to be for the department of defense to be audited, none of you will be here so we won't have any kind of accountability for you. the passive aggressive. we'll just - yeah we're going to get there but it's somebody else's job is frustrate together me and to have you say, we don't need thebta or to focus on getting the financial statements audited, can you help me how your going to keep it's a priority for the department to get audited financial statements and not committee resources to getting that done? >> mike? >> yeah. couple of questions embedded there if i can take the first one. you asked where the hundred billion came from. discuss that with mr. keen. that's what it takes to get our war fighting a counts to two to 3% real growth.

>> actually give you that math. i'm not following. >> i'll provide you with the math. the calculation but that's where the hundred billion dollars came from. it wasn't totalling of proposals but a target based on what we thought we needed to get war fighting constituted 3% which is what history tell use, you need to continue upgrades and training and personnel. the bulk of your question was on audited financial statements. >> and sustainable systems. >> that's where i was going actually. the most important piece is not an audit in my mind. the most important piece is management information systems that the audit provides just a test of. we're committed that. it is as i'm sure you well understand given your background. somewhat different than the private sector. the goal here is not providing information to investors but

ensuring the tax pairs money is well spent. for that reason we have focused our upgrading management systems doing with budget resources. we're trying focus on the most important information. as you indicated, this is a monmom mammoth job. >> we had this conversation. focus on the data you use and it's not getting there. you're not getting there. but go ahead. >> well, if we're not getting there we probably ought to have a discuss because that's what we're trying and as you indicated mr. hail had the lead for this. business transformation agency plays the role in terms of the business systems and the secretaries conclusion, not that it would hinder audited financial statements but that thebta became an added layer

when congress added the deputy chief manager office to which thebta reports that there was no long another need for the under secretary level of official and the defense agency. we'll fold the responsibilities underneath the,dc m o and we think we'll get over head savings by the combining. that's the conclusion. not a rolling back to audit financial statements. >> chair recognizes the lieutenant from new jersey. >> good morning. thanks for your testimony. i think that what secretary gates has to say is characteristicicallyness, correct and i want to be a supporter of his efforts to bring some rationality to this exploding budget so. appreciate the work on his behalf and his position. >> unsolicited advice. as you have heard from mr. nice

and mr. forbes and we'll from the mr. scott. - any time we make some kind of reduction or change in this budget, it's very difficult to do. your living that every tom davis. i think it's especially important to do so in a way that prose seed rally conceivable in every respect. the concern i would express having heard about the joint forces command is you know, a decision announced august ninth. given the cycle of when congress considered appropriations bills and authorization bills is unfortunate. when you're going to make decisions you should follow traction. doing it in the budget presentation so the normal process can work it's course or you should call for another bracket and as perfect as that it. it's gained credibility. the hard decisions you have ahead i think will become more

achievable if you follow some regular order. second. my friend from texas said, the legislation he and i worked on together that the committee unanimously approved the floor. which hopefully, will be enacted as part of the authorization bill does place great emphasis on the financial audits. i think you'll gain credibility with the public and congress when the audits are done. i think it will permit us to discover areas where we can in fact achieve efficiency without risks the security of the country. i wanted to ask you. your opinion on the following question. any of the three of you would be fine. the waste the nature weapons bill the president signed may of 2009 was predicated on the premise of the,ja o report that we have over spent by nearly 300

million and 17 major weapons systems. what do you think a plausible goal is in terms of reducing out lays in future major weapons systems in other words if we could unscram tbl egg from the theory. it would have saved about 300 billion dollars. what to you think we'll gain in terms of avoiding cost over runs if we properly implement the law and the present stein in 2009. it's - gentlemen, just hold up. you'll get your remaining time. they've just announced a vote on a motion adjourn, i'm going to pause it's the chairs intention to continue the hearing so those that need to make that vote, go do so. thank you very much. we'll give you back that half a minute or so. >> of course, mr. chairman.

it's hard to set a target. i hate to set a tar the get to fail by so much. i think under doctor carters leadership and with the committees legislative stance i think we've put in place things that allow us to do that. we're putting far more contracts under fixed price in tentives than cost terms which give a convergence of the incentives of both contractor and the government now to bring it in at the price that was originally quoted. be as we're now sharing the risk. if we go over. doctor carter is introduced things that are making schedule a key performance perimeter because indeed it's loss of schedule that's one of the most common causes for cost over runnel. we want schedule, not just

performance to be over run. happy for doctor carter to expand on those. the target is to bring it to no cost overruns. i'm not nieve. that's ambitious but that is the goal. >> doctor carter? would you like to comment? >> just to echo what the deputy said. it's an ed fuss we build brick by brick. joint strike fighter program. an example. which we had to tell you last fall was an aircraft that in 2002 we told you would be 50 million dollars per aircraft in 2002 dollars and our current estimate which was a credible estimate of so-called will cost was 92,000,000 per aircraft and deputy celebritying rer day lynn and gates said, we should know,

we're not going to pay that let's see what we can to to get that number down. we're working with the performers of the work to do that. we're making some progress in that regard and just in that regard as a result of that progress, i think that the services have been able to reallocate for money they that they thought might have to spend on joint strike fighter over the next five years. some 580 million dollars. which is a contribution to the hundred billion dollars. another example. the multi-year on a six billion dollar contract. now about 5 point 3 billion dollars because you allowed us to procure those on a multi-year basis. 600 million over those that will not have to be spent but can be reallocated from that. essentially the overhead that

make the fae team as a consequence of them not being able to plan on a multi-year basis. that can be plowed, exactly the principal that secretary lynn has been talking about. >> mr. whitman? from virginia. >> thanks for joining us. i want to jump in since my time is limited and talk about the decision-making between the recommendation to close joint forces command. first of all, i think there's a tremendous lack of transparency there. took us over 7 weeks to get a response back from recognize see tear. ranking member forbes and mckee on and myself requested that. when we got the letter back it re-reinstateed the initial decision and had justification why this didn't fall under braecht. and i noted that the parsing of terms. seems as we look at the process,

first of all, we were told, well this is an efficiency effort. we'll look to where we can obtain efficiencies but we're told there's no analysis or cost analysis about closing jif come. that's yet to come and then we said, well really it was anticipate business decision but a military decision. when we ask, tell us strategic analysis behind that we're told we're in the process of doing it. we have operational opportunities out there. but strategically we have not figured out how it'll be done. none of those details have been tut together. let us understand about the process. we had over 30 meetings and we said, well it'll be nice to know what happened those 30 meetings and amazing how 30 can take place at the pentagon. there nose at single note or proceedings about those that you can divulge to us. i'd love to know more an about

how they take place and how you can have no proceedings and nothing to get our hands on to understand what's doing on there. you can understand why we're a little bit frustrateed by the lack of transparency. the lack of understanding about a decision of this magnitudes as the chairman point the - the effort to providing a framework for jointness and a decision of this magnitude without the transparency and this body understanding and secretary lynn you lectured on a responsibility office a leader and yours is to pro stride information so we as congress can do our duty to make sure we understand the decisions and the implications to the nature of those decisions i appreciate the lecture but the responsibility cuts both ways and the pen the two has a responsibility to die velg back

to us clearly how the decision was made and the underlying part there. my question boils down to this. it seems this process is wrought with inconsistencies and lack of information disclosed to us. even at one point when a meeting was had, kristen fox said this was a philosophical decision. so it's efficiency, no, it's military decision, no. philosophical decision and without transparency. my question is i want to know historically about how the decisions are made. can you tell me other instances where decisions are made of this magnitude. when you do the analysis afterwards and a post-decision analysis instead of a pre decision analysis. can you tell me when that focus has been in the past, on saying, we'll do the analysis after we make a decision or

recommendation? >> mr. whitman, i appreciate the fact that you and other members of the delegation feel we should have gotten you more information and got energy it to you faster. so i discussed with congressman nighe going forward, we met with the governor. yesterday morning with the self and other members. we will ensure as i discussed that the governor in those same members get the opportunity to meet directly with the secretary. we'll seek your input. >> chairman, with all due respect, that's know that the question i asked. i asked, can you tell me when in the past decisions have been made like this with the lack of analysis prior to the decision and without that being able to be divulged? >> i was addressing some of the pre amble.

the secretary made his decision with enormous input from the military and the civilian advisers that he's had. as we discussed. reasons here is on what's the the military purpose for this command and is it still valid today? the conclusion he came to based on the advice was know the purpose had been sved some cases and could be come established by other organizations and was due implicative in cases such as force provisioning and the joint forces command wasn't needed in that role. so for those reasons and he received a lot of input to that decision from his advicers in the meetings you correctly summarized, he made his decision. as we discussed with other members of the committee. once he's made that the question is how much of the billion dollars would be saved and

that's decision about what would be retained and what would not. we'll not eliminate every component of the joint forces plan or keep. we'll go through a thorough analysis that we will share with you as i dis discussed. we'll have the complete case you desire. >> gentle woman from california? five minutes? >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. i appreciate you are all here. this is very difficult and i certainly understand the concerns of my colleagues. i wanted to shift for a second, in the more personal health care area. we're talking about jointn ses on the one hasn't and in the house defense authorize psychs there's establishing a unified medical command. given that an center for analysis predicts such a move

would save approximately 29 $4,000,000 a year. we were surprised that the department opposed strongly that section of the bill and it's also true, of course that i don't think any of the political a pointe decisions have been filled political affair. what objection the unified medical command you have and that you've encountered. what - what is the - i think considerable push back to reject the house proposal we think would save significant saving? >> the - this is - as congressman knows this is a long running debate over a command verses an agency how we treat our health care. i actually think that we ought to, as secretary indicated a completely open mind. that second track i indicated

was outside input. i think we should consider all possibilities. as we look it at overhead savings though we've had questions in the past i would assert that we should take a look in the new fiscal circumstances we face and we should look at that proposal. >> is there a sense or idea of what kind of management structure in fact you might be thinking about? what - that would be quite different from today? >> we don't have - i don't have any proposals in terms of changing the military. the medical management structure for the department at this point. >> okay. i think that a lot of issues have been raised about either commands or other installations that might be, you might be thinking about closing. is there anything else you might share with us about other commands at this point?

>> i mean, i think the secretary has said as part of his direction to the services if he thinks there needs to be changes, they should have put that in submissions. we've not got ebb to that input so we're not to the point of looking to closing bases or installations at this point. >> thank you. let me turn to important personnel issue and effects the men and women across our country and certain lay cross the globe and recognizing the strides that have been made and certainly in family support assistance. as we look to efficiencies. how would you articulate the efficiencies in family policy that are being envisioned right now and how are these efficiency

studies going to impact our policies as it relates to the men and women and their families serving to day? >> i think the secretary would be interested in any proposals where we could deliver the same services to our military families in a more efficient way. i do not think he would be looking favorable on proposals that would reduce the support to families at this point. not quite part of the direct war fighting but i think the secretary believes it's equally important and that would not be the avenue the secretary is looking to go down. he's more interesting in the things frankly, we've discussed. reducing bureaucracy. as benefits for military families, that's not the direction he's looking to in shifts in resources. >> i appreciate that. as you know we're in unchartered

territories as our men and women return and i don't think we've got our heads quite around what that will mean and very quickly. the people have raised issues of in sources and outsourcing and i think one of the things i'm hearing now in the sandy a go community is concern from businesses that a number of their positions and their people, highly qualified people, they use the word poaching. that the military is essentially, you know, finding them, it's not that hard to find them and bring them understand they think that you know this could create an imbalance down the road. i want to express that to you that, that is being heard and wonder if you have a comment? >> gentlemen from colorado? i guess not. >> ten second? we do hear reports from field that we need to follow up and make sure that

all of the steps that are taken are appropriate and that the government isn't doing anything inappropriate in seeking new goals of getting more expertise into the government. that's certainly not the objective of the in sourcing program. >> gentlemen from colorado. >> mr. lynn, secretary carter and general cart write thanks so much for. this. i certainly respect the comments of randy forbes, congress man from virginia in terms of the process and maybe it wasn't the best process you used arriving at your conclusion, but i want to say this as someone that served in the united states army and marine corp. in the first gulf war and iraq war. that the 15 intervening years between 1990 and 2005 between my service and the first war and the iraq war, there's been anquan tum leap in term of

jointness in our military the and think it's something that today is energy grained the military culture. i think you're right to evaluate. whether or not we still need the joint forces command in light of the extraordinary changes and progress that are, our military has made. let me go to a few other issues. on the in sources and outsourcing issue. seems republican administrations want to outside and democrats want to in source. let me say, maybe there's a compromise and that's effectively managing contracts and i think we need to can a better job before we make a decision is about in sources and effectively managing the contracts we have. couple more quick issues and love your response. i think one area that we could actually derive a savings and

increase effectiveness in military and it is not certainly subject of our discussions today. our personnel in terms of promotion is too rapid and i think our members of the military are not getting enough experience in the respective time and i think we would improve our war fighting skills in saving the operating budget if we would slow this promotion process down. with that, i would defer to any of you for the comments. >> let me, on the issue of managing service contracts we in fact agree and a significant part of the initiative was improvements in that regard. let me ask him to describe those for you. >> there's a number of those that have to do with improving our trade craft. getting a better deal, value for the 200 billion we spend on services but specifically to the

in sourcing question raised. couple of points. the first is, yes it has gone back and forth from time-to-time. the important thing to bear in mind is not one size fits all. some things it's beneficial to outsourcing. mowing the at the base. why should the base commander try and figure that out. there's people that are koik that for a living that are much more efficient. when it comes to con tracking officers and systems command you really want in the government, people that have those skills. and - what lay mind the secretary defense for the acquisition workforce that's obstacle going and which he's indicated not being curtailed because of the efficiencies initiative was left to save money, though on average it can be the case that a government

employee fully-loaded costs less than a con tracker. the point was to get within our walls on our side of the table the talent that we need responsibly to spend 400 billion in contracting goods and services we do every year. are we poaching? i mean, we do go to the open market and ask people to come and join the ranks of government. they come from some other job and i'm delighted when they do come. i tell you, i talk to these people and what we have on our side when we recruit is the mission. we don't have money and don't pay a lot. our buildings are not steel and glass but we have the mission and that polarisly for young people gets them hooked is the ideal they'll contribute. >> let me enter at this point. you also have a personnel system

that rewards mediocrity. that definitely needs to be reformed. >> i agree with you. in fact that's something celebritying rer tcel secretary gates addresses all the time. >> the gentlemen from connecticut. mr. courtney. five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank the witnesses for their testimony today. doctor carter and your testimony, i think you sort of frameed the fact that just setting a side all these percentage numbers, increase, decrease the fact is we still have to deal with the challenge of the alternative broken programs or ones that work. i think really, that really should be the outcome that we're all trying achieve together in the short time i've been here,

seeing the president helicopter and the destroyer program sort of collapse under their own weight is not a rhetorical point you're making. in your testimony. you know, the - program that we've been keeping an eye on over the last year or so, the fsbn program that you point out has been endorseed by in the nuclear repostering program. there's no question that the price tag which the navy was, you know, assuming was one that was going to potentially challenge the surface of our navy and again, it appears from your testimony that already in the last few months there's been some progress made in terms of the milestone, a class reduction. you know, i guess the question is, you know, that reduction has

nothing to do with the fact that this administration is still committed moving forward with this one that appreciated if you can address that point and secondly, the capability that's been identified in terms of that program and our national security need for a deterrent also is not being compromised. it's about not trying end up with another program ten or 20 years down the road is going to unsustainable and really effect our ability to defend ourselves as a nation. wondering you can address that point. >> it's more of a question of how than where. if you don't get the how right, you can get the whether wrong. the helicopter is an example of that. we don't want to be in a situation where we design a submarine we know we can't afford. and the navy has done - i think,

an excellent job in the last several months of going through all the design drivers and looking at where the change in one of the design features or the requirements that drives the design features can be changed in such a way that the cost of the submarine is reduced without sacrificing any way military capabilities. this kind of disciplined system really does work. they have managed to reduce the estimated cost of that submarine by 16% already and very plausible that they'll get gown down to the 27 percent if you consider this is a property that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars over the next 20 years if you're talking 16%.

27 billion dollars in cost you won't have to pay, that's significant engineering achievement and will bring the submarine in at a price the country can afford and won't be a collapsing program. >> in the timing of that milestone, given the fact that design work is sort of commencing at this point, i mean, really consistent with all the acquisition reform models this committee enforces is not to not get in a position of design build and wasting money. again, i think what you've described is something that fits well in the schedule that your budget is embarking on and as you said. long-term. that's going to create some relief for the budget or defense budget without sacrificing any of our countries deterrence. which again is something that i

think has been embraced by this administration. there's no compromise being made as far as this initiative regarding those goals that were set forth. that's - just want to under score that. >> absolutely is consistent with both and very much with the intent of the work of this committee in the area of acquisition reform. particularly at the beginning of the program life-cycle. >> thank you. i yield back. >> gentlemen from utah. mr. bishop? five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. gentlemen, this is an important issue which is why many of us are staying longer. i want to go into another areas of weeds for a moment. general cart write thanks for being here and - mr. carter, if i can talk to you specifically about it. i've been appreciative in the

past of your understanding of industrial base issues and solid rocket mos or the when other agencies outside the department of the defense were clueless about the entire one. the small turbine energys the weapon of choice is basically the tomorrow a hawk air launch cruise missiles. we have those because industrial base produces them at a low cost with a high efficient turban commission. one of the things to produce it on the super sonic cruise missile put that's private sector in danger of maintaining that industrial base and losing the expertise to keep them functional. the three questions i do have. specifically for you is small defense turbo than. something your office has specifically identified as a

defense, industrial base concern. second lishgs what can we expect to see from your offers in ways of specific actions to a that concern if it's identified as such? and finally with the announcing that they're jointly doing a super sonic missile is it wise for this administration to pull back r&d at this time and is that a specific point of discussion in making decisions on that super sonic cruise missile as well as procurements and cut back missiles for tomorrow a hawahawk.

if you could write the actions and get to us. was that action part of the consideration? did you discuss that before making this decision? >> yes. not those specific programs, but the global situation and the other and investments that we will need to make and stand off weapons. we know we need to make them. they're being considered as part of the long range strike family of systems work that's going on.

they may well result in other kinds of new stan off weapons programs and it's for that reason. to protect that option that the industrial base is so important so if we do choose that option we'll have the industrial capability to produce the engines. >> too many people have the naive notion these can be turned on and off like a spic et. thanks. i yield back. >> gentleman, we recently had a classified briefing on the roller situation in afghanistan and the need to deploy them in an expedient manner. one testify things that came to life and i'm trying stay in the confine of the classified nature of that was that the sparks two roller is made overseas and that the date for all of them being

delivered is several months off. one of the things that is delaying the a rival of all of them is that, we in the purchase of this we did not get the technical data package. i would hope one of the revision that your organization is looking into making is that any time our nation pays to develop a weapon, that is apart of that contract, that we'll own the technical data packet for the project. if we feel like a supplier is taking too long to deliver that product. then we as a nation will have the right to take that technical data package to another supplier if need be in order to beat that program delivered in a more timely manner. i don't think as a citizen, any citizen of this country wants to

see a single soldier sailor or airman or marine, who's lost life or limb niece lesley because someone has that information takes too long to deliver it. i would welcome any of the secretaries or general's thoughts on that but i want to hear reassurance going forward. any time we spend the nation's money to develop a product that we'll tone technical data to that product we'll have paid to get delivered. secretary carter? >> if i may, very aware of the sparks roller issue. they are being destroyed at a rate larger than we had anticipated. >> for the sake of the public. when the roller is destroyed vehicle behind sit not. exactly right, but the bad news is now we have to get another one in, in a hurry.

>> that's exactly right. i agree about technical data. you and i have discussed that in the combat ship competition and i'll just note new jersey the spirit of amen to what you said, that in the document that iraqi sued two weeks ago that of the 23 items in that one, specifically is to improve our - the way that we acquire technical data packets. we need to learn rights in that regard and also how to value them so that they can be - we can carry out the transaction. appropriate transaction with industry. i agree completely. >> with that. the chair recognize z chair from virginia. >> i want to follow up with a

couple of thoughts and questions. celebritying rer tear lynn you heard from a number of committee members today. the notion that this process is hard. >> now what i wanted to ask you was - and i know that the secretary has said most of the decision-making he intends to be done during that process. i think you back that up today. i'm sure curious to know if you can shed light on why secretary gates decided august ninth was the right time to pre announce a certain segment of those and not to noting the fact that we've had discussion about the fact that an analysis of joint forces command for example of how this could and would be done and what

the options are being has yet to be done. why not wait and do this as part of the regular process? >> i think secretary gates felt a strong need to jump start the process to establish this is an aggressive process and a process he's going to be involved in personally and that he wanted to start by establishing - what he's called culture of savings and in particular, he focused on the areas of headquarters of staffing and general officers. senior executives and redundancy and extra lairs and wanted to take more management steps he could take to establish the path ahead. so that's we go forward with the budget, the rest of the building would follow on and be an equally aggressive.

>> again i wanted to encourage you in the strongest possible terms to do this process in the regular established order. i think you'll find your ability to work with congress on it will be greatly enhanceed if we have an opportunity to be part of that. i want to recognize that you've said you intend to include us in the analysis before any decisions are implemented. thank you for that. i want to note. general cart write said during that analysis. at this point all options are on the table and essentially the status quo is one possible option for that analysis. one possible option. we may reach another conclusion but that's on the table still and i appreciate that we're allowed to be involved in the process going forward. one last thing in terms of comments and i want to follow up on something mr. whitman asked, he said can you give us an

example of when a decision was made without an analysis that we agree needs to be done. the cart before the horse thing. i can think of one and thats with the recommendation to build a fifth home court and without the analysis done to support that decision. i say this just to say, for the record. given the fact that we're going through a difficult decision on how to save money and cut down overhead and reallocate. i will be very surprised and displayed if during this butt process we have coming up, that the defense department again having stated we have to find savings in overhead especially things that are redundant and due implicative asks for money to build a department that's that by it's very nature. i wanted to state that for the record.

this is a tough process and i recognize nigh you have difficult work to do here and i appreciate that you recognize that today. i think it was late incoming but i'm happy to note you agree we should be part of the that process doing forward. i look forward to working on that with you to take a very good business case if you want to use that word. military look. but in an analysis of the best decision-making we can make going forward on the contract joint forces command and all issues we have to solve together. mr. chair, i yield back. >> gentlemen yield? you have a few seconds left. 18 to be exact. i just want to clarify what the gentlemen is pro - indicated in his statement and earlier statement to reiterate or confirm what i hear him saying, is that you've committed involve

the congress in the decision to disband or to eliminate jif come or you agree - or you made the decision and the secretary will make the decision, president will make the decision and then you will include us on how to carry out the decision? >> the secretary has made his recommendation to the president on dis- establishing joint forces command. the president has not yet made his decision and i've committed here with congress man nooi and others as we move forward on the implementation of that decision should the president a firm it. we'll work with the committee and congress in going or making those imply men tax decisions. >> sounds like i hear you saying that.

thank you. >> for the benefit of the committee. they have just called vote on the adjournment resolution. so it is the chair's intention to keep this going for another ten minutes and that'll be followed by two five minute votes making mere hearing 2:45. so having that said, ten minutes the chair recognizes mr. wilson of south carolina. >> thank you mr. chair and thanks for being here today. i share the concerns of congressman forbes. your testimony is that the joint forces command decision was made

for several odd hock among senior dod officials. i know they have reviewed documents that outline their military rational for the decision, knowing that there's been documentation, considered, i request those print and electronic used as basis for the military decisions to be provided to the committee. additionally my question is to secretary carter. the national guard and reserve. forces have been instrumental on the global war of terrorism. i know how successful and capable guard and reserve are. i served both for 38 years and have four soonns. but guard reserve faces still shortages of proper equipment for use in theater. how are the proposed acquisition reforms going to e foekt the guard and reserve?

>> it will effect the procurement of equipment in respective of the customer, but i think the burden of your question is better answers by general cart write than by mwri. >> our intention is is to get the force standing in order to go support either the global war on terrorism or any other activities that might be identified on the federal side of the state side. the question is, can we afford through the sufficiencys to get sufficient equipment to outfit

everybody with the capabilities best that we have or are there going to be short ages we have to manage and so, how? the idea is to generate the resources not to have the shortages. >> great and you personally i want to thank the marine corporaticorpo. at this time i yield my time to congressman from virginia. >> would you agree to provide to the chair and the ranking member the copy of the nondisclosure you provided people at joint forces command to sign? >> i'm not directly familiar with those nondisclosure agreements but i'll explore whether or not there is one and report my findings to the chairman and ranking member. >> if there is one, will you give them a copy. can you tell us, is it your testimony that you provided to this committee all of the

written analysis given to the secretary of defense to make his decision to close to joint forces command? >> we have provided the committee - yes or no? all the written information? if you have, yes, if you have not, no. >> we've provided all the rational any - have you provided all the written analysis given to the secretary of defense if you haven't it's okay, i just need to know. >> you're going to have to let me answer. >> we have provided the committee a body of material that supports what the secretary - that's not my question mr. secretary. i'm asking have you provided this committee with all of the written analysis provided to the secretary of defense to make the decision to close the joint forces command? yes or no?

pretty simple. >> we've provided the committee with the material that supports the decision that the secretary made. >> i'm asking if you provided the written material given to the secretary, all the material that was given to the secretary for the secretary to make his decision? >> i've answered the question. >> no, you haven't. you said analysis. that could be back filled. have we got ebb all the written documentation provided to the secretary? >> the secretary has provided you the material that - that he thinks we should have? >> that supports his decision. i'll go back and see if there's more material we can provide you. >> what you're saying is you don't know whether there was more information given to him or not? >> i'm saying i'll explore if there's more material - do you know if there's more

material as you sit there testifying? >> sorry? >> do you know if there was more material given that was provided to the amendment? >> i'm saying we provided a body of material. >> you're not going to answer the question and just like you haven't given the information. i yield the chair back. >> secretary carter and general cartwright, let me divert from the topic slightly and bring up concerns about the military build up in guam and there's issues of cost efficiencys if we get the build up done right. the record of decision was sign by consistent secretary and why the delays of final decision on the location of a firing range it state as preference to acquire land on the east side of

the island above the historical cultural site. i remain extremely skeptical such a land acquisition deal can be struck with the land of guam. can you outline what steps the department is taking in regards to meet marine corp. training requirements has the department considered ten ion is land or other land that could be used. i'm skeptical that a deal can be struck and i would not feel it prudent for the department to spend billions of dollars without a deal secured for the training range. so can you please comment and can i get your commitment to seriously explore alternatives for the marine corp. firing range? >> yes. thank you for the question. appreciate the questions as you know i recently viced guam and saw for myself the plans and the issues that we face.

the training ranges is a critical issue. i agree. to have the marines move to graham and maintain the level office training that we would expect out of a marine unit. we do need to find some resolution of this issue. i think you correctly described it. that location in there is a preferred location. after analyzing government land and some other options. ten yen is probably appropriate for some training but not close enough for the small arms training we're talking of here. we're much more interesting in a training range on guam. we're continuing to understand the cultural concerns and the site that's there. we're continuing to work, work those issues and we're hoping that we can find a resolution that allows the marines to conduct their training on guam

without compromising the cultural site and we're going to continue to work with you on that and i agree it's a critical issue going forward. >> that ca i want it on the re that you're seriously looking at alternatives. general cartwright, i guess i'm following up on congressman wilson's question. i - the recommendation put forth are a good start on some of these to a maximum efficiencies, but as i reviewed the recommendations i'm perplexed as to high the department is not tackled personnel costs and what further frustrates me is i don't see anywhere, where the national guard plays a role in the solutions. this is frustrating to me from the regard of guam. the guard can retain quality soldiers and airmen at a significant savings over the

active duty personnel. can i get a commitment to add quality review this efficiency? >> i think your reference here is the more frequent use of the guard in active force in ensuring they're actively equipped? >> and there will be savings. >> the guard in itself will generate savings to e request quip the guard and keep it trained at the levels we have become accustomed to that's substantially higher than anything in the past. so our commitment here is to again trait savings to put it back into that tooth that we consider the guard to be. how much we get here and our work with congress will determine the amount of money available to do that i knowledge there's are savings we read from utilizing the guard that we don't necessarily receive utilizing active forces but

there's trades we make there as well. operationally. >> thank you. i yield back. >> thanks to the gentle women. the chair recognizes the again from virginia for, if you can keep it brief, we have only three minutes remaining on the vote across the street. >> thank you. on theqdr there's no recommendation to close jeff come, correct? >> right. >> there's no recommendation to close jeff-com and the decision was made not to close it? is that right? >> yes. >> and it was mentioned in braukt jurisdiction and in reference - and your answer to my colleague from virginia mr. forbes you said you have given information to support the decision. that invites the inquiry whether or not there's documents that

did not support the decision that are floating around. are such documents exist? >> not to my knowledge. >> no document exists that either evaluations that suggested that maybe it shouldn't be closeed? there was no written debate about this? >> mr. scott? >> i hate to do this to you but we're at the two minute mark. could i ask you to please submit the remainder of the questions? >> could i just get a quick answer to that and then, thank you very much mr. chairman for the opportunity to just get in the couple of questions. >> if you would, the gentlemen will submit the remainder of the questions for the record. >> general cartwright and general or chairman skeleton as questions for the record. thanks to all of you for being here. the meeting stand as urinstands.

>> thank you mr. chairman. [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2010] .