what it's doing in the back of a box. and sometimes that's what really catches us unawares. so there is a shared responsibility between those of us now and the new generation coming. the new generation of pilots will likely have been participants in virtual reality activities. through the form of video and computer games and an interesting statistic for those who are not aware of it, we have these massively multiplayer online games. .

>> the box itself, there are good advantage and good things about how it is continuing to be

developed. this picture up there is actually a picture from the bowing 787 simulator. the simulators have been progressing, they are going to continue to do so, and the gap between the sim and real world is more blurred. this is not a bad thing. it can be a good thing. the biggest point is it is a reality, whether we like it or not. let's tap into the strength of as we great greater fidelity, that should be leveraged to its maximum possible ability.

reaction skills are really key, and they're very good. this tool does well at that. you can get the necessary reactions without killing yourself when you're in emergency action, something i would much rather do in a simulator than a real airplane. when things don't work, we can reset the sim. next slide. however, there are some unintended consequences when you marry some of the practices that we us the sim for or could use them for, and when we bring this together to the next generation of pilots, as the perception of simulator and reality becomes less, there is less sense of that perceptional difference between the sim and the real airplane. there is research indicating that virtual reality simulation

can reduce the fear response to death hazards. what i'm talking about is not that pilots will mistake that oh, i didn't realize i was in a real airplane, because i thought it was so much like the i am. no. i'm talking about around the edges. because of the emergence in virtual reality activities to a much greater extent than the present pilot group, we need to be aware of a very probable response, so when they get into the airplane, they have less of a response to recognizing that we're getting closer to the edges of safety than we really want to be, and so there's no real reset in the airplane. if you hit the ground, it's real ground, and you get real dead.

next slide. the question is do we really want our pilots first death wakeup call to occur during a revenue flight? anecdotal evidence suggests that is a possibility. cultural context and research supports that this is a reasonable question to ask, and to look at. next slide. one of the things that i propose we do is we need to look at a tactical change. as a group, all of us, pilots, management, certificate holders, regulators, we all have to look for this and try to answer the question. i, myself, don't have an answer. it's something we have to work on as a group, but i think we should look at those

possibilities. we can reevaluate how the tool is used with an eye towards trying to find out how do we reinforce the reality of real-world death, and do that from within the simulator virtual reality world? it's not going to be an easy answer, but i do believe it is achievable, and i do believe that as we can make progress on this kind of area, we will make progress on safety, which will save real lives in the future. to conclude, i say we need to dare to think outside the box. it's something we can do. it is a human advantage. thank you. [ applause ]

>> thank you, paul. very good. actually, it offers a very good segue into our next presentation. suggested, the training landscape is changing, either with the generation of our pilots, or the tools that we have to train them. one thing that hasn't changed is to mitigate in-flight loss of control. we have to be able to respond. we have to be able to retrieve skills going back to our very basic airmanship. discussing those issues with flying airplanes, not necessarily just straight and level, i'm pleased to introduce brian birksp he has served on a number of international panels on flight simulation, is vice chairman of alpha training council, and flies for alaska

airlines. >> i'm pleased to be able to process today on in flight control and recovery training for pilots. i always like to start with a success story. obviously, loss of control in flight has been high in the media light lay with some unfortunate accidents with loss of air france over the mid atlantic, and many others. it can deem like a daunting challenge to go after this target right now. using some examples in the past as a template, let's look at the early 1970's, when we had a rash of accidents from wind shear on approach. industry marshaled its efforts with alpha and looked at the opportunities to target

preventing wind shear accidents. we learned much about micro bursts, adopts measuring exalts, and emphasized the importance of weather information to pilots. we utilized the best tools possible in using simulators to have procedures and deal with this from a constructive building block approach in a pilot professional career. what resulted was a significant decrease in wind shear events. if you look at these accidents in the early 1970's, it's amazing to look back. there is a very remote possibility of this now. control through it terrain was another addressed known target. this centered on technological improvements. we were able to have technical solutions, and combined that with pilots awareness, knowledge and training procedures. oftentimes, we placed difficult

circling approaches and nighttime conditions with approaches, and combined the training element, as well. we can start off, and it may be a daunting task. many are familiar with this slight. this is starting in 1999 showing loss of control in flight has been the leading cause of accidents globally. this trend is increasing. it doubles the next category, controlled flight in terrain. it continues to decrease while loss of control increases. there is important aspects to loss of control in flight. the number one cause of loss of control accidents have to do with aerodynamic stall. there are other subsets, spatial disorientation, shifting c.g.,

aas as i am metric thrust. here's a demonstration of why this might be a target-rich environment. the trend of loss of control is increasing. combine this with other streams of information, and look at some of the traditional training targets, you look at the chance of loss of life and loss of control accident as opposed to traditional training target, you are three and a half times more likely to die this way than a runway excursion or no one engine systems failure. we can put the best minds to solve this. i want to comment on a couple of these. the f.a.a. and industry will be

completing their activities next month. they have great progress. some of the members are here in the room today. the f.a.a. stall working group in july passed a safo, much needed in the industry, to change the emphasis and practical test standards for minimum loss of altitude when you have a stall than reduced angle of attack. i plowed them for coming up with that change. it's long overdo. they came out with an info this past july, which really recommends the use of an outstanding piece of content, the airplane upset recovery training aid, which has been a very effective tool. unfortunately, it is not widely used by training providers or airlines. it is getting higher visibility. i want to talk about some of the

other activities. iosa has a training group. i'm going to talk about an effort that i've been involved in representing alpha starting last summer, the committee for aviation training in the extended envelope, being no one normal flight attitudes. this began last summer in june at the royal aeronautical society. we had organizations from all over thebs world. at the conclusion of this outstanding conference, there was unanimous consent by the delegates globally to ask the society to form a standing committee to address loss of control in flight. what differentiates them from the stall working group is we're looking at long-term

comprehensive solution to loss of control in-flight primarily through pilot training activities. the f.a.a. stall working group was a short-term effort that was to offer solutions within the existing regulatory structure. our mission was to look at long-term, comprehensive ways to address loss of control. i want to emphasize we're still early in this process. our deliverables are schedule would for the end of next year. we're still in the data analysis process right now. i am encouraged to offer preliminary results from our determinations as we looked at this. i've been the co chair of the training and regulatory group, and our first responsibility was to do a proper training needs analysis, to have a good feel of what the existing knowledge, experience, and skill level was for the aggregate pilots right now, when faced with an upset event. we had to do a survey of the capability of existing or future

training platforms or mediums that would allow the pilots to close that gap, a proper gap analysis. we're pretty far along on that. i want to point out a few of our determinations, it is early and subject to change. i do want to bring about with these other groups, we are gaining confidence that there hasn't been any contributions between the f.a.a. stall working group, eye cade, or other groups. we are coming up with the same kind of determinations and solutions. here's what we know. there's a lack of basic aerodynamic information. for too long, our airlines, when they hire a pilot into it is inventory just assume that that pilot comes with certain academic knowledge, skill levels to perform duties. we found research a the fact, and many propagated from the

ntsb conclusions that you can't make that assumption. so, what we need is a more vigorous approach to the return to the basics. we also learned that there's limitations to the use of full-flight simulators when we use that for upset recovery training. i'll talk about that more explicitly. we learned our approach to training upset recovery is probably@' inferior methodology. we need to consider using more robust and realistic training scenarios. i'll talk about that in a little bit. finally, is the skill set. we talk about upset prevention and recovery training. prevention is the primary goal. if we equip our pilots with the knowledge and experience to prevent the upset from occurring, to not operating in a high threat regime, or to be more vigorous or aware of

operating in a higher threaten environment, then that is the primary goal. as you go down through the stream ofs this, the other opponents of recovery are pilot awareness or avoidance, recognition, and finally, is recovery. the"4 avoidance and recognition tend to be more knowledge based or experienced based, applied with am democratic or training tools. the recovery as i willset is the most problem take. we're putting pilots in situations that they have no experience for. we have to look at the infrastructure and"7 training. we are cost conscious of solutions. we've adopted what we call the

graduated strategy. this is where we identify the low-hanging fruit, and try to ma'am maze the existing training infrastructure that works when it comes to effective recovery training. that's very important, but we're looking at it in a long term structural basis. this was put out years ago. they had a revision to this, specifically high altitude threats recently. it's an outstanding piece of content. two of the primary authors i've seen this week are the original authors. in part of our training needs analysis, we found out less than 40% of airlines or training providers are using this content in how they do recovery training. that training was not mandated. it will be under house bill

5900. it is mandated for alcao. it tend said before to be mostly volunteer. let's talk about the graduated strategy, and this is kind of the good news. the first emphasis is on aerodynamic academics, the good news being that we have training platforms that are able to quickly embrace this approach, and provide adequate academics to our pilots, whether threw distributed materials, distance education, c.b.t., or building block approach with classroom construction, direct interface, and particularly with the full-flight simulator. we can get this easily with the academic portion. one more technical in nature, where i learned probably more than i wanted to about simulator capabilities are the limitations

and appropriateness of using full flight simulators. i can't talk about all the elements, but right now, the manufacture of the module are required to deliver aerodynamic data to the simulator in a normal flight regime. once you get beyond stall, all bets are off with the accuracy of the data. that has implications if you use the device inappropriately. i'll give you an example of that. a stall in a high performance swept wing jet aircraft can be very dynamically unstable. the years we've been use it, it tends to abvery benign event in the simulator. what we get out there is a false sense of security of a line pilot when they go back to the line, not fully appreciating the

threat level of a full aerodynamic stall. we want to train approaching the stall train with initial on set of buffet, initial stick shaker, but there's a big difference between an approach to stall and aerodynamic stall. the simulators can be a key issue to preventing negative training. another example on this is the american airlines 587, where an inappropriate rudder input led to the failure of the vertical -- the tail. i don't mean this to impugn the american airlines training program. they undertook that with the best in tent. there might very well be aircrafts that were saved with that training content. simulators are strapped to the ground. the motion chewing is there to

represent an acceleration cue. we'll never be able to sustain them like in real flight. that's what we try to do with upset recovery training. if a pilot is in a full flight simulator and utilizing full rudder reverse also, it's limited. what you get is a little bit of shake, not noticeable in the simulator. oftentimes, the pilot doesn't know the full rudders are being in putted, let alone the check pilot in the back. if the full flight simulator represented what the aircraft would have experienced, they would be slammed around in that cab, and you would never have to explain why it is improper to use full rudder input. that's an example we have. i'm an advocate of full flight simulators. this is the most difficult we

face for long term solutions. at my airline, i didn't really understand when i was an instructor the limitations of the device, and how to use that to train pilots. when we do a better job of that to prevent negative understanding of training, we'll control what pilots get by using that device. the methodology and the way weh! generally train is maneuvers based training. one pilot does the activity, followed by the next pilot, preannounced. through our server, we found many pilots would memorize stall entry procedures, and they were geared up due to recovery right now. unfortunately, in the real context of upsets on line or stalls, it's always a surprise event. the crew never knows when it's

coming, unaware until it happens. shouldn't we train upset recovery the way we train every other recovery, scenario based training? it's appropriate to use traditional maneuver training for the initial skill set. if you want to evaluate the training, it becomes not an individual pilot task, but a shared crew responsibility. looking at mandated training as part of our certificate license or rating level is another thing we want to look at. when they hire a person a within a.t.p., that rating should mean something as far as knowledge or experience level p.m. if you want to leverage the ability for pilots to have the appropriate knowledge, attitudes, and skills to avoid royceing recovery from upsets, the law of primayies

tells us that should happen early on. in a building block approach, we should bring it up through a professional pilot stream, commercial pilot, and specific training. i will say that it is mandated recovery training in this law of primacy approach. we are looking at this data right now with initial findings. i want to talk about alpha's position on simulators and motion and how to conduct this target of upset recovery training. our position is that we should train and do evaluations in the highest simulators available. when you put your license on the line, your certificate on the line, that should be conducted in a device more aircraft-like

than a fixed base device. to do anything else, you can be assured that you are not really training a representation of the aircraft, something that's not that similar. i'll leave this up here. this will be available afterwards. we have efforts undergoing as to alpha on the advisory board to see how g.p.l. is initiated. we are involved in standardizing the use of simulators and training devices in all pilot activities. i'll stop there. thank you. [ applause ] >> i kind of get the impression you know about something this stuff. did you get this out of wikipedia? nicely done. i'd like to change gears a little bit here. we've talked about the training environment. we've talked about generational

differences. we certainly have lacked at more technical aspects of pilot training, and hot buttons out there. i want to kind of change the gears a little bit, because our training doesn't end at the training center. it's got to continue well after we go out. the need for ongoing command and leadership training, and effective mentoring has been recognized by the recent congress, passing house resolution 5900. to discuss this ongoing training requirement and professional development of pilots, i'm pleased to introduce christopher malo. he is a member of the alpha training council. he has been directly involved with the mentoring and leadership program at his airline, and will discuss some of the things that he has done that we believe are crucial elements to a professional development and mentoring

system. captain. >> thank you, chuck. first off, it's hard to follow brian, and mine will be much less technical. i wanted to take an opportunity to thank all of you for coming. as express jet, we have 150 committee volunteers that sacrifice time, family for the better of the pilot group as a whole, and our industry as a whole. all of you do the same thing, and i hope your m.e.c.'s appreciate you aband your pilot groups appreciate you. without you, we wouldn't be able to do what we're doing today. i'd like to take time today to discuss mentoring, and how important it is in the professional development of a pilot. i promise to be concise, and leave time for questions. i would like to start by reading

two quotes. next slide. that i think embody what mentoring is. "we make a living by what we get. we make a life by what we give." the other quote captures the overall theme of mentoring. "mentoring is a brain to pick, an ear to listen, and a push in the right direction." next slide. mentor, tradition, heritage. when you look at all three definitions, one can view a mentor as a person who serves to insure that a tradition, heritage, value, and best practice tod3 the permanent and professional development of an individual are passed from generation to generation.

many of these previously mentioned items often writing, the alpha code of ethics. i'm sure you all have something in your manuals about this. these items can't be trained. you can't learn this in a school house or read it on a piece of paper and make it happen. it won't become real and understood until you have the assistance of a skilled mentor. at that point, that person will have the realization, the epiphany when they talk to a mentor and go this really works. i learned something. mentoring exists in every profession and everyone's real life. your parents and teachers and peers are mentors. next slide. from a mentoring perspective, there are many aspects of an

airline pilot that sets us apart from a pilot. i heard this morning the gold standard, and that's really true. as a pilot, we are only concerned with fly that go aircraft safely in accordance with law and regulation. as one person in my airline put it, you are flying the tube through a set parameter, and that's all you're concerned with. it goes beyond that. you have flying skills, leadership, the alpha code of ethics, and safety, security, regulatory compliance, passenger comfort and the schedule. many of you probably heard my rant last year, and i'm going to give it again, and that is that it is nothing wrong with all of us as alpha leaders and mentors to say this is what we expect of

you. you are airline pilots, you signed up for this, and this is what we expect you to live by. it's your job as a mentor when individuals stray, give them a helpful nudge back into that realm. next slide. i'd like to move on and discuss formal versus informal mentoring. they are both effective methods, and are equally important. formal mentoring, you kind of view as a long-term, 1-on-1 relationship between a mentor and protege. every person you fly with, when a first officer comes into an airline, every captain they fly with is a mentor for them. i'd like to discuss in more detail formal mentoring. it may not exist at every carrier right now, but as you've

heard with house rule 5900, that will all change. next slide. we set up a long-standing and formal mentoring program years ago. the program pairs senior captains with new first officers, and senior captains with all new captaining who have taken their first command at our carrier. we assign mentors to captain who have upgrade as a result of soft skills. in our opinion, we had breakdown and felt the result was because of the stagnation of the industry. before, we had pilots that would progress quickly from the right seat to the left seat, and mentoring or informal mentoring was almost a mandate. the day you started on the line, your captain looked at you

saying you'll be in my seat soon, let me teach you. after 9/11, we had furloughs, we moved backwards, we were all in our seat for years. at that point, you saw a complete shutdown of mentoring. people thought why learn that he's doing, i'm just going to sit over here and watch the clouds go by. the problem is as we all know, this industry shifts at a moment's notice. now you have a big cadre of senior first officers that are upgrading who really had no mentoring. not only is that bad, because they didn't get all those values that they can get out of monitoring, but ultimately you have to be mentored to know how to mentor. once these people upgrade, you have people with no mentoring, and monon on how to do it. during this time, in conjunction with our mentor committee, we

worked on what pilots should as a minimum be discuss to go prepare for one day being in command. next slide. the mentor program was an instant success, and began to fill the void left by the lack of informal mentoring. we define mentoring at our carrier as the sounding board for concerns and questions. the mentor provides advice and guidance for questions a pilot may not be comfortable asking to a company official. oftentimes, a pilot, and you probably have all experienced, would be more comfortable discussing issues with a trusted mentor he or she has built a relationship with over a company official. this could be for a number of reasons, they are embarrassed, maybe they have a fear of showing lack of knowledge. the last part of our program that we developed is something

i'm proud of. it takes a lot of work from volunteers, and that's our pilot mentor manual. it is over 100 pages developed by volunteers, and is kept up to date. it covers aspects ranging from you're parking in a hub to what alpha can offer you to certain expectations our company has have conduct of an airline pilot. next slide. this is actual cuts out of our pilot mentor manual. there is a schematic of how to get to a hub. we have who you can reach out to. in the foreground, you see the hotel guide, and a little subset called professionalism. that's a snippet which says what we expect of our pilots. we expect them to understand

that you're an airline pilot when you're on the overnight, on the van, walking through the airport. you are not just an airline pilot in the flight deck, your behavior, conduct, and professionalism reflects on all of us. next slide. let's move on to informal mentoring. it exists in every carrier. i think it exists everywhere. in my opinion, the a informal mentoring that occurs at a carrier is the result of three things, one, pilot culture, which is the biggest, varying by carrier to carrier. the second is, and what has turned our monitoring around is bye off on the formal mentoring program. in other words, you mentor a brand new first officer or captain, he gets tangible benefit, and in turn, is they go this really helped me, i'm going

to pass it along to the next guy. the third and final one is the eat or be eaten syndrome, the necessity. >> you're upgrading in nine months, youpd may want to learn something before you get in the left seat. as discussed earlier, the lack of informal mentoring occurs with stagnation, and when progress is made, all the weaknesses are displayed. it manifests itself because when a carrier returns to a short upgrade time, if the captains don't have a mentor mentality, the cycle continues. the only way to break the cycle is to have a strong mentoring program to rein still it. it's like you're planting a seed. there are a few reasons informal mentoring works. a message is much more powerful, you have much less defensive barriers. obviously, the message is more

received when coming from a peer. we'd rather be told what we're doing wrong by a buddy than a boss. next slide. second, it's been proven that learning occurs best when a discussion of a decision event or issue occurs soon after the event unfolds. due to the nature of our job, when you're overnighting in wherever, this often falls on the shoulder of the captain or other crew member. discussing the event days or weeks later with a supervisor, or a check airman, not immediately available to the person seeking mentoring does not produce the same benefit. this means all of you, all alpha pilots are involved in the professional development of everyone. each one of you and all alpha pilots must take vested interest to do it right every time, and then mentor pilots, your fellow pilots every opportunity you

get. last but not least, we have non-verbal and unintended inform alimony at herring,!g occurring all the time. you all know what i'm talking about, the captain that looks over to you and says hopefully you'll take a couple good things from me and ignore the bad stuff. by the time you're a captain, you'll have a bunch of stuff from all the different captains. it can be good and it can be bad. your fellow airline pilots learn their future behavior from you. they look at the people who have come before them, and say that is how i'm supposed to behave. he's been here 10 years, she's been here 15 years. they know how to do this. please be cognizant as your behavior today create the norms of tomorrow. next slide. i wanted to leave you with the full text of house rule 5900 as it regards to mentoring to ponder. i strongly encourage all of your

m.e.c.s to establish a formal mentoring program. it has done wonders at our carrier, received its benefit, and has become self sufficient at some point. you see people buying into it, if you want to call it that, enough informal mentoring eclipses the formal mentoring program. thank you. [ applause ] >> very nice. well, we've kind of given you an interesting perspective on the airline pilot training/professional business from technical toll very general, some very thought-provoking stuff. you know, as i started out by saying events have really caused some changes to occur in the industry from the regulator, and now with the passage of house resolution 5900, it will

separate. i expect the next three years very, very busy years. we are going to see some very significant changes in the way pilots are trained and qualified, and how that training works within the airline. it's going to be a very interesting time, so hopefully, we can use some of the concepts through it. each generation says well, my generation is the generation that's got the profound changes. i'm going to say that just like the generations before me. we are going to see some very profound changes here in the next couple of years. with that, i think there are some great opportunities to improve, and make our transportation system that much better. with that, we would like to open it up, hear from you. we've had some rather interesting concepts brought out here, but we'd like to take some

questions. we have a couple minutes. >> good afternoon. my name is bryant camp. thank you for the presentation. a couple quick questions about mentor ship. i'm curious to know how you select mentors, and whether or not they receive specialized training. in the process for new captains, is there a specific mentoring that goes on regarding leadership skills and conflict resolution, and stuff like to? thank you. >> sure. i'll answer the second part of your question first. there are set items we do discuss with both first officers and captains, however, the majority of mentoring is the individual as the pilot. you see individuals that are extremely strong in one area, and weak in another, and then you'll talk to the next person,

and it's completely vice versa. to say we treat everyone the same is not a true statement. the selection of mentors, we look for people that we believe embody what's laid out in the alpha code of ethics, we look for people who do it by the book, and they're proud of it, people that you just look up to, and say, and you know who i'm talking about, when you walk into the crew room, or wherever, and you say man, that guy's, he's professional. those are the people we approach first. the majority of the other mentor that is came onboard once we start it were people that were affected by the mentor program, to say they were -- got positive results out of it and said i believe in it, i want to do this, and they've become involved. as far as training, we don't have any formal training program

that we put them through yet. we are in the process of actually developing a complete policy and procedure manual for our mentor program, as well as a training program. >> thank you. yes. >> just a first couple of observations. this is primarily for captain burkes, but really all of you. i was told i have the best job in alpha. there have been a few days that i actually believed that. those have been the occasions where the airplane was trying to kill me. i consider myself seriously to be one of the very few fortunate people to have experienced for one thing, the flying the nafa twin autor cleveland, the one with the ice bolted to the tail,

rode through a tail plane icing stall, and it was an experience i'll never forget, because when i got snookered into this situation, the airplane bunted over, and it was a negative g-maneuver. we went from blue over brown to all brown like this. i pulled 100-pounds with my left hand to recover from that. that wasn't the record for the program. the record pull was a guy using two hands, pulled 161 pounds. and yes, we can't simulate that in the simulator. i have wished since that day that everyone who flies an airplane even remotely susceptible to tail plane icing could have the experience i had. back in 2002, 2003, i was one of the very fortunate people to get

to fly the upset recovery training program in new mexico involving an early model leer programmed to create upsets. the g-onset wasn't as abrupt as the tail plane icing experience. i just wish there was some way to get the funding back for that program, and/or to get that kind of experience into the sim with the kind of g, because the startle factor from the g can be really impressive. >> you've got kind of a couple questions in there. i'd like to throw to it brian first, that maybe can speak to some of the technical aspects of that, but i'd also like to throw it to paul, because he talked about that startle factor.

>> first of all, you have to look at type-specific scenarios. when you talk about tail plane icing, that's specific to certain types of aircraft. you have to be careful at that level that the recovery training applies specifically to your aircraft. it could be different. talking about your on aircraft training, i'm glad you brought to up. i might be premature to talk about conclusions. when i talk about limitations of full flight simulators, the only way to close that gap is on-aircraft training. cal-span was a government funded research program taking experienced pilots and putting them in a seattle to replicate the flight control forces of a 737 instead of a lear jet. you could pull positive g. up to

2g's up to negative half a g, which is realistic in the event of an upset. probably the best training i've ever had. here's what's important. in the hundreds of experienced airline pilots that went through this research program, 80% of them could not recover that lear jet aircraft the first time they were exposed to an upset. that's knowing they were going for upset recovery training. if you extrapolate that up to what you get in a surprise event on the line, that's a pretty ugly picture. the good news is over 90% of those same pilots, once given enough repetitions were able to perform not just one recovery, but recoveries in many scenarios. we are looking for training in a professional pilot scheme.

that begins at private pilot training to commercial pilot training. it's a very important question. you talk about startle in a simulator, it's different. the physiology of a human reaction in an actual aircraft as opposed to synthetic training is significantly different. if you interview these experienced pilots, they know academically what to do. when immersed requiring sensory overload to have the skill set to recovery, you have to expose them to the real environment before they become comfortable and fluent to be able to perform those skills. skills. >> you want to speak to startle factor? >> i talked about how simulators, the fidelity is

improving. it has taken leaps and bounds in the visual area and others. in the technological aspects of the simulator, one thing lagging behind to help emu late this area in human factors is the audio channel. when you have an instructor doing all of the audio calls, simulating the call to the company, the dispatcher, the flight attendant, it's too unrealistic. in order to do this, we need to look at ways within the simulator to enhance that area is one. we also have to create and work on developing scenarios whereby the instructor may not be absolutely sure, a crew may get into a stall, but we've got a create a scenario where it's likely and normal kinds of daily

overloads will come, maybe a scenario where there are several points where this might happen. then we can get a crew that gets overloaded, so that when they end up happening on a stall or an upset, they don't know it's coming, and they didn't expect it, because then you have the startle factor. every time it happens on line, i guarantee you, the crew had no clue until the airplane or the auto pilot dumped on them. >> very good, thank you. yes, sir. >> yes,al fred johnston, united airlines, triple seven pilot on the a.t.s. committee. you mentioned the reduced training footprint that we pilots have been encounters in the last few years. the training programs seem to be getting shorter and shorter. what effect has this had on

pilot proficiency and morale. >> nog matter what property you're on, you cang tell the] stress that's on our pilots. it'sa an anecdotal observation, no doubt, but when companies are focused more on shortening a footprint and not determining the importance of individual training events, in other words, trying to accomplish the same amount oef training in shorter periods of time, it's an incredible amount of stress on our pilots.c that's why our training committees, e.a.p. programs, professional standards are absolutely critical now to help our pilots get through these types of issues. however, we as the representative body need to challenge our regulators, our

companies, as well. therea are places where we can train withu shorter footprints, no doubt about it. the analysis of the tasks that are needed needs to be done, as well. it needs to beaa done professionally, it needs to be done in a fair and balanced way, so that we know that we don't determine training foot prints, and then try to fit the training in. we are allowed toq identify the training tasks and then build a footprint to fit that in.i if that includes shortening footprints because we have an experienced pilot force and we're able to do that, so be it, we endorse that. we also insist, and endorse the philosophy of going the other way. many of our carriers don't take fulle advantage of a.q.p. i hope that answers your question. the stress load isaa high. also, we need to be proactive, and involved ina developing our

training. we will gladly sit at anyone's tablem to help them out, and at anay carrier's table. we think we can get to that sweet spot. >> thank you.a we've got time for one more question. sir. >> ken hall, atlantic southeast. i believe the legislation that's been signed recently has a potential of putting all of us as a profession between a rock and a hard place when we encounter the pilot choice we all know is coming up. has anyone on the committee, or has alpha given any thought to how we're going to react to that? are we going to look at potentially changing our american business model, which is one of always hiring experienced pilots, and adapting a model that has been used with some success in europe of hiring

pilots with zero hours, and creating mentored programs that get them from zero hours to a fully qualified crew member status? where does the panel stand on that? >> that's a very good question. oh, thanks, that's my question. you bring up a very, very interesting point, because world-wide admonitio is being considered. it has it's basis in admonitio training. we will upgrade the certificates all pilots have to have. we are at least here in the united states going to see something that you could probably look at and say is counter to the admonitio but we

also have an opportunity here.@c we have an opportunity to communicate right now to a new generation of pilots that there's going to be a different approach to becoming an airline pilot here in the united states. you may find that now people that are really committed to going into this industry will have to be drawn to formal programs where there is the appropriate balance of flight experience, structured training to achieve the standards thatyf basically the house has given us. i don't want to say that admonitio can never work here under that legatory structure, but we're going to have to adopt to new changes that will come into effect in the next three years. we're going to have to have real smart people in the aviation business take a look at the possibility of starting with zero time, and seeing if we can create a structure here in the

u.s. short term, right now, the house has basically said we want the experienced pilots, and we want pilots with higher-grade certificates, and the bars being raised, and we're going to have to respond to that right now. thank you all for your attention. it's been a flash address you, and i would like to thank my panel for a very, very good panel. thank you. [ applause ] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] >>.ñw