. there is a disaster in 1998. did you did are you familiar? >> i recall that incident. >> what your member the details? >> i didn't remember anything. >> what if i tell you that there was a ghastly that cause an

explosion killed 167 people? did that refresh your mind? >> what i see as the previous casualty. the guerrillas set out in my mind a lot of things were identified i 1998

[inaudible] let me run through some of these items here. you understand what we call the safety net, and do not you? >> i have not. >> in terms of rules of a various entity. half year never herd of that? >> i do not know that phrase. >> within the safety net, there are different in ditties with different responsibilities. they have different trees bonds

abilities in insuring the safety of the vessels. >> let me go first into the response aspect. yesterday, we receive testimony from the rig manager for the deepwater horizon. later on, we received testimony from mr. john winslow.